

AMERICAN STATE PAPERS.

MILITARY AFFAIRS.

24TH CONGRESS.]

No. 731.

[2D SESSION.]

HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY; ITS CHANGES BY LEGISLATION AND PRACTICE; OBJECTIONS TO ITS CONSTITUTION AND OPERATIONS; MODIFICATIONS TO ADAPT IT TO THE WANTS OF THE NATION; HISTORY OF THE NAMES AND MATTERS RELATING TO ALL CADETS, FROM 1800 TO 1834; MILITARY HISTORY OF ALL GRADUATES RECEIVED INTO THE ARMY; AMOUNT APPROPRIATED FOR THE MILITARY ACADEMY AND ANNUAL EXPENSES, FROM 1815 TO 1834; THE SAME, FROM 1802 TO 1815; RECENT APPOINTMENTS, GRADUATES, AND HOW DISPOSED OF; RESIGNATIONS FROM THE ARMY OF GRADUATES, AND REMARKS ON THE REGULATIONS OF THE ACADEMY, ETC.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MARCH 1, 1837.

Mr. SMITH, of Maine, from the Select Committee, to whom the subject was referred, reported: *

The first official recommendation, under the federal government, of the policy and necessity of adopting a system of military instruction in the army of the United States is to be found in a report, dated January 18, 1790, made by General Knox, then Secretary of War under President Washington, who, in turn, communicated with Congress upon the subject by a special message, dated January 21, 1790.* It is worthy of remark that in this message the President neither approved nor disapproved of the principles or details of the report; but said: "Considering the subject to be of the highest importance to the welfare of our country, and liable to be placed in various points of view, I have directed him (the Secretary of War) to lay the plan before Congress for their information, that they may make such use thereof as they may judge proper."

The plan of "military education" thus proposed was wholly of a practical nature, embracing the study of none of the abstruse sciences involved in the art of war. It embraced all the youth of the United States "of eighteen, nineteen, and twenty years of age, to be denominated the advanced corps." They were to be clothed, armed, and subsisted, while on duty, at the public expense. Those of eighteen and nineteen years of age were to perform camp duty thirty days successively in each year; and those of twenty years of age were to be disciplined in like manner fourteen days in each year.

The "advanced corps," says the report, "are designed not only as a school in which the youth of the United States are to be instructed in the art of war, but they are in all cases of exigence to serve as an actual defence to the community."

The report also enforces the universality of its plan of military education in the following language: "Every State possesses not only the right of personal service from its members, but the right to regulate the service on principles of equality for the general defence. All being bound, none can complain of injustice on being obliged to perform his equal proportion. Therefore it ought to be a permanent rule that those who in youth decline or refuse to subject themselves to the course of military education established by the laws should be considered as unworthy of public trust or public honors, and excluded therefrom accordingly."

Let it be remarked, for consideration hereafter, that the foregoing plan will be found strongly characterized by two features: 1st. That all the youth of the country within the ages prescribed were to be made by it participants in an equal degree of the military education provided by government, whether considered as a privilege or a hardship. 2d. While constituting a school of instruction, they were also "to serve as an actual defence to the community;" in other words, were to constitute a part of the actual and active military force of the nation.

Nothing was matured by Congress upon the above plan. On May 8, 1792, "An act (chap. 33) more effectually to provide for the national defence, by establishing a uniform militia throughout the United States," was passed by Congress. No provision for scientific instruction in the art of war was contained therein. In the annual message of President Washington, December 3, 1793, he thus adverts to this last-named act: "It is an inquiry which cannot be too solemnly pursued, whether the act 'more effectually to provide for the national defence, by establishing a uniform militia throughout the United States,' has organized them so as to produce their full effect; whether your own experience in the several States has not detected some imperfections in the scheme; and whether a material feature in an improvement of it

* See American State Papers, vol. i, on Military Affairs, p. 6.

ought not to be, to afford an opportunity for the study of those branches of the military art which can scarcely every be attained by practice alone."

The report of the "Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred the subject of the Military Academy at West Point," made to the House of Representatives, May 17, 1834,* alludes to the above-quoted paragraph of President Washington's message, as follows: "Mr. Jefferson has informed us that when the preparation of this message was discussed in the cabinet, the President mentioned a military academy as one of the topics that should be introduced, and that he himself raised the objection that there was no clause in the Constitution which warranted such an establishment; that the above sentence was, nevertheless, incorporated in the message, and was again the subject of special deliberation. The reply of Washington was, that he would not recommend anything prohibited by the Constitution; but, if it was doubtful, he was so impressed with the necessity of the measure that he would refer it to Congress, and let them decide for themselves whether the Constitution authorized it or not."

If it be correct that President Washington contemplated in his suggestion the establishment of a "military academy," as the said Committee of Congress on Military Affairs seem to have been desirous of having understood, it cannot be reasonably doubted that he was likewise so understood by the committee of the House of Representatives to whom that part and subject of the message was referred, and the report which they made thereupon should in that event be construed as having relation to such an institution. To this report the first-named committee abstained entirely from making allusion of any kind in connexion with the message. However, as a necessary and cotemporary exposition of the views entertained by the popular branch of Congress upon the subject that is treated of in the message—be that subject, in truth, a "military academy" or some other system of discipline—it is most appropriate to present here a copy of said report. It was made to the House of Representatives by the chairman of a committee of seven, on March 24, 1794, and is as follows:† "Mr. Cobb, from the committee appointed to report whether any and what alterations are, in their opinion, necessary to the act more effectually to provide for the national defence, by establishing a uniform militia throughout the United States, made the following report: That they are impressed with the importance of a more energetic system for the establishment of a uniform militia than what is contemplated by the present existing laws of the United States; but in viewing this subject as applied to the Constitution of the United States, and the powers therein expressly reserved to the different States, they have their doubts how far Congress can, consistent therewith, make any important alterations or amendments to the present law; and as the right of training the militia is constitutionally reserved to the States, if they can be impressed with the importance of exercising this power and directing its operation more especially to the light infantry and grenadier companies of each regiment, an efficient force may be thereby created, and equal to any that can probably be obtained by any additional law of the United States made under the constitutional powers of Congress. Under this view of the subject, and until further experience shall be had under the existing law, the committee are of opinion that no amendment is necessary to the act for establishing a uniform militia throughout the United States."

After this report no further action was had upon the subject by the House of Representatives during that session of Congress. But in the same session the act of May 9, 1794, (chapter 24,) was passed, entitled "An act providing for raising and organizing a corps of artilleryists and engineers." It incorporated with the corps of artillery, then in the service, by enlistment for the term of three years, seven hundred and sixty-four non-commissioned officers, privates, and artificers, to serve as privates and musicians, and a "proper proportion of commissioned officers" to command them. It gave to this amalgamated force the denomination of the "corps of artilleryists and engineers," it subjected this corps to the same rules and articles of war as governed the other troops of the United States. And by the same act it was made "the duty of the Secretary of War to provide, at the public expense, under such regulations as shall be directed by the President of the United States, the necessary books, instruments, and apparatus for the use and benefit of the said corps." By another section of the same act the President of the United States was authorized to "cause such proportions of the said corps to serve in the field, on the frontier, or in the fortifications of the sea-coast," as he might deem consistent with the public service. The "Committee on Military Affairs" of the first session of the last Congress, in their before-named report, characterize the above-mentioned act as "an authentic exposition of the views of Congress." The remark is indisputably correct; and it deserves here to be noted, that the act is marked most strongly by the same important feature which characterized the plan reported by General Knox in 1790, as already mentioned, viz: that of making the corps, thus organized, a constituent part of the military force of the nation, "to serve in the field, on the frontier, or in the fortifications of the sea-coast,"‡ as the commander-in-chief might direct.

In his annual message to Congress, of December 7, 1796, President Washington recommends the establishment of a military academy in direct terms; the plan, however, which he contemplated was not disclosed, and consequently the recommendation furnishes no standard by which to judge of the conformity of subsequent measures upon this subject with the one he then had in view. In no less strong terms the establishment of a national university was recommended by the same message: "A primary object of such a national institution should be," says the message, "the education of our youth in the science of government. In a republic, what species of knowledge can be equally important? And what duty more pressing on its legislature than to patronize a plan for communicating it to those who are to be the future guardians of the liberties of the country?"

The committee, to whom the part quoted of the above message was referred, and to whom, also, had been referred a memorial upon the same subject from the commissioners appointed under the "act for establishing the temporary and permanent seat of government of the United States," reported, on the 21st of December, 1796,§ recommending nothing more than that authority be given to proper persons to receive, and hold in trust, pecuniary donations towards the establishment of a university in the District of Columbia; and, after a full debate, even this recommendation of the committee was disagreed to by the House of

* American State Papers, vol. v, on Military Affairs, No. 582.

† American State Papers, vol. i, on Military Affairs, page 66.

‡ The resolution referred to the committee as the basis of this act was as follows:

"Resolved, That an additional corps of artillery, not to exceed eight hundred men, officers included, and also including one chief and four assistant engineers, ought to be raised for garrisoning the fortifications which are or may be erected for the defence of the sea-coast."—(See *Journal of the House*, March 31, 1794.)

§ The following is a copy of the report:

"The committee, to whom was committed the memorial of the commissioners appointed under the 'act establishing the

Representatives.³ Upon that part of the message relating to the institution of a military academy, no order whatever was taken by the House, and the subject did not even go into the hands of a committee. What construction ought to be put upon these facts, by way of arriving at "an authentic exposition of the views of Congress" at the period under reference upon this subject, the committee making this report will not assume to assert, although it seems hardly to admit of a difference of opinion.

By an act of April 27, 1798, (chapter 50,) Congress provided "an additional regiment of artillerists and engineers," to "be considered as a part of the military establishment of the United States for the time being," to be governed by the same rules and articles of war "as the other troops, and to be employed by the President of the United States," in detachments, or otherwise, in the field, or in the fortifications upon the sea-coast. By the same act "all necessary books, instruments, and apparatus" were to be provided for the use and benefit of said regiment. In a letter from the Secretary of War to the chairman of the committee of defence, and dated June 28, 1798, after alluding to the before-named acts of May 9, 1794, and April 27, 1798, said: "The Secretary, without designing to derogate from the merits of the officers appointed to the corps established by the acts cited, feels it his duty to suggest that other and supplementary means of instruction to the books and instruments to be provided appear to be absolutely indispensable to enable them to acquire a due degree of knowledge in the objects of their corps. It is certain that the best faculties and inclinations for the arts and sciences cannot be unfolded and applied to useful purposes when proper encouragement and assistance have been denied or neglected. The knowledge of certain arts and sciences is absolutely necessary to the artillerist and engineer: such are arithmetic, geometry, mechanics, hydraulics, and designing.

"It is therefore submitted whether provision ought not to be made for the employment of three or four teachers of the enumerated sciences, to be attached generally to the two corps of artillerists and engineers, and obligated to give instructions and lessons at such times and places, and under such regulations, as the President may direct. The employment of teachers would give the intended effect to the provision of the laws for the appointment of two cadets to each company. It was supposed that these cadets would form a nursery from which qualified officers might be drawn to fill vacancies, &c.; but it must occur that, without proper masters to teach them the sciences necessary to the engineer and artillerist, this nursery can produce no valuable plants."[†]

On the 16th of July following, the date of the suggestions just quoted, "An act (chap. 93) to augment the army of the United States, and for other purposes," was passed, in which was incorporated the following provision: "That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, authorized to appoint a number, not exceeding four, of teachers of the arts and sciences necessary for the instruction of the artillerists and engineers." Such thenceforth was the only mode of scientific instruction provided for the army until the act of March 16, 1802. It is, however, due to the history of the subject to notice a communication from the Secretary of War, and submitted to Congress by President Adams on the 14th January, 1800. To this communication a supplementary one was also made to the House of Representatives on the 13th of February, in the same year, by the Secretary of War, through the chairman of the Committee of Defence. The President, in communicating the former document, without expressing any direct opinion upon it otherwise, characterized it as "containing various matters in which the honor and safety of the nation are deeply involved."

The plan suggested by the Secretary of War, Mr. McHenry, was to organize four schools—"The Fundamental School," "The School of Engineers and Artillerists," "The School of Cavalry and Infantry," and "The School of the Navy." The first three under one general director, and subordinate directors, professors, &c., for each. In the "Fundamental School" was to be taught a theoretic knowledge of all the sciences involved in each of the branches of the art of war. The application or practice of the theoretic knowledge thus acquired was to be the business of the other respective schools, each being in this confined to the branch which its name or title indicates.

The persons to be thus instructed by government in the several schools are described in the Secretary's plan as follows: "those appointed or designed for engineers;" "those appointed or designed for the artillery service;" "those appointed to or destined for the cavalry and infantry;" "those appointed to or destined for the naval service."

The plan also suggested that "persons who, by previous instruction elsewhere, may have become acquainted with some or all of the branches taught in the 'Fundamental School,' may, after due examination by the directors and professors of that school, be either received there for a short time, or pass immediately to one or other of the schools of practice, according to the nature and extent of their acquirements and intended destination." "In addition to these, detachments of officers and non-commissioned officers of the army ought to attend one or other of the schools, in rotation, for the purpose of instruction and exercise, according to the nature of the corps to which they respectively belong."[‡]

Such was the plan proposed in 1800; and here again it is to be remarked, as an important characteristic of this plan, and the same which has been seen to have marked each preceding plan to which the committee have directed their attention, that only those persons who were appointed or destined for the public service, and who, in fact, constituted a portion of the actual military or naval force of the country, were to be instructed in these proposed schools at the public expense.

This appears still more explicitly in the following extract from the Secretary's plan relating to the expenses incident thereto, viz:

"Agreeably to the plan of the Military Academy, the directors thereof are to be officers taken from the army; consequently no expense will be incurred by such appointments." "The plan also contemplates that officers of the army, cadets, and non-commissioned officers shall receive instruction in the academy. As the rations and fuel which these are entitled to in the army will suffice for them in the academy, no additional expense will be required for these objects of maintenance while there." "The expenses of servants, and certain incidental charges relative to the police and administration, may be defrayed by those who shall be admitted out of their pay and emoluments."

temporary and permanent seat of government of the United States,' and to whom, also, was referred that part of the President's speech relating to a national university, report the following resolution:

"Resolved, That it is expedient at present that authority should be given, as prayed for by the said memorial, to proper persons to receive, and hold in trust, pecuniary donations in aid of the appropriations already made towards the establishment of a university in the District of Columbia."

³ See Journal of the House, December 27, 1796.

[†] American State Papers, vol. i, on Military Affairs, pages 128, 129.

[‡] American State Papers, vol. i, on Military Affairs, pages 124, 142.

Following out the history of the foregoing proposition, we find it was referred in the House of Representatives to a committee of seven on the 13th of January, 1800. On the 19th of March following a bill was reported upon the subject, which was opposed on its first reading, but, upon a vote of the House, was admitted to a second reading, and referred to a Committee of the Whole House; while in this stage, the further consideration of it was postponed on the 28th of April until the first Monday of the December following; upon which question the yeas and nays were taken—64 yeas to 23 nays. This vote was evidently considered tantamount to a most decided expression of the House against the measure, and the consideration of it was not resumed during the continuance of that Congress.*

On the 30th December, 1801, the House of Representatives adopted, in Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, the following resolution: "Resolved, That it is expedient to reduce the military establishment of the United States." Upon this resolution the House, on the same day, raised a committee to prepare a bill pursuant thereto. On the 11th of January following, (1802,) said committee reported a bill, which was passed on the 16th of (chap. 9) March of the same year, entitled "An act fixing the military establishment of the United States." By this act the corps of artilleryists and engineers created by the acts of May 9, 1794, and April 27, 1798, already alluded to, was dissolved, and a new corps of artilleryists and a new corps of engineers, as distinct bodies, were created; the latter to "consist of one engineer, with the pay, rank, and emoluments of a major; two assistant engineers, with the pay, rank, and emoluments of captains; two other assistant engineers, with the pay, rank, and emoluments of first lieutenants; two other assistant engineers, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of second lieutenants; and ten cadets, with the pay of sixteen dollars per month, and two rations per day." The same section of the act (sect. 26) provided for certain contingent promotions in the corps, and "that the number of the whole corps shall at no time exceed twenty officers and cadets." Section 27 of the same act provided "that the said corps, when so organized, shall be established at West Point, in the State of New York, and shall constitute a Military Academy; and the engineers, assistant engineers, and cadets shall be subject at all times to do duty in such places and on such service as the President of the United States shall direct." By section 28, the Secretary of War, under the regulations of the President, was authorized to provide the necessary books, implements, and apparatus for said corps.

On the 28th of February of the succeeding year, (1803,) by an additional act, (chap. 66,) the President was "authorized to appoint one teacher of the French language and one teacher of drawing, to be attached to the corps of engineers;" also, "one artificer, and eighteen men to aid in making practical experiments, and for other purposes."

The preceding provisions, which are all that Congress made upon the subject prior to the last cited act and for several years thereafter, exhibit with accuracy the original character and extent of design of the Military Academy at West Point, as also the entire history of its conception and growth, so far as the records of Congress and actual legislation can illustrate it.

And here it is deemed proper to remark briefly upon some of the indisputable characteristics of the institution, viewing it only in the shape which was given to it by the founders of it and by the original provisions of law creating it, as already traced.

With no justice can it be said that "the corps of engineers," on being organized under the act of March 16, 1802, as a corps distinct from the corps of artilleryists, and with the exclusive appellation of the "Military Academy," differed in any substantial quality from "the corps of artilleryists and engineers" which had existed previously under the acts of May 9, 1794, and July 16, 1798; certainly no new principle of government or legislation was involved in this new organization of the "corps of engineers," with the addition of the term "Military Academy" to its name. It amounted only to a slight modification of the same constitutional means which had previously been resorted to for the accomplishment of the same end. A brief comparison of the two institutions will demonstrate this most fully:

1. The "corps of artilleryists and engineers" of 1794 and 1798 was created a constituent part of the military force of the United States. This appears from enactments already cited, but besides these the act of March 3, 1795, (chap. 109,) entitled "An act for continuing and regulating the military establishment of the United States, and for repealing sundry acts heretofore passed on that subject," expressly declares the same fact, as follows: "That the present military establishment of the United States, composed of a corps of artilleryists and engineers, &c., be, and the same is hereby, continued."

The "corps of engineers" of 1802, denominated the "Military Academy," was, in this respect, of the same character. The act by which it was instituted is entitled "An act fixing the military peace establishment of the United States."

2. The President of the United States was authorized to cause the former corps, in whole or in part, "to serve in the field, on the frontier, or in the fortifications on the sea-coast," as he might deem consistent with the public service. The latter corps, though stationed at West Point, were, in like manner, made "subject, at all times, to do duty in such places and on such service as the President of the United States should direct."

3. Provision was made, as already quoted in nearly the same words, for the supply of each corps with the necessary books, instruments, and apparatus at the public expense.

4. In relation to each corps, an amendatory act was passed providing a specific number of teachers for each, and in nearly the same language.

5. The former corps were to be governed by the same rules and articles of war "as the other troops of the United States," and it is believed that the latter corps were alike subject to the same rules and articles.†

6. The former corps was limited in number to 992, exclusively of the commissioned officers; the latter corps was "at no time to exceed twenty officers and cadets."

Thus "the corps of engineers and artilleryists" is seen to have been organized upon substantially the same principles, charged with the same duties, subject to the same direction and government, and invested with all of the same means and privileges of scientific improvement as was the subsequent "corps of engineers," denominated also the "Military Academy." The two corps, as engineers, differed but partially in name, and *absolutely in nothing except the number of their members.*

* The Committee on Military Affairs of the first session of the last Congress are in error when they say the subject was revived at the next meeting of Congress.

† Extract from the report of the Hon. J. C. Calhoun, Secretary of War, dated February 4, 1819, in reply to a resolution of the Senate of January 25, 1819. "The cadets are under the government of the rules and articles of war, so far as they are applicable."—(See also American State Papers, vol. ii, on Military Affairs, No. 188.)

The foregoing parallel demonstrates, moreover, that in the original establishment of the "Military Academy" at West Point nothing was intended or accomplished beyond a dissolution of the previously existing connexion* or identity between the artillery and engineers of the army, and the organization of them into distinct bodies, without assigning any additional privileges or liabilities to either.

It is also to be remarked that, at this period, the academy, being constituted of the active and practical engineer corps exclusively, neither embraced, nor was intended to embrace, any persons whomsoever except those who were of the army, and who belonged to the army, and who constituted a portion of the regular military force of the United States, and were liable "at all times to do duty at such places and on such service as the President of the United States might direct." And, in the preservation of this important feature, the institution is seen to have been kept within the same limits and based upon the same fundamental principle which characterized the early plan of military instruction proposed by General Knox, while Secretary of War, and the still later plan proposed by Mr. McHenry, while Secretary of War, each of which plans has been heretofore the subject of remark in this report, and served as the basis of the before-mentioned suggestions of both President Washington and President Adams.

It is recommended that this common characteristic of said plans and of the academy be borne constantly in mind, that the point where it was subsequently merged and lost to the academy may be fully understood, and the transformation of the institution, which was thereby effected, may be justly appreciated.

Having ascertained how the academy originated, and what its incipient and original character was, we are brought to the consideration of the second branch of our subject.

PART II.

Of the changes which the character of the institution has undergone by legislation and practice.

In prosecuting this branch of the examination, it is believed to be due to the subject, and to a just understanding of it by the House, to correct a singular error contained in the before-named report of the Committee on Military Affairs made at the first session of the last Congress. On page 6 of that report the document which comes next in order to be noticed in this report is adverted to, viz: a message from President Jefferson to Congress, dated March 18, 1808. The message says: "The scale on which the Military Academy at West Point was originally established is become too limited to furnish the number of well-instructed subjects in the different branches of artillery and engineering which the public service calls for. The want of such characters is already sensibly felt, and will be increased with the enlargement of our plans of military preparation. The chief engineer having been instructed to consider the subject, and to propose an augmentation which might render the establishment commensurate with the present circumstances of our country, has made the report which I now transmit for the consideration of Congress."

Upon this message said report of the Committee on Military Affairs thus remarks:

"This message was referred to Messrs. Nicholas, of Virginia; Troup, of Georgia; Desha, of Kentucky; Upham, of Massachusetts, and Milner, of Pennsylvania. The names of some of these gentlemen are identified with republican principles, and they will not be suspected of having lost sight of or disregarded the strict requirements of the Constitution. This committee reported a bill on the 12th of April, which added one hundred and fifty-six members to the corps of cadets, and which passed in the House by a vote of 95 to 16."

The foregoing paragraph is entirely erroneous in the impression which it imparts to the reader. The message was referred to the gentlemen named, but they neither reported the bill mentioned, nor made any other report whatever, at any time, upon the message of the President.

The bill mentioned as having passed by a vote of 95 to 16 originated in the Senate, and not in the House, and it never had the remotest connexion with or affinity to the message† of the President, and was not referred to the committee upon that message, but to a different committee. Moreover, it will be found, upon examination, to contain not a single allusion to, or provision in favor of, the Military Academy at West Point; nor did it contemplate the addition of a single cadet to the corps of engineers, (which still constituted the academy,) according to the impression conveyed by the report of the Committee on Military Affairs. It added one hundred and fifty-six cadets to the army, but these were distributed among different corps, viz: Twenty cadets to the light artillery; one hundred to the infantry; sixteen to the cavalry; and twenty to the riflemen. The title of the act making this addition to the army is "An act to raise, for a limited time, an additional military force," and was approved on the 12th of April, 1808, (chap. 43.) In a report from the Engineer department, communicated to the chairman of the Military Committee of the House on the 2d of April, 1822,‡ in relation to this addition of cadets to the army, it is said, "very few, if any, of the cadets thus authorized were appointed." Nor was it until the act of April 29, 1812, (chap. 72,) entitled "An act making further provision for the corps of engineers," (four years after the above cited act,) that the act of April 12, 1808 was made to affect, in any way, the corps of

*How far the following suggestions of Mr. McHenry's previous report of January 13, 1800, entered into this measure, or was the basis of it, does not appear of record. His report says: "It is conceived that the entire union of the officers, artillery and engineers in one corps, as in our present establishment, is not advisable. The art of fortification and the service of artillery, though touching each other in many points, are, in the main, distinct branches, and each so comprehensive that their separation is essential to perfection in either. This has been ascertained by long experience. Among the powers of Europe there is not one recollected which, at the present day, is not conscious of this truth. When any of them have attempted to unite these corps, the disadvantages which resulted were soon felt to be so momentous as to produce conviction that each required a separate organization. Such a union was once attempted in France; according to an ordinance of the 8th December, 1755, the artillery and engineer corps of that nation, which had been separate, were combined into one. The experiment was, however, of short duration. In 1758 the engineer corps was disjoined from the corps of artillery, and called, as before, the corps of engineers, since which time these corps have remained separate."—(See American State Papers, vol i, on Military Affairs, p. 135.)

† This message was referred in the Senate on the day of its date. On the 28th of the same month a bill was reported. On the 15th of April the bill was postponed until the first Monday of December then next following, and the consideration of it was not afterwards resumed. It was in substance as follows: Section 1 provided for an addition of two captains, two first lieutenants and two second lieutenants, and four cadets to the engineer corps. Section 2 provided for the enlistment of artificers and thirty-one men. Section 3 provided for removing the academy to the city of Washington, and limiting the academical staff to one professor of natural and experimental philosophy, one professor of mathematics, and two teachers under him, one professor of engineering in all its branches, and, under him, the teacher of drawing and the teacher of French, already authorized by the act of February 28, 1803. Section 4 provided for the selection of a public lot for the site of the academy in Washington. Section 5 provided for the admission to the academy for instruction of the cadets of the engineer corps, and the cadets of the army, and the midshipmen of the navy.—(See original bills on the files of the Senate.)

‡ See American State Papers, vol. ii, on Military Affairs, No. 226.

engineers or Military Academy at West Point. The operation of the act of 1808 was altered so as to effect an enlargement of the academy by the following provision in the act of 1812, viz:

"SECTION 3. That the cadets heretofore appointed in the service of the United States, whether of artillery, cavalry, riflemen, or infantry, or that may in future be appointed as hereinafter provided, shall at no time exceed two hundred and fifty; that they may be attached, at the discretion of the President of the United States, as students to the Military Academy, and be subject to the established regulations thereof; that they shall be arranged into companies of non-commissioned officers and privates, according to the directions of the commandant of engineers, and be officered from the said corps, for the purposes of military instruction; that there shall be added to each company of cadets four musicians; and the said corps shall be trained and taught all the duties of a private, non-commissioned officer, and officer, be encamped at least three months of each year, and taught all the duties incident to a regular camp; that the candidates for cadets be not under the age of fourteen, nor above the age of twenty-one years; that each cadet, previously to his appointment by the President of the United States, shall be well versed in reading, writing, and arithmetic, and that he shall sign articles, with the consent of his parent or guardian, by which he shall engage to serve five years unless sooner discharged; and all such cadets shall be entitled to and receive the pay and emoluments now allowed by law to cadets in the corps of engineers."^{*}

"SEC. 4. That when any cadet shall receive a regular degree from the academical staff, after going through all the classes, he shall be considered among the candidates for a commission in any corps, according to the duties he may be judged competent to perform; and in case there shall not at the time be a vacancy in such corps, he may be attached to it at the discretion of the President of the United States, by brevet of the lowest grade, as a supernumerary officer, with the usual pay and emoluments of such grade, until a vacancy shall happen: *Provided*, That there shall not be more than one supernumerary officer to any one company at the same time."

The act of 1808 being thus shown not to have been an offspring of President Jefferson's message of March 18, 1808, nor of the committee who have been described, in part, "as identified with republican principles," and it being seen, also, that if the origin of that act had been as imputed, the provisions of the act had no relation whatever to the Military Academy of 1802, until four years after its passage, and then only by the provisions of another act bearing an entirely different title. It may be further remarked, as a matter of history, that only two of the gentlemen constituting the committee of 1808 were members of the House of Representatives when the bill of 1812 was passed; both of whom voted so to amend the bill as to remove the institution into the District of Columbia where Congress possessed and exercised then, as now, exclusive jurisdiction and legislation. Whether they voted in favor or against the final passage of the bill does not appear of record. But in further illustration of the design of Congress in this act, the fact does appear by the journals of both houses that the title of the bill was amended in the House by substituting for the title of "An act to raise an additional military force," the title of "An act to raise for a *limited time* an additional military force," and this by a vote of yeas 58 to nays 29; and after the proposition to amend it, by inserting after the word "raise" the words "for an unlimited time," had been rejected.

From what has preceded, it is made manifest that history must exonerate not only the name of Jefferson, but those other gentlemen described as "identified with republican principles," from all participation in the enlargement of the Military Academy by the act of 1808, and in a manner which that act did not contemplate. Mr. Jefferson, in particular, will be so exonerated, on a review of the plan of enlargement submitted with and contemplated in his before-named message of March 18, 1808. Such a review will demonstrate the following positions:

1. He contemplated educating at the *public expense only* such persons, whether officers or cadets, as belonged and were essential to the actual and active military or naval force of the government; in other words, which may be quoted from his message, his only design at the public expense was so to augment the academy as "to furnish the number of well-instructed subjects in the different branches of artillery and engineering, which the public service calls for." "The want of such characters," says the message, "is already sensibly felt, and will be increased with the enlargement of our plans of military preparation."

2. He contemplated an assessment to be made upon all other "youths from any of the States, who might wish for such an education, whether designed for the army or navy, or neither, to the value of their education," and to "form a fund for extra or contingent expenses," of the institution by such an assessment. "The citizen youth so adopted," says his plan, "should be required to sign the articles of war for the time being."

3. He contemplated that, "as these youths grow up and take their stations in society, they would naturally become militia officers, and in a few years, in the ordinary course of events, we should see an uniformity in our militia resulting from a spirit of emulation, which the reputation of having received a military education would naturally excite."

Such was the plan submitted by Mr. Jefferson in 1808; and to every mind that has examined the plan of Mr. Secretary Knox, submitted to Congress by President Washington, and that of Mr. Secretary McHenry, submitted to Congress by President Adams, and that of the corps of artillerists and engineers, which existed prior to the establishment of the academy in 1802, and that upon which the academy was originally established in 1802, this important observation must occur, viz: That all of them, including Mr. Jefferson's plan in 1808, were based upon this one and the same proposition of educating no persons at the public expense except those who are of the army, who belong to the army, and who constitute a portion of the regular military force of the United States, and are essential to the public service. It was not until the act of April 29, 1812, before cited, that this great distinctive principle and feature was partially departed from. Under the operation of the same act, it was eventually lost entirely to the institution. In a report from the Secretary of War, dated February 23, 1820,† this change was alluded to as follows: "The Military Academy has acquired a character and importance which seem not to have been contemplated in its original institution. It originated in the act of the 16th March, 1802, which created the corps of engineers," &c. And, again, in the same document, the act by which the change was thus

^{*} By an opinion of the Attorney General of the United States (see American State Papers, vol. iii, on Military Affairs, No. 300, page 223) the augmentation contemplated by this section of the statute is construed to be exclusive of the ten cadets authorized by the act of March 16, 1802, thus making the aggregate number of cadets 260.

† American State Papers, vol. ii, on Military Affairs, No 188.

wrought in the character of the institution is specifically pointed out as follows: "The institution was further enlarged and changed in its character by the act of the 29th of April, 1812."

To this change, whatever its character may have been, the name of President Madison has been sometimes cited as authority, by reference to his annual messages to Congress in 1810 and 1811. In each of those messages he recommended the academy to the consideration of Congress. In the former, to use his own language, "principally with a view to a more enlarged cultivation and diffusion of the advantages of such institutions, by providing professorships for all the necessary branches of military instruction, and by the establishment of an additional academy at the seat of government or elsewhere." In the latter message, he adverted to the hostile spirit and acts of the British cabinet "in trampling on rights which no independent nation can relinquish," and the necessity "of putting the United States into an armor and an attitude" of war; and in this connexion added, "nor can the occasion fail to remind you of the importance of those military seminaries, which in every event will form a valuable and frugal part of our military establishment." It was at the last named session of Congress that the act of 1812 passed. It is obvious, however, that the recommendations of the above cited messages contemplated no change in the academy, except an extension of it upon the same principles which had previously characterized it, viz: that of making it a school of instruction for those exclusively, who actually constituted a portion of the military force of the United States, and were essential to the public service. But he approved the act in his capacity of President of the United States. How far this secures to the institution, as it now exists, the authority of his name will appear distinctly in the examination about to be made into the purpose in which it originated, and the operation of it subsequently.

The impending war with Great Britain gave impulse to both Mr. Madison and Congress upon the subject of military instruction. This has already been partially demonstrated, and will be completely, by a recurrence to the details of the Executive messages of 1810 and 1811, already cited. The condition of the country being such, at that time, as to require a very great numerical extension* of the military power of the government, as well officers as privates, corresponding provision for the instruction of these in the art of war was justly regarded of like necessity to the security and defence of the nation. The Military Academy was, for this purpose, extended, as has already been explained, and in a measure to correspond with the demand for an extension of the army and militia. The particular changes in the character of the academy, which were immediately effected in this extension, consisted of—

1. The provision for educating persons who constitute no part of the effective military force of the government.

2. The provision for educating such persons gratuitously at the public expense.

3. The provision for thus educating such persons independent of all obligation on their part to continue in the public service beyond the period of completing their education.

This last position is substantially correct, notwithstanding the enlistment of the cadets was fixed at five years, and the term of their studies at four years; and so all subsequent experience has demonstrated.

The operation of the act could not immediately develop another change in the character of the institution which has since resulted from it, viz: An augmentation of the number of persons instructed beyond the wants of the public service.

To this latter feature the institution is indebted to the continuance of the act beyond the existence of that peculiar condition of the nation and the nation's wants, which gave rise to the act, rather than to any original design of the act. When the war of 1812 was terminated, the occasion for the army and militia, upon their extended scale, was at an end; and so was that of the academy upon its extended scale. The former were accordingly reduced, but no corresponding reduction took place, nor has it since been made, in the latter. The extension of the academy, under the operation of the act of 1812, may, therefore, be said to have survived both the original occasion and original design of it. Taking this view of it, neither Mr. Madison's authority nor that of the Congress of 1812, can be fairly made responsible for this last great change in the constitution of the academy. Had the army of the United States been continued down to this day in the aggregate number to which it was extended at the commencement of the war of 1812, viz: 58,254, by the Congress of that period and by Mr. Madison, would the authority of either be fairly adduced in justification thereof? or could either be justly made responsible for the principle or policy involved by such a course? Every candid mind must answer in the negative. And, as the same reasoning holds good in relation to the continuance of the academy upon its extended scale, the same negative answer must be entertained as to the accountability of Mr. Madison, or the Congress of 1812, upon that subject.

From the minute historical view which has been taken in the preceding pages, it must be apparent to all that the institution at West Point is not in principle, nor in practice, what it was under Washington, under the elder Adams, and under Jefferson, nor what it was only designed to be under Mr. Madison. What it now is it has attained to independent of the authority of their illustrious names, if not against their authority.

Whether it is what it ought to be remains now to be considered.

PART III.

Of the objections to the present constitution and operations of the Military Academy.

The three distinctive features of the change in the character of the academy, effected immediately by the act of April 29, 1812, as already delineated, viz:

1st. The provision for educating persons at the academy who constitute no part of the effective military force of the government.

2d. The provision for educating such persons gratuitously† at the public expense; and,

3d. The provision for thus educating such persons, independent of all obligation on their part to con-

* The aggregate of the peace establishment, before the war of 1812, was 9,996 of commissioned, warrant, non-commissioned officers, and privates.—(American State Papers, vol. i, on Military Affairs, p. 785.) The total authorized force in 1813, after the declaration of war, was 58,254.—(Ibid., p. 455.) October 17, 1814, the military establishment amounted to 62,448.—(Idem, p. 514.) By the act of March 3, 1815, (chap 231,) passed at the termination of the war, the peace establishment was limited to 10,000 men. The total strength of the army January, 1819, 7,616.—(Idem, p. 815.)

† This provision is utterly dissimilar to that of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, England.—(See part iv of this report for a synopsis of the terms of admission into that institution.)

tinue in the public service beyond their period of completing their education, form very grave objections to the present constitution of the academy, objections which are founded in the principles of the federal Constitution, as well as a regard for a just economy in the national expenditures. Even upon the supposition that the number of persons thus educated only corresponds, annually, with the necessary additions to the public service, the constitutional power of Congress thus to educate, without either a current recompense to the government or the obligation for their future service, or to abide the wants of the government, is certainly of a very doubtful character, if the exercise of it falls in any degree short of positive assumption.

If those who do not constitute any part of the effective military force of the nation, actually in the public service, may rightfully be educated at the public expense, upon the alleged possibility of a contingency that may render their services necessary and useful to the government in its military operations, and of a contingency that may also be of a character to induce them to enter the service of the government as needed, it is difficult to discover why others may not be educated in like manner, at the public expense, with special reference to a possible contingency that may render *their* services, also, necessary and useful to the government, in its civil operations, and to such a contingency, also, as may induce them to enter the civil departments of government service as needed. In other words, if schools may be established by Congress to educate men for the army, at the public expense, and without their yielding any current recompense to the government, or binding themselves to its future service, in consideration thereof, may they not, by a most obvious parity of reasoning, be established to educate them upon the like easy terms, for diplomats, or for heads of departments, or for clerks and accountants? These are all necessary and constitutional officers of government. For chaplains, also, involving directly the science of theology and sectarian religion? If such schools are constitutionally instituted in relation to any one class of persons beyond those in the immediate service and wants of the government, where will this exercise of power and government patronage stop? It may be asked, where need it stop in its extension to other classes of our citizens? Is not the national government absolute in its guardianship of the literature, science, and of every study that can enter into the education of our citizens, for either military, civil, or religious employment in life? In this view, would there be any exercise of power remaining to, or obligation resting upon, the State governments in relation to these matters, which seem to be peculiarly and exclusively incident to the guardianship of the State governments? Or can it be said that this guardianship is to be exercised concurrently by the federal government and the State governments? The committee cannot think that such a position as this last will be seriously advanced by any one. And yet, if it be not, the duty of fostering literature and instituting seminaries of learning must devolve exclusively upon the federal government, or exclusively upon the State governments. If it devolves upon the latter, as it does clearly in the opinion of the committee, then it is obvious that the national government can only rely for its contingent resources of this character upon the efficiency and disposition of the State governments to supply them, and as well in regard to its military as its civil functions, and in the manner it is compelled to do in relation to many supplies demanded and necessary in both its military and civil administrations. Nor, in the former case of dependence more than in the latter, cases that arise from the constitutional reservation of powers to the States respectively, will an omission of the State governments to adopt the requisite and prudential measures for furnishing such supplies to the federal government, endow the federal government, even in case of a contingency rendering them necessary, with constitutional power to relieve itself against the consequences of such omission, however disastrous these might threaten to become. An omission of the State governments to exercise any power or to discharge any duty devolving upon and belonging to them cannot add, in any degree, to the constitutional power or duty of the national government, no more than the exercise of usurped power by the former in any case can diminish that of the latter. In the case of such omission by the former, and particularly relative to the subject of education, it is easy to imagine that the national government may be unfortunately destitute of the resources best adapted to its purpose. But the misfortune, when it shall occur in this manner, will fall upon the same people who suffer the default in the State governments, making it thereby their interest to remedy it at once, by putting forth their energies through the latter government. Herein lies the safety as well as wisdom of assigning to the national government specific functions, and of reserving others to the State governments exclusively, without assuming to make either the national or the State governments absolutely independent of the other. This constitutional partition of powers should be studiously preserved, as being both wise and safe; and every attempt to justify an excessive exercise of power by the one government under the pretence of an omission by the other to perform its appropriate business, ought to be promptly resisted, however laudable the motive or desirable the design of it may be in fact.

The power and duty of instituting seminaries of learning, and of devising other means for the general improvement of the citizens for any particular and every purpose, being thus reserved to the State governments exclusively, the national government cannot rightfully enter into any attempt of the kind; certainly not to embrace any persons except those actually in the public service and actually subject to the commands of government, and upon whom necessarily rests, for the time being, the execution of certain public duties. In this position there is no denial of power to the national government to instruct, in all things essential to a proper discharge of their official duties, all persons actually in the employ and administration of the government; although it may, at the same time, be suggested as a mark of bad policy and bad economy in any government to have in its employ, for officers, individuals who have yet to learn the theoretical and fundamental principles of their duties. Thus it is clear that constitutional principles, principles of sound policy, and principles of fiscal economy, are all opposed to these features of the institution at West Point now under review. Policy and economy alike require that the instruction imparted at the public expense should be imparted to those persons who are actually in the public service, or bound to render the public a fair equivalent. The same principles, with still greater emphasis, demand that instruction thus furnished should be limited to the number of persons actually needed by the public service, if not to those who are actually in it, or are bound to yield a fair equivalent. This last consideration brings us to a fourth feature in the present constitution of the academy at West Point, which also forms a powerful objection to it, viz:

4th. The provision made for educating persons at the public expense, in numbers far exceeding and disproportioned to the wants of the public service.

This feature, it will be recollected, was not originally in the institution, nor the immediate offspring of the act of April 29, 1812; but it is the result of continuing the expansive provisions of that act beyond the continuance of the occasion and design which gave rise to it.

In a report of the Secretary of War to the House of Representatives, dated January 28, 1831, it is

said: "By an estimate of the last five years, it appears that the supply of the army from the corps of graduated cadets has averaged about 22 annually, while those who graduate are about 40, making, in each year, an excess of 18. The number received annually into the academy averages 100, of which only the number stated, to wit, 40, pass through the prescribed course of education at school, and become supernumerary lieutenants in the army. Thus it is perceivable that but two-fifths of the young gentlemen who in each year are admitted to the academy succeed in passing through the regular course of studies or obtain admittance into the army."

This proportion of graduates from the number admitted annually is considerably less than was estimated by the Engineer department as early as 1822. It was then said "the average number of cadets to be admitted hereafter may be estimated at 75 per annum, of whom about 20 will be rejected at the first semi-annual examination ensuing their admission on trial, and 15 others will resign or be otherwise separated from the academy prior to the graduating of the class, so that the number of cadets who will be graduated each year may be estimated at 40. Hence the proportion of graduates to the whole number of cadets admitted upon trial may be estimated hereafter as 8 to 15, or as 1 to 1 $\frac{7}{8}$. These results are derived from calculations made by the superintendent, and are founded upon the most certain data which can be obtained under the present operation of the system of education at West Point, and may be relied on as substantially correct."

The committee are not aware of the cause which has thus diminished the success of the institution with its students since 1822, unless it is to be found in the supineness and indifference which are apt to characterize the functions of those who are the recipients of extravagant bounties or gratuitous support from the government. It has been well said by an intelligent writer on government that "whatever each man does for himself is done well; whatever his neighbor or his country undertakes to do for him is done ill. It is wisdom to incite men to act for themselves, not to retain them in a state of perpetual pupilage."

Assuming the average number of cadets who enter the academy to be 100 annually, and the average number of graduates to be 40, and the average number of vacancies in the army to be 22, demonstrating thereby that only two-fifths of those who enter become graduates, and only a small fraction more than one in five, or one-fifth, enter the public service, and the unfruitfulness of the system of military instruction secured to the army, in the present constitution of the academy, scarcely admits of controversy. Still more objectionable does it appear in point of sterility, when it is considered that the average number of cadets supported by the public treasury at the institution throughout the year is 250, making the annual proportion of graduates, as above estimated by the Secretary of War, to the whole number instructed fall short of *one in six*, and the proportion of those actually entering the public service annually to the number instructed fall short of *one in eleven*. Can such operations be characterized as successful? Can an institution operating upon a scale so large, and yet accomplishing results so limited, although so much beyond the demands of the public service, be regarded as healthy and vigorous in its own constitution? Can it be defended in its present extent as an institution founded in a just and economical regard to the wants of the public service?

To educate at the public expense any number of persons who constitute no part of the effective military force of the government, and who are not bound to yield an equivalent in future services, nor otherwise, finds no justification in either of the plans of military instruction submitted by Washington, the elder Adams, and Jefferson; and much less does the educating of any number of persons upon any conditions whatever, who are not needed and cannot be employed to advantage in the public service, find justification or authority in either of these illustrious names, nor in that of Mr. Madison. The act of April 29, 1812, as has already been seen, and under which the institution is now operating upon its extensive and fruitless scale, did not contemplate originally such results. The title as well as the history of that act bears testimony to the designs of its framers to limit the duration of its provisions by the war upon which the nation was entering.† The committee are aware that the policy thus questioned and repudiated by them, and of course the principle involved therein of educating persons at the public expense, according to the plan of instruction pursued at West Point, in numbers greatly exceeding the demands of the public service, have been gradually introduced into the administration of the national academy.

But it must be conceded on all sides that they were never broached for the acceptance and support of the people of this country during the administration of either Washington, the elder Adams, Jefferson, or Madison, by any person participating in the responsibilities of either of those administrations, *nor in any subsequent administration, until the institution at West Point was found to be in the way of providing for the education of a much larger number of cadets than the public service called for.*

The following extract from a report of the Secretary of War, dated January 15, 1819,‡ may probably with justice claim to have first formally announced this new theory, viz:

"The question [of an additional academy] ought not to be determined by a reference simply to the wants of our military peace establishment, which, from our geographical position and the policy of our government, will always bear a small proportion to the population of the country and to our military establishment in time of war. So far from graduating the number and extent of our military academies by the want of the army in time of peace, the opposite principle would probably be more correct, that, in proportion as our regular military establishment is small, the government ought to be careful to disseminate, by education, a knowledge of the art of war. The cadets who cannot be provided for in the army will return to private life, but, in the event of war, the knowledge will not be lost to the country."

It is most certain that such doctrine did not enter at all into the original establishment of the academy at West Point, for it was virtually repudiated then by the studious manner in which the plans of all its founders and original advocates limited its provisions to the actual demands of the military establishment of the government; and the plan submitted by Jefferson in 1808 required all supernumeraries who might elect a military education to pay to the government an assessment of the value thereof.§ However successful the advocates of this new doctrine may have been with it in the continuance until the

* See American State Papers, vol. ii, on Military Affairs, No. 226.

† See ante, page 11.

‡ See American State Papers, vol. i, on Military Affairs, No. 173. By the same document it appears that the number of vacancies in the army from the 1st of August, 1816, to the 1st of May, 1818, was 148, or 84 per annum.

"But," continues the report, "as it is probable that the causes which have operated to produce so many vacancies in this time have been accidental, and consequent on the change from active service to the inactivities of a peace establishment, there will not, it is believed, in future be so many, and that the cadets who will annually terminate their studies at West Point will be equal, or nearly so, to the annual average vacancies."

§ See ante, page 12.

present time of the academy at West Point, it cannot be believed that any new institution could obtain the sanction of either Congress or the American people, if proposed mainly with a view of forelaying possible contingencies in a similar manner, and if based upon a scale so unproductive, and yet so exceeding the actual demands of the public service. But if such be not a sound principle and correct policy upon which to start an institution *de novo*, how can they be so regarded for the continuance of an institution which otherwise must be subjected to modification and reduction?

It may not be unprofitable to examine yet more in detail the operations of the institution, with a view of illustrating at the same time the unproductiveness of it in graduates, considering the means which it absorbs and the disproportion of its products nevertheless to the demands of the public service.

By table E in the appendix to this report, based upon the details of documents A* and B, also in the appendix, it appears that, from 1802 to 1815, inclusive, the number of students admitted to the academy was 418. The number that graduated during the same period was only 157 or 159 by document B. Thus is demonstrated that less than 2 in 5 of those who entered graduated, or that the average number admitted annually at the public expense was 29 and a fraction, while the average annual number of graduates for the public service was but 11 and a fraction.

By the same data, it further appears that of the number who thus graduated and survived four years next succeeding the period of their graduating respectively, (there being 141,) more than 1 in 4, and more than double the number that died, viz: 39, resigned, without continuing in the public service for the term of four years respectively, after having graduated at the public expense; and more than half of the 39 resigned before the expiration of two years' service. By the same table it also appears that of the 159 graduates prior to the close of 1815 but 96 continued in the public service at the termination of that year, being but a fraction over 1 in 5 of those that had entered the academy, and less than 3 in 5 of the number who had graduated at the public expense; and not one-third more in number than actually graduated at the academy during the same year (1815) and the preceding year alone! In effecting this diminution, 28 had resigned, 19 died, and 16 had been disbanded and dismissed; demonstrating the average number of resignations to have been annually more numerous by upwards of one-third than the annual average number of deaths, and but one-fifth less than the aggregate of all other vacancies combined!

Such were the numerical products of the institution to the public service during the first thirteen years of its operations, and such the aids derived from it to the army of the United States. Following out the history of those who graduated prior to the close of the year 1815, and who then remained in the public service, the same table E shows that but 31 remained in the army at the end of the year 1834—38 having resigned, 16 died, and 11 been discharged and dismissed—demonstrating the number of resignations to have been within a fraction of one-half of all the survivors, and more than double the number of deaths, and within a fraction one-fourth greater than the number of deaths, dismissals, and of the disbanded, combined!

By table F in the appendix of this report, also based upon documents A and B, it appears that 1,318 students have been admitted into the academy since 1815 and prior to the year 1831; that during the same period 470 have graduated at the institution, demonstrating that considerably less than 2 in 5 of the number that entered have continued in it to graduate; that of the 470, 35 died within four years next succeeding the periods of their graduating respectively, leaving 435; and that of this remainder, 76, being more than double the number that had died, resigned, or declined the public service, without continuing in it the term of four years, after graduating at the public expense. More than half of these resigned without so continuing in the public service for the term of two years!

By the same documents it appears that of the 470 graduates only 265 continued in the public service to the end of the year 1830—62 having died or been dismissed, and 127 having resigned—demonstrating the number of resignations to have been more than double the number of all other vacancies combined; and that the number so continuing in service equalled only 1 in 5 of the number who entered the academy since 1815, and but a few more than one-half of the number that had graduated at the public expense during the same period.

Reviewing the operations of the academy from its establishment to the close of the year 1830, it will be found from the data of the tables E and F that less than 2 in 5 of those who have entered have continued to graduate for the public service; and that, within a small fraction, 2 in 5 of all who have graduated have resigned the public service; that more than 1 in 5 of all the graduates have resigned without continuing in the public service for the term of four years after graduating at the public expense; and that of all the vacancies in the army that have occurred among graduates of West Point, from resignations, deaths, and dismissals, combined, 2 in 5 have been caused by resignations alone. This disproportion of the number of resignations to that of deaths and dismissals conjoined cannot but arrest the attention of every mind still more forcibly when it is considered that the period under review has been in part a period of war and active service, such as was calculated greatly to multiply the number of the two classes of vacancies with which that of the resignations is contrasted.

The conviction which inevitably follows each view that has been taken of the operations of the institution in reference to its productiveness for the public service, is that, as the institution is now constituted and conducted, it becomes much more of an object to gain admission into it and to obtain an education and concurrent support in it at the public expense than to enter the public service afterwards, there to continue any considerable length of time. The principle upon which alone a school thus conducted at the public expense can be made profitable to the public service—the principle of rendering the admission into the school and an education at it secondary in importance to an admission into the army and the public service—has been inverted entirely. Admission into the army has obviously become secondary to that of admission into the school, and the acquisition of an education at the public expense has proved in practice to be the primary inducement of assuming to be a candidate for future public service.

Viewing the operations of the institution with reference to its fiscal expenditures, and contrasting these with its numerical productiveness in graduates for the public service, and an equally unfavorable result is demonstrated.

Table E, before mentioned, exhibits the expenditure with which the government has been taxed in the education of each graduate for the public service from 1802 to the close of the year 1815; and table F extends the same exhibit through the succeeding years to the close of 1830. From these data it appears

* Documents in the appendix, marked H, I, and K, furnish data that have arisen since the period embraced by the several documents referred to in the body of this report.

that during the period mentioned the net expense to the government to educate a cadet for the duties and station of an officer in the army of the lowest grade known to the service has been in some instances as high as \$24,360, and in no instance less than \$1,432 94, including the expenditures for buildings; and without these last charges, as high as \$31,520 for a single cadet, and never less than \$903; and this including only such expenditures as are ascertained to have been actually bestowed. It is known, nevertheless, that it is now out of the power of the government to ascertain the whole extent* of the actual expenditures made during several years upon the institution, because of the mode in which the accounts of them were kept, and also from the destruction of documents and vouchers by fire in 1814. The same tables show, however, that the government has expended to a certainty \$3,268,517 44 in conducting the academy since its institution and prior to 1834. This amount apportioned equally among the whole number of cadets that had in the meantime graduated at the academy—viz: 784—demonstrates the average cost of the education of each to the government to have been \$4,169 02, and \$4,075 22 for each graduated since 1815, and \$3,098 05 if nothing but pay, forage, and subsistence be brought into the account. If the same sums were apportioned among those graduates who have actually entered the public service, and continued in active service, not merely as supernumeraries, the expense of each would be increased to the extent of two-fifths of the above sums. It will be recollected that this calculation of the Secretary of War, founded in experience, was, in 1831, that only twenty-two of every forty graduates enter the service; hence, the expense of each to government is about \$6,000.

In any view which can be taken of such operations and results, it is believed that they cannot but be regarded as a most unprofitable and, therefore, wasteful expenditure of the public money. It cannot be doubted that every essential branch of theoretic knowledge imparted to students at this institution may be acquired at numerous colleges and public seminaries in the country by the same number of individuals at less than the fourth part of the cost of it to government at West Point Academy; in other words, upwards of fourfold the number of the youths of the country may be educated by government in all the essentials of the theoretic knowledge to qualify them for the public service at numerous other literary institutions of the highest order, of which our country can boast and may justly be proud, that are graduated at West Point Academy as now conducted, and without adding one dollar to the expenses of government beyond the sums annually appropriated from the treasury for that institution. "A just economy, expending where the public service requires, and withholding where it does not, is among the indispensable duties of government." This simple but most invaluable axiom of a popular government like our own, most fittingly enjoined upon the consideration of Congress in a late annual message of the Chief Magistrate of the nation, seems to demand imperiously a practical application of itself to the operations of the academy at West Point.

Passing from these objectionable features of the institution, another one, of graver aspect indeed, is found in its evident want of moral power and influence over the cadets. It is not intended by the committee to indicate an opinion in this remark that there has been any striking or censurable deficiency or want of vigilance on the part of the officers of the institution, or that an improvement in this particular is attainable, but rather to call the attention of the House to the unavoidable tendencies of this system of gratuitous instruction, and to the opinion that it is not in the nature of an institution thus organized and conducted at the public expense to exert that moral power and those salutary restraints which are essential to the ends desired. That individual interest and responsibility on the part of the instructed, and in some degree on the part of the instructors also, that are the life-spring of the literary institutions of our country which have originated in and are conducted by and are dependent upon private and individual enterprise, will ever be wanting to it in all probability, and cannot be supplied by any exertion of legislative power. There is discoverable the same laxity and impotency in the theory of educating young men at the public expense that are known to attach to every enterprise conducted by the munificence of governments. All experience teaches that at least a twofold amount of means to accomplish any given end is necessary in the hands of government that is required in the hands of private individuals; and it is believed that the disproportion is upon an average still much greater than here stated. It has been seen recently in the pages of this report that, from some combination of causes peculiar to the constitution and operations of the academy at West Point, less than two in five of the students who are found qualified to enter, and that do enter it, continue in it to graduate; and, furthermore, that the average expenses of the government graduates there are more than twofold greater to the government than those of the graduates at other institutions of the highest grade in the nation are to themselves; demonstrating in these particulars an inherent constitutional inefficiency and weakness in this system of education.

By table A, appended to this report, it appears that the average annual number of dismissals from the institution during the ten years preceding the close of 1831 has considerably exceeded one in four of the whole number that entered during the same period. This fact exhibits the institution in singular contrast with every other institution of a similar high grade in the country; in truth, this number, in all probability, exceeds the combined delinquencies and dismissals of every other college in the Union. It may be said that they are sometimes occasioned by the want of mental capacity in the students to pursue the arduous course of studies required of them; but the same cause must exhibit like results in other institutions of the highest grade in the country, if it were equal to the production of them at this institution; and yet in such other institutions instances of the kind are rarely known. Nor can the physical requirements at West Point be regarded with more justice as productive of these results. On the contrary, the physical duties of the cadet may be considered without doubt as productive of health far beyond what is derivable from the means and ordinary habits of any other body of students in the country. By the rules of the academy camp duty is required of the cadets only two† months in the year, (although the act of 1812 requires three months,) and this period is selected at midsummer, when it constitutes a luxury rather than a hardship. Other causes therefore must operate to effect the unfavorable and anomalous results to which we have adverted.

* In American State Papers, vol. iv, on Military Affairs, No. 445, page 363, it is said: "It is proper to remark that prior to the act of March 3, 1809, no separate account was kept of the appropriations for the Military Academy; and up to the year 1812, inclusive, all the accounts of expenditures of the War Department which had been settled and sent to the treasury for revision were destroyed in the year 1814 with the public buildings. It is consequently impossible to furnish all the particulars," &c.

† Extract from the regulations of the Military Academy:

"§ 38. During the months of July and August the cadets will be encamped, and the institution will be exclusively military. During the remaining ten months of the academic year instruction will be given in all the courses."—(See an act of April 29, 1812, sec. 3, requiring three months' camp duty, quoted ante, page 10.)

In a communication of the Secretary of War to the House of Representatives, dated February 28, 1828, this singular fact is thus adverted to: "The experience of many successive years has shown that a considerable number of those who are appointed, [cadets,] from some cause, either inaptitude or irregular conduct, are dismissed."

Pursuing this inquiry, the committee have examined the "conduct roll" of the academy from 1826 to 1834, inclusive, excepting only that of 1832. On this roll "all offences against orders or regulations are recorded." These offences are divided into seven grades, each of which grades comprises those of nearly the same degree of criminality. The degree of criminality of offences of each grade is expressed by a number, as follows: Offences of the first grade, by 10; of the second grade, by 8; of the third, by 5; of the fourth, by 4; of the fifth, by 3; of the sixth, by 2; of the seventh, by 1. For each year (after the first) that a cadet has been a member of the institution his offences are made to count more, by adding to the number expressing the degree of criminality of each offence, one-sixth for his second, one-third for his third, and one-half for his fourth year. The numbers expressive of the offences of each cadet are added up at the end of the year, making a sum total of criminality. The following table, deduced from "the conduct roll" of the years mentioned, exhibits the most conclusive evidence of the moral inefficiency of the institution, though aided by the most rigid regulations, and its inherent weakness against the spirit of insubordination to which young men are ever inclined to give indulgence when conscious of their irresponsibility or their responsibility only to a power that is a dependent recipient of the public bounty, and, consequently, solicitous to husband for itself the friendly feelings "of all sorts of men:"

A table deduced from the "conduct roll" of the cadets at the Military Academy, from 1826 to 1834, inclusive, excepting the year 1832, showing—

1st.	2d.	3d.	4th.	5th.	6th.	7th.	8th.	9th.	10th.	11th.	12th.	13th.	14th.	15th.	16th.	17th.
The year of the specified degree of criminality.	The number guilty over 50 degrees.	The number guilty over 100 degrees.	The number guilty over 150 degrees.	The number guilty over 200 degrees.	The number guilty over 250 degrees.	The number guilty over 300 degrees.	The number guilty over 350 degrees.	The number guilty over 400 degrees.	The number guilty over 450 degrees.	The number guilty over 500 degrees.	The number guilty over 550 degrees.	The number guilty over 600 degrees.	The number not guilty of any offence.	The number of the classes of each year.	The number deficient and turned back into lower classes.	Highest degree of criminality in each year.
1826..	150	83	52	29	18	11	4	3	2	1	1	1	7	222	22	621
1827..	152	86	46	27	13	8	5	3	2	—	—	—	12	202	13	489
1828..	112	63	37	20	10	5	4	1	1	—	—	—	15	207	32	474
1829..	114	75	38	26	16	9	3	3	2	1	1	1	26	209	25	729
1830..	145	74	43	26	19	14	10	8	5	4	3	2	13	215	23	669
1831..	150	88	34	7	3	3	2	1	—	—	—	—	10	219	46	413
1833..	109	51	24	3	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	24	210	7	269
1834..	134	73	30	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	17	242	12	224

It cannot be credited that any other institution of a similarly high grade in the country, conducted by individual enterprise upon individual responsibilities, and dependent for success upon its inherent energies and moral power, has anything in the history of its police that will at all compare with the above table of the annual delinquencies and malconduct in the academy at West Point; nor is it to be credited that anything short of a gratuitous education, and emoluments superadded, could induce parents to commit sons to the charge of an institution in which so much and so frequent irregularity of conduct, and such a spirit of insubordination, were known to prevail. It is seen that scarcely one in twenty escapes the contamination of the evil associations engendered there. For what period, let it be asked, could any college or institution of learning, conducted upon private munificence and by individual interest, retain public confidence or the support of our citizens, were so large a proportion of its students found deficient annually in their attainments and under the necessity of being turned behind their class, as has been the case in the institution at West Point year after year? The answer must be the same on every side. Most conclusively is the want of moral power and influence in the institution demonstrated by its history and operations.

Since 1831 a new penalty has been added to the code of the academy regulations, by which a dismissal is incurred by the commission of offences to the amount of 200 in the scale of criminality for one year. Although this rule has not been rigidly enforced, it is evident that it has had a most salutary effect. Still the "conduct roll" of the institution is a swift witness against this system of education.

From other evidences of an indisputable character it is also very apparent that the moral influences and power of the institution are not equal to the unruly temperament of youth, and to the spirit of arrogance and insubordination* which is engendered and prevails there. In the latter part of the year 1830, as appears by the House document No. 167, 1st session of the 20th Congress, the Secretary of War, who is bound to exercise a supervision of the institution, felt constrained to censure publicly a portion of the school, and characterized them as "regardless of correct deportment and their own interest," and as "insensible to the objects for which they had been placed there." In 1828 \$10,000 of the public money was appropriated to purchase a farm and tavern-house in the vicinity of the academy. By a recurrence to the reasons inducing this expenditure, they will be found to have originated in and confined to the

* Speaking of the cadets in the junior department of the Military College at Sandhurst, England, M. Dupin, in his *Military View*, says: "Military discipline is preserved at the college with scrupulous attention, but it does not prevent the youths from feeling that they are candidates for the profession of arms of a privileged rank. This is evident from the air of pride which is observable in their carriage at an age when bashful timidity or unassuming frankness is the usual characteristic."—(Vol. ii, page 78)

*acknowledged impotency of the moral influences and government of the academy to compete with the counter-influences of the tavern.**

It is believed that such results are attributable almost exclusively to the inevitable and natural tendency of a system of education founded on government patronage alone. They cannot arise from want of rigid rules for the government of the institution any more than from a want of ordinary vigilance in the officers attached to it. A mere glance at the rules prescribed for the observance of both officers and cadets will at once dispel such a suspicion. The error of these, if any there be, will, it is believed, be found rather upon the side of too much rigor than otherwise; for both the freedom of speech and of the press are subjected to a censorship, so far as the rights of cadets are concerned, unlike everything to be found elsewhere in our land. It is, therefore, in the nature of the institution itself, as has been already remarked, that its moral weakness and inefficiency are to be found. This characteristic is believed to be inseparable from an institution constituted and sustained, as is the academy at West Point, exclusively at the public expense, and not at the charge nor upon the responsibility of either the instructors or instructed.

It has been objected to the institution that undue partiality has been practiced in the selection of individuals for admission into it. In former years, as the tables A and B, annexed to this report, will illustrate, great inequality existed in the apportionment of students among the several States; in fact, there was no just rule of apportionment observed or assumed in this respect. But for six or eight years past a remedy of this objection has been attempted and practiced upon. In a report of the Secretary of War to the House of Representatives, dated February 28, 1828,† it was admitted that "the populous cities have an undue share of the cadets compared with the country." But an avoidance of this inequality was also promised. However, the information of the committee upon the subject ceases with the date of the promise, as the tables annexed designate only the States whence the students have been selected. But there are instances of the continuance of cadets at the school, after being once admitted, for an undue and improper length of time, more indicative of personal favoritism or of a partial influence in the administration of the institution than is any other fact with which the committee have met in pursuing this investigation. And if, from what has transpired in relation to many cadets subsequent to their selection, just inferences can be adduced respecting the motives that may have preponderated previous to, or in making the selections, the conviction of every mind would be, that the charge of favoritism has not been wholly without foundation. In truth, favoritism is a feeling and weakness which will enter, more or less, into the dispensation of government patronage everywhere; and this is a consideration which should admonish all legislators who seek only the public good to curtail the indulgence of this passion, by limiting the bestowment of government preferment and patronage to the smallest number of objects practicable. In numerous instances, which an examination into the details of table A, annexed to this report, will detect, have cadets been permitted to remain at West Point academy five, six and seven years at the public expense, to enable them to graduate. Such instances must have obviously operated to exclude, for a like period, other applicants for admission; and yet capacities so dilatory, whether from idleness or natural inferiority, would appear to be the least fitted to be the recipients of the special indulgences and bounties of government.

That the sons of the rich have been preferred to those of the poor, in the selection of cadets for the institution, is also a charge against the institution which has found a place in the suspicions, if not in the convictions, of many honest minds. To what extent, if to any, it is founded in realities the committee are unable to say; it is, however, the every day observation of all, that, where the same privilege is offered to the competition of the rich and poor indiscriminately, the influence of wealth possesses a most decided advantage, and will, in most cases, bear off the prize. When competitors, thus unequally armed with power for ulterior good or evil to him who decides between them, appear in the field, the arbiter begins to see somewhat of his own interest involved, and to calculate what decision will elicit the strongest support of himself in the making of it. But this is a country of equal rights and privileges, and no measure ought to be countenanced, and no institution sustained at the public expense, if it can, with any safety, be dispensed with, that involves tendencies to impair or contravene this great principle of equality, by inducing the hope of favor or reward to influence the mind of him who decides upon the rival claims of his fellow-citizens. Talent, merit, and industry, here, upon this hallowed soil of freedom, should have fair play. Let government refuse to interfere where the chances of its taking sides with their only great rival, wealth, are against them; and though in their native nakedness, and unaided by family titles or the pageantry of fashion, they will attain their true elevation, and other qualities will lose none that belong to themselves; this is both a just and a practicable theory. Reflection and observation will convince every man that, ordinarily, the poor lad of industry and merit asks no favors of government, if it will but withhold them from others who are disposed to supersede him. As a general remark, it is equally true, it is the rich and influential in community that are the first to seek, and most aspiring in the pursuit of, the partialities of government. Perhaps their inducements in this are stronger from their superior prospects of success; and it would be very strange if these known principles of human action have not entered largely into the acquisition, by this class of citizens, of the privileges and preferment held out by government in the institution at West Point, though the fact be not susceptible of clear and tangible proof. A conviction, so naturally deducible from general and acknowledged principles, can hardly require much additional proof in detail to give it currency. And while an institution is so much exposed to it as the academy at West Point, it cannot hope to command popular confidence or exert a salutary influ-

* See debates of the House of Representatives upon the appropriation, reported in the National Intelligencer of February 20, 1824, and debates in the Senate upon the same, reported in the same paper, under dates of February 28 and March 4, 1824.

† Extract from the regulations of the academy:

"118 No cadet shall sign any certificate or statement relative to personal altercations between members of the academy or army, or to any transactions of a private nature, without the permission of the superintendent. 120. Any cadet who, in concert with others, shall adopt any measures under pretence of procuring a redress of grievances shall be dismissed the service. 122. All publications relative to the Military Academy, or to transactions at the Military Academy, are strictly prohibited. Any professor, assistant professor, teacher, academic order, or cadet, therefore, who shall be at all concerned in writing or publishing any article of such character in any newspaper or pamphlet, or in writing or publishing any handbill, shall be dismissed the service, or otherwise severely punished. 147. The cadets are prohibited from taking any newspaper or other periodical publication without special permission of the superintendent; and no such permission shall be given for more than one newspaper for each cadet, and then only on condition of its being paid for in advance."

‡ American State Papers, vol. iii, on Military Affairs, No. 374.

ence upon the public mind, it is believed that the academy has ceased to do so, and that popular feeling is averse to it. Already two great and enlightened States of the Union, through their legislatures, have declared themselves opposed to it, as will appear from sheet marked G, in the appendix to this report: the one, on the ground that it is "partial in its operations and wholly inconsistent with the spirit and genius of our liberal institutions;" the other, on the ground that "it has been wholly perverted from the designs of its founders, and that the best interests of the nation require that it should be abolished."

Upon general principles of policy this system of educating officers at the public expense is not without serious objections arising from its tendencies to create invidious distinctions and jealousies in the ranks of the army. These, in turn, are calculated to give rise to the most dangerous embarrassments in time of war and conflict with a foreign power. It is scarcely necessary in this connexion to advert to the quite too ready inclinations of military men to be jealous towards and the rivals of each other, nor to the lengths which they are too apt, in their ardor, to be carried, under the impulses of such passions. It is known to all that more than once during the glorious war of the American revolution did this class of causes convert the fairest prospects of victory into embarrassments of the most imminent danger. The purest patriotism that was ever kindled, or that has ever burned within the breasts of men, was found quite too weak, at times, to suppress the strong influences of such emotions, claiming, as they ever did, and as their kind ever will, a most intimate and delicate alliance with the personal honor of the contending parties.

It is vain to expect that *all* the army officers of the United States, in every emergency, will consist of those who have graduated at West Point academy. While it shall be otherwise, as it ever has been, still is, and in all probability must ever be, invidious distinctions, pregnant with the most baneful influences, and, at particular junctures, productive of all the deplorable consequences which have just been adverted to, will obtain and will be maintained in the ranks of the army, among its officers, affecting the sympathies of every grade, from the major generals down to the lowest subalterns. The officer educated at West Point will cherish, and, at times, carry into his intercourse with coadjutors, a sense of personal superiority over another of his own grade, or even of a higher grade than his own, who has entered the army through some other avenue and with less imposing pretensions. Such is human nature, as displayed in all the different professions of life, and particularly in the military profession. At this moment the army of the United States exhibits numerous proofs in strong illustration and confirmation of this reasoning, as very slight inquiry will persuade every individual. In view of these admonitions, drawn from our past history as a nation, and from contemporaneous evidences, as well as being founded in the common sense and observation of mankind, it behooves provident legislators to watch against every institution and system that is in any degree calculated to engender in the ranks of the army of the United States distinctions, jealousies, and conflicting feelings of the character described.

Nor is the objection that has been considered founded in exclusive regard for the feelings and natural relationship of the officers of the army. In a nation like ours, based, as has been justly remarked by the Committee on Military Affairs of a late session of Congress, upon the great principle of *amalgamating all orders of society*, the feelings and prejudices of the soldier are to be in a measure consulted. A nation thus constituted cannot be forced into submissive obedience to a class of military or other officers, towards whom all previous observation has excited in the citizen feelings of aversion and disrespect. Make it the known condition of filling up the army of the United States at any juncture of danger that the citizen soldier's wishes are not to be consulted in the selection of your officers, and that, so far from it, all his wishes and feelings are to be violated by placing over him men whose education, habits, temperament, and feelings, he has been accustomed to regard with a feverish dislike, and what will be the consequences? Either a failure in filling up the desired ranks, or the earliest discharges of their musketry will be to rid themselves of their obnoxious commandants, and to devolve the duty of command upon some more congenial comrade. Ask the old soldiers and officers from among the people who have served in the battles of our nation, if they have not seen these very results effected beyond all reasonable doubts, in cases where such disaffection has been general between privates and their officers; and the answer will be in the affirmative. Can it be doubted that when the "bone and muscle" of our countrymen shall come into the field they will demand for their captains and their generals men who have feelings in common with themselves—men who, like themselves, know well the temperament of mankind from having mixed with them in all the various pursuits of life? These must and will constitute the chief materials for your officers at such a crisis, let what may be done, and let what may be said, in organizing, sustaining, and displaying military schools and their cadets. Were the country now in a condition to desire the presentation of some valorous and commanding spirit, a man, or set of men, endowed with the genius and heroic talents of Washington, to guide our forces to battle and to victory, would the experienced and practical eye overlook the great multitude of brave, efficient, and energetic men, with which private life abounds, and rest its only or principal hopes upon the resources or materials of West Point academy; or upon any of the graduates of that institution in consideration only of their past association with it? It is believed that the hopes and confidence of the people would obtain a very different direction at such a juncture. On such occasions, he who is made by nature and by inherent worth the master-spirit of his kind will stand forth regardless of diplomas, and regardless of the compliments of examining committees, as also the tinsels of scholarship, and at a single blast of the war note, infused with his own chivalrous spirit, the multitude would seek *his* standard in preference to that of all others; and *his* would be the arm most relied upon to defend the nation's rights and the nation's honor; and the ruling motive in the selection of their chief would operate in the choice of commandants under him. All history teaches these truths, inasmuch that they almost entirely cease to partake of prophecy. And hence it is believed to be in vain to think of eliciting, in times of profound peace, by any provisions of art, of discipline, or of legislation, that talent and those extraordinary traits of character which are destined and best qualified in the hour of danger to rush into an ascendancy over the minds of men, and with giant powers to control the fortunes of a great people. War alone can summon forth such spirits, and they are peculiar to a state of war.

These considerations and this reasoning result in the conclusion that the graduates at West Point are not the men upon whom the command of the army of the United States will probably devolve, or upon whom the army itself will suffer to be devolved the command, in case of war. Their artificial qualifications will not win the confidence of American soldiers. The feelings and the prejudices which are already abroad towards them will stand forth as insuperable obstacles when the yeomanry of the land shall be required to take the field. And hence, however the institution may be calculated to make a glittering array in time of peace, or to qualify young men for professors in other literary seminaries, for novelists and magazine writers, and otherwise for fashionable life, (and for all these purposes its capabilities are

conceded to be pre-eminent, if improved,) the support of it is nevertheless but a useless waste of the public money, so far as the substantial interests of the nation and people, as a government, are concerned.

The committee are far from an intention to detract from the proud services which were rendered by some of the graduates of the institution during the late war with Great Britain. These have been referred to in support of the institution quite frequently. They are acknowledged to be of a character to reflect the highest credit, but not so much upon the institution as upon the men themselves. Were the institution to rest its merits upon such evidences, and covet of these brave men the primary honors of their valorous achievements, it would still lead to a course of argument which must result more to the prejudice than to the advantage of the institution. For when it is considered how "few and far between" were the instances during the war; that they, in fact, did not exceed six, or eight at most, from the whole number of persons that had graduated, which will yield this recommendation thus claimed for the institution, its utility could hardly be questioned upon more solid or conclusive grounds. The paucity of the numbers* of the graduates for which distinction can be claimed, of itself demonstrates how little advantage is to be counted upon in time of war from its operations and influence. But apart from this, it cannot be doubted that the distinguished men thus pointed at would have been brave, valorous, and distinguished, under any circumstances, and even though they had never seen the institution at West Point.

Other men were equally brave, equally valorous, equally distinguished, and equally successful in the same crisis, without having participated previously in either its instruction or discipline. Each was qualified to be so by nature, and not by the mere force of circumstances; and one of the truths upon which this report is founded is, that such men will be found in every emergency of our country, with or without any factitious aids. In fine, as late as in 1819, long subsequent to the war, it was explicitly asserted in an official paper, by Brigadier General Bernard and Colonel McRee, of the engineer corps, whose combined authority cannot be questioned by military men, that "the elementary school at West Point has hitherto been very inferior as such, and altogether inadequate to the objects for which it was established. If any [cadets] have been so fortunate as to render themselves serviceable either in the artillery or engineers, the cause must be sought for in their own industry, and not in the education received by them at West Point, which was barely sufficient to excite a desire for military inquiries and of military pursuits."—(See American State Papers, vol. i, on Military Affairs, No. 173, p. 835.)

The committee will conclude this division of their report with adverting to one other objection that appertains to the present constitution and operation of the academy. This is its exclusion as officers from the army of the United States, as also from becoming candidates for office in the army, all persons above the age of twenty-one years, as well as all persons under that age who do not previously obtain admission and graduate at the West Point academy. All above the age of twenty-one years are excluded by law from admission into the academy; and as those who graduate there are entitled to precedence in filling vacancies in the army, from their being commissioned by brevet as supernumeraries, when vacancies actually exist; and as these are far more numerous than the vacancies that occur annually, the operation of the institution has the effect stated, of excluding unqualifiedly all persons above the age of twenty-one years from entering, as officers, the army of the United States, however pre-eminent they may be in qualifications; and furthermore, it secures both the honors and emoluments of the military service of the country to the select number exclusively who graduate at West Point. No inducement whatever is left for the acquisition by our citizens of military knowledge at their own expense, however much disposed, nor for the institution of military schools; and no competition is allowed those endowed with military ardor and genius adapted to the profession of arms, unless they are under the age of twenty-one years, and are also numbered among the West Point cadets.

It is believed that such an operation is more baneful to the army of the United States than all the other results of the academy are beneficial; and that, by this monopoly of privileges, much of the best talent and many of the most invaluable men for military services to be found in the country are proscribed from the pursuit of the country's highest good, as well as from their own, in the way that best admits of the accomplishment of both. It is not until men are past the age of twenty-one years that their characters are generally sufficiently formed to determine the pursuit for which they are, by nature and education combined, best adapted. Nor is it until they have passed that period of life that they ordinarily understand their own characters and bent of mind sufficiently to select, discreetly, the pursuit in which they can be of the greatest benefit to themselves, their fellow-citizens, and country. But the principle upon which the academy at West Point is founded, in this respect, presupposes education and discipline to be everything; and that with suitable care in the direction of these to a given end, a pursuit or profession for life may be entered upon at random; and, therefore, that boyhood and youth are equally safe as manhood or maturity of years in making a selection! In principle and in theory this is believed to be wrong, and the annual results of thirty years' practice upon it furnish full demonstration of the error.

The army of the United States, in all its grades, should be kept open to the fair, manly, and impartial competition of all citizens, like every other department of government; and no discouragement, much less actual exclusion, of any one denomination, who are able of body, from seeking its honors, ought to be countenanced, and certainly not to be reduced to system. Such a policy is adverse to the genius of our free institutions, and is suited only to those governments under which distinctions and privileges are hereditary, and men are made the creatures of government, and not government the creature of men. It is alike the interest and the duty of Americans to repudiate it, and to guard their institutions against every similitude of it.

PART IV.

Of the modifications which are requisite to adapt the institution at West Point to the present condition and wants of the nation.

From the nature of the objections to the present constitution, operations, and expense to the government of the Military Academy, already delineated in the preceding pages, one of the obvious modifications required in the institution to adapt it to the present condition and wants of the nation is, to abolish entirely the system of educating cadets in the elementary and theoretic sciences. The numerous, extensive, and economical facilities that are furnished by colleges and other literary seminaries, now in successful operation in nearly every section of the Union, for qualifying the youth of the country in all

* Only nine officers who were graduated at West Point, of all grades in the service, since the first establishment of the institution to July, 1834, have been killed in battle.—(See register of officers and graduates of the academy published in July, 1834, page 21.)

the branches of elementary and theoretic sciences involved in the art of war, and now taught at the Military Academy, constitute additional considerations in favor of this modification.

Instead of the instruction which shall be thus discontinued, it is recommended that the same thorough knowledge of the several sciences which it involves, and which are applicable to all arms of the service as well as to each particular arm, be prescribed as indispensable qualifications for appointment to the lowest grade of commissioned officers in the army of the United States; lessening at the same time, or not, the number of supernumerary officers of this grade now admitted to appointments. It is believed that the standard of scientific qualification for admission to official rank in the army, however elevated it may be, being once made known, will be attained by numbers vastly disproportioned to the vacancies that shall exist at any crisis; and that the government will never be in want of candidates for appointments and promotion of character and capacities to reflect honor upon the service. The enterprise and the ambition of the young men in this country are equal to the most exalted requirements of the government, and need only reasonable incentives and open field of honorable competition to elicit both.

The proposed changes will make room for a provision which has been a great desideratum with military men in this country, and most needed to secure perfection in "whatever relates to the discipline, conduct, and administration of troops," viz: the institution of a school of application and practice of those elementary and theoretic sciences which are proposed to serve in future as the initiatory qualifications of persons commissioned in the army, and for their improvement and perfection in the art of war upon an extended and liberal scale, of all who shall, with these qualifications, become officers in the service of the United States.

It might have been stated, as an additional objection to the academy as now organized and conducted, that, with the exception of a select few, the cadets do not, in their whole course of exercises, become used to practical command to any extent. At the academy they acquire no experience as commandants, and receive their knowledge of such duties only theoretically at best. The extent of their actual discipline and practice is bounded by the exercises of private soldiers and non-commissioned officers. When, therefore, they go forth from the institution to assume command, they go forth as novices still in their ulterior and most important duties, except in theory, and have yet to acquire that finishing tact which can alone give value or secure success to all their preceding labors and study, and test their usefulness in service.

The necessity and benefits of a school of application and practice have been frequently the subjects of official recommendation by practical military men. But so far from being necessarily united with a school of elementary instruction like the present institution at West Point, in order to give it efficiency and success, a total separation of it from such an institution has been specifically recommended by military men of high authority in both theory and practice. General Bernard and Colonel McRee, in 1819, in a document already adverted to in this report,* and after reviewing the worth of the academy at West Point, say: "We are of opinion that a school of application is decidedly necessary to the military service of the country; that, to be rendered efficient, it ought to be separate from all immediate connexion with any other institution." General Thomas S. Jesup, under date of November 5, 1823, in an official document, said: "The importance to the army of a school of practice is too obvious to require demonstration. Without such an establishment uniformity of discipline cannot be expected; nor can the government be sufficiently acquainted with the character, capacity, and attainments of its officers to be able to employ them with advantage in the event of war. In developing character and talent, a school properly organized would have the same advantage in peace which active service would have in war."† Major General Brown, under date of January 12, 1827,‡ after adverting to the operations of the academy at West Point, said: "It seemed, however, almost in vain that military education should be fostered if it were to terminate with the course of studies at West Point; and a school of practice was anxiously looked to as a supplemental institution, in which the theoretic instruction of the academic graduate might be applied with good effect to the practical duties and relations of military service."

Thus it is seen that while the elementary and theoretic school may, and should, upon every principle of constitutional restraint enjoined by the national compact, upon principles of sound policy and national economy also, be dispensed with, in a confident reliance upon other organized seminaries not dependent upon the public treasury for support to impart all elementary and theoretic instruction now derived from such a school, supported at the public expense, it is seen to be no less expedient to supply the army with a school of a different order—a school of application and practice—such as can exist and is needed to exist for the purposes of the national government. The modifications of the present institution at West Point which are proposed to be resolved into this result combine great simplicity, a vast annual saving in the expenditures of the public money, and increased efficiency and directness in the improvement of the army officers of the United States, besides removing all invidious distinctions among them. They will confine the public expenditures in support of the school to those persons exclusively who will, without this, be in the pay of the government—to persons who will be actually in the service of government, and who will be also rendering it a recompense while in the improvement of themselves; in that they will constitute for the time being a substantial part of the military force of the nation, and be liable "at all times to do duty at such places and on such service as the President of the United States may direct," precisely as were the officers and members of the Military Academy in the days of Jefferson.

But, as a consideration of still more decisive and important bearing, these modifications will keep wide open all the grades of office in the army to the free and honorable competition of all classes of citizens, and encourage a spirit of emulation and improvement in the acquisition of scientific knowledge and in the profession of arms throughout the country, and as well among the privates in the ranks who may aspire to promotion as among citizen soldiers in general. The attainment of such a state of feeling, and the establishment, or rather restoration to the citizen and soldier, of these equal privileges and prospects of honorable employment and promotion in the military service of his country, from all of which he is now cut off by the privileged classes graduated at West Point, cannot fail to produce a most salutary effect and renovation of spirit in the military institutions of the several States of the Union, as well as a most decided improvement among the privates and officers, and in the general administration of the army of the United States.

The whole circle of abstruse sciences involved in the art of war will likewise receive a new impulse

* American State Papers, vol. i, on Military Affairs, No. 173

† Idem, No. 357.

‡ Idem, No. 357.

See also the plan submitted to Congress by Mr. McHenry while Secretary of War under President John Adams, ante, page 5.

throughout the Union by thus removing the bars which now forbid to all but the West Point graduate the practical improvement of them in the broad field furnished by the military operations of the national government.

Collegiate education in every State will be of increased value to the American youth by this enlargement of the prospects of successful employment in the public service. Actual merit in the pursuit of military preferment and renown will acquire by it a new elevation in our republic, and be no longer dependent for mastery and station upon political influences and personal favoritism, wealth, and local habitations, but upon the certain and unalterable laws of science.

This, it is confidently asserted, should be the case. It comports with the genius of freedom and equal rights which so strongly marks our institutions, and which has been so eloquently and justly commended to the guardianship of every succeeding generation, in both word and deed, by the patriotic founders of our government.

The committee are far from encouraging any studied similitude in the formation of our own institutions to those of European governments.* They are aware, and proud of the fact, that the people of this country are not bound to their government through feelings of mixed admiration and fear, excited by its stupendous powers, by imposing extravagancies, by gaudy decorations, and by servile imitations of the corrupting devices of arbitrary governments on another continent. It is the simplicity of their government; the economy of which it is susceptible without impairing its efficiency; the few powers, in fact, which it requires to be exerted for all purposes of protection to its citizens in their pursuit of the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity: these are what distinguish and endear it in the estimation of our constituents and countrymen.

It may, however, be remarked that the theory of the school of application and practice contemplated by the committee finds in its general features a confirmation in the experience of other governments, where the option of theories for schools of this class has been exercised without restraint from any limitations of constitutional law, and where economy in public expenditures is graduated only by the latitudinarian axiom that "a public debt is a public blessing," and therefore no considerations of that character induced the preference.

The Royal Military College at Sandhurst, England, which was instituted in 1799, originated in "the necessity of forming regimental officers, and more particularly those of the staff, with a more perfect knowledge of the theory of the art of war.† Officers exclusively were the pupils. In 1801 a royal warrant gave regularity to the attempt which had been made in the two preceding years. By this authority a supreme board, composed of the commander-in-chief, the secretary at war, the heads of the principal military departments, and several general officers, received a discretionary power to establish, by rules and statutes, the government and administration of the college. The institution was divided into two departments, differing in the nature of the studies as well as in the age and rank of the pupils. That for officers studying for the staff of the army, which was reserved exclusively for such as had attained to manhood, was termed the senior department; the other, for youths previous to their entrance into the service, the junior department." In 1808 improvements were instituted in the organization of the college. The youths admitted into the junior department, with the title of "gentlemen cadets," are of three classes: 1st, the sons of officers of all ranks, whether of the land or sea forces, who have died in the service, leaving their families in pecuniary distress; 2d, the sons of all officers of the army above the rank of subalterns actually in the service, and the sons of living naval officers of rank not below that of masters and commandant, and the orphan sons of officers who have not left their families in pecuniary difficulties; and, 3d, the sons of noblemen and private gentlemen. All but the first class pay annual stipends to the college for their education; the first are educated gratuitously. Those of the second class pay a sum proportioned to the rank of their parents in the service, or at the time of their decease. Those of the third class pay a sum equivalent to the expenses of their education, board, and clothing. The stipend paid by the second class varies from £30 to £75 per annum for each cadet. The amount paid by the third class is £125 for instruction, board and clothing, washing, medical attendance, &c.

"The object of the senior department," says Dupin, "is to instruct officers already in the service in the scientific parts of the art of war, that they may afterwards be enabled to discharge, with the greatest possible advantage, the functions of commanding officers of corps, or of situations in the staff of quartermaster and adjutant general, whenever promotion or the circumstances of warfare may summon them to such employments." No officer is received into the senior department until he has undergone a preliminary examination, in a satisfactory manner, relative to his qualifications to enter upon the practical exercises which constitute the course of instruction in that department. These exercises embrace, in the outline, "the mathematics, fortification, castramentation, military topography, reconnoissance of ground, estimation of the military resources of a country, disposition and movement of troops under different circumstances of offensive and defensive warfare," and translation of French and German military works. The period of residence of an officer at the college is fixed at one year.

Thus it is seen that the principle of requiring individuals to educate themselves for admission into the English service as officers, and preparatory to entering upon the practical exercises of the senior department of the Royal Military College, has always been practiced upon, with the exception of the very few instances coming within the description of "sons of officers who have died in the service leaving their families in pecuniary distress." The principle is not affected by the provision for educating the cadets for an equivalent in their preliminary qualifications at an institution conducted by the government.

The policy of it there is probably founded in—1st, a purpose to preserve both the forms and spirit of a privileged order in the military service; 2d, in the obstacles which debar the attainment, at so small cost, of a similar preparatory education at other existing institutions and colleges. Neither of these considerations obtains weight in this country, but the opposite of both prevails. And hence the opposite policy is recommended of dissevering from the control and patronage of the government so much of the

* In a letter addressed to the inhabitants of the United States on the subject of an established militia, the veteran Baron Steuben, inspector general of the armies of the United States, says: "Upon a review of all the military of Europe, there does not appear to be a single form which could be safely adopted by the United States. They are unexceptionably different from each other; and, like all other human institutions, seem to have started as much out of accident as design. The local situation of the country, the spirit of the government, the character of the nation, and, in many instances, the character of the prince, have all had their influence in settling the foundation and discipline of their respective troops, and render it impossible that we should take either as a model."

† Dupin's Military View, vol. ii, chap. 2.

present system of military education at West Point as corresponds to the junior department of the Military College at Sandhurst.

To carry into effect the views and positions of this report the committee submit herewith a bill, which provides:

1st. For abolishing the education of cadets at the public expense.

2d. For the organization at West Point of a military school of application and practice, in which the officers of the army of the United States shall be instructed to apply, practically, for military purposes, the several branches of the elementary and theoretic sciences involved in the art of war.

3d. For the appointment of a superintendent and assistant instructors of said school, and prescribing the outline of their duties

4th. For the detachment of officers to attend said school, and for their government while there, and for the detachment of artillery and infantry, to aid in the practical experiments thereof, as may be necessary.

5th. For the salaries of the superintendent and assistant instructors.

6th. For an annual report to Congress of the proceedings of the school, and other information relative to the organization and police of the same.

7th. For prescribing the qualifications requisite for appointment to office in the army of the United States, and for a board of examiners to pass upon the applications and qualifications of candidates for appointment in the army.

8th. For regulating the selection of candidates for appointment as officers in the army from the number reported by the board of examiners as qualified, according to law.

9th. For regulating appointments in the different corps of engineers.

10th. For the removal of the superintendent and assistant instructors of the school from the offices filled by them, respectively, without affecting their rank and command in the army.

The committee will conclude their report with remarking that the effect of this measure, if adopted by Congress, will be to lessen the patronage, simplify the operations, and economize the administration of government; to open the honors and emoluments of the military service to the fair and honorable competition of all classes of citizens; to encourage an extended cultivation of the sciences involved in the art of war, and renovate the military ardor of men in every State of the Union; to make superior merit the only standard of preferment—exciting the emulation of youth everywhere in the land; disheartening the patriotic ambition of none, and strengthening the attachment of the American people collectively to their institutions and laws. In fine, it will opportunely check the tendency of the federal government to expand its powers into the disputed regions of constitutional law, in following out the indefinite permission "to raise and support armies."

If any individual shall be disposed to distrust the effect of it upon the system of military instruction provided for the army, in the spirit of the wife of Theopompus, King of Sparta, when she rebuked his establishment of the ephori, a set of magistrates to hold in check the exercise of power by the King himself, on the ground that he would thereby leave the kingship diminished to his sons, let the admiring reply of Theopompus, in the same spirit of elevated patriotism and political foresight which conceived it, be recalled and applied in answer—"I shall leave it smaller, but I shall leave it more permanent."

A BILL for modifying the system of military instruction at West Point, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all acts now in force authorizing the enlistment or appointment of cadets in the Military Academy of the United States at West Point, in the State of New York, be, and hereby are, repealed from and after the thirtieth day of June next; and all such cadets now in the service or under the instruction of the United States shall be disbanded and dismissed from and after the thirtieth day of June next.

SEC. 2. *And be it further enacted,* That the Secretary of War, under the direction of the President of the United States, shall, as soon as may be after the thirtieth day of June next, organize a military school of application and practice at West Point, for the improvement of the officers of the army of the United States in the application and practice, for military purposes, of the several branches of elementary and theoretic sciences involved in the art of war; and the Secretary of War shall appoint an officer as superintendent of said school, possessing competent theoretical and practical qualifications to command on parade; to instruct the officers constituting said school in all the tactics appertaining to every branch of military service; to lecture upon the theory and principles thereof, and to illustrate the practical application of the science of mathematics, topographical drawing, and engineering to the purposes of both offensive and defensive war, including a regular course of practical illustrations of artillery service, the uses of mortars, howitzers, and the principles of gunnery generally, together with instructions by lectures and practice in military police and other duties of camp and garrison service; all which instructions it shall be the duty of said superintendent to impart to said school, aided by such number of assistant and subordinate officers, who shall also be instructors of competent qualifications, as the Secretary of War shall deem it expedient to appoint.

SEC. 3. *And be it further enacted,* That for the purposes of the practical instruction contemplated in the second section of this act, the officers of the army of the United States shall repair to West Point in rotation, under such regulations and in such numbers as the Secretary of War shall direct, with the approbation of the President of the United States, not exceeding at any one time one-third of the company of officers in service; and to remain at said school for such time as the Secretary of War shall determine, not exceeding one year in three successive years. The arrangement, classification, and discipline of said officers, while at said school, shall be prescribed with reference to their instruction in the duties of the corps from which they have been detailed or for which they are destined, by the superintendent thereof, under the direction of the Secretary of War; and in the same manner the Secretary of War shall prescribe all necessary rules and regulations for the government of said school, not inconsistent with the rules and articles of war. And the President of the United States shall order, from time to time, such detachments of artillery and infantry to be stationed at West Point as may be deemed useful for the advancement of the practical instruction and illustrations in the art of war contemplated by the provisions of this act, and not inconsistent with the general welfare of the army.

SEC. 4. *And be it further enacted*, That the salary of the superintendent of said school shall be, until otherwise ordered, two thousand five hundred dollars per annum; and the assistant officers, who shall also be instructors of the first grade, shall receive for salary seventeen hundred dollars each per annum; and if a second grade of assistant officers, being also instructors, shall be appointed, they shall severally receive for salary twelve hundred dollars per annum; which sums shall be in full compensation for all their services, respectively, and in lieu of forage, rations, pay for servants, and all incidental expenses.

SEC. 5. *And be it further enacted*, That said superintendent shall have charge of said school, and of all property belonging to the United States connected therewith and remaining at West Point, and shall be holden responsible for the safe-keeping of the same.

SEC. 6. *And be it further enacted*, That it shall be the duty of the Secretary of War to report to Congress at the next session thereof, and thereafter annually at the commencement of each session of Congress, a statement of his proceedings under the provisions of this act, and therewith a copy of all rules and regulations prescribed for the organization and government of said school, together with a list of the names of the officers and instructors employed therein, the capacity in which each is employed, and the salary paid to them respectively, and of the names of the officers detailed for instruction, with a designation of the corps to which they belong, respectively, together with such other information relating to the institution as he may think proper to communicate.

SEC. 7. *And be it further enacted*, That the superintendent of said school, together with the assistant instructors thereof, shall constitute a board of examiners, whose duty it shall be to examine publicly all applicants for appointment to office in the army of the United States, who shall, after the organization of said school, present themselves therefor at the time and place, in each year, to be designated for that purpose by the rules and regulations for the government of said school. And all such applicants as shall, upon examination by said board, and in compliance with the rules and regulations aforesaid, be found qualified in the several branches of elementary and theoretical knowledge involved in the art of war, to enter upon a course of application and practice of the same as taught at said school, shall be so reported, arranged according to their degrees of proficiency, to the Secretary of War, who shall, of the number, recommend from time to time to the President of the United States for appointment, the number required to fill all vacancies existing in the officers of the army of the United States, regard being had in the selection to their respective degrees of proficiency and merit. But said appointments shall at no time interfere with the existing rules of promotion in the army.

SEC. 8. *And be it further enacted*, That all vacancies that shall hereafter occur in the corps of engineers shall be filled, during the pleasure of the Secretary of War, directed by the President of the United States, from the officers who shall have passed through the course of exercises and practice taught at the school aforesaid, taking for this purpose those who rank highest for proficiency in the sciences appertaining to the duties of said corps, and in the order of superior merit.

SEC. 9. *And be it further enacted*, That the superintendent of said school, and each assistant and subordinate officer therein, who shall also be an instructor, shall be removed from his office therein at the pleasure of the President of the United States; but such removal shall not deprive any such officer and instructor of the rank or command to which his commission in the army entitled him at the time of entering upon service at the academy.

APPENDIX.

A 1.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, *Washington City, December 15, 1834.*

SIR: I am instructed by the select committee of the House of Representatives on the subject of the Military Academy at West Point to request the following information of your department, to wit:

The names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy of the United States at West Point from its origin until the present time; the year of their admission, respectively; the State or Territory, including the District of Columbia, from which they came, respectively; with a designation of those that have been withdrawn from the academy before graduating, and the year of their withdrawal, respectively; of those that have been dismissed, and the year of their dismissal, respectively; of those that have been graduated, and the year of their graduating, respectively; of those graduates who have received commissions in the army of the United States; of those thus commissioned that have subsequently left the army, and the date and cause of their leaving it, respectively; of those thus commissioned that still remain in the service of the United States, and their rank and station, respectively.

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRANCIS O. J. SMITH.

HON. LEWIS CASS, *Secretary of War.*

A 2.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *January 21, 1835.*

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 15th ultimo, requesting, on behalf of the select committee of the House of Representatives on the Military Academy, to be furnished with the names of all the cadets that have been received at that institution from its establishment; and, in reply, to transmit herewith statements prepared in the offices of the chief engineer and the adjutant general, which contain the information called for.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

MAHLON DICKERSON, *Acting Secretary of War.*

HON. F. O. J. SMITH, *Chairman Select Committee on Military Academy, House of Representatives.*

A 3.

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, *Washington, January 9, 1835.*

SIR: I have the honor herewith to transmit so much of the information called for by the letter of the 15th ultimo, of the Hon. F. O. J. Smith, in behalf of the select committee of the House of Representatives on the subject of the Military Academy at West Point, as can be furnished by this department.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. GRATIOT, *Chief Engineer.*

HON. LEWIS CASS, *Secretary of War.*

A 4.

Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets who have been received into the Military Academy of the United States at West Point from its origin until the present time; the year of their admission, respectively; the States or Territories, including the District of Columbia, from which they came, respectively; with a designation of those that have been withdrawn from the academy before graduating, and the year of their withdrawal, respectively; of those that have been dismissed, and the year of their dismissal, respectively; and of those who have graduated, and the year of their graduating, respectively.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have withdrawn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those who have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
1	Joseph G. Swift.....	1800	Massachusetts	Joseph G. Swift.....	1802
1	William Gates.....	1801	...do.....	William Gates.....	1806
2	Samuel Gates.....	1801	...do.....	Samuel Gates.....	1804
3	Henry B. Jackson.....	1801	...do.....	Henry B. Jackson.....	1803
4	John Lillie.....	1801	...do.....	John Lillie
5	Ambrose Porter.....	1801	Connecticut.....	Ambrose Porter.....	1802
6	S. M. Levy.....	1801	Maryland.....	S. M. Levy.....	1802
7	W. R. Armistead.....	1801	Virginia.....	W. R. Armistead.....	1803
1	John Livingston.....	1802	New York.....	John Livingston.....	1803
2	Joseph G. Totten.....	1802	Connecticut.....	Joseph G. Totten.....	1805
1	H. N. Allen.....	1803	Vermont.....	H. N. Allen.....	1804
2	John Doyle.....	1803	Dist. of Columbia.....	John Doyle.....	1803
3	J. F. Heileman.....	1803	Massachusetts.....	Julius F. Heileman.....	1806
4	Prentis Williard.....	1803	Connecticut.....	Prentis Williard.....	1806
5	Thomas Bennett.....	1803	New Jersey.....	Thomas Bennett.....	1806
6	William Macomb.....	1803	...do.....	William Macomb.....	1806
7	S. B. Rathbone.....	1803	New York.....	S. B. Rathbone.....	1808
8	Fred. Lewis.....	1803	...do.....	Fred. Lewis.....
9	William McRee.....	1803	North Carolina.....	William McRee.....	1805
1	Ethan A. Allen.....	1804	Vermont.....	Ethan A. Allen.....	1806
2	George Bomford.....	1804	New York.....	George Bomford.....	1805
3	John J. Kelly.....	1804	...do.....	John J. Kelly.....	1806
4	Robert Lucas.....	1804	Pennsylvania.....	Robert Lucas.....	1806
5	P. V. Bouis.....	1804	Territory of Miss.....	P. V. Bouis.....	1806
6	Joseph Proveaux.....	1804	South Carolina.....	Joseph Proveaux.....	1806
7	A. Chouteau.....	1804	Territory of Miss.....	A. Chouteau.....	1806
8	Charles Gratiot.....	1804	...do.....	C. Gratiot.....	1806
9	Lewis Lorrimer.....	1804	...do.....	Lewis Lorrimer.....	1806
10	A. Lorrimer.....	1804	...do.....	A. Lorrimer.....	1806
1	Satterlee Clark.....	1805	Vermont.....	Satterlee Clark.....	1807
2	Luther Dyer.....	1805	...do.....	Luther Dyer.....	1806
3	W. Partridge.....	1805	...do.....	W. Partridge.....	1806
4	E. D. Wood.....	1805	New York.....	E. D. Wood.....	1806
5	Alex. J. Williams.....	1805	Pennsylvania.....	A. J. Williams.....	1810
6	Henry J. Williams.....	1805	...do.....	Henry J. Williams.....	1812
7	Louis Vallé.....	1805	Territory of Miss.....	Louis Vallé.....	1808
8	Alden Partridge.....	1805	Vermont.....	Alden Partridge.....	1806
1	John Anderson.....	1806	...do.....	John Anderson.....	1807
2	D. A. Buck.....	1806	...do.....	D. A. Buck.....	1808
3	Luther Leonard.....	1806	...do.....	Luther Leonard.....	1808
4	Justus Post.....	1806	...do.....	Justus Post.....	1807
5	Samuel Babcock.....	1806	Massachusetts.....	Samuel Babcock.....	1808
6	Samuel Champion.....	1806	Connecticut.....	Samuel Champion.....	1807
7	James Gibson.....	1806	Maryland.....	James Gibson.....	1808
8	Thomas Beall.....	1806	Dist. of Columbia.....	Thomas Beall.....	1811
9	H. H. Villard.....	1806	...do.....	H. H. Villard.....	1811
1	Oliver G. Burton.....	1807	Vermont.....	Oliver G. Burton.....	1808
2	Heman A. Fay.....	1807	...do.....	Heman A. Fay.....	1808
3	Milo Mason.....	1807	...do.....	Milo Mason.....	1808
4	George P. Peters.....	1807	New Hampshire.....	George P. Peters.....	1808

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have withdrawn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those who have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
5	Altheus Roberts	1807	New Hampshire					Altheus Roberts	1808
6	M. Huntington	1807	Connecticut					M. Huntington	1808
7	Osmond Marsh	1807	do.					Osmond Marsh	1811
8	S. Thayer	1807	Massachusetts					S. Thayer	1808
9	R. E. De Russey	1807	New York					R. E. De Russey	1811
10	Samuel Noah	1807	do.					Samuel Noah	1807
11	J. R. Alexander	1807	Unknown	J. R. Alexander	1816				
12	George W. Hyht	1807	do.					George W. Hyht	1812
13	C. Juderwinck	1807	do.			C. Juderwinck	1808		
14	James Smith	1807	do.			James Smith	1808		
15	Asa Aikins	1807	do.	Asa Aikins	1808				
16	Erastus Roberts	1807	New Hampshire	Erastus Roberts	1809				
1	Leonidas Buck	1808	Vermont					Leonidas Buck	1813
2	James D. Cobb	1808	do.					James D. Cobb	1811
3	Samuel H. Holly	1808	do.					Samuel H. Holly	1808
4	Augustus Conant	1808	do.					Augustus Conant	1812
5	Gus. Loomis	1808	do.					Gus. Loomis	1811
6	Ezra Smith	1808	do.					Ezra Smith	1811
7	John Bliss	1808	New Hampshire					John Bliss	1811
8	Henry A. Hobart	1808	Massachusetts					Henry A. Hobart	1811
9	Augustus Magee	1808	do.					Augustus Magee	1809
10	George Templeman	1808	do.					George Templeman	1812
11	James Dallaly	1808	Connecticut					James Dallaly	1811
12	Adam Larrabee	1808	do.					Adam Larrabee	1811
13	F. B. Murdoch	1808	do.					F. B. Murdoch	1812
14	Abraham Sands	1808	do.					Abraham Sands	1809
15	Joseph A. Wilcox	1808	do.					Joseph A. Wilcox	1812
16	John S. Brush	1808	New York					John S. Brush	1812
17	John R. Bell	1808	do.					John R. Bell	1812
18	Sol. Conkling	1808	do.					Sol. Conkling	1809
19	Milton Haxton	1808	do.					Milton Haxton	1809
20	Thomas Ketchum	1808	do.					Thomas Ketchum	1811
21	George Morley	1808	do.					George Morley	1812
22	N. W. Osgood	1808	do.					N. W. Osgood	1812
23	S. M. Osborn	1808	do.	S. M. Osborn					
24	George Ronan	1808	do.					George Ronan	1811
25	C. Vanderverter	1808	do.					C. Vanderverter	1808
26	Armstrong Irvin	1808	Pennsylvania					Armstrong Irvin	1811
27	Benjamin Fields	1808	Maryland					Benjamin Fields	1811
28	John J. Abert	1808	Virginia					John J. Abert	1814
29	Thomas B. Randolph	1808	do.					Thomas B. Randolph	1812
30	Patrick Byrne	1808	Unknown	Patrick Byrne	1808				
31	Charles Blanchard	1808	do.	C. Blanchard	1811				
32	S. D. Davies	1808	do.			S. D. Davies	1809		
33	James F. Griswold	1808	do.			James F. Griswold	1809		
34	Ansart Hall	1808	do.					Ansart Hall	1809
35	L. Kingsbury	1808	do.	L. Kingsbury	1809				
36	John A. Lillington	1808	do.	John A. Lillington	1810				
37	George W. Pike	1808	Unknown			George W. Pike	1810		
38	Joel Strong	1808	do.	Joel Strong	1810				
39	Henry Walcott	1808	do.			Henry Walcott	1810		
40	H. C. White	1808	do.			H. C. White	1810		
41	William Cutbush	1808	Pennsylvania					William Cutbush	1812
42	Saul Neuman	1808	Massachusetts					Saul Neuman	1809
1	Alexander Fanning	1809	do.					Alex. Fanning	1812
2	W. F. Hobert	1809	do.					W. F. Hobert	1812
3	R. Ashley	1809	Rhode Island						
4	H. Burchstead	1809	New York					H. Burchstead	1811
5	M. V. Bousaubin	1809	New Jersey					M. V. Bousaubin	1811
6	W. R. Smith	1809	do.					W. R. Smith	1812
7	John A. Chandler	1809	Unknown	John A. Chandler	1810				
8	Joel Johnston	1809	do.	Joel Johnston	1810				
9	W. C. Lefruguell	1809	do.	W. C. Lefruguell	1810				
10	Asa Paine	1809	Unknown	Asa Paine	1810				
11	Theodore Randall	1809	Maryland					Theodore Randall	1809
1	Alex. Thompson	1810	New York					Alex. Thompson	1812
2	W. Sumpter	1810	South Carolina					W. Sumpter	1812
	(None.)	1811							
1	John A. Dix	1812	New Hampshire	John A. Dix					
2	John Wright	1812	Vermont					John Wright	1814
3	Isaac A. Adams	1812	Massachusetts					Isaac A. Adams	1817
4	N. G. Dana	1812	do.					N. G. Dana	1814
5	John S. Allanson	1812	New York					John A. Allanson	1814

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have with'd'wn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those who have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
6	Charles Merchant.....	1812	New York.....					Charles Merchant....	1814
7	John Monroe.....	1812	do.....					John Monroe.....	1814
8	Henry W. Fitzhugh.....	1812	Dist. of Columbia...					Henry W. Fitzhugh...	1814
9	George W. Gardiner.....	1812	do.....					George W. Gardiner ..	1814
10	James Spencer.....	1812	Kentucky.....					James Spencer.....	1817
1	Alonzo Breuer.....	1813	Vermont.....					Alonzo Breuer.....	1815
2	M. Partridge.....	1813	do.....	M. Partridge.....	1817				
3	J. Parkhurst.....	1813	do.....					J. Parkhurst.....	1814
4	Jasper Strong.....	1813	do.....					Jasper Strong.....	1819
5	Jackman Davis.....	1813	New Hampshire.....					J. Davis.....	1814
6	George Blaney.....	1813	Massachusetts.....					George Blaney.....	1815
7	Thomas Childs.....	1813	do.....					T. Childs.....	1814
8	Thomas Denny.....	1813	do.....	Died at Mil. Academy	1815				
9	O. B. Fowle.....	1813	do.....	O. B. Fowle.....	1814				
10	George W. Gardiner.....	1813	do.....					George W. Gardiner..	1814
11	John Hills.....	1813	do.....					John Hills.....	1815
12	Henry H. Loving.....	1813	do.....					H. H. Loving.....	1818
13	N. H. Loving.....	1813	do.....	N. H. Loving.....	1819				
14	Ward Marston.....	1813	Massachusetts.....	Ward Marston.....	1818				
15	John A. Webber.....	1813	do.....					J. A. Webber.....	1815
16	Samuel W. Wetmore.....	1813	do.....					S. W. Wetmore.....	1814
17	William Wells.....	1813	do.....					W. Wells.....	1814
18	Simon Willard.....	1813	do.....					Simon Willard.....	1815
19	James Ripley.....	1813	Connecticut.....					James Ripley.....	1814
20	Robert L. Armstrong.....	1813	New York.....					R. L. Armstrong.....	1814
21	John Armstrong.....	1813	do.....					John Armstrong.....	1814
22	Thomas K. Brown.....	1813	do.....					Thomas K. Brown....	1814
23	Benjamin Bonville.....	1813	do.....					B. Bonville.....	1817
24	Stephen Birdsall.....	1813	do.....					S. Birdsall.....	1814
25	George Brewerton.....	1813	do.....	George Brewerton ..	1817				
26	Henry Brewerton.....	1813	do.....					Henry Brewerton ..	1819
27	Samuel Cooper.....	1813	do.....					S. Cooper.....	1815
28	Ebenezer Chaston.....	1813	do.....	Died at Mil. Academy	1816				
29	L. G. De Russy.....	1813	do.....					L. G. De Russy.....	1814
30	John B. Duffy.....	1813	do.....	John B. Duffy.....	1816				
31	C. Despenville.....	1813	do.....					C. Despenville.....	1817
32	Charles Davies.....	1813	do.....					Charles Davies.....	1815
33	Thomas J. Gardiner.....	1813	do.....					Thomas J. Gardiner..	1815
34	Nicholas Gray.....	1813	do.....	N. Gray.....	1816				
35	George K. Gibbs.....	1813	do.....	George K. Gibbs ..	1818				
36	Esau Humphrey.....	1813	do.....					E. Humphrey.....	1814
37	Allen A. Jackson.....	1813	do.....	Allen A. Jackson ..	1816				
38	Milo Johnson.....	1813	do.....					Milo Johnson.....	1815
39	Wm. L. McLaughlin.....	1813	do.....			W. L. McLaughlin ..	1816		
40	James L. McBurnie.....	1813	do.....			James L. McBurnie..	1814		
41	William Rigall.....	1813	do.....					William Rigall.....	1815
42	William Remvick.....	1813	do.....	W. Remvick.....	1816				
43	G. B. Staats.....	1813	do.....			G. B. Staats.....	1814		
44	W. H. Swift.....	1813	do.....					W. H. Swift.....	1819
45	Henry Smith.....	1813	do.....					Henry Smith.....	1815
46	James Simonson.....	1813	do.....					J. Simonson.....	1815
47	M. F. Vanderverter.....	1813	do.....					M. F. Vanderverter..	1815
48	W. Williams.....	1813	do.....					W. Williams.....	1815
49	A. Wendall.....	1813	do.....					A. Wendall.....	1815
50	Bloomfield Webb.....	1813	do.....	B. Webb.....	1815				
51	Hillary Brunet.....	1813	Pennsylvania.....					H. Brunet.....	1814
52	Thomas J. Baird.....	1813	do.....					Thomas J. Baird....	1814
53	James K. Armstrong.....	1813	New York.....	James K. Armstrong ..	1816				
54	Isaac E. Craig.....	1813	Pennsylvania.....					Isaac E. Craig.....	1814
55	Stephen Herberger.....	1813	do.....	S. Herberger.....	1815				
56	Thomas J. Leslie.....	1813	do.....					Thomas J. Leslie ..	1815
57	Robert C. Brent.....	1813	Maryland.....					R. C. Brent.....	1815
58	Henry R. Dulany.....	1813	do.....					Henry R. Dulany....	1815
59	Joseph Smoot.....	1813	do.....	Joseph Smoot.....	1817				
60	John Symington.....	1813	Maryland.....					John Symington ..	1815
61	W. C. N. Armistead.....	1813	Virginia.....	W. C. N. Armistead ..	1818				
62	Edmund Brooke.....	1813	do.....					E. Brooke.....	1815
63	James D. Graham.....	1813	do.....					James D. Graham ..	1817
64	Thomas P. Guynn.....	1813	do.....	T. P. Guynn.....	1818				
65	James Monroe.....	1813	do.....					James Monroe.....	1815
66	Robert J. Scott.....	1813	Virginia.....					R. J. Scott.....	1815
67	Samuel McKenzie.....	1813	North Carolina.....					S. McKenzie.....	1818
68	William B. G. Taylor.....	1813	do.....	W. B. Taylor.....	1815				

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have with'dwn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those who have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
69	Daniel Turner	1813	North Carolina	D. Turner.	1814
70	John McKenzie.....	1813	South Carolina.....	John McKenzie.....	1819
71	Henry Middleton	1813	do.....	H. Middleton	1815
72	George Trescott	1813	do.....	George Trescott	1813
73	Robert M. Forsyth.....	1813	Georgia.....	R. M. Forsyth.....	1815
74	Robert W. Pooler.....	1813	do.....	R. W. Pooler.....	1815
75	H. W. Griswold.....	1813	Ohio.....	H. W. Griswold	1815
76	Eli W. Kerr.....	1813	do.....	E. W. Kerr.....	1817
77	C. A. Ogden.....	1813	do.....	C. A. Ogden.....	1819
78	J. R. Sloo.....	1813	do.....	J. R. Sloo.....	1815
79	James Badalet.....	1813	Maryland.....	James Badalet.....	1814
80	William Vandeburg.....	1813	do.....	W. Vandeburg.....	1816
81	William L. Booth.....	1813	District of Columbia.....	W. L. Booth	1814
82	Alexander Cochran.....	1813	do.....	Alexander Cochran	1815
83	William A. Dulany.....	1813	do.....	W. A. Dulany.....	1815
84	W. S. Evelith.....	1813	do.....	W. S. Evelith.....	1815
85	William M. Graham.....	1813	do.....	William M. Graham.....	1817
86	B. S. A. Lowe.....	1813	do.....	B. S. A. Lowe.....	1814
87	Thomas W. Lendrum.....	1813	do.....	T. W. Lendrum.....	1815
88	William W. McIntire.....	1813	do.....	Died at Mil Academy.	1818
89	Edwin Newton.....	1813	do.....	E. Newton.....	1816
90	George W. Swift.....	1813	do.....	George W. Swift.....	1817
91	Thomas Stephenson.....	1813	do.....	Thomas Stephenson.....	1814
92	Charles M. Thruston.....	1813	do.....	C. M. Thruston.....	1814
93	George A. Washington.....	1813	do.....	G. A. Washington	1815
94	Alexander Smoot.....	1813	do.....	A. Smoot.....	1816
95	S. G. Morgan.....	1813	Unknown.....	S. G. Morgan.....	1815
1	Roswell Conant.....	1814	Vermont.....	R. Conant.....	1819
2	J. Dimmick.....	1814	do.....	J. Dimmick.....	1819
3	Ethan A. Hitchcock.....	1814	do.....	Ethan A. Hitchcock.....	1817
4	H. Webster.....	1814	do.....	H. Webster.....	1818
5	W. H. Chase.....	1814	Massachusetts.....	W. H. Chase.....	1815
6	G. Cooper.....	1814	do.....	G. Cooper.....	1818
7	Charles Dana.....	1814	do.....	C. Dana.....	1815
8	Benjamin Gorham.....	1814	do.....	B. Gorham.....	1820
9	James B. Gerry.....	1814	do.....	James B. Gerry.....	1816
10	W. G. Malcolm.....	1814	do.....	W. G. Malcolm.....	1819
11	John B. F. Russell.....	1814	do.....	J. B. F. Russell.....	1818
12	John D. Rupp.....	1814	do.....	John D. Rupp.....	1819
13	William Shearer.....	1814	do.....	William Shearer.....	1816
14	Elijah Stodert.....	1814	do.....	E. Stodert.....	1818
15	F. W. C. Stony.....	1814	do.....	F. W. C. Stony.....	1815
16	C. M. Watson.....	1814	do.....	C. M. Watson.....	1817
17	Alexander Antill.....	1814	New York.....	Alexander Antill.....	1817
18	F. N. Berrien.....	1814	do.....	F. N. Berrien.....	1815
19	F. N. Barbarin.....	1814	do.....	F. N. Barbarin.....	1820
20	Edward Butler.....	1814	do.....	E. Butler.....	1817
21	George Cooper.....	1814	do.....	George Cooper.....	1820
22	William E. Cruger.....	1814	do.....	W. E. Cruger.....	1819
23	R. Delafield.....	1814	do.....	R. Delafield.....	1818
24	Peter Embry.....	1814	do.....	Not in M. A. Register.....	P. Embry.....	1815
25	C. Eakin.....	1814	do.....	C. Eakin.....	1815
26	John P. Emmett.....	1814	do.....	John P. Emmett.....	1819
27	Henry J. Feltus.....	1814	do.....	H. J. Feltus.....	1820
28	John E. Fields.....	1814	do.....	John E. Fields.....	1816
29	S. German.....	1814	do.....	S. German.....	1817
30	Henry Gilbert.....	1814	do.....	H. Gilbert.....	1819
31	Henry P. Giles.....	1814	do.....	H. P. Giles.....	1818
32	B. L. Havilan.....	1814	do.....	B. L. Havilan.....	1816
33	William Hamilton.....	1814	do.....	William Hamilton.....	1817
34	James S. Hepburn.....	1814	do.....	James S. Hepburn.....	1819
35	Edgar S. Hawkins.....	1814	do.....	E. S. Hawkins.....	1820
36	Daniel Jacob.....	1814	do.....	Daniel Jacob.....	1817
37	John C. Kerk.....	1814	do.....	John C. Kerk.....	1817
38	Ambrose Kirkland.....	1814	do.....	A. Kirkland.....	1816
39	Z. J. D. Kinsley.....	1814	do.....	Z. J. D. Kinsley.....	1819
40	John Lamb.....	1814	do.....	John Lamb.....	1816
41	Edward Livingston.....	1814	do.....	Edward Livingston.....	1817
42	Julius A. Lagnel.....	1814	do.....	J. A. Lagnel.....	1821
43	M. Livingston.....	1814	do.....	M. Livingston.....	1819
44	Edmund Moreton.....	1814	do.....	E. Moreton.....	1819
45	Alexander Moreton.....	1814	do.....	A. Moreton.....	1821
46	William A. McKisson.....	1814	do.....	W. A. McKisson.....	1816

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have with'dwn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those who have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
47	William S. Maitland	1814	New York					W. S. Maitland	1820
48	Lewis N. Morris	1814	do					Lewis N. Morris	1820
49	W. S. Oakley	1814	do	W. S. Oakley	1818				
50	Giles Porter	1814	do					Giles Porter	1818
51	James Rogers	1814	do	James Rogers	1815				
52	Jaques Ruden	1814	do	Jaques Ruden	1818				
53	Alexander Spencer	1814	do	Alexander Spencer	1816				
54	Thomas Spencer	1814	do	Thomas Spencer	1816				
55	E. C. Sickles	1814	do					E. C. Sickles	1819
56	A. B. Skinner	1814	do					A. B. Skinner	1820
57	A. Tompkins	1814	do	A. Tompkins	1816				
58	John M. Tafts	1814	do					John M. Tafts	1820
59	D. D. Tompkins	1814	do					D. D. Tompkins	1820
60	F. A. Underhill	1814	do					F. A. Underhill	1819
61	M. Vallean	1814	do	M. Vallean	1817				
62	W. H. Welsh	1814	do	W. H. Welsh	1815				
63	E. R. Alberti	1814	Pennsylvania	E. R. Alberti	1817				
64	H. Bache	1814	do					H. Bache	1818
65	Jos. Cauffman	1814	do			Jos. Cauffman	1816		
66	Jno. H. Kepple	1814	do	Jno. H. Kepple	1818				
67	D. Mulhalon	1814	do	D. Mulhalon	1818				
68	Louis Ravardi	1814	do	Louis Ravardi	1818				
69	A. Roumfort	1814	do					A. Roumfort	1817
70	Thos. Symington	1814	do	Thos. Symington	1817				
71	W. B. Weed	1814	do	W. B. Weed	1818				
72	Henry H. Baker	1814	New Jersey	Henry H. Baker	1818				
73	Harvey Brown	1814	do					Harvey Brown	1818
74	Jas. H. Cooper	1814	do	Jas. Cooper	1816				
75	W. C. De Hart	1814	do					W. C. De Hart	1820
76	David Hopkins	1814	do	D. Hopkins	1816				
77	W. C. Bordly	1814	Maryland	W. C. Bordly	1818				
78	Leonard O. Brooke	1814	do					Leonard O. Brooke	1818
79	Joshua Barny	1814	Maryland					Joshua Barny	1820
80	Jos. N. Chambers	1814	do					Jos. N. Chambers	1818
81	Jas. A. Chambers	1814	do					Jas. A. Chambers	1820
82	J. A. Dumeste	1814	do					J. A. Dumeste	1819
83	Wm. G. Hall	1814	do	Wm. G. Hall	1819				
84	Edward Harding	1814	do					Edward Harding	1818
85	Geo. O. Karrick	1814	do	Geo. O. Karrick	1817				
86	Edwin E. Little	1814	do	Edwin E. Little	1817				
87	Thos. Noel	1814	do					Thos. Noel	1820
88	E. L. Nicholson	1814	do	E. L. Nicholson	1819				
89	Samuel Ringold	1814	do					Samuel Ringold	1818
90	James Ringold	1814	do	James Ringold	1816				
91	Robert A. Slye	1814	do	Robert A. Slye	1816				
92	John Schwartz	1814	do	John Schwartz	1817				
93	Thomas E. Sudler	1814	do					Thomas E. Sudler	1820
94	R. B. Tayler	1814	do	R. B. Tayler	1816				
95	Wm. Turnbull	1814	do					Wm. Turnbull	1819
96	Thomas Tilghman	1814	do			Thomas Tilghman	1818		
97	Wm. H. Van Wycke	1814	do	Wm. H. Van Wycke	1818				
98	John W. Winder	1814	do					John W. Winder	1820
99	Robert Wright	1814	do	Robert Wright	1818				
100	Wm. Whitcroft	1814	do						
101	George Webb	1814	do					George Webb	1818
102	Edward Alexander	1814	Virginia	Edward Alexander	1817				
103	Benj. L. Beall	1814	do	Benj. L. Beall	1818				
104	A. Brockenborough	1814	do					A. Brockenborough	1819
105	John R. Berryman	1814	do	John R. Berryman	1818				
106	H. Berryman	1814	do					H. Berryman	1817
107	Francis J. Bailey	1814	do			Francis J. Bailey	1817		
108	G. W. Corprew	1814	do					G. W. Corprew	1818
109	Landor Carter	1814	do	Landor Carter	1816				
110	W. B. Davidson	1814	do					W. B. Davidson	1815
111	Jos. Dangerfield	1814	Virginia					Jos. Dangerfield	1818
112	George W. Fairfax	1814	do	George W. Fairfax	1816				
113	George W. Frost	1814	do	George W. Frost	1816				
114	Frederick Griffith	1814	do					Frederick Griffith	1817
115	Edward S. Gault	1814	do	Edward S. Gault					
116	John Gough	1814	do	John Gough	1817				
117	T. L. Jamerson	1814	do	T. L. Jamerson	1817				
118	Wm. Janners	1814	do	Wm. Janners	1816				
119	Lucius Jones	1814	do	Lucius Jones	1818				

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have withdrawn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those who have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
120	Alfred Lee	Alfred Lee	1817
121	R. B. Lee	R. B. Lee.....	1817
122	A. McDonald.....	1814	Virginia	A. McDonald.....	1817
123	James Newton.....	1814	do	James Newton.....	1817
124	Hay Taliaferro.....	1814	do	Hay Taliaferro.....	1817
125	John M. Washington ..	1814	do	John M. Washington..	1817
126	J. R. Wallace.....	1814	do	J. R. Wallace.....	1817
127	Edward Bernard.....	1814	North Carolina.....	Edward Bernard	1818
128	W. Funner.....	1814	do	W. Funner.....	1816
129	W. G. McNeil.....	1814	do	W. G. McNeil.....	1817
130	James H. Walker.....	1814	do	James H. Walker.....	1818
131	Charles Parker.....	1814	South Carolina.....	Charles Parker.....	1817
132	Wm. H. Gorden	1814	Georgia	Wm. H. Gorden	1815
133	Thomas Rodney.....	1814	Delaware	Thomas Rodney	1819
134	Alexander Reed	1814	do	Alexander Reed.....	1818
135	Samuel L. Smith.....	1814	do	Samuel L. Smith.....	1818
136	John R. Vinton.....	1814	Rhode Island	John R. Vinton.....	1817
137	Thomas O. Bruff.....	1814	District of Columbia..	Thomas O. Bruff.....	1818
138	James H. Coolidge.....	1814	do	James H. Coolidge	1821
139	E. J. Lambert.....	1814	do	E. J. Lambert.....	1817
140	Benedict Maul.....	1814	do	Benedict Maul.....	1817
141	Wm. S. Newton.....	1814	do	Wm. S. Newton.....	1818
142	John H. Pleasonton.....	1814	do	J. H. Pleasonton.....	1817
143	George D. Ramsay.....	1814	do	George D. Ramsay.....	1820
144	Charles Simmes.....	1814	do	Charles Simmes.....	1817
145	William Johnson.....	1814	Kentucky	William Johnson.....	1817
146	John D. W. Orr.....	1814	do	John D. W. Orr.....	1817
147	John Payne.....	1814	do	John Payne.....	1818
148	John Pratt.....	1814	do	John Pratt.....	1818
149	George W. Whistler.....	1814	do	George W. Whistler.....	1819
150	James R. Stubbs.....	1814	Ohio	James R. Stubbs.....	1815
151	James D. Worthington.....	1814	do	Jas. D. Worthington.....	1819
152	A. Gano.....	1814	do	A. Gano.....	1815
153	John Hutt.....	1814	do	John Hutt.....	1818
154	E. Du Bois.....	Indiana	E. Du Bois.....	1818
155	R. A. Forsyth.....	Michigan	R. A. Forsyth.....	1817
156	Samuel Hunt.....	Samuel Hunt.....
1	John R. Bowes.....	1815	Massachusetts	John R. Bowes.....	1819
2	Andrew Talcott.....	1815	Connecticut	Andrew Talcott.....	1818
3	N. J. Cruger.....	1815	New York.....	N. J. Cruger.....	1820
4	Edward D. Mansfield.....	1815	do	Edward D. Mansfield.....	1819
5	Lewis N. Morris.....	1815	do	Lewis N. Morris.....	1820
6	Edward O'Fling.....	1815	do	Edward O'Fling.....	1817
7	Jason Rogers.....	1815	do	Jason Rogers.....	1821
8	W. E. Sykes.....	1815	do	W. E. Sykes.....	1817
9	James A. Williams.....	1815	do	James A. Williams.....	1818
10	James R. Blaney.....	1815	Delaware.....	James R. Blaney.....	1819
11	Charles R. Vining.....	1815	do	Charles R. Vining.....	1819
12	Benjamin C. Vining.....	Benjamin C. Vining.....	1818
13	George Leib.....	Pennsylvania.....	George Leib.....	1816
14	William C. Lindsay.....	1815	do	William C. Lindsay.....	1815
15	Joseph Strong.....	1815	do	Joseph Strong.....	1818
16	A. R. Woolley.....	1815	do	A. R. Woolley.....	1820
17	W. C. Bordley.....	1815	Maryland	W. C. Bordley.....	1818
18	Henry Thompson.....	1815	do	Henry Thompson.....	1819
19	George S. Watkins.....	1815	do	George S. Watkins.....	1818
20	John M. Edwards.....	1815	Virginia	John M. Edwards.....	1819
21	Charles Guerrent.....	1815	do	Charles Guerrent.....	1820
22	John J. Jackson.....	1815	do	John J. Jackson.....	1818
23	Robert A. Lacey.....	1815	do	Robert A. Lacey.....	1818
24	Charles Marshall.....	1815	do	Charles Marshall.....	1819
25	Thomas Ragland.....	1815	do	Thomas Ragland.....	1819
26	S. B. Dusenbury.....	1815	North Carolina.....	S. B. Dusenbury.....	1820
27	Samuel McRee.....	1815	do	Samuel McRee.....	1820
28	Richard Nixon.....	1815	do	Richard Nixon.....	1817
29	John C. Pickens.....	1815	do	John C. Pickens.....	1817
30	John Harleston.....	1815	South Carolina.....	John Harleston.....	1816
31	John L. L'Engle.....	John L. L'Engle.....	1819
32	Edward Pinckney.....	1815	South Carolina.....	Edward Pinckney	1818
33	Richard White.....	Richard White.....	1815
34	Richard Millen.....	Georgia.....	Richard Millen.....	1818
35	Charles C. Ward.....	1815	do	Charles C. Ward.....	1817
36	Wm. B. McClellan.....	1815	Tennessee	Wm. B. McClellan	1819

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have with'dwn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those who have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
37	R. Corbin.....	1815	Ohio.....	R. Corbin.....	1818				
38	Thomas J. McArthur.....	1815	do.....					Thomas J. McArthur.....	1820
39	John F. Hamtramck.....	1815	Illinois.....					John F. Hamtramck.....	1819
40	C. A. W. Ball.....	1815	District of Columbia..	C. A. W. Ball.....	1818				
41	John C. Jones.....	1815	do.....	John C. Jones.....	1817				
42	Z. F. Johnson.....	1815	do.....			Z. F. Johnson.....	1818		
43	William H. Kerr.....	1815	do.....	William H. Kerr.....	1819				
44	George Lindsay.....	1815	do.....					George Lindsay.....	1820
45	William O'Neil.....	1815	do.....	William O'Neil.....	1817				
46	Robert O'Neil.....	1815	do.....	Robert O'Neil.....	1817				
47	Andrew Ramsay.....	1815	do.....	Andrew Ramsay.....	1817				
48	Edward Swann.....	1815	do.....	Edward Swann.....	1816				
1	Charles Cutts.....	1816	New Hampshire.....	Charles Cutts.....	1818				
2	Nath. Johnson.....	1816	do.....	Nath. Johnson.....	1818				
3	W. G. Hunter.....	1816	Vermont.....	W. G. Hunter.....	1818				
4	Henry Bainbridge.....	1816	Massachusetts.....					Henry Bainbridge.....	1821
5	Charles Dimmick.....	1816	do.....					Charles Dimmick.....	1821
6	Isaac C. Easton.....	1816	do.....	Isaac C. Easton.....	1818				
7	Prescott Robinson.....	1816	do.....	Prescott Robinson.....	1818				
8	G. W. Talmage.....	1816	Connecticut.....	G. W. Talmage.....	1820				
9	Daniel Tyler.....	1816	do.....					Daniel Tyler.....	1819
10	Vincent M. Lowe.....	1816	New York.....	Killed by the accidental discharge of a gun.					
11	Charles Ratcliffe.....	1816	do.....	Charles Ratcliffe.....	1820				
12	John F. Scott.....	1816	do.....					John F. Scott.....	1821
13	James A. Willing.....	1816	do.....	James A. Willing.....	1820				
14	David Kirby.....	1816	do.....	David Kirby.....					
15	S. Tuttle.....	1816	do.....					S. Tuttle.....	1820
16	D. Lacock.....	1816	Pennsylvania.....	Died at the Military Academy.	1818				
17	Joseph Pentland.....	1816	do.....					Joseph Pentland.....	1821
18	Ed. C. Ross.....	1816	do.....					Ed. C. Ross.....	1821
19	William Wright.....	1816	Maryland.....	William Wright.....	1817				
20	Richard Ashton.....	1816	Virginia.....			Richard Ashton.....	1817		
21	Robert S. Brooke.....	1816	do.....					Robert S. Brooke.....	1820
22	William P. Buchanan.....	1816	do.....					Wm P. Buchanan.....	1820
23	W. M. C. Fairfax.....	1816	do.....	W. M. C. Fairfax.....	1819				
24	Armistead Long.....	1816	do.....	Armistead Long.....	1820				
25	Westwood Lacey.....	1816	do.....					Westwood Lacey.....	1822
26	Thomas Mason.....	1816	do.....	Thomas Mason.....	1817				
27	A. Madison.....	1816	do.....					A. Madison.....	1817
28	W. H. Bell.....	1816	North Carolina.....					W. H. Bell.....	1820
29	Robert W. Allston.....	1816	South Carolina.....					Robert W. Allston.....	1821
30	Wm. T. Browne.....	1816	do.....	Wm. T. Browne.....	1818				
31	Rutledge C. Holmes.....	1816	do.....	Rutledge C. Holmes.....	1819				
32	Daniel J. Gaillard.....	1816	do.....			Daniel J. Gaillard.....	1819		
33	Wm. H. James.....	1816	do.....	Wm. H. James.....	1816				
34	Rawlings Lownds.....	1816	do.....					Rawlings Lownds.....	1820
35	Robert Rouland.....	1816	do.....	Robert Rouland.....	1818				
36	Thomas O. Lowndes.....	1816	do.....	Thomas O. Lowndes.....	1819				
37	E. G. W. Butler.....	1816	Tennessee.....					E. G. W. Butler.....	1820
38	Alexander Barron.....	1816	do.....	Alex. Barron.....	1818				
39	Charles Floyd.....	1816	Georgia.....			Charles Floyd.....	1817		
40	W. A. Eliason.....	1816	Dist. of Columbia.....					W. A. Eliason.....	1819
41	Daniel Easton.....	1816	do.....	Daniel Easton.....	1818				
42	Jefferson Myers.....	1816	do.....			Jefferson Myers.....	1820		
1	Horace Bliss.....	1817	New Hampshire.....					Horace Bliss.....	1822
2	Benjamin Walker.....	1817	do.....					Benj. Walker.....	1819
3	Otes Wheeler.....	1817	do.....					Otes Wheeler.....	1821
4	Alvin Edson.....	1817	Vermont.....	Alvin Edson.....	1819				
5	C. G. Pierce.....	1817	do.....	C. G. Pierce.....	1822				
6	Silas B. Fillebrown.....	1817	Massachusetts.....	Silas B. Fillebrown.....	1820				
7	Samuel A. Hobart.....	1817	do.....	Samuel A. Hobart.....	1822				
8	Henry S. Meade.....	1817	do.....	Henry S. Meade.....	1818				
9	Jona. S. Prescott.....	1817	do.....					Jona. S. Prescott.....	1821
10	W. Wheelwright.....	1817	do.....					W. Wheelwright.....	1821
11	Joseph Mansfield.....	1817	Connecticut.....					Joseph Mansfield.....	1821
12	John B. Scott.....	1817	do.....					John B. Scott.....	1821
13	Seth M. Capron.....	1817	New York.....					Seth M. Capron.....	1821
14	James Grier.....	1817	do.....					James Grier.....	1821
15	William Rose.....	1817	do.....					William Rose.....	1822
16	Eustis Frenor.....	1817	do.....					Eustis Frenor.....	1822

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have withdrawn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those who have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
17	Israel Clark.....	1817	Pennsylvania.....	Israel Clark.....	1818
18	Julian Henry.....	1817do.....	Julian Henry.....	1820
19	James Wood.....	1817do.....	James Wood.....	1820
20	Ed. L. Wells.....	1817	Delaware.....	Ed. L. Wells.....	1818
21	William Bourne.....	1817	Maryland.....	Wm. Bourne.....	1819
22	Hammond Burwell.....	1817	New Hampshire.....	Hammond Burwell.....	1821
23	Henry Hobbs.....	1817	Maryland.....	Henry Hobbs.....	1820
24	John H. Latrobe.....	1817do.....	John H. Latrobe.....	1821
25	Jefferson Vail.....	1817do.....	Jefferson Vail.....	1821
26	Thomas Wright.....	1817do.....	Thomas Wright.....	1819
27	Robert Day.....	1817	Virginia.....	Robert Day.....	1822
28	Walter Guynn.....	1817do.....	Walter Guynn.....	1822
29	James Henshaw.....	1817do.....	James Henshaw.....	1821
30	William J. Scott.....	1817do.....	Wm. J. Scott.....	1820
31	Nath. Tyler.....	1817do.....	Nath. Taylor.....	1820
32	George Taylor.....	1817do.....	George Taylor.....	1820
33	W. W. Gaillard.....	1817	South Carolina.....	W. W. Gaillard.....	1821
34	Robert S. Hunt.....	1817do.....	Robert S. Hunt.....	1819
35	John C. Holland.....	1817do.....	John C. Holland.....	1821
36	W. G. Waites.....	1817do.....	W. G. Waites.....	1820
37	Clark Burdine.....	1817	Georgia.....	Clark Burdine.....	1821
38	E. B. Alexander.....	1817	Kentucky.....	E. B. Alexander.....	1823
39	John S. Craig.....	1817do.....	John S. Craig.....	1820
40	John McKay.....	1817do.....	John McKay.....	1818
41	William Stith.....	1817do.....	William Stith.....	1820
42	John J. Abercrombie.....	1817	Tennessee.....	John J. Abercrombie.....	1822
43	Richard Cross.....	1817do.....	Richard Cross.....	1819
44	A. J. Donelson.....	1817do.....	A. J. Donelson.....	1820
45	Samuel Kennedy.....	1817do.....	Samuel Kennedy.....	1819
46	Thompson Morris.....	1817	Ohio.....	Thompson Morris.....	1822
47	David Wallace.....	1817do.....	David Wallace.....	1821
48	W. W. Wells.....	1817	Indiana.....	W. W. Wells.....	1821
49	D. Moniac.....	1817	Mississippi.....	D. Moniac.....	1822
50	R. A. Thruston.....	1817	Dist. of Columbia.....	R. A. Thruston.....	1821
51	Joshua Baker.....	1817	Louisiana.....	Joshua Baker.....	1819
1	George Stickney.....	1818	New Hampshire.....	George Stickney.....	1819
2	A. W. Wright.....	1818do.....	A. W. Wright.....	1822
3	H. Day.....	1818	Vermont.....	H. Day.....	1823
4	Truman Emerson.....	1818do.....	Truman Emerson.....	1819
5	J. D. Hopson.....	1818do.....	J. D. Hopson.....	1822
6	George Wright.....	1818do.....	George Wright.....	1822
7	Henry Carlton.....	1818	Massachusetts.....	Henry Carlton.....	1820
8	E. D. Clay.....	1818do.....	E. D. Clay.....	1819
9	Thomas Edwards.....	1818do.....	Thomas Edwards.....	1822
10	John W. Fales.....	1818do.....	John W. Fales.....	1819
11	George F. Folger.....	1818	Massachusetts.....	George W. Folger.....	1822
12	M. A. Jones.....	1818do.....	M. A. Jones.....	1820
13	Fred. Searle.....	1818do.....	Fred. Searle.....	1823
14	T. B. Wheelock.....	1818do.....	T. B. Wheelock.....	1822
15	Henry Clark.....	1818	Connecticut.....	Henry Clark.....	1822
16	George Dutton.....	1818do.....	George Dutton.....	1822
17	Albert Lincoln.....	1818do.....	Albert Lincoln.....	1822
18	Charles C. Smith.....	1818do.....	Charles C. Smith.....	1822
19	John S. Wolcott.....	1818do.....	John S. Wolcott.....	1820
20	D. H. Vinton.....	1818	Rhode Island.....	D. H. Vinton.....	1822
21	D. W. Allenson.....	1818	New York.....	D. W. Allenson.....	1823
22	E. B. Birdsall.....	1818do.....	E. B. Birdsall.....	1823
23	H. D. Burke.....	1818do.....	H. D. Burke.....	1821
24	H. Rose.....	1818do.....	H. Rose.....	1818
25	R. D. C. Collins.....	1818do.....	R. D. C. Collins.....	1823
26	Samuel C. Ellis.....	1818	New York.....	Samuel C. Ellis.....	1822
27	Edward Feltus.....	1818do.....	Ed. Feltus.....	1819
28	H. H. Gird.....	1818do.....	Henry H. Gird.....	1822
29	Charles Holt.....	1818do.....	Charles Holt.....	1823
30	J. H. Hewitt.....	1818do.....	J. H. Hewitt.....	1822
31	T. R. Ingalls.....	1818do.....	T. R. Ingalls.....	1822
32	Gov'r Morris.....	1818do.....	Gov'r Morris.....	1823
33	G. W. McLean.....	1818do.....	G. W. McLean.....	1820
34	John Nicholls.....	1818do.....	John Nicholls.....	1823
35	John C. Pickell.....	1818do.....	John C. Pickell.....	1822
36	J. G. Reynolds.....	1818do.....	J. G. Reynolds.....	1822
37	Charles B. Shaw.....	1818	New York.....	Charles B. Shaw.....
38	Joseph Snelling.....	1818do.....	Joseph Snelling.....	1821

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have with'd'wn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those who have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
39	C. Smith	1818	New York	C. Smith	1819
40	Ed. Thompson	1818	do	Ed. Thompson	1820
41	B. H. Wright	1818	do	B. H. Wright	1823
42	G. J. D. Wade	do	G. J. D. Wade	1820
43	W. Whitten	do	W. Whitten	1819
44	William Wane	do	William Wane	1820
45	William C. Young	do	William C. Young	1822
46	William Cook	1818	New Jersey	William Cook	1822
47	Augustus Canfield	1818	do	Augustus Canfield	1822
48	W. C. Fenimore	1818	do	W. C. Fenimore	1822
49	Jasper Maccomb	1818	do	Withdrawn—cause unkn'n
50	Joseph A. Phillips	1818	do	Joseph A. Phillips	1823
51	William M. Boyce	1818	Pennsylvania	William M. Boyce	1822
52	John L. Bean	1818	do	John L. Bean	1820
53	St. Clair Denny	1818	do	St. Clair Denny	1822
54	J. H. Fulton	1818	do	J. H. Fulton	1819
55	Thomas J. Harmon	1818	do	Thomas J. Harmon	1819
56	N. Holmes	1818	do	N. Holmes	1818
57	Thomas Johnson	1818	do	Thomas Johnson	1822
58	Francis Lee	1818	do	Francis Lee	1822
59	George A. McCall	do	George A. McCall	1822
60	John J. Shuler	1818	Pennsylvania	John J. Shuler	1822
61	George Shales	1818	do	George Shales	1818
62	Charles Rodney	1818	Delaware	Charles Rodney	1819
63	E. G. Tilton	1818	do	E. G. Tilton	1820
64	Henry S. Coulter	1818	Maryland	Henry S. Coulter	1820
65	Ed. H. Courtney	1818	do	Ed. H. Courtney	1821
66	John Denny	1818	do	John Denny	1818
67	Elijah Massey	1818	do	Elijah Massey	1823
68	D. S. Miles	1818	do	D. S. Miles	1824
69	J. F. Buck	1818	Virginia	J. F. Buck	1821
70	Wm. D. Chipley	do	Wm. D. Chipley	1819
71	R. Corbin	do	R. Corbin	1819
72	Campbell Graham	1818	Virginia	Campbell Graham	1822
73	A. Graham	1818	do	A. Graham	1823
74	Wm. H. Harding	1818	do	Wm. H. Harding	1820
75	T. F. Johnson	do	T. F. Johnson	1821
76	D. Hunter	1818	Virginia	D. Hunter	1820
77	Thomas McNamara	1818	do	Thomas McNamara	1822
78	Enoch Mason	1818	do	Enoch Mason	1821
79	James R. Stevenson	1818	do	James R. Stevenson	1822
80	M. G. Taliaferro	1818	do	M. G. Taliaferro	1821
81	H. B. Tyler	1818	do	H. B. Tyler	1820
82	Henry E. Bell	1818	North Carolina	Henry E. Bell	1823
83	James H. Cooke	1818	do	James H. Cooke	1822
84	F. Green	1818	do	F. Green	1819
85	Henry L. Irwin	1818	do	Henry L. Irwin	1819
86	John E. Newell	1818	do	John E. Newell	1823
87	Benjamin E. Person	1818	do	Benjamin E. Person	1819
88	James Scott	1818	do	Died at Mil. Academy	1819
89	John J. James	1818	South Carolina	John J. James	1820
90	P. D. Treyvant	1818	do	P. D. Treyvant	1820
91	Samuel Wragg	1818	do	Samuel Wragg	1822
92	John P. Watts	1818	do	John P. Watts	1819
93	P. McCormick	1818	Georgia	P. McCormick	1820
94	Marcus Anderson	1818	Tennessee	Marcus Anderson	1819
95	N. W. Easterland	1818	do	N. W. Easterland	1820
96	Albert S. Miller	1818	do	Albert S. Miller	1823
97	D. M. Porter	1818	do	D. M. Porter	1821
98	Nath. Gardiner	1818	Kentucky	Nath. Gardiner	1818
99	C. L. Lee	1818	do	C. L. Lee	1819
100	Ed. J. Piers	1818	do	Ed. J. Piers	1822
101	M. W. Satterwhite	1818	do	M. W. Satterwhite	1822
102	Isaac Trimble	1818	do	Isaac Trimble	1822
103	Ed. E. Root	1818	Ohio	Ed. E. Root	1821
104	William Wall	1818	do	William Wall	1822
105	J. R. Wilcox	1818	do	J. R. Wilcox	1822
106	Francis Lassell	1818	Indiana	Francis Lassell	1821
107	N. P. Trist	1818	Louisiana	N. P. Trist	1821
108	George L. Cathcart	1818	Dist. of Columbia	George L. Cathcart	1820
109	David Hunter, Jr.	1818	do	David Hunter, Jr.	1822
110	James Ross	1818	do	James Ross	1819
111	Henry Stewart	1818	do	Henry Stewart	1823

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those who have withdrawn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those who have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
1	Cyrus Conant.....	1819	Maine.....	C. Conant.....	1821
2	A. McMillon.....	1819	do.....	A. McMillan.....	1822
3	Levi Nute.....	1819	New Hampshire.....	Levi Nute.....	1823
4	A. Esterbrook.....	1819	Vermont.....	Died at Mil. Academy	1823
5	William Bissel.....	1819	do.....	William Bissel.....	1821
6	A. Richardson.....	1819	do.....	A. Richardson.....	1823
7	C. Webber.....	1819	do.....	Died in 1820.....
8	L. B. Webster.....	1819	do.....	L. B. Webster.....	1823
9	John W. Colton.....	1819	Massachusetts.....	John W. Colton.....	1823
10	G. H. Crosman.....	G. H. Crosman.....	1823
11	Fred. Lithgow.....	Fred. Lithgow.....	1820
12	Ed. Seavey.....	Ed Seavey.....	1821
13	Henry Vose.....	Henry Vose.....	1822
14	Geo. W. Waters.....	George W. Waters.....	1823
15	W. B. Dyer.....	1819	Connecticut.....	W. B. Dyer.....	1822
16	Reuben Holmes.....	1819	do.....	Reuben Holmes.....	1823
17	Joel Hawley.....	1819	do.....	Joel Hawley.....	1820
18	Jas. W. Kingsbury.....	1819	do.....	Jas. W. Kingsbury.....
19	Julius J. B. Kingsbury.....	1819	do.....	Julius J. B. Kingsbury.....	1823
20	Timothy Lamabee.....	1819	do.....	Timothy Lamabee.....	1822
21	George S. Green.....	1819	Rhode Island.....	George S. Green.....	1823
22	Wm. B. Bloodgood.....	1819	New York.....	W. B. Bloodgood.....	1824
23	James Diven.....	1819	do.....	James Diven.....	1820
24	Charles Holt.....	1819	do.....	Charles Holt.....	1823
25	Henry B. Hoffman.....	1819	do.....	Henry B. Hoffman.....	1821
26	R. Pearson.....	1819	do.....	R. Pearson.....	1820
27	George M. Picton.....	1819	do.....	George M. Picton.....	1824
28	A. H. Ratcliffe.....	A. H. Ratcliffe.....	1821
29	George C. Richards.....	1819	New York.....	George C. Richards.....	1823
30	Washington Romain.....	Washington Romain.....	1820
31	Jos. R. Smith.....	1819	New York.....	Jos. R. Smith.....	1823
32	Wm. B. Thompson.....	1819	do.....	Wm. B. Thompson.....	1824
33	James Engle.....	1819	do.....	James Engle.....	1825
34	Sidney P. Haines.....	1819	do.....	Sidney P. Haines.....	1821
35	Elias Phillips.....	1819	do.....	Elias Phillips.....	1823
36	John G. Stone.....	1819	do.....	John G. Stone.....	1821
37	Ralph B. Shrew.....	1819	do.....	Ralph B. Shrew.....	1821
38	Thomas Collins.....	1819	Pennsylvania.....	Thomas Collins.....	1821
39	William Florence.....	1819	do.....	William Florence.....	1822
40	Andrew Kinnard.....	1819	do.....	Andrew Kinnard.....	1823
41	W. McCullock.....	1819	do.....	W. McCullock.....	1822
42	John McCartney.....	1819	do.....	John McCartney.....	1821
43	George Nauman.....	1819	do.....	George Nauman.....	1823
44	Walter Wall.....	1819	do.....	Walter Wall.....	1819
45	T. H. Bird.....	1819	do.....	Died at Mil. Academy	1819
46	Mark W. Batman.....	1819	do.....	Mark W. Batman.....	1823
47	Pinkney Davidson.....	1819	Maryland.....	Died at Mil. Academy	1821
48	Robert T. Conrad.....	1819	Virginia.....	Robert T. Conrad.....	1821
49	George F. Brent.....	1819	do.....	George F. Brent.....	1821
50	W. Van Buskirk.....	1819	do.....	W. Van Buskirk.....	1821
51	Wm. L. Harris.....	1819	do.....	W. L. Harris.....	1824
52	Ed. C. McDonald.....	1819	do.....	Died at Mil. Academy	1822
53	John Moore.....	1819	do.....	John Moore.....	1821
54	Richard Newman.....	1819	do.....	Richard Newman.....
55	John Van Swaringen.....	1819	do.....	John Van Swaringen.....	1824
56	Uriel Wright.....	Uriel Wright.....	1822
57	T. Washington.....	T. Washington.....	1820
58	W. Reynolds.....	1819	Delaware.....	W. Reynolds.....	1823
59	Lorenzo Thomas.....	1819	do.....	Lorenzo Thomas.....	1823
60	W. C. C. Carrington.....	1819	North Carolina.....	W. C. C. Carrington.....	1820
61	A. B. Gloster.....	1819	do.....	A. B. Gloster.....	1821
62	Alfred Mordecai.....	1819	do.....	Alfred Mordecai.....	1823
63	Sam. W. Sutherland.....	1819	do.....	Sam. W. Sutherland.....	1823
64	R. De Trimble.....	1819	South Carolina.....	R. De Trimble.....	1823
65	Stephen Lee.....	1819	do.....	Stephen Lee.....	1821
66	James S. McCall.....	1819	do.....	James S. McCall.....	1819
67	Lydell Saxon.....	1819	do.....	Lydell Saxon.....	1821
68	James F. Walker.....	1819	Georgia.....	James F. Walker.....	1821
69	Alfred Beckley.....	1819	Kentucky.....	Alfred Beckley.....	1823
70	John Lowry.....	1819	do.....	John Lowry.....	1820
71	Ed. J. Peers.....	1819	do.....	Ed. J. Peers.....	1819
72	N. B. Stout.....	1819	do.....	N. B. Stout.....	1820
73	R. B. Washington.....	1819	do.....	R. B. Washington.....	1820

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have with'dwn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those who have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
74	J. R. Burley.....	1819	Ohio.....	J. R. Burley.....	1820
75	F. L. Guion.....	1819	Mississippi.....	F. L. Guion.....	1823
76	Charles Goodwin.....	1819	do.....	Charles Goodwin.....	1820
77	L. T. Jamison.....	1819	Louisiana.....	L. T. Jamison.....	1824
78	George Andrews.....	1819	Dist. of Columbia.....	George Andrews.....	1823
79	E. R. Armistead.....	1819	do.....	E. R. Armistead.....	1821
80	W. T. Washington.....	1819	do.....	W. T. Washington.....
81	John Failey.....	1819	Michigan.....	John Failey.....	1823
82	James Hamilton.....	1819	Mississippi.....	James Hamilton.....	1821
1	George W. Long.....	1820	New Hampshire.....	George W. Long.....	1824
2	R. P. Parrot.....	1820	do.....	R. P. Parrott.....	1824
3	Timothy Paige.....	1820	do.....	Timothy Paige.....	1824
4	F. Thomas.....	1820	Vermont.....	F. Thomas.....	1825
5	R. A. Coney.....	1820	Maine.....	R. A. Coney.....	1823
6	J. C. McMillan.....	1820	do.....	J. C. McMillan.....	1822
7	J. W. A. Smith.....	1820	do.....	J. W. A. Smith.....	1824
8	S. R. Allston.....	1820	Massachusetts.....	S. R. Allston.....	1825
9	W. W. Eaton.....	1820	do.....	W. W. Eaton.....	1824
10	J. M. Fessenden.....	1820	do.....	J. M. Fessenden.....	1824
11	E. W. Low.....	1820	do.....	E. W. Low.....	1824
12	F. B. Newcomb.....	1820	do.....	F. B. Newcomb.....	1824
13	N. Tillinghast.....	1820	do.....	N. Tillinghast.....	1824
14	William Hunter.....	1820	Rhode Island.....	William Hunter.....	1823
15	E. Backus.....	1820	New York.....	E. Backus.....	1824
16	Jos. Cadle.....	1820	do.....	Joseph Cadle.....	1824
17	H. K. Fleming.....	1820	do.....	H. K. Fleming.....	1820
18	A. W. Stow.....	do.....	A. W. Stow.....	1823
19	W. A. Thornton.....	1820	New York.....	W. A. Thornton.....	1825
20	H. A. Wilson.....	1820	do.....	H. A. Wilson.....	1824
21	Henry Beilin.....	1820	Pennsylvania.....	Henry Beilin.....	1822
22	N. Bennett.....	1820	do.....	N. Bennett.....	1824
23	Julius Catlin.....	1820	do.....	Julius Catlin.....	1824
24	John K. Findlay.....	1820	do.....	John K. Findlay.....	1824
25	Nath. Fowler.....	1820	do.....	Nath. Fowler.....	1823
26	W. A. Gordon.....	1820	do.....	W. A. Gordon.....	1824
27	Alexander Johnson.....	1820	do.....	Alexander Johnson.....	1824
28	F. T. Krease.....	1820	do.....	F. T. Krease.....	1821
29	Samuel McCoskey.....	1820	do.....	S. McCoskey.....	1822
30	George O'Driscoll.....	1820	do.....	George O'Driscoll.....	1824
31	A. W. Porter.....	1820	do.....	A. W. Porter.....	1821
32	C. F. Smith.....	1820	Pennsylvania.....	C. F. Smith.....	1825
33	Osborn Cross.....	1820	Maryland.....	Osborn Cross.....	1825
34	S. P. Dickenson.....	1820	do.....	S. P. Dickenson.....	1822
35	A. Drane.....	1820	do.....	A. Drane.....	1824
36	George W. Garey.....	1820	do.....	George W. Garey.....	1825
37	George Davis.....	1820	Delaware.....	George Davis.....	1822
38	L. F. Carter.....	1820	Virginia.....	L. F. Carter.....	1825
39	D. H. Mahan.....	1820	do.....	D. H. Mahan.....	1824
40	R. B. Wallace.....	1820	do.....	R. B. Wallace.....	1821
41	W. Taliaferro.....	1820	do.....	W. Taliaferro.....	1822
42	W. A. Borden.....	1820	North Carolina.....	W. A. Borden.....	1821
43	F. B. Shepard.....	1820	do.....	F. B. Shepard.....	1822
44	Henry Williams.....	1820	do.....	Henry Williams.....	1822
45	J. Dickenson.....	1820	South Carolina.....	J. Dickenson.....	1821
46	R. E. Hazard.....	1820	do.....	R. E. Hazard.....	1824
47	W. G. Williams.....	1820	do.....	W. G. Williams.....	1824
48	Thomas Bucklie.....	1820	Georgia.....	T. Bucklie.....	1821
49	F. L. Jones.....	1820	Tennessee.....	F. L. Jones.....	1824
50	A. P. Maury.....	1820	do.....	A. P. Maury.....	1821
51	H. L. Conner.....	1820	Mississippi.....	H. L. Conner.....	1824
52	J. N. Dillihanty.....	1820	do.....	J. N. Dillihanty.....	1824
53	H. E. V. Robinson.....	1820	Mississippi.....	H. E. V. Robinson.....	1823
54	W. P. Bainbridge.....	1820	Kentucky.....	W. P. Bainbridge.....	1824
55	W. Bickley.....	1820	do.....	W. Bickley.....	1824
56	Washington Buford.....	1820	Kentucky.....	W. Buford.....	1822
57	J. R. Ward.....	1820	do.....	J. R. Ward.....	1822
58	William Bailey.....	1820	Ohio.....	W. Bailey.....	1822
59	J. W. Stephenson.....	1820	Illinois.....	J. W. Stephenson.....	1822
60	J. G. Bruff.....	1820	District of Columbia.....	J. G. Bruff.....	1821
61	H. S. Chalmers.....	1820	do.....	H. S. Chalmers.....	1821
62	E. W. Lewis.....	1820	do.....	E. W. Lewis.....	1824
63	R. G. Wirt.....	1820	do.....	R. G. Wirt.....	1822
64	James D. Barnham.....	1820	Michigan.....	J. D. Barnham.....	1825

A. 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin till the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have with'dwn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those that have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
65	George Tennon.....	1820	Mississippi.....	George Tennon.....	1821
1	J. W. Harris.....	1821	New Hampshire.....	J. W. Harris.....	1825
2	G. Dorr.....	1821	Massachusetts.....	G. Dorr.....	1825
3	S. Mills, Jr.....	1821	do.....	Died at Mil. Academy.	1822
4	L. M. Parker.....	1821	do.....	L. M. Parker.....	1823
5	W. H. Stackpole.....	1821	do.....	W. H. Stackpole.....	1823
6	W. F. Hopkins.....	1821	Connecticut.....	W. F. Hopkins.....	1825
7	T. S. Brown.....	1821	New York.....	T. S. Brown.....	1825
8	W. H. Bibby.....	1821	do.....	W. H. Bibby.....	1823
9	E. P. Maycellin.....	1821	do.....	Died at Mil. Academy.	1822
10	P. McMartin.....	1821	do.....	P. McMartin.....	1825
11	C. F. Mumford.....	1821	do.....	C. F. Mumford.....	1822
12	A. D. Mackay.....	1821	do.....	A. D. Mackay.....	1825
13	E. L. Pettit.....	1821	do.....	E. L. Pettit.....	1822
14	P. A. Ratcliffe.....	1821	do.....	P. A. Ratcliffe.....	1825
15	S. V. Ryan.....	1821	do.....	S. V. Ryan.....	1825
16	Horace Smith.....	1821	do.....	H. Smith.....	1825
17	James F. Swift.....	1821	do.....	J. F. Swift.....	1825
18	R. C. Smead.....	1821	do.....	R. C. Smead.....	1825
19	O. C. Tibalts.....	1821	do.....	O. C. Tibalts.....	1822
20	F. J. Van Ness.....	1821	do.....	F. J. Van Ness.....	1824
21	J. S. Worth.....	1821	do.....	J. S. Worth.....	1825
22	N. S. Harris.....	1821	New Jersey.....	N. S. Harris.....	1825
23	W. R. Montgomery.....	1821	do.....	W. R. Montgomery.....	1825
24	John Williamson.....	1821	do.....	J. Williamson.....	1825
25	A. D. Bache.....	1821	Pennsylvania.....	A. D. Bache.....	1825
26	Joseph Bonnell.....	1821	do.....	Joseph Bonnell.....	1825
27	A. H. Bowman.....	1821	do.....	A. H. Bowman.....	1825
28	John M. Erving.....	1821	do.....	John M. Erving.....	1823
29	James R. Irwin.....	1821	do.....	J. R. Irwin.....	1825
30	H. W. Nancrede.....	1821	do.....	H. W. Nancrede.....	1824
31	Cyrus F. Smith.....	1821	do.....	Cyrus F. Smith.....	1823
32	B. Shaw.....	1821	do.....	B. Shaw.....	1822
33	J. D. Gibbs.....	1821	Delaware.....	J. D. Gibbs.....	1822
34	J. M. Hughes.....	1821	do.....	J. M. Hughes.....	1824
35	G. A. Kely.....	1821	Maryland.....	G. A. Kely.....	1824
36	H. Polk.....	1821	do.....	H. Polk.....	1822
37	J. T. A. Sanford.....	1821	do.....	J. T. A. Sanford.....	1822
38	James S. Thompson.....	1821	do.....	James S. Thompson.....	1825
39	D. Bedinger.....	1821	Virginia.....	D. Bedinger.....	1822
40	M. M. Clarke.....	1821	do.....	M. M. Clarke.....	1826
41	Alexander Herring.....	1821	do.....	Alexander Herring.....	1824
42	M. S. Maurice.....	1821	do.....	M. S. Maurice.....	1824
43	Theodore Meade.....	1821	do.....	Theodore Meade.....	1825
44	J. R. Page.....	1821	do.....	J. R. Page.....	1822
45	Washington Seawell.....	1821	do.....	W. Seawell.....	1825
46	F. L. Dancy.....	1821	North Carolina.....	F. L. Dancy.....	1826
47	W. M. Inge.....	1821	do.....	W. M. Inge.....	1822
48	G. W. McGee.....	1821	do.....	G. W. McGee.....	1824
49	F. Norcom.....	1821	do.....	F. Norcom.....	1825
50	N. H. Street.....	1821	do.....	N. H. Street.....	1825
51	A. H. Brisbane.....	1821	South Carolina.....	A. H. Brisbane.....	1825
52	J. B. Cape.....	1821	do.....	J. B. Cape.....	1822
53	S. M. Dessausure.....	1821	do.....	S. M. Dessausure.....	1822
54	Benjamin Huger.....	1821	do.....	B. Huger.....	1825
55	Joseph Beck.....	1821	Georgia.....	Joseph Beck.....	1822
56	Joseph Clay.....	1821	do.....	Joseph Clay.....	1825
57	M. R. T. Harrison.....	1821	do.....	Name changed to J. Williams.	M. R. T. Harrison.....	1825
58	J. V. Lacey.....	1821	do.....	J. V. Lacey.....	1821
59	A. S. Miller.....	1821	do.....	Died Mar. 15, 1822.
60	E. C. Mounger.....	1821	do.....	E. C. Mounger.....
61	W. H. Simmes.....	1821	do.....	W. H. Simmes.....	1826
62	D. S. Donelson.....	1821	Tennessee.....	D. S. Donelson.....	1825
63	J. Meredith.....	1821	do.....	J. Meredith.....
64	Robert Anderson.....	1821	Kentucky.....	R. Anderson.....	1825
65	J. G. Anderson.....	1821	do.....	J. G. Anderson.....	1825
66	J. W. Cox.....	1821	do.....	J. W. Cox.....	1824
67	Thomas H. Clay.....	1821	do.....	Thomas H. Clay.....	1822
68	J. B. Grayson.....	1821	do.....	J. B. Grayson.....	1826
69	James Lafon.....	1821	do.....	James Lafon.....	1822
70	W. C. Summers.....	1821	do.....	W. C. Summers.....	1822
71	J. B. Cox.....	1821	Ohio.....	J. B. Cox.....	1822

A 4—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin till the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have with'dwn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those that have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
72	Inlay Goodno.....	1821	Ohio.....	Inlay Goodno.....	1822
73	J. Callin.....	1821do.....	J. Callin.....	1822
74	William B. Lee.....	1821	District of Columbia.....	William B. Lee.....	1823
75	W. A. McRea.....	1821do.....	W. A. McRea.....	1822
76	Francis Taylor.....	1821do.....	F. Taylor.....	1825
1	Charles C. Frost.....	1822	Maine.....	C. C. Frost.....	1825
2	Moses E. Merrill.....	1822do.....	M. E. Merrill.....	1826
3	H. P. Thatcher.....	1822do.....	H. P. Thatcher.....	1822
4	Thomas J. Cram.....	1822	New Hampshire.....	T. J. Cram.....	1826
5	N. S. Durell, jr.....	1822do.....	N. S. Durell, jr.....
6	James F. Miller.....	1822do.....	James F. Miller.....	1826
7	J. C. Townsend.....	1822do.....	J. C. Townsend.....	1826
8	Lewis B. Peck.....	1822	Vermont.....	L. B. Peck.....	1823
9	George H. Prentiss.....	1822do.....	G. H. Prentiss.....	1826
10	Thomas S. Trask.....	1822do.....	T. S. Trask.....	1826
11	D. H. Tufts.....	1822do.....	D. H. Tufts.....	1826
12	Thomas S. Twiss.....	1822do.....	Thomas S. Twiss.....	1826
13	J. L. Daniel.....	1822	Massachusetts.....	Dead.....
14	N. J. Eaton.....	1822do.....	N. J. Eaton.....	1827
15	F. B. McNeil.....	1822do.....	F. B. McNeil.....	1825
16	James C. Stevans.....	1822do.....	J. C. Stevans.....	1824
17	George Woodbridge.....	1822do.....	G. Woodbridge.....	1826
18	Silas Casey.....	1822	Rhode Island.....	Silas Casey.....	1826
19	A. H. Foot.....	1822	Connecticut.....	A. H. Foot.....	1822
20	W. S. Whiting.....	1822do.....	W. S. Whiting.....	1822
21	T. B. Brown.....	1822	New York.....	T. B. Brown.....	1827
22	L. P. Buckley.....	1822do.....	L. P. Buckley.....	1824
23	L. F. Dering.....	1822do.....	L. F. Dering.....	1822
24	Amos B. Eaton.....	1822do.....	A. B. Eaton.....	1826
25	John Johnson.....	1822do.....	John Johnson.....	1825
26	R. W. Kearney.....	1822do.....	R. W. Kearney.....	1825
27	Edgarill Lacey.....	1822do.....	E. Lacey.....	1827
28	John T. Parker.....	1822do.....	J. T. Parker.....	1824
29	M. M. Wilson.....	1822do.....	M. M. Wilson.....	1822
30	Alexander T. Nicoll.....	1822	New Jersey.....	A. T. Nicoll.....	1824
31	J. M. Berrien.....	1822	Pennsylvania.....	J. M. Berrien.....	1826
32	Charles Colerick.....	1822do.....	Charles Colerick.....	1826
33	E. P. Duane.....	1822do.....	E. P. Duane.....	1825
34	M. C. Ewing.....	1822do.....	M. C. Ewing.....	1826
35	John Grimmel.....	1822do.....	J. Grimmel.....	1824
36	W. B. Hare.....	1822do.....	W. B. Hare.....
37	S. P. Heintzelman.....	1822do.....	S. P. Heintzelman.....	1826
38	Andrew McManus.....	1822do.....	Andrew McManus.....	1823
39	John McClellan.....	1822do.....	J. McClellan.....	1826
40	Thomas H. Pearse.....	1822do.....	T. H. Pearse.....	1826
41	Joseph Ramsay.....	1822do.....	Joseph Ramsay.....	1823
42	J. D. Searight.....	1822do.....	J. D. Searight.....	1823
43	Jacob Zielon.....	1822do.....	J. Zielon.....	1825
44	C. G. Ridgeley.....	1822	Delaware.....	C. G. Ridgeley.....	1826
45	John Archer.....	1822	Maryland.....	John Archer.....	1826
46	J. H. Benson.....	1822do.....	J. H. Benson.....	1822
47	S. H. Ridsby.....	1822do.....	S. H. Ridsby.....	1826
48	T. Armstrong.....	1822	Virginia.....	T. Armstrong.....	1825
49	William Bryant.....	1822do.....	W. Bryant.....	1826
50	Alexander G. Baldwin.....	1822do.....	Alex. G. Baldwin.....	1826
51	F. J. Brooke.....	1822do.....	F. J. Brooke.....	1826
52	William Bell.....	1822do.....	William Bell.....	1824
53	J. D. Glenn.....	1822do.....	J. D. Glenn.....	1822
54	D. S. Herring.....	1822do.....	D. S. Herring.....	1826
55	William B. Magruder.....	1822do.....	Wm. B. Magruder.....	1827
56	A. C. McCrae.....	1822do.....	A. C. McCrae.....	1826
57	C. H. C. Minor.....	1822do.....	C. H. C. Minor.....	1826
58	H. T. Washington.....	1822do.....	H. T. Washington.....	1826
59	J. H. Bowman.....	1822	North Carolina.....	J. H. Bowman.....	1824
60	J. T. Green.....	1822do.....	J. T. Green.....	1822
61	A. H. Henderson.....	1822do.....	A. H. Henderson.....	1825
62	B. H. Henderson.....	1822do.....	B. H. Henderson.....	1826
63	M. P. Parks.....	1822do.....	M. P. Parks.....	1826
64	Warren Thomas.....	1822do.....	Warren Thomas.....	1823
65	L. S. W. Wilkins.....	1822do.....	L. S. W. Wilkins.....	1825
66	R. Colcoke.....	1822	South Carolina.....	R. Colcoke.....	1826
67	G. P. Cohen.....	1822do.....	G. P. Cohen.....	1825
68	John G. Furnham.....	1822do.....	J. G. Furnham.....	1827

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have with'd'wn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those who have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
69	Fisher Gadsden	1822	South Carolina	Fisher Gadsden	1825				
70	Thomas M. Hazell	1822	do	Thomas M. Hazell	1825				
71	A. F. Holmes	1822	do	A. F. Holmes	1822				
72	Thomas Studman	1822	do	Thomas Studman					
73	E. B. White	1822	do					E. B. White	1826
74	A. Jackson	1822	Georgia			A. Jackson	1825		
75	James Allison	1822	Tennessee			James Allison	1825		
76	James G. Allen	1822	do					James G. Allen	1826
77	W. Barton	1822	do	W. Barton					
78	J. F. Sanders	1822	do	J. F. Sanders	1823				
79	D. P. Buckner	1822	Kentucky	D. P. Buckner	1822				
80	H. L. Griffin	1822	do					H. L. Griffin	1826
81	Joseph Hise	1822	do	Joseph Hise	1822				
82	J. B. Bissell	1822	Ohio	J. B. Bissell	1822				
83	E. B. Babbitt	1822	Indiana					E. B. Babbitt	1826
84	J. Hitchcock	1822	Alabama					J. Hitchcock	1827
85	A. B. Keyes	1822	do	A. B. Keyes	1825				
86	A. S. Johnson	1822	Louisiana					A. S. Johnson	1826
87	L. P. Choteau	1822	Missouri	L. P. Choteau	1823				
88	A. J. Pleasonton	1822	District of Columbia					A. J. Pleasonton	1826
89	R. Washington	1822	do			R. Washington	1824		
90	C. W. Whipple	1822	Michigan			C. W. Whipple	1827		
91	J. B. Strong	1822	Florida			J. B. Strong	1825		
92	E. R. Smith	1822	do					E. R. Smith	1826
93	W. H. C. Bartlett	1822	Missouri					W. H. C. Bartlett	1826
1	M. S. Howe	1823	Maine			M. S. Howe	1827		
2	E. H. Hubbard	1823	do	E. H. Hubbard					
3	F. J. Thompson	1823	do			F. J. Thomson	1824		
4	W. H. Baker	1823	Vermont					W. H. Baker	1828
5	C. Cushman	1823	do	C. Cushman	1826				
6	J. S. Congar	1823	do	J. S. Congar					
7	H. C. Dennison	1823	do	H. C. Dennison					
8	Isaac Lynde	1823	do					Isaac Lynde	1827
9	L. B. Whitney	1823	do	L. B. Whitney	1824				
10	E. H. L. Elwyn	1823	New Hampshire	E. H. L. Elwyn					
11	T. J. Austin	1823	Massachusetts					T. J. Austin	1828
12	John Child	1823	do					John Child	1827
13	R. J. Cleveland	1823	do	R. J. Cleveland	1823				
14	R. E. Clary	1823	do					R. E. Clary	1828
15	G. T. Goldwaite	1823	do			G. T. Goldwaite	1825		
16	J. R. Greenhough	1823	do					J. R. Greenhough	1827
17	M. S. Stilwell	1823	do					M. S. Stilwell	1827
18	F. Wheaton	1823	Rhode Island	F. Wheaton					
19	Edward French	1823	Connecticut					Edward French	1828
20	Wm. R. Lee	1823	do			William R. Lee	1824		
21	E. G. Mitchell	1823	do					E. G. Mitchell	1828
22	William W. Mather	1823	do					William W. Mather	1828
23	A. J. Centre	1823	New York					A. J. Centre	1827
24	N. N. Clarke	1823	do					N. N. Clarke	1827
25	J. C. Clarke	1823	do			John C. Clarke	1826		
26	Philip J. Forbes	1823	do			Philip J. Forbes	1824		
27	John R. Gardiner	1823	do					John R. Gardiner	1828
28	F. Harrison, jr.	1823	do	F. Harrison, jr.	1826				
29	Alanson House	1823	do			Alanson House	1824		
30	George W. Hughes	1823	do			George W. Hughes	1827		
31	Edward Schenck	1823	do					Edward Schenck	1827
32	T. B. W. Stockton	1823	do					T. B. W. Stockton	1827
33	Abm. Van Buren	1823	do					Abm. Van Buren	1827
34	J. P. Van Antwerp	1823	do	J. P. Van Antwerp	1826				
35	John Westcott	1823	do	John Westcott	1823				
36	George Bungard	1823	Pennsylvania	George Bungard	1823				
37	Alexander Cheeves	1823	do			Alexander Cheeves	1825		
38	George Fretterman	1823	do					George Fretterman	1827
39	Theodore Franks	1823	do			Theodore Franks	1828		
40	Washington Hood	1823	do					Washington Hood	1827
41	A. R. Hentzell	1823	do					A. R. Hentzell	1827
42	A. B. Johnson	1823	do			A. B. Johnson	1827		
43	David Perkins, jr.	1823	do					David Perkins, jr.	1827
44	J. C. Stocker	1823	do			J. C. Stocker	1827		
45	Edward Watts	1823	do			Edward Watts	1827		
46	James Wilson	1823	do	James Wilson	1823				
47	J. W. Collins	1823	Maryland			J. W. Collins	1827		
48	Lewis Gale, jr.	1823	do					Lewis Gale, jr.	1827

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have withdrawn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those who have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
49	Essex Sterrett	1823	Maryland					Essex Sterrett	1827
50	N. C. Weemes	1823	do	N. C. Weemes	1823				
51	W. E. Aisquith	1823	Virginia					W. E. Aisquith	1827
52	P. H. George Cocke	1823	do					P. H. George Cocke	1827
53	D. O. Carr	1823	do			D. O. Carr	1824		
54	F. W. Campbell	1823	do			F. W. Campbell	1824		
55	Henry Fairfax	1823	do	Henry Fairfax	1826				
56	G. M. Graham	1823	do	G. M. Graham	1826				
57	A. M. Green	1823	do	A. M. Green	1825				
58	Alexander S. Hooe	1823	do					Alexander S. Hooe	1827
59	William M. Mathews	1823	do	William M. Mathews	1824				
60	C. F. M. Nowland	1823	do			C. F. M. Nowland	1825		
61	S. F. Singleton	1823	do			S. F. Singleton	1824		
62	P. H. Taliaferro	1823	do			P. H. Taliaferro	1824		
63	T. M. Washington	1823	do	T. M. Washington	1823				
64	Pleasant Heise	1823	North Carolina	Pleasant Heise	1824				
65	George Hooper	1823	do	George Hooper	1824				
66	James H. Lamotte	1823	do					James H. Lamotte	1827
67	Edward L. Martin	1823	do	Edward L. Martin	1824				
68	Leonidas Polk	1823	do					Leonidas Polk	1827
69	Giles M. Pearson	1823	do	Giles M. Pearson	1826				
70	G. J. Rains	1823	do					G. J. Rains	1827
71	Samuel Spruille	1823	do	Samuel Spruille	1823				
72	Washington Thompson	1823	do			W. Thompson	1824		
73	Thomas Drayton	1823	South Carolina					Thomas Drayton	1828
74	William S. Moore	1823	do					William S. Moore	1827
75	F. M. Robertson	1823	do	F. M. Robertson	1826				
76	Solomon Betten	1823	Georgia			Solomon Betten	1825		
77	J. B. Beekman	1823	do	J. B. Beekman	1823				
78	P. A. A. Early	1823	do	P. A. A. Early	1823				
79	Josiah Wilson	1823	do	Josiah Wilson	1824				
80	P. B. Anderson	1823	Tennessee	P. B. Anderson	1825				
81	Samuel J. Hayes	1823	do	Samuel J. Hayes	1826				
82	R. M. Saunders	1823	do	R. M. Saunders	1823				
83	C. H. Watkins	1823	do			C. H. Watkins	1824		
84	N. B. Buford	1823	Kentucky					N. B. Buford	1827
85	Lucien Bibb	1823	do					Lucien Bibb	1827
86	J. A. J. Bradford	1823	do					J. A. J. Bradford	1827
87	L. F. Carter	1823	do			L. F. Carter	1825		
88	M. Flourmay	1823	do	M. Flourmay	1823				
89	W. W. Flanagan	1823	do					W. W. Flanagan	1827
90	A. D. Mann	1823	do	A. D. Mann	1823				
91	William Irwin, jr	1823	Ohio			William Irwin, jr	1826		
92	W. M. L. Kenton	1823	do			W. M. L. Kenton	1824		
93	W. Silliman, jr	1823	do	W. Silliman, jr	1825				
94	Isaac P. Simonton	1823	do					Isaac P. Simonton	1827
95	J. F. Schenck	1823	do			J. F. Schenck	1824		
96	Samuel Torrence	1823	do					Samuel Torrence	1828
97	J. Van Horn	1823	do					J. Van Horn	1827
98	C. J. Wright	1823	do					C. J. Wright	1828
99	Thomas Worthington	1823	do					Thomas Worthington	1827
100	Henry Bry	1823	Louisiana			Henry Bry	1825		
101	D. Walker	1823	do			D. Walker	1824		
102	A. Cook	1823	Missouri			A. Cook	1825		
103	A. R. Eaton	1823	do			A. R. Eaton	1825		
104	R. B. Graham	1823	do			R. B. Graham	1824		
105	J. W. Penrose	1823	do					J. W. Penrose	1828
106	F. Hewitt	1823	Illinois			F. Hewitt	1824		
107	W. Maynardier	1823	District of Columbia					W. Maynardier	1827
108	E. S. Sibley	1823	Michigan					E. S. Sibley	1827
1	Thomas Cutts	1824	Maine					Thomas Cutts	1828
2	Seth Estman	1824	do					Seth Estman	1829
3	B. W. Kinsman	1824	do					B. W. Kinsman	1828
4	John L. Locke	1824	do					John L. Locke	1827
5	Amos Foster	1824	New Hampshire					Amos Foster	1828
6	James N. Gale	1824	do			James N. Gale	1825		
7	Robert E. Temple	1824	Vermont					Robert E. Temple	1828
8	T. B. Adams	1824	Massachusetts					Thomas B. Adams	1828
9	Peter R. Bryant	1824	do	Peter R. Bryant	1825				
10	George E. Chase	1824	do					George E. Chase	1828
11	William Kenneth	1824	do			William Kenneth	1825		
12	W. R. Phelps	1824	do	W. R. Phelps	1824				
	C. N. Green	1824	Rhode Island	C. N. Green	1825				

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have with'dwn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those who have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
14	A. Martin.....	1824	Rhode Island.....	A. Martin.....	1824
15	Thomas C. Brockway....	1824	Connecticut.....	Thomas C. Brockway	1828
16	A. E. Church.....	1824	do.....	A. E. Church.....	1828
17	R. B. Hitchcock.....	1824	do.....	R. B. Hitchcock.....	1824
18	George C. Bomford.....	1824	New York.....	George C. Bomford ..	1827
19	George W. Cuyler.....	1824	do.....	George W. Cuyler.....	1825
20	G. O. Collins.....	1824	do.....	G. O. Collins.....	1828
21	W. P. N. Fitzgerald.....	1824	do.....	W. P. N. Fitzgerald..	1827
22	R. Fulton.....	1824	do.....	R. Fulton.....	1825
23	Alex. H. Hammond.....	1824	do.....	Alex. H. Hammond.....	1825
24	C. B. Rees.....	1824	do.....	C. B. Rees.....	1828
25	B. Sheppard.....	1824	do.....	B. Sheppard.....	1825
26	John F. Sherrill.....	1824	do.....	John F. Sherrill.....	1825
27	F. E. Hunt.....	1824	New Jersey.....	F. E. Hunt.....	1829
28	Charles G. Hunter.....	1824	do.....	Charles G. Hunter.....	1824
29	Theo. Simpson.....	1824	do.....	Theo. Simpson.....	1825
30	P. R. Van Wyck.....	1824	do.....	P. R. Van Wyck.....	1828
31	John H. M. Clayton.....	1824	Delaware.....	John H. M. Clayton..	1826
32	D. M. Farrelly.....	1824	Pennsylvania.....	D. M. Farrelly.....	1827
33	George Jackson.....	1824	do.....	George Jackson.....	1825
34	James F. Izard.....	1824	do.....	James F. Izard.....	1828
35	Henry Smyser.....	1824	do.....	Henry Smyser.....	1826
36	C. Stephenson.....	1824	do.....	C. Stephenson.....	1825
37	A. Thompson.....	1824	Maryland.....	Died.....
38	R. C. Tilghman.....	1824	do.....	R. C. Tilghman.....	1828
39	C. H. Winder.....	1824	do.....	C. H. Winder.....	1825
40	A. M. Green.....	1824	Virginia.....	A. M. Green.....	1825
41	Hugh W. Mercer.....	1824	do.....	Hugh W. Mercer.....	1828
42	Daniel McNeil.....	1824	North Carolina.....	Daniel McNeil.....	1825
43	J. E. B. Finley.....	1824	South Carolina.....	J. E. B. Finley.....	1826
44	J. H. Wright.....	1824	do.....	J. H. Wright.....	1829
45	George Mathews.....	1824	Georgia.....	George Mathews.....	1825
46	C. H. Spalding.....	1824	do.....	C. H. Spalding.....	1825
47	R. M. Williams.....	1824	do.....	R. M. Williams.....	1827
48	J. L. Dashiell.....	1824	Tennessee.....	J. L. Dashiell.....	1825
49	J. G. M. Floyd.....	1824	do.....	J. G. M. Floyd.....	1825
50	William Gillespie.....	1824	do.....	William Gillespie.....	1825
51	Joel Lewis.....	1824	do.....	Joel Lewis.....	1825
52	James Thompson.....	1824	do.....	James Thompson.....	1828
53	Robert Serrin.....	1824	do.....	Robert Serrin.....	1828
54	George H. Batzell.....	1824	Kentucky.....	George H. Batzell.....	1825
55	A. W. Davis.....	1824	do.....	A. W. Davis.....	1825
56	Thomas M. Lewis.....	1824	do.....	Thomas M. Lewis.....	1827
57	James T. Martin.....	1824	do.....	James T. Martin.....	1825
58	S. J. Stewart.....	1824	do.....	S. J. Stewart.....	1827
59	E. Worthington.....	1824	do.....	E. Worthington.....	1825
60	R. W. Burnett.....	1824	Ohio.....	R. W. Burnett.....	1829
61	B. F. Gard.....	1824	do.....	B. F. Gard.....	1828
62	L. M. Guynn.....	1824	do.....	L. M. Guynn.....	1825
63	Eli Mygatt.....	1824	do.....	Eli Mygatt.....	1825
64	Calvin Pease.....	1824	do.....	Calvin Pease.....	1825
65	A. Cutler.....	1824	Indiana.....	A. Cutler.....	1825
66	John F. Lane.....	1824	do.....	John F. Lane.....	1828
67	William Palmer.....	1824	do.....	William Palmer.....	1828
68	J. R. S. Van Vleet.....	1824	do.....	J. R. S. Van Vleet.....	1825
69	N. W. Edwards.....	1824	Illinois.....	N. W. Edwards.....	1825
70	W. L. E. Morrison.....	1824	do.....	W. L. E. Morrison... ..	1828
71	J. W. Penrose.....	1824	Missouri.....	J. W. Penrose.....	1828
72	S. K. Cobb.....	1824	Alabama.....	S. K. Cobb.....	1828
73	E. B. Grayson.....	1824	do.....	E. B. Grayson.....	1824
74	S. A. Roberts.....	1824	do.....	S. A. Roberts.....	1827
75	F. J. Davis.....	1824	Mississippi.....	F. J. Davis.....	1828
76	W. B. Guion.....	1824	do.....	W. B. Guion.....	1827
77	Alfred Lewis.....	1824	Louisiana.....	Alfred Lewis.....	1825
78	G. Rousseau.....	1824	do.....	G. Rousseau.....	1828
79	James W. Hamilton.....	1824	Arkansas.....	James W. Hamilton.....	1827
1	John P. Davis.....	1825	Maine.....	John P. Davis.....	1829
2	Charles Hayward.....	1825	do.....	Charles Hayward.....	1826
3	Albemarle Cady.....	1825	New Hampshire.....	Albemarle Cady.....	1829
4	Peter Johnson.....	1825	do.....	Peter Johnson.....	1829
5	Charles May.....	1825	Vermont.....	Charles May.....	1829
6	Sidney Burbank.....	1825	Massachusetts.....	Sidney Burbank.....	1829
	James Barnes.....	1825	do.....	James Barnes.....	1829

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have withdrawn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those who have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
8	A. G. Blanchard.....	1825	Massachusetts.....					A. G. Blanchard.....	1829
9	W. R. Lee, jr.....	1825	do.....			W. R. Lee, jr.....	1829		
10	G. R. Sullivan.....	1825	do.....					G. R. Sullivan.....	1829
11	Caleb Sibley.....	1825	do.....					Caleb Sibley.....	1829
12	John R. Randolph.....	1825	Rhode Island.....	John R. Randolph....	1826				
13	M. Knowlton.....	1825	Connecticut.....					M. Knowlton.....	1829
14	G. A. Sterling.....	1825	do.....					G. A. Sterling.....	1829
15	E. R. Williams.....	1825	do.....					E. R. Williams.....	1829
16	O. M. Adams.....	1825	New York.....			O. M. Adams.....	1826		
17	P. N. Adams.....	1825	do.....	P. N. Adams.....	1826				
18	P. L. Chauncey.....	1825	do.....			P. L. Chauncey.....	1827		
19	Thomas A. Davis.....	1825	do.....					Thomas A. Davis.....	1829
20	C. S. Howe.....	1825	do.....					C. S. Howe.....	1829
21	C. W. Hackley.....	1825	do.....					C. W. Hackley.....	1829
22	William Hoffman.....	1825	do.....					William Hoffman.....	1829
23	L. P. Lupton.....	1825	do.....					L. P. Lupton.....	1829
24	Charles Mason.....	1825	do.....					Charles Mason.....	1829
25	W. Patterson.....	1825	do.....			W. Patterson.....	1826		
26	Thomas Smith.....	1825	do.....	Thomas Smith.....	1826				
27	A. H. Smith.....	1825	do.....			A. H. Smith.....	1828		
28	Thomas Swords.....	1825	do.....					Thomas Swords.....	1829
29	J. H. Taylor.....	1825	do.....					James H. Taylor.....	1830
30	John C. Casey.....	1825	New Jersey.....					John C. Casey.....	1829
31	John Freeman.....	1825	do.....					John Freeman.....	1829
32	J. S. Vandevceer.....	1825	do.....					J. S. Vandevceer.....	1830
33	Henry D. Bird.....	1825	Delaware.....			Henry D. Bird.....	1827		
34	S. P. Brady.....	1825	Pennsylvania.....	S. P. Brady.....	1826				
35	James Clarke.....	1825	do.....					James Clarke.....	1829
36	L. H. Drum, jr.....	1825	do.....					L. H. Drum, jr.....	1830
37	Mylan Fox.....	1825	do.....	Mylan Fox.....	1828				
38	R. Harris, jr.....	1825	do.....	R. Harris, jr.....	1826				
39	A. Hamilton.....	1825	do.....	A. Hamilton.....	1826				
40	W. C. Hall.....	1825	do.....	W. C. Hall.....	1826				
41	John L. Keffor.....	1825	do.....			J. L. Keffor.....	1826		
42	T. B. Linnard.....	1825	do.....					T. B. Linnard.....	1830
43	John H. Pawling.....	1825	do.....					John H. Pawling.....	1829
44	J. S. Schrivner.....	1825	do.....	J. S. Schrivner.....	1826				
45	A. Snyder.....	1825	do.....					A. Snyder.....	1829
46	J. A. Smith.....	1825	do.....					J. A. Smith.....	1829
47	E. P. Hanson.....	1825	Maryland.....	E. P. Hanson.....	1826				
48	John F. Kennedy.....	1825	do.....					John F. Kennedy.....	1829
49	F. D. Magruder.....	1825	do.....	F. D. Magruder.....	1826				
50	R. H. West.....	1825	do.....	R. H. West.....	1826				
51	James Purviance.....	1825	do.....			James Purviance.....	1828		
52	N. H. Wyse.....	1825	do.....			N. H. Wyse.....	1826		
53	W. H. Warfield.....	1825	do.....					W. H. Warfield.....	1829
54	D. O. Carr.....	1825	Virginia.....	D. O. Carr.....	1827				
55	James E. Johnson.....	1825	do.....					James E. Johnson.....	1829
56	F. Jones.....	1825	do.....			F. Jones.....	1828		
57	N. W. W. Kerr.....	1825	do.....	N. W. W. Kerr.....	1826				
58	Robert E. Lee.....	1825	do.....					Robert E. Lee.....	1829
59	A. G. Pendleton.....	1825	do.....	A. G. Pendleton.....	1826				
60	J. W. Paine.....	1825	do.....	J. W. Paine.....	1826				
61	G. B. Wallace.....	1825	do.....	G. B. Wallace.....	1826				
62	William M. Ward.....	1825	do.....	William M. Ward.....	1826				
63	W. Boylan.....	1825	North Carolina.....	W. Boylan.....	1827				
64	James N. Fossyth.....	1825	do.....			James N. Fossyth.....	1826		
65	N. S. Hall.....	1825	do.....			N. S. Hall.....	1826		
66	T. Holmes.....	1825	do.....					T. Holmes.....	1829
67	E. R. Long.....	1825	do.....					E. R. Long.....	1829
68	S. C. Yellowby.....	1825	do.....	S. C. Yellowby.....	1826				
69	R. Cordias.....	1825	South Carolina.....	R. Cordias.....	1826				
70	T. P. Loundes.....	1825	do.....	T. P. Loundes.....	1827				
71	C. Pettigru.....	1825	do.....					C. Pettigru.....	1829
72	John J. Sally.....	1825	do.....			John J. Sally.....			
73	R. B. Scriven.....	1825	do.....					R. B. Scriven.....	1819
74	H. L. Theues.....	1825	do.....	H. L. Theues.....	1825				
75	J. W. M. Berrien.....	1825	Georgia.....			J. W. M. Berrien.....	1827		
76	W. H. Harford.....	1825	do.....					W. H. Harford.....	1829
77	P. O. Lumpkin.....	1825	do.....	P. O. Lumpkin.....	1827				
78	John Mackay.....	1825	do.....					John Mackay.....	1829
79	James S. Moore.....	1825	do.....					James S. Moore.....	1829
80	W. D. Chappell.....	1825	Tennessee.....	W. D. Chappell.....	1825				

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have withd'wn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those who have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
81	J. G. M. Floyd.....	1825	Tennessee.....	J. G. M. Floyd.....	1827
82	John Roberts.....	1825do.....	John Roberts.....	1826
83	G. Brown.....	1825	Kentucky.....	G. Brown.....	1829
84	A. T. Bledsoe.....	1825do.....	A. T. Bledsoe.....	1830
85	N. F. Clark.....	1825do.....	N. F. Clark.....	1826
86	C. C. Davies.....	1825do.....	C. C. Davies.....	1830
87	George Green.....	1825do.....	George Green.....	1827
88	W. R. McKee.....	1825do.....	W. R. McKee.....	1829
89	R. Sterritt.....	1825do.....	R. Sterritt.....	1826
90	B. W. Brice.....	1825	Ohio.....	B. W. Brice.....	1829
91	C. P. Buckingham.....	1825do.....	C. P. Buckingham.....	1829
92	O. M. Mitchell.....	1825do.....	O. M. Mitchell.....	1829
93	J. M. Trimble.....	1825do.....	J. M. Trimble.....	1826
94	George Wilson.....	1825do.....	George Wilson.....	1830
95	James Allen.....	1825	Indiana.....	James Allen.....	1829
96	H. Hunter.....	1825	Illinois.....	H. Hunter.....	1826
97	M. L. Clark.....	1825	Missouri.....	M. L. Clark.....	1830
98	W. R. Bromley.....	1825	Alabama.....	W. R. Bromley.....	1827
99	J. S. Greening.....	1825do.....	J. S. Greening.....	1826
100	R. G. Humphreys.....	1825	Mississippi.....	R. G. Humphreys.....	1827
101	M. H. Trimble.....	1825	Louisiana.....	M. H. Trimble.....	1826
102	W. C. D. Murdock.....	1825	District of Columbia.....	W. C. D. Murdock.....	1827
103	R. S. Rogers.....	1825do.....	R. S. Rogers.....	1826
104	Jos. B. Smith.....	1825do.....	Jos. B. Smith.....	1829
105	T. A. H. Edwards.....	1825	Michigan.....	T. A. H. Edwards.....	1826
1	James M. Hill.....	1826	Maine.....	James M. Hill.....	1830
2	Benjamin Poole.....	1826do.....	Benjamin Poole.....	1830
3	D. Davis.....	1826	Massachusetts.....	D. Davis.....	1827
4	E. M. Dwight.....	1826do.....	E. M. Dwight.....	1826
5	J. B. Walbach.....	1826do.....	J. B. Walbach.....	1827
6	W. B. Southgate.....	1826	Vermont.....	W. B. Southgate.....	1827
7	J. H. Leavenworth.....	1826do.....	J. H. Leavenworth.....	1830
8	W. Eustis.....	1826	Massachusetts.....	W. Eustis.....	1830
9	Levi Lincoln.....	1826do.....	Levi Lincoln.....	1826
10	A. T. Jenckes.....	1826	Rhode Island.....	A. T. Jenckes.....	1827
11	G. W. Patton.....	1826do.....	G. W. Patton.....	1830
12	J. R. Randolph.....	1826do.....	J. R. Randolph.....	1828
13	F. Vinton.....	1826do.....	F. Vinton.....	1830
14	W. H. Pitken.....	1826	Connecticut.....	W. H. Pitken.....	1826
15	P. N. Adams.....	1826	New York.....	P. N. Adams.....	1826
16	W. C. Hayward.....	1826do.....	W. C. Hayward.....	1830
17	S. B. Legate.....	1826do.....	S. B. Legate.....	1830
18	George W. McClure.....	1826do.....	George W. McClure.....	1830
19	T. Miller.....	1826do.....	T. Miller.....	1827
20	Edwin Rose.....	1826do.....	Edwin Rose.....	1830
21	Elias Root.....	1826do.....	Elias Root.....	1827
22	John S. Stoddard.....	1826do.....	John S. Stoddard.....	1830
23	A. J. Swift.....	1826do.....	A. J. Swift.....	1830
24	John H. Williard.....	1826do.....	John H. Williard.....	1828
25	A. S. Worth.....	1826do.....	A. S. Worth.....	1827
26	A. C. M. Penington.....	1826	New Jersey.....	A. C. M. Penington.....	1828
27	M. Scott.....	1826do.....	M. Scott.....	1831
28	J. C. Taylor.....	1826do.....	J. C. Taylor.....	1827
29	Jacob Brown.....	1826	Pennsylvania.....	Jacob Brown.....	1828
30	G. J. Claiborne.....	1826do.....	G. J. Claiborne.....	1826
31	F. Calhoun.....	1826do.....	F. Calhoun.....	1827
32	John Conrad, jr.....	1826do.....	John Conrad, jr.....	1831
33	W. A. Maxwell.....	1826do.....	W. A. Maxwell.....	1828
34	George W. Murray.....	1826do.....	George W. Murray.....	1830
35	H. Norris.....	1826do.....	H. Norris.....	1827
36	J. Ritner, jr.....	1826do.....	J. Ritner, jr.....	1830
37	James S. Naudain.....	1826	Delaware.....	James S. Naudain.....	1827
38	R. H. Whitely.....	1826do.....	R. H. Whitely.....	1830
39	L. J. Beall.....	1826	Maryland.....	L. J. Beall.....	1830
40	J. M. Clendennin.....	1826do.....	J. M. Clendennin.....	1830
41	W. H. Emory.....	1826do.....	W. H. Emory.....	1831
42	R. Gott.....	1826do.....	R. Gott.....	1827
43	R. A. Ross.....	1826do.....	R. A. Ross.....	1830
44	James West.....	1826do.....	James West.....	1830
45	W. R. Boyer.....	1826	Virginia.....	W. R. Boyer.....	1827
46	F. H. Deane.....	1826do.....	F. H. Deane.....	1827
47	John B. Fulton.....	1826do.....	John B. Fulton.....	1827
48	J. D. Johnson.....	1826do.....	J. D. Johnson.....	1827

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have with'dwn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those who have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
49	George N. Kennon.....	1826	Virginia	George N. Kennon..	1827
50	Benjamin Lewis.....	1826do.....	B. Lewis.....	1827
51	John B. Magruder.....	1826do.....	John B. Magruder...	1830
52	F. H. Nowell	1826do.....	F. H. Nowell	1827
53	W. L. Otey.....	1826do.....	W. L. Otey	1827
54	W. N. Pendleton	1826do.....	W. N. Pendleton.....	1830
55	Jos. J. Winters.....	1826do.....	Jos. J. Winters	1826
56	J. H. R. Burgoin.....	1826	North Carolina..	J. H. R. Burgoin	1830
57	R. F. Caldwell.....	1826do.....	R. F. Caldwell.....	1826
58	D. A. Manning.....	1826do.....	D. A. Manning.....	1830
59	Alfred Plummer.....	1826do.....	Alfred Plummer	1827
60	Alexander T. Telfair. .	1826do	Alexander T. Telfair.	1827
61	D. Whitehurst.....	1826	South Carolina..	D. W. Whitehurst..	1827
62	W. E. Basinger.....	1826	Georgia.....	W. E. Basinger	1830
63	J. A. Campbell.....	1826do.....	J. A. Campbell.....	1828
64	W. H. Miller.....	1826do.....	W. H. Miller	1829
65	M. J. B. Wood.....	1826do.....	Died at the academy
66	J. T. Collinsworth	1826	Tennessee.....	J. T. Collinsworth	1830
67	George W. Lawson.....	1826do.....	George W. Lawson...	1830
68	William Moore.....	1826do.....	William Moore	1828
69	W. R. Morgan.....	1826do.....	W. R. Morgan.....	1826
70	J. G. Overton.....	1826do.....	Died at the academy .	1828
71	C. Schoolfield.....	1826do.....	C. Schoolfield	1827
72	J. L. Williams.....	1826do.....	J. L. Williams.....	1827
73	T. L. Alexander.....	1826	Kentucky	T. L. Alexander.....	1830
74	John W. Barry.....	1826do.....	John W. Barry.....	1830
75	A. Buckner.....	1826do.....	A. Buckner.....	1827
76	Henry Clay.....	1827do.....	Henry Clay.....	1831
77	John Bartley.....	1826	Ohio.....	John Bartley.....	1826
78	Austin Barber.....	1826do.....	Austin Barber	1827
79	John H. Harris.....	1826do.....	John H. Harris.....	1826
80	Joseph N. Phillips.....	1826	Indiana.....	Joseph N. Phillips...	1827
81	James H. Prentiss.....	1826do.....	James H. Prentiss....	1830
82	Samuel Kinney.....	1826	Illinois.....	Samuel Kinney.....	1830
83	Charles Whistler.....	1826	Mississippi.....	Charles Whistler...	1827
84	Thomas B. Percy.....	1826	Louisiana	Thomas B. Percy....	1829
85	B. F. Rousal.....	1826do.....	B. F. Rousal.....
86	T. J. Royster.....	1826do.....	T. J. Royster	1830
87	G. G. Skipwith.....	1826do.....	G. G. Skipwith	1827
88	T. R. Beck.....	1826	Alabama.....	T. R. Beck	1828
89	R. C. Buchanan.....	1826	District of Columbia..	R. C. Buchanan.....	1830
90	W. S. Chandler.....	1826do.....	W. S. Chandler.....	1830
91	Thomas J. Lee.....	1826do.....	Thomas J. Lee	1830
92	J. B. D. Harham.....	1826	Florida.....	J. B. D. Harham	1827
1	H. E. Prentiss.....	1827	Maine.....	H. E. Prentiss	1831
2	R. S. Dix.....	1827	New Hampshire.....	R. S. Dix.....	1832
3	E. G. Eastman.....	1827do.....	E. G. Eastman.....	1831
4	W. O. L. Elvyn.....	1827do.....	Died at the academy .	1828
5	P. Anderson.....	1827	Vermont.....	P. Anderson.....	1828
6	H. W. Pettis.....	1827do.....	H. W. Pettis.....	1832
7	D. P. Russell	1827do.....	D. P. Russell	1828
8	F. W. Bottone.....	1827	Massachusetts.....	F. W. Bottone.....	1827
9	H. J. Ropes.....	1827do.....	H. J. Ropes.....	1828
10	C. H. Larned.....	1827	Rhode Island.....	C. H. Larned.....	1831
11	B. R. Alden.....	1827	New York.....	B. R. Alden.....	1831
12	G. D. Beers.....	1827do.....	G. D. Beers.....	1828
13	Jacob Brown, jr.....	1827do.....	Jacob Brown, jr.....	1832
14	William Constable.....	1827do.....	William Constable..	1828
15	George W. Duer.....	1827do.....	George W. Duer.....	1828
16	C. D. Goodrich.....	1827do.....	C. D. Goodrich.....	1827
17	A. F. Lauyer.....	1827do.....	A. F. Lauyer.....	1828
18	C. D. Marsh.....	1827do.....	C. D. Marsh.....	1829
19	S. H. Miller.....	1827do.....	S. H. Miller	1831
20	W. A. Norton.....	1827do.....	W. A. Norton.....	1831
21	E. A. Ogden.....	1827do.....	E. A. Ogden.....	1831
22	R. Park.....	1827do.....	R. Park.....	1831
23	S. H. John.....	1827do.....	S. H. John.....	1828
24	H. Swartwort.....	1827do.....	H. Swartwort	1832
25	G. H. Talcott.....	1827do.....	G. H. Talcott	1831
26	H. Van Rensselaer.....	1827do.....	H. Van Rensselaer...	1831
27	A. A. Wilder.....	1827do.....	A. A. Wilder.....	1828
28	F. Wilkinson.....	1827do.....	F. Wilkinson.....	1831
29	Horatio Vanclue.....	1827	New Jersey.....	Horatio Vanclue.....	1831

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have withdrawn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those who have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
30	J. M. Bouman	1827	Pennsylvania.....	J. M. Bouman.....	1832
31	James W. Burbridge	1827	J. W. Burbridge.....	1828
32	A. W. Garber	1827	Pennsylvania	A. W. Garber	1828
33	T. J. McKean	1827	do.....	T. J. McKean.....	1831
34	Horatio Norris	Horatio Norris.....	1828
35	James H. Stewart.....	James H. Stewart	1828
36	Lorenzo Sitgraves	1827	Pennsylvania	Lorenzo Sitgraves...	1832
37	William W. Templin.....	1827	do.....	William W. Templin.....	1829
38	Ingham Woods	1827	do.....	Ingham Wood.....	1831
39	Benjamin J. Wallace	1827	Benjamin J. Wallace.....	1831
40	Thomas Stockton.....	1827	Delaware.....	Thomas Stockton.....	1831
41	John H. Barney	1827	Maryland.....	John H. Barney.....	1828
42	William Chapman.....	1827	do.....	William Chapman	1831
43	S. J. Ridgely	1827	do.....	S. C. Ridgely.....	1831
44	William L. Alexander	1827	Virginia	William L. Alexander.....	1828
45	James D. Brown.....	1827	do.....	James D. Brown.....	1830
46	J. H. Caldwell	1827	do.....	J. H. Caldwell.....	1827
47	John Haskins.....	1827	do.....	John Haskins.....	1828
48	L. G. Harvey	1827	do.....	L. G. Harvey.....	1827
49	T. T. Henderson	1827	do.....	T. T. Henderson	1828
50	William Kello.....	1827	do.....	William Kello.....	1832
51	Thomas A. Lewis	1827	do.....	Thomas A. Lewis.....	1827
52	R. H. Peyton	1827	do.....	R. H. Peyton	1831
53	R. E. Robinson	1827	do.....	R. E. Robinson	1827
54	Beverly Snickers	1827	do.....	Beverly Snickers	1829
55	E. J. Spencer	1827	do.....	E. J. Spencer	1827
56	William E. Taylor.....	1827	do.....	William E. Taylor.....	1827
57	J. M. Taliaferro.....	1827	do.....	J. M. Taliaferro.....	1827
58	George W. Turner	1827	do.....	George W. Turner	1831
59	James Allen.....	1827	North Carolina.....	James Allen.....	1831
60	James W. Armstrong	1827	do.....	James W. Armstrong.....	1830
61	John G. Harvey.....	1827	do.....	John G. Harvey.....	1831
62	John H. Harden	1827	do.....	John H. Harden	1828
63	Henry A. Hawkins	1827	do.....	Henry A. Hawkins.....	1829
64	C. F. McRae	1827	do.....	C. F. McRae	1827
65	J. H. Purrington.....	1827	do.....	J. H. Purrington	1827
66	M. W. Rhinehart	1827	do.....	M. W. Rhinehart	1827
67	M. S. Stokes	1827	do.....	M. S. Stokes	1829
68	J. A. G. Bouchell.....	1827	South Carolina	J. A. G. Bouchell.....	1827
69	L. B. Northrop	1827	do.....	L. B. Northrop	1831
70	William W. Turner.....	1827	do.....	William W. Turner.....	1828
71	James S. Williams.....	1827	Georgia	James S. Williams.....	1831
72	A. M. Lea.....	1827	Tennessee.....	A. M. Lea.....	1831
73	C. W. Nelson.....	1827	do.....	C. W. Nelson.....	1827
74	John W. Adair	1827	Kentucky.....	John W. Adair	1828
75	E. F. Covington	1827	do.....	E. F. Covington.....	1831
76	A. Laughery.....	1827	do.....	A. Laughery.....	1829
77	William A. Miller.....	1827	do.....	William A. Miller.....	1828
78	Jacob Ammen	1827	Ohio	Jacob Ammen	1831
79	A. W. Beatty	1827	do.....	A. W. Beatty	1829
80	George W. Cass.....	1827	do.....	George W. Cass.....	1832
81	S. R. Curtis	1827	do.....	S. R. Curtis	1831
82	F. Patterson.....	1827	do.....	Died at Mil. Academy.....	1828
83	Joseph C. Vance	1827	do.....	Joseph C. Vance.....	1832
84	C. Whittlesey	1827	do.....	C. Whittlesey	1831
85	A. G. Edwards	Illinois	A. G. Edwards.....	1832
86	William Woolley	Missouri.....	William Woolley.....	1827
87	B. T. Hughes	Louisiana	B. T. Hughes	1828
88	R. A. Wilkinson.....	do.....	R. A. Wilkinson	1827
89	John N. Drake	Alabama	John N. Drake	1830
90	Isaac S. Rowland.....	Michigan.....	Isaac S. Rowland.....	1829
91	James Scull	Arkansas	James Scull	1827
92	George Willis	Florida	George Willis	1827
93	Andrew A. Humphreys	Pennsylvania	And. A. Humphreys.....	1831
1	Charles H. Granger.....	1828	Maine.....	Charles H. Granger	1829
2	Thomas M. Hill.....	1828	do.....	Thomas M. Hill.....	1832
3	E. D. Keyes.....	1828	do.....	E. D. Keyes.....	1832
4	George Watson.....	1828	do.....	George Watson.....	1832
5	John Bellows.....	1828	New Hampshire	John Bellows.....	1828
6	John Beach	1828	do.....	John Beach	1832
7	F. T. Kidder	1828	do.....	F. T. Kidder	1828
8	F. McDuffie.....	1828	do.....	F. McDuffie.....	1832
9	John J. Deavitt.....	1828	Vermont	John J. Deavitt.....	1828

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have with'dwn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those who have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
10	Vertulon Rich.....	1828	Vermont.....	Vertulon Rich.....	1828
11	Charles G. Bush.....	1828	Massachusetts.....	Charles G. Bush.....	1831
12	W. H. Clarke.....	1828	do.....	W. H. Clarke.....	1829
13	Freeman Hinkley.....	1828	do.....	Freeman Hinkley.....	1828
14	R. B. Marcy.....	1828	do.....	R. B. Marcy.....	1832
15	Henry J. Ropes.....	1828	do.....	Henry J. Ropes.....	1829
16	George W. Ward.....	1828	do.....	George W. Ward.....	1832
17	Jacob Bailey.....	1828	Rhode Island.....	Jacob Bailey.....	1832
18	Thomas E. Clark.....	1828	Connecticut.....	Thomas E. Clark.....	1829
19	George D. Dimon.....	1828	do.....	George D. Dimon.....	1833
20	F. Freeman.....	1828	do.....	F. Freeman.....	1830
21	T. H. C. Kingsbury.....	1828	do.....	T. H. C. Kingsbury.....	1829
22	Henry G. Sill.....	1828	do.....	Henry G. Sill.....	1832
23	D. Ayres.....	1828	New York.....	D. Ayres.....	1828
24	John H. Allen.....	1828	do.....	John H. Allen.....	1833
25	John E. Brackett.....	1828	do.....	John E. Brackett.....	1832
26	John J. Beardsley.....	1828	do.....	John J. Beardsley.....	1828
27	L. Jones.....	1828	do.....	L. Jones.....	1831
28	John N. Macomb.....	1828	do.....	John N. Macomb.....	1832
29	John C. Reid.....	1828	do.....	John C. Reid.....	1833
30	Edward Saffern.....	1828	do.....	Edward Saffern.....	1828
31	William H. Storer.....	1828	do.....	William H. Storer.....	1832
32	D. P. Whiting.....	1828	do.....	D. P. Whiting.....	1832
33	Henry Southard.....	1828	New Jersey.....	Henry Southard.....	1829
34	J. H. Simpson.....	1828	do.....	J. H. Simpson.....	1832
35	John N. Elbert.....	1828	Delaware.....	John N. Elbert.....	1829
36	W. B. Burnett.....	1828	Pennsylvania.....	W. B. Burnett.....	1832
37	A. B. Bradford.....	1828	do.....	A. B. Bradford.....	1828
38	J. C. Campbell.....	1828	do.....	J. C. Campbell.....	1829
39	John R. Edie.....	1828	do.....	John R. Edie.....	1829
40	Lewis Howell.....	1828	do.....	Lewis Howell.....	1832
41	Pharon Jarrett.....	1828	do.....	Pharon Jarrett.....	1829
42	M. M. Moore.....	1828	do.....	M. M. Moore.....	1828
43	John Markoe, Jr.....	1828	do.....	John Markoe, Jr.....	1828
44	P. Waddell.....	1828	do.....	P. Waddell.....	1831
45	William Wall.....	1828	do.....	William Wall.....	1832
46	R. H. Archer.....	1828	Maryland.....	R. H. Archer.....	1832
47	E. M. Muncaster.....	1828	do.....	E. M. Muncaster.....	1829
48	T. Tilghman.....	1828	do.....	T. Tilghman.....	1832
49	R. O. Burton.....	1828	Virginia.....	R. O. Burton.....	1828
50	R. S. Chew.....	1828	do.....	R. S. Chew.....	1829
51	A. G. Conway.....	1828	do.....	A. G. Conway.....	1828
52	P. St. George Cocke.....	1828	do.....	P. St. George Cocke.....	1832
53	C. E. Dodridge.....	1828	do.....	C. E. Dodridge.....	1828
54	G. G. Davidson.....	1828	do.....	G. G. Davidson.....	1828
55	B. S. Ewell.....	1828	do.....	B. S. Ewell.....	1832
56	George H. Griffin.....	1828	do.....	George H. Griffin.....	1832
57	Taliaferro Hunter.....	1828	do.....	Taliaferro Hunter.....	1829
58	B. A. Lee.....	1828	do.....	B. A. Lee.....	1828
59	S. McClintie.....	1828	do.....	S. McClintie.....	1830
60	John N. Rose.....	1828	do.....	John N. Rose.....	1828
61	R. H. N. Saunders.....	1828	do.....	R. H. N. Saunders.....	1829
62	William E. Taylor.....	1828	do.....	William E. Taylor.....	1828
63	Robert E. Whitlocke.....	1828	do.....	Robert E. Whitlocke.....	1829
64	H. K. Burguyn.....	1828	North Carolina.....	H. K. Burguyn.....	1831
65	D. Donaldson.....	1828	do.....	D. Donaldson.....	1829
66	R. C. Gatlin.....	1828	do.....	R. C. Gatlin.....	1832
67	John H. Hardin.....	1828	do.....	John H. Hardin.....	1828
68	C. McRea.....	1828	do.....	C. McRea.....	1829
69	M. W. Rhinehart.....	1828	do.....	M. W. Rhinehart.....	1828
70	J. E. Dargin.....	1828	South Carolina.....	J. E. Dargin.....	1829
71	Edward Deas.....	1828	do.....	Edward Deas.....	1832
72	P. H. Earle.....	1828	do.....	P. H. Earle.....	1829
73	John W. Lee.....	1828	do.....	John W. Lee.....	1828
74	A. C. Myers.....	1828	do.....	A. C. Myers.....	1833
75	T. D. Sumpter.....	1828	do.....	T. D. Sumpter.....	1829
76	William G. Bonner.....	1828	Georgia.....	William G. Bonner.....	1831
77	R. W. Habersham.....	1828	do.....	R. W. Habersham.....	1829
78	R. G. Fain.....	1828	Tennessee.....	R. G. Fain.....	1832
79	John W. McCrabb.....	1828	do.....	John W. McCrabb.....	1833
80	Joseph D. McCann.....	1828	do.....	Joseph D. McCann.....	1829
81	Asbury Ury.....	1828	do.....	Asbury Ury.....	1832
82	H. K. Yoakum.....	1828	do.....	H. K. Yoakum.....	1832

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have withdrawn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those who have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
83	Joshua Cobb.....	1828	Kentucky.....	Joshua Cobb.....	1831
84	George B. Crittenden.....	1828	do.....	George B. Crittenden.....	1832
85	Joseph G. Hawkins.....	1828	do.....	Joseph G. Hawkins.....	1831
86	Jas. P. Hardin.....	1828	do.....	James P. Hardin.....	1832
87	William A. Miller.....	1828	do.....	William A. Miller.....	1829
88	H. Marshall.....	1828	do.....	H. Marshall.....	1832
89	Richard Shelly.....	1828	do.....	Richard Shelly.....	1829
90	M. Thompson.....	1828	do.....	M. Thompson.....	1828
91	E. P. Fyffe.....	1828	Ohio.....	E. P. Fyffe.....	1828
92	N. G. R. Gassaway.....	1828	do.....	Died at the Military Acad'y Nov., 1829.
93	G. P. Kingsbury.....	1828	do.....	G. P. Kingsbury.....	1832
94	James Walker.....	1828	do.....	James Walker.....	1831
95	J. R. D. Burnett.....	1828	Indiana.....	J. R. D. Burnett.....	1833
96	George B. Clark.....	1828	do.....	George B. Clark.....	1828
97	L. Gregory.....	1828	do.....	L. Gregory.....	1831
98	John C. Sprigg.....	1828	Illinois.....	John C. Sprigg.....	1830
99	A. Allen.....	1828	Mississippi.....	A. Allen.....	1830
100	R. P. Smith.....	1828	do.....	R. P. Smith.....	1832
101	A. Bouigny.....	1828	Louisiana.....	A. Bouigny.....	1830
102	John N. Drake.....	1828	do.....	John A. Drake.....	1830
103	Joel Riggs.....	1828	do.....	Joel Riggs.....	1833
104	T. F. Wilkinson.....	1828	do.....	T. F. Wilkinson.....	1832
105	James V. Bomford.....	1828	District of Columbia.....	James V. Bomford.....	1832
106	C. B. Chalmers.....	1828	do.....	C. B. Chalmers.....	1834
107	A. F. Seaton.....	1828	do.....	A. F. Seaton.....	1833
108	A. Brush.....	1828	Michigan.....	A. Brush.....	1832
109	James L. Scull.....	1828	Arkansas.....	James L. Scull.....	1830
110	John T. Williams.....	1828	Florida.....	John T. Williams.....	1828
1	H. C. Baxter.....	1829	Maine.....	H. C. Baxter.....	1830
2	C. H. Granger.....	1829	do.....	C. H. Granger.....	1830
3	J. M. Chadwick.....	1829	New Hampshire.....	J. M. Chadwick.....	1831
4	T. B. Lambert.....	1829	do.....	T. B. Lambert.....	1829
5	Benjamin Alvord.....	1829	Vermont.....	Benjamin Alvord.....	1833
6	E. Brewster.....	1829	do.....	E. Brewster.....	1829
7	W. W. S. Bliss.....	1829	do.....	W. W. S. Bliss.....	1833
8	J. L. Coburn.....	1829	do.....	J. L. Coburn.....	1834
9	S. G. Simmonds.....	1829	do.....	S. G. Simmonds.....	1834
10	J. G. Barnard.....	1829	Massachusetts.....	J. G. Barnard.....	1833
11	John P. Centre.....	1829	do.....	J. P. Centre.....	1833
12	W. H. Clark.....	1829	do.....	W. H. Clark.....	1830
13	James L. Cooper.....	1829	do.....	James L. Cooper.....	1833
14	R. W. Lee.....	1829	do.....	R. W. Lee.....	1833
15	R. R. Mudge.....	1829	do.....	R. R. Mudge.....	1833
16	D. Ruggles.....	1829	do.....	D. Ruggles.....	1833
17	F. A. Smith.....	1829	do.....	F. A. Smith.....	1833
18	N. S. Varnum.....	1829	do.....	N. S. Varnum.....	1830
19	T. T. Wyman.....	1829	do.....	T. T. Wyman.....	1830
20	David E. Hale.....	1829	Rhode Island.....	D. E. Hale.....	1833
21	G. W. Holly.....	1829	Connecticut.....	G. W. Holly.....	1832
22	Francis Howe.....	1829	do.....	Francis Howe.....	1832
23	H. W. Wessels.....	1829	do.....	H. W. Wessels.....	1833
24	John C. Willy.....	1829	do.....	J. C. Willy.....	1829
25	J. E. Beardsley.....	1829	New York.....	J. E. Beardsley.....	1829
26	E. A. Capron.....	1829	do.....	E. A. Capron.....	1833
27	J. C. Davis.....	1829	do.....	J. C. Davis.....	1831
28	Julius E. Edson.....	1829	do.....	J. E. Edson.....	1830
29	E. D. Elliott.....	1829	do.....	E. D. Elliott.....	1832
30	George P. Field.....	1829	do.....	George P. Field.....	1834
31	C. A. Garsay.....	1829	do.....	C. A. Garsay.....	1830
32	John Graham.....	1829	do.....	John Graham.....	1834
33	William Harris.....	1829	do.....	William Harris.....	1830
34	Arnold Harris.....	1829	do.....	Arnold Harris.....	1834
35	Rufus King.....	1829	do.....	Rufus King.....	1833
36	G. Mills.....	1829	do.....	G. Mills.....	1830
37	Henry McKavett.....	1829	do.....	Henry McKavett.....	1834
38	H. A. Norris.....	1829	do.....	H. A. Norris.....	1833
39	Wm. H. Sidell.....	1829	do.....	Wm. H. Sidell.....	1833
40	T. Ten Brooke.....	1829	do.....	T. Ten Brooke.....	1830
41	J. F. Ewing.....	1829	New Jersey.....	J. F. Ewing.....	1832
42	A. E. Shiras.....	1829	do.....	A. E. Shiras.....	1833
43	Henry Dupont.....	1829	Delaware.....	Henry Dupont.....	1833
44	J. E. Blake.....	1829	Pennsylvania.....	J. E. Blake.....	1833

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have with'd'wn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those who have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
45	G. W. Cullum	1829	Pennsylvania					G. W. Cullum	1833
46	J. P. Davis	1829	do	J. P. Davis	1829				
47	J. M. Green	1829	do			J. M. Green	1830		
48	J. H. Hobart	1829	do	J. H. Hobart	1831				
49	Pharon Jarrett	1829	do			Pharon Jarrett	1831		
50	D. McBride	1829	do			D. McBride	1831		
51	James McClure	1829	do					James McClure	1833
52	John H. Miller	1829	do					John H. Miller	1833
53	James G. Reid	1829	do					James G. Reid	1834
54	Alonzo Switzer	1829	do			Alonzo Switzer	1830		
55	Ed. Schriver	1829	do					Ed. Schriver	1833
56	R. S. Smith	1829	do					R. S. Smith	1834
57	John Watson	1829	do	John Watson	1829				
58	James C. Lynn	1829	Maryland	J. C. Lynn	1830				
59	George H. Ringold	1829	do					G. H. Ringold	1833
60	A. Ball	1829	Virginia			A. Ball	1830		
61	R. W. Crawford	1829	do	R. W. Crawford	1829				
62	J. L. Davis	1829	do					J. L. Davis	1833
63	D. B. Harris	1829	do					D. B. Harris	1833
64	F. A. Hunter	1829	do	F. A. Hunter	1830				
65	Geo. H. Pegram	1829	do					Geo. H. Pegram	1833
66	Ed. D. Steptoe	1829	do			Ed. D. Steptoe	1830		
67	Larkin Smith	1829	do	In the Mil. Academy					
68	F. H. Smith	1829	do					F. H. Smith	1833
69	A. D. Townes	1829	do			A. D. Townes	1830		
70	T. H. Williamson	1829	do	T. H. Williamson	1833				
71	John Wimbish	1829	do	John Wimbish	1829				
72	D. Donaldson	1829	North Carolina			D. Donaldson	1830		
73	A. Plunkett	1829	do	A. Plunkett	1830				
74	Alfred Staley	1829	do	Alfred Staley	1829				
75	H. L. Scott	1829	do					H. L. Scott	1833
76	J. H. Shepard	1829	do	J. H. Shepard	1830				
77	T. H. Brennan	1829	South Carolina	T. H. Brennan	1829				
78	W. S. Drayton	1829	do	W. S. Drayton	1832				
79	B. E. Dubose	1829	do					B. E. Dubose	1833
80	N. Cruger	1829	do			N. Cruger	1830		
81	James Reed	1829	do			James Reed	1830		
82	John Word	1829	do	John Word	1830				
83	R. W. Habersham	1829	Georgia	R. W. Habersham	1830				
84	N. W. Hunter	1829	do					N. W. Hunter	1833
85	B. Hunter	1829	do			B. Hunter	1830		
86	Jos. D. McCann	1829	Tennessee	J. D. McCann	1830				
87	J. A. Thomas	1829	do					J. A. Thomas	1833
88	Philip Barbour	1829	Kentucky					Philip Barbour	1834
89	Henry Waller	1829	do					Henry Waller	1833
90	J. Caldwell	1829	Ohio	J. Caldwell	1829				
91	J. W. Caldwell	1829	do			J. W. Caldwell	1831		
92	D. C. Green	1829	do	D. C. Green	1829				
93	James Walker	1829	do			James Walker	1821		
94	Jno. Walke	1829	do			Jno. Walke	1830		
95	Wm. Dewey	1829	Indiana			William Dewey	1833		
96	Isaiah Garrett	1829	Missouri					Isaiah Garrett	1833
97	R. G. Paul	1829	do					R. G. Paul	1834
98	W. M. Carpenter	1829	Louisiana	W. M. Carpenter	1831				
99	C. N. Olivier	1829	do			C. N. Olivier	1830		
100	Win. A. Ellmore	1829	Alabama			W. A. Ellmore	1830		
101	J. P. Harrison	1829	do					J. P. Harrison	1833
102	J. P. Walker	1829	do			J. P. Walker	1831		
103	Thos. H. Johns	1829	District of Columbia					Thos. H. Johns	1833
104	Jas. Rush	1829	do	Jas. Rush	1830				
105	J. M. Wells	1829	do			J. M. Wells	1830		
106	J. W. Anderson	1829	do					J. W. Anderson	1833
107	W. S. Ketchum	1829	do					W. S. Ketchum	1834
108	Henry Ingraham	1829	Florida			Henry Ingraham	1830		
1	S. M. Plumer	1830	Maine	In the academy					
2	Ransom Huntoon	1830	New Hampshire	Ransom Huntoon	1834				
3	W. A. Parker	1830	do			W. A. Parker	1831		
4	C. A. Fuller	1830	Massachusetts					C. A. Fuller	1834
5	Ed. F. Barnard	1830	do	Ed. F. Barnard	1830				
6	Wm. K. Mills	1830	do	Wm. K. Mills	1832				
7	J. H. Whipple	1830	do	J. H. Whipple	1830				
8	J. W. Adams	1830	Connecticut	J. W. Adams	1832				
9	B. C. Watson	1830	Rhode Island			B. C. Watson	1831		

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have with'dwn from the academy, before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those who have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
10	C. D. Wood	1830	Rhode Island	C. D. Wood	1831				
11	B. S. Roberts	1830	Vermont	In the academy					
12	G. W. Featherstonaugh	1830	New York			G. W. Featherstonaugh	1831		
13	T. B. Arden	1830	do.	In the academy					
14	C. H. Hughes	1830	do.			C. H. Hughes	1831		
15	T. H. Teall	1830	do.	T. H. Teall	1834				
16	C. H. E. Spoor	1830	do.			C. H. E. Spoor	1831		
17	B. Conkling	1830	do.	B Conkling	1830				
18	M. C. Pitcher	1830	do.			M. C Pitcher	1831		
19	Ed. Suffron	1830	do.			Ed. Suffron	1831		
20	Wm. H. De Forest	1830	do.	In the academy					
21	C. A. Garsay	1830	do.			C. A. Garsay	1830		
22	M. S. Miller	1830	do.					M. S. Miller	1834
23	Wm. Smith	1830	do.					Wm. Smith	1834
24	James Duncan	1830	do.					James Duncan	1834
25	J. C. Williamson	1830	do.	J. C. Williamson	1831				
26	J. Holcombe	1830	New Jersey	J. Holcombe	1831				
27	W. C. Crane	1830	do.			W. C. Crane	1832		
28	Wm. H. Price	1830	Pennsylvania					Wm. H. Price	1834
29	Alex. Montgomery	1830	do.					Alex. Montgomery	1834
30	H. M. Naglee	1830	do.	In the academy					
31	James Hall	1830	do.	James Hall	1832				
32	Nath. McGiffin	1830	do.	N. McGiffin	1831				
33	James F. Cooper	1830	do.					J. F. Cooper	1834
34	Charles De Silver	1830	do.	C. De Silver	1831				
35	Wm. T. Stockton	1830	do.					W. T. Stockton	1834
36	Robert Allen	1830	Maryland					Robert Allen	1834
37	L. P. Balch	1830	do.	L. P. Balch	1832				
38	Levin Hodson	1830	do.	L. Hodson	1830				
39	R. Ridgely	1830	do.			R. Ridgely	1831		
40	F. O. Wyse	1830	do.			F. O. Wyse	1831		
41	F. Britton	1830	Virginia					F. Britton	1834
42	C. C. Baldwin	1830	do.	C. C. Baldwin	1830				
43	T. L. Brent	1830	do.	In the academy					
44	R. R. Chamberlain	1830	do.			R. R. Chamberlain	1831		
45	E. S. Fontaine	1830	do.			E. S. Fontaine	1831		
46	W. G. Freeman	1830	do.					W. G. Freeman	1834
47	T. P. Giles	1830	do.	T. P. Giles	1830				
48	John E. Johnson	1830	do.	J. E. Johnson	1832				
49	John F. Lee	1830	do.					John F. Lee	1834
50	A. Magruder	1830	do.	A. Magruder	1831				
51	Edwin Robinson	1830	do.	Edwin Robinson	1832				
52	Eustace Robinson	1830	do.					E. Robinson	1834
53	W. S. Reid	1830	do.	W. S. Reid	1831				
54	J. W. Smyth	1830	do.			J. W. Smyth	1830		
55	Henry S. Turner	1830	do.					H. S. Turner	1834
56	E. Turner	1830	do.	E. Turner	1830				
57	J. Wingfield	1830	do.			J. Wingfield	1831		
58	R. A. Burton	1830	North Carolina			R. A. Burton	1831		
59	A. V. Brumby	1830	do.	In the academy					
60	Charles Lutterloh	1830	do.			C. Lutterloh	1831		
61	A. M. Mitchell	1830	do.	In the academy					
62	J. B. Southall	1830	do.	J. B. Southall	1831				
63	A. B. Brailsford	1830	South Carolina	A. B. Brailsford	1831				
64	J. W. Crook	1830	do.			J. W. Crook	1831		
65	T. O. Barnwell	1830	do.					T. O. Barnwell	1834
66	A. M. Battey	1830	Georgia			A. M. Battey	1832		
67	Goode Bryan	1830	do.					Goode Bryan	1834
68	J. J. B. Hoxey	1830	do.	J. J. B. Hoxey	1830				
69	John C. Hunter	1830	do.	J. C. Hunter	1830				
70	P. R. Thompson	1830	do.	In the academy					
71	C. H. Fry	1830	Kentucky					C. H. Fry	1834
72	H. Loughborough	1830	do.					H. Loughborough	1834
73	T. G. Porter	1830	do.	T. G. Porter	1830				
74	C. Pope	1830	do.					C. Pope	1834
75	John M. Scott	1830	do.	In the academy					
76	S. T. Tibbatts	1830	do.	S. T. Tibbatts	1830				
77	J. E. Henderson	1830	Tennessee					J. E. Henderson	1834
78	T. P. Jones	1830	do.			T. P. Jones	1830		
79	R. P. Pryor	1830	do.			R. P. Pryor	1831		
80	D. Shelby	1830	do.	D. Shelby	1831				
81	L. C. Standefer	1830	do.	L. C. Standefer	1830				
82	J. Caldwell	1830	Ohio			J. Caldwell	1831		

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have withdrawn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those who have graduated at the United States Military Academy.	Year of their graduation.
83	A. R. Johnson	1830	Ohio.....	In the academy.....
84	E. Kibby	1830	do.....	E. Kibby	1834
85	James Wilson	1830	do.....	James Wilson.....	1830
86	F. N. Ogden	1830	Louisiana.....	F. N. Ogden	1832
87	C. N. Olivier.....	1830	do.....	C. N. Olivier.....	1832
88	T. W. Gibson.....	1830	Indiana.....	T. W. Gibson.....	1832
89	Thomas A. Morris	1830	do.....	T. A. Morris.....	1834
90	S. S. Slaughter	1830	do.....	S. S. Slaughter	1830
91	Henry Miner.....	1830	Alabama.....	H. Miner.....	1831
92	J. Primm	1830	Illinois.....	J. Primm	1831
93	Alexander McNair.....	1830	Missouri.....	Alex. McNair.....	1831
94	S. L. Hunt.....	1830	Michigan.....	S. L. Hunt.....	1831
95	G. F. Owen.....	1830	Arkansas.....	G. F. Owen.....	1830
96	John Sanders.....	1830	Florida.....	John Sanders.....	1834
97	W. D. Vinson	1830	District of Columbia.....	W. D. Vinson	1830
98	Geo. C. Waggaman.....	1830	do.....	Geo. C. Waggaman	1830
99	J. M. Wells.....	1830	do.....	In the academy.....
100	S. P. Walker.....	1830	do.....	S. P. Walker.....	1831
101	Alex. S. Macomb.....	1830	In the academy.....
102	L. A. B. Walbach.....	1830	L. A. B. Walbach.....	1834
103	Edgar A. Poe	1830	E. A. Poe.....	1831

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have withdrawn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those now in the Military Academy.
1	L. Bradbury	1831	Maine					L. Bradbury
2	Henry Prince	1831	do					Henry Prince
3	J. L. Stevenson	1831	do	J. L. Stevenson	1832			
4	C. J. Whiting	1831	do					C. J. Whiting
5	H. L. Kendrick	1831	New Hampshire					H. L. Kendrick
6	J. H. Whipple	1831	Massachusetts					J. H. Whipple
7	H. Brookes	1831	do					H. Brookes
8	C. H. Bigelow	1831	do					C. H. Bigelow
9	E. M. Stilwell	1831	do	E. M. Stilwell	1832			
10	J. W. Judson	1831	Connecticut					J. W. Judson
11	Alexander Wolcott	1831	do			Alexander Wolcott	1831	
12	C. A. Green	1831	Rhode Island	C. A. Green	1831			
13	S. Whitehorn	1831	do					S. Whitehorn
14	E. M. Burton	1831	Vermont	Died at Military Academy, Sept., 1834.				
15	R. F. Baker	1831	New York					R. F. Baker
16	W. S. Brown	1831	do					W. S. Brown
17	W. S. Church	1831	do			W. S. Church	1832	
18	A. Campbell	1831	do					A. Campbell
19	W. S. Henry	1831	do					W. S. Henry
20	J. H. Martindale	1831	do					J. H. Martindale
21	E. Maynard	1831	do	E. Maynard	1831			
22	J. McC. Morgan	1831	do					J. McC. Morgan
23	J. Moulton	1831	do	J. Moulton	1831			
24	G. W. Morell	1831	do					G. W. Morell
25	M. C. Patrick	1831	do					M. C. Patrick
26	Isaac Reeve, jr.	1831	do					Isaac Reeve, jr.
27	C. Vandeventer	1831	do			C. Vandeventer	1832	
28	W. H. Warner	1831	do					W. H. Warner
29	J. Holcombe	1831	New Jersey	J. Holcombe	1831			
30	W. D. McKissack	1831	do					W. D. McKissack
31	George Thomas	1831	do			George Thomas	1832	
32	Alexander Bowman	1831	Pennsylvania			A. Bowman	1832	
33	John Davis	1831	do			John Davis	1832	
34	D. De Silver	1831	do	C. De Silver	1831			
35	R. W. Dennis	1831	do			R. W. Dennis	1834	
36	W. N. Grier	1831	do					W. N. Grier
37	Heman Haupt	1831	do					H. Haupt
38	George Mead	1831	do					George Mead
39	C. G. Brown	1831	Maryland	C. G. Brown	1831			
40	Thomas T. Gault	1831	do	Thomas T. Gault	1834			
41	W. R. Handy	1831	do	W. R. Handy	1831			
42	Alfred Herbert	1831	do					A. Herbert
43	F. G. Skinner	1831	do			F. G. Skinner	1832	
44	James H. Stokes	1831	do					James H. Stokes
45	R. L. Scott	1831	do	R. L. Scott	1832			
46	L. Tighman	1831	do					L. Tighman
47	F. G. Crawford	1831	Virginia	F. G. Crawford	1831			
48	James N. Ellis	1831	do					J. N. Ellis
49	Henry Field	1831	do	H. Field	1832			
50	A. J. Minor	1831	do			A. J. Minor	1834	
51	R. W. Norris	1831	do	R. W. Norris	1832			
52	J. M. Renicke	1831	do					J. M. Renicke
53	Thomas Wilson	1831	do	Thomas Wilson	1831			
54	Thomas H. Ash	1831	North Carolina			T. H. Ash	1832	
55	P. B. Bullock	1831	do			P. B. Bullock	1832	
56	John H. Cook	1831	do	J. H. Cook	1831			
57	G. B. Clitherall	1831	do			G. B. Clitherall	1832	
58	J. L. Keais	1831	do					J. L. Keais
59	C. Miller	1831	do	C. Miller	1831			
60	R. H. Smith	1831	do			R. H. Smith	1832	
61	A. B. Faust	1831	South Carolina	A. B. Faust	1831			
62	P. C. Gaillard	1831	do					P. C. Gaillard
63	W. H. Griffin	1831	do					W. H. Griffin
64	J. J. McMahan	1831	do			J. J. McMahan	1832	
65	W. H. Betts	1831	Georgia					W. H. Betts
66	W. A. Jenkins	1831	do			W. A. Jenkins	1832	
67	Hugh McLeod	1831	do					H. McLeod
68	L. M. H. Walker	1831	do					L. M. H. Walker
69	M. Blair	1831	Kentucky					M. Blair
70	W. V. Cosby	1831	do	W. V. Cosby	1832			
71	John Hanly	1831	do					John Hanly
72	H. Martin, jr.	1831	do			H. Martin	1832	

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have withdrawn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those now in the Military Academy.
73	J. H. Spurgin.....	1831	Kentucky			J. H. Spurgin.....	1832
74	S. S. Tibbatts.....	1831do.....					S. S. Tibbatts.....
75	A. Dougherty.....	1831	Tennessee.....	A. Dougherty.....	1831		
76	R. Henderson.....	1831do.....					R. Henderson.....
77	A. C. White.....	1831do.....	A. C. White.....	1832		
78	George W. Ames.....	1831	Ohio	G. W. Ames.....	1832		
79	John W. Scott.....	1831do.....					John W. Scott.....
80	George W. Shaw.....	1831do.....					George W. Shaw.....
81	A. H. Tappen.....	1831do.....					A. H. Tappen.....
82	J. B. Plauché.....	1831	Louisiana			J. B. Plauché.....	1833
83	W. M. Cox.....	1831	Mississippi.....			W. M. Cox.....	1832
84	J. M. Withers.....	1831	Alabama.....					J. M. Withers.....
85	D. Cabaune.....	1831	Missouri.....					D. Cabaune.....
86	W. K. Hanson.....	1831	District of Columbia.....					W. K. Hanson.....
87	G. C. Waggaman.....	1831do.....					G. C. Waggaman.....
88	J. H. Eaton.....	1831do.....					J. H. Eaton.....
89	A. B. Eustis.....	1831do.....			A. B. Eustis.....	1832
90	G. M. Legate.....	1831do.....					G. M. Legate.....
91	James L. Mason.....	1832do.....					James L. Mason.....
92	R. A. Wainright.....	1831do.....					R. A. Wainright.....
93	Joseph Roberts.....	1831	Delaware.....					Joseph Roberts.....
1	Henry Carter.....	1832	Maine.....	H. Carter.....	1834		
2	D. Leadbetter.....	1832do.....					D. Leadbetter.....
3	Thomas McCrate.....	1832do.....					Thomas McCrate.....
4	W. B. Arvin.....	1832	New Hampshire.....					W. B. Arvin.....
5	C. B. Daniel.....	1832do.....					C. B. Daniel.....
6	D. P. Woodbury.....	1832do.....					D. P. Woodbury.....
7	J. H. Adams.....	1832	Massachusetts.....					J. H. Adams.....
8	M. Churchill.....	1832do.....					M. Churchill.....
9	T. P. Rogers.....	1832do.....			T. P. Rogers.....	1832
10	W. A. Brown.....	1832	Connecticut.....	W. A. Brown.....	1832		
11	F. Stevens.....	1832do.....	F. Stevens.....	1832		
12	William Wales.....	1832do.....	William Wales.....	1832		
13	C. A. Green.....	1832	Rhode Island.....					C. A. Green.....
14	John W. Phelps.....	1832	Vermont.....					J. W. Phelps.....
15	J. W. Sherman.....	1832	Rhode Island.....					J. W. Sherman.....
16	D. C. Sprague.....	1832do.....			D. C. Sprague.....	1832
17	M. Burke, jr.....	1832	New York.....					M. Burke, jr.....
18	A. P. Allen.....	1832do.....					A. P. Allen.....
19	B. Conkling.....	1832do.....					B. Conkling.....
20	H. C. Clark.....	1832do.....	H. C. Clark.....	1832		
21	D. P. Devitt.....	1832do.....					D. P. Devitt.....
22	A. Hamilton.....	1832do.....					A. Hamilton.....
23	J. S. Hathaway.....	1832do.....					John S. Hathaway.....
24	A. B. Lansing.....	1832do.....					A. B. Lansing.....
25	C. H. E. Spoor.....	1832do.....					C. H. E. Spoor.....
26	C. B. Sing.....	1832do.....					C. B. Sing.....
27	William T. Martin.....	1832	New Jersey.....					William T. Martin.....
28	George C. Thomas.....	1832do.....					George C. Thomas.....
29	William Culbertson.....	1832	Pennsylvania.....			William Culbertson.....	1832
30	William Frazer.....	1832do.....					William Frazer.....
31	Asa Gregory.....	1832do.....					Asa Gregory.....
32	William P. Israel.....	1832do.....			William P. Israel.....	1832
33	N. B. Kneass.....	1832do.....	N. B. Kneass.....	1832		
34	R. A. Luther.....	1832do.....					R. A. Luther.....
35	H. M. Morehead.....	1832do.....					H. M. Morehead.....
36	M. C. Meigs.....	1832do.....					M. C. Meigs.....
37	John O'Brien.....	1832do.....					John O'Brien.....
38	John F. Rowland.....	1832do.....					John F. Rowland.....
39	H. M. Slack.....	1832do.....			H. M. Slack.....	1832
40	T. D. Stiles.....	1832do.....	T. D. Stiles.....	1832		
41	H. H. Lockwood.....	1832	Delaware.....					H. H. Lockwood.....
42	Robert McLane.....	1832do.....	Robert McLane.....	1832		
43	James L. Donaldson.....	1832	Maryland.....					James L. Donaldson.....
44	R. Ridgely.....	1832do.....					R. Ridgely.....
45	J. R. Anderson.....	1832	Virginia.....					J. R. Anderson.....
46	Samuel Bransford.....	1832do.....					Samuel Bransford.....
47	B. R. Battaille.....	1832do.....	B. R. Battaille.....	1832		
48	F. A. Lewis.....	1832do.....					F. A. Lewis.....
49	John B. Randolph.....	1832do.....	John B. Randolph.....	1832		
50	W. M. Randolph.....	1832do.....	W. M. Randolph.....	1832		
51	M. L. Schackelford.....	1832do.....					M. L. Schackelford.....
52	C. Southgate.....	1832do.....	C. Southgate.....	1832		

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have withdrawn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those now in the Military Academy.
53	C. Q. Tompkins	1832	Virginia					C. Q. Tompkins
54	N. P. Young	1832	do			N. P. Young	1833	
55	H. Bate	1832	North Carolina					H. Bate
56	William Cameron	1832	do	William Cameron	1832			
57	O. P. Hackett	1832	do			O. P. Hackett	1832	
58	John B. Hawkins	1832	do			John B. Hawkins	1833	
59	Charles Hoskins	1832	do					Charles Hoskins
60	W. L. Mock	1832	do					W. L. Mock
61	J. M. Roberts	1832	do			J. M. Roberts	1832	
62	F. Saunders	1832	do	F. Saunders	1833			
63	Thomas Chiffell	1832	South Carolina					Thomas Chiffell
64	John R. Cheves	1832	do			J. R. Cheves	1833	
65	M. C. M. Hammond	1832	do					M. C. M. Hammond
66	John S. Rich	1832	do			John S. Rich	1833	
67	J. C. Simonds	1832	do			J. C. Simonds	1834	
68	John Jones	1832	Georgia			John Jones	1833	
69	W. H. T. Walker	1832	do					W. H. T. Walker
70	Samuel Gaines	1832	Tennessee	Samuel Gaines	1832			
71	J. L. Jameson	1832	do	J. L. Jameson	1832			
72	R. P. Pryor	1832	do			R. P. Pryor	1833	
73	James Williams	1832	do	James Williams	1834			
74	G. L. Welcker	1832	do					G. L. Welcker
75	A. P. Crittenden	1832	Kentucky					A. P. Crittenden
76	Thomas G. Porter	1832	do			Thomas G. Porter	1832	
77	J. A. Rowan	1832	do			J. A. Rowan	1832	
78	R. G. Stockton	1832	do					R. G. Stockton
79	C. A. Green	1832	Ohio			C. A. Green	1833	
80	C. C. Mauro	1832	do	C. C. Mauro	1833			
81	Adonis Hebert	1832	Louisiana			Adonis Hebert	1832	
82	Samuel Moore	1832	Alabama					Samuel Moore
83	John P. Walker	1832	do					John P. Walker
84	R. C. Peters	1832	do					R. C. Peters
85	Robert Allen	1832	Indiana					Robert Allen
86	John H. Milroy	1832	do			John H. Milroy	1832	
87	J. S. Berry	1832	Illinois			J. S. Berry	1833	
88	C. H. Simms	1832	do	C. H. Simms	1832			
89	J. B. S. Todd	1832	do					J. B. S. Todd
90	J. V. Wren	1832	Mississippi	J. V. Wren	1832			
91	Robert H. Gamble	1832	Florida			Robert H. Gamble	1833	
92	J. McKinstry	1832	Michigan	J. M. Kinstry	1832			
93	J. H. Mullett	1832	do	J. H. Mullett	1833			
94	J. J. B. Robb	1832	District of Columbia	J. J. B. Robb	1833			
95	Peter V. Hagner	1832	do					Peter V. Hagner
96	Walker Baylor	1832	do			Walker Baylor	1833	
97	C. R. Gates	1832	do					C. R. Gates
98	William B. Wallace	1832	New Jersey					William B. Wallace
99	Israel Woodruff	1832	do					Israel Woodruff
1	E. P. Scammon	1833	Maine					E. P. Scammon
2	Jacob Currier	1833	New Hampshire					Jacob Currier
3	J. W. Gunnison	1833	do					J. W. Gunnison
4	J. H. Bates	1833	Massachusetts					J. H. Bates
5	W. W. Chapman	1833	do					W. W. Chapman
6	Jos. Hooker	1833	do					Jos. Hooker
7	C. G. Plummer	1833	do	C. G. Plummer	1833			
8	Ed. Townsend	1833	do					Ed. Townsend
9	H. C. Pratt	1833	do					H. C. Pratt
10	Charles Reed	1833	do	Charles Reed	1834			
11	S. R. Soley	1833	do					S. R. Soley
12	W. A. Brown	1833	Connecticut					W. A. Brown
13	H. W. Benham	1833	do					H. W. Benham
14	J. Sedgwick	1833	do					J. Sedgwick
15	Frederick Stevens	1833	do			Frederick Stevens	1834	
16	D. A. Thatcher	1833	do					D. A. Thatcher
17	William Wales	1833	do			William Wales	1834	
18	F. Woodbridge	1833	Vermont					F. Woodbridge
19	George Bunner	1833	New York			George Bunner	1834	
20	John Bratt	1833	do					John Bratt
21	L. P. Davidson	1833	do					L. P. Davidson
22	Wm. G. Grandin	1833	do					W. G. Grandin
23	William Harlbert	1833	do					William Harlbert
24	James H. Perry	1833	do					J. H. Perry
25	A. G. Steere	1833	do					A. G. Steere
26	C. F. Wooster	1833	do					C. F. Wooster

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have withdrawn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those now in the Military Academy.
27	L. G. Arnold.....	1833	New Jersey.....	L. G. Arnold.....
28	W. Sherwood.....	1833	do.....	W. Sherwood.....
29	O. Beecher.....	1833	Pennsylvania.....	O. Beecher.....
30	E. W. Bradford.....	1833	do.....	E. W. Bradford.....
31	J. W. Butler.....	1833	do.....	J. W. Butler.....	1834
32	E. G. Creacraft.....	1833	do.....	E. G. Creacraft.....
33	E. W. Morgan.....	1833	do.....	E. W. Morgan.....
34	N. B. Kneass.....	1833	do.....	N. B. Kneass.....
35	J. C. Pemberton.....	1833	do.....	J. C. Pemberton.....
36	S. D. Dobbins.....	1833	do.....	S. D. Dobbins.....	1833
37	Israel Vogdes.....	1833	do.....	Israel Vogdes.....
38	Robert McLane.....	1833	Delaware.....	Robert McLane.....
39	George C. Rodney.....	1833	do.....	George C. Rodney.....
40	A. E. Jones.....	1833	Maryland.....	A. E. Jones.....
41	W. W. Mackall.....	1833	do.....	W. W. Mackall.....
42	J. T. Rigney.....	1833	do.....	J. T. Rigney.....
43	W. H. Roberts.....	1833	do.....	W. H. Roberts.....	1834
44	J. B. Tilghman.....	1833	do.....	J. B. Tilghman.....
45	F. O. Wyse.....	1833	do.....	F. O. Wyse.....
46	John Wood.....	1833	do.....	John Wood.....	1833
47	J. M. Harvie.....	1833	Virginia.....	J. M. Harvie.....
48	L. A. Armistead.....	1833	do.....	L. A. Armistead.....	1833
49	R. M. Bland.....	1833	do.....	R. M. Bland.....
50	R. M. Chapman.....	1833	do.....	R. M. Chapman.....	1833
51	James G. Carter.....	1833	do.....	James G. Carter.....
52	R. H. Chilton.....	1833	do.....	R. H. Chilton.....
53	J. R. C. Garland.....	1833	do.....	J. R. C. Garland.....
54	William Hardin.....	1833	do.....	William Hardin.....
55	J. P. Preston.....	1833	do.....	J. P. Preston.....
56	John Pollard.....	1833	do.....	John Pollard.....	1833
57	N. W. Reynolds.....	1833	do.....	N. W. Reynolds.....
58	W. M. Randolph.....	1833	do.....	W. M. Randolph.....	1834
59	E. G. Steptoe.....	1833	do.....	E. G. Steptoe.....
60	Charles Southgate.....	1833	do.....	Charles Southgate.....
61	R. T. Jones.....	1833	do.....	R. T. Jones.....
62	G. W. Washington.....	1833	do.....	G. W. Washington.....
63	B. Bragg.....	1833	North Carolina.....	B. Bragg.....
64	B. F. Beach.....	1833	do.....	B. F. Beach.....
65	L. Hagler.....	1833	do.....	L. Hagler.....
66	R. S. Moore.....	1833	do.....	R. S. Moore.....
67	J. S. Toomer.....	1833	do.....	J. S. Toomer.....	1833
68	D. S. Henry.....	1833	South Carolina.....	D. S. Henry.....	1833
69	J. Claiborne.....	1833	Tennessee.....	J. Claiborne.....
70	R. S. Jennings.....	1833	do.....	R. S. Jennings.....
71	N. L. Lindsley.....	1833	do.....	N. L. Lindsley.....
72	R. Newnan.....	1833	do.....
73	W. H. Porter.....	1833	do.....	R. Newnan.....	1834
74	A. M. Rutledge.....	1833	do.....	W. H. Porter.....	1834
75	B. W. Ballard.....	1833	Kentucky.....	Died April 27, 1834.....	A. M. Rutledge.....
76	J. L. Cooke.....	1833	do.....	J. L. Cooke.....
77	Nevil Hopson.....	1833	do.....	Nevil Hopson.....
78	Edward Johnson.....	1833	do.....	Edward Johnson.....
79	W. S. Henry.....	1833	Georgia.....	W. S. Henry.....	1833
80	George Taylor.....	1833	do.....	George Taylor.....
81	W. H. Watson.....	1833	do.....	W. H. Watson.....
82	E. G. Forshey.....	1833	Ohio.....	E. G. Forshey.....
83	R. S. Granger.....	1833	do.....	R. S. Granger.....
84	G. F. Heyward.....	1833	do.....	G. F. Heyward.....	1833
85	William Johns.....	1833	do.....	William Johns.....	1833
86	G. M. Daniel.....	1833	Mississippi.....	G. M. Daniel.....	1834
87	D. H. Dickinson.....	1833	do.....	D. H. Dickinson.....	1833
88	A. J. Dickerson.....	1833	do.....	A. J. Dickerson.....	1833
89	J. R. Liddell.....	1833	do.....	J. R. Liddell.....
90	P. Butler.....	1833	Louisiana.....	P. Butler.....	1833
91	Paul Harridet.....	1833	do.....	Paul Harridet.....	1833
92	Alexander Poree.....	1833	do.....	Alexander Poree.....	1833
93	H. H. Sibley.....	1833	do.....	H. H. Sibley.....
94	E. B. Hunt.....	1833	Indiana.....	E. B. Hunt.....	1834
95	Samuel Woods.....	Samuel Woods.....
96	E. W. West.....	Illinois.....	E. W. West.....	1834
97	A. B. Dyer.....	Missouri.....	A. B. Dyer.....
98	L. C. Easton.....	L. C. Easton.....
99	J. McKinstry.....	1833	Michigan.....	J. McKinstry.....

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have withdrawn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those now in the Military Academy.
100	Thomas Williams.....	1833	Michigan.....		1833			Thomas Williams.....
101	W. S. Ward.....	1833	Florida.....					W. S. Ward.....
102	R. H. Gamble.....	1833	..do.....	R. H. Gamble.....				
103	W. H. Fowler.....	1833	Dist. of Columbia.....					W. H. Fowler.....
104	W. H. French.....	1833	..do.....		1833			W. H. French.....
105	B. H. Hill.....	1833	..do.....					B. H. Hill.....
106	John O'Neal.....	1833	..do.....	John O'Neal.....				
107	J. J. B. Robb.....	1833	..do.....			J. J. B. Robb.....	1833	
108	F. Wharton.....	1833	..do.....			F. Wharton.....	1834	
109	Jubal A. Early.....	1833	Virginia.....					Jubal A. Early.....
110	Franklin Saunders.....	1833	North Carolina.....					Franklin Saunders.....
111	William Armstrong.....	1833	Indiana.....		1834			Wm. Armstrong.....
112	Henry Eckford.....	1833						Henry Eckford.....
1	George Bowers.....	1834	New Hampshire.....	George Bowers.....				
2	Charles Reed.....	1834	Massachusetts.....					Charles Reed.....
3	S. H. Campbell.....	1834	Vermont.....					S. H. Campbell.....
4	L. Pitkin.....	1834	..do.....					L. Pitkin.....
5	J. H. Mathews.....	1834	New York.....					J. H. Mathews.....
6	John Dickson.....	1834	..do.....					John Dickson.....
7	A. H. Dearborn.....	1834	..do.....					A. H. Dearborn.....
8	Leslie Chase.....	1834	..do.....					Leslie Chase.....
9	F. S. Mumford.....	1834	..do.....					F. S. Mumford.....
10	H. W. Merrill.....	1834	..do.....					H. W. Merrill.....
11	Wm. Barry.....	1834	..do.....					Wm. Barry.....
12	R. W. Foote.....	1834	New Jersey.....					R. W. Foote.....
13	A. J. Smith.....	1834	Pennsylvania.....					A. J. Smith.....
14	J. C. Fletcher.....	1834	..do.....					J. C. Fletcher.....
15	J. W. Butler.....	1834	..do.....					J. W. Butler.....
16	S. D. Dobbins.....	1834	..do.....					S. D. Dobbins.....
17	W. A. Nicholls.....	1834	..do.....					W. A. Nicholls.....
18	Charles F. Ruff.....	1834	..do.....					Charles F. Ruff.....
19	Wm. Gilpin.....	1834	Delaware.....					Wm. Gilpin.....
20	R. M. Cochran.....	1834	..do.....					R. M. Cochran.....
21	Charles J. Hughes.....	1834	Maryland.....					Charles J. Hughes.....
22	R. L. Stockton.....	1834	..do.....					R. L. Stockton.....
23	C. Freeman.....	1834	..do.....					C. Freeman.....
24	G. W. Mitchell.....	1834	..do.....					G. W. Mitchell.....
25	W. B. Blair.....	1834	Virginia.....					W. B. Blair.....
26	C. L. Stevenson.....	1834	..do.....					C. L. Stevenson.....
27	John Pollard.....	1834	..do.....	John Pollard.....	1834			
28	W. H. Wright.....	1834	North Carolina.....					W. H. Wright.....
29	Alexander Erwin.....	1834	..do.....					Alexander Erwin.....
30	R. G. Barnwell.....	1834	South Carolina.....					R. G. Barnwell.....
31	W. F. Graham.....	1834	..do.....					W. F. Graham.....
32	J. H. Trapier.....	1834	..do.....					J. H. Trapier.....
33	J. S. K. Reaves.....	1834	..do.....					J. S. K. Reaves.....
34	Wm. J. Hardel.....	1834	Georgia.....					Wm. J. Hardel.....
35	Robt. Fleming.....	1834	..do.....			Robt. Fleming.....	1834	
36	Henry C. Wayne.....	1834	..do.....					Henry C. Wayne.....
37	R. H. Graham.....	1834	Kentucky.....					R. H. Graham.....
38	Buckner Board.....	1834	..do.....					Buckner Board.....
39	W. Boswell.....	1834	..do.....					W. Boswell.....
40	Leonidas Johnson.....	1834	..do.....					Leonidas Johnson.....
41	Thomas Norfleet.....	1834	Tennessee.....					Thos. Norfleet.....
42	J. M. Jetton.....	1834	..do.....					J. M. Jetton.....
43	Wm. Hickman.....	1834	..do.....					Wm. Hickman.....
44	M. A. Haynes.....	1834	..do.....					M. A. Haynes.....
45	C. A. Kennedy.....	1834	..do.....			C. A. Kennedy.....	1834	
46	G. W. Thompson.....	1834	Ohio.....					G. W. Thompson.....
47	W. H. Shover.....	1834	..do.....					W. H. Shover.....
48	Irvin McDowell.....	1834	..do.....					Irvin McDowell.....
49	P. T. G. Beauregard.....	1834	Louisiana.....					P. T. G. Beauregard.....
50	Thos. J. Throop.....	1834	Indiana.....					Thos. J. Throop.....
51	R. A. Arnold.....	1834	Mississippi.....					R. A. Arnold.....
52	Thos. Metcalf.....	1834	..do.....					Thos. Metcalf.....
53	Geo. W. Smith.....	1834	Illinois.....					Geo. W. Smith.....
54	J. M. Scarritt.....	1834	..do.....					J. M. Scarritt.....
55	B. M. P. Inge.....	1834	Alabama.....					B. M. P. Inge.....
56	Ed. N. Clark.....	1834	..do.....					Ed. N. Clark.....
57	Walker Perry.....	1834	..do.....					Walker Perry.....
58	Thos. Casey.....	1834	..do.....					Thos. Casey.....
59	L. A. Armistead.....	1834	..do.....					L. A. Armistead.....
60	Ed. M. Clark.....	1834	..do.....					Ed. M. Clark.....

A 4.—Register exhibiting the names and numbers of all the cadets, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of all the cadets that have been received into the Military Academy from its origin to the present time.	Year of their admission.	States and Territories, including the Dist. of Columbia, from which they came.	Names of those that have withdrawn from the academy before graduating.	Year of their withdrawal.	Names of those who have been dismissed from the academy.	Year of their dismissal.	Names of those now in the Military Academy.
61	James M. Ketchum	1834	James M. Ketchum.....
62	J. M. V. Kennedy.....	1834	J. M. V. Kennedy.....
63	O. P. Ransom	1834	O. P. Ransom
64	Thos. L. Ringold	1834	District of Columbia..	Thos. L. Ringold
65	J. W. S. McNiell	1834	J. W. S. McNiell.....

RECAPITULATION.

Year of their admission.	Number received into the Military Academy from its origin to January 1, 1835.	Number of those that have withdrawn from the Military Academy.	Number of those that have been dismissed from the Military Academy.	Number of those that have graduated at the Military Academy.	Number of those present at the Military Academy.	Total aggregate.
1800.....	1	1	1
1801.....	7	2	5	7
1802.....	2	2	2
1803.....	9	2	1	6	9
1804.....	10	2	8	10
1805.....	8	2	6	8
1806.....	9	9	9
1807.....	16	3	2	11	16
1808.....	42	6	5	31	42
1809.....	11	5	6	11
1810.....	2	2	2
1811.....	None.
1812.....	10	1	9	10
1813.....	95	25	5	65	95
1814.....	156	80	7	69	156
1815.....	48	24	4	20	48
1816.....	42	22	4	16	42
1817.....	51	23	3	25	51
1818.....	111	61	6	44	111
1819.....	82	46	4	32	82
1820.....	65	30	3	32	65
1821.....	76	26	17	33	76
1822.....	93	32	18	43	93
1823.....	108	34	32	42	108
1824.....	79	21	31	27	79
1825.....	105	35	20	50	105
1826.....	91	26	28	37	91
1827.....	94	27	27	40	94
1828.....	110	32	34	44	110
1829.....	108	32	29	46	1	108
1830.....	103	34	32	24	13	103
1831.....	93	23	20	50	93
1832.....	99	22	23	56	99
1833.....	111	17	16	76	111
1834.....	66	2	2	62	66
Total	2,113	693	372	785	253	2,113

The foregoing recapitulation from the department is incorrect in many points, being at variance with the specifications of the register upon which it assumes to be based. The committee have substituted the following

RECAPITULATION.

Years.	Number received into the academy annually.	Number of those that entered each year and were subsequently withdrawn from the Military Academy.	Number of those that entered each year and were subsequently dismissed from the Military Academy.	Number of those that have graduated at the Military Academy.	Number of those now at the Military Academy.
1802.....	2			2	
1803.....	9	2	1	3	
1804.....	10	2		2	
1805.....	8	2		3	
1806.....	9			14	
1807.....	16	3	2	5	
1808.....	42	6	5	15	
1809.....	11	4		7	
1810.....	2			1	
1811.....				17	
1812.....	12	1		17	
1813.....	95	25	5	1	
1814.....	156	80	7	30	
1815.....	48	24	4	40	
1816.....	42	22	4		
1817.....	51	23	3	19	
1818.....	111	61	6	23	
1819.....	82	46	4	29	
1820.....	65	30	3	31	
1821.....	76	26	17	24	
1822.....	93	32	18	40	
1823.....	108	34	32	36	
1824.....	79	21	31	30	
1825.....	105	35	20	36	
1826.....	91	26	28	43	
1827.....	94	27	27	38	
1828.....	110	32	34	33	
1829.....	108	32	29	46	
1830.....	103	34	32	42	
1831.....	93	23	20	33	
1832.....	99	22	23	45	
1833.....	111	17	16	43	
1834.....	66	2	2	36	

B.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, January 20, 1835.*

SIR: Herewith I respectfully submit a statement embracing the names and military history of all the cadets, being graduates of the Military Academy, who have been appointed or received commissions in the army, in conformity to the special call of the chairman of the select committee on the subject of the Military Academy, the Hon. F. O. J. Smith, of the House of Representatives. The statement enrolls 781 graduates, of whom 219 have resigned as officers of the army; died, 97; dropped or dismissed, 17; now remaining in the army as commissioned officers, 351; besides the 69 supernumeraries, brevets 2d lieutenants remaining on the 31st of December, 1834, as "candidates for commissions," who probably will not all be absorbed in the army sooner than June, 1837; making the whole number of graduates now in the army, 420.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

Hon. L. Cass, *Secretary of War.*

B.

Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, and attached to regiments and corps by brevet of the lowest grade, as candidates for commissions, in conformity with the 4th section of the act "making further provision for the corp of engineers," approved April 29, 1812, showing their subsequent history while in the service, and in what manner any may have made their exit from it.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
1	Joseph G. Swift.....	Oct. 12, 1802	2d lieutenant...	Engineers....	Nov. 12, 1818, as col. of engineers and brigadier gen. by brevet.						Massachusetts...	
2	Simon M. Levido.....do.....do.....	Sept. 30, 1805, as 2d lieut. of engineers.						Maryland.....	
3	W. K. Armistead	March 5, 1803do.....do.....					Col. & brig. gen. by bvt.	3d artillery ...	Virginia	
4	Henry B. Jackson.....	April 14, 1803do.....do.....	Sept. 30, 1803, as 2d lieut. of artillery.						Massachusetts...	
5	John Livingston	May 1, 1803do.....	Artillery....	March 31, 1806, as 2d lieut. of artillery.						New York.....	
6	Samuel Gates.....	Mar. 27, 1804do.....do.....	August 1, 1805, as 2d lieut. of artillery.						Massachusetts...	
7	H. M. Allen	July 5, 1804do.....do.....		May 11, 1813, as captain of artillery.					Vermont	
8	George Bomford.....	July 1, 1805do.....	Engineers....					Colonel	Ordnance	New York.....	
9	William McReedo.....do.....do.....	March 31, 1819, as lieut. col. and col. by bvt. of engineers.						North Carolina ..	
10	Joseph G. Tottendo.....do.....do.....					Lt. col. and col. by bvt.	Engineers	Connecticut	
11	William Gates.....	March 6, 1806do.....	Artillery....					Major	1st artillery...	Massachusetts ..	
12	J. F. Heileman	May 6, 1806do.....do.....					Capt. and major by bvt.	2d artillery ...	Vermont	
13	Paschal V. Bouis	March 6, 1806do.....do.....	July 31, 1808, as 1st lieut. of artillery.						Missouri.....	
14	Joseph Provcaux.....	Mar. 14, 1806do.....do.....		Nov. 10, 1813, as 1st lieut. of artillery.					do.....	
15	Aug. Choteau.....	June —, 1806	Ensign	Infantry	Jan. 13, 1807, as ensign of infantry.						do.....	
16	Charles Gratiot.....	Oct. 30, 1806	2d lieutenant ..	Engineers ...							do.....	
17	Eleaz. D. Wood.....do.....do.....do.....		Sept. 17, 1814, as capt. and lieut. col. board of engineers.			Col. & brig. gen. by bvt.	Engineers	New York.....	
18	Alden Partridge.....do.....	1st lieutenant..do.....	April 15, 1818, as captain of engineers.						Vermont	

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
19	Wm. Partridge.....	Oct. 30, 1806	2d lieutenant..	Engineers	Sept. 20, 1812, as captain of engineers.	Vermont	Disbanded as captain of artillery in 1821.
20	Prentiss Williard.....do.....do.....do.....	Oct. 12, 1813, as captain of engineers.	do.....	
21	Thomas Bennet.....	Nov. 14, 1806do.....	Artillery.....	Sept. 26, 1818, as captain of artillery.	New Jersey.....	
22	Louis Lorimer.....do.....do.....	Infantry.....	Dec. 31, 1809, as 2d lieut. of infantry.	Missouri.....	
23	Ethan Allen.....do.....do.....	Artillery.....	Vermont.....	
24	Robert Lucas.....do.....do.....do.....	October 31, 1810, as 2d lieut. of artillery.	Pennsylvania...	
25	J. D. Windham.....do.....do.....do.....	March 14, 1812, as 1st lieut. of artillery.	New York.....	
26	Saterlee Clarke.....	Dec. 9, 1807do.....do.....	Dec. 31, 1813, as 1st lieut. of artillery.	Vermont.....	
27	Justus Post.....do.....do.....do.....	do.....	
28	John Anderson.....do.....do.....do.....	Sept. 14, 1834, as topographical engineer.	do.....	
29	Samuel Champlain.....do.....do.....do.....	do.....	Disbanded in 1815.
30	Samuel Noah.....do.....	Ensign.....	Infantry.....	March 13, 1814, as 1st lieut. of infantry.	New York.....	
31	Daniel A. Buck.....	Feb. 28, 1808	2d lieutenant..	Engineers.....	Vermont.....	Do.
32	Samuel Babcock.....do.....do.....do.....	Dec. 22, 1830, as major of engineers.	Massachusetts..	
33	Sylvanus Thayer.....do.....do.....do.....	Maj. and lieut. col. bvt	Engineers.....	do.....	Disbanded as 1st lieut. of artillery in 1815.
34	James Gibson.....	June 1, 1808	1st lieutenant..	Artillery.....	September 17, 1814, as colonel of the 4th rifle regiment.	Delaware.....	
35	Heman A. Fay.....do.....	2d lieutenant..do.....	Vermont.....	
36	Samuel B. Rathbone.....do.....do.....do.....	December 8, 1812, as 2d lieut. of artillery.	New York.....	
37	Oliver G. Burton.....do.....do.....	4th infantry..	Vermont.....	Disbanded in 1815 as major of 4th infantry.
38	Milo Mason.....	Jan. 9, 1809do.....	Artillery.....	Captain and bvt. major.	1st artillery.....	do.....	Declined.
39	Louis Valle.....	June 1, 1808	Ensign.....	Infantry.....	Missouri.....	

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
40	M. Huntington.....	June 1, 1808	2d lieutenant..	Infantry.....	Feb. 20, 1811, as 1st lieut. of infantry.						Connecticut....	
41	George P. Peters.....do.....do.....	Artillery.....		Nov. 23, 1819, as captain of 4th infantry.					New Hampshire..	
42	Alpheus Roberts.....	Dec. 12, 1808do.....do.....		August 27, 1809, as 2d lieutenant of light artillery.						
43	Luther Leonard.....do.....do.....do.....							Vermont.....	Disbanded as captain of light artillery in 1821. Declined as A. D. Q. M. G. in 1815.
44	Charles Vandeventer.....do.....do.....do.....							New York.....	
45	Samuel H. Holley.....do.....do.....do.....	Jan. 1, 1810, as 2d lieut. of light artillery.						Vermont.....	
46	Samuel Newman.....do.....do.....do.....	June 25, 1810, as 2d lieut. of light artillery.						Massachusetts...	
47	Solomon Conklin.....	Jan. 24, 1809do.....do.....		August 9, 1810, as 2d lieut. of artillery.					Vermont.....	
48	Aug. W. Magee.....do.....do.....do.....	June 22, 1812, as 2d lieut. of artillery.						Massachusetts...	
49	Milton Haxton.....	Jan. 27, 1809	Cornet.....	Dragoons.....		December 29, 1809, as cornet of dragoons.					New York.....	
50	Abrm. L. Sands.....	Feb. 18, 1809	2d lieutenant..	Artillery.....	Nov. 1, 1823, as captain of artillery.					do.....	
51	Ansart Hall.....	Jan. 27, 1809	Ensign.....	Infantry.....	Feb. 16, 1810, as ensign of infantry.						Vermont.....	
52	Theo. Randall.....	June 28, 1809	2d lieutenant..	Artillery.....	March 31, 1811, as 2d lieut. of infantry.						Maryland.....	
53	Alex. J. Williams.....	July 23, 1810do.....	Engineers.....		August 15, 1814, as captain of artillery.					Pennsylvania...	
54	Thomas J. Beall.....	Mar. 1, 1811do.....	Artillery.....		Oct 26, 1832, as captain of infantry.					Maryland.....	
55	Joseph Dalliba.....do.....do.....do.....	May 1, 1824, as captain of artillery.						New York.....	
56	Gus. Loomis.....do.....do.....do.....				Captain and bvt. major.	1st infantry	Vermont.....		
57	Ezra Smith.....do.....do.....do.....	June 9, 1814, as 1st lieutenant artillery.				do.....		
58	Rich. H. Ashley.....do.....do.....do.....							Massachusetts...	Disbanded as 1st lieut. light artillery in 1815.

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
59	M. P. Boisaubin.....	Mar. 1, 1811	2d lieutenant ..	Light artillery		August 10, 1813, as 1st lieutenant light artillery.					New Jersey.....	
60	Adam Larabee.....	do.....	do.....	do.....							Connecticut.....	Disbanded as captain of light artillery in 1815.
61	Henry A. Hobart.....	do.....	do.....	do.....		May 27, 1813, as 1st lieutenant light artillery.					Maine.....	
62	Thomas Ketchum.....	do.....	do.....	do.....							New York.....	Disbanded as captain of light artillery in 1815.
63	James D. Cobb.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	June 9, 1814, as 1st lieutenant light artillery.						Vermont.....	
64	Armstrong Irvine.....	do.....	do.....	do.....		Jan. 15, 1817, as captain light artillery.					Pennsylvania ..	
65	H. H. Willard.....	do.....	Ensign.....	Infantry.....	May 13, 1816, as captain corps of artillery.						Dist. of Columbia.	
66	Ormond Marsh.....	do.....	do.....	1st infantry.....							Connecticut.....	Disbanded as 1st lieutenant in 1815.
67	George Ronan.....	do.....	do.....	do.....		August 15, 1812, as ensign of infantry.					New York.....	
68	John Bliss.....	do.....	do.....	Infantry.....	May 30, 1813, as 1st lieutenant of infantry.						New Hampshire.	
69	H. Burchstead.....	do.....	do.....	do.....		Nov. 30, 1813, as 1st lieutenant of infantry.					New York.....	
70	Benjamin Fields.....	do.....	do.....	do.....			June 1, 1811, as ensign of infantry.				do.....	
71	R. E. De Russey.....	Nov. —, 1811	2d lieutenant ..	Engineers.....					Major & bvt. lieutenant col.	Engineers.....	do.....	
72	F. B. Murdock.....	Jan. 3, 1812	do.....	Light artillery	Jan. 1, 1815, as 1st lieutenant light artillery.						Connecticut.....	
73	George W. Hight.....	do.....	do.....	do.....							Vermont.....	Disbanded as 1st lieutenant light artillery in 1815.
74	John S. Brush.....	do.....	do.....	Artillery.....							Connecticut.....	Disbanded as 1st lieutenant artillery in 1815.
75	Nath'l W. Osgood.....	do.....	do.....	do.....		October 21, 1813, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.					Massachusetts ..	
76	John R. Bell.....	do.....	do.....	Light artillery	November 30, 1825, as captain artillery.						New York.....	
77	G. W. Templeman.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	November 1, 1812, as 2d lieutenant light artillery.						Massachusetts ..	

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
78	T. B. Randolph.....	Jan. 3, 1812	2d lieutenant..	Light artillery	Feb. 6, 1815, as captain of infantry.						Virginia.....	
79	Wm. F. Hobart.....do.....do.....do.....	Jan. 25, 1823, as captain of infantry.						Maine.....	
80	Wm. Sumpter.....do.....do.....do.....	July 1, 1818, as captain of infantry.						South Carolina...	
81	Jos. N. Wilcox.....do.....do.....	3d infantry..		October 21, 1812, as 1st lieutenant of infantry.					Connecticut....	
82	George Morley.....do.....do.....do.....		September, 1813, as 1st lieutenant of infantry.					New York.....	
83	Augustus Conant.....do.....do.....	6th infantry..	October 31, 1812, as 1st lieutenant infantry.						Vermont....	
84	L. L. Buck.....do.....do.....do.....						do.....	Disbanded as captain of infantry in 1815.
85	A. R. Thompson.....do.....do.....do.....				Major.....	2d infantry...		New York.....	
86	Wm. R. Smith.....	June 1, 1812do.....	Lt. artillery..		Sept. 3, 1813, as 1st lieutenant light artillery.					New Jersey....	
87	William Cutbush.....	July 1, 1812	1st lieutenant..	Corps of engineers.	October 1, 1817, as captain of engineers.						Pennsylvania...	
88	A. C. W. Fanning....	July 6, 1812do.....	Artillery.....				Major.....	4th artillery...		Massachusetts...	
89	George Trescott.....	Oct. 16, 1813	3d lieutenant..	Corps of engineers.	March 31, 1819, as 2d lieutenant of engineers.						South Carolina..	
90	G. W. Gardiner.....	Mar. 11, 1814do.....	Artillery.....				Captain.....	2d artillery....		Dist. Columbia..	
91	O. S. Merchant.....do.....do.....do.....				1st lieutenant and brevet captain.do.....		New York.....	
92	Nathl G. Dana.....do.....do.....do.....		February 4, 1833, as captain 1st artillery.					Massachusetts...	
93	John Munroe.....do.....do.....do.....				Captain.....	4th artillery...		New York.....	
94	John S. Allanson.....do.....do.....do.....	October 31, 1820, as 1st lieutenant of artillery.					do.....	
95	L. G. De Russey.....do.....do.....do.....				Paymaster.....do.....	do.....	
96	Thomas Childs.....do.....do.....do.....				Captain.....	3d artillery...		Massachusetts..	
97	S. Birdsall.....do.....do.....do.....							New York.....	Disbanded as 2d lieutenant of artillery in 1815.
98	John Wright.....do.....	2d lieutenant..	Corps of engineers.	July 23, 1818, as 2d lieutenant of engineers.						Vermont.....	
99	John Armstrong.....	May 19, 1814do.....	Artillery.....							New York.....	Disbanded as 1st lieutenant 4th rifle reg. in 1815.
100	J. W. Ripley.....	June 1, 1814do.....do.....				Captain.....	Ordnance.....		Connecticut....	

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
101	Daniel Turner.....	July 21, 1814	2d lieutenant ..	Artillery.....	North Carolina...	Declined as 2d lieut. of artillery in 1815.
102	Isaac E. Craig	do.....	do.....	do.....	June 26, 1819, as 1st lieut. of artillery.	Pennsylvania....		
103	C. M. Thruston	do.....	do.....	do.....	Captain.....	3d artillery...	Kentucky.....	Disbanded as 1st lieut. of artillery in 1821.	
104	H. W. Fitzhugh	do.....	do.....	do.....	1st lieut. and vlt. capt.	2d artillery...	Dist. Columbia..		
105	J. J. Davis.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	Feb. 20, 1838, as 1st lieut. of artillery.	New Hampshire..		
106	T. Stephenson.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	Aug. 4, 1819, as 1st lieut. of ordnance.	Dist. Columbia...		
107	E. Humphrey.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	New York.....		
108	S. A. Wetmore	do.....	3d lieutenant ..	do.....	July 16, 1816, as 2d lieut. of artillery.	Massachusetts...		
109	William Wells	do.....	do.....	Lt. artillery.	December 1, 1834, as 1st lieut. light artillery.	do.....		
110	William L. Booth.....	do.....	do.....	Artillery.....	July 1, 1822, as 1st lieut. of artillery.	Dist. Columbia...		
111	T. J. Baird.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	May 1, 1828, as captain of artillery.	Pennsylvania....		
112	J. Parkhurst.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	July 6, 1821, as 1st lieut. of artillery.	Vermont.....		
113	R. L. Armstrong.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	Oct. 10, 1834, as 1st lt. and vlt. capt. of art.	New York.....		
114	James Budolet.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	July 31, 1818, as 2d lieut. of artillery.	Indiana.....		
115	G. W. Gardner	do.....	do.....	do.....	July 31, 1819, as 1st lieut. of artillery.	Massachusetts...		
116	B. S. A. Lowe.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	Sept. 30, 1819, as 1st lieut. of artillery.	Dist. Columbia...		
117	T. R. Broome.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	November 1, 1816, as 3d lieut. of artillery.	New York.....		
118	H. Brunot	do.....	do.....	2d infantry...	Pennsylvania....	Disbanded as 1st lieut. of infantry in 1821.	
119	John J. Abert.....	Nov. 22, 1814	Brevet major...	Top. eng'rs...	Brevet lieut. col.....	Top. engineers.	Virginia.....		
120	John Middleton.....	Mar. 2, 1815	2d lieutenant...	Corps of eng'rs	July 15, 1816, as 2d lieut. of engineers.	South Carolina...		
121	William F. Rigal.....	do.....	3d lieutenant...	Ordnance.....	New York.....		

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
122	James Simonson.....	Mar. 2, 1815	3d lieutenant..	Ordnance...	Nov. 30, 1833, as 1st lieut. of artillery.	New York.....	
123	John Hills.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	Captain.....	Ordnance.....	Massachusetts ..	
124	Simon Willard.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	May 1, 1816, as 3d lieut. of ordnance.	do.....	
125	John Symington.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	Captain.....	Ordnance.....	Maryland.....	
126	William Gordon.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	October 15, 1815, as 3d lieut. of ordnance.	Georgia.....	
127	John R. Sloo.....	do.....	do.....	Artillery.....	April 30, 1818, as 2d lieut. of artillery.	Ohio.....	
128	H. W. Griswold.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	October 23, 1834, as captain of artillery.	do.....	
29	James Monroe.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	September 30, 1832, as 1st lieut. of artillery.	Virginia.....	
30	Robert C. Bront.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	November 1, 1823, as 1st lieut. of artillery.	Maryland.....	
131	Abraham Windell ..	do.....	do.....	do.....	October 23, 1817, as 2d lieut. of infantry.	New York.....	
132	Robert J. Scott.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	November 4, 1818, as 2d lieut. of artillery.	Maryland.....	
133	Alonzo Brewer.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	October 16, 1816, as 3d lieut. of artillery.	Vermont.....	
134	Franc. N. Berrier ..	do.....	do.....	do.....	May 31, 1816, as 2d lieut. of artillery.	New York.....	
135	George Cooper.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	February 15, 1817, as 3d lieut. of artillery.	do.....	
136	G. A. Washington ..	do.....	do.....	do.....	December 9, 1817, as 2d lieut. of artillery.	Dist. of Columbia	
137	Henry Smith.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	Captain.....	6th infantry...	New York.....	
138	Alex. F. Cochrane....	do.....	do.....	do.....	Dist. of Columbin.	Disbanded as 1st lieut. of artillery in 1821.
139	Mich. F. Van De Venter.	do.....	do.....	do.....	New York.....	Declined as 3d lieut. of artillery, June 18, 1815.
140	Milo Johnson.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	March 1, 1818, as 2d lieut. of artillery.	do.....	
141	Aaron G. Gano.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	October 1, 1817, as 3d lieut. of artillery.	Ohio.....	

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
143	Robert M. Forsyth	Mar. 2, 1815	3d lieutenant...	Artillery.....	Dec. 1, 1818, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.	Georgia.....	
143	Thomas W. Lendrum..	do	do	do	Dist. of Columbia.	
144	Henry R. Delaney.....	do	do	do	May 31, 1825, as captain of infantry.	Captain.....	3d artillery. ...	Maryland.....	
145	George Blancy.....	Mar. 4, 1815	Bvt. 2d lieutenant...	Corps of eng'rs	Massachusetts ...	
146	Thomas J. Leslie.....	do	do	do	Capt. and brevet major.	Engineers.....	Pennsylvania.....	
147	William S. Evelyth ...	do	do	do	October 4, 1818, as 2d lieutenant of engineers.	1st lieutenant and bvt. capt..	do	Dist. of Columbia.	
148	Robert W. Pooler.....	do	do	do	August 14, 1818, as 2d lieutenant of engineers.	Georgia	
149	Wm. H. Chase	do	do	do	Captain...	Engineers	Massachusetts...	
150	W. E. Williams	Dec. 2, 1815	3d lieutenant...	Ordnance	May 10, 1826, as 1st lieutenant of artillery.	New York.....	
151	Wm. B. Davidson.....	do	do	do	1st lieutenant.....	3d artillery ...	Virginia	
152	John A. Webber.....	Dec. 11, 1815	Bvt. 2d lieutenant ...	Light artillery	February 20, 1825, as 1st lieutenant of artillery.	Massachusetts...	
153	Thos. J. Gardner.....	do	do	do	July 20, 1822, as 1st lieutenant of artillery.	New York	
154	B. L. Bonneville.....	do	do	do	May 31, 1834, as capt. of infantry.	do	
155	Samuel Cooper	do	do	do	do	
156	Charles Davies.....	do	do	do	1st lieutenant and bvt. capt	4th artillery.....	do	
157	James R. Stubbs.....	do	do	do	Professor of mathematics	do	
158	Peter Embury.....	do	do	do	November 1, 1816, as bvt. 2d lt. of light art.	Ohio	Disbanded, as asst. dep. gr. mr. gen. in 1821.
159	Rich. M. White.....	do	do	do	August 31, 1820, as 2d lieutenant of light art'ry.	New York.....	
160	James M. Spencer	July 17, 1817	3d lieutenant...	Artillery	August 16, 1820, as 1st lieutenant of artillery.	Indiana	
161	Isaac A. Adams	do	do	do	October 19, 1820, as 1st lieutenant of artillery.	Maine.....	
162	Wm. M. Graham.....	do	do	do	Captain.....	4th infantry...	Virginia	
163	Jas. D. Graham.....	do	do	do	Brevet major	Top. engineers.	do	
164	Chas. Despenville.....	do	do	do	March 1, 1830, as 1st lieutenant of artillery.	New York.....	

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
165	John C. Kirk	July 17, 1817	3d lieutenant ..	Artillery	September 30, 1823, as 1st lieut. of artillery.						New York	
166	John R. Vinton	do	do	do					1st lieut. and bvt. capt..	3d artillery ...	Rhode Island...	
167	Richard B. Lee	do	do	do					do	do	Virginia	
168	Fred. L. Griffith	do	do	do		January 28, 1832, as 1st lieut. of artillery.					do	
169	Edw. J. Lambert	do	do	do	September 30, 1823, as 1st lieut. of infantry.						Dist. of Columbia	
170	Wm. G. McNeill.	do	do	do					Brevet major	Top. engineers.	New York	
171	A. W. McDonald	do	do	do	January 31, 1819, as 1st lieut. of infantry.						Virginia	
172	Henry Berryman	do	do	do	April 30, 1833, as capt. of infantry.						do	
173	Const. M. Eakin	do	do	do	October 27, 1828, as 1st lieut. of artillery.						New York	
174	John D. W. Orr	do	do	do	December 1, 1817, as 3d lieut. of artillery.						Kentucky	
175	E. A. Hitchcock	do	do	do					Captain	1st infantry ...	Vermont	
176	J. M. Washington	do	do	do					do	4th artillery ...	Virginia	
177	Rich. Delafield	July 24, 1818	do	Corps of eng'rs					do	Engineers	New York	
178	Andrew Talcott	do	Bvt. 2d lieut ..	do					do	do	Connecticut ...	
179	Stanhope Smith	do	2d lieutenant..	Artillery		September 10, 1828, as 1st lieut. of artillery.					Delaware	
180	Horace Webster	do	do	3d infantry ...	December 31, 1825, as 1st lieut. of infantry.						Vermont	
181	Samuel Ringgold	do	do	Artillery					1st lieut. and bvt. capt..	3d artillery ...	Maryland	
182	Harvey Brown	do	do	Lt. artillery ..					do	4th artillery ...	New Jersey	
183	Jos. N. Chambers	do	do	Artillery	November 6, 1823, as 1st lieut. of artillery.						Maryland	
184	Samuel M. Kenzie	do	do	do					1st lieutenant	2d artillery ...	North Carolina..	
185	Giles Porter	do	do	do					Captain	1st artillery ...	New York	
186	Geo. W. Corprew	do	do	do	June 30, 1833, as 1st lieut. of artillery.						Virginia	
187	John J. Jackson	do	do	do	January 1, 1823, as 2d lieut. of infantry.						do	
188	Edward Harding	do	do	do					Captain	Ordnance	Maryland	
189	Benj. C. Vining	do	3d lieutenant..	Ordnance		April 8, 1822, as 2d lieut. of artillery.					Delaware	

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
190	Henry H. Loring.....	July 24, 1818	2d lieutenant...	6th infantry..	Captain.....	3d infantry....	Massachusetts...	Disbanded, as 2d lieutenant of infantry, 1821.
191	J. F. Dangerfield.....do.....do.....	Artillery.....	December 20, 1820, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.	Virginia.....	
192	Joseph Strong.....do.....do.....do.....	May 31, 1826, as 1st lieutenant of artillery.	Pennsylvania..	
193	Jno. B. F. Russell.....do.....do.....	Lt. infantry..	Captain.....	5th infantry...	Massachusetts...	
194	George Webb.....do.....do.....	Artillery.....	April 20, 1832, as 1st lieutenant of artillery.	Maryland.....	
195	Hartman Bache.....do.....	Bvt. captain...	Top. eng'rs..	Brevet major.....	Top. engineers.	Pennsylvania..	
196	Wm. S. Newton.....do.....	2d lieutenant...	Lt. artillery..	1st lieutenant and bvt. capt..	3d artillery....	Dist. of Columbia.	
197	Leon. O. Brooko.....do.....do.....	4th infantry..	Maryland.....	
198	Henry Giles.....do.....do.....	5th infantry..	January 1, 1820, as 2d lieutenant of infantry.	New York.....	
199	John Pratt.....do.....do.....	1st infantry..	Kentucky..	
200	Wm. A. Ellason.....	July 1, 1819do.....	Engineers.....	Captain.....	Engineers.....	Dist. of Columbia	
201	F. A. Underhill.....do.....do.....do.....	November 1, 1823, as 2d lieutenant of engineers.	New York.....	
202	Cornel. A. Ogden.....do.....do.....do.....	1st lieutenant.....	Engineers.....	New Jersey....	
203	Edw. Mansfield.....do.....do.....do.....	New York.....	
204	Henry Brewerton.....do.....	Bvt. 2d lieutenant...do.....	1st lieutenant.....	Engineers.....do.....	
205	John R. Bowes.....do.....	3d lieutenant...	Ordnance.....	August 1, 1822, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.	Massachusetts...	
206	H. A. Thompson.....do.....	2d lieutenant...	Artillery.....	1st lieutenant and bvt. capt..	4th artillery..	Maryland.....	
207	Z. J. D. Kinsley.....do.....do.....	Lt. artillery..	1st lieutenant.....	3d artillery....	New York.....	
208	Wm. Turnbull.....do.....do.....	Artillery.....	Brevet captain.....	Ass't top. eng'rs.	Maryland.....	
209	Joshua Baker.....do.....do.....do.....	October 31, 1820, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.	Louisiana.....	
210	Justin Dimmick.....do.....do.....	Lt. artillery..	1st lieutenant and bvt. capt..	1st artillery...	Vermont.....	
211	Geo. W. Whistler.....do.....do.....	Artillery.....	December 31, 1833, as 1st lieutenant of artillery.	Kentucky.....	
212	Benjamin Walker.....do.....	3d lieutenant...	Ordnance.....	Captain.....	3d infantry....	New Hampshire..	
213	Daniel Tyler.....do.....	2d lieutenant...	Lt. artillery..	May 31, 1834, as 1st lieutenant of artillery.	Connecticut.....	
214	J. F. Hamtramck.....do.....do.....	Artillery.....	March 1, 1822, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.	Illinois.....	

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
215	Ethan C. Sickles.....	July 1, 1819	2d lieutenant...	Lt. artillery..	October 12, 1823, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.	New York.....	
216	Jas. Hepburne.....do.....do.....	Artillery.....	October 1, 1824, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.do.....	
217	John L'Engle.....do.....do.....do.....	1st lieutenant.....	3d artillery.....	South Carolina..	
218	John M. Edwards.....do.....do.....	Lt. artillery..	November 1, 1824, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.	Virginia.....	
219	Austin Brockenborough.....do.....do.....	Artillery.....	June 30, 1833, as 1st lieutenant of artillery.do.....	
220	Wm. Malcolm.....do.....do.....	8th infantry..	August 7, 1823, as 1st lieutenant of infantry.	Massachusetts..	
221	John McKenzie.....do.....do.....do.....	September 26, 1823, as 1st lieutenant of infantry.	North Carolina..	
222	Joseph D. Rupp.....do.....do.....	Lt. artillery..	December 17, 1821, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.	Massachusetts..	
223	Jacob A. Dumeste.....do.....do.....	Artillery.....	October 10, 1831, as 1st lieutenant of artillery.	Maryland.....	
224	James R. Blaney.....do.....do.....do.....	Nov. 27, 1826, as 1st lieutenant of artillery.	Delaware.....	
225	Roswell Conant.....do.....do.....	Rifle.....	Sept. 30, 1820, as 2d lieutenant of rifle.	Vermont.....	
226	Jasper Strong.....do.....do.....	8th infantry..	Dec. 25, 1833, as 1st lieutenant of infantry.do.....	
227	Henry Gilbert.....do.....do.....	Artillery.....	June 26, 1827, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.	New York.....	
228	William H. Swift.....do.....do.....do.....	Brevet captain.....	Assistant top engineers.do.....	
229	Stephen Tuttle.....	July 1, 1820	Bvt. 2d lieutenant...	Engineers.....	1st lieutenant.....	Engineers.....	New Jersey.....	
230	A. J. Donelson.....do.....do.....do.....	February 1, 1822, as 2d lieutenant of engineers.	Tennessee.....	
231	Thomas E. Sudler.....do.....	3d lieutenant..	Ordnance.....	November 16, 1821, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.	Maryland.....	
232	William H. Bell.....do.....do.....do.....	Captain.....	Ordnance.....	North Carolina..	
233	William C. DeHart.....do.....do.....do.....	1st lieutenant.....	2d artillery.....	New York.....	
234	F. N. Barberin.....do.....do.....do.....do.....	3d artillery.....do.....	
235	Robt. S. Brooke.....do.....do.....do.....	December 1, 1820, as 3d lieutenant of ordnance.	Virginia.....	
236	James A. Chambers.....do.....	2d lieutenant..	Lt. artillery..	1st lieutenant.....	2d artillery.....	Maryland.....	

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
237	Ed. G. W. Butler.....	July 1, 1820	2d lieutenant..	Artillery.....	May 28, 1831, as 1st lieut. of artillery.						Tennessee.....	
238	D. D. Tompkins.....	do	3d lieutenant..	Ordnance.....				1st lieutenant.....	1st artillery...		New York.....	
239	John H. Winder.....	do	2d lieutenant..	Artillery.....				do	do		Maryland.....	
240	W. P. Buchanan.....	do	3d lieutenant..	Ordnance.....	March 31, 1832, as 2d lieut. of artillery.						Virginia.....	
241	S. B. Dusenbury.....	do	2d lieutenant..	Artillery.....				1st lieutenant.....	4th artillery...		North Carolina..	
242	Henry J. Feltus.....	do	do	do	March 31, 1827, as 1st lieut. of artillery.						New York.....	
243	N. J. Cruger.....	do	do	2d infantry...	October 31, 1827, as captain of infantry.						do	
244	Rawlins Lowndes.....	do	do	Artillery.....	December 31, 1830, as 1st lieut. of infantry.						South Carolina..	
245	Lewis N. Morris.....	do	do	do				Captain.....	3d infantry...		New York.....	
246	Joshua Barney.....	do	do	do	July 31, 1832, as 2d lieut. of artillery.						Maryland.....	
247	George F. Lindsay.....	do	do	2d infantry...	July 1, 1832, as 2d lieut. of infantry.						Dist. Columbia..	
248	John M. Tufis.....	do	do	Artillery.....	November 1, 1832, as 2d lieut. of artillery.						New York.....	
249	Benjamin Gorham.....	do	do	Lt. artillery..		October 15, 1821, as 2d lieut. of infantry.					Massachusetts..	
250	Samuel McRoe.....	do	do	8th infantry..				Captain.....	1st infantry...		North Carolina..	
251	Thomas Noel.....	do	do	6th infantry..				do	6th infantry...		Maryland.....	
252	Thomas McArthur.....	do	do	do	October 24, 1820, as 2d lieut. of infantry.						Ohio.....	
253	Charles Guerrant.....	do	do	7th infantry..							Virginia.....	Declined as 2d lieut. of light infantry in 1820.
254	Geo. D. Ramsay.....	do	do	Light artillery				1st lieutenant.....	1st artillery...		Dist. Columbia..	
255	Edgar S. Hawkins.....	do	do	3d infantry...				Captain.....	7th infantry...		New York.....	
256	Wm. S. Maitland.....	do	do	do				1st lieutenant.....	3d artillery...		do	
257	Aaron B. Skinner.....	do	do	5th infantry..							do	Disbanded as 2d lieut. of infantry, 1821.
258	Wm. W. Morris.....	do	do	6th infantry..				1st lieutenant.....	4th artillery...		do	
259	Ed. H. Courtney.....	July 1, 1821	Bvt. 2d lieut..	Corps eng. ...	Dec. 31, 1834, professor of natural and experimental philosophy.			Ed. H. Courtney.....			Maryland.....	
260	Clark Burdine.....	do	do	4th artillery..	June 1, 1825, as 2d lieut. of artillery.						Georgia.....	

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
261	Jonathan Prescott.....	July 1, 1821	Bvt. 2d lieutenant...	2d artillery...	September 30, 1833, as 1st lieutenant of artillery.			Jonathan Prescott.....			Massachusetts...	
262	Wm. W. Wells.....	do.....	do.....	3d artillery...	July 31, 1831, as 1st lieutenant of artillery.			Wm. W. Wells.....			Indiana.....	
263	Chas. Dimmock.....	do.....	do.....	1st artillery...				1st lieutenant.....	1st artillery...		Massachusetts...	
264	John C. Holland.....	do.....	do.....	3d artillery...		October 10, 1825, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.		John C. Holland.....			South Carolina...	
265	Edward C. Ross.....	do.....	do.....	4th artillery...				1st lieutenant.....	4th artillery...		Pennsylvania...	
266	W. Wheelright.....	do.....	do.....	1st artillery...	May 31, 1833, as 1st lieutenant of artillery.			W. Wheelright.....			Massachusetts...	
267	David Wallace.....	do.....	do.....	2d artillery...	June 1, 1822, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.			David Wallace.....			Ohio.....	
268	Robert W. Allston.....	do.....	do.....	3d artillery...	Feb. 1, 1822, as bvt. 2d lieutenant of artillery.			R. W. Allston.....			South Carolina..	
269	John F. Scott.....	do.....	do.....	1st artillery...	October 10, 1825, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.			John F. Scott.....			New York.....	
270	James Grier.....	do.....	do.....	2d artillery...		August 22, 1826, as 1st lieutenant of infantry.		James Grier.....			do.....	
271	John B. Scott.....	do.....	do.....	4th artillery...				1st lieutenant.....	4th artillery...		Connecticut.....	
272	Joseph Pentland.....	do.....	do.....	6th infantry...			April 22, 1830, as captain of infantry.				Pennsylvania...	
273	Alex. H. Morton.....	do.....	do.....	2d infantry...	July 12, 1833, as 1st lieutenant of infantry.						New York.....	
274	Wm. W. Gaillard.....	do.....	do.....	4th infantry...		October 11, 1822, as 2d lieutenant of infantry.		Wm. W. Gaillard.....			South Carolina..	
275	Seth M. Capron.....	do.....	do.....	5th infantry...	May 31, 1827, as 1st lieutenant of infantry.						New York.....	
276	Jefferson Vail.....	do.....	do.....	1st infantry...				Captain.....	1st infantry...		Maryland.....	
277	Jas. Henshaw.....	do.....	do.....	7th infantry...	Dec. 1, 1821, as bvt. 2d lieutenant of infantry.						Virginia.....	
278	Otis Wheeler.....	do.....	do.....	3d infantry...				1st lieutenant.....	3d infantry...		New Hampshire..	
279	Henry Bainbridge.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				do.....	do.....		Massachusetts...	
280	Jason Rogers.....	do.....	do.....	2d infantry...				Captain.....	6th infantry...		New York.....	
281	David M. Porter.....	do.....	do.....	4th infantry...	July 31, 1823, as 2d lieutenant of infantry.			David M. Porter.....			Tennessee.....	
282	Ju. A. D'Lagnel.....	do.....	do.....	5th infantry...				1st lieutenant.....	2d artillery...		New York.....	
283	George Dutton.....	July 1, 1822	do.....	Corps eng.....				George Dutton.....	do.....	Engineers.....	Connecticut.....	
284	J. K. Mansfield.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				J. K. Mansfield.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

VOL. VII. 6

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
285	Charles G. Smith	July 1, 1822	2d lieutenant...	3d artillery...	September 25, 1837, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.	Connecticut	
286	Thos. R. Ingalls	do.....	do.....	2d artillery...	December 31, 1829, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.	New York.....	
287	Horace Bliss.....	do.....	do.....	4th artillery...	1st lieutenant.....	4th artillery...	New Hampshire ..	
288	William Cooke	do.....	do.....	do.....	January 31, 1832, as 1st lieutenant of artillery.	New Jersey	
289	William Rose.....	do.....	Bvt. 2d lieutenant.	2d artillery...	November 22, 1825, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.	New York.....	
290	Walter Gwynn	do.....	do.....	3d artillery...	February 2, 1832, as 1st lieutenant of artillery.	Virginia	
291	Campbell Graham.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	1st lieutenant.....	3d artillery...	do.....	
292	T. B. Wheelock.....	do.....	do.....	4th artillery...	June 30, 1829, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.	do.....	Dragoons	Massachusetts ..	
293	James H. Cooke	do.....	do.....	1st artillery ..	January 31, 1833, as 1st lieutenant of artillery.	North Carolina...	
294	Wm. C. Young.....	do.....	do.....	2d artillery...	May 31, 1826, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.	New York.....	
295	Augustus Canfield	do.....	do.....	1st artillery	Brevet captain	Asst. top. eng'r.	New Jersey.....	
296	David H. Vinton.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	1st lieutenant.....	3d artillery	Rhode Island	
297	John J. Schuler.....	do.....	do.....	2d artillery...	April 30, 1838, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.	John S. Schuler	Pennsylvania	
298	John Pickell.....	do.....	do.....	4th artillery...	John Pickell.....	1st lieutenant.....	4th artillery...	New York.....	
299	Isaac Trimble	do.....	do.....	3d artillery...	May 31, 1832, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.	Isaac Trimble	Kentucky.....	
300	Henry H. Gird.....	do.....	do.....	4th artillery...	November 30, 1829, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.	Henry H. Gird.....	New York.....	
301	Benjamin H. Wright.....	do.....	2d lieutenant...	2d infantry...	June 1, 1823, as 2d lieutenant of infantry.	do.....	
302	Wm. M. Boyce.....	do.....	do.....	1st infantry	1st lieutenant.....	1st infantry...	Pennsylvania	
303	St. Clair Denny.....	do.....	do.....	5th infantry...	do.....	5th infantry...	do.....	
304	Westwood Lacey.....	do.....	do.....	4th infantry...	November 3, 1829, as 1st lieutenant of infantry.	Virginia	
305	Eustace Trenor.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	Captain	Dragoons	Vermont	
306	George Wright.....	do.....	do.....	3d infantry...	1st lieutenant.....	3d infantry...	do.....	
307	David Hunter.....	do.....	do.....	5th infantry...	Captain	Dragoons	Dist of Columbia.	
308	Geo. A. McCall.....	do.....	do.....	4th infantry...	1st lieutenant.....	4th infantry...	Pennsylvania	

1837.]

MILITARY ACADEMY.

65

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
309	Albert Lincoln	July 1, 1822	2d lieutenant...	5th infantry		October 13, 1822, as 2d lieutenant of infantry.					Connecticut	
310	Francis Lee	do	do	7th infantry				Captain	7th infantry	Pennsylvania		
311	Jas. R. Stephenson	do	do	do				1st lieutenant	do	Virginia		
312	John D. Hopson	do	do	3d infantry		February 17, 1829, as 1st lieutenant of infantry.				Vermont		
313	Thompson Morris	do	do	2d infantry				1st lieutenant	2d infantry	Ohio		
314	John E. Wilcox	do	do	5th infantry	July 31, 1834, as 2d lieutenant of infantry.					do		
315	Thomas Johnston	do	do	7th infantry			Dec. 4, 1834, as 1st lieutenant of infantry.			Pennsylvania		
316	Geo. W. Folger	do	Bvt. 2d lieutenant	2d infantry	December 20, 1826, as 1st lieutenant of infantry.					Massachusetts		
317	Thos. McNamara	do	do	7th infantry	June 30, 1830, as 1st lieutenant of infantry.					Virginia		
318	Aaron M. Wright	do	do	3d infantry			March 31, 1826, as 2d lieutenant of infantry.			New Hampshire		
319	J. J. Abercrombie	do	do	1st infantry				1st lieutenant	1st infantry	Tennessee		
320	Samuel Wragg	do	do	4th infantry		Nov. 27, 1828, as 2d lieutenant of infantry.				South Carolina		
321	David Moniac	do	do	6th infantry	Dec. 31, 1822, as bvt. 2d lieutenant of infantry.					Alabama		
322	Henry Clarke	do	do	5th infantry		October 14, 1830, as 1st lieutenant of infantry.				Connecticut		
323	Alfred Mordecai	July 1, 1823	do	Corps of engineers.				Alfred Mordecai	Captain	Ordnance	Virginia	
324	George S. Green	do	do	1st artillery					1st lieutenant	3d artillery	Rhode Island	
325	Geo. O. Richards	do	do	2d artillery		1825, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.					New York	
326	Reuben Holmes	do	2d lieutenant	6th infantry		November 4, 1833, as captain of dragoons.					Connecticut	
327	Sam'l U. Sutherland	do	Bvt. 2d lieutenant	4th artillery	July 15, 1824, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.						North Carolina	
328	Lucien B. Webster	do	do	3d artillery					1st lieutenant	1st artillery	Vermont	
329	Fred. L. Guion	do	do	4th artillery		April, 1824, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.					Mississippi	
330	George Nauman	do	do	2d artillery					1st lieutenant	1st artillery	Pennsylvania	
331	Alfred Beckley	do	do	3d artillery					do	4th artillery	Kentucky	
332	Frederick Searle	do	do	1st artillery				Frederick Searle	do	do	Massachusetts	

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
333	Rich. De Treville.....	July 1, 1833	Bvt. 2d lieut. ..	3d artillery...	April 30, 1825, as 2d lieut. of artillery.			Rich. De Treville			South Carolina ..	
334	Andrew Kinnarddo.....do.....	1st artillery ..	October 31, 1830, as 2d lieut. of artillery.			Andrew Kinnard.....			Pennsylvania	
335	George W. Waters.....do.....do.....	6th infantry...				Captain	6th infantry...		Massachusetts...	
336	John Farleydo.....do.....	2d artillery ..			John Farley	1st lieutenant.....	1st artillery...		Michigan Ter'ry..	
337	Levi M. Nutedo.....	2d lieutenant ..	6th infantry...			do.....	6th infantry...		New Hampshire ..	
338	Mark W. Batmando.....do.....do.....			do.....do.....		Pennsylvania	
339	Lorenzo Thomasdo.....do.....	4th infantry...			do.....	4th infantry...		Delaware.....	
340	J. J. B. Kingsburydo.....do.....	2d infantry...			do.....	2d infantry...		Connecticut.....	
341	George Andrews.....do.....do.....	6th infantry...			do.....	6th infantry...		Dist. Columbia ..	
342	R. D. S. Collins.....do.....do.....	4th infantry...			do.....	4th infantry...		New York.....	
343	William Reynolds.....do.....do.....	1st infantry...	August 1, 1830, as 1st lieut. of infantry.						Delaware.....	
344	Joseph R. Smith.....do.....do.....	2d infantry...				1st lieutenant.....	2d infantry...		New York.....	
345	Hannibal Day.....do.....do.....do.....			do.....do.....		Vermont.....	
346	R. H. Stewartdo.....do.....	1st infantry ..	July 14, 1828, as 2d lieut. of infantry.						Dist. Columbia ..	
347	Elias Phillipsdo.....do.....	4th infantry...				1st lieutenant.....	4th infantry...		New Jersey	
348	Joseph A. Phillipsdo.....do.....	7th infantry...			do.....	7th infantry...	do.....	
349	Asa Richardson.....do.....do.....	6th infantry...			do.....	6th infantry...		Vermont.....	
350	John E. Newell.....do.....	Bvt. 2d lieut. ..	1st infantry...			do.....	7th infantry...		North Carolina ..	
351	John Nicholls.....do.....do.....	4th infantry...			do.....	6th infantry...		Connecticut.....	
352	George H. Crosman.....do.....do.....	3d infantry...			do.....do.....		Massachusetts...	
353	Charles Holt.....do.....do.....	2d infantry...		September 14, 1824, as 2d lieut. of infantry.					New York.....	
354	John W. Cottondo.....do.....	5th infantry...				1st lieutenant.....	3d infantry...		Massachusetts...	
355	E. B. Alexander.....do.....do.....	6th infantry...			do.....do.....		Kentucky.....	
356	Albert S. Miller.....do.....do.....	7th infantry...			do.....	1st infantry...		Tennessee.....	
357	Egbert B. Birdsall.....do.....do.....	3d infantry...			do.....	3d infantry...		New York.....	
358	Dennis H. Mahan.....do.....do.....	Corps of engineers.				Professor of engineering.			Virginia.....	
359	J. W. A. Smith.....	July 1, 1824do.....	2d artillery...			February 12, 1828, as 2d lieut. of artillery.				Maine.....	
360	Robert P. Parrottdo.....do.....	1st artillery...				1st lieutenant.....	3d artillery...		New Hampshire ..	
361	R. E. Hazzard.....do.....do.....	4th artillery...	Sept. 30, 1829, as 2d lieut. of artillery.						South Carolina ..	
362	John K. Findlaydo.....do.....	3d artillery...	May 13, 1828, as 2d lieut. of artillery.						Pennsylvania.....	

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
363	N. B. Bennett	July 1, 1824	Bvt. 2d lieut. ..	3d artillery ..		Nov. 2, 1832, as 2d lieut. of artillery.					Pennsylvania ...	
364	J. N. Dillahunty	do.	do.	4th artillery ..	April 14, 1832, as 2d lieut. artillery.			J. N. Dillahunty			Mississippi	
365	Francis L. Jones	do.	do.	do.				Francis L. Jones	1st lieutenant	4th artillery	Tennessee	
366	George W. Long	do.	do.	1st artillery ..				George W. Long	do.	do.	New Hampshire ..	
367	J. M. Fessenden	do.	do.	do.	Nov. 30, 1831, as 2d lieut. of artillery.			J. M. Fessenden			Massachusetts ...	
368	W. P. Bainbridge	do.	do.	3d artillery ..				W. P. Bainbridge	1st lieutenant	4th artillery	Kentucky	
369	J. M. W. Pieton	do.	do.	2d artillery ..	March 1, 1832, as 2d lieut. of artillery.			J. M. W. Pieton			New York	
370	H. A. Wilson	do.	do.	do.				H. A. Wilson	1st lieutenant	4th artillery	do.	
371	Nich. Tillinghast	do.	2d lieutenant .	7th infantry ..				do.	do.	7th infantry	Massachusetts ...	
372	W. G. Williams	do.	do.	do.				do.	Brevet captain and asst.	Top. engineers.	South Carolina ...	
373	Anthony Drane	do.	Bvt. 2d lieut .	do.				do.	1st lieutenant	5th infantry	Maryland	
374	L. T. Jamison	do.	do.	5th infantry ..				do.	do.	do.	Louisiana	
375	Wm. Bickley	do.	do.	6th infantry ..	January 15, 1825, as 2d lieut. of infantry.			do.	do.	do.	Kentucky	
376	Ephraim W. Low	do.	do.	3d infantry ..		July, 1825, as 2d lieut. of infantry.		do.	do.	do.	Massachusetts ...	
377	Joseph Cadle	do.	do.	7th infantry ..			April 7, 1830, as 2d lieut. of infantry.	do.	do.	do.	New York	
378	Alex. Johnston	do.	do.	5th infantry ..				do.	1st lieutenant	5th infantry	Pennsylvania ...	
379	Wm. L. Harris	do.	do.	4th infantry ..				do.	do.	1st infantry	Virginia	
380	Wm. Bloodgood	do.	do.	1st infantry ..				do.	do.	2d infantry	New York	
381	Wm. W. Eaton	do.	do.	6th infantry ..		May 10, 1823, as 2d lieut. of infantry.		Wm. Bloodgood	do.	do.	Massachusetts ...	
382	Timothy Paige	do.	do.	3d infantry ..				Wm. W. Eaton	do.	do.	do.	
383	F. D. Newcomb	do.	do.	2d infantry ..				Timothy Paige	1st lieutenant	4th infantry	New Hampshire ..	
384	Dixon S. Miles	do.	do.	4th infantry ..				F. D. Newcomb	do.	do.	Massachusetts ...	
385	Electus Backus	do.	do.	2d infantry ..				Dixon S. Miles	do.	7th infantry	Maryland	
386	Julius Catlin	do.	do.	7th infantry ..	Sept. 8, 1826, as 2d lieut. of infantry.			Electus Backus	do.	1st infantry	New York	
387	J. Van Swearingen	do.	do.	1st infantry ..				Julius Catlin	do.	do.	Pennsylvania ...	
388	W. B. Thompson	do.	do.	5th infantry ..	Dec. 31, 1830, as 1st lieut. of infantry.			J. Van Swearingen	1st lieutenant	6th infantry	Maryland	
389	Alex. D. Bache	July 1, 1825	do.	Corps eng'rs..	June 1, 1829, as 2d lieut. of engineers.			W. B. Thompson	do.	do.	New York	
								Alex. D. Bache			Pennsylvania ...	Still a brevet 2d lieut. at the close of 1826—27.

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born	Remarks.
390	Peter McMartin	July 1, 1825	Bvt. 2d lieut. ..	Corps eng'rs.	April 18, 1826, as 2d lieut. of engineers.			Peter McMartin.....			New York.....	Still a brevet 2d lieut. to April, 1826.
391	A. H. Bowmando.....do.....do.....				A. H. Bowman	2d lieutenant	Engineers	Pennsylvania....	Do. to April, 1827.
392	Thompson Brown.....do.....do.....do.....				Thompson Brown.....do.....do.....	New York.....	Do. to April, 1827-'28.
393	D. S. Donelsondo.....	2d lieutenant ..	3d artillery...	January 22, 1826, as 2d lieut. of artillery.						Tennessee.....	
394	S. V. R. Ryando.....	Bvt. 2d lieut. ..	1st artillery ..	March 31, 1833, as 2d lieut. of artillery.						New York.....	
395	R. C. Smead.....do.....do.....	3d artillery...					1st lieutenant.....	4th artillery....do.....	
396	Benj. Hugerdo.....do.....do.....					Captain	Ordnance	South Carolina ..	
397	Francis Taylordo.....do.....	4th artillery...					1st lieutenant.....	1st artillery....	Virginia	
398	A. H. Brisbanedo.....do.....	3d artillery...	January 1, 1828, as 2d lieut. of artillery.						South Carolina ..	
399	W. Finn Hopkins.....do.....do.....	2d artillery...					1st lieutenant.....	4th artillery....	Connecticut.....	
400	W. A. Thorntondo.....do.....	1st artillery...					2d lieutenant.....do.....	New York.....	
401	Jos. W. Harris.....do.....do.....	4th artillery...					1st lieutenant.....	3d artillery....	New Hampshire ..	
402	M. J. Williamsdo.....do.....	1st artillery ..	October 31, 1827, as 2d lieut. of infantry.			M. J. Williams.....			Georgia.....	
403	Robert Andersondo.....do.....	2d artillery...				Robert Anderson	1st lieutenant.....	3d artillery....	Kentucky.....	
404	Alex. D. Mackny.....do.....do.....	3d artillery...				Alex. D. Mackny.....do.....	1st artillery....	New York.....	
405	James R. Irwin.....do.....do.....	2d artillery...				James R. Irwindo.....do.....	Pennsylvania....	
406	Horace Smith.....do.....do.....	1st artillery...	January 8, 1828, as 2d lieut. of artillery.			Horace Smith.....			New York.....	
407	Charles F. Smith.....do.....do.....	2d artillery...				Charles F. Smith.....	1st lieutenant.....	2d artillery....	Pennsylvania....	
408	Wash. Seawelldo.....do.....	7th infantry..				do.....	7th infantry....	Virginia	
409	Law. F. Carterdo.....do.....	4th infantry..				do.....do.....do.....	
410	Fred. Norcom.....do.....do.....do.....	August 31, 1833, as 2d lieut. of artillery.						North Carolina ..	
411	Nathl. H. Street.....do.....do.....do.....	September 1, 1826, as 2d lieut. of infantry.			Nathl. H. Street.....		do.....	
412	Joseph S. Worth.....do.....do.....	3d infantry...				Joseph S. Worth.....	1st lieutenant.....	6th infantry....	New York.....	
413	N. Sayre Harris.....do.....do.....	5th infantry..				N. Sayre Harris.....do.....	3d infantry....	New Jersey.....	
414	Osborne Cross.....do.....do.....	1st infantry...				O. borne Cross.....do.....	1st infantry....	Maryland.....	
415	Joseph Bonnelldo.....do.....	5th infantry..				Joseph Bonnelldo.....	3d infantry....	Pennsylvania....	
416	W. R. Montgomerydo.....do.....	3d infantry...				W. R. Montgomerydo.....do.....	New Jersey.....	
417	H. St. J. Linden.....do.....do.....	2d infantry...				H. St. J. Linden.....do.....	6th infantry....	Maryland.....	
418	Jas. J. Andersondo.....do.....	6th infantry..	July 1, 1830, as 2d lieut. of infantry.			Jas. J. Anderson.....			Kentucky.....	

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
419	Jas. D. Burnham.....	July 1, 1825	2d lieutenant...	3d artillery...		March 6, 1824, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.					New York.....	
420	Gustavus Dorr.....	do.....	Bvt. 2d lieutenant...	2d infantry...				Gustavus Dorr.....	1st lieutenant.....	6th infantry...	Massachusetts...	
421	Fred. Thomas.....	do.....	2d lieutenant...	7th infantry...		May 27, 1831, as 2d lieutenant of infantry.					Vermont.....	
422	Geo. W. Garey.....	do.....	Bvt. 2d lieutenant...	do.....		December 10, 1834, as 1st lieutenant of infantry.		Geo. W. Garey.....			Maryland.....	
423	James Engle.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				James Engle.....	1st lieutenant.....	5th infantry...	New Jersey.....	
424	Joseph Clay.....	do.....	do.....	6th infantry...		July 8, 1833, as 2d lieutenant of infantry.		Joseph Clay.....			Georgia.....	
425	Samuel R. Allston.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				Samuel R. Allston.....	2d lieutenant.....	4th infantry...	Massachusetts...	Still a brevet 2d lieutenant at close of 1826.
426	W. H. C. Bartlett.....	do.....	do.....	Engineers.....				W. H. C. Bartlett.....	do.....	Engineers.....	Missouri.....	Still a brevet 2d lieutenant at close of 1827-'28-'29.
427	Thomas S. Twiss.....	July 1, 1826	do.....	do.....	June 30, 1829, as 2d lieutenant of engineers.			Thomas S. Twiss.....			Vermont.....	Still a brevet 2d lieutenant at close of 1827-'28.
428	William Bryant.....	do.....	do.....	1st artillery...					2d lieutenant.....	3d artillery....	Virginia.....	
429	T. Jeff. Cram.....	do.....	do.....	2d artillery...					do.....	4th artillery....	New Hampshire..	
430	Chas. G. Ridgely.....	do.....	do.....	1st infantry...	Feb. 23, 1827, as bvt. 2d lieutenant of infantry.			Chas. G. Ridgely.....			Delaware.....	
431	John McClellan.....	do.....	do.....	3d artillery...				John McClellan.....	1st lieutenant.....	1st artillery....	Pennsylvania...	
432	B. H. Henderson.....	do.....	do.....	4th artillery...	June 30, 1832, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.						North Carolina..	
433	A. S. Johnston.....	do.....	do.....	2d infantry...	May 31, 1834, as 2d lieutenant of infantry.			A. S. Johnston.....			Louisiana,	
434	Ed. B. White.....	do.....	do.....	1st artillery...				Ed. B. White.....	2d lieutenant.....	3d artillery....	South Carolina ..	
435	F. L. Dancey.....	do.....	do.....	2d artillery...				F. L. Dancey.....	1st lieutenant.....	2d artillery....	North Carolina..	
436	Jos. D. Searight.....	do.....	do.....	4th infantry...				Jos. D. Searight.....	2d lieutenant.....	6th infantry...	Pennsylvania...	
437	J. C. Townsend.....	do.....	do.....	3d artillery...		October 1, 1826, as bvt. 2d lieutenant of artillery.					New Hampshire..	
438	Daniel S. Herring.....	do.....	do.....	4th artillery...				Daniel S. Herring.....	2d lieutenant.....	3d artillery....	Virginia.....	
439	George Woodbridge.....	do.....	do.....	1st artillery...	June 30, 1829, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.			George Woodbridge.....			Massachusetts...	
440	Michael M. Clark.....	do.....	do.....	2d artillery...				Michael M. Clark.....	1st lieutenant.....	2d artillery....	Virginia.....	
441	Maskell C. Ewing.....	do.....	do.....	3d artillery...				Maskell C. Ewing.....	2d lieutenant.....	4th artillery....	Pennsylvania...	
442	S. P. Heintzelman.....	do.....	do.....	3d infantry...				S. P. Heintzelman.....	1st lieutenant.....	2d infantry....	do.....	
443	Theop. B. Brown.....	do.....	do.....	4th artillery...		Sept. 14, 1834, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.		Theop. B. Brown.....			New York.....	

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
444	Danforth H. Tufts.....	July 1, 1826	Bvt. 2d lieut...	1st artillery..				Danforth H. Tufts ...	2d lieutenant.....	4th artillery...	Vermont	
445	A. J. Pleasanton.....do.....do.....	6th infantry..	June 30, 1830, as 2d lieut. of artillery.			A. J. Pleasanton.....do.....do.....	Dist. Columbia ..	Still a brevet 2d lieut. at the close of 1837.
446	Martin P. Parks.....do.....do.....	2d artillery...	April 5, 1838, as brevet 2d lieut. of artillery.			Martin P. Parks.....do.....do.....	North Carolina...	Do.
447	John B. Grayson.....do.....do.....	3d artillery...				John B. Grayson.....	1st lieutenant.....	2d artillery.....	Kentucky	Do.
448	John Williamson.....do.....do.....	4th artillery...				John Williamson.....do.....	1st artillery.....	New Jersey	Do.
449	Henry J. Griffin.....do.....do.....	5th infantry..		Feb. 20, 1838, as 2d lieut. of infantry.		Henry J. Griffin.....do.....do.....	Virginia	
450	John Archer.....do.....do.....	7th infantry..	March 31, 1834, as 1st lieut. of infantry.			John Archer.....do.....do.....	Maryland.....	
451	Samuel H. Ridgely....do.....do.....	1st infantry ..		April 3, 1837, as brevet 2d lieut. of infantry.		Samuel H. Ridgely....do.....do.....do.....	
452	John M. Berrien.....do.....do.....	2d infantry...				John M. Berrien.....	1st lieutenant.....	5th infantry...	Pennsylvania ..	
453	Edwin B. Babbitt.....do.....do.....	3d infantry...				Edwin B. Babbitt.....do.....	3d infantry.....	Indiana	
454	Rich. W. Colcock.....do.....do.....	4th infantry...				Rich. W. Colcock.....	2d lieutenant.....do.....	South Carolina ..	
455	Charles L. C. Minor....do.....do.....	5th infantry..		October 31, 1833, as 2d lieut. of infantry.		Charles L. C. Minor....do.....do.....	Virginia	
456	Wm. H. Sims.....do.....do.....	6th infantry..	March 28, 1837, as bvt. 2d lieut. of infantry.			Wm. H. Sims.....do.....do.....	Georgia	
457	Francis J. Brooke.....do.....do.....	7th infantry..				Francis J. Brooke.....	2d lieutenant.....	6th infantry...	Virginia	
458	Nathaniel C. Macrae...do.....do.....	1st infantry...				Nathaniel C. Macrae...do.....	3d infantry...do.....	
459	James G. Allen.....do.....do.....	2d infantry..	May 20, 1838, as 2d lieut. of infantry.			James G. Allen.....do.....do.....	Tennessee	
460	Alex. G. Baldwin.....do.....do.....	3d infantry...				Alex. G. Baldwin.....	2d lieutenant.....	3d infantry...	Virginia	
461	Amos B. Eaton.....do.....do.....	4th infantry..				Amos B. Eaton.....do.....	2d infantry...	New York.....	
462	Moses E. Merrell.....do.....do.....	5th infantry..				Moses E. Merrell.....	1st lieutenant.....	5th infantry..	Maine	Still a brevet 2d lieut. at the close of 1837.
463	Charles Colerick.....do.....do.....	6th infantry..		Jan. 9, 1838, as brevet 2d lieut. of infantry.		Charles Colerick.....do.....do.....	Pennsylvania ..	Do.
464	Silas Casey.....do.....do.....	7th infantry..				Silas Casey.....	2d lieutenant.....	2d infantry...	Rhode Island ...	Do.
465	Thomas H. Pearce.....do.....do.....	1st infantry ..	March 31, 1839, as 2d lieut. of infantry.			Thomas H. Pearce.....do.....do.....	Pennsylvania ..	Do.
466	Eph. K. Smith.....do.....do.....	2d infantry...				Eph. K. Smith.....	1st lieutenant.....	5th infantry...	Florida	Do.
467	Eben. S. Sibley.....	July 1, 1827do.....	Artillery ..				Eben. S. Sibley.....do.....	1st artillery...	Michigan	
468	John Child.....do.....do.....do.....				John Child.....	2d lieutenant.....	3d artillery...	Massachusetts ..	
469	Wm. Maynadler.....do.....do.....do.....				Wm. Maynadler.....	1st lieutenant.....	1st artillery...	Dist. Columbia ..	
470	J. A. J. Bradford.....do.....do.....do.....				J. A. J. Bradford.....	Captain	Ordnance ..	Kentucky	

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
471	Lucien J. Bibb.....	July 1, 1837	Bvt. 2d lieut...	Artillery...		September 7, 1831, as 2d lieut. of artillery.		Lucien J. Bibb.....			Kentucky.....	
472	Napoleon B. Buford....	do.....	do.....	do.....				Napoleon B. Buford....	2d lieutenant.....	3d artillery....	do.....	
473	Edwin Schenck.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	Sept. 30, 1828, as brevet 2d lieut. of artillery.			Edwin Schenck.....			New York....	
474	Leonidas Polk.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	Dec. 1, 1827, as brevet 2d lieut. of artillery.						North Carolina..	
475	Essex Sterrett.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	June 21, 1828, as brevet 2d lieut. of artillery.			Essex Sterrett.....			Maryland.....	
476	George Fetterman.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				George Fetterman.....	2d lieutenant.....	3d artillery....	Pennsylvania....	
477	William E. Aisquith....	do.....	do.....	do.....			May 24, 1832, as 2d lieut. of artillery.	William E. Aisquith....			Virginia.....	
478	T. Worthington.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	Nov. 8, 1828, as bvt. 2d lieut. of artillery.			T. Worthington.....			Ohio.....	
479	Gabriel J. Raines.....	do.....	do.....	Infantry....				Gabriel J. Raines.....	1st lieutenant.....	7th infantry....	North Carolina..	
480	John G. Furman.....	do.....	do.....	do.....		Aug. 29, 1830, as 2d lieut. of infantry.		John G. Furman.....			South Carolina..	
481	W. B. Magruder.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	Oct. 25, 1827, as bvt. 2d lieut. of infantry.						Virginia.....	
482	T. B. W. Stockton.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				T. B. W. Stockton....	1st lieutenant.....	1st infantry....	New York.....	
483	Alex. S. Hooc.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				Alex. S. Hooc.....	do.....	5th infantry....	Virginia.....	
484	William Flanagan.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	May 20, 1828, as bvt. 2d lieut. of infantry.			Wm. Flanagan.....			Kentucky.....	
485	George H. Prentis.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	Jan. 29, 1828, as bvt. 2d lieut. of infantry.			George H. Prentis.....			Vermont.....	
486	David Perkins.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				David Perkins.....	Captain.....	Dragoons.....	Pennsylvania....	
487	Samuel Hitchcock.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	Dec. 19, 1827, as bvt. 2d lieut. of infantry.						Alabama.....	
488	Alex. J. Centre.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				Alex. J. Centre.....	2d lieutenant.....	5th infantry....	New York.....	
489	P. St. Geo. Coecke.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				P. St. George Coecke...	1st lieutenant.....	Dragoons.....	Virginia.....	
490	Thomas S. Trask.....	do.....	do.....	do.....		—, 1828, as bvt. 2d lieut. of infantry.		Thomas S. Trask.....			Vermont.....	
491	Abner R. Hetzel.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				Abner R. Hetzel.....	2d lieutenant.....	2d infantry....	Pennsylvania....	
492	Joseph H. Lamotte.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				Joseph H. Lamotte.....	1st lieutenant.....	1st infantry....	North Carolina..	
493	Edgar M. Lacy.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				Edgar M. Lacy.....	2d lieutenant.....	5th infantry....	New York.....	
494	Levin Gale.....	do.....	do.....	do.....		Sept. 1, 1832, as 2d lieut. of infantry.		Levin Gale.....			Maryland.....	

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

201—III—70A

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Re-signed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
495	I. P. Simonton	July 1, 1827	Bvt. 2d lieut. . .	Infantry				I. P. Simonton	1st lieutenant.....	Dragoons.	Ohio	Still a bvt 2d lieut. at the close of 1828-'29.
496	J. Van Horn.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				J. Van Horn.....	2d lieutenant.....	3d infantry.....	do.....	Do. 1828.
497	Wash. Hood.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				Wash. Hood.....	4th infantry.....	Pennsylvania...	do.....	Do. 1828.
498	Isaac Lynd.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				Isaac Lynd.....	5th infantry.....	Vermont.....	do.....	Do. 1828-'29.
499	Nathaniel J. Eaton.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				Nathl. J. Eaton.....	6th infantry.....	Massachusetts...	do.....	Do. 1828.
500	Steph. W. Moore.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				Steph. W. Moore.....	1st lieutenant.....	South Carolina...	do.....	Do. 1828.
501	J. K. Greenough.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				J. K. Greenough.....	2d lieutenant.....	1st infantry.....	Massachusetts...	Do. 1828.
502	Wm. S. Stillwell.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	March 31, 1833, as 2d lieut. of infantry.			Wm. S. Stillwell.....			do.....	Do. 1828.
503	Abm. Van Buren.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				Abm. Van Buren.....	1st lieutenant.....	Dragoons.....	New York.....	Do. 1828-'29.
504	Nelson N. Clark.....	do.....	do.....	do.....		July 11, 1832, as 2d lieut. of infantry.		Nelson N. Clark.....			do.....	Do. 1828.
505	Albert E. Church.....	July 1, 1828	do.....	Artillery.....					2d lieutenant.....	3d artillery.....	Connecticut.....	
506	R. C. Tilghman.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				R. C. Tilghman.....	1st lieutenant.....	1st artillery.....	Maryland.....	Do. 1829.
507	Hugh W. Mercer.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				Hugh W. Mercer.....	do.....	2d artillery.....	Virginia.....	
508	Robert E. Temple.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				Robert E. Temple.....	2d lieutenant.....	3d artillery.....	Vermont.....	
509	Charles O. Collins.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				Charles O. Collins.....	do.....	4th artillery.....	New York.....	
510	James J. Austin.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	Nov. 8, 1828, as bvt. 2d lieut. of artillery.						Massachusetts...	
511	Edmund French.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				Edmund French.....	2d lieutenant.....	1st artillery.....	Connecticut.....	Do. 1829-'30.
512	Joseph L. Locke.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				Joseph L. Locke.....	1st lieutenant.....	2d artillery.....	Maine.....	
513	George E. Chase.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	Aug. 31, 1833, as 2d lieut. of artillery.			George E. Chase.....			Massachusetts...	
514	John F. Lane.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				John F. Lane.....	2d lieutenant.....	4th artillery.....	Indiana.....	
515	Wm. Palmer.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				William Palmer.....	do.....	1st artillery.....	do.....	Do. 1829-'30-'31.
516	Thos. B. Adams.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				Thomas B. Adams.....	1st lieutenant.....	2d artillery.....	Massachusetts...	
517	Robert E. Clary.....	do.....	do.....	Infantry.....				Robert E. Clary.....	2d lieutenant.....	5th infantry.....	do.....	Do. 1829.
518	Robert Sevier.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				Robert Sevier.....	do.....	6th infantry.....	Tennessee.....	
519	Wm. W. Mather.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				Wm. W. Mather.....	1st lieutenant.....	7th infantry.....	Connecticut.....	
520	Enos G. Mitchell.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				Enos G. Mitchell.....	2d lieutenant.....	1st infantry.....	do.....	
521	James F. Izard.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				James F. Izard.....	1st lieutenant.....	Dragoons.....	Pennsylvania...	Do. 1829-'30.
522	Thomas Cutts.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				Thomas Cutts.....	2d lieutenant.....	3d infantry.....	Maine.....	Do. 1829-'30.
523	Wm. H. Baker.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	May 20, 1831, as 2d lieut. of infantry.			Wm. H. Baker.....			Vermont.....	
524	James L. Thompson.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				James L. Thompson.....	2d lieutenant.....	5th infantry.....	Tennessee.....	Do. 1829.
525	Gus. S. Rousseau.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	April 30, 1833, as 2d lieut. of infantry.			Gus. S. Rousseau.....			Louisiana.....	Do. 1829.

1831]

MILITARY ACADEMY.

73

B—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
526	B. W. Kinsman.....	July 1, 1828	Bvt. 2d lieutenant	Infantry		May 14, 1832, as 2d lieutenant of infantry.		B. W. Kinsman.....			Maine.....	Still a brevet 2d lieutenant at the close of 1829.
527	Jefferson Davis.....	do	do	do				Jefferson Davis.....	1st lieutenant.....	Dragoons.....	Mississippi.....	Do. 1829.
528	W. L. E. Morrison.....	do	do	do	October 16, 1830, as bvt. 2d lieutenant of infantry.			W. L. E. Morrison.....			Illinois.....	Do. 1829.
529	Samuel K. Cobb.....	do	do	do		January 11, 1834, as 2d lieutenant of infantry.		Samuel K. Cobb.....			Alabama.....	Do., 1829-'30-'31-'32.
530	Samuel Torrence.....	do	do	do		September 1, 1832, as 2d lieutenant of infantry.		Samuel Torrence.....			Ohio.....	Do. 1829.
531	Amos Foster.....	do	do	do		February 7, 1832, as 2d lieutenant of infantry.		Amos Foster.....			New Hampshire.....	Do. 1829.
532	Thos. Drayton.....	do	do	do				Thos. Drayton.....	2d lieutenant.....	6th infantry.....	South Carolina.....	Do. 1829-'30.
533	T. C. Brockway.....	do	do	do		September 28, 1831, as 2d lieutenant of infantry.		T. C. Brockway.....			Connecticut.....	Do. 1829.
534	John R. Gardiner.....	do	do	do				John R. Gardiner.....	2d lieutenant.....	1st infantry.....	New York.....	Do. 1829.
535	Crafts J. Wright.....	do	do	do	November 8, 1828, as bvt. 2d lieutenant of infantry.						Ohio.....	
536	James W. Penrose.....	do	do	do				James W. Penrose.....	2d lieutenant.....	2d infantry.....	Missouri.....	Do. 1829-'30-'31.
537	Charles Mason.....	July 1, 1829	do	Engineers	December 31, 1831, as 2d lieutenant of engineers.			Charles Mason.....			New York.....	Do. 1830.
538	Robert E. Lee.....	do	do	do				Robert E. Lee.....	2d lieutenant.....	Engineers.....	Virginia.....	Do. 1830-'31.
539	Wm. H. Harford.....	do	do	4th infantry	September 15, 1833, as 2d lieutenant of infantry.			Wm. H. Harford.....			Georgia.....	Do. 1830.
540	J. Allen Smith.....	do	do	3d artillery				J. Allen Smith.....	2d lieutenant.....	3d artillery.....	Pennsylvania.....	
541	James Barnes.....	do	do	4th artillery				James Barnes.....	do	4th artillery.....	Massachusetts.....	
542	Cath. P. Buckingham.....	do	do	3d artillery	September 30, 1831, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.			Cath. P. Buckingham.....			Ohio.....	Do. 1830.
543	Joseph B. Smith.....	do	do	4th artillery	May 31, 1832, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.			Joseph B. Smith.....			Dist. of Columbia.....	Do. 1830.
544	John Mackay.....	do	do	2d artillery					2d lieutenant.....	2d artillery.....	Georgia.....	
545	C. W. Hackley.....	do	do	3d artillery	September 30, 1833, as 2d lieutenant of artillery.			C. W. Hackley.....			New York.....	Do. 1830.
546	Minor Knowlton.....	do	do	1st artillery				Minor Knowlton.....	2d lieutenant.....	1st artillery.....	Connecticut.....	Do. 1830-'31.
547	John C. Casey.....	do	do	2d artillery				do	do	2d artillery.....	New Jersey.....	
548	Wm. R. McKee.....	do	do	3d artillery				Wm. R. McKee.....	do	3d artillery.....	Kentucky.....	Do. 1830-'31.
549	Jos. E. Johnston.....	do	do	4th artillery				Jos. E. Johnston.....	do	4th artillery.....	Virginia.....	Do. 1830.
550	John F. Kennedy.....	do	do	1st artillery				John F. Kennedy.....	do	1st artillery.....	Maryland.....	Do. 1830-'31.

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
551	O. M. K. Mitchell.....	July 1, 1829	Bvt. 2d lieut...	2d artillery...	November 30, 1833, as 2d lieut. of artillery.			O. M. K. Mitchell.....			Ohio.....	
552	Gustavus Brown.....	do.....	do.....	3d artillery...		July 12, 1833, as 2d lieut. of artillery.		Gustavus Brown.....			Kentucky.....	Still a brevet 2d lieut. at the close of 1830-'31.
553	Sidney Burbank.....	do.....	do.....	1st infantry...				Sidney Burbank.....	2d lieutenant.....	1st infantry...	Massachusetts..	Do. 1830.
554	Wm. Hoffman.....	do.....	do.....	6th infantry..				Wm Hoffman.....	do.....	6th infantry...	New York.....	Do. 1830-'31-'32.
555	Charles Petigru.....	do.....	do.....	4th artillery.				Charles Petigru.....	do.....	4th artillery...	South Carolina..	Do. 1830.
556	Franklin E. Hunt.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				Franklin E. Hunt.....	do.....	do.....	New Jersey.....	Do. 1830.
557	L. P. Lupton.....	do.....	do.....	3d infantry...				L. P. Lupton.....	1st lieutenant.....	Dragoons.....	New York.....	Do. 1830-'31-'32.
558	Seth Eastman.....	do.....	do.....	1st infantry...				Seth Eastman.....	2d lieutenant.....	1st infantry...	Maine.....	Do. 1830.
559	Thomas Swords.....	do.....	do.....	4th infantry..				Thomas Swords.....	1st lieutenant.....	Dragoons.....	New York.....	Do. 1830.
560	Albemarle Cady.....	do.....	do.....	6th infantry..				Albemarle Cady.....	2d lieutenant.....	6th infantry...	New Hampshire..	Do. 1830-'31-'32.
561	Thomas A. Davis.....	do.....	do.....	1st infantry...	October 31, 1831, as brevet 2d lieut. infantry.			Thos. A. Davis.....			New York.....	Do. 1830.
562	A. G. Blanchard.....	do.....	do.....	3d infantry...				A. G. Blanchard.....	2d lieutenant.....	3d infantry...	Massachusetts..	Do. 1830-'31-'32.
563	Chilteab S. Howe.....	do.....	do.....	4th infantry..				Chilteab S. Howe.....	do.....	4th infantry...	New York.....	Do. 1830.
564	Caleb Sibley.....	do.....	do.....	5th infantry..				Caleb Sibley.....	do.....	5th infantry...	Massachusetts..	
565	Jas. H. Wright.....	do.....	do.....	6th infantry..		Sept. 21, 1830, as brevet 2d lieut. infantry.		Jas. H. Wright.....			South Carolina..	
566	Geo. A. Sterling.....	do.....	do.....	7th infantry.	Dec. 30, 1831, as 2d lieutenant infantry.			Geo. A. Sterling.....			Connecticut.....	Do. 1830.
567	Jos. H. Pawling.....	do.....	do.....	1st infantry...	Nov. 30, 1830, as brevet 2d lieut. infantry.			Jos. H. Pawling.....			Pennsylvania....	
568	Antes Snyder.....	do.....	do.....	2d infantry...	Sept. 30, 1830, as brevet 2d lieut. infantry.			Antes Snyder.....			do.....	
569	W. H. Warfield.....	do.....	do.....	3d infantry...	Oct. 12, 1832, as brevet 2d lieut. infantry.			W. H. Warfield.....			Maryland.....	Do. 1830-'31.
570	James Clark.....	do.....	do.....	4th infantry..	Aug. 18, 1830, as brevet 2d lieut. infantry.			James Clark.....			Pennsylvania....	
571	James Allen.....	do.....	do.....	5th infantry..				James Allen.....	2d lieutenant.....	Dragoons.....	Indiana.....	Do. 1830-'31-'32.
572	Jonathan Freeman.....	do.....	do.....	6th infantry..				Jonathan Freeman.....	do.....	6th infantry...	New Jersey.....	Do. 1830-'31-'32.
573	John P. Davis.....	do.....	do.....	7th infantry..				John P. Davis.....	1st lieutenant.....	7th infantry...	Maine.....	Do. 1830.
574	G. R. J. Bowdoin.....	do.....	do.....	1st infantry..	Aug. 31, 1832, as brevet 2d lieut. infantry.			G. R. J. Bowdoin.....			Massachusetts..	Do. 1830-'31.
575	Edwin R. Long.....	do.....	do.....	2d infantry...				Edwin R. Long.....	2d lieutenant.....	2d infantry...	North Carolina..	Do. 1830-'31-'32.
573	Benj. W. Price.....	do.....	do.....	3d infantry...	Feb. 13, 1832, as brevet 2d lieut. infantry.			Benj. W. Price.....			Ohio.....	Do. 1830-'31.

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
577	Robert W. Burnett.....	July 1, 1829	Bvt. 2d lieutenant....	4th infantry..	March 31, 1833, as 2d lieutenant infantry.			Robert W. Burnett.....			Ohio.....	Still a bvt. 2d lieutenant at the close of 1830-'31.
578	James S. Moore.....do.....do.....	5th infantry..	Oct. 31, 1829, as brevet 2d lieutenant infantry.						Georgia.....	
579	Charles O. May.....do.....do.....	6th infantry..		Jan. 19, 1830, as brevet 2d lieutenant infantry.		Charles O. May.....			Vermont.....	
580	T. H. Holmes.....do.....do.....	7th infantry..				T. H. Holmes.....	2d lieutenant.....	7th infantry....	North Carolina...	Do. 1830.
581	Ed. R. Williams.....do.....do.....	1st infantry..				Ed. R. Williams.....do.....	1st infantry....	Connecticut.....	Do. 1831
582	R. B. Scrivner.....do.....do.....	2d infantry..				R. B. Scrivner.....do.....	4th infantry....	South Carolina...	Do. 1830-'31.
583	Alex. J. Swift.....	July 1, 1830do.....	Engineers.....				Alex. J. Swift.....do.....	Engineers.....	New York.....	Do. 1830.
584	Wm. E. Basinger.....do.....do.....	2d artillery..				Wm. E. Basinger.....do.....	2d artillery....	Georgia.....	
585	W. S. Chandler.....do.....do.....do.....				W. S. Chandler.....do.....do.....	Dist. of Columbia.	
586	Francis Vinton.....do.....do.....	3d artillery..				Francis Vinton.....do.....	3d artillery....	Rhode Island....	Do. 1831.
587	W. N. Pendleton.....do.....do.....	2d artillery..	Oct 31, 1833, as 2d lieutenant artillery.			W. N. Pendleton.....			Virginia.....	Do. 1831.
588	Geo. W. Lawson.....do.....do.....do.....	June 30, 1831, as brevet 2d lieutenant artillery.			Geo. W. Lawson.....			Tennessee.....	
589	Thomas J. Lee.....do.....do.....	4th artillery..				Thomas J. Lee.....	2d lieutenant.....	4th artillery....	Dist. of Columbia.	Do. 1831.
590	John W. Barry.....do.....do.....	1st artillery..				John W. Barry.....do.....	1st artillery....	Kentucky.....	Do. 1831.
591	Thos. B. Linnard.....do.....do.....	2d artillery..				Thos. B. Linnard.....do.....	2d artillery....	Pennsylvania....	Do. 1831.
592	Benjamin Poole.....do.....do.....	3d artillery..				Benjamin Poole.....do.....	3d artillery....	Maine.....	Do. 1831.
593	Simon H. Drum.....do.....do.....	4th artillery..				Simon H. Drum.....do.....	4th artillery....	Pennsylvania....	Do. 1381.
594	James H. Prentiss.....do.....do.....	1st artillery..				James H. Prentiss.....do.....	1st artillery....	Indiana.....	Do. 1831.
595	R. H. K. Whitely.....do.....do.....	2d artillery..				R. H. K. Whitely.....do.....	2d artillery....	Delaware.....	Do. 1831.
596	Edwin Rose.....do.....do.....	3d artillery..				Edwin Rose.....do.....	3d artillery....	New York.....	Do. 1831.
597	John B. Magruder.....do.....do.....	7th infantry..				John B. Magruder.....do.....	1st artillery....	Virginia.....	Do. 1831.
598	Albert T. Bledsoe.....do.....do.....do.....	August 31, 1832, as bvt. 2d lieutenant of infantry.			Albert T. Bledsoe.....			Kentucky.....	Do. 1831.
599	John S. Stoddard.....do.....do.....	5th infantry..							New York.....	Declined.
600	John W. Murray.....do.....do.....	7th infantry..		Feb 14, 1831, as bvt. 2d lieutenant of infantry.		John W. Murray.....			Pennsylvania....	
601	James West.....do.....do.....do.....		Sept. 28, 1834, as 2d lieutenant of infantry.		James West.....			Maryland.....	Still a bvt. 2d lieutenant at the close of 1831.
602	James M. Hill.....do.....do.....	2d infantry..				James M. Hill.....	2d lieutenant.....	2d infantry....	Maine.....	Do. 1831-'32.
603	Samuel Kenney.....do.....do.....	7th infantry..				Samuel Kenney.....do.....	7th infantry....	Illinois.....	Do. 1831-'32.
604	J. H. Leavenworth.....do.....do.....	4th infantry..				J. H. Leavenworth.....do.....	2d infantry....	Vermont.....	Do. 1831-'32.
605	M. L. Clark.....do.....do.....	6th infantry..	May 31, 1833, as bvt. 2d lieutenant of infantry.			M. L. Clark.....			Missouri.....	Do. 1831-'32.

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
606	J. T. Collinsworth.....	July 1, 1830	Bvt. 2d lieut. ..	5th infantry..				J. T. Collinsworth.	2d lieutenant ..	5th infantry....	Tennessee	Still a bvt. 2d lieut. at the close of 1831-'33.
607	Lloyd J. Beall.	do.....	do.....	1st infantry..				Lloyd J. Beall.	do.....	1st infantry....	Maryland	Do. 1831.
608	Wm. C. Heyward.....	do.....	do.....	3d infantry..	Feb. 6, 1832, as bvt 2d lieut. of infantry.			William C. Heyward.....			New York.....	Do. 1831.
609	Joseph Ritner.....	do.....	do.....	4th infantry..		February 18, 1834, as 2d lieut. of infantry.		Joseph Ritner.....			Pennsylvania ...	Do. 1831.
610	J. H. K. Burgwin	do.....	do.....	2d infantry..				J. H. K. Burgwin	2d lieutenant	Dragoons	North Carolina..	Do. 1831-'33.
611	T. L. Alexander.....	do.....	do.....	6th infantry..				T. L. Alexander	do.....	6th infantry....	Kentucky.....	Do. 1831-'33.
612	Jas. H. Taylor.....	do.....	do.....	3d infantry..				Jas. H. Taylor.....	do.....	3d infantry....	New York.....	Do. 1831-'33.
613	R. C. Buchanan.....	do.....	do.....	4th infantry..				R. C. Buchanan.....	do.....	4th infantry....	Dist. of Columbia.	Do. 1831.
614	Cams. C. Daveiss.....	do.....	do.....	5th infantry..				C. C. Daveiss.....	do.....	5th infantry....	Kentucky.....	Do. 1831-'32.
615	J. S. Vanderveer.....	do.....	do.....	6th infantry..				J. S. Vanderveer.....	do.....	Dragoons	New Jersey.....	Do. 1831-'32.
616	Thos. J. Royster.....	do.....	do.....	do.....		Sept. 5, 1832, as bvt. 2d lieut. of infantry.		Thos. J. Royster.....			Louisiana.....	Do. 1831.
617	George Wilson.....	do.....	do.....	1st infantry..				George Wilson.....	2d lieutenant	1st infantry....	Ohio	Do. 1831-'33.
618	George W. Patten.....	do.....	do.....	2d infantry..				George W. Patten.....	do.....	2d infantry....	Rhode Island ...	Do. 1831-'32.
619	William Eustis.....	do.....	do.....	3d infantry..				William Eustis	do.....	Dragoons	Massachusetts ...	Do. 1831-'32-'33.
620	Dav. A. Manning.....	do.....	do.....	4th infantry..				Dav. A. Manning.....	do.....	4th infantry....	North Carolina..	Do. 1831-'32.
621	George W. McClure.....	do.....	do.....	5th infantry..		July 21, 1834, as 2d lieut. of dragoons.		George W. McClure.....			New York.....	Do. 1831-'32-'33.
622	Richard Ross.....	do.....	do.....	7th infantry..				Richard Ross.....	2d lieutenant	7th infantry....	Maryland.....	Do. 1831-'32.
623	J. M. Clendenin.....	do.....	do.....	2d infantry..				J. M. Clendenin.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	Do. 1831-'32.
624	Stephen B. Legate.....	do.....	do.....	3d infantry..				Stephen B. Legate.....	do.....	3d infantry....	New York.....	Do. 1831-'32.
625	Roswell Park.....	July 1, 1831	do.....	Engineers ..				Roswell Park.....	do.....	Engineers.....	do.....	Do. 1831-'32.
626	Henry Clay, Jr.....	do.....	do.....	2d artillery..	Nov. 1, 1831, as bvt. 2d lieut. of artillery.						Kentucky.....	
627	James Allen.....	do.....	do.....	4th artillery..	July 31, 1834, as 2d lieut. of artillery.			James Allen.....			North Carolina..	
628	Henry E. Prentiss.....	do.....	do.....	2d artillery..				Henry E. Prentiss.....	2d lieutenant	2d artillery....	Maine	
629	Albert M. Lea.....	do.....	do.....	1st artillery..				Albert M. Lea.....	do.....	Dragoons	Tennessee.....	Do. 1832.
630	Rich. H. Peyton.....	do.....	do.....	2d artillery..				Richard H. Peyton.....	do.....	2d artillery....	Virginia.....	
631	Wm. A. Norton.....	do.....	do.....	4th artillery..	Sept. 30, 1832, as 2d lieut. of artillery.			William A. Norton.....			New York.....	
632	George W. Turner.....	do.....	do.....	1st artillery..				George W. Turner.....	2d lieutenant	1st artillery....	Virginia.....	
633	Samuel C. Ridgely.....	do.....	do.....	4th artillery..				Samuel C. Ridgely.....	do.....	4th artillery....	Maryland.....	
634	Samuel H. Miller.....	do.....	do.....	3d artillery..	Nov. 30, 1832, as 2d lieut. of artillery.			Samuel H. Miller.....			New York.....	Do. 1832.

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed.	Remarks.
635	George H. Talcott.....	July 1, 1831	Bvt. 2d lieut. ..	3d artillery...				George H. Talcott	2d lieutenant	3d artillery.....	New York.....	Still a bvt. 2d lieut. at the close of 1832.
633	Jacob Ammen.....	do.....	do.....	1st artillery...				Jacob Ammen.....	do.....	1st artillery...	Ohio.....	Do 1832.
637	A. A. Humphreys.....	do.....	do.....	2d artillery...				A. A. Humphreys....	do.....	2d artillery...	Pennsylvania...	Do 1832.
638	Wm. H. Emory.....	do.....	do.....	4th artillery...				Wm. H. Emory.....	do.....	4th artillery...	Maryland.....	Do 1832.
639	Wm. Chapman.....	do.....	do.....	5th infantry...				Wm. Chapman.....	do.....	5th infantry...	do.....	Do 1832.
640	Chas. H. Larned.....	do.....	do.....	4th infantry...				Chas. H. Larned....	do.....	4th infantry...	Rhode Island...	Do 1832.
641	E. G. Eastman.....	do.....	do.....	2d infantry...		October 6, 1834, as 2d lieut. of infantry.		E. G. Eastman.....	do.....	2d infantry...	New Hampshire.	Do. 1832-'33.
642	Moses Scott.....	do.....	do.....	5th infantry...				Moses Scott.....	2d lieutenant	5th infantry...	New Jersey.....	Do. 1832.
643	Thos. J. McKean.....	do.....	do.....	4th infantry...	March 31, 1834, as 2d lieut. of infantry.			Thos. J. McKean....	do.....	4th infantry...	Pennsylvania...	Do. 1832.
644	H. Van Rensselaer.....	do.....	do.....	5th infantry...	January 27, 1832, as bvt. 2d lieut. of infantry.			H. Van Rensselaer...	do.....	5th infantry...	New York.....	Do. 1832.
645	Edm. A. Ogden.....	do.....	do.....	1st infantry...				Edm. A. Ogden.....	2d lieutenant.....	1st infantry...	do.....	Do. 1832.
646	L. B. Northrop.....	do.....	do.....	7th infantry...				L. B. Northrop.....	do.....	Dragoons.....	South Carolina..	Do. 1832-'33.
647	E. F. Covington.....	do.....	do.....	1st infantry...	September 30, 1833, as 2d lieut. of infantry.			E. F. Covington....	do.....	1st infantry...	Kentucky.....	Do. 1832.
648	Ho. P. Vaneleve.....	do.....	do.....	5th infantry...				Ho. P. Vaneleve....	Bvt. 2d lieutenant.....	5th infantry...	New Jersey.....	Do. 1832-'33.
649	Brad. R. Alden.....	do.....	do.....	4th infantry...				Brad. R. Alden.....	2d lieutenant	4th infantry...	New York.....	Do. 1832.
650	Thos. Stockton.....	do.....	do.....	5th infantry...				Thos. Stockton.....	Bvt. 2d lieutenant.....	5th infantry...	Delaware.....	Do. 1832-'33-'34.
651	Samuel R. Curtis.....	do.....	do.....	7th infantry...	June 30, 1832, as bvt. 2d lieut. of infantry.			Sam'l R. Curtis.....	do.....	7th infantry...	Ohio.....	Do. 1832-'33-'34.
652	James S. Williams.....	do.....	do.....	6th infantry...				James S. Williams....	2d lieutenant	6th infantry...	Georgia.....	Do. 1832-'33.
653	Ingham Wood.....	do.....	do.....	1st infantry...				Ingham Wood.....	do.....	1st infantry...	Pennsylvania...	Do. 1832.
654	Fred. Wilkinson.....	do.....	do.....	4th infantry...				Fred. Wilkinson....	do.....	4th infantry...	New York.....	Do. 1832-'33.
655	John G. Harvey.....	do.....	do.....	2d infantry...	Feb. 15, 1833, as bvt. 2d lieut. of infantry.			John G. Harvey.....	do.....	2d infantry...	North Carolina..	Do. 1832.
656	Chas. Whittlesey.....	do.....	do.....	6th infantry...	Sept 30, 1832, as bvt. 2d lieut. of infantry.			Chas. Whittlesey....	do.....	6th infantry...	Ohio.....	Do. 1832.
657	John Conrad.....	do.....	do.....	5th infantry...				John Conrad.....	Bvt. 2d lieutenant.....	5th infantry...	Pennsylvania...	Do. 1832-'33-'34.
658	George W. Ward.....	July 1, 1832	do.....	2d artillery...				George W. Ward.....	2d lieutenant	2d artillery...	Massachusetts...	Do. 1832.
659	Robert P. Smith.....	do.....	do.....	do.....				Robert P. Smith....	do.....	do.....	Mississippi.....	Do. 1832.
660	Benj. S. Ewell.....	do.....	do.....	4th artillery...				Benj. S. Ewell.....	do.....	4th artillery...	Virginia.....	Do. 1832.
661	George W. Cass.....	do.....	do.....	7th infantry...				George W. Cass.....	do.....	7th infantry...	Ohio.....	Do. 1832.
662	Jacob W. Bailey.....	do.....	do.....	1st artillery...				Jacob W. Bailey....	do.....	1st artillery...	Rhode Island...	Do. 1832.
663	P. St. George Cooke.....	do.....	do.....	2d artillery...	April 1, 1834, as 2d lieut. of artillery.			P. St. George Cooke..	do.....	2d artillery...	Virginia.....	Do. 1832.

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
664	Henry G. Sill.....	July 1, 1832	Bvt. 2d lieut.	1st artillery..				Henry G. Sill.....	2d lieutenant.....	1st artillery...	Connecticut....	
665	Joseph C. Vance.....do.....do.....	2d artillery..				Joseph C. Vance.....do.....	2d artillery....	Ohio.....	
666	George Watson.....do.....do.....	1st artillery..				George Watson.....do.....	1st artillery....	Maine.....	
667	Erasmus D. Keyes.....do.....do.....	3d artillery..				Erasmus D. Keyes.....do.....	3d artillery....do.....	
668	Franklin McDuffie.....do.....do.....	4th artillery..		July 15, 1833, as bvt. 2d lieut. of artillery.					New Hampshire..	
669	Lewis Howell.....do.....do.....	7th infantry..	October 31, 1833, as bvt. 2d lieut. of infantry.			Lewis Howell.....			Pennsylvania....	
670	William Wall.....do.....do.....	3d artillery..				William Wall.....	2d lieutenant.....	3d artillery....do.....	
671	John N. Maccomb.....do.....do.....	4th artillery..				John N. Maccomb.....do.....	4th artillery....	New York.....	
672	Edward Deas.....do.....do.....do.....				Edward Deas.....do.....do.....	South Carolina..	
673	John E. Brackett.....do.....do.....	2d artillery..	August 31, 1833, as bvt. 2d lieut. of artillery.			John E. Brackett.....			New York.....	
674	Ward B. Burnett.....do.....do.....do.....				Ward B. Burnett.....	2d lieutenant.....	2d artillery....	Pennsylvania....	Still a bvt. 2d lieut. at the close of 1833.
675	James H. Simpson.....do.....do.....	3d artillery..				James H. Simpson.....do.....	3d artillery....	New Jersey.....	
676	Alfred Brush.....do.....do.....	4th artillery..				Alfred Brush.....do.....	4th artillery....	Michigan.....	Do. 1833.
677	Richard G. Fam.....do.....do.....	1st artillery..	Dec. 31, 1832, as bvt. 2d lieut. of artillery.						Tennessee.....	
678	H. K. Yoakum.....do.....do.....	3d artillery..	March 31, 1833, as bvt. 2d lieut. of artillery.			H. K. Yoakum.....		do.....	
679	Tench Tilghman.....do.....do.....	4th artillery..	Nov. 30, 1833, as bvt. 2d lieut. of artillery			Tench Tilghman.....			Maryland.....	
680	Wm. H. Pettes.....do.....do.....	1st artillery..				Wm. H. Pettes.....	2d lieutenant.....	1st artillery....	Vermont.....	
681	Theo. F. G. Wilkinson.....do.....do.....	2d artillery..				T. F. J. Wilkinson.....do.....	2d artillery....	Alabama.....	Do. 1833.
682	Loren. Sitgreaves.....do.....do.....	1st article..				Loren. Sitgreaves.....do.....	1st artillery....	Pennsylvania....	
683	Geo. B. Crittenden.....do.....do.....	4th infantry..	April 30, 1833, as bvt. 2d lieut. of infantry.			Geo. B. Crittenden.....			Kentucky.....	
684	Jacob Brown.....do.....do.....	2d infantry..				Jacob Brown.....	2d lieutenant.....	2d infantry....	New York.....	Do. 1833.
685	Daniel P. Whiting.....do.....do.....	7th infantry..				Daniel P. Whiting.....do.....	7th infantry....do.....	
686	Randolph B. Marcy.....do.....do.....	5th infantry..				Randolph B. Marcy.....	Brevet 2d lieutenant...	5th infantry....	Massachusetts..	Do. 1833-'34.
687	James P. Hardin.....do.....do.....	4th infantry..	Dec. 15, 1832, as bvt. 2d lieut. of infantry.						Kentucky.....	
688	Thomas M. Hill.....do.....do.....	1st infantry..				Thomas M. Hill.....	2d lieutenant.....	1st infantry....	Maine.....	Do. 1833.
689	Roger S. Dix.....do.....do.....	7th infantry..				Roger S. Dix.....do.....	7th infantry....	New Hampshire..	
690	Robert H. Archer.....do.....do.....	3d infantry..				Robert H. Archer.....	Brevet 2d lieutenant....	4th artillery....	Maryland.....	Do. 1833-'34.
691	Jas. V. Bomford.....do.....do.....	2d infantry..				Jas. V. Bomford.....do.....	2d infantry....	Dist. Columbia..	Do. 1833-'34.
692	Richard C. Gatlin.....do.....do.....	7th infantry..				Richard C. Gatlin.....	2d lieutenant.....	7th infantry....	North Carolina..	Do. 1833.

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
693	Wm. H. Storer	July 1, 1833	Bvt 2d lieut...	1st infantry ..				Wm. H. Storer	Brevet 2d lieutenant...	1st infantry...	New York	Still a bvt 2d lieut. at the close of 1833-'34.
694	George H. Griffin	do	do	6th infantry..				Geo. H. Griffin.....	do	6th infantry...	Virginia	Do. 1833-'34.
695	John Beach	do	do	1st infantry ..				John Beach.....	do	1st infantry...	New Hampshire.	Do. 1833-'34.
696	William O Kello	do	do	3d infantry ..				William O. Kello	2d lieutenant.....	3d infantry...	Virginia.....	Do. 1833.
697	Henry Swartwout.....	do	do	do				Henry Swartwout.....	do	do	New York	Do. 1833.
698	Gaines P. Kingsbury.....	do	Bvt. 3d lieut.	M. rangers...				Gaines P. Kingsbury ..	Brevet 2d lieutenant..	Dragoons.....	Ohio	Do. 1833-'34.
699	Humphrey Marshall.....	do	do	do	April 30, 1833, as bvt. 3d lieut. mount'd rang'rs.						Kentucky	
700	Jas. M. Bowman	do	do	do				Jas. M. Bowman	Brevet 2d lieutenant...	Dragoons	Pennsylvania....	Do. 1833-'34.
701	Asbury Ury.....	do	do	do				Asbury Ury.....	do	do	Tennessee	Do. 1833-'34.
702	Albert G. Edwards.....	do	do	do				Albert G. Edwards.....	do	do	Illinois	Do. 1833-'34.
703	Frederick A. Smith.....	July 1, 1833	Bvt. 2d lieut.	Engineers.....				Frederick A. Smith	do	Engineers	Massachusetts ...	Do. 1834.
704	Jona. G. Barnard	do	do	do				Jona. G. Barnard	do	do	do	Do. 1834.
705	Geo. W. Cullum.....	do	do	do				Geo. W. Cullum.....	do	do	Pennsylvania	Do. 1834.
706	Rufus King.....	do	do	do				Rufus King.....	do	do	New York	Do. 1834.
707	Francis H. Smith	do	do	1st artillery ..					2d lieutenant	1st artillery...	Virginia	
708	Wm. H. Sidell.....	do	do	do	October 1, 1833, as bvt. 2d lieut. of artillery.						New York.....	
709	David B. Harris.....	do	do	do				David B. Harris.....	2d lieutenant	1st artillery ..	Virginia	
710	Roswell W. Lee	do	do	3d artillery ..				Roswell W. Lee.....	do	3d artillery ..	Massachusetts ...	
711	W. W. S. Bliss	do	do	4th infantry ..				W. W. S. Bliss.....	do	4th infantry ..	New Hampshire.	
712	Erastus A. Capron.....	do	do	1st artillery ..				E. A. Capron	do	1st artillery ..	New York	
713	Isaiah Garratt.....	do	do	2d artillery ..			Nov. 15, 1833, as bvt. 2d lieut. of artillery.				Missouri	
714	John H. Miller.....	do	do	4th artillery ..				John H. Miller	Brevet 2d lieutenant...	4th artillery ..	Pennsylvania ...	Do. 1834.
715	David E. Hale	do	do	1st artillery ..				David E. Hale	2d lieutenant	1st artillery ..	New Hampshire..	
716	Robert R. Mudge.....	do	do	3d artillery ..				Robert R. Mudge.....	Brevet 2d lieutenant ..	3d artillery ..	Massachusetts ...	Do. 1834.
717	John A. Thomas.....	do	do	do				John A. Thomas.....	do	do	Tennessee	Do. 1834.
718	James L. Davis.....	do	do	4th artillery ..				James L. Davis.....	do	4th artillery ..	Virginia	Do. 1834.
719	Edmund Schriver.....	do	do	2d artillery ..				Edmund Schriver.....	2d lieutenant	2d artillery ..	Pennsylvania ...	
720	Henry Waller.....	do	do	do	October 9, 1833, as bvt. 2d lieut. of artillery.						Kentucky	
721	John H. Allen	do	do	3d artillery ..				John H. Allen	Brevet 2d lieutenant...	3d artillery ..	New York	Do. 1834.
722	Alex. E. Shiras	do	do	4th artillery ..				Alex. E. Shiras	do	4th artillery ..	New Jersey.....	Do. 1834.
723	Henry Dupont	do	do	do	June 15, 1834, as bvt. 2d lieut. of artillery.						Delaware.....	
724	Benjamin Alvord	do	do	4th infantry ..				Benjamin Alvord	Brevet 2d lieutenant ..	4th infantry...	Vermont	Do. 1834.

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

VOL. VII—1834

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
725	George D. Dimon	July 1, 1833	Bvt. 2d lieutenant	1st infantry		Sept. 16, 1834, as bvt. 2d lieutenant of infantry.		George D. Dimon			Connecticut	Still as bvt. 2d lieutenant at the close of 1833.
726	Isaac R. D. Burnett	do.	do.	2d infantry				Isaac R. D. Burnett	Brevet 2d lieutenant	2d infantry	Indiana	Do. 1834.
727	Jacob E. Blake	do.	do.	6th infantry				Jacob E. Blake	do.	6th infantry	Pennsylvania	Do. 1834.
728	John L. Hooper	do.	do.	4th infantry				John L. Hooper	do.	4th infantry	Massachusetts	Do. 1834.
729	Joel Riggs	do.	do.	1st infantry	Oct. 9, 1833, as bvt. 2d lieutenant of infantry.						Alabama	
730	John W. McCrabb	do.	do.	4th infantry				John W. McCrabb	Brevet 2d lieutenant	4th infantry	Tennessee	Do. 1834.
731	Henry W. Wessels	do.	do.	2d infantry				Henry W. Wessels	do.	2d infantry	Connecticut	Do. 1834.
732	John P. Center	do.	do.	6th infantry				John P. Center	do.	6th infantry	Massachusetts	Do. 1834.
733	Geo. H. Pegram	do.	do.	1st infantry				George H. Pegram	do.	1st infantry	Virginia	Do. 1834.
734	Abraham C. Myers	do.	do.	4th infantry				Abraham C. Myers	do.	4th infantry	South Carolina	Do. 1834.
735	George H. Ringgold	do.	do.	6th infantry				George H. Ringgold	do.	6th infantry	Maryland	Do. 1834.
736	Daniel Ruggles	do.	do.	5th infantry				Daniel Ruggles	do.	5th infantry	Massachusetts	Do. 1834.
737	James W. Anderson	do.	do.	2d infantry				James W. Anderson	do.	2d infantry	Virginia	Do. 1834.
738	James McClure	do.	do.	1st infantry				James McClure	do.	1st infantry	Pennsylvania	Do. 1834.
739	J. Chester Reid	do.	do.	5th infantry				J. Chester Reid	do.	5th infantry	New York	Do. 1834.
740	Thomas H. Johns	do.	do.	2d infantry				Thomas H. Johns	do.	2d infantry	Dist. of Columbia	Do. 1834.
741	Benj. E. Dubose	do.	do.	3d infantry			Oct. 1, 1833, as bvt. 2d lieutenant of infantry.				South Carolina	
742	Jos. P. Harrison	do.	do.	6th infantry				Jos. P. Harrison	Brevet 2d lieutenant	6th infantry	Alabama	Do. 1834.
743	Henry L. Scott	do.	do.	4th infantry				Henry L. Scott	do.	4th infantry	North Carolina	Do. 1834.
744	Aug. F. Seaton	do.	do.	7th infantry				Aug. F. Seaton	2d lieutenant	7th infantry	Dist. of Columbia	
745	Nathaniel W. Hunter	do.	do.	do.	Oct. 1, 1833, as bvt. 2d lieutenant of 7th infantry.						Georgia	
746	William Smith	July 1, 1834	do.	Engineers				William Smith	Brevet 2d lieutenant	Engineers	New York	
747	John Sanders	do.	do.	do.				John Sanders	do.	do.	Florida	
748	H. Loughborough	do.	do.	2d artillery					2d lieutenant	2d artillery	Kentucky	
749	Thos. A. Morris	do.	do.	1st artillery				Thos. A. Morris	Brevet 2d lieutenant	1st artillery	Indiana	
750	R. T. P. Allen	do.	do.	do.				R. T. P. Allen	do.	do.	Maryland	
751	James Duncan	do.	do.	2d artillery					2d lieutenant	2d artillery	New York	
752	Epaphras Kibby	do.	do.	1st artillery				Epaphras Kibby	Brevet 2d lieutenant	1st artillery	Ohio	
753	Wm. T. Stockton	do.	do.	2d artillery					2d lieutenant	2d artillery	Pennsylvania	
754	John F. Lee	do.	do.	1st artillery				John F. Lee	Brevet 2d lieutenant	1st infantry	Virginia	
755	Chas. A. Fuller	do.	do.	3d artillery				Chas. A. Fuller	do.	3d artillery	Massachusetts	
756	Curran Pope	do.	do.	2d artillery	Dec. 31, 1834, as bvt. 2d lieutenant of artillery.						Kentucky	
757	C. B. Chalmers	do.	do.	1st artillery				C. B. Chalmers	Brevet 2d lieutenant	1st artillery	Dist. of Columbia	

B.—Statement of the graduates of the Military Academy annually appointed in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names of the graduates of the Military Academy appointed in the army by commission, or brevet of the lowest grade.	Date of appointment.	Rank.	Regiment or corps.	Resigned, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Died, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Dropped or dismissed, with the specification of the rank held at the time.	Graduates, being supernumerary officers of the lowest grade, remaining at the close of each year as candidates for commissions.	Present rank in the army.	Regiment or corps.	From what State or Territory appointed or born.	Remarks.
758	J. E. Henderson	July 1, 1834	Bvt. 2d lieut.	2d artillery				J. E. Henderson	Brevet 2d lieutenant	2d artillery	Tennessee	
759	Morris S. Miller	do	do	3d artillery				Morris S. Miller	do	3d artillery	New York	
760	Wm. G. Freeman	do	do	4th artillery				Wm. G. Freeman	do	4th artillery	Virginia	
761	L. A. B. Walbach	do	do	1st artillery				L. A. B. Walbach	do	1st artillery	New Hampshire	
762	James F. Cooper	do	do	3d infantry				James F. Cooper	do	3d infantry	Pennsylvania	
763	Gabriel R. Paul	do	do	7th infantry				George P. Paul	2d lieutenant	7th infantry	Missouri	
764	George P. Field	do	do	3d infantry				George P. Field	Brevet 2d lieutenant	3d infantry	New York	
765	Cary H. Fry	do	do	do				Cary H. Fry	do	do	Kentucky	
766	Henry S. Turner	do	do	Dragoons				Henry S. Turner	do	Dragoons	Virginia	
767	Sen. G. Simmons	do	do	7th infantry					2d lieutenant	7th infantry	Vermont	
768	T. O. Barnwell	do	do	3d infantry				T. O. Barnwell	Brevet 2d lieutenant	3d infantry	South Carolina	
769	Henry McKavett	do	do	7th infantry				Henry McKavett	do	7th infantry	New York	
770	Goode Bryan	do	do	5th infantry				Goode Bryan	do	5th infantry	Georgia	
771	Joseph L. Coburn	do	do	3d infantry				Joseph L. Coburn	do	3d infantry	Vermont	
772	James G. Reed	do	do	7th infantry				James G. Reed	do	7th infantry	Pennsylvania	
773	P. N. Barbour	do	do	3d infantry				P. N. Barbour	do	3d infantry	Kentucky	
774	Arnold Harris	do	do	7th infantry				Arnold Harris	do	7th infantry	New York	
775	Richard S. Smith	do	do	2d infantry				Richard S. Smith	do	2d infantry	Pennsylvania	
776	E. Robinson	do	do	4th infantry				E. Robinson	do	4th infantry	Virginia	
777	Wm. S. Ketchum	do	do	6th infantry				Wm. S. Ketchum	do	6th infantry	Connecticut	
778	Forbes Britton	do	do	7th infantry				Forbes Britton	do	7th infantry	Virginia	
779	John Graham	do	do	4th infantry				John Graham	do	4th infantry	New York	
780	Wm. H. Price	do	do	1st infantry				Wm. H. Price	do	1st infantry	Pennsylvania	
781	A. Montgomery	do	do	7th infantry				A. Montgomery	do	7th infantry	do	

RECAPITULATION.

Number of graduates appointed in the army from 1802 to 1834, inclusive	781
Number of graduates resigned as officers of the army	219
Number died in the service	97
Number declined, disbanded, dropped, or dismissed	*45
Number of graduates, being supernumerary brevet 2d lieutenants, remaining at the close of the year as candidates for commissions	69
Number of graduates now in the army as commissioned officers	351
Aggregate	781
Number of commissioned officers now in the army	351
Brevet 2d lieutenants awaiting promotion	69
Number of graduates now in the army as commissioned officers and brevet 2d lieutenants	420

* Of this number (45) twenty-eight either declined their appointments or were disbanded.

C 2.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *January 14, 1835.*

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 15th ultimo, respecting the appropriations for West Point, and, in reply, beg leave to refer you to the enclosed reports from the Second and Third Auditors, which furnish the information called for by the committee on whose behalf you wrote.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

LEWIS CASS.

Hon. F O J SMITH, *of the Select Committee on the Military Academy, House of Representatives.*

C 3.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, *Second Auditor's Office, January 13, 1835.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a statement of the pay, rations, forage, and allowance for servants, of instructors, cadets, and all other persons employed at, or attached to, the Military Academy at West Point, from the 1st January, 1830, to 31st December, 1834, prepared in compliance with the request of the select committee of the House of Representatives on this subject.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM B. LEWIS

Hon. LEWIS CASS, *Secretary of War.*

Statement showing the pay and rations, forage and allowance for servants, of instructors, cadets, and all other persons employed at, or attached to, the Military Academy at West Point, specifically, for each and every purpose, and for each and every year, from January 1, 1830, to December 31, 1834, agreeably to the estimates of the War Department, and furnished in compliance with the request of the select committee of the House of Representatives on the subject of the Military Academy, dated December 15, 1834.

Officers.	Pay, subsistence, forage, and allowance for servants.					Remarks.
	1830.	1831.	1832.	1833.	1834.	
Superintendent of Military Academy.....	\$365 00	\$365 00	\$366 00	\$328 00	\$292 00	Additional rations are charged.
Commandant of cadets and instructor.....	292 00	292 00	292 00	292 00	292 00	Do. do.
Paymaster and treasurer.....	764 00	764 00	764 00	764 00	766 00	
Professor of natural and experimental philosophy..	1,699 00	1,699 00	1,699 00	1,699 00	1,723 00.	
Assistant professor of natural and experimental philosophy.....	180 00	180 00	180 00	180 00	180 00	\$18 per month additional as lieutenant.
Professor of engineering.....	1,506 00	1,506 00	1,506 00	1,506 00	1,530 00	
Assistant professor of engineering.....	180 00	180 00	180 00	180 00	180 00	Do. do.
Professor of mathematics.....	1,506 00	1,506 00	1,506 00	1,506 00	1,530 00	
Assistant professor of mathematics.....	180 00	180 00	180 00	180 00	180 00	Do. do.
Chaplain and professor of ethics.....	1,506 00	1,506 00	1,506 00	1,506 00	1,530 00	
Professor of chemistry.....	120 00	120 00	120 00	120 00	120 00	\$10 per month additional as surgeon.
Teachers of French, (two).....	1,870 00	1,870 00	1,870 00	1,870 00	1,894 00	
Teacher of drawing.....	935 00	935 00	935 00	935 00	947 00	
Master of the sword.....	466 00	466 00	466 00	466 00	466 00	
Cadets, including eight acting assistant professors and teachers, with \$10 per month additional compensation.....	85,460 00	85,460 00	85,460 00	85,460 00	85,460 00	
Musicians, twenty for five companies.....	1,440 00	1,440 00	1,440 00	1,440 00	1,440 00	
Clerk to paymaster.....	600 00	600 00	600 00	600 00	600 00	
Total amounts yearly.....	99,069 00	99,069 00	99,070 00	99,032 00	99,140 00	

W. B. LEWIS.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, *Second Auditor's Office, January, 1835.*

D 1.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, *Third Auditor's Office, December 27, 1834.*

SIR: I have the honor to return the letter of the Hon. Francis O. J. Smith, referred to this office, in which he "requests, by direction of the select committee of the House of Representatives on the subject of the Military Academy, to be furnished with a statement of the whole amount of money that has been appropriated for the purchase, construction, and repairs of buildings and appurtenances for the Military Academy at West Point from the 1st of July, 1815, to the present time," with the accompanying statement. The acts making appropriations for the Military Academy, it will be perceived, do not designate, except in a few instances, the sums appropriated under the heads called for by the committee; hence, where they

are not so designated, the amount could not be stated from the appropriation accounts in this office, they being in all cases kept according to the appropriations, as directed by law. In order, therefore, to give the committee the best information on the subject which the records of this office afford, the accompanying statement has been prepared, exhibiting every appropriation made during the period called for, designating the amounts where they are specified for any of the objects called for by the committee.

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

PETER HAGNER, *Auditor.*

Hon. LEWIS CASS, *Secretary of War.*

D 2.

Statement of the amount of money appropriated for the use of the Military Academy at West Point for purposes other than for the pay and emoluments of the officers, professors, cadets, &c., with the dates of the several acts of appropriation from the year 1815 to the year 1834, both inclusive; exhibiting, as far as practicable, the amount appropriated for the purchase, construction, and repair of buildings and appurtenances; furnished in pursuance of a letter from the Hon. Francis O. J. Smith to the Secretary of War, dated December 15, 1834.

For what purposes appropriated.	On account of buildings, as far as can be designated.	Amount appropriated.
<i>Per Act March 3, 1815.</i>		
For completing buildings and for providing an apparatus, a library, and all necessary implements, and for such contingent expenses as may be necessary		\$20,000 00
<i>Act April 29, 1816.</i>		
For the erection of buildings at West Point, including arrearages.....	\$115,800 00	115,800 00
<i>Act March 3, 1817.</i>		
For the purchase of maps, plans, books, instruments, fuel, and stationery; repairing buildings, and for two boats.....		16,570 00
<i>Act February 19, 1818.</i>		
For fuel, transportation, class-books, repairs of barracks and other buildings, and for contingent expenses		12,075 00
<i>Act February 15, 1819.</i>		
For fuel, maps, plans, books, erection of quarters and other buildings, and for contingent expenses.....		35,640 00
<i>Act April 14, 1820.</i>		
For fuel, maps, plans, books, apparatus, and contingent expenses \$18,322 00		
For completing the building..... 2,500 00	2,500 00	
For arrearages prior to the year 1818..... 21,428 57		
		42,250 57
<i>Act March 3, 1821.</i>		
For the Military Academy.....		17,036 22
<i>Act March 15, 1822.</i>		
For quartermaster supplies, transportation, mathematical instruments, books, and stationery.....		13,979 00
<i>Act March 3, 1823.</i>		
For quartermaster supplies, transportation, mathematical instruments, books, and stationery.....		12,000 00
<i>Act March 10, 1824.</i>		
For the purchase of Gridley's farm.....		10,000 00
<i>Act May 26, 1824.</i>		
For quartermaster's department, fuel, stationery, and contingencies.....		11,500 00

D 2.—Statement of the amount of money appropriated for the use of the Military Academy—Continued.

For what purposes appropriated.	On account of buildings, as far as can be designated.	Amount appropriated.
<i>Act February 21, 1825.</i>		
For quartermaster supplies, transportation, mathematical instruments, books, and stationery.....		\$11, 500 00
<i>Act March 25, 1826.</i>		
For quartermaster supplies, transportation, stationery, outstanding debts, repairs, chairs for examinations, fire-grates, and lightning-rods.....	\$15, 542 74	
For articles required for the mathematical, drawing, chemical, and mineralogical departments; additions to the library, paving barrack parades, conduit for supplying water.....	19, 187 75	
		34, 730 49
<i>Act March 2, 1827.</i>		
For quartermaster supplies, transportation, and stationery....	7, 915 42	
For articles required for the mathematical, drawing, chemical, and mineralogical departments; library, new buildings, and repairs, and improvements of barracks and parade grounds	24, 224 53	
		32, 139 95
<i>Act March 2, 1828.</i>		
For fuel, stationery, transportation, repairs, and for improving barracks, erecting new buildings, procuring articles for the mathematical, mineralogical, and chemical departments, and for the library and contingencies.....	32, 234 58	
For defraying the expenses of the board of visitors.....	1, 500 00	
		33, 734 58
<i>Act May 24, 1828.</i>		
For the Military Academy for the first quarter of the year 1829.....		3, 000 00
<i>Act March 2, 1829.</i>		
For fuel, transportation, stationery, repairs, and improving buildings, procuring articles for the mathematical, drawing, chemical, and mineralogical departments, and for the library and contingencies.....	22, 257 00	
For the deficit of the appropriation of 1827 for the expenses of the board of visitors.....	1, 168 11	
For the expenses of the board of visitors for the year 1829....	1, 500 00	
		24, 925 11
<i>Act March 11, 1830.</i>		
For fuel, stationery, transportation, printing, forage, and postage	9, 660 00	
For repairs and improvements of the buildings and grounds about the hospital.....	4, 310 00	
For defraying the expenses of the board of visitors.....	1, 500 00	
For hire of quartermaster's and adjutant's clerks, and assistants to librarian and professors of chemistry.....	1, 092 00	
For the increase of the library, subscription to military and scientific journals, and binding books.....	1, 500 00	
For philosophical apparatus.....	1, 956 00	
For models and modeller, and books on architecture for department of engineering.....	1, 000 00	
For repairing mathematical instruments, and for models for the drawing department.....	250 00	
For apparatus pertaining to the chemical and mineralogical departments and contingencies.....	868 64	
For miscellaneous items.....	1, 636 00	
For incidental expenses.....	400 00	
For arrearages for clerk hire for 1828.....	270 00	
		24, 442 64
<i>Act May 31, 1830.</i>		
For the erection of a military laboratory and workshop.....	2, 500 00	2, 500 00
<i>Act March 2, 1831.</i>		
For defraying the expenses of the board of visitors.....	1, 500 00	
For fuel, forage, stationery, printing, transportation, and postage	8, 400 00	

D 2.—Statement of the amount of money appropriated for the use of the Military Academy—Continued.

For what purposes appropriated.		On account of buildings, as far as can be designated.	Amount appropriated.
For repairs and improvements of buildings and grounds.....	\$3, 400 00	\$3, 400 00
For pay of adjutant's clerk and quartermaster's clerk.....	900 00		
For increase and expenses of the library.....	1, 400 00		
For philosophical apparatus.....	2, 000 00		
For models for fortifications.....	1, 800 00		
For models for drawing, for repairing instruments, for chemical and mineralogical apparatus.....	750 00		
For miscellaneous items and incidental expenses.....	1, 600 00		
For fuel for the first quarter of 1832.....	2, 300 00		
			\$24, 050 00
<i>Act April 5, 1832.</i>			
For defraying the expenses of the board of visitors at West Point, and their travelling expenses.....	2, 000 00		
For fuel, forage, stationery, printing, transportation, and postage	8, 762 00		
For reconstructing the outbuildings attached to the academy, and for improvements connected therewith.....	1, 500 00	1, 500 00
For general repairs of barracks, academy's mess-house, officers' and professors' quarters, storehouses, wharf, carts, boat, fences, roads, paints, and other objects.....	4, 825 00	4, 825 00
For renewals and repairs of grates.....	150 00		
For pay of adjutant's and quartermaster's clerks.....	900 00		
For increase and expenses of the library.....	1, 400 00		
For philosophical apparatus.....	790 00		
For models for department of engineering.....	600 00		
For models for the drawing department, repairs of instruments for the mathematical department, apparatus and contingencies for the chemical department.....	887 00		
For miscellaneous items and expenses.....	1, 625 00		
			23, 439 00
<i>Act March 2, 1833.</i>			
For erecting a building for military and other exercises.....	6, 000 00	6, 000 00
For defraying the expenses of the board of visitors.....	2, 000 00		
For fuel, forage, stationery, printing, transportation, and postage	8, 500 00		
For repairs, improvements, and expenses of buildings, grounds, roads, wharf, and boat.....	4, 000 00	4, 000 00
For pay of adjutant's and quartermaster's clerks.....	900 00		
For increase and expenses of the library.....	1, 400 00		
For philosophical apparatus.....	890 00		
For models for engineering department.....	600 00		
For models for drawing department, repairs of instruments for the mathematical department, apparatus and contingencies for department of chemistry.....	900 00		
For miscellaneous items and incidental expenses of the academy	1, 575 00		
For the erection of the chapel.....	10, 000 00	10, 000 00
			36, 765 00
<i>Act June 28, 1834.</i>			
For defraying the expenses of the board of visitors.....	2, 000 00		
For fuel, forage, stationery, transportation, printing, and postage	8, 486 30		
For repairs, improvements, and expenses of buildings, grounds, roads, wharf, boats, carts, and fences.....	9, 610 96	9, 610 96
For pay of adjutant's and quartermaster's clerks.....	900 00		
For philosophical apparatus and their repairs.....	698 00		
For models for department of engineering.....	800 00		
For models for the drawing department, apparatus and contingencies for the department of chemistry, and repairs of instruments in the mathematical department.....	1, 117 00		
For the departments of mineralogy, artillery and sword exercise	1, 130 00		
For increase and expenses of the library.....	1, 216 22		
For completing the outbuildings, &c., attached to the cadets' barracks.....	1, 081 50	1, 081 50
For miscellaneous items and incidental expenses.....	1, 671 47		
For the erection of a building for military and other exercises in the winter, in addition to \$6,000 appropriated last session.	14, 000 00	14, 000 00
			42, 711 45
		179, 527 46	590, 889 01

PETER HAGNER, Auditor.

E.

A table of the annual expenses of the Military Academy at West Point, as near as can be ascertained, from 1802 to the close of the year 1815, including pay, forage, and subsistence of all officers, professors, and cadets, for buildings, repairs, books, and all incidental charges; also of other details respecting the operations of the institution.

Year.	Pay, subsistence, forage, books, maps, stationery, and incidental charges.	Buildings, repairs, and appurtenances, exclusive of the original site.	Number of the cadets received into the academy.	Aggregate annual expenses.	Number of graduates annually.	Declined and resigned.					Died within four years after graduating.	Disbanded and dismissed prior to 1816.	Graduates still in service.	Aggregate annual expense divided among the graduates of each year.	Aggregate annual expense for pay, forage, subsistence, and incidental charges alone, divided among the graduates of each year.
						Same year of graduating.	First year after graduating.	Second year after graduating.	Third year after graduating.	Fourth year after graduating.					
1802....	\$7,854 00	\$27,000 00	2	\$34,854 00	2	1	\$17,427 00	\$3,927 00
1803....	7,854 00	9,000 00	9	16,854 00	3	1	1	1	5,618 00	2,618 00
1804....	7,854 00	9,000 00	10	16,854 00	2	1	1	8,427 00	3,927 00
1805....	7,854 00	9,000 00	8	16,854 00	3	1	5,618 00	2,618 00
1806....	15,360 00	9,000 00	9	24,360 00	14	1	1	1	1	3	1,740 00	1,097 14
1807....	15,360 00	9,000 00	16	24,360 00	5	2	2	4,872 00	3,072 00
1808....	15,360 00	9,000 00	42	24,360 00	15	1	2	1	2	3	2	1,624 00	1,024 00
1809....	15,360 00	9,000 00	11	24,360 00	7	1	1	1	1	3,460 00	2,194 28
1810....	15,360 00	9,000 00	2	24,360 00	1	1	24,360 00	15,360 00
1811....	15,360 00	9,000 00	24,360 00	17	1	2	4	5	2	1,432 94	903 52
1812....	31,520 00	*141,824 82	10	17	2	1	4	3	2	1,854 12
1813....	31,520 00	95	481,774 56	1	5,474 71	31,520 00
1814....	87,820 00	156	30	2	2	5	9	2,927 33
1815....	94,820 00	†94,269 74	48	40	2	5	2	4	3	10	2,370 50
	369,256 00	344,044 56	418	713,350 56	†157	7	8	9	12	3	16	18	31

* From 1812 to July 1, 1815, inclusive.
 † From July 1, 1815, to December 31, 1815.
 ‡ The aggregate of this table varies from that of table B, which gives 159 names.

Table of the annual expenses of the Military Academy to government since 1815 to the end of the year 1834, as near as ascertained; also of the number of cadets, graduates, &c.

Year.	Pay, forage, and subsistence of officers, professors, cadets, &c., in each year.	Buildings, repairs, books, maps, stationery, and incidental charges in each year.	Number of cadets admitted in each year.	Aggregate expense of each year.	Number of graduates in each year.	Declined and resigned same year of graduating.	Declined and resigned first year after graduating.	Declined and resigned second year after graduating.	Declined and resigned third year after graduating.	Declined and resigned fourth year after graduating.	Died within four years after graduating.	Dismissed from the service since 1815.	Still in service.	Aggregate annual expense divided among the graduates of each year.	Aggregate annual expense of pay, forage, and subsistence alone, divided among the graduates.	Aggregate of resignations prior to the close of 1834, in each class of graduates, between 1815 and 1831.	Aggregate of deaths and dismissals prior to the close of 1834, in each class of graduates, between 1815 and 31.
1816.....	\$102,946 00	\$31,592 87 115,800 00 16,570 00	43 51	\$376,308 87	19	1	1	7	\$19,805 73	\$11,176 10	7	3
1817.....	109,400 00																
1818.....	110,101 00	12,075 00	111	122,176 00	23	2	1	1	11	5,312 00	4,352 23	7	4
1819.....	109,270 00	35,640 00	82	144,910 00	29	2	2	2	3	1	10	4,996 89	3,767 93	11	7
1820.....	110,248 00	42,250 57	65	152,498 57	31	2	1	1	1	15	4,019 30	3,556 38	12	1
1821.....	111,125 00	17,036 22	76	128,161 22	24	1	2	1	2	2	1	8	5,340 05	4,630 20	12	4
1822.....	98,275 00	13,979 00	93	112,254 00	40	1	1	2	2	2	22	2,806 35	2,456 87	14	9
1823.....	99,426 00	12,000 00	108	111,426 00	36	1	1	3	27	3,095 16	2,706 27	5	4
1824.....	99,494 00	21,500 00	79	120,994 00	30	1	1	1	2	2	17	4,033 13	3,316 46	8	5
1825.....	99,494 00	11,500 00	105	110,994 00	36	3	1	1	1	2	23	3,083 16	2,763 72	9	5
1826.....	69,494 00	34,730 49	91	134,224 49	43	2	2	3	1	4	24	3,121 50	2,313 70	11	6
1827.....	99,494 00	32,139 95	94	131,633 95	38	3	4	3	1	23	3,464 05	2,618 26	9	6
1828.....	99,521 00	33,734 58	110	133,255 58	33	2	1	1	4	21	4,038 04	3,015 78	6	5
1829.....	90,117 00	27,925 11	108	127,042 11	46	1	3	4	5	3	3	27	2,761 78	2,154 71	16	3
1830.....	99,069 00	26,942 64	103	126,011 64	42	1	1	2	2	30	3,000 27	2,358 79
1831.....	99,069 00	24,050 00	93	123,119 00	33	1	3	4	2	1	3,730 87	3,002 01
1832.....	99,070 00	23,439 00	99	122,509 00	45	2	6	1	2	2,722 40	2,201 50
1833.....	99,032 00	36,765 00	111	135,797 00	43	4	1	3,204 50	2,303 00
1834.....	99,140 00	42,711 45	66	141,851 45	36	1	4,728 30	3,304 60
Deduct for last four years.....	1,942,785 00 396,311 00	612,381 88 526,965 45	1,687 369	2,555,166 88 523,276 45	627 157	20 8	31 10	22 5	16 2	12	38 3	8	265	127	62
	1,540,474 00	485,416 43	1,318	2,031,890 43	470	12	21	17	14	12	35	8	265

G

STATE OF TENNESSEE.

A resolution in relation to the Military Academy at West Point, in the State of New York.

Whereas many of the good citizens of these United States have viewed with deep and manifest interest the vast appropriations of public money for the support of the Military Academy in the State of New York—a few young men, sons of distinguished and wealthy families, through the intervention of members of Congress, are educated at this institution at the expense of the great body of the American people, which entitle them to privileges and elevate them above their fellow-citizens who have not been so fortunate as to be educated under the patronage of this aristocratical institution; and whereas it is considered by this general assembly that such institutions are repugnant to the great and fundamental principles of our government, by creating a demand upon the government for a large amount of money to support and protect an institution almost unknown to the people, and well calculated in its character to fill all the offices in the army of the United States under the patronage of the government, to the exclusion of the meritorious and talented portion of the country who have not received their academical education at the government school; such a power is wholly unknown to the Constitution of the United States, and at war with those principles and maxims which should ever be held sacred by a free and enlightened people. Since the year 1794, when this institution was established as a corps of artillerists and engineers, it has gradually set up claims to government patronage by acts of Congress from time to time, increasing the pay, rank, and emoluments of its officers, as well as the number of cadets, until the year 1812, when an appropriation of twenty-five thousand dollars was made by Congress to erect public buildings, and procure a library, apparatus, &c., and now is supported by annual appropriations by the government; all of which is viewed as an unnecessary expenditure of the public funds: Therefore—

1. *Resolved by the general assembly of the State of Tennessee*, That our senators in Congress be instructed, and our representatives requested, to oppose the passage of all laws making further appropriations for the support of said institution.

2. *Resolved*, That the secretary of state cause a copy of the foregoing preamble and resolution to be furnished each of our senators and representatives in Congress.

F. W. HAULING, *Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

D. BURFORD, *Speaker of the Senate.*

Passed November 26, 1833.

STATE OF OHIO.

Resolutions in relation to the Military Academy at West Point, in the State of New York.

Resolved by the general assembly of the State of Ohio, That the Military Academy heretofore established at West Point, in the State of New York, and supported exclusively by the funds of the general government, is partial in its operations, and wholly inconsistent with the spirit and genius of our liberal institutions.

Resolved, therefore, That said military establishment ought to be abolished, and that our senators in Congress be instructed, and our representatives requested, to oppose any further appropriations for the support of the said academy; provided, that no representative shall be considered as requested to vote against the known wishes of his immediate constituents.

Resolved, That the governor of this State transmit to each of said senators and representatives an authenticated copy of the foregoing resolutions.

JOHN H. KEITH, *Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

DAVID T. DISNEY, *Speaker of the Senate.*

MARCH 3, 1834.

H 1.

WASHINGTON, December 28, 1836.

SIR: In behalf of the select committee of the House of Representatives on the subject of the West Point Academy, I am instructed to inquire of your department as follows:

1st. The names and grades of the several officers of the United States army who have resigned their commissions within the last two years, and the dates of their resignations, respectively; which of them graduated at West Point Academy, and the dates of their graduating, and the States from which they were, respectively, appointed as cadets.

2d. What number of cadets have been appointed within two years past, their names, the dates of their appointments, and the States from which they were, respectively, appointed; also, what number have resigned or been dismissed during the same periods, the dates of their dismissals or resignations, respectively, and the States from which they were originally appointed, and the names of those who have graduated during the same period, and how many of them have received appointment by brevet, or otherwise, in the army.

3d. What number of cadets are now at the academy, and their names; from what States appointed, and the dates of their appointments.

4th. What number of cadets appointed within two years past were on subsequent examination rejected, or have resigned for any cause; from what States were such cadets appointed; and by what new appointments and from what States were the vacancies thus created filled.

5th. What changes, if any, have been made in the organization, rules of conducting, or the system of instruction of the academy at West Point within two years past.

An early answer as shall be convenient is desired.

With sentiments of great consideration and respect, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

FRANCIS O. J. SMITH.

HON. B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War, United States.*

H 2.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *January 7, 1837.*

SIR: The accompanying reports and documents, prepared by the adjutant general and the chief engineer, contain the information asked for in your letter of the 28th ultimo, except that required by the fifth paragraph of that communication. Measures for obtaining this, you will perceive, have been taken, and when it is received it shall be transmitted to you forthwith.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War ad interim.*

Hon. F. O. J. SMITH, *of the Select Committee on the Military Academy, H. R.*

H 3.

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, *Washington, January 7, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to hand you three tabular statements, containing answers to the 2d, 3d, and 4th questions proposed by the Hon. F. O. J. Smith, in behalf of the select committee of the House of Representatives on the subject of the West Point Academy, in his letter of the 28th ultimo. Question 5, relating in part to the internal regulations of the academy—some changes may have occurred therein without being reported to the department; and information on this subject has been requested from the superintendent, which, when received, a full reply to the question will be given.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

C. GRATIOT.

Hon. B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War ad interim.*

Statement showing what number of cadets have been appointed within two years past, their names, the dates of their appointment, and the States from which they were respectively appointed; also what number have resigned during the same period, or been dismissed, the dates of their dismissal or resignations, respectively, and the States from which they were originally appointed, and the names of those who have graduated during the same period, and how many of these last received appointments by brevet or otherwise in the army, up to January 1, 1837, so far as shown by the records of this office.

Cadets appointed to Military Academy in 1835 and 1836.						Resignations and dismissals.					Graduates in 1835.		
Whole number appointed.	Number.	Names.	Date of appointment.	State.	Declined their appointment.	Rejected.	Resigned.	Date.	Dismissed.	Date.	State from which originally appointed.	Graduated.	Appointments in the army.
1	1	Henry L. Smith.....	Feb., 1835	Maine.....								George W. Morell.....	George W. Morell.....
2	2	A. A. Gibson.....	do.....	do.....								C. H. Bigelow.....	C. H. Bigelow.....
3	3	J. D. Bacon.....	do.....	do.....								John H. Martindale.....	J. H. Martindale.....
4	4	S. D. Carpenter.....	do.....	do.....			S. D. Carpenter.....	Oct., 1835			Maine.....	C. J. Whiting.....	C. J. Whiting.....
5	5	T. O. Holm.....	do.....	do.....	T. O. Holm.....							George M. Legate.....	George M. Legate.....
6	6	J. D. C. Hill.....	April, 1835	do.....					J. D. C. Hill.....	Jan., 1836	Maine.....	A. Herbert.....	A. Herbert.....
7	7	T. W. T. Gardiner.....	March, 1836	do.....								A. Brumly.....	A. Brumly.....
8	8	S. D. Carpenter.....	do.....	do.....								Joseph Roberts.....	Joseph Roberts.....
9	9	B. E. Wilson.....	do.....	do.....	B. E. Wilson.....							Horace Brooks.....	Horace Brooks.....
10	10	T. Sevey.....	do.....	do.....								James M. Morgan.....	James M. Morgan.....
11	11	G. Stevens.....	May, 1836	do.....	G. Stevens.....							R. M. Renicke.....	R. M. Renicke.....
12	12	J. H. Williams.....	June, 1836	do.....			J. H. Williams.....	Sept., 1836			Maine.....	R. Henderson.....	R. Henderson.....
13	1	George Thorn.....	Feb., 1835	New Hampshire.....								Jaret N. Ellis.....	Jaret N. Ellis.....
14	2	H. P. Allen.....	March, 1836	do.....								John L. Keais.....	John L. Keais.....
15	3	J. L. Folsom.....	do.....	do.....								W. S. Brown.....	W. S. Brown.....
16	4	S. L. Fish.....	do.....	do.....								H. L. Kendrick.....	H. L. Kendrick.....
17	5	W. R. Low.....	do.....	do.....								James H. Stokes.....	James H. Stokes.....
18									Jacob Currier.....	June, 1835	New Hampshire.....	M. Blair.....	M. Blair.....
19	1	C. H. Humber.....	Feb., 1835	Massachusetts.....								George Meade.....	George Meade.....
20	2	Wm. B. Green.....	do.....	do.....								W. H. Betts.....	W. H. Betts.....
21	3	H. D. Grafton.....	do.....	do.....								G. G. Waggaman.....	G. G. Waggaman.....
22	4	Isaac J. Stevens.....	do.....	do.....								W. K. Hanson.....	W. K. Hanson.....
23	5	S. B. Howe.....	do.....	do.....	S. B. Howe.....							H. M. Naglee.....	H. M. Naglee.....
24	6	B. P. Tilden.....	March, 1836	do.....								A. Campbell.....	A. Campbell.....
25	7	James L. Nye.....	Aug., 1836	do.....		James L. Nye.....						A. S. Maccomb.....	A. S. Maccomb.....
26	8	S. G. Jones.....	do.....	do.....								John H. Hanly.....	John H. Hanly.....
27							J. W. S. McNeill.....	Jan., 1835			Massachusetts.....	W. H. Griffin.....	W. H. Griffin.....
28							Isaac H. Adams.....	June, 1836			do.....	P. C. Gaillard.....	P. C. Gaillard.....
29									Charles Reed.....	June, —	do.....	H. Haupt.....	H. Haupt.....
30	1	Henry B. Judd.....	Feb., 1835	Connecticut.....								S. M. Plummer.....	S. M. Plummer.....
31	2	F. Thompson.....	March, 1836	do.....								A. M. Mitchell.....	A. M. Mitchell.....
32	3	H. Burbeck, jr.....	do.....	do.....								A. H. Tappen.....	A. H. Tappen.....

H 4.—Statement showing what number of cadets have been appointed within two years past, their names, the dates of their appointment, &c.—Continued.

Whole number appointed.	Number.	Cadets appointed to Military Academy in 1835 and 1836.					Resignations and dismissals.					Graduates in 1835.	
		Names.	Date of appointment.	State.	Declined their appointment.	Rejected.	Resigned.	Date.	Dismissed.	Date.	State from which originally appointed.	Graduated.	Appointments in the army.
33	D. A. Thatcher.....	Aug, 1836	Connecticut ...	W. H. Do Forest.....	W. H. Do Forest.....
34	1	C. M. Haile.....	March, 1836	Rhode Island	P. R. Thompson.....	P. R. Thompson.....
35	2	J. M. Smith.....	do.....	do.....	W. M. D. McKissack ..	W. M. D. McKissack ..
36	3	F. D. Randall.....	do.....	do.....	S. T. Tibbatts.....	S. T. Tibbatts.....
37	1	I. Richardson.....	Feb., 1835	Vermont.....	I. Richardson.....	July, 1836	J. M. Wells.....	J. M. Wells.....
38	2	H. S. Burton.....	do.....	do.....	W. S. Henry.....	W. S. Henry.....
39	3	I. Richardson.....	March, 1836	do.....	John M. Scott.....	John M. Scott.....
40	4	John Hooper.....	do.....	do.....	George W. Shaw.....	G. W. Shaw.....
41	1	J. C. Robinson.....	Feb., 1835	New York.....	J. H. Eaton.....	J. H. Eaton.....
42	2	L. E. Allen.....	do.....	do.....	J. M. Withers.....	J. M. Withers.....
43	3	G. O. Maher.....	Sept., 1835	do.....	Isaac Reeve.....	Isaac Reeve.....
44	4	Mason Seely.....	Feb., 1835	do.....	John W. Scott.....	John W. Scott.....
45	5	J. A. Haskin.....	do.....	do.....	L. Smith.....	L. Smith.....
46	6	T. R. Brooks.....	do.....	do.....	T. R. Brooks.....	July, 1836	New York.....	M. R. Patrick.....	M. R. Patrick.....	
47	7	T. D. Callender.....	do.....	do.....	Thomas B. Arden.....	Thomas B. Arden.....
48	8	E. H. Gridley.....	do.....	do.....	E. H. Gridley.....	Dec., 1835	New York.....	J. H. Whipple.....	J. H. Whipple.....	
49	9	E. Vandeventer.....	do.....	do.....	E. Vandeventer	L. Bradbury.....	L. Bradbury.....
50	10	R. D. Frothingham.....	do.....	do.....	R. D. Frothingham...	Oct., 1836	New York.....	R. A. Wainwright.....	R. A. Wainwright.....	
51	11	John Whiting.....	do.....	do.....	John Whiting	B. S. Roberts.....	B. S. Roberts.....
52	12	George W. Suffern.....	do.....	do.....	G. W. Suffern	W. N. Grier.....	W. N. Grier.....
53	13	James Molyneux.....	do.....	do.....	Thomas L. Brent.....	Thomas L. Brent.....
54	14	B. F. Dey.....	do.....	do.....	B. F. Dey	H. Prince.....	H. Prince.....
55	15	H. W. Hallik.....	do.....	do.....	Hugh McLeod.....	H. McLeod.....
56	A. Hamilton.....	June, 1835	New York.....	A. R. Johnson.....	A. R. Johnson.....	
57	James H. Perry.....	do.....	do.....
58	A. G. Steere.....	Nov., 1835
59	John Dickson.....	Feb., 1836
60	Henry Eckford.....	Oct., 1836	George L. Welcker....	George L. Welcker....
61	16	George W. Suffern.....	March, 1836	New York.....	James L. Mason.....	James L. Mason.....
62	17	D. Young.....	do.....	do.....	D. Leadbetter.....	D. Leadbetter.....
63	18	E. A. Dunscomb.....	do.....	do.....	E. A. Dunscomb.....	Dec., 1836	J. R. Anderson.....	J. R. Anderson.....
64	19	O. L. Sheppard.....	do.....	do.....	M. C. Meigs.....	M. C. Meigs.....
65	20	Wm. Steel.....	do.....	do.....	D. P. Woodbury.....	D. P. Woodbury.....
66	21	H. B. Field.....	do.....	do.....	Fisher A. Lewis.....	Fisher A. Lewis.....
67	22	W. G. Torry.....	do.....	do.....	S. J. Bransford.....	S. J. Bransford.....
68	23	H. Whiting.....	do.....	do.....	A. P. Allen.....	A. P. Allen.....
69	24	J. E. Strong.....	do.....	do.....	J. E. Strong	W. H. Warner.....	W. H. Warner.....

H 4.—Statement showing what number of cadets have been appointed within two years past, their names, the dates of their appointment, &c.—Continued.

Cadets appointed to Military Academy in 1835 and 1836.						Resignations and dismissals.					Graduates in 1836.		
Whole number appointed.	Number.	Names.	Date of appointment.	State.	Declined their appointment.	Rejected.	Resigned.	Date.	Dismissed.	Date.	State from which originally appointed.	Graduated.	Appointments in the army.
70	25	J. Maxon	March, 1836	New York								B. Conkling	B. Conkling
71	26	George T. Lawrence	do	do								W. B. Wallace	W. B. Wallace
72	27	S. Van Vliet	do	do								M. Churchill	M. Churchill
73	28	O. F. Winship	do	do								D. P. Dewitt	D. P. Dewitt
74	29	S. Wilcox	do	do								J. L. Donalson	J. L. Donalson
75	30	H. Wardwell	do	do								S. P. J. O'Brien	S. P. J. O'Brien
76	31	George B. Reab	Aug., 1836	do					George B. Reab	Nov., 1836	New York	R. A. Luther	R. A. Luther
77	1	James B. Ricketts	Feb., 1835	New Jersey								Thomas W. Shermon	Thomas W. Shermon
78									R. W. Footé	June, 1835	New Jersey	J. F. Roland	J. F. Roland
79	2	W. P. Shepard	March, 1836	New Jersey								C. B. Sing	C. B. Sing
80	3	F. Hamilton	do	do								A. P. Crittenden	A. P. Crittenden
81	4	Theo. Meade	do	do								H. H. Lockwood	H. H. Lockwood
82	5	W. R. Traverse	Aug., 1836	do								C. A. Green	C. A. Green
83	1	John H. Hill	Feb., 1835	Pennsylvania								John W. Phelps	John W. Phelps
84	2	William Brindle	do	do			William Brindle	Nov., 1835			Pennsylvania	P. V. Hagner	P. V. Hagner
85	3	S. K. Dawson	do	do								M. L. Shackelford	M. L. Shackelford
86	4	D. C. Bonham	do	do			D. C. Bonham	Jan., 1836			Pennsylvania	C. Q. Tompkins	C. Q. Tompkins
87	5	James L. Rankin	do	do								M. J. Burke	M. J. Burke
88	6	M. S. Culbertson	do	do								John W. Judson	John W. Judson
89	7	William Mealy	do	do		William Mealy						C. J. Woodruff	C. J. Woodruff
90	8	William H. Kone	do	do								W. B. Arvin	W. B. Arvin
91	9	H. J. Biddle	do	do								John S. Hathaway	John S. Hathaway
92	10	And. J. Porter	do	do			And. J. Porter	May, 1836			Pennsylvania	Robert Allen	Robert Allen
93												William Frazer	William Frazer
94												George C. Thomas	George C. Thomas
95												A. B. Lansing	A. B. Lansing
96	11	D. C. Bonham	March, 1836	Pennsylvania								C. B. Daniels	C. B. Daniels
97	12	Thos. Higgins	do	do								William Mock	William Mock
98	13	J. M. Ramsay	do	do								R. F. Baker	R. F. Baker
99	14	R. P. Maclay	do	do								C. Hoskins	C. Hoskins
100	15	S. P. Collins	do	do			S. P. Collins	Oct., 1836			Pennsylvania	S. Whitehouse	S. Whitehouse
101	16	Wm. Brindle	do	do								C. R. Gates	C. R. Gates
102	17	D. G. Rogers	do	do								M. C. M. Hammond	M. C. M. Hammond
103	18	J. C. Ruple	do	do								R. G. Stockton	R. G. Stockton
104	19	J. H. Cassidy	do	do	J. H. Cassidy							T. P. Chiffelle	T. P. Chiffelle
105	20	And. J. Porter	Sept., 1836	do								L. Thigman	L. Thigman
106	21	Horace Moses	do	do	H. Moses							Thomas McCrate	Thomas McCrate

H 4.—Statement showing what number of cadets have been appointed within two years past, their names, the dates of their appointment, &c—Continued.

Whole number appointed.	Number.	Cadets appointed to Military Academy in 1835 and 1836.					Resignations and dismissals.					Graduates in 1836.		
		Names.	Date of appointment.	State.	Declined their appointment.	Rejected.	Resigned.	Date.	Dismissed.	Date.	State from which originally appointed.	Graduated.	Appointments in the army.	
107	22	John Irvin	Sept, 1836	Pennsylvania										
108				Delaware										
109	1	R. M. Jones	Feb, 1835	Maryland			William Gilpin	Feb., 1835						
110	2	Garrett Barry	do	do			R. M. Jones	Oct., 1835						
111	3	A. C. H. Dame	June, 1836	do										
112	4	J. Armstrong, Jr.	July, 1836	do										
113														
114							R. L. Stockton	Oct., 1835						
115														
116														
117	1	R. Q. Butler	Feb., 1835	Virginia										
118	2	G. W. Washington	do	do										
119	3	Thomas Jordan	March, 1836	do			G. W. Washington	Aug, 1836						
120	4	S. S. Anderson	do	do										
121	5	Thos. M. Smyth	do	do										
122	6	George Thomas	do	do										
123	7	D. W. Scott	do	do										
124	8	R. Clemens	do	do										
125	9	R. S. Ewell	do	do										
126	10	R. B. Garnett	do	do										
127	11	F. N. Page	August, 1836	do										
128														
129							James F. Preston	Jan., 1836						
130							R. M. Bland	April, 1836						
131							C. Southgate	May, 1836						
132	12	J. F. Lewis	August, 1836	Virginia	J. F. Lewis		John R. Garland	Oct., 1836						
133	1	Joshua Pinder	Feb., 1835	North Carolina ..										
134	2	J. F. Glimmer	do	do										
135	3	A. W. Davidson	do	do										
136	4	James Palmer	March, 1836	do										
137	5	James G. Martin	do	do										
138	6	J. M. Leach	do	do										
139	7	R. Campbell	do	do										
140	8	C. P. Kingsbury	do	do										
141	9	John R. Jones	August, 1836	do										
142							H. Date	April, 1835						

H 4.—Statement showing what number of cadets have been appointed within two years past, their names, the dates of their appointment, &c.—Continued.

Whole number appointed.	Number.	Cadets appointed to Military Academy in 1835 and 1836.					Resignations and dismissions.					Graduates in 1836.	
		Names.	Date of appointment.	State.	Declined their appointment.	Rejected.	Resigned.	Date.	Dismissed.	Date.	State from which originally appointed.	Graduated.	Appointments in the army.
143								Alexander Irwin	Feb., 1835	North Carolina			
144								R. S. Moore	June, 1836	do.			
145								W. F. Beach	do.	do.			
								L. Hagler	Feb., 1835	do.			
146	1	W. H. Wisner	Feb., 1835	South Carolina				W. H. Wisner	June, 1836	South Carolina			
147	2	Hugh Rose	do.	do.		H. Rose	Jan., 1836			do.			
148	3	A. R. Lawton	do.	do.									
149	4	— Snipes	do.	do.	— Snipes								
150	5	J. P. Cunningham	do.	do.	J. P. Cunningham								
151	6	Hugh Rose	March, 1836	do.		H. Rose	Sept., 1836						
152	7	— Snipes	do.	do.	— Snipes								
153	8	Paul Pritchard	do.	do.				Paul Pritchard	Dec., 1836	South Carolina			
154	9	W. J. Duval	do.	do.									
155								W. F. Graham	June, 1836	South Carolina			
156	10	John L. Toomer	March, 1836	South Carolina	John L. Toomer								
157								R. G. Burnwell	Feb., 1835	South Carolina			
158	1	John W. King	Feb., 1835	Georgia		J. W. King	Jan., 1836						
159	2	J. M. Bolling	do.	do.	J. M. Bolling								
160	3	F. H. Sandford	do.	do.	F. H. Sandford								
161	4	B. S. McWhorter	do.	do.	B. S. McWhorter								
162	5	John W. King	March, 1836	do.	J. W. King								
163	6	M. A. Stoval	do.	do.									
164	7	W. R. Shivers	do.	do.									
165	8	C. C. Coffee	do.	do.									
166	9	W. R. Jordan	do.	do.				W. R. Jordan	Dec., 1836	Georgia			
167								Jno. H. Watson	June, 1835	do.			
168								L. M. H. Walker	May, 1835	do.			
169	1	E. B. Gaither	Feb., 1835	Kentucky									
170	2	Thos. Hunter	do.	do.									
171	3	C. Wickliff, jr	do.	do.									
172	4	R. H. Tobin	do.	do.		R. H. Tobin							
173	5	William Berry	do.	do.	W. Berry								
174	6	C. H. Tyler	do.	do.	C. H. Tyler								
175	7	M. T. Chrisman	March, 1836	do.	M. T. Chrisman								
176	8	B. F. Allan	do.	do.		B. F. Allan	Nov., 1836			Kentucky			
177	9	William Kouns	do.	do.		W. Kouns	do.			do.			
178	10	L. Metcalf	do.	do.									

H 4.—Statement showing what number of cadets have been appointed within two years past, their names, the dates of their appointments, &c.—Continued.

Whole number appointed.	Number.	Cadets appointed to Military Academy in 1835 and 1836.					Resignations and dismissions.					Graduates in 1836.	
		Names.	Date of appointment.	State.	Declined their appointment.	Rejected.	Resigned.	Date.	Dismissed.	Date.	State from which originally appointed.	Graduated.	Appointments in the army.
179						J. P. L. Cooke.....	Nov., 1835				Kentucky.....		
180						L. Johnson.....	Aug., 1836				do.....		
181	1	Jno. D. Goneke.....	Feb., 1835	Tennessee.....									
182	2	J. C. McLamore.....	do.....	do.....		J. C. McLamore.....	Sept., 1835						
183	3	W. Robertson.....	do.....	do.....									
184	4	J. B. Boyd, jr.....	do.....	do.....									
185	5	Ed. Douglass.....	do.....	do.....	Died before reaching West Point.								
186	6	W. Defendorf.....	do.....	do.....									
187	7	J. P. McCown.....	do.....	do.....									
188	8	James A. Lea.....	do.....	do.....	Jas. A. Lea.....								
189	9	James Guest.....	do.....	do.....	Jas. Guest.....								
190	10	William Hayes.....	Oct., 1835	do.....									
191	11	A. M. Green.....	March, 1836	do.....	A. M. Green.....								
192	12	W. A. Blythe.....	do.....	do.....	W. A. Blythe.....								
193	13	James Metcalf.....	do.....	do.....									
194	14	W. Elliott.....	May, 1836	do.....									
195	15	J. M. Parrish.....	June, 1836	do.....									
196	16	E. B. Littlefield.....	August, 1836	do.....									
197						N. L. Lindsay.....	Dec., 1835				Tennessee.....		
198						Jno. Claiborne.....	do.....				do.....		
199								J. M. Jotson.....	Feb., 1835		do.....		
200								Wm. Hickman.....	do.....		do.....		
201	1	W. P. Miller.....	Feb'ry, 1835	Ohio.....		W. P. Miller.....	Dec., 1835						
202	2	E. A. Paine.....	do.....	do.....									
203	3	Wm. Irvin.....	do.....	do.....									
204	4	John Eberlien.....	do.....	do.....	J. E. Eberlien.....								
205	5	Oscar Mitchell.....	do.....	do.....	O. Mitchell.....								
206	6	W. S. Cameron.....	do.....	do.....	W. S. Cameron.....								
207	7	H. J. Hunt.....	do.....	do.....									
208	8	G. Parrish.....	do.....	do.....	G. Parrish.....								
209	9	E. Norton.....	do.....	do.....	E. Norton.....								
210	10	Pitt Cooke.....	do.....	do.....	Pitt Cooke.....								
211	11	R. W. Smith.....	do.....	do.....	R. W. Smith.....								
212	12	P. Lugenbiel.....	do.....	do.....									
213	13	Hiram Smith.....	do.....	do.....	Hiram Smith.....								
214	14	R. H. Lancaster.....	March, 1836	do.....									

H 4.—Statement showing what number of cadets have been appointed within two years past, their names, the dates of their appointment, &c.—Continued.

281—IIA—TOA

Cadets appointed to the Military Academy in 1835 and 1836.						Resignations and dismissals.					Graduates in 1836.		
Whole number appointed.	Number.	Names.	Date of appointment.	State.	Declined their appointment.	Rejected.	Resigned.	Date.	Dismissed.	Date.	State from which originally appointed.	Graduated.	Appointments in the army.
215	15	J. N. Caldwell.....	March, 1836	Ohio
216	16	B. R. Johnson	do	do
217	17	G. L. Higgins	do	do
218	18	John McNutt	do	do
219	19	W. T. Sherman.....	do	do
220	20	W. S. Belt.....	do	do	W. S. Belt ..	Nov., 1836	Geo. W. Thompson..	Jan'y, 1835	Ohio
221	C. G. Forshey	April, 1836
222	1	John S. Webb.....	Feb'y, 1835	Louisiana	John S. Webb	Jan'y, 1836	Louisiana
223	2	John B. Smith.....	do	do
224	3	James Beale.....	March, 1836	do	J. Beale.
225	4	P. O. Hebert	June, 1836	do
226	1	A. J. Coffee.....	Feb'y, 1835	Alabama	A. J. Coffee	Jan., 1836	Alabama
227	2	G. W. Martin.....	March, 1836	do	G. W. Martin.....	Nov., 1836	Alabama
228	3	E. N. Clark	do	do	E. N. Clark
229	4	Ed. H. Nelson	do	do	E. H. Nelson
230	John J. Walker.....	June, 1835	Alabama
231	Richard Peters.....	do	do
232	J. W. Perry	April, 1836	do
233	1	J. W. S. Bell	Feb'y, 1835	Indiana
234	2	E. R. S. Candy	do	do
235	3	John Myers	do	do	John Myers
236	4	J. Clark, jr.....	March, 1836	do	J. Clark, jr.
237	5	F. L. Maddox	do	do	F. L. Maddox
238	6	Wm. Gilham	do	do
239	Thos. J. Throop	June, 1836	Indiana
240	1	J. P. Cabiness	Feb'y, 1835	Illinois	J. P. Cabiness
241	2	W. J. Linn	do	do	W. J. Linn
242	3	H. A. Clemson	do	do	H. A. Clemson
243	4	W. J. Linn	March, 1836	do	W. J. Linn.....	Nov., 1836	Illinois
244	5	E. K. Kane	do	do	Died before reaching the academy.
245	G. W. Smith	Feb'y, 1835	Illinois
246	1	John A. Griffith.....	March, 1836	Missouri.....	J. A. Griffith.....
247	L. D. Cabanne.....	June, 1835
248	1	C. A. Cunningham.....	March, 1836	Arkansas	C. A. Cunningham
249	1	John Kirehoval	do	Mississippi.....
250	J. R. Liddell.....	Feb'y, 1835	Mississippi

H 4.—Statement showing what number of cadets have been appointed within two years past, their names, the dates of their appointment, &c.—Continued.

		Cadets appointed to the Military Academy in 1835 and 1836.					Resignations and dismissions.					Graduates in 1836.	
Whole number appointed.	Number.	Names.	Date of appointment.	State.	Declined their appointment.	Rejected.	Resigned.	Date.	Dismissed.	Date.	State from which originally appointed.	Graduated.	Appointments in the army.
251	1	T. W. Maccomb.....	Feb'y, 1835	Florida.....	T. W. Maccomb.....								
252	2	T. W. Maccomb.....	March, 1836	do.....	T. W. Maccomb.....								
253	3	H. D. Wallen.....	July, 1836	do.....									
254									W. S. Ward.....	Sept., 1835	Florida.....		
255	1	Wm. Johns.....	Feb'y, 1835	Dist. of Columbia.									
256	2	C. F. Wilcox.....	do.....	do.....									
257	3	Ed. O. Ord.....	do.....	do.....									
258	4	R. H. Weightman.....	do.....	do.....									
259	5	W. Bronaugh.....	March, 1836				W. Bronaugh.....	Oct., 1836					
260	6	Thomas Donoho.....	do.....	Dist. of Columbia.	Thomas Donoho.....								
261	7	George W. Getty.....	do.....	do.....									
262	1	G. A. De Russey*.....	Feb'y, 1835										
263	2	Ed. Green*.....	do.....										
264	3	Theo. H. Porter‡.....	do.....						Theo. H. Porter.....	July, 1836			
265	4	W. H. Cummings*.....	April, 1836										
266	5	W. P. Jones*.....	do.....										
267	6	W. H. Churchill*.....	do.....										
268	7	C. W. Lear*.....	do.....		C. W. Lear.....								
269	8	F. N. Clark*.....	do.....										
270	9	S. Nicholson‡.....	do.....		S. Nicholson.....								
271	10	F. W. Grigson‡.....	do.....		F. W. Grigson.....								
272	11	F. S. Claxton‡.....	do.....		F. S. Claxton.....								
273	12	D. Irwin.....	do.....										
274	13	W. S. Smith‡.....	April, 1835										
275	14	G. W. Hunter‡.....	April, 1836		G. W. Hunter.....								
276							L. A. Armistead.....	Feb'y, 1836					
277									E. M. Clark.....	Dec., 1836			
278		James G. Carter.....		Virginia.....	Died June, 1835.....								

* Son of an officer of the army.

‡ Son of an officer of the navy.

‡ Son of an officer of marines.

H 4—Continued.

Statement showing "what number of cadets are now at the Military Academy, and their names, from what States appointed, and the dates of their appointment," January 1, 1837.

Whole number.	No. from each State.	Name.	From what State appointed.	Date of appointment.	Remarks.
1	1	E. P. Scammon	Maine.....	March, 1833	
2	2	H. L. Smith	do	Feb., 1835	
3	3	A. A. Gibson	do.....	do.....	
4	4	J. D. Bacon	do.....	do.....	
5	5	J. W. T. Gardiner	do.....	March, 1836	
6	6	S. D. Carpenter	do.....	do.....	
7	7	Theodore Sivey	do.....	do.....	
8	1	John W. Gunnison.....	New Hampshire	March, 1833	
9	2	George Thorn	do.....	Feb., 1835	
10	3	S. L. Fish.....	do.....	March, 1836	
11	4	Joseph L. Folsom	do.....	do.....	
12	5	H. P. Allen	do.....	do.....	
13	6	W. R. Low.....	do.....	do.....	
14	1	J. H. Bates.....	Massachusetts	March, 1833	
15	2	E. D. Townsend.....	do.....	do.....	
16	3	Joseph Hooker	do.....	do.....	
17	4	W. W. Chapman	do.....	do.....	
18	5	J. R. Soley	do.....	do.....	
19	6	H. C. Pratt	do.....	do.....	
20	7	W. B. Green.....	do.....	Feb., 1835	
21	8	C. H. Humber.....	do.....	do.....	
22	9	Isaac I. Stevens.....	do.....	do.....	
23	10	H. D. Grafton	do.....	do.....	
24	11	B. P. Tilden	do.....	March, 1836	
25	12	S. G. Jones	do.....	do.....	
26	1	C. M. Haile	Rhode Island	do.....	
27	2	Joseph M. Smith.....	do.....	do.....	
28	3	F. D. Randall	do.....	do.....	
29	1	John Sedgwick.....	Connecticut	March, 1833	
30	2	Henry W. Bonham	do.....	do.....	
31	3	W. C. Brown.....	do.....	do.....	
32	4	Henry B. Judd	do.....	Feb., 1835	
33	5	Thomas Thompson.....	do.....	Feb., 1836	
34	6	H. Burbeck, jr.....	do.....	do.....	
35	1	Francis Woodbridge	Vermont	March, 1833	
36	2	S. H. Campbell	do.....	March, 1834	
37	3	Lucius Pitkin	do.....	do.....	
38	4	H. S. Burton	do.....	Feb., 1835	
39	5	J. P. Richardson	do.....	March, 1836	
40	6	John Hooper	do.....	do.....	
41	1	William Hulbert.....	New York.....	March, 1833	
42	2	W. G. Grandin.....	do.....	do.....	
43	3	John Bratt	do.....	do.....	
44	4	L. P. Davidson	do.....	do.....	
45	5	C. F. Wooster.....	do.....	do.....	
46	6	John H. Mathews	do.....	March, 1834	
47	7	A. H. Dearborn	do.....	do.....	
48	8	Leslie Chase	do.....	do.....	
49	9	F. S. Mumford	do.....	do.....	
50	10	W. F. Barry	do.....	do.....	
51	11	H. W. Merrill.....	do.....	do.....	
52	12	J. C. Robinson	do.....	Feb., 1834	
53	13	L. H. Allen	do.....	do.....	
54	14	Mason Seely	do.....	do.....	
55	15	J. A. Haskin	do.....	do.....	
56	16	T. D. Callender	do.....	do.....	
57	17	James Molyneaux	do.....	do.....	
58	18	H. W. Hallieck.....	do.....	do.....	
59	19	Gregory O'Maher	do.....	do.....	
60	20	G. W. Suffern.....	do.....	March, 1835	
61	21	D. Young	do.....	do.....	
62	22	O. L. Sheppard	do.....	do.....	
63	23	William Steel	do.....	do.....	
64	24	H. B. Field	do.....	do.....	
65	25	W. G. Torrey	do.....	do.....	
66	26	Henry Whiting.....	do.....	do.....	
67	27	Jared Maxson	do.....	do.....	
68	28	John T. Lawrence	do.....	do.....	
69	29	S. Van Vliet	do.....	do.....	
70	30	O. F. Winship	do.....	do.....	

H 4.—Statement showing what number of cadets are now at the Military Academy, &c.—Continued.

Whole number.	No. from each State.	Name.	From what State appointed.	Date of appointment.	Remarks.
71	31	Sylvanus Wilcox.....	New York.....	March, 1836	
72	32	Henry Wardwell.....	do.....	do.....	
73	1	L. G. Arnold.....	New Jersey.....	March, 1833	
74	2	W. T. Martin.....	do.....	do.....	
75	3	Walter Sherwood.....	do.....	do.....	
76	4	Joseph B. Ricketts.....	do.....	Feb., 1835	
77	5	W. P. Shepard.....	do.....	March, 1836	
78	6	F. Hamilton.....	do.....	do.....	
79	7	Theodore Meade.....	do.....	do.....	
80	8	W. R. Travers.....	do.....	Aug., 1836	
81	1	Asa Gregory.....	Pennsylvania.....	March, 1833	
82	2	E. W. Morgan.....	do.....	do.....	
83	3	Ed. Bradford.....	do.....	do.....	
84	4	J. C. Pemberton.....	do.....	do.....	
85	5	Israel Vogdes.....	do.....	do.....	
86	6	A. J. Smith.....	do.....	March, 1834	
87	7	John C. Fletcher.....	do.....	do.....	
88	8	W. A. Nicholls.....	do.....	do.....	
89	9	Charles A. Ruff.....	do.....	do.....	
90	10	John W. Butler.....	do.....	do.....	
91	11	John H. Hill.....	do.....	Feb., 1835	
92	12	S. Dawson.....	do.....	do.....	
93	13	James S. Ranking.....	do.....	do.....	
94	14	M. S. Culbertson.....	do.....	do.....	
95	15	William K. Koon.....	do.....	do.....	
96	16	H. J. Biddle.....	do.....	do.....	
97	17	D. C. Bonham.....	do.....	March, 1836	
98	18	Theodore Higgins.....	do.....	do.....	
99	19	James M. Ramsay.....	do.....	do.....	
100	20	R. P. Maclay.....	do.....	do.....	
101	21	William Brindle.....	do.....	do.....	
102	22	D. L. Rodgers.....	do.....	do.....	
103	23	J. C. Ruple.....	do.....	do.....	
104	24	Andrew J. Porter.....	do.....	June, 1836	
105	25	John Irvin.....	do.....	do.....	
106	1	Robert M. McLane.....	Delaware.....	March, 1833	
107	2	George C. Rodney.....	do.....	do.....	
108	3	R. M. Cochran.....	do.....	March, 1834	
109	1	Randolph Ridgely.....	Maryland.....	Feb., 1832	
110	2	W. W. Mackall.....	do.....	March, 1833	
111	3	F. O. Wyse.....	do.....	do.....	
112	4	A. E. Jones.....	do.....	do.....	
113	5	C. J. Hughes.....	do.....	March, 1834	
114	6	Const. Freeman.....	do.....	do.....	
115	7	Garret Barry.....	do.....	Feb., 1835	
116	8	A. C. H. Dame.....	do.....	June, 1836	
117	9	John Armstrong.....	do.....	July, 1836	
118	1	Ed. J. Steptoe.....	Virginia.....	March, 1833	
119	2	Jubal A. Earley.....	do.....	do.....	
120	3	John M. Harvie.....	do.....	do.....	
121	4	R. T. Jones.....	do.....	do.....	
122	5	R. H. Chilton.....	do.....	do.....	
123	6	William Hardin.....	do.....	do.....	
124	7	A. W. Reynolds.....	do.....	do.....	
125	8	W. B. Blair.....	do.....	March, 1834	
126	9	C. L. Stevenson.....	do.....	do.....	
127	10	R. Q. Butler.....	do.....	Feb., 1835	
128	11	Thomas Jordan.....	do.....	March, 1836	
129	12	S. S. Anderson.....	do.....	do.....	
130	13	George H. Thomas.....	do.....	do.....	
131	14	D. W. Scott.....	do.....	do.....	
132	15	Sherrard Clemens.....	do.....	do.....	
133	16	B. S. Ewell.....	do.....	do.....	
134	17	R. B. Garnett.....	do.....	do.....	
135	18	F. N. Page.....	do.....	Aug., 1836	
136	1	Braxton Bragg.....	North Carolina.....	March, 1833	
137	2	Frank Saunders.....	do.....	March, 1834	
138	3	W. H. Wright.....	do.....	do.....	
139	4	J. F. Gilmer.....	do.....	Feb., 1835	
140	5	A. W. Davidson.....	do.....	do.....	
141	6	James Palmer.....	do.....	March, 1836	
142	7	James G. Martin.....	do.....	do.....	
143	8	James M. Leach.....	do.....	do.....	
144	9	R. P. Campbell.....	do.....	do.....	
145	10	C. P. Kingsbury.....	do.....	do.....	

H 4.—Statement showing what number of cadets are now at the Military Academy, &c.—Continued.

Whole number.	No. from each State.	Name.	From what State appointed.	Date of appointment.	Remarks.
146	11	John R. Jones.....	North Carolina.....	July, 1836	
147	1	John H. Trapier.....	South Carolina.....	March, 1834	
148	2	J. S. K. Reeves.....	do.....	do.....	
149	3	A. R. Lawton.....	do.....	March, 1835	
150	4	W. J. Duval.....	do.....	March, 1836	
151	1	W. H. T. Walker.....	Georgia.....	Feb., 1832	
152	2	George Taylor.....	do.....	March, 1833	
153	3	W. J. Hardie.....	do.....	March, 1834	
154	4	H. C. Wayne.....	do.....	do.....	
155	5	M. A. Stoval.....	do.....	March, 1836	
156	6	W. R. Shivers.....	do.....	do.....	
157	7	C. C. Coffee.....	do.....	do.....	
158	1	Nevill Hopson.....	Kentucky.....	March, 1833	
159	2	Ed. Johnson.....	do.....	do.....	
160	3	Buckner Board.....	do.....	March, 1834	
161	4	William Boswell.....	do.....	do.....	
162	5	E. B. Gaither.....	do.....	Feb., 1835	
163	6	Thomas Hunton.....	do.....	do.....	
164	7	C. Wickliffe.....	do.....	do.....	
165	8	Leonidas Metcalf.....	do.....	March, 1836	
166	1	A. M. Rutledge.....	Tennessee.....	March, 1833	
167	2	R. S. Jennings.....	do.....	do.....	
168	3	M. A. Haynes.....	do.....	March, 1834	
169	4	Thomas J. Norfleet.....	do.....	do.....	
170	5	Jno. D. Goecke.....	do.....	Feb., 1835	
171	6	William Robertson.....	do.....	do.....	
172	7	J. B. Boyd, jr.....	do.....	do.....	
173	8	J. P. McCoun.....	do.....	do.....	
174	9	W. Defendorf.....	do.....	do.....	
175	10	William Hayes.....	do.....	Oct., 1835	
176	11	James Metcalf.....	do.....	April, 1836	
177	12	Washington Elliott.....	do.....	May, 1836	
178	13	J. M. Parrish.....	do.....	June, 1836	
179	14	E. B. Littlefield.....	do.....	August, 1836	
180	1	R. S. Granger.....	Ohio.....	March, 1833	
181	2	Jno. McDowell.....	do.....	March, 1834	
182	3	William H. Shover.....	do.....	do.....	
183	4	E. A. Paine.....	do.....	Feb., 1835	
184	5	William Irvin.....	do.....	do.....	
185	6	H. J. Hunt.....	do.....	do.....	
186	7	P. Lugenbiel.....	do.....	do.....	
187	8	R. H. Lancaster.....	do.....	March, 1836	
188	9	J. N. Caldwell.....	do.....	do.....	
189	10	B. R. Johnson.....	do.....	do.....	
190	11	G. L. Higgins.....	do.....	do.....	
191	12	Jno. McNutt.....	do.....	do.....	
192	13	W. T. Sherman.....	do.....	do.....	
193	1	H. H. Sibley.....	Louisiana.....	March, 1833	
194	2	P. T. G. Beauregard.....	do.....	March, 1834	
195	3	J. B. Smith.....	do.....	Feb., 1835	
196	4	P. O. Hebert.....	do.....	June, 1836	
197	1	R. A. Arnold.....	Mississippi.....	March, 1834	
198	2	Jno. Tollecoif.....	do.....	do.....	
199	3	Jno. Kircheval.....	do.....	March, 1836	
200	1	S. D. J. Moore.....	Alabama.....	March, 1832	
201	2	Z. M. P. Inge.....	do.....	March, 1834	
202	3	Thomas Casey.....	do.....	do.....	
203	1	William Armstrong.....	Indiana.....	March, 1833	
204	2	Samuel Woods.....	do.....	do.....	
205	3	J. M. S. Bell.....	do.....	Feb., 1835	
206	4	E. R. S. Canby.....	do.....	do.....	
207	5	William Gilham.....	do.....	March, 1836	
208	1	J. B. S. Todd.....	Illinois.....	March, 1833	
209	2	J. M. Scarritt.....	do.....	March, 1834	
210	1	L. C. Easton.....	Missouri.....	March, 1833	
211	2	Alexander B. Dyer.....	do.....	do.....	
212	1	Thomas Williams.....	Michigan.....	do.....	
213	2	J. McKinstry.....	do.....	do.....	
214	1	H. D. Wallen.....	Florida.....	July, 1836	
215	1	W. H. Fowler.....	District of Columbia.....	March, 1833	
216	2	W. H. French.....	do.....	do.....	
217	3	B. H. Hill.....	do.....	do.....	
218	4	T. L. Ringold.....	do.....	March, 1834	
219	5	R. H. Graham.....	do.....	do.....	

H 4.—Statement showing what number of cadets are now at the Military Academy, &c.—Continued.

Whole number.	No. from each State.	Name.	From what State appointed.	Date of appointment.	Remarks
220	6	William B. Johns.....	District of Columbia.....	March, 1835	
221	7	C. G. Wilcox.....	do.....	do.....	
222	8	Ed. O. Ord.....	do.....	do.....	
223	9	R. H. Weightman.....	do.....	do.....	
224	10	George W. Getty.....	do.....	March, 1836	
225	1	James M. Ketchum.....	do.....	March, 1834	Son of an officer of the army.
226	2	O. P. Ransom.....	do.....	do.....	Do. do.
227	3	Theo. V. Kennedy.....	do.....	do.....	Son of an officer of the navy.
228	4	W. S. Smith.....	do.....	April, 1835	Do. do.
229	5	E. B. Green.....	do.....	Feb., 1835	Son of an officer of the army.
230	6	G. A. De Russey.....	do.....	do.....	Do. do.
231	7	F. N. Clark.....	do.....	April, 1836	Do. do.
232	8	W. H. Cummings.....	do.....	do.....	Do. do.
233	9	William P. Jones.....	do.....	do.....	Do. do.
234	10	W. H. Churchill.....	do.....	do.....	Do. do.
235	11	D. S. Irwin.....	do.....	do.....	
236	12	Theo. M. V. Kennedy.....	do.....	March, 1834	

Statement showing "what number of cadets appointed within two years past were, in subsequent examination, rejected, or have resigned from any cause; and from what State were such cadets appointed; and by what new appointments, and from what States, were the vacancies filled?"

Cadets appointed within two years; rejected, resigned, &c.				New appointments.	
No.	Names.	Rejected, resigned, &c.	States.	Names.	States.
1	S. D. Carpenter.....	Resigned.....	Maine.....	S. D. Carpenter.....	Maine.
2	T. O. Holm.....	Declined.....	do.....	J. D. O. Hill.....	do.
3	J. D. C. Hill.....	Dismissed.....	do.....	G. Stevens.....	do.
4	G. Stephens.....	Declined.....	do.....	J. H. Williams.....	do.
5	J. H. Williams.....	Resigned.....	do.....		
1	S. B. Howe.....	Declined.....	Massachusetts.....		
2	James L. Nye.....	Rejected.....	do.....		
1	Israel Richardson.....	Resigned.....	Vermont.....	Israel Richardson.....	Vermont.
1	T. E. Brook.....	Dismissed.....	New York.....		
2	E. H. Gridly.....	Resigned.....	do.....		
3	E. Vandeventer.....	Declined.....	do.....		
4	R. D. Frothingham.....	Dismissed.....	do.....		
5	John Whiting.....	Declined.....	do.....	B. F. Dey.....	New York.
6	B. F. Dey.....	Rejected.....	do.....	Henry Whiting.....	do.
7	G. W. Suffern.....	Declined.....	do.....	Geo. W. Suffern.....	do.
8	John Dickson.....	Resigned.....	do.....	O. Winship.....	do.
9	E. A. Dunscomb.....	do.....	do.....		
10	J. E. Strong.....	Declined.....	do.....		
11	George Reab.....	Dismissed.....	do.....		
1	Wm. Brindle.....	Resigned.....	Pennsylvania.....	W. Brindle.....	Pennsylvania.
2	D. C. Bonham.....	do.....	do.....	D. C. Bonham.....	do.
3	Wm. Mealy.....	Rejected.....	do.....	J. M. Ramsay.....	do.
4	A. J. Porter.....	Resigned.....	do.....	A. J. Porter.....	do.
5	H. Moses.....	Declined.....	do.....		
6	J. H. Cassidy.....	do.....	do.....		
7	S. P. Collins.....	Resigned.....	do.....		
1	R. M. Jones.....	do.....	Maryland.....		
1	George W. Washington.....	do.....	Virginia.....	B. S. Ewell.....	Virginia.
2	T. M. Smyth.....	Dismissed.....	do.....		
3	Jacob F. Lewis.....	Declined.....	do.....		
1	Joshua Pinder.....	Dismissed.....	North Carolina.....		
1	Wm. H. Wesner.....	do.....	South Carolina.....		
2	H. Rose.....	Resigned.....	do.....	H. Rose.....	South Carolina.
3	— Snipes.....	Declined.....	do.....		
4	A. P. Cunningham.....	do.....	do.....		
5	H. Rose.....	Resigned.....	do.....		
6	John L. Turner.....	Declined.....	do.....		
7	Paul Pritchard.....	Dismissed.....	do.....		
1	J. M. Bolling.....	Declined.....	Georgia.....		
2	F. H. Sandford.....	do.....	do.....		
3	B. S. McWhorter.....	do.....	do.....		
4	J. W. King.....	do.....	do.....		
1	R. H. Tobin.....	Rejected.....	Kentucky.....	M. T. Chrisman.....	Kentucky.
2	M. T. Chrisman.....	Declined.....	do.....		
3	W. Berry.....	do.....	do.....	Chas. Wickliffe.....	do.
4	C. H. Tyler.....	do.....	do.....		
5	B. Fallin.....	Resigned.....	do.....		
6	W. Kouns.....	do.....	do.....		

H 4.—STATEMENT—Continued.

Cadets appointed within two years; rejected, resigned, &c.				New appointments.	
No.	Names.	Rejected, resigned, &c.	States.	Names.	States.
1	John O McLamore	Resigned	Tennessee	A. Hayes	Tennessee.
2	Ed. Douglass	Died	do	W. A. Blythe	do.
3	James A. Lea	Declined	do	John P. McCoun	do.
4	James A. Guest	do	do	W. Elliott	do.
5	A. M. Green	do	do		
6	W. A. Blythe	do	do	Jos. K. Parrish	do.
1	W. P. Miller	Resigned	Ohio	W. S. Belt	Ohio.
2	W. S. Belt	do	do		
3	J. E. Eberlien	Rejected	do	John McNutt	do.
4	W. S. Cameron	Declined	do	John N. Caldwell	do.
5	G. Parrish	do	do		
6	E. Norton	do	do		
7	Pitt Cooke	do	do		
8	R. W. Smith	do	do		
9	Hiram Smith	do	do		
1	John S. Webb	Dismissed	Louisiana	P. O. Hebert	Louisiana.
2	J. Beall	Declined	do		
1	A. J. Coffee	Resigned	Alabama		
2	E. H. Nelson	Declined	do		
3	G. W. Martin	Dismissed	do		
1	J. P. Cabiness	Rejected	Illinois		
2	W. J. Linn	Declined	do	W. J. Lien	Illinois.
3	W. J. Linn	Dismissed	do		
4	E. K. Kane	Died	do		
5	H. A. Clemison	Declined	Illinois		
1	J. A. Griffith	do	Missouri		
1	C. A. Cunningham	Rejected	Arkansas		
1	T. W. Macomb	Declined	Florida	H. D. Wallen	Florida.
1	Wm. Bronaugh	Resigned	District of Columbia.		
2	Thomas Donoho	Rejected	do		
1	Theo. H. Porter	Dismissed	do		

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, Washington, January 1, 1837.

Recapitulation of the foregoing statement.

States selected from.	Number appointed in 1835 and 1836.	Number declined.	Number rejected.	Number resigned.	Number dismissed.	Number died within two years.	In the academy January 1, 1837.
Maine	12	3		2	1		7
New Hampshire	5				1		6
Massachusetts	8	1	1	2	1		12
Rhode Island	3						3
Connecticut	3			1			6
Vermont	4			1			6
New York	31	4	1	6	4		32
New Jersey	5				1		8
Pennsylvania	22	2	1	7	1		25
Delaware				1			3
Maryland	4			2	3		9
Virginia	12	1		5	1	1	18
North Carolina	9			1	5		11
South Carolina	10	4		2	4		4
Georgia	9	4		2	2		7
Kentucky	10	3	1	4			8
Tennessee	16	4		3	2	1	14
Ohio	20	7	1	3	1		13
Louisiana	4	1			1		4
Alabama	4	2		4	2		3
Indiana	6	3			1		5
Illinois	5	2	1		2	1	2
Mississippi	1				1		3
Missouri	1	1		1			2
Arkansas	1		1				
Michigan							2
Florida	3	2			1		1
District of Columbia	7		1	1			10
Sons of officers of the army and navy	14	5		1	2		12
	229	49	8	49	37	3	236

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, Washington, January 1, 1837.

I 1.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, January 2, 1836.*

SIR: In obedience to your instructions, I herewith submit a statement of the officers of the army whose resignations have been accepted in the years 1835 and 1836; specifying those who are graduates of the Military Academy, with the date of graduating, or their first appointment in the army, and the designation of State or Territory from whence appointed as cadets.

By this statement it will be seen that the number of resignations in 1835 is forty-one; in 1836, one hundred and seventeen; in both years, one hundred and fifty-eight; of which number two are colonels, one lieutenant colonel, twenty-seven captains, one hundred and nineteen subalterns, two paymasters, one surgeon, and six assistant surgeons.

Of the whole number of officers (one hundred and fifty-eight) who have resigned in 1836, thirty-two were appointed from civil life and the remainder from the Military Academy.

Respectfully submitted.

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

Hon. B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War.*

I 2.

List of officers of the army whose resignations have been accepted in the years 1835 and 1836 respectively, with the date of each resignation, specifying those who are graduates of the Military Academy, with the dates of graduating or their first appointment in the army, and the designation of States or Territories from whence appointed as cadets.

No.	Names.	Rank and regiment.	Date of commission.	Date of resignation.	Graduates of the Military Academy, and date of graduating.	State appointed from as cadets.
1	Roger Jones	Lieutenant colonel 4th artillery ..	Nov. 17, 1834	April 6, 1835	
2	Jesse Bean	Captain 1st dragoons ..	Aug. 15, 1833	May 31, 1835	
3	Henry Whiting	Captain 1st artillery	Mar. 3, 1817	Oct. 1, 1835	
4	Joshua Howard do	Mar. 6, 1834	Dec. 31, 1835	
5	Henry H. Loring	Captain 3d infantry	July 15, 1831	Oct. 31, 1835	July 24, 1818	Massachusetts.
6	Truman Cross	Captain 7th infantry	Sept. 27, 1819	May 4, 1835	
7	N. G. Wilkinson do	July 31, 1824	June 1, 1835	
8	James L. Dawson do	April 30, 1833	Dec. 31, 1835	
9	Jefferson Davis	First lieutenant 1st dragoons	Mar. 4, 1833	June 30, 1835	July 1, 1828	Mississippi.
10	Hugh W. Mercer	First lieutenant 2d artillery	Oct. 10, 1834	April 30, 1835 do	Virginia.
11	Z. J. D. Kinsley	First lieutenant 3d artillery	Aug. 30, 1825	Dec. 1, 1835	July 1, 1819	New York.
12	George W. Long	First lieutenant 4th artillery	Feb. 2, 1832	Dec. 31, 1835	July 1, 1824	New Hampshire.
13	Horatio A. Wilson do	May 30, 1832	Jan. 31, 1835 do	New York.
14	Nathaniel S. Harris	First lieutenant 3d infantry	Sept. 11, 1829	May 31, 1835	July 1, 1825	New Jersey.
15	Anthony Drane	First lieutenant 5th infantry	Aug. 20, 1828	Nov. 25, 1835	July 1, 1824	Maryland.
16	John L. Watson	Second lieutenant 1st dragoons	Sept. 19, 1833	June 30, 1835	
17	David B. Harris	Second lieutenant 1st artillery	Mar. 6, 1834	Aug. 31, 1835	July 1, 1833	Virginia.
18	Henry E. Prentiss	Second lieutenant 2d artillery	July 1, 1831	Sept. 10, 1835	July 1, 1831	Maine.
19	Joseph C. Vance do	Dec. 31, 1833	Oct. 31, 1835	July 1, 1832	Ohio.
20	T. F. J. Wilkinson do	April 30, 1834	Feb. 28, 1835 do	Alabama.
21	William Bryant	Second lieutenant 3d artillery	July 1, 1826	Aug. 31, 1835	July 1, 1826	Virginia.
22	John Child do	July 1, 1827	Dec. 31, 1835	July 1, 1827	Massachusetts.
23	N. B. Buford do do do do	Kentucky.
24	Edward R. Williams	Second lieutenant 1st infantry	July 1, 1829	June 30, 1835	July 1, 1829	Connecticut.
25	Stephen B. Legate	Second lieutenant 3d infantry	Oct. 31, 1833	Aug. 31, 1835	July 1, 1830	New York.
26	Frederick Wilkinson	Second lieutenant 4th infantry	Feb. 18, 1834	Dec. 31, 1835	July 1, 1831	Do.
27	Moses Scott	Second lieutenant 5th infantry	Oct. 1, 1833	Aug. 31, 1835 do	New Jersey.
28	A. G. Edwards	Brevet 2d lieutenant 1st dragoons ..	July 1, 1832	May 2, 1835	July 1, 1832	Illinois.
29	Jones M. Withers do	July 1, 1835	Dec. 5, 1835	July 1, 1835	Alabama.
30	James N. Ellis	Brevet 2d lieutenant 1st artillery do	Oct. 19, 1835 do	Virginia.
31	Richard Henderson	Brevet 2d lieutenant 2d artillery do	Nov. 30, 1835 do	Tennessee.
32	W. S. Brown	Brevet 2d lieutenant 3d artillery do	Dec. 31, 1835 do	New York.
33	Herman Haupt	Brevet 2d lieutenant 3d infantry do	Sept. 30, 1835 do	Pennsylvania.
34	Eustace Robinson	Brevet 2d lieutenant 4th infantry ..	July 1, 1834	June 11, 1835	July 1, 1834	Virginia.
35	Goode Bryan	Brevet 2d lieutenant 5th infantry do	April 30, 1835 do	Georgia.
36	Henry M. Naglee do	July 1, 1835	Dec. 31, 1835	July 1, 1835	Pennsylvania.
37	Lucius Bradbury	Brevet 2d lieutenant 7th infantry do	Oct. 1, 1835 do	Maine.
38	Thomas S. Bryant	Assistant surgeon	Oct. 5, 1825	Dec. 31, 1835	
39	James B. Sullivan do	May 5, 1829 do	
40	Benjamin R. Hogan do	July 13, 1832	April 30, 1835	
41	Lucius O'Erien do do	Dec. 31, 1835	
1	Henry Dodge	Colonel 1st dragoons	Mar. 4, 1833	July 4, 1836	
2	Duncan L. Clinch	Colonel 4th infantry	April 20, 1819	Sept. 21, 1836	
3	Andrew Talcott	Captain corps of engineers	Dec. 23, 1830 do	July 24, 1818	Connecticut.
4	Robert P. Parrott	Captain of ordnance	Jan. 13, 1836	Oct. 31, 1836	July 1, 1824	New Hampshire.
5	David Hunter	Captain 1st dragoons	Mar. 4, 1833	July 4, 1836	July 1, 1822	District of Columbia.
6	Charles Dimmock	Captain 1st artillery	Aug. 6, 1836	Sept. 30, 1836	July 1, 1821	Massachusetts.
	Thomas C. Legate	Captain 2d artillery	May 13, 1829	Dec. 31, 1836	

I 2.—List of officers of the army whose resignations have been accepted, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names.	Rank and regiment.	Date of commission.	Date of resignation.	Graduates of the Military Academy, and date of graduating.	State appointed from as cadets.
8	Felix Ansart.....	Captain 3d artillery.....	Nov. 28, 1819	Aug. 31, 1836	
9	Charles M. Thruston.....	do.....	Feb. 17, 1827do.....	July 21, 1814	District of Columbia.
10	Charles Ward.....	Captain 4th artillery.....	June 27, 1836do.....	
11	Henry A. Thompson.....	do.....	Aug. 31, 1836	Oct. 15, 1836	July 1, 1819	Maryland.
12	William M. Boyce.....	Captain 1st infantry.....	Oct. 25, 1835	Nov. 14, 1836	July 1, 1822	Pennsylvania.
13	Seth M. Johnson.....	Captain 2d infantry.....	Sept. 13, 1831	June 28, 1836	
14	James Dean.....	Captain 3d infantry.....	Oct. 4, 1827	Nov. 15, 1836	
15	William Martin.....	Captain 4th infantry.....	Dec. 28, 1835	Sept. 23, 1836	
16	Thomas Hunt.....	Captain 5th infantry.....	Sept. 27, 1824	Oct. 31, 1836	
17	Joseph M. Baxley.....	do.....	Mar. 4, 1833	April 1, 1836	
18	William E. Cruger.....	do.....	Oct. 1, 1833	Oct. 31, 1836	
19	Zalmon C. Palmer.....	Captain 6th infantry.....	Feb. 15, 1826	Dec. 31, 1836	
20	Henry Smith.....	do.....	July 7, 1826	Nov. 16, 1836	March 2, 1815	New York.
21	Jason Rogers.....	do.....	Aug. 30, 1828	July 31, 1836	July 1, 1821	Do.
22	Nicholas Tillinghast.....	Captain 7th infantry.....	July 1, 1835do.....	July 1, 1824	Massachusetts.
23	Thompson S. Brown.....	First lieutenant corps of engineers.	May 15, 1835	Oct. 31, 1836	July 1, 1825	New York.
24	Lancaster P. Lupton.....	First lieutenant 1st dragoons.....	Mar. 4, 1833	Mar. 31, 1836	July 1, 1829	Do.
25	Charles F. M. Noland.....	do.....do.....	Sept. 19, 1833	Mar. 1, 1836	
26	J. W. Shaumburg.....	do.....do.....	Mar. 1, 1836	July 1, 1836	
27	Gaines P. Kingsbury.....	do.....do.....	July 4, 1836	Oct. 15, 1836	July 1, 1832	Ohio.
28	John Farley.....	First lieutenant 1st artillery.....	Aug. 1, 1832	Feb. 29, 1836	July 1, 1823	Michigan Territory.
29	John McClellan.....	do.....do.....	Sept. 30, 1833	Nov. 19, 1836	July 1, 1826	Pennsylvania.
30	R. C. Tilghman.....	do.....do.....	Oct. 23, 1834	Mar. 31, 1836	July 1, 1828	Maryland.
31	Edmund French.....	do.....do.....	Feb. 25, 1835	Viny 3, 1836do.....	Connecticut.
32	John W. Barry.....	do.....do.....	Dec. 31, 1835	Nov. 30, 1836	July 1, 1830	Kentucky.
33	Henry W. Fitzhugh.....	First lieutenant 2d artillery.....	April 20, 1818	June 28, 1836	July 21, 1814	District of Columbia.
34	Francis L. Dancy.....	do.....do.....	Nov. 3, 1832	Sept. 11, 1836	July 1, 1826	North Carolina.
35	Joseph L. Locke.....	do.....do.....	Nov. 17, 1831	Aug. 16, 1836	July 1, 1828	Maine.
36	A. A. Humphreys.....	do.....do.....	Aug. 16, 1836	Sept. 30, 1836	July 1, 1831	Pennsylvania.
37	George W. Ward.....	do.....do.....	Sept. 11, 1836	Dec. 31, 1836	July 1, 1832	Massachusetts.
38	Robert P. Smith.....	do.....do.....	Sept. 30, 1836do.....do.....	Mississippi.
39	Francis N. Barbarin.....	First lieutenant 3d artillery.....	Feb. 28, 1827	Sept. 16, 1836	July 1, 1820	New York.
40	George S. Greene.....	do.....do.....	May 31, 1829	June 30, 1836	July 1, 1823	Rhode Island.
41	Edward B. White.....	do.....do.....	Dec. 1, 1835	Aug. 13, 1836	July 1, 1826	South Carolina.
42	W. R. McKee.....	do.....do.....	Aug. 13, 1836	Sept. 15, 1836	July 1, 1829	Kentucky.
43	Horace Bliss.....	First lieutenant 4th artillery.....	Dec. 31, 1827	June 10, 1836	July 1, 1822	New Hampshire.
44	Alfred Beckley.....	do.....do.....	July 31, 1831	Oct. 24, 1836	July 1, 1823	Kentucky.
45	William F. Hopkins.....	do.....do.....	Sept. 14, 1834	June 30, 1836	July 1, 1825	Connecticut.
46	Thomas J. Crain.....	do.....do.....	April 10, 1835	Sept. 16, 1836	July 1, 1826	New Hampshire.
47	M. C. Ewing.....	do.....do.....	Dec. 31, 1835	Aug. 15, 1836do.....	Pennsylvania.
48	James Barnes.....	do.....do.....	June 27, 1836	July 31, 1836	July 1, 1829	Massachusetts.
49	T. B. W. Stockton.....	First lieutenant 1st infantry.....	Mar. 4, 1833	Nov. 20, 1836	July 1, 1827	New York.
50	Jonathan K. Greenough.....	do.....do.....	Dec. 10, 1834	Dec. 17, 1836do.....	Massachusetts.
51	Joseph S. Gallagher.....	First lieutenant 2d infantry.....	Feb. 2, 1830	June 28, 1836	
52	William Bloodgood.....	do.....do.....	Dec. 28, 1832	Dec. 31, 1836	July 1, 1824	New York.
53	Richard W. Colcock.....	First lieutenant 3d infantry.....	May 31, 1835	April 1, 1836	July 1, 1826	South Carolina.
54	Elias Phillips.....	First lieutenant 4th infantry.....	Mar. 30, 1831	Jan. 31, 1836	July 1, 1823	New Jersey.
55	Francis D. Newcomb.....	do.....do.....	April 4, 1832	Sept. 30, 1836	July 1, 1824	Massachusetts.
56	Timothy Paige.....	do.....do.....	Mar. 4, 1833	Mar. 16, 1836do.....	New Hampshire.
57	Samuel R. Alston.....	do.....do.....	Nov. 28, 1835	Jan. 31, 1836	July 1, 1825	Massachusetts.
58	Washington Hood.....	do.....do.....	Dec. 28, 1835	Aug. 7, 1836	July 1, 1827	Pennsylvania.
59	John M. Berrien.....	First lieutenant 5th infantry.....	Dec. 31, 1830	Dec. 31, 1836	July 1, 1826	Do.
60	Alexander J. Center.....	do.....do.....	Dec. 31, 1834do.....	July 1, 1827	New York.
61	William W. Mather.....	First lieutenant 7th infantry.....	Dec. 4, 1834	Aug. 31, 1836	July 1, 1828	Connecticut.
62	George W. Cass.....	do.....do.....	Dec. 3, 1835	Oct. 26, 1836	July 1, 1832	Ohio.
63	W. H. C. Bartlett.....	Second lieutenant corps of engineers	July 1, 1826	April 20, 1836	July 1, 1826	Missouri.
64	Roswell Park.....	do.....do.....	July 1, 1831	Sept. 30, 1836	July 1, 1831	New York.
65	Albert M. Lea.....	Second lieutenant 1st dragoons.....	Mar. 4, 1833	May 31, 1836do.....	Tennessee.
66	Lloyd Tilghman.....	do.....do.....	July 4, 1836	Sept. 30, 1836	July 1, 1836	Maryland.
67	George W. Turner.....	Second lieutenant 1st artillery.....	July 1, 1831	June 30, 1836	July 1, 1831	Virginia.
68	W. H. Pettes.....	do.....do.....	Sept. 30, 1833	Sept. 11, 1836	July 1, 1832	Vermont.
69	Lor. Sigreaves.....	do.....do.....do.....	Aug. 31, 1836do.....	Pennsylvania.
70	Francis H. Smith.....	do.....do.....	Nov. 30, 1833	May 1, 1836	July 1, 1833	Virginia.
71	Thomas A. Morris.....	do.....do.....	Feb. 25, 1835	April 13, 1836	July 1, 1834	Indiana.
72	R. T. P. Allen.....	do.....do.....	April 6, 1835	July 31, 1836do.....	Maryland.
73	Arnoldus V. Brumby.....	do.....do.....	Dec. 31, 1835	June 30, 1836	July 1, 1835	North Carolina.
74	M. Churchill.....	do.....do.....	July 1, 1836	Nov. 19, 1836	July 1, 1836	Massachusetts.
75	Alexander P. Crittenden.....	do.....do.....	July 31, 1836	Sept. 30, 1836do.....	Kentucky.
76	Ward B. Burnett.....	Second lieutenant 2d artillery.....	April 1, 1834	July 31, 1836	July 1, 1832	Pennsylvania.
77	William T. Stockton.....	do.....do.....	Dec. 1, 1834	May 31, 1836	July 1, 1834	Do.
78	Charles J. Whiting.....	do.....do.....	Sept. 10, 1835do.....	July 1, 1835	Maine.
79	George M. Legate.....	do.....do.....	Oct. 31, 1835	April 1, 1836do.....	New York.
80	David P. De Witt.....	do.....do.....	July 1, 1836	Oct. 31, 1836	July 1, 1836	Do.
81	George Fetterman.....	Second lieutenant 3d artillery.....	July 1, 1827	May 31, 1836	July 1, 1827	Pennsylvania.
82	Francis Vinton.....	do.....do.....	July 1, 1830	Aug. 31, 1836	July 1, 1830	Rhode Island.
83	John H. Allen.....	do.....do.....	Dec. 28, 1835	June 30, 1836	July 1, 1833	New York.
84	George G. Meade.....	do.....do.....	Dec. 31, 1835	Oct. 26, 1836	July 1, 1835	Pennsylvania.

I 2.—List of officers of the army whose resignations have been accepted, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names.	Rank and regiment.	Date of commission.	Date of resignation.	Graduates of the Military Academy, and date of graduating.	States appointed from as cadets.
85	William B. Wallace	Second lieutenant 3d artillery	July 1, 1836	Sept. 30, 1836	July 1, 1836	New Jersey.
86	Thomas J. Lee	Second lieutenant 4th artillery	July 1, 1830	Aug. 31, 1836	July 1, 1830	District of Columbia.
87	William H. Emory	do do	July 1, 1831	Sept. 30, 1836	July 1, 1831	Maryland.
88	Benjamin S. Ewell	do do	July 1, 1832	do do	July 1, 1832	Virginia.
89	Alfred Brush	do do	Sept. 14, 1834	July 28, 1836	do do	Michigan.
90	James L. Davis	do do	April 10, 1835	Sept. 11, 1836	July 1, 1833	Virginia.
91	William B. Arvin	do do	July 31, 1836	Nov. 30, 1836	July 1, 1836	New Hampshire.
92	Ingham Wood	Second lieutenant 1st infantry	Sept. 30, 1833	Dec. 17, 1836	July 1, 1831	Pennsylvania.
93	Jesse H. Leavenworth	Second lieutenant 2d infantry	July 1, 1830	Oct. 31, 1836	July 1, 1830	Vermont.
94	Jacob Brown	do do	July 21, 1834	July 31, 1836	July 1, 1832	New York.
95	Cary H. Fry	Second lieutenant 3d infantry	Aug. 31, 1835	Oct. 31, 1836	July 1, 1834	Kentucky.
96	John T. Collingsworth	Second lieutenant 5th infantry	July 1, 1830	July 31, 1836	July 1, 1830	Tennessee.
97	Horatio P. Vancleve	do do	Dec. 31, 1834	Sept. 11, 1836	July 1, 1831	New Jersey.
98	Thomas Stockton	do do	Aug. 31, 1835	Oct. 31, 1836	do do	Delaware.
99	Thomas F. Drayton	Second lieutenant 6th infantry	July 1, 1828	Aug. 15, 1836	July 1, 1828	South Carolina.
100	Rufus King	Bvt. second lieut. corps of engineers	July 1, 1833	Sept. 30, 1836	July 1, 1833	New York.
101	John H. Martindale	Bvt. second lieut. 1st dragoons	July 1, 1835	Mar. 10, 1836	July 1, 1835	Do.
102	Henry C. Moorhead	do do	July 1, 1836	Sept. 30, 1836	July 1, 1836	Pennsylvania.
103	Arthur B. Lansing	Bvt. second lieut. 1st artillery	do do	do do	do do	New York.
104	Montgomery Blair	Bvt. second lieut. 2d artillery	July 1, 1835	May 20, 1836	July 1, 1835	Kentucky.
105	Robert M. Renick	Bvt. second lieut. 4th artillery	do do	April 30, 1836	do do	Virginia.
106	William H. Price	Bvt. second lieut. 1st infantry	July 1, 1834	Aug. 31, 1836	July 1, 1834	Pennsylvania.
107	George W. Shaw	do do	July 1, 1835	Oct. 31, 1836	July 1, 1835	Ohio.
108	Richard S. Smith	Bvt. second lieut. 2d infantry	July 1, 1834	Oct. 19, 1836	July 1, 1834	Pennsylvania.
109	John W. Scott	do do	July 1, 1835	Mar. 15, 1836	July 1, 1835	Ohio.
110	Hugh McLeod	Bvt. second lieut. 3d infantry	Sept. 18, 1835	June 30, 1836	Sept. 18, 1835	Georgia.
111	Archibald Campbell	Bvt. second lieut. 6th infantry	July 1, 1835	Sept. 30, 1836	July 1, 1835	New York.
112	Thomas P. Chiffelle	Bvt. second lieut. 7th infantry	July 1, 1836	do do	July 1, 1836	South Carolina.
113	Arthur P. Hayne	Paymaster	July 4, 1836	Oct. 25, 1836	do do	do do
114	Morgan Neville	do do	do do	Oct. 18, 1836	do do	do do
115	Zina Pitcher	Surgeon	July 15, 1832	Dec. 31, 1836	do do	do do
116	William A. Berry	Assistant surgeon	April 25, 1831	Nov. 19, 1836	do do	do do
117	S. Etting Myers	do do	July 13, 1832	Mar. 31, 1836	do do	do do

RECAPITULATION.

RECAPITULATION FOR 1835.							RECAPITULATION FOR 1836.										
	Lieutenant colonels.	Captains.	First lieutenants.	Second lieutenants.	Brevet second lieutenants.	Assistant surgeons.	Total.		Colonels.	Captains.	First lieutenants.	Second lieutenants.	Brevet second lieutenants.	Paymasters.	Surgeons.	Assistant surgeons.	Total.
Officers appointed from civil life	1	6	1	..	4	12	Officers appointed from civil life	2	10	3	2	1	2	20
Officers appointed from the Military Academy	1	7	11	10	29	Officers appointed from the Military Academy	10	37	37	13	97
Aggregate	1	7	7	12	10	4	41	Aggregate	2	20	40	37	13	2	1	2	117

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, Washington, January 2, 1837.

R. JONES, Adjutant General.

K 1.

WAR DEPARTMENT, January 13, 1837.

SIR: In conformity with the intimation in my letter of the 7th instant, I herewith transmit a report of the chief engineer, and the accompanying documents, in answer to the fifth paragraph of your communication of the 28th ultimo. A copy of the reply made to the communication of the academic board, transmitted by the superintendent, is also annexed, as illustrative of the course of the department on the topics embraced in that communication.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

B. F. BUTLER, Secretary of War ad interim.

Hon. F. O. J. SMITH, of the Select Committee on the Military Academy, H. R.

K 2.

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, *Washington, January 11, 1837.*

SIR: You will find herewith a copy of a letter from the superintendent of the Military Academy, together with the communications there referred to, and a copy of the regulations of the institution, furnishing the information asked by *question fifth* of the Hon. F. O. J. Smith's letter of the 28th ultimo, which was in part replied to on the 7th instant.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

C. GRATIOT.

Hon. B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War ad interim.*

K 3.

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY, *West Point, January 5, 1837.*

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 30th ultimo, asking for information necessary to enable the department to reply to question No. 5, proposed by the committee for investigating the affairs of the Military Academy.

The question asks, first, for the changes, if any, that have taken place in the organization of the institution within the last two years; second, for the changes in the "*rules of conducting*," by which it is inferred the committee allude to the internal regulations of the academy; and, lastly, for the changes in the system of instruction within the same time.

To which I beg leave to reply that no changes have been made in the *organization* within the time referred to; and that the only change in the regulations, in addition to those specified in the lithographed order, dated "Adjutant's office, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, May 1, 1836," and appended to the copy of the regulations herewith transmitted, to which I beg leave to refer you, are embraced in a regulation of the Secretary of War, dated June 27, 1836.

It may be proper to state, in reference to this part of the inquiry, that a most important and beneficial change has, within the last year, been introduced in the practice under regulation No. 67. Formerly it was customary to retain at the academy cadets whose demerit on the records of delinquencies exceeded two hundred, till the regular examinations in January and June; whereas, at present, all such cases are at once brought before the academic board, to the end that they may be laid without loss of time before the Department of War. The reasons of this change are detailed in a communication addressed to the Secretary of War by the academic staff, dated on or about the 21st October, 1836, the day on which it was enclosed by me to your department.

The only change in the system of instruction has been the omission of the branch of mineralogy, in consequence of the want of a professor.

I have the honor to be, sir, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

R. E. DE RUSSEY, *Lieut. Col., Supt. Military Academy.*

Brig. Gen. CHAS. GRATIOT, *Chief Engineer of the United States.*

K 4.

JUNE 27, 1836.

The following regulations, in substitution of the 108th paragraph of the Military Academy regulations, is published for the information of all concerned:

Any cadet who shall absent himself from his room at night, between tattoo and reveille, for a longer time than half an hour on any one time, without leave, and shall fail to satisfy a court-martial that he did not absent himself for any immoral purpose; and that he did not, while so absent, go to any house of entertainment, or any other place without the limits prescribed to cadets, shall be dismissed the service, or otherwise punished, at the discretion of a garrison court-martial.

LEWIS CASS.

K 5.

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY, *West Point, New York, October 20, 1836.*

SIR: It is with an unfeigned feeling of regret that the academic board find themselves called upon to request your action on the cases of the accompanying names of cadets, who, for an habitual neglect of their duties, are recommended for dismissal from this institution. In submitting these cases for your decision, the academic board deem it, at the same time, but a proper discharge of their duty to invite your attention to the regulation of the academy under which the recommendation is made, and to lay before you their opinions on its bearing, maturely formed after several years' observation of its effects on the discipline of the corps of cadets.

Previously to the year 1831 a record of all violations of the academy regulations by each cadet was regularly kept, as at present, on a delinquent roll; but no general summary of delinquencies was made until the final examination of the cadet, at which time the delinquent roll entered as one of the elements for determining the rank assigned him in his class before recommending him to the President for a commission in the army. The operation of this system was found to be, that as the consequences resulting from the conduct of the cadet were not immediate, and, at the worst, affected only the rank assigned him in his class, they were by the many totally disregarded, and served but as a slight check on the few. This system, therefore, after a fair trial, was abandoned, as not fully satisfying the end in view; and, in its place, the 67th regulation was submitted by the academic board to the Secretary of War, and received his sanction for the future government of the academy.

This regulation, so far as it has been enforced, has produced very beneficial results on the discipline of the cadets, and, in the opinion of the academic board, would, if strictly adhered to, fully answer the purposes for which it was established. Holding out to all the certainty of prompt punishment for habitual

bad conduct, and removing from the institution those who, if suffered to remain, would by their example prove highly injurious to their more orderly comrades, it is not overrating its importance to say that, without its rigorous enforcement, good order and discipline cannot be maintained.

In connexion with this subject the academic board would also invite your attention, sir, to the 24th and 92d regulations. There is no point on which opinion is more settled in this board than on the indispensable necessity of a strict enforcement also of these regulations; for experience has fully satisfied them that reinstatements of dismissed cadets have but in very few cases proved of benefit to the individuals themselves, whilst, on the mass, the example of such exceptions to the regulations has produced effects the most unfavorable. With the chances of escape from punishment, the temptations to the commission of delinquencies necessarily increase; and it may be safely affirmed that the leniency extended for the safety of one had, in the end, caused the destruction of many, who, without the hope of such escape held up before them, might have persevered in a correct course.

Whatever of benefit the country at large, and the army in particular, may have derived from this institution, this board sincerely express the belief may be traced to its discipline. Whatever tends to preserve this must also tend to multiply and perpetuate those benefits; and, with its prostration, the institution must cease to produce those results that have thus far given it a fair claim on the patronage of the people. The habits and opinions acquired within the walls of the academy will be carried by its pupils into other walks of life. If here insubordination is suffered to creep in, the consequences to the army are inevitable.

Having maturely formed these opinions, after long and careful observation of these regulations on the well-being of the academy, the academic board would respectfully but earnestly urge upon you, sir, the necessity of their rigorous enforcement in all cases.

Most respectfully submitted.

R. E. DE RUSSEY,
Lieut. Colonel, Supt. Military Academy, and President of the Board.
C. BERARD, *Secretary of the Board.*

The Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR.

K 6.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *November 9, 1836.*

SIR: I have had the honor to receive, through the chief engineer, the communication addressed to this department under date of the 20th ultimo, by the academic board, transmitting the names of certain cadets who, for habitual neglect of their duties, were reported for dismissal from the Military Academy, and submitting certain observations in respect to the importance of enforcing the regulation under which that report was made.

You will receive from the chief engineer official notice that the recommendation of the board in regard to two of the cadets named in the report has been carried into effect; and but for the resignations of the other two, transmitted for acceptance in your communication to General Gratiot of the 2d instant, they also would have been dismissed.

The views expressed by the academic board in respect to the importance of adhering to the regulations referred to in their remarks meet my entire concurrence. It is indeed idle to expect that the signal benefits hitherto derived from the Military Academy can be long continued, unless the discipline established for the instruction and government of the cadets be faithfully observed. The connexion of the undersigned with the institution will be short; but whilst it shall endure he wishes it to be fully understood by the cadets that, so far as may depend on him, the regulations will be enforced with strict impartiality and inflexible justice. This resolution is founded not only in convictions of official duty, but on an earnest desire to promote the usefulness and honor of the corps. That all concerned may be duly notified of the course which will hereafter be pursued, you will be pleased to promulgate, in orders, the contents of this paragraph, or so much thereof as you may think proper.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War ad interim.*

Lieut. Col. R. E. DE RUSSEY, Supt of Military Academy, West Point, N. Y.

24TH CONGRESS.]

No. 732.

[2D SESSION.]

ON CLAIM OF CITY OF MOBILE, ALABAMA, FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSE OF EQUIPPING TWO COMPANIES OF MOUNTED VOLUNTEERS FOR PROTECTION AGAINST THE CREEK INDIANS IN 1836

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MARCH 1, 1837.

Mr. ELISHA WHITTLESEY, from the Committee of Claims, to whom was referred a bill from the Senate for the relief of the corporate authorities of the city of Mobile, reported:

That the bill provides "that the Secretary of War be, and he is hereby, directed to cause to be audited the accounts of the corporate authorities of the city of Mobile, for advances of money and expenses incurred in equipping, mounting, and sending to the place of rendezvous, two full companies of mounted men, under a call from the governor of Alabama, at the beginning of the hostilities of the Creek Indians, in the summer of 1836, and the amount or balance found due is hereby directed to be paid out of any moneys in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, as soon as the Secretary of War shall approve the same."

The bill was unaccompanied with a report. The following papers were before the Senate, to wit: the petition of the mayor of Mobile; a copy of a resolution passed by the board of the mayor and aldermen of the city of Mobile on the 15th of December last, authorizing the mayor to memorialize Congress on the subject of this claim; a letter from C. C. Clay, governor of Alabama, dated August 20, 1836, informing the mayor of Mobile he had no money at his disposal to refund the advances made by the corporate authorities of Mobile; and a letter from Benjamin B. Morrell, dated August 20, 1836, addressed to the mayor and aldermen of Mobile, informing them he had seventy-eight horses of theirs, waiting for instructions from them.

It appears, from the memorial signed by G. W. Owens, mayor of the city of Mobile, that at the commencement of hostilities with the Creek Indians, the governor of Alabama called on the county and city of Mobile for two companies of mounted men. The men volunteered, but they were not mounted, nor had they the means of transportation. The danger is represented to be imminent, and to avert it the city authorities voted, as they say, forty-five thousand dollars, which they put into the hands of disbursing officers, and nearly the whole amount, they say, was expended.

They say the horses of one company were received by Captain Harding, an officer of the United States; and those of the other company were received by an officer of the United States at Montgomery, and the company sent as a guard to the emigrating Indians as far as Mobile; that the horses received by Captain Harding were sold at public vendue, as was supposed, on account of the United States; that those received at Montgomery were put at the disposal of the city authorities, and were sold at great sacrifice, and much expense for keeping them.

The expense of the war having been assumed by the general government, the memorial prays a remuneration of the money expended.

The committee addressed a letter to the Secretary of War for information, and they desired him to state:

1. How many men were in each company mentioned.
2. How long said companies were in the service.
3. Whether in paying the men for their services they were allowed a per diem compensation of forty cents a day for the use of their horses.
4. Have any of the horses been sold; if so, how many, and at what gross price, and by whose authority; and has the money for which they were sold been accounted for.
5. Have the corporate authorities of Mobile exhibited any statement showing the manner in which the money advanced by them has been disbursed.

Papers marked A, B, C, and D, and a report from Major Cross, acting quartermaster general, and a report from General Towson, paymaster general, in answer to the inquiries of the committee, are received.

A is a letter from Captain Harding to Major Hunt, dated August 3, 1836, then acting quartermaster general, informing him that the corporate authorities of Mobile had asked remuneration for advances made, and that they had turned the horses over to the United States; seventy of them were in his possession, and he asked for advice as to selling them. B is an answer from T. Cross, then acting quartermaster general, dated August 17, to Captain Harding, disapproving of his having received the horses, and, after calling his attention to the acts of March 19 and May 23, 1836, Major Cross directed him, if he had not disposed of the horses, to return them to the corporation. C is a letter from Captain Harding to Major Cross, dated September 15, 1836, informing him that he had sold the horses on his own responsibility, before the receipt of Major Cross's letter of August 17, and that he would turn over the money to the city authorities. D is a letter from Lieutenant Grayson to the mayor of Mobile, dated August 17, informing him that he had delivered the horses that belonged to Captain Milton's company to Mr. Morrell, subject to the order of said mayor.

The report of Major Cross refers to the above documents, and says "the corporate authorities of Mobile have not exhibited to this office any statement showing the application of the money advanced by the city."

General Towson, in answer to the first three inquiries, reports as follows: As to Captain John Milton's company, supposed to be one of the two companies, to wit:

- "1. There are eighty-six men on the roll, officers included.
- "2. The company was in service from May 28 to July 27, 1836.
- "3. In paying the men for their services, they were paid a per diem of forty cents for the use of their horses."

And as to the 4th and 5th inquiries, he says his office furnishes no information.

The committee do not doubt the good intention of the city authorities in advancing the money mentioned, nor the patriotic spirit that prompted the citizens to volunteer their services in defence of the country.

If an agent asks his principal to refund money he has advanced, he renders his account, and shows how he has invested it. An adherence to that rule is necessary to protect the rights of the United States in conducting military operations, when the States and corporations voluntarily advance money, and put it into the hands of their own officers to disburse.

It is said that the money was advanced by the city of Mobile to fit out two companies to defend the inhabitants in that section of the country against the hostile Creek Indians, and that it was so expended. There is no evidence before the committee to prove how the money has been disbursed. If the money had been paid into the hands of a disbursing officer of the United States authorized to receive it, the city authorities would not be holden to account for its disbursement, but it is different where they appoint an officer to disburse it.

So far as horses were purchased, their own citizens have had the benefit of the purchase. The law of the United States pays a stipulated price to mounted volunteers where they furnish their own horses. In this case, forty cents per day has been paid to the volunteers from Mobile for the use of horses they received from the city authorities; and after such payment the United States are asked to refund to the same authorities the money they expended in purchasing horses, for the daily use of which their citizens have been paid. If the city authorities intended to look to the United States to refund the money advanced, they should have reported their proceeding to the War Department. If the horses were the property of the United States, and the parties had so considered, the volunteers would only have been paid for their own services, but now they have been paid forty cents for the use of each horse daily; and when the United States did not furnish forage in kind, a further allowance of twenty-five cents per day has been made, making a daily allowance of sixty-five cents to each volunteer when he did not draw for forage.

How the residue of the money was expended is not known. The committee do not say the money should not be refunded, but they express the opinion that the memorialists should show how the money was disbursed before the United States make any provision for settling the claim. Until then, the committee think no relief should be granted, and they recommend the said bill do not pass.

[24TH CONGRESS.]

No. 733.

[2D SESSION.]

STATEMENT OF THE NUMBER OF COMPANY OFFICERS OF THE ARMY IN SERVICE AGAINST THE CREEK AND SEMINOLE INDIANS IN FLORIDA IN 1836; THE NUMBER AND RANK OF THOSE WHO RESIGNED; THE NUMBER OF COMPANIES OF THE SEVERAL ARMS IN SERVICE THERE DURING THAT YEAR.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MARCH 2, 1837.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *March 1, 1837.*

SIR: In answer to two of the resolutions of the House of Representatives of the 13th ultimo, one calling for information respecting the officers of the army who resigned during the year 1836, and the other respecting "the number of companies of the different corps of the army that have been operating during the past year against the Creeks and Seminoles," and the commissioned officers performing military duty with them, I have the honor to transmit herewith a report and tabular statements prepared by the adjutant general of the army.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War ad interim*HON. JAMES K. POLK, *Speaker of the House of Representatives.*ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, February 28, 1837.*

SIR: In obedience to your instructions, I herewith respectfully submit table A, being a statement of the number of captains and subalterns of the army whose resignations have been tendered and accepted during the year 1836. This table contains such information relative thereto as the records of this office can furnish, and is rendered in such form as is supposed best to meet the requirements of the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 13th of February.

It will be seen by this table that the resignations of 19 captains, 35 first lieutenants, 36 second lieutenants, and 13 brevet second lieutenants—in all, 103 captains and subalterns—have been tendered and accepted in 1836. It appears that 27 officers were on leave of absence; that 52 were serving with the army; 14 employed on civil duties under the orders of the chiefs of the engineer department and topographical engineers; and that 16 sent in their resignations after the orders were issued to join their regiments, and 5 others soon after complying with such orders. It will also be seen that 12 lieutenants had never joined their regiments, of whom, however, 8 were of the graduating class of 1836.

In further obedience to your instructions, I also herewith respectfully submit table B, being statements (Nos. 1 and 2) showing the number of companies of the regular army, and the number of officers on duty with them, which have been operating during the year 1836 against the Seminole Indians in Florida, and the Creeks in Georgia and Alabama, at the several dates specified therein.

The remarks annexed to statements Nos. 1 and 2 of this table (B) explain, in some degree, the cause of so many captains and subalterns being absent from their companies, and show that a portion of the officers so separated were on important military duty as staff officers, or acting staff officers, or acting field officers, on service with troops in the field. But I deem it proper respectfully to remark on this occasion that many officers were absent and employed upon service which had but little relation to the army. Official reports from commanders in the field, and on various occasions, show the great deficiency in the complement of company officers for service in the field during the military operations of the last year; and as illustrative of the actual wants of the service, I make the following extract from the official report of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Pierce, dated "Fort Heileman, Gary's Ferry, September 13, 1836," to wit:

"I cannot permit the express to depart without stating to you the miserable, deplorable situation of the regular troops in the Territory, as regards their efficient action in the field. There are here 11 companies of artillery; the whole present a fighting force of 110 men; and when we are entitled to 55 officers, we have here only *six* for company duty." The colonel of the 1st regiment of artillery reports, February 2, 1837, that "there are only seven company officers present for duty with the *nine* companies, (of the regiment,) and that not one of the officers attached to companies C, D, and I are *present* with any of those companies. Hence the delay and difficulty in procuring the requisite reports and returns," &c. These companies are now serving in the campaign against the Seminole Indians.

These and other official reports from commanding officers, which might be cited relative to the state of the service in the field, are now respectfully referred to, with no other view than in the hope that the competent authority may, at a proper time, direct such measures to be taken as will effectually prevent a recurrence of the inconvenience so injuriously felt in the army relative to the want of officers for *duty with their companies*, and which have been so frequently mentioned by commanders in the field and elsewhere.

Respectfully submitted.

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*HON. B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War ad interim.*

A.—Statement showing the number of captains and subalterns of the army who have tendered their resignations during the year 1836; how and where each was employed at the time of resigning; the dates of acceptance thereof; also, specifying those who may have resigned on receiving orders to join their respective companies and stations, or immediately after complying with the order; also, the time which each officer, so resigned, may have served with his company or regiment during the five years ending December 31, 1836, according to the returns in the Adjutant General's office.

No.	Rank and names.	Regiment or corps.	Where last employed.	On what business or duty engaged at the time of resignation, &c.	Date of acceptance of resignation.	Period of service with his corps, company, or regiment, during the five years ending December 31, 1836.	Remarks.
1	Captain A. Talcott.....	Corps of engineers.	Albany	Hudson River improvement	Sept. 21, 1836	All the time	
2	Captain R. P. Parrott.....	Ordnance	Creek Nation.....	With the army.....	Oct. 31, 1836	1 year 8 months.....	When lieutenant of artillery, and previous to his appointment as captain in the ordnance.
3	Captain D. Hunter	1st dragoons		Leave of absence.....	July 4, 1836	3 years	Part of the period, while in the second regiment of infantry.
4	Captain C. Dimmock.....	1st artillery.....	Fort Monroe.....	Assistant quartermaster	Sept. 30, 1836	No period, being in staff.....	Resigned, under orders to join his company in Florida, on being promoted.
5	Captain T. C. Legate	2d artillery	Galena	Superintending lead mines.....	Dec. 31, 1836	No period	Resigned under orders to join his company in Florida.
6	Captain F. Ansart.....	3d artillery	Creek Nation.....	With the army.....	Aug. 31, 1836	Whole period.....	
7	Captain C. M. Thruston.....	do.....	Florida	do.....	do.....	3 years 7 months.....	
8	Captain C. Ward.....	4th artillery.....	Creek Nation.....	do.....	do.....	2 years 2 months.....	Resigned soon after being relieved from ordnance duty, and joining his company in the Creek nation.
9	Captain H. A. Thompson.....	do.....	Fort McHenry.....	Acting adjutant 4th artillery.....	Oct. 15, 1836	Whole period	
10	Captain Wm. M. Boyce	1st infantry		Leave of absence.....	Nov. 14, 1836	7 months	Having been on recruiting service and topographical duty.
11	Captain I. Dean	3d infantry	Fort Towson	With his company	Nov. 15, 1836	4 years 2 months.....	
12	Captain W. Martin	4th infantry	Lewistown.....	Recruiting	Sept. 23, 1836	3 years 6 months.....	
13	Captain P. Hunt	5th infantry		Leave of absence.....	Oct. 31, 1836	No period.....	Having been assistant to the commissary general of subsistence.
14	Captain J. M. Baxley	do.....	Fort Dearborn	With his company	April 1, 1836	2 years 11 months.....	
15	Captain W. E. Cruger.....	do.....	Rochester.....	Recruiting.....	Oct. 31, 1836	2 years 7 months.....	
16	Captain Z. C. Palmer	6th infantry		Leave of absence	Dec. 31, 1836	2 years 11 months.....	
17	Captain H. Smith	do.....	Monroe, Michigan.....	Engineer duty.....	Nov. 16, 1836	9 months	Resigned under orders to join his company.
18	Captain J. Rogers.....	do.....	Camp Sabine	With his company.....	July 31, 1836	2 years 2 months.....	
19	Captain N. Tillinghast.....	7th infantry	Fort Gibson.....	do.....	do.....	7 months	Having served at the Military Academy.
1	First Lieut. T. S. Brown	Corps of engineers.	Lake Erie.....	Harbor improvement.....	Oct. 31, 1836	All the time	
2	First Lieut. L. P. Lupton	1st dragoons	Fort Leavenworth	With his company	Mar. 31, 1836	3 years 6 months.....	Part of the period while in the third infantry.
3	First Lieut. F. M. Noland	do.....		Absent, with leave, sick.	Mar. 1, 1836	No period	
4	First Lieut. J. W. Shaumburg.....	do.....	Fort Des Moines.....	With troops.....	July 31, 1836	7 months	
5	First Lieut. G. P. Kingsbury	do.....		Leave of absence.....	Oct. 15, 1836	2 years 7 months.....	
6	First Lieut. J. McClellan.....	1st artillery.....	Creek Nation.....	With the army.....	Nov. 19, 1836	4 years 7 months.....	
7	First Lieut. E. French.....	do.....		Leave of absence.....	May 3, 1836	2 years 3 months.....	
8	First Lieut. J. W. Barry	do.....	Newport, Kentucky.....	Assistant quartermaster	Nov. 30, 1836	1 year 7 months.....	Resigned under orders to join his post in Florida, having recently served in the Indian department.
9	First Lieut. H. W. Fitzhugh.....	2d artillery		Leave of absence.....	June 28, 1836	No period	Having been in the staff.
10	First Lieut. F. L. Dancy.....	do.....	Florida	With the army.....	Sept. 11, 1836	2 years 10 months.....	
11	First Lieut. J. L. Locke	do.....	do.....	do.....	Aug. 16, 1836	2 years 3 months.....	
12	First Lieut. A. A. Humphreys	do.....	do.....	do.....	Sept. 30, 1836	2 years 10 months.....	
13	First Lieut. G. W. Ward.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	Dec. 31, 1836	10 months	
14	First Lieut. R. P. Smith.....	do.....	West Point.....	Military Academy.....	do.....	2 years 8 months.....	
15	First Lieut. F. N. Barbarin.....	3d artillery.....	Watertown arsenal, Mass.....	Ordnance duty	Sept. 16, 1836	1 year 11 months.....	

A.—Statement showing the number of captains and subalterns in the army, &c.—Continued.

No.	Rank and names.	Regiment or corps.	Where last employed.	On what business or duty engaged at the time of resignation, &c.	Date of acceptance of resignation.	Period of service with his corps, company, or regiment, during the five years ending December 31, 1836.	Remarks.
16	First Lieutenant E. B. White.....	3d artillery.....	Knoxville, Tennessee.....	Topographical duty.....	Aug. 13, 1836	6 months.....	On survey for Charleston and Cincinnati railroad. Resigned under orders to join his company.
17	First Lieutenant W. R. McKee.....	do.....	Creek nation.....	With the army.....	Sept. 15, 1836	1 year 5 months.....	Resigned soon after complying with order to join his company in the Creek nation, having been recently on engineer duty.
18	First Lieutenant H. Bliss.....	4th artillery.....	Leave of absence.....	June 10, 1836	10 months.....	Having been on engineer duty on Cumberland road.
19	First Lieutenant A. Beckley.....	do.....	Fort Hamilton.....	In charge of property.....	Oct. 24, 1836	1 year 8 months.....	Resigned under orders to join his company in the Creek nation.
20	First Lieutenant W. F. Hopkins.....	do.....	do.....	Leave of absence.....	June 30, 1836	No period.....	Do. do. do.
21	First Lieutenant T. J. Cram.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	Sept. 16, 1836	3 months.....	Having served previously at the Military Academy.
22	First Lieutenant M. C. Ewing.....	do.....	Florida.....	With the army.....	Aug. 15, 1836	A few days.....	Resigned soon after repairing to Florida, having been previously employed on the Potomac aqueduct.
23	First Lieutenant J. Burnes.....	do.....	West Point.....	Military Academy.....	July 31, 1836	1 year 9½ months.....
24	First Lieutenant T. B. W. Stockton.....	1st infantry.....	Michigan City.....	Topographical duty.....	Nov. 30, 1836	No period.....	Resigned under orders to join his company.
25	First Lieutenant J. K. Greenough.....	do.....	Terre Haute, Indiana.....	Engineer duty.....	Dec. 17, 1836	2 years 4 months.....	Do. do.
26	First Lieutenant Wm. Bloodgood.....	2d infantry.....	Leave of absence.....	Dec. 31, 1836	2 years 2½ months.....
27	First Lieutenant R. W. Colcock.....	3d infantry.....	do.....	April 1, 1836	1 year 9 months.....	Having been previously employed on the Cumberland road.
28	First Lieutenant F. D. Newcomb.....	4th infantry.....	Eastern States.....	Assistant quartermaster.....	Sept. 30, 1836	No period.....	Resigned under orders to join his post in Florida.
29	First Lieutenant T. Paige.....	do.....	Florida.....	With the army.....	Mar. 16, 1836	1 year 5 months.....
30	First Lieutenant S. R. Alston.....	do.....	Creek nation.....	do.....	Jan. 31, 1836	4 years.....
31	First Lieutenant W. Hood.....	do.....	Washington.....	Topographical duty.....	Aug. 7, 1836	No period.....
32	First Lieutenant J. M. Berrien.....	5th infantry.....	Michigan Territory.....	do.....	Dec. 31, 1836	2½ months.....	Resigned under orders to join his company.
33	First Lieutenant A. J. Center.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	8½ months.....	Do. do.
34	First Lieutenant W. W. Mather.....	7th infantry.....	Fort Gibson.....	With his company.....	Aug. 31, 1836	5½ months.....	Having served at the Military Academy.
35	First Lieutenant G. W. Cass.....	do.....	Brownsville.....	Engineer duty.....	Oct. 23, 1836	No period.....	Never joined. Resigned under orders to join his company.
1	Second Lieutenant W. H. C. Bartlett.....	Corps of engineers.....	West Point.....	Military Academy.....	April 20, 1836	Whole period.....
2	Second Lieutenant R. Park.....	do.....	Delaware breakwater.....	Construction.....	Sept. 30, 1836do.....
3	Second Lieutenant A. M. Lea.....	1st dragoons.....	Fort Des Moines.....	With his company.....	May 31, 1836	10 months.....
4	Second Lieutenant L. Tilghman.....	do.....	Leave of absence.....	Sept. 30, 1836	No period.....	Never joined his regiment. Graduate of 1836.
5	Second Lieutenant G. W. Turner.....	1st artillery.....	Florida.....	With the army.....	June 30, 1836	1 year 10 months.....
6	Second Lieutenant W. H. Pettes.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	Sept. 11, 1836	3 years 9 months.....
7	Second Lieutenant L. Sitgreaves.....	do.....	Creek nation.....	do.....	Aug. 31, 1836	3 years 3 months.....
8	Second Lieutenant F. H. Smith.....	do.....	Pikesville.....	Ordnance.....	May 1, 1836	7 months.....
9	Second Lieutenant T. A. Morris.....	do.....	Indiana.....	Engineer duty.....	April 13, 1836	6 months.....	Resigned under orders to join his company in Florida.
10	Second Lieutenant R. T. P. Allen.....	do.....	Florida.....	With the army.....	July 31, 1836	5½ months.....
11	Second Lieutenant A. V. Brumby.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	June 30, 1836	2 months.....
12	Second Lieutenant M. Churchhill.....	do.....	Leave of absence.....	Nov. 19, 1836	No period.....	Never joined his regiment. Graduate of 1836.
13	Second Lieutenant A. P. Crittenden.....	do.....	do.....	Sept. 30, 1836do.....	Do. do.
14	Second Lieutenant W. B. Burnett.....	2d artillery.....	Florida.....	With the army.....	July 31, 1836	2 months.....
15	Second Lieutenant W. T. Stockton.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	May 31, 1836	11 months.....
16	Second Lieutenant C. J. Whiting.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	1 month.....
17	Second Lieutenant G. M. Legate.....	do.....	Leave of absence, sick.....	April 1, 1836do.....

A.—Statement showing the number of captains and subalterns in the army, &c.—Continued.

VOL. VII—152

No.	Rank and names.	Regiment or corps.	Where last employed.	On what business or duty engaged at the time of resignation, &c.	Date of acceptance of resignation.	Period of service with his corps, company, or regiment, during the five years ending December 31, 1836.	Remarks.
18	Second Lieutenant D. P. Dewitt.....	2d artillery	Leave of absence.....	Oct. 31, 1836	No period.....	Never joined his regiment. Graduate of 1836.
19	Second Lieutenant F. Vinton.....	3d artillery	Creek nation	With the army	Aug. 31, 1836	2 years 3 months.....	Resigned soon after complying with orders to join his company in the Creek nation.
20	Second Lieutenant J. H. Allen..... do.....	Fort Wolcott	June 30, 1836	2 years 1 month.....	Resigned under orders to join his company in the Creek nation.
21	Second Lieutenant G. G. Meade..... do.....	Watertown arsenal, Mass.	Ordnance	Oct. 26, 1836	No period.....	Having served temporarily on Indian duty.
22	Second Lieutenant W. B. Wallace..... do.....	Leave of absence.....	Sept. 30, 1836do.....	Never joined his regiment. Graduate of 1836.
23	Second Lieutenant T. J. Lee.....	4th artillery.....	Creek nation	With the army	Aug. 31, 1836	2 years 3 months.....	
24	Second Lieutenant W. H. Emory..... do.....do.....do.....	Sept. 30, 1836	4 years 4 months.....	
25	Second Lieutenant B. S. Ewell..... do.....	West Point.....	Military Academy..... do.....	No period.....	Never joined his regiment, having served at the Military Academy the whole period.
26	Second Lieutenant A. Brush..... do.....	Creek nation	With the army	July 28, 1836	A few days	Resigned soon after complying with orders to join his company in the Creek nation, having been on engineer duty in Michigan.
27	Second Lieutenant J. L. Davis..... do.....do.....do.....	Sept. 11, 1836	2 years 11 months.....	
28	Second Lieutenant W. B. Arwin..... do.....	Floridado.....	Nov. 30, 1836	2 months	
29	Second Lieutenant J. Wood.....	1st infantry.....	Leave of absence.....	Dec. 17, 1836	4 years 5 months.....	
30	Second Lieutenant J. H. Leavenworth..	2d infantry.....	Auburn.....	Recruiting	Oct. 31, 1836	3 years 9 months.....	
31	Second Lieutenant J. Brown..... do.....	Leave of absence.....	July 31, 1836	2 years 7 months.....	
32	Second Lieutenant C. H. Fry.....	3d infantry.....do.....	Oct. 31, 1836	1 year 8 months.....	
33	Second Lieutenant J. T. Collingsworth..	5th infantry.....	Fort Winnebago.....	With his company.....	July 31, 1836	3 years 8 months.....	
34	Second Lieutenant H. P. Vaneleve..... do.....do.....do.....	Sept. 11, 1836	4 years 3 months.....	
35	Second Lieutenant T. Stockton..... do.....	Columbus, Ohio.....	Engineer duty	Oct. 31, 1836	No period.....	Never joined. Resigned under orders to join his company.
36	Second Lieutenant T. F. Drayton.....	6th infantry.....	South Carolina.....	Topographical duty	Aug. 15, 1836do.....	On survey for Charleston and Cincinnati railroad. Resigned on being ordered to join his company.
1	Brevet Second Lieut. R. King.....	Corps engineers ..	Albany	Hudson river improvement.	Sept. 30, 1836	Whole period.....	
2	Brevet Second Lieut. J. H. Martindale ..	1st dragoons	Absent with leave	Mar. 10, 1836	No period.....	
3	Brevet Second Lieut. H. C. Morehead do.....do.....	Sept. 30, 1836do.....	Never joined his regiment. Graduate of 1836.
4	Brevet Second Lieut. A. B. Lansing	1st artillery.....do.....do.....do.....	Do. do.
5	Brevet Second Lieut. M. Blair.....	2d artillery.....	Florida	With the army	May 20, 1836	3 months.....	
6	Brevet Second Lieut. R. M. Renick.....	4th artillery.....	Fort Monroe.....	With his company	April 30, 1836	7 months	
7	Brevet Second Lieut. W. H. Price.....	1st infantry.....	Fort Snelling.....do.....	Aug. 31, 1836	1 year 9 months.....	
8	Brevet Second Lieut. G. W. Shaw..... do.....do.....do.....	Oct. 31, 1836	10 months	
9	Brevet Second Lieut. R. S. Smith.....	2d infantry.....	Leave of absence.....	Oct. 19, 1836	No period.....	Never joined his regiment, having been on topographical duty the whole period.
10	Brevet Second Lieut. J. W. Scott..... do.....	Houlton, Me.....	With his company	Mar. 15, 1836	3 months	
11	Brevet Second Lieut. H. McLeod.....	3d infantry.....	Fort Jesup, La.....do.....	June 30, 1836do.....	
12	Brevet Second Lieut. A. Campbell.....	6th infantry.....	Camp Sabine.....do.....	Sept. 30, 1836	11 months	
13	Brevet Second Lieut. T. P. Cheffelle.....	7th infantry.....	Leave of absence.....do.....	No period.....	Never joined his regiment. Graduate of 1836.

B No. 1.

Detailed statement of the number of companies of the several regiments of the regular army operating against the Seminole Indians in 1836, for the months of March, June, September, and December, showing the number and grade of the commissioned officers serving with them; taken from the muster-rolls and returns on file in the Adjutant General's office.

Regiments.	No of companies.	Captains.	First lieutenants.	Second lieutenants.	Total commissioned officers serving with companies.	Remarks.
First regiment of dragoons.....	1	2	3	Detachment.
First regiment of artillery.....	8	6	5	7	18	
Second regiment of artillery.....	7	5	3	6	14	
Third regiment of artillery.....	3	2	3	1	6	
Fourth regiment of infantry.....	8	2	4	6	
Total.....	26	14	15	18	47	Mar. 31, 1836.
First regiment of dragoons.....	Detachment.
First regiment of artillery.....	8	4	2	2	8	
Second regiment of artillery.....	7	2	1	7	10	
Third regiment of artillery.....	3	3	2	5	
Fourth regiment of infantry.....	8	3	1	6	10	
Total.....	26	9	7	17	33	June 30, 1836.
Second regiment of dragoons.....	1	1	1	Sept. 30, 1836.
First regiment of artillery.....	8	6	3	1	10	
Second regiment of artillery.....	7	3	4	2	9	
Third regiment of artillery.....	4	1	1	2	4	
Fourth regiment of artillery.....	4	3	2	1	6	
Fourth regiment of infantry.....	7	1	1	6	8	
Total.....	31	14	12	12	38	
Second regiment of dragoons.....	1	1	1	2	Dec. 31, 1836.
First regiment of artillery.....	9	5	3	4	12	
Second regiment of artillery.....	7	3	5	8	
Third regiment of artillery.....	8	2	2	5	9	
Fourth regiment of artillery.....	7	5	1	2	8	
Fourth regiment of infantry.....	8	1	1	5	7	
Total.....	40	13	11	22	46	

Remarks.—In the first three months of the year (1836) there were 9 field officers serving with the troops in Florida; in April, May and June, 7; in July, August, and September, 3; in October, November, and December, 7.

It will be seen that in June there were serving with the 26 companies (several of which were much reduced in strength) 9 captains, 7 first lieutenants, and 17 second lieutenants, making 33 officers. The residue, to wit: 17 captains, 37 first lieutenants, 27 second lieutenants, in all 81 company officers, (deducting several vacancies,) were absent from their respective companies, a part of whom were variously employed on the staff in Florida, but the greater number were absent on ordnance, engineer, and topographical duty, Indian service, &c., and several of the number absent were on leave, being sick, &c.

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, Washington, February 27, 1837.

B No. 2.

Detailed statement of the number of companies of the several regiments of the regular army operating against the Creek Indians in 1836, for the month of June, 1836, showing the number and grade of the commissioned officers serving with them.

Regiments.	No. of companies.	Captains.	First lieutenants.	Second lieutenants.	Brevet second lieutenants.	Total commissioned officers serving with companies
First regiment of artillery.....	1	1	1	2
Second regiment of artillery.....	1	1	1
Third regiment of artillery.....	4	4	1	1	6
Fourth regiment of artillery.....	7	6	3	1	3	13
Second regiment of infantry.....	2	2	2	4
Fourth regiment of infantry.....	1	1	1
Total.....	16	13	5	6	3	27

Remarks.—In June there were three field officers serving with the troops in the Creek nation. Of the 13 captains reported to be serving with the 16 companies, 5 were on higher duty as commanders of battalions, acting as inspectors, or performing other important duties as field officers with the troops in the field. The actual number of company officers, acting as such with the 16 companies, were 8 captains, 5 first lieutenants, and 9 second lieutenants, in all, 22; leaving, after deducting two vacancies, 50 who were not on duty with their respective companies. The last remark, respecting absent company officers, in statement No. 1, is applicable also, in some degree, to the state of the service in the Creek country. (Vide remarks of statement No 1 of table B.)

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, February 27, 1837.*

24TH CONGRESS.]

No. 734.

[2D SESSION.]

ON CLAIM OF THE CITY OF AUGUSTA, GEORGIA, FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF MONEY ADVANCED FOR THE EXPENSES OF TWO COMPANIES OF VOLUNTEERS FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF HOSTILITIES OF THE INDIANS IN FLORIDA IN 1836.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MARCH 3, 1837.

Mr. ELISHA WHITTLESEY, from the Committee of Claims, to whom was referred the claim of the city of Augusta, Georgia, reported:

That the claim is for money raised in said city and distributed to the volunteers that went from there to the defence of Florida.

Three thousand one hundred and eighty dollars appear to have been paid to F. M. Robertson, captain commanding the Richmond Blues, on the 21st of October, 1836. In an affidavit made by Captain Robertson he states that he received said sum of money, and that he paid over to the non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates of the "Richmond Blues," under his command, the sum of thirty dollars each; and that said money was, to the best of his knowledge and belief, applied by the said non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, to the purchase of necessaries for the campaign in Florida.

On the 21st day of October, 1836, the said corporative authorities advanced a sum of money (not named in the report) to Captain Samuel Bones, commanding the Richmond Hussars, raised in Augusta for the service in Florida.

The affidavit of Captain Bones is similar to that of Captain Robertson.

There was paid a further sum to Captain Robertson of five hundred dollars, which he states, in his affidavit, was applied for necessaries. It does not appear what necessaries were purchased. If they were such as are allowed to the troops in the service of the United States, or if they come within the construction given by the Secretary of War to the act of May 28, 1836, the claims can be settled at the Treasury Department. If they were not such as were allowed to the troops, nor such as can be paid for under the act mentioned, the committee wish to know what they were, and whether they were of the character that the United States should allow to other troops.

The committee refer to a report made by them at the present session on a bill from the Senate for the relief of the city of Mobile, and to a report made on the claim for the repayment of money advanced by the corporation of Washington and other citizens of Wilkes county, Georgia, to certain volunteers engaged to aid in the suppression of Indian hostilities at the south. For their views on this subject the following resolution is submitted:

Resolved, That the Committee of Claims be discharged from the further consideration of the above claim, and that the same be laid on the table.

24TH CONGRESS.]

No. 735.

[2D SESSION.]

ON CLAIM OF THE CORPORATION OF WASHINGTON, WILKES COUNTY, GEORGIA, FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF ADVANCES MADE FOR THE EQUIPMENT OF CERTAIN VOLUNTEERS EMPLOYED FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF INDIAN HOSTILITIES IN FLORIDA IN 1836.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MARCH 3, 1837.

Mr. ELISHA WHITTLESEY, from the Committee of Claims, to whom was referred the claim for repayment of money advanced by the corporation of Washington and other citizens of Wilkes county, Georgia, to certain volunteers engaged to aid in the suppression of Indian hostilities at the south, reported:

That among the papers is a subscription addressed "to the patriot and philanthropist," and is as follows, to wit:

"A number of men having united with the volunteer cavalry corps which is making up, who are unable to furnish them arms, with horses and accoutrements, this is therefore directed to the liberality of those who cannot unite in this association, and who feel an interest in behalf of their suffering fellow-citizens of Florida. February 22, 1836."

Six hundred and forty-nine dollars were subscribed for the purposes mentioned in the subscription. The committee have been furnished with a copy of the proceedings of the citizens of Washington, on the 1st of March, 1836, relative to the settlement of the accounts of commissioners appointed to disburse the money contributed. It appears that the money raised, by the account of money disbursed, was \$1,198. It appears by said account that the money was disbursed in the purchase of horses, saddles, bridles, blankets, and expenses in marching troops.

There is another paper, signed by Stephen A. Johnston on behalf of the donors, addressed to S. Andrews and others, a committee, by which it appears that at another place (but where it is not stated) there were subscribed, for the benefit of the Florida volunteers, \$408 50.

There is no evidence that the property purchased was put into the military service of the United States. It is remarked, in the paper last mentioned, "that the donors did not anticipate a return of the money." If corporations or persons advance money for the benefit of the United States, and do not pay it into the hands of known and recognized disbursing officers or agents, they should show, before such money is repaid, that it has been expended for the public service. If this rule is not adhered to, it is in vain that Congress prescribe laws fixing the compensation to be paid for services, or the clothing or rations to be allowed to the United States troops or to the militia.

If such corporations or persons pay money into the hands of an officer, or to any person not an agent or disbursing officer of the United States, the United States have no control over such officer or person to call him to an account. If the money is paid to the militia or volunteers, or if articles of clothing are delivered to them and not deducted from their pay, the United States will be obliged to pay the money twice if they are to pay it to the corporations or persons who contribute it. No deduction can be made from the pay of such militia and volunteers unless proper vouchers are taken and the proper officers of the United States are notified of it.

Congress passed a law at the last session, on the 28th of May, 1836, to pay to the people in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama, for all advances and expenditures made in prosecuting the defence against Indian hostilities. The claimants should first endeavor to settle their claims at the treasury, and according to the principles by which other claims are settled. The following resolution is submitted:

Resolved, That the Committee of Claims be discharged from the further consideration of the above claim, and that the same be laid on the table.

24TH CONGRESS.]

No. 736.

[2D SESSION.]

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE OPERATIONS AND EXPENDITURES OF THE NATIONAL ARMORIES IN 1836.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MARCH 3, 1837.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *March 3, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit a report of the colonel of ordnance, which furnishes the information called for by the act of Congress of April 2, 1794, in reference to armories.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War ad interim.*

Hon. JAMES K. POLK, *Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

No. 1.

Statement of the operations of the armory at Springfield during the year 1836.

Dr.

For value of public grounds, buildings, machinery, and fixtures thereto, and of ordnance and ordnance stores of every description on hand January 1, 1836.....	\$2,482,637 56	
For value of supplies received at this armory during the year:		
From Watertown arsenal, 5,000 pounds powder, at 20 cents.....	1,000 00	
From Frankford arsenal, 2,500 pounds powder, at 20 cents.....	500 00	
From Washington arsenal, 8 Harper's Ferry muskets, at \$12.....	96 00	
From Washington arsenal, 1 box for packing muskets.....	2 00	
3,400 dragoon sabres and scabbards, at \$6 50.....	22,100 00	
114 boxes for sabres and scabbards, at \$2.....	228 00	
	<hr/>	\$2,506,563 56
For the amount expended during the year under the appropriations:		
National armories.....	\$160,022 63	
Deduct house rent.....	988 75	
	<hr/>	159,033 88
National armories at Springfield.....		20,954 04
Additional machinery and fixtures.....		4,481 12
Repairing and renewing fences.....		202 29
Finishing gun-racks in new arsenal.....		1,780 57
Building new pay office, with model room.....		155 89
Difference in the cost of 13,000 muskets (manufactured in 1835) and their appraised value December 31, 1836.....		13,910 00
		<hr/>
		200,517 79
		<hr/>
		2,707,081 35

Cr.

By amount expended on buildings, and fixtures thereto, machinery, &c., during the year.....	27,579 91	
By amount of articles fabricated during the year:		
13,500 muskets, complete, at \$11 07.4.....	149,501 09	
13,414 screw-drivers, at 8 cents.....	1,073 12	
10,440 wipers, at 13 cents.....	1,357 20	
211 spring vices, at 35 cents.....	73 85	
14,000 lead flint caps, at 1 cent.....	140 00	
By amount of work done at the military store not incidental to the manufacture of arms.....	346 79	
	<hr/>	180,071 96
By amount of articles issued during the year:		
10,045 muskets, complete, at \$12.....	120,540 00	
10,025 screw-drivers, at 7 cents.....	701 75	
10,025 wipers, at 13 cents.....	1,303 25	
10,000 flint caps, at 1 cent.....	100 00	
1,003 ball-screws, at 15 cents.....	150 45	
1,003 spring vices, at 35 cents.....	351 05	
502 boxes for packing ditto, at \$2.....	1,004 00	
1,000 pounds musket balls, at 6 cents.....	60 00	
200 pounds rifle balls.....	12 00	
1,100 pounds musket powder, at 25 cents.....	275 00	
2,457 dragoon sabres, with scabbards, at \$6 50.....	15,970 50	
82 boxes for packing ditto, at \$2.....	164 00	
1,000 artillery swords and scabbards, at \$4 25.....	4,250 00	
20 boxes for packing ditto, at \$2.....	40 00	
8 muskets complete, for samples, at \$12.....	96 00	
2 boxes for packing ditto, at \$1 15.....	2 30	
	<hr/>	145,020 30
Total value of public grounds, buildings, machinery, or other fixtures thereto, and of ordnance and ordnance stores of every description on hand December 31, 1836.....		2,381,995 09
		<hr/>
		2,707,081 35

GEORGE BOMFORD, *Colonel of Ordnance.*

No. 2

Statement of the operations of the armory at Harper's Ferry during the year 1836.

Dr.

For value of component parts of arms on hand January 1, 1836.....		\$32,796 43
For unwrought materials on hand January 1, 1836.....		67,689 30
For amount expended during the year for all purposes by paymasters.....	\$195,837 12	
Deduct rents received.....	3,074 66	
		<hr/>
Total drawn from the treasury.....		192,762 46
For value of supplies received during the year from the Pikesville arsenal, 20,000 musket flints, at \$2 50 per thousand.....	50 00	
From the Washington arsenal, powder, lead, cartridges, accoutrements, &c..	796 92	
From the Frankford arsenal, 2,500 pounds of powder, at 20 cents per pound..	500 00	
		<hr/>
		1,346 92
		<hr/>
		294,595 11

Cr.

By amount expended under special appropriation for completion of machinery in three shops.....	4,563 29	
By amount expended for new improved machinery.....	575 49	
By amount expended for completing new water-wheels.....	301 52	
By amount expended for new drill-shop at rifle factory.....	854 03	
By amount expended for the purchase of private dwelling-houses.....	3,298 00	
		<hr/>
		9,592 33
By amount expended under appropriations for national armories:		
For permanent improvements.....	6,736 25	
For permanent improvements at tilt-hammer shop, (special).....	2,453 49	
For miscellaneous expenses.....	2,292 88	
For cost of model guns.....	4,989 28	
For 9,150 muskets, complete, at \$11 $\frac{7333}{100000}$	107,364 75	
For 10,000 flint caps, at 1 cent.....	100 00	
By amount expended in the manufacture of Hall's rifle.....	37,033 24	
		<hr/>
		160,969 89
By value of unwrought materials on hand December 31, 1836.....	76,007 23	
By value of component parts December 31, 1836.....	46,753 96	
		<hr/>
		122,761 19
By amount of articles issued to arsenals during the year:		
Mount Vernon arsenal.....	985 20	
Pikesville arsenal.....	51 25	
Allegheny arsenal.....	10 65	
Washington arsenal.....	2 50	
Augusta arsenal.....	114 99	
Charleston arsenal.....	57 76	
Fort Monroe arsenal.....	49 35	
		<hr/>
		1,271 70
		<hr/>
		294,595 11

GEORGE BOMFORD, *Colonel of Ordnance.*

No. 3.

Statement of the operations of the Hall rifle factory during the year 1836.

Dr.

To value of component parts of arms on hand January 1, 1836.....	\$41,510 92	
To value of unwrought materials January 1, 1836.....	1,654 02	
		<hr/>
		\$43,164 94
To amount expended during the year, comprising all payments made, exclusive of the articles charged, at the military storekeeper's office.....	28,673 35	
From which deduct rents received.....	131 58	
		<hr/>
		28,541 77
To amount of articles received from military storekeeper.....		10,158 03
		<hr/>
		81,864 74

Cr.

By amount expended in permanent improvements.....		9,896 35
By amount of unwrought materials delivered to the military storekeeper December 31, 1836.....	717 45	
By amount of component parts of rifles, &c., (unserviceable,) delivered to military storekeeper same day.....	76 55	
		<hr/>
		794 00

By amount of rifles and equipments delivered into arsenal:		
1,809 rifles, at \$15 24 cents each.....	\$27, 569 16	
1,518 bayonets, at \$1 17 each.....	1, 776 06	
1,770 screw-drivers, at 8 cents each.....	141 60	
1,770 wipers, at 20 cents each.....	354 00	
177 bullet moulds, at 40 cents each.....	70 80	
3,000 flasks, complete, with belts, at \$1 25 each.....	3, 750 00	
177 spring vices, at 26 cents each.....	46 02	
	<hr/>	\$33, 707 64
By amount expended in making two carbines, and one model musket, complete.....		509 14
By amount of component parts on hand December 31, 1836.....	36, 905 25	
By amount of materials, (unserviceable).....	43 95	
	<hr/>	36, 948 20
		<hr/>
		81, 855 33

GEORGE BOMFORD, *Colonel of Ordnance.*

24th CONGRESS.]

No. 737.

[2d SESSION.]

LIST OF OFFICERS OF THE ARMY EMPLOYED UPON DUTY WHICH SEPARATED THEM FROM THEIR REGIMENTS OR CORPS DURING THE YEAR 1836.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MARCH 3, 1837.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *March 3, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith, in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 13th ultimo, a report and detailed statement prepared by the adjutant general of the army in relation to the officers of the army who, during the year 1836, were employed on business which separated them from their respective regiments or corps.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War ad interim.*

Hon. JAMES K. POLK, *Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, March 3, 1837.*

SIR: In obedience to your instructions, I herewith respectfully submit a statement, being a list of the several officers of the army who, in the year 1836, were so employed as to separate them from their regiments or corps. The statement is prepared with a view to furnish all the information relative to the subject of inquiry embraced in a resolution of the House of Representatives of February 13, 1837.

It will be seen that there were 123 officers of the line on various detached service, (without including seven aides-de-camp, twenty assistant quartermasters, five officers of the commissary's department, in the total, thirty-two,) who, being on the staff, were employed in their appropriate duties with the army. The officers on the recruiting service are also omitted, to wit: two field officers, thirteen captains, and thirteen subalterns; total, twenty-eight. Of the above-mentioned 123 officers of the line, detached from their regiments and companies, one was of the rank of major, fifteen of captain, 107 of lieutenant; of whom forty-five were in the engineer department, including twenty appropriately and usefully employed at the Military Academy, twenty-five also usefully employed in the ordnance department, thirty-two in the topographical engineer department, twelve in the Indian department, two in the Adjutant General's office, as assistants to the adjutant general, two in the Commissary General's office, one in the War Department, one at the headquarters of the army, and three on other special duty. The whole number of officers thus separated from their regiments and corps may be thus classed: thirty-two on the staff, twenty-eight on the recruiting service, and 123 on various detached service, as seen in the specifications set opposite to their names, of the kind of duty in which they were respectively employed; making an aggregate of 183. According to the official report of October 7, 1836, prepared by order of the President, the number of officers of the line of every grade then absent from their regiments and corps from every cause, sickness and leave of absence included, was about 240, as ascertained from the latest returns received at the time.

As the nature of the service of the several officers of the line of the army detailed for duty which separates them from their regiments is generally only known at this office by the official designation of "engineer duty," "topographical duty," "ordnance duty," "Indian duty," &c., the specification of the particular service or business on which the respective officers so detailed may be variously engaged, of course, can be best obtained from the chiefs of the several departments under whose instructions they may be specially employed. Accordingly, the specifications of the "kind of employment" or business in which the several officers detached from their respective companies in the year 1836 have been engaged, "the time and places where employed," and the other particular information required by the terms of the resolution as expressed in the heading of columns 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of this table, have, to the extent furnished, been supplied by the heads of the other bureaus of the War Department, with but few exceptions.

Respectfully submitted.

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

Hon. B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War ad interim.*

Statement of the several officers of the army who at any time during the year 1836 have been employed on any service or business which separated them from their respective regiments or corps, in such manner as to show the kind of employment, the places where employed, the commencement and termination of such service, at whose instance employed, whether in the service of corporate companies or individuals; and also the specification of time which each of the said officers may have performed military duty with his regiment or corps during the five years ending December 31, 1836.

No.	Names, rank, and regiment.	Designation of the department in which the officer has been detailed to serve.	Date of order of detail.	Date of order of relief.	Period during which the officer has performed military duty with his regiment during the five years ending December 31, 1836.	Designation of the kind of employment or business in which the officer has been engaged.	Where employed.	Commencement of employment.	Termination of employment.	Names of the persons or corporate authority on whose application the officer has been employed.
FIRST REGIMENT DRAGOONS.										
1	First Lieut. J. P. Simonton	Indian department.....	April 29, 1836	Not yet rel'd.	8 months	Disbursing agent Indian annuities	Detroit, Michigan.....	Still on duty.	
2	First Lieut. J. Allen	Engineer department.....	Jan. 10, 1834	Oct. 15, 1836	1 year 7 months.....	Superintendent public works at Chicago	Chicago	Jan. 30, 1834	Dec. 6, 1836	Chief engineer, Gen. Gratiot.
FIRST REGIMENT ARTILLERY.										
1	First Lieut. A. D. Mackay	Topographical duty	April 22, 1835do.....	1 year 8 months.....	
2	First Lieut. J. Williamson	Ordnance department.....	Oct. 25, 1835do.....	3 years 3 months	Commanding arsenal.....	Apalacheicola	Nov. 28, 1835	Still on duty.	Colonel of ordnance.
3	First Lieut. J. H. Winder	Engineer department.....	June 8, 1836do.....	2 years 10 months.....	Superintending public works at Cape Fear river.	Cape Fear.....	July 16, 1836	Sept. 20, 1836	Chief engineer, Gen. Gratiot.
4	First Lieut. E. S. Sibley.....do.....	Sept. 7, 1836do.....	3 months.....	Superintending public roads in Michigan.....	Michigan.....	Sept. 14, 1836	Nov. 19, 1836	Do.
5	First Lieut. W. Maynadier	Ordnance department.....	Oct. 30, 1833do.....	1 year 4 months.....	Commanding arsenal.....	Pikesville	Nov. 12, 1835	Nov. 16, 1836	Colonel of ordnance.
6	First Lieut. M. Knowlton.....	Military Academy.....	Aug. 17, 1832	Not yet rel'd.	8 months.....	Assistant teacher of French, Military Academy.	West Point	Sept. 14, 1833	Still on duty.	Chief engineer, Gen. Gratiot.
1	Second Lieut. J. B. Magruder ..	Ordnance department.....	Nov. 11, 1836	Dec. 31, 1836	1 year 10 months.....	Draughtsman in Ordnance office.....	Ordnance office.....	Nov. 23, 1836do.....	Colonel of ordnance.
2	Second Lieut. J. Ammen	Military Academy.....	Sept. 11, 1834	Not yet rel'd.	1 year 9 months.....	Assistant professor of philosophy, Military Academy.	West Point	Oct. —, 1834do.....	Chief engineer, Gen. Gratiot.
3	Second Lieut. J. W. Baileydo.....	Jan. 28, 1834do.....	1 year 1 month	Acting professor of chemistry, Military Academy.	West Point.....	Mar. 17, 1834do.....	Do.
4	Second Lieut. F. H. Smith.....	Ordnance department.....	Feb. 9, 1836	May 1, 1836	1 year 1 month	Commanding arsenal.....	Pikesville	Feb. 13, 1836	April —, 1836	Colonel of ordnance.
5	Second Lieut. D. E. Hale.....do.....	Jan. 1, 1836	Jan. 25, 1836	3 years 3 months.....do.....	Pikesville	Jan. 8, 1836	Jan. 28, 1836	Do.
6	Second Lieut. T. A. Morris.....	Engineer department.....	Mar. 16, 1835	Jan. 21, 1836	9½ months.....	Cumberland road	Indiana	Capt. Ogden, superintendent.
7	Second Lieut. R. T. P. Allen.....	Topographical department.....	July 17, 1834	Jan. 23, 1836	4 months.....	
8	Second Lieut. O. B. Chalmers ..	Ordnance department.....	July 25, 1836	Feb. 11, 1837	1 year 8 months.....	Draughtsman	Ordnance office	July 25, 1836	Dec. 31, 1836	Colonel of ordnance.
9	Second Lieut. L. A. B. Walbach ..	Engineer department.....	May 15, 1835	Oct. 15, 1836	7½ months.....	Cumberland road in Indiana and Illinois	Indiana and Illinois	Chief engineer, Gen. Gratiot.
10	Second Lieut. D. Leadbetterdo.....	July 14, 1836	Not yet rel'd.	No period	Improvement of Hudson river and Engineer department.	Washington and Hudson river.	July 15, 1836	Still on duty.	Do.
11	Second Lieut. M. C. Meigs.....do.....do.....do.....	No period	Public works on the Delaware river	Delaware river	July 17, 1836do.....	Do.
12	Second Lieut. F. A. Lewis.....do.....	July 11, 1836	Oct. 15, 1836	24 days.....	Engineer department and improvement of the Ohio river.	Washington and Ohio....	July 11, 1836do.....	Do.
13	Second Lieut. W. H. Warner	Topographical department ..	July 18, 1836do.....	2 months.....	
14	Second Lieut. P. V. Hagner.....do.....do.....do.....	2 months.....	
SECOND REGIMENT ARTILLERY.										
1	Captain T. C. Legate	Ordnance department.....	April 20, 1829do.....	No period	Superintending lead mines.....	Galena	April 23, 1829	Oct. 8, 1836	Colonel of ordnance.
1	First Lieut. A. Lovddo.....	Jan. 11, 1836	Dec. 31, 1836	2 years 11½ months. ...	Commanding arsenal.....	Vergennes.....	Jan. 11, 1836	Still on duty.	Do.
2	First Lieut. H. S. Mallory.....do.....	Oct. 30, 1833	Oct. 15, 1836	1 year 10½ monthsdo.....	Rome	Dec. 1, 1833	Nov. 17, 1836	Do.
3	First Lieut. J. A. D'Lagnel.....do.....	Nov. 7, 1835	Nov. 1, 1836	10 months.....	Draughtsman	Ordnance office.....	Nov. 7, 1835	Nov. 1, 1836	Do.

Statement of the several officers of the army who at any time during the year 1836 have been employed, &c.—Continued.

VOL. VII—16e

No.	Names, rank, and regiment.	Designation of the department in which the officer has been detailed to serve.	Date of order of detail.	Date of order of relief.	Period during which the officer has performed military duty with his regiment during the five years ending December 31, 1836.	Designation of the kind of employment or business in which the officer has been engaged.	Where employed.	Commencement of employment.	Termination of employment.	Names of the persons or corporate authority on whose application the officer has been employed.
SECOND REGIMENT ARTILLERY—Cont'd										
4	First Lieut. O. F. Smith.....	Military Academy.....	May 15, 1829	Not yet rel'vd	No period.....	Adjutant at the Military Academy.....	West Point.....	June 25, 1829	Still on duty	Chief engineer, Gen. Gratiot.
5	First Lieut. F. L. Dancy.....	Engineer department.....	July 14, 1836	Sept. 11, 1836	2 years 10 months.....	Resigned before the order detaching him reached him.	Do.
6	First Lieut. J. Mackay.....	Topographical department..	Aug. 25, 1836	Oct. 15, 1836	2 months.....	Central railroad.....	Georgia.....	W. W. Gordon, esq., in behalf of the Central Railroad and Banking Company of Georgia.—R. Jones, <i>Adj't. Gen'l</i>
1	Second Lieut. T. B. Linnard..... do.....	May 4, 1835	Jan. 21, 1836	1 year 7 months.....
2	Second Lieut. R. H. K. Whitely...	Ordnance department.....	Oct. 30, 1833	June 3, 1836	2 years 4 months.....	Assistant to the commander of arsenal.....	Fort Monroe.....	Jan. 10, 1834	June 3, 1836	Colonel of ordnance.
3	Second Lieut. A. A. Humphreys....	Topographical department..	Aug. 22, 1834	Jan. 21, 1836	2 years 10 months.....
4	Second Lieut. G. W. Ward..... do.....	Dec. 14, 1832 do.....	10 months.....
5	Second Lieut. R. P. Smith.....	Military Academy.....	Aug. 23, 1835	Dec. 31, 1836	2 years 8 months.....	Assistant professor of rhetoric at Military Academy.	West Point.....	Nov. —, 1835	Dec. 25, 1836	Chief engineer, Gen. Gratiot.
6	Second Lieut. W. B. Burnett.....	Topographical department..	Dec. 23, 1834	Jan. 21, 1836	2 months.....
7	Second Lieut. E. Schriver.....	Adjutant general's office...	Nov. 25, 1835	Not yet rel'vd	2½ months.....	Assistant to the adjutant general.....	Washington.....	Nov. 28, 1835	Still on duty	Adjutant gen'l, Gen. R. Jones.
8	Second Lieut. H. Loughborough....	Engineer department.....	Aug. 22, 1834	June 3, 1836	No period.....	Cumberland road in Ohio.....	Ohio.....	Chief engineer, Gen. Gratiot.
9	Second Lieut. W. T. Stockton.....	Topographical department..	Sept. 30, 1835	Jan. 21, 1836	11 months.....
10	Second Lieut. J. E. Henderson..... do.....	July 17, 1834	Jan. 23, 1836	No period.....
11	Second Lieut. C. A. Fuller..... do.....	Aug. 22, 1834	Jan. 21, 1836	4 months.....
12	Second Lieut. H. Brooks.....	Military Academy.....	Nov. 5, 1836	Not yet rel'vd	1 year.....	Assistant professor of mathematics at Military Academy.	West Point.....	Nov. —, 1836	Still on duty.	Do.
13	Second Lieut. H. L. Kendrick..... do.....	Aug. 28, 1835 do.....	No period.....	Assistant professor of chemistry at Military Academy. do.....	Sept. 1, 1835 do.....	Do.
14	Second Lieut. J. S. Brandsford.....	Topographical department..	July 11, 1836	Oct. 15, 1836	1 month.....
15	Second Lieut. B. Conklin..... do.....	July 18, 1836 do.....	No period.....
16	Second Lieut. R. Allen..... do.....	July 14, 1836 do.....	No period.....
THIRD REGIMENT ARTILLERY.										
1	Captain R. B. Lee.....	Ordnance department.....	Oct. 28, 1836	Not yet rel'vd	1 year 6½ months.....	Superintending construction of arsenal.....	Little Rock.....	Nov. 9, 1836	Still on duty.	Colonel of ordnance.
2	Captain S. Ringgold..... do.....	Jan. 14, 1835	Aug. 24, 1836	1 year 10 months.....	Assistant to commander of arsenal.....	Watervliet.....	April 15, 1835	Aug. 24, 1836	Do.
1	First Lieut. W. S. Newton..... do.....	Oct. 30, 1833	Not yet rel'vd	1 year 10 months.....	Commanding arsenal.....	Baton Rouge.....	Feb. —, 1834	Still on duty.	Do.
2	First Lieut. F. N. Barbarin..... do..... do..... do.....	1 year 11 months.....	Assistant to commander of arsenal.....	Watertown.....	Jan. 10, 1834	July —, 1836	Do.
3	First Lieut. M. Burke..... do..... do.....	Jan. 21, 1836	2 years 5 months..... do.....	Alleghany.....	Nov. 20, 1833	Jan. 21, 1836	Do.
4	First Lieut. O. Graham..... do.....	Nov. 5, 1836	Not yet rel'vd	3 years 7 months.....	Commanding arsenal.....	Pikesville.....	Nov. 5, 1836	Still on duty	Do.
5	First Lieut. J. W. Harris.....	Indian department.....	Aug. 12, 1833 do.....	3 months.....	Disbursing agent Indian removal, Seminoles..	Fort King.....
6	First Lieut. R. Anderson.....	Military Academy.....	Aug. 23, 1835 do.....	1 year ½ month.....	Instructor of artillery at Military Academy....	West Point.....	Sept. 1, 1835	Still on duty.	Chief engineer, Gen. Gratiot.
7	First Lieut. E. B. White.....	Topographical department..	Dec. 18, 1832	June 3, 1836	6 months.....	Cincinnati and Charleston railroad.—R. J.....

1837.]

OFFICERS ON DETACHED SERVICE.

121

Statement of the several officers of the army who at any time during the year 1836 have been employed, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names, rank, and regiment.	Designation of the department in which the officer has been detailed to serve.	Date of order of detail.	Date of order of relief.	Period during which the officer has performed military duty with his regiment, during the five years ending December 31, 1836.	Designation of the kind of employment or business in which the officer has been engaged.	Where employed.	Commencement of employment.	Termination of employment.	Names of the persons or corporate authority on whose application the officer has been employed.
THIRD REGIMENT ARTILLERY—Cont.										
8	First Lieut. A. E. Church	Military Academy.....	Oct. 15, 1833	Not yet rel'vd	1 year 6½ months.....	Assistant professor of mathematics at Military Academy.	West Point.....	Oct. 26, 1833	Still on duty.	Chief engineer, Gen. Gratiot.
9	First Lieut. R. E. Temple.....	Ordnance department.....	Nov. 5, 1836do.....	6 months.....	Assistant to commander of arsenal.....	Watervliet.....	Nov. 16, 1836do.....	Colonel of ordnance.
10	First Lieut. E. Rose.....	Topographical department.....	Jan. 17, 1834	June 3, 1836	1 year 11 months.....do.....do.....do.....do.....do.....
11	First Lieut. W. R. McKee.....	Engineer department.....	Jan. 28, 1834	June 28, 1836	1 year 5 months.....	Cumberland road.....	Ohio.....do.....do.....	Chief engineer, Gen. Gratiot.
12	First Lieut. E. D. Keyes.....	Office eastern department..	Oct. 19, 1833	Oct. 15, 1836	9 months.....	Assistant in adjutant general's office, eastern department.	New York.....do.....	Still on duty..do.....
1	Second Lieut. G. G. Meade.....	Ordnance department.....	July 11, 1833	Oct. 15, 1836	No period.....	Assistant to commander of arsenal.....	Watertown.....	July 13, 1836	Oct. 23, 1836	Colonel of ordnance.
2	Second Lieut. J. A. Thomas.....	Military Academy.....	Dec. 13, 1834	Not yet rel'vd	1 year 3 months.....	Assistant instructor of tactics, Military Academy.	West Point.....	Dec. —, 1834	Still on duty..	Chief engineer, Gen. Gratiot.
3	Second Lieut. J. B. Anderson.....	Engineer department.....	July 14, 1836do.....	No period.....	On fortifications at Forts Calhoun, and Pulaski, and engineer's duty at Washington.	Foris Calhoun, Pulaski, and Washington.do.....do.....	Do.
4	Second Lieut. D. P. Woodbury.....do.....	July 11, 1836do.....	No period.....	Cumberland road.....	Ohio.....do.....do.....	Do.
5	Second Lieut. A. P. Allen.....	Topographical department.....	July 18, 1836	Oct. 15, 1836	No period.....do.....do.....do.....do.....do.....
6	Second Lieut. J. L. Donaldson.....do.....	July 23, 1836do.....	No period.....do.....do.....do.....do.....do.....
7	Second Lieut. C. A. Greene.....do.....	July 18, 1836do.....	No period.....do.....do.....do.....do.....do.....
8	Second Lieut. J. C. Woodruff.....	Military Academy.....	Oct. 14, 1836	Not yet rel'vd	No period.....	Assistant professor of engineering at Military Academy.	West Point.....	Nov. —, 1836	Still on duty..	Chief engineer, Gen. Gratiot.
FOURTH REGIMENT ARTILLERY.										
1	Captain S. Cooper.....	Special duty..	Sept. 1, 1836do.....	No period.....	Special judge advocate.....	Washington.....	Dec. 1, 1836do.....do.....
1	First Lieut. C. Ward.....	Ordnance department.....	Oct. 30, 1833	Mar. 1, 1836	2 years 2 months.....	Commanding arsenal.....	Champlain.....	Dec. —, 1833	May 6, 1836	Colonel of ordnance.
2	First Lieut. J. B. Scott.....do.....	June 4, 1835	Not yet rel'vd	1 year 10 months.....do.....	Washington.....	June 26, 1833	Still on duty..	Do.
3	First Lieut. F. L. Jones.....do.....	July 14, 1836	Oct. 15, 1836	2 years.....	Locating and constructing arsenal.....	Little Rock..	July 27, 1836	Oct. 15, 1836	Do.
4	First Lieut. R. C. Smende.....	Engineer duty.....	Sept. 14, 1834do.....	9 months.....	Public works, Oswego harbor.....	Oswego.....	Apr. 23, 1833	Nov. 1, 1836	Chief engineer, Gen. Gratiot.
5	First Lieut. W. A. Thornton.....	Ordnance department.....	Mar. 27, 1833do.....	1 year 3 months.....	Assistant to commander of arsenal.....	Watervliet.....	Apr. 23, 1833	Nov. 15, 1836	Colonel of ordnance.
6	First Lieut. T. J. Cram.....	Military Academy.....	July 27, 1832do.....	3 months.....	Assistant professor of philosophy at Military Academy.	West Point.....	Aug. 30, 1832	June 25, 1836	Chief engineer, Gen. Gratiot.
7	First Lieut. M. O. Ewing.....	Topographical department.....	Sept. 12, 1832	May 14, 1836	A few days.....do.....do.....do.....do.....do.....
8	First Lieut. D. H. Tufts.....	Ordnance department.....	Oct. 30, 1833	Oct. 15, 1836	1 year 6 months.....	Assistant to commander of arsenal.....	St. Louis.....	Dec. 29, 1833	Nov. 7, 1836	Colonel of ordnance.
1	Second Lieut. J. Barnes.....	Military Academy.....	Oct. 15, 1833	July 31, 1836	1 year 9½ months.....	Assistant instructor of tactics at Military Academy.	West Point.....	Nov. 1, 1833	Aug. 5, 1836	Chief engineer, Gen. Gratiot.
2	Second Lieut. J. E. Johnston.....	Topographical department.....	July 17, 1834	Oct. 15, 1836	2 years 1 month.....do.....do.....do.....do.....	Chief engineer, Gen. Gratiot.
3	Second Lieut. T. E. Hunt.....	Engineer department.....	Sept. 14, 1834	June 28, 1836	2 years.....	Cumberland road in Illinois and Indiana.....	Illinois and Indiana.....do.....	Still on duty..	Chief engineer, Gen. Gratiot.
4	Second Lieut. S. O. Ridgely.....	Military Academy.....	July 14, 1831	Not yet rel'vd	No period.....	Assistant professor of engineering at Military Academy.	West Point.....	Aug. 28, 1831do.....	Do.
5	Second Lieut. B. S. Ewell.....do.....	Aug. 17, 1832	Aug. 31, 1836	No period.....	Assistant professor of philosophy at Military Academy.	West Point.....	Aug. 31, 1832	Aug. —, 1836	Do.

Statement of the several officers of the army who at any time during the year 1836 have been employed, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names, rank, and regiment.	Designation of the department in which the officer has been detailed to serve.	Date of order of detail.	Date of order of relief.	Period during which the officer has performed military duty with his regiment during the five years ending December 31, 1836.	Designation of the kind of employment or business in which the officer has been engaged.	Where employed.	Commencement of employment.	Termination of employment.	Names of the persons or corporate authority on whose application the officer has been employed.
FOURTH REG'T ARTILLERY—Cont'd.										
6	Second Lieut. J. N. Maccomb	Topographical department..	Dec. 23, 1834	June 3, 1836	1 year.....	Chief engineer, Gen. Gratiot.
7	Second Lieut. A. Brush	Engineer department.....	Sept. 21, 1832do.	A few days.....	
FIRST REGIMENT INFANTRY.										
1	Captain T. F. Smith.....do.....	July 5, 1836	Not yet rel'd.	3 years 1½ month.....	Commissioner of western military road	Western frontier.....	Still on duty .
1	Captain T. B. Stockton	Topographical department..	Nov. 5, 1835	July 18, 1836	No period	Do.
2	First Lieut. J. K. Greenough	Engineer department.....	July 11, 1836	Oct. 15, 1836	2 years 4 months.....	Cumberland road in Indiana and Illinois	Illinois and Indiana.....	Do.
3	First Lieut. S. Burbank	Military Academy.....	Aug. 8, 1836	Not yet rel'd.	3 years 5 months.....	Assistant instructor of tactics at Military Academy.	West Point	Aug. —, 1836	Still on duty .
4	First Lieut. S. Eastmando.....	Jan. 9, 1833do.	No period	Assistant teacher of drawing at Military Academy.do.	Jan. 21, 1833do.	Do.
SECOND REGIMENT INFANTRY.										
1	First Lieut. J. J. B. Kingsbury	Indian department.....	May 27, 1836	Nov. 12, 1836	3 years 11 months....	In connexion with an exploring party of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians.	Mackinac	July 25, 1836	Nov. 11, 1836	Do.
1	Second Lieut. R. S. Smith	Topographical department..	July 17, 1834	Oct. 19, 1836	No period	Do.
THIRD REGIMENT INFANTRY.										
1	Major J. Fowle.....	Military Academy.....	May 6, 1833	Not yet rel'd.	7 months.....	Instructor of tactics at Military Academy.....	West Point	July 6, 1833	Still on duty .
1	Captain J. Garland.....	Clothing bureau.....	Mar. 14, 1832do.	No period	Clothing bureau.....	Washington.....	Do.
2	Captain B. Walker.....	Pay department.....	Sept. 30, 1836do.	4 years 8 months.....	Do.
1	First Lieut. J. Van Horne	Indian department.....	Sept. 10, 1832do.	9½ months.....	Disbursing agent Cherokees removing west.....	Fort Gibson.....	Still on duty .
1	Second Lieut. H. Swartwout	Military Academy.....	April 25, 1836do.	2 years 10 months	Assistant instructor of tactics at Military Academy.	West Point	June —, 1836do.	Do.
2	Second Lieut. J. F. Cooper	Topographical department..	July 17, 1834	Oct. 15, 1836	No period	Do.
FOURTH REGIMENT INFANTRY.										
1	Captain Page	Indian department	July 10, 1832	Not yet rel'd.	7 months.....	Disbursing agent Creek emigration.....	Fort Mitchell	Still on duty .
2	Captain L. Thomas.....	Adj't general's department..	June 5, 1833	Sept. 1, 1836	1 year 6 months.....	Assistant to adjutant general	Washington	July 3, 1833	Sept. 3, 1836	Do.
1	First Lieut. R. B. Screven	Indian department.....	July 5, 1835	Not yet rel'd.	3 years 1½ month.....	Disbursing agent and commissioner Creek removal.	Fort Gibson.....	Sept. 6, 1836	Dec. 31, 1836	Do.
2	First Lieut. W. Hood	Topographical department..	Nov. 31, 1834	July 7, 1836	No period	Do.
3	First Lieut. B. R. Alden.....	Military Academy.....	May 20, 1833	Not yet rel'd.	1 year 5 months.....	Assistant teacher of French at Mil. Academy..	West Point	Aug. 1, 1833do.	Do.
4	First Lieut. W. W. S. Blissdo.....	July 23, 1834do.	8½ months.....	Assistant professor of mathematics at Military Academy.do.....	Oct. —, 1834do.	Do.
FIFTH REGIMENT INFANTRY.										
1	Captain T. Hunt.....	Com. gen.'s department	Aug. 25, 1821	No period	Do.
2	Captain J. B. F. Russell.....	Indian department.....	Nov. 6, 1833	Not yet rel'd.	1 year 9 months.....	Disbursing agent Pottawatonic removal.....	Chicago	Still on duty..
1	First Lieut. J. M. Berrien	Topographical department..	Aug. 15, 1834	Oct. 15, 1836	2½ months.....	Do.

Statement of the several officers of the army who at any time during the year 1836 have been employed, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names, rank, and regiment.	Designation of the department in which the officer has been detailed to serve.	Date of order of detail.	Date of order of relief.	Period during which the officer has performed military duty with his regiment during the five years ending December 31, 1836.	Designation of the kind of employment or business in which the officer has been engaged.	Where employed.	Commencement of employment.	Termination of employment.	Names of the persons or corporate authority on whose application the officer has been employed.
FIFTH REGIMENT INFANTRY—Con'd.										
2	First Lieut. A. J. Center	Topographical department..	Mar. 25, 1833	Oct. 15, 1836	8 months
1	Second Lieut. T. Stockton	Engineer department.....	Sept. 11, 1834 do	No period	Cumberland road in Ohio.....	Ohio
SIXTH REGIMENT INFANTRY.										
1	Captain J. Brown	Indian department.....	Sept. 8, 1831	Not yet rel'd.	No period	Principal disbursing agent Indian emigration west.	Little Rock	Still on duty..
2	Captain H. Smith.....	Engineer department.....	Jan. 26, 1833	Oct. 15, 1836	9½ months.....	Superintendent public works Oswego, on south shore of Lake Erie.	South shore Lake Erie...	Feb. 13, 1833	Nov. 9, 1836	Chief engineer, Gen. Gratiot.
1	First Lieut. M. W. Batman	Indian department.....	Oct. 1, 1834	Not yet rel'd.	2 years 9½ months.....	Agent for Creek emigration.....	Tuskegee	Still on duty..
2	First Lieut. J. D. Scaright..... do	Sept. 23, 1836 do	3 years 4 months.....	Disbursing agent Winnebago removal.....	Wisconsin Territory.....	Sep. 21, 1836	Dec. 31, 1836
1	Second Lieut. T. F. Drayton.....	Topographical department..	Apr. 13, 1836	Aug. 15, 1836	No period	Cincinnati and Charleston railroad.—R. J.
1	Second Lieut. A. Cady.....	Engineer department.....	July 11, 1836	Oct. 15, 1836	1 year 8½ months.....	Cumberland road in Indiana.....	Indiana	Captain C. A. Ogden.
3	Second Lieut. J. Freeman do do do	2 years 2 months.....	Cumberland road in Indiana.....	Indiana ..?	Do.
4	Second Lieut. J. S. Williams*..... do	June 11, 1834	Jan. 25, 1836	2 years 6 months.....	Cumberland road east of the Ohio	Cumberland road east of Ohio.
5	Second Lieut. J. E. Blake	Com. Gen's office.....	June 14, 1836	Not yet rel'd.	1 year.....
SEVENTH REGIMENT INFANTRY.										
1	Captain J. R. Stevenson	Indian department.....	Dec. 28, 1830 do	No period	Disbursing agent Creeks west	Fort Gibson	Dec. 31, 1836
2	Captain J. A. Phillips do.....	Oct. 11, 1836 do	1 year 8 months.....	Superintending Choctaw emigration.....	Natchez.....	Oct. 13, 1836 do
1	First Lieut. G. W. Cass	Engineer department.....	Sept. 5, 1832	Oct. 15, 1836	No period	Cumberland road east of the Ohio	Cumberland road east of the Ohio.
2	First Lieut. D. P. Whiting	Ordnance department.....	Jan. 1, 1836	Mar. 23, 1836	No period	Draughtsman Ordnance office.....	Washington	Jan. 1, 1836	Mar. 23, 1836	Colonel of ordnance.
3	First Lieut. R. S. Dix	Topographical department..	Jan. 16, 1835	Oct. 15, 1836	2 years 1 month
1	Second Lieut. S. G. Simmons do.....	Aug. 23, 1834 do.....	No period
2	Second Lieut. J. G. Reed do.....	Sept. 1, 1834 do.....	No period

* This officer was relieved from service in the engineer department (being at the time employed on the Cumberland road, and then absent from his company since July, 1834) on the 25th of January, 1836, when he proceeded to join his regiment. On the 25th of August he was again ordered away, at the instance of W. W. Gordon, esq., of Georgia, in behalf of the president and directors of the "Central Railroad and Banking Company of Georgia." Lieutenant Williams did not enter upon this business, the order of detail having been virtually countermanded by the President October 15, 1836.—(Vide "General Order No. 69, of 1836.")

R. J.

NOTE.—It will be seen by the omissions indicated by the blanks in columns 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, that the information called for by the resolution, and which these columns are intended to furnish, is wanting; such specification of the particular service, or business in which the officer detailed may have been employed, &c., &c., being generally only known to the chiefs of the several departments under whose instructions they serve.—R. J.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, Washington, March 3, 1837.

R. JONES, Adjutant General of the Army.

24TH CONGRESS.]

No. 738.

[2D SESSION.]

PROCEEDINGS OF MILITARY COURTS OF INQUIRY ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY
UNDER COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCOTT AND MAJOR GENERAL GAINES, AND
ON THE COURSE PURSUED BY THOSE OFFICERS RESPECTIVELY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE MARCH 3, 1837.

Proceedings of the military court of inquiry in the case of Major General Scott and Major General Gaines.

[Printed in pursuance of a resolution of the Senate of March 3, 1837.]

IN SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, *March 3, 1837.*

Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested, as soon as he shall have acted finally on the proceedings of the military court of inquiry lately held at Frederick, in Maryland, to transmit a copy thereof to the Senate, or to the Secretary of the Senate if the Senate be not in session, and that the Secretary cause the same to be printed without delay, and transmitted to the senators respectively.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, March 29, 1837.*

SIR: I herewith transmit, by instruction of the Secretary of War, the proceedings of the court of inquiry lately held at Frederick, in Maryland, in compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the United States of March 3, 1837.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

ASBURY DICKINS, Esq., *Secretary of the Senate of the United States.*

MEMORANDA OF DOCUMENTS SENT.

Major General Scott's case.

PART FIRST.

No. 1. "Proceedings of a court of inquiry in the case of *Major General Scott.*"
["Failure of the Florida campaign in 1836."]

PART SECOND.

No. 2. "Proceedings of a court of inquiry in the case of *Major General Scott.*"
["Delay in opening and prosecuting the Creek campaign."
"Major General Scott's address, or summary of evidence taken in his case."]

Major General Gaines's case.

No. 3. "Proceedings of a court of inquiry in the case of *Major General Gaines.*"
"Defence of Major General E. P. Gaines before the court of inquiry, of which Major General Macomb is President."

No. 4. "Proceedings of a court of inquiry in reference to publications of officers of the army."

No. 1.

Proceedings of a court of inquiry in the case of Major General Scott.—Failure of the Florida campaign in 1836. Part first.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS.

- A. General Gaines's objections to the court, October 30, 1836.
B. General Gaines to the court of inquiry, January 7, 1837.
No. 1. General Scott to the Adjutant General, July 20, 1836.
2. General Scott to the Adjutant General, August 2, 1836.
3. General Scott to the Adjutant General, October 18, 1836.
4. Secretary of War to General Scott, January 21, 1836.
5. General Call to the President of the United States, December 22, 1835.
6. General Call to the President of the United States, January 9, 1836.

- No. 7. Colonel Fitzpatrick to General Call, January 8, 1836.
8. Governor Eaton to Secretary of War, January 9, 1836.
9. General Call to Governor Eaton, January 8, 1836.
10. General Call to Governor Eaton, January 8, 1836.
11. Secretary of War to General Clinch, January 11, 1836.
12. General order No. 7, January 21, 1836.
13. Secretary of War to governors of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, January 21, 1836.
14. General order No. 9, January 25, 1836.
15. Secretary of War to General Scott, January 29, 1836.
16. General Scott (per Captain Canfield) to Adjutant General, January 25, 1836.
17. General Scott (per Captain Canfield) to Adjutant General, January 27, 1836.
18. General Scott to Adjutant General, January 31, 1836.
19. Lieutenant Van Buren to General Scott, January 31, 1836.
20. General Scott to Adjutant General, February 2, 1836.
21. General Scott (per Lieutenant Johnson) to Adjutant General, February 3, 1836.
22. General Scott to Governor McDuffie, January 29, 1836.
23. General Scott to Governor McDuffie, January 31, 1836.
24. General Scott to Governor McDuffie, February 1, 1836.
25. General Scott to Governor McDuffie, February 2, 1836.
26. General Scott to Governor Schley, January 31, 1836.
27. General Scott to Governor Clay, January 31, 1836.
28. General Scott, to Governor Eaton, February 1, 1836.
29. General Scott to Colonel Lindsay, February 2, 1836.
30. Governor Eaton to General Scott, February 3, 1836.
31. Secretary of War to General Scott, February 2, 1836.
32. Secretary of War to Governor Schley, February 2, 1836.
33. Secretary of War to General Scott, February 6, 1836.
34. General Scott to Adjutant General, February 6, 1836.
35. General Scott to General Eustis, February 9, 1836.
36. Adjutant General to General Scott, February 10, 1836.
37. General Scott to Governor Eaton, February 11, 1836.
38. General Scott to Adjutant General, February 16, 1836.
39. General Scott to Quartermaster and Commissary at New Orleans, February 14, 1836.
40. General Scott to Quartermaster at Charleston, February 12, 1836.
41. General Scott to General Clinch, February 12, 1836.
42. Major Clark to General Scott, February 26, 1836.
43. General Scott (per Lieutenant Van Buren) to Adjutant General, February 19, 1836.
44. General Scott to Adjutant General, February 20, 1836.
45. Adjutant General to General Scott, March 2, 1836.
46. General Scott (per Lieutenant Van Buren) to Adjutant General, February 22, 1836.
47. General Scott to Adjutant General, February 26, 1836.
48. General Gaines to General Clinch, February 2, 1836.
49. General Gaines to General Clinch, February 22, 1836.
50. General Clinch to General Scott, February 24, 1836.
51. Captain McCall to General Clinch, February 22, 1836.
52. General Scott to Adjutant General, March 2, 1836.
53. General Scott's order No. 1, February 22, 1836.
54. General Scott's order No. 4, February 26, 1836.
55. Notes on order No. 4, February 28, 1836.
56. General Scott's order No. 5, February 27, 1836.
57. General Scott's order No. 6, February 27, 1836.
58. General Scott to General Clinch, February 25, 1836.
59. General Scott to General Clinch, February 26, 1836.
60. General Scott to General Clinch, No. 1, March 1, 1836.
61. General Scott to General Clinch, No. 2, March 1, 1836.
62. General Gaines to General Clinch, February 28, 1836.
63. General Gaines to General Clinch, February 29, 1836.
64. General Scott (per Lieutenant Van Buren) to General Clinch, March 2, 1836.
65. Colonel Smith to Captain Shannon, February 25, 1836.
66. General Scott's order No. 11, March 4, 1836.
67. General Scott's order No. 12, March 5, 1836.
68. General Scott to Adjutant General, March 6, 1836.
69. General Scott to General Clinch, March 4, 1836.
70. General Scott (per Lieutenant Temple) to General Clinch, March 6, 1836.
71. General Scott to Adjutant General, March 9, 1836.
72. Two letters from Major Lytle to General Scott, March 5 and 9, 1836.
73. Governor Eaton to Lieutenant Van Buren, February 24, 1836.
74. General Scott to General Eustis, March 9, 1836.
75. General Scott to Lieutenant Dusenbury, March 9, 1836.
76. General Scott to Lieutenant Searight, March 10, 1836.
77. General Scott to Adjutant General, March 14, 1836.
78. General Gaines's order No. 7, March 9, 1836.
79. General Clinch to General Scott, March 12, 1836.
80. General Scott to General Eustis, March 14, 1836.
81. General Scott (by Colonel Gadsden) to Colonel Lindsay, March 13, 1836.
82. General Scott's order No. 13, March 14, 1836.
83. Secretary of War to Colonel Hogan, January 21, 1836.
84. Colonel Hogan to General Scott, February 1, 1836.
85. Secretary of War to General Scott, April 12, 1836.

- No. 86. Colonel Hogan to Secretary of War, March 28, 1836.
 87. Secretary of War to Colonel Hogan, April 12, 1836.
 88. Governor Eaton to General Scott, March 7, 1836.
 89. General Clinch to General Scott, March 13, 1836.
 90. General Clinch to General Scott, March 13, 1836.
 91. General Scott's order No. 14, March 14, 1836.
 92. General Scott's order No. 15, March 16, 1836.
 93. General Scott (by Colonel Gadsden) to General Eustis, March 16, 1836.
 94. General Scott to Adjutant General, March 20, 1836.
 95. General Scott to General Eustis, March 20, 1836.
 96. General Scott to Colonel Crane, March 23, 1836.
 97. General Scott (per Lieutenant Van Buren) to Adjutant General, March 25, 1836.
 98. General Eustis to General Scott, March 22, 1836.
 99. General Scott's order No. 16, April 6, 1836.
 100. Lieutenant Morris's return of subsistence, April 8, 1836.
 101. General Scott's order No. 23, April 9, 1836.
 102. General Scott's order No. 26, April 10, 1836.
 103. General Scott's order to Adjutant General, April 12, 1836.
 104. General Clinch's report to General Scott, April 8, 1836.
 105. General Eustis's report to General Scott, April 10, 1836.
 106. Colonel Lindsay's report to General Scott, April 10, 1836.
 107. General Scott's order No. 22, April 8, 1836.
 108. General Scott's order No. 24, April 9, 1836.
 109. General Scott's order No. 28, April 11, 1836.
 110. General Scott to Colonel Smith, April 10, 1836.
 111. General Scott's order No. 37, April 16, 1836.
 112. General Scott (by Colonel Gadsden) to Paymaster Mapes, April 12, 1836.
 112-113. General Scott (by Colonel Gadsden) to Major Read, April 14, 1836.
 113. General Scott to Colonel Lindsay, April 14, 1836.
 114. General Scott's order No. 38, April 16, 1836.
 115. Secretary of War to General Scott, April 15, 1836.
 116. General Scott to Adjutant General, April 30, 1836.
 117. General Scott to Secretary of War, April 14, 1836.
 118. Adjutant General to General Scott, May 5, 1836.
 119. General Scott to Adjutant General, May 11, 1836.
 120. General Clinch's report to General Scott, April 27, 1836.
 121. General Clinch to General Scott, April 27, 1836.
 122. Governor Call to General Scott, or commanding officer Fort Drane, April 26, 1836.
 123. Adjutant McCants to Commanding Officer of Fort Drane, April 11, 1836.
 124. Council of war at Fort Drane, April 29, 1836.
 125. General Scott (No. 1) to General Clinch, May 1, 1836.
 126. General Scott (No. 2) to General Clinch, May 1, 1836.
 127. General Clinch to General Scott, May 5, 1836.
 128. General Scott to General Clinch, May 7, 1836.
 129. Colonel Lindsay's report to General Scott, May 7, 1836.
 130. Colonel Chisholm to Colonel Lindsay, April 22, 1836.
 131. Lieutenant Colonel Foster to Colonel Lindsay, April 29, 1836.
 132. Colonel Chisholm to Colonel Lindsay, April 30, 1836.
 133. Colonel Smith's report to General Scott, April 26, 1836.
 134. Major Read's report to General Scott, April 27, 1836.
 135. General Scott's order No. 46, May 11, 1836.
 136. General Scott to Captain Dummett, May 11, 1836.
 137. General Scott's order No. 47, May 16, 1836.
 138. General Scott's order No. 48, May 17, 1836.
 139. General Scott to Governor Call, May 17, 1836.
 140. Governor Call to General Scott, May 26, 1836.
 141. Secretary of War to General Scott, June 1, 1836.
 142. Hon. J. M. White to President United States, May 28, 1836.
 143. General Scott to Secretary of War, June 21, 1836.
 144. Hon. J. M. White to President of Court of Inquiry, December 13, 1836.
 145. General Scott (by General Eustis) to Adjutant General, May 16, 1836.
 146. General Scott to Adjutant General, May 20, 1836.
 147. General Scott to Major Heileman, May 17, 1836.
 148. General Scott to General Eustis, May 20, 1836.
 149. Captain Hitchcock to Hon. Mr. Lyon, March 11, 1836.
 150. Captain McCall to Editor of New Orleans Bulletin, May, 1836.
 151. Extracts of General Clinch's letters to Adjutant General, referred to in testimony of the former.
 152. Major Clark to Quartermaster General, August 16, 1836.
 153. Captain Shannon to Quartermaster General, March 1, 1836.
 154. Captain Shannon to Quartermaster General, April 11, 1836.
 155. Secretary of War to General Scott, May 16, 1836.
 156. Secretary of War to Governor Call, May 16, 1836.
 157. Governor Schley to General Scott, May 18, 1836.
 158. Secretary of War to General Scott, May 19, 1836.
 159. Secretary of War to General Jesup, May 19, 1836.
 160. General Scott to Adjutant General, May 22, 1836.
 161. Secretary of War to General Jesup, May 23, 1836.
 162. Secretary of War to General Scott, May 25, 1836.
 163. General Order No. 34, May 26, 1836.

- No. 164. General Scott to Adjutant General, May 26, 1836.
165. General Scott to Governor Schley, May 26, 1836.
166. General Scott to Commissary and Quartermaster at New Orleans, May 26, 1836.
167. General Scott to Major Beard, May 27, 1836.
168. Major Baden to General Scott, May 31, 1836.
169. Governor Schley to Major Baden, May 27, 1836.
170. Duplicate of No. 166, with a P. S., dated May 28, 1836.
171. Quartermaster Dimmock to General Scott, May 29, 1836.
172. General Scott to Adjutant General, June 2, 1836.
173. Governor Clay to Commanding Officer of Georgia Militia, at Columbus, May 28, 1836.
174. General Scott (No. 1) to Governor Clay, May 31, 1836.
175. General Scott (No. 2) to Governor Clay, May 31, 1836.
176. General Scott to General Jesup, June 1, 1836.
177. Captain Harding to Governor Clay, February 8, 1836.
178. General Scott to Captain Harding, June 3, 1836.
179. Captain Harding to General Scott, June 14, 1836.
180. General Scott to Major Beard, June 3, 1836.
181. General Scott (by Major Kirby) to General Irwin, June 2, 1836.
182. Lieutenant Dimmock to Major Kirby, No. 1, June 2, 1836.
183. Lieutenant Dimmock to Major Kirby, No. 2, June 2, 1836.
184. General Scott (by Major Kirby) to Quartermaster Dimmock, June 3, 1836.
185. General Scott's orders Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.
186. Major Beard to General Scott, June 5, 1836.
187. General Scott (by Major Kirby) to Major Beard, June 7, 1836.
188. Lieutenant Heintzelman to Major Kirby, June 8, 1836.
189. General Jesup to General Scott, June 8, 1836.
190. General Jesup to Secretary of War, June 10, 1836.
191. General Jesup to Secretary of War, June 11, 1836.
192. General Scott (by Major Kirby) to Major Beard, June 10, 1836.
193. General Scott to General Jesup, June 10, 1836.
194. General Scott to Adjutant General, June 12, 1836.
195. Major Baden to Major Kirby, June 11, 1836.
196. General Scott (by Major Kirby) to Major Baden, June 14, 1836.
197. General Scott (by Major Kirby) to Lieutenant Deas, June 11, 1836.
198. Lieutenant Heintzelman to Major Kirby, June 12, 1836.
199. General Scott to Adjutant General, June 14, 1836.
200. General Scott's order No. 8, June 16, 1836.
201. John Crowell, jr., esq., to General Scott, June 16, 1836.
202. Major Beard to General Scott, June 16, 1836.
203. General Scott to Adjutant General, June 17, 1836.
204. General Scott to General Jesup, June 16, 1836.
205. General Scott to Adjutant General, June 18, 1836.
206. General Jesup to General Scott, June 15, 16, 1836.
207. General Jesup to General Scott, No. 1, June 17, 1836.
208. General Scott to General Jesup, June 17, 1836.
209. General Scott to Adjutant General, June 21, 1836.
210. General Jesup to General Scott, No. 2, June 17, 1836.
211. General Jesup to General Scott, June 19, 1836.
212. General Scott to General Jesup, June 19, 1836.
213. General Scott to General Jesup, June 21, 1836.
214. General Jesup to F. P. Blair, June 20, 1836.
215. General Scott to Adjutant General, No. 1, June 23, 1836.
216. General Jesup to General Scott, June 20, 1836.
217. General Jesup to General Scott, (copy,) June 12, 1836.
218. General Scott to General Jesup, June 21, 1836.
219. General Scott to General Jesup, June 22, 1836.
220. General Jesup to General Scott, June 22, 1836.
221. General Scott to Adjutant General, No. 2, June 23, 1836.
222. General Scott to Governor Call, June 17, 1836.
223. General Scott to Commissary General of Subsistence and Lieutenants L'Engle, Dimmock, and Mackay, June 20, 1836.
224. Lieutenant Heintzelman to Major Kirby, June 22, 1836.
225. Secretary of War to General Scott, June 20, 1836.
226. Secretary of War to General Scott, June 20, 1836.
227. Secretary of War to General Scott, June 24, 1836.
228. General Moore to General Scott, June 25, 1836.
229. General Scott's order No. 8, June 16, 1836.
230. General Scott's order No. 11, June 20, 1836.
231. General Scott's order No. 13, June 20, 1836.
232. General Scott's order No. 15, June 21, 1836.
233. General Scott's order No. 17, June 22, 1836.
234. General Scott's order No. 27, July 6, 1836.
235. General Scott's order No. 28, July 6, 1836.
236. General Scott to Adjutant General, June 24, 1836.
237. General Jesup to General Scott, June 23, 1836.
238. General Patterson to General Jesup, June 22, 1836.
239. Captain Parrott to General Jesup, June 22, 1836.
240. General Jesup to Secretary of War, June 25, 1836.
241. General Scott to General Jesup, June 26, 1836.
242. General Jesup to Adjutant General, June 28, 1836.

- No. 243. General Scott to Adjutant General, July 2, 1836.
 244. General Scott to Governor Call, July 1, 1836.
 245. General Scott to Commodore Dallas, July 1, 1836.
 246. General Scott to Officer Commanding West Tennessee brigade, July 2, 1836.
 247. General Scott's order No. 22, July 2, 1836.
 248. General Scott to Adjutant General, July 4, 1836.
 249. General Scott to Adjutant General, July 6, 1836.
 250. General Scott to General Moore, July 4, 1836.
 251. General Scott to Lieutenant Johnson, U. S. N., July 5, 1836.
 252. General Scott (by Lieutenant Lee) to Adjutant General, July 5, 1836.
 253. General Scott to General Wool, July 4, 1836.
 254. General Scott to Major Hoxie, July 6, 1836.
 255. General Macomb to General Scott, June 25, 1836.
 256. General Macomb to General Scott, June 28, 1836.
 257. General Macomb to General Jesup, June 28, 1836.
 258. General Scott to General Macomb, July 8, 1836.
 259. General Scott's order No. 29, July 7, 1836.
 260. General Scott to Adjutant General, July 20, 1836.
 261. General Jesup to General Scott, July 7, 1836.
 262. General Jesup to Adjutant General, September 9, 1836.
 263. Captain Lane's printed sheet, August 8, 1836.
 264. F. P. Blair to Judge Advocate, January 8, 1837.
 265. General Jesup's communication to the Globe, of September 26, 1836.
 266. General Woodward to Judge Advocate, November 27, 1836.
 267. General Jesup to Governor Schley, August 2, 1836.
 268. General Jesup to Governor Schley, August 28, 1836.

Proceedings of a court of inquiry held at the city of Frederick, Maryland, by virtue of the following orders, to wit:

GENERAL ORDER No. 65.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Adjutant General's Office, Washington, October 3, 1836.*

The following order is published for the information of all concerned:

By direction of the President of the United States a court of inquiry, to consist of Major General Macomb, president, and Brevet Brigadier Generals Atkinson and Brady, members, is hereby ordered to assemble at the city of Frederick, in Maryland, as soon as the state of the military operations against the Indians will permit the witnesses to attend, (of which the president of the court is to judge and determine, and to give notice to all concerned,) to inquire and examine into the causes of the failure of the campaigns in Florida against the Seminole Indians, under the command of Major General Gaines and of Major General Scott, in 1836; and the causes of the delay in opening and prosecuting the campaign in Georgia and Alabama against the hostile Creek Indians, in the year 1836; and into every subject connected with the military operations in the campaigns aforesaid; and, after fully investigating the same, the court will report the facts, together with its opinion on the whole subject, for the information of the President of the United States.

Captain Samuel Cooper, of the 4th regiment of artillery, is hereby appointed to act as judge advocate and recorder of the court.

LEWIS CASS.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 3, 1836.*

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

GENERAL ORDER No. 68.

. ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, October 14, 1836.*

The following order has been received from the War Department, and is published for the information of all concerned:

WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 13, 1836.*

1. It appearing by the public prints that the official report of Brevet Major General Gaines, dated "Headquarters Western Department, Camp Sabine, July 4, 1836," made to the adjutant general of the army, has been published, and the said publication being without the sanction of the War Department, or other proper authority, the court of inquiry of which Major General Alexander Macomb is president will, in addition to the duties already assigned to it, inquire into the facts as to the manner and by whose authority the said official report was made public.

2. The court will also report its opinion as to the violation of the rules of the service by such publication, and as to the character of said report, in reference to all its bearings and consequences as it concerns general military propriety and the discipline of the army.

3. And, further, the court will examine and inquire into any other reports and publications made by Brevet Major General Gaines, or by any other officer of the army, having reference to military affairs, and published without the sanction of the War Department, or other proper authority, and give its opinion on the tendency of such reports and publications, in the same manner as it is herein required to do in the case referred to in the foregoing paragraph of this order.

C. A. HARRIS, *Acting Secretary of War.*

By order of Major General Macomb.

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

FREDERICK CITY, *Maryland*, November 7, 1836.

Agreeably to the above orders, and in compliance with notice duly communicated by the president of the court, the court met on this day.

Present: Major General Macomb, president; Captain Cooper, judge advocate and recorder.

In consequence of the absence of Brigadier Generals Atkinson and Brady, the president adjourned the court to meet to-morrow.

NOVEMBER 8, 1836.

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Macomb, president; Brigadier General Brady, member; Captain Cooper, judge advocate and recorder.

General Atkinson not having yet arrived, the court adjourned to meet again to-morrow.

NOVEMBER 9, 1836.

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Macomb, president; Brigadier General Brady, member; Captain Cooper, judge advocate and recorder.

The judge advocate communicated to the court a letter from Brigadier General Atkinson, in which the general states that, in consequence of his illness, he is unable to reach the court before the 22d or 25th of the present month; whereupon, the court adjourned to meet on the 25th of November.

NOVEMBER 25, 1836.

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Macomb, president; Brigadier General Atkinson, Brigadier General Brady, members; Captain Cooper, judge advocate and recorder.

The court adjourned to meet on Monday, the 28th instant.

NOVEMBER 28, 1836.

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Macomb, president; Brigadier General Atkinson, Brigadier General Brady, members; Captain Cooper, judge advocate and recorder.

The orders constituting the court having been read, the judge advocate stated to the court that he had received a letter from Major General Gaines, dated Mobile, October 30, covering a communication addressed to the court, dated Mobile, October 29, in which he makes objections to the organization and location of the court.

These communications (marked A) having been read to the court, Major General Scott claimed the right of being heard, and addressed the court to this effect:

"How far Major General Gaines, when his own case shall come up for investigation, may have a right to object, with or without cause, to a member of this court, is a question which I shall not discuss, having myself no such objection to urge; but when he proposes the adjournment of the court to Mobile, or any other distant place whatever, I have the right to resist the proposition, on the ground of the delay it involves. Further delay, Mr. President, is positive injustice to me. I am ready and anxious for the investigation of every act of mine that has been complained of, having already suffered much in my feelings, and, perhaps, in public opinion, from the time that has been allowed to elapse, in despite of my earnest solicitations, since a judicial investigation into my conduct was threatened by the Executive. I shall, therefore, not voluntarily consent to, but earnestly protest against, the unnecessary loss of another day in having that conduct, in every matter complained of, fully probed and investigated by this court, which has at length been appointed for the purpose.

"In all cases like those contemplated by the order under which this court has assembled the President of the United States has the unquestionable right to appoint both the time and place of investigation. His order precludes all right of discussion on those points.

"The strange proposition of Major General Gaines, that no testimony, written or parol, shall be taken by this court, in his *wilful* absence, which may in any degree allude to him or his conduct, would be less extraordinary if the only issue to be tried was between the United States and that officer; but to the issue between the United States and the humble individual who addresses you General Gaines is, in the contemplation of law, as much a stranger as any bystander in this court. In this particular issue he has no right whatever to interfere. The Executive has a clear right to proceed against me, and I have as clear a right to defend myself by all legal and honorable means, without regard to the absence or presence of General Gaines, just as in respect to the presence or absence of any other individual whatever.

"If the evidence that may be adduced against or for me before this court, in the investigation of my particular case, should affect Major General Gaines, he will stand, in respect to such evidence, precisely on the footing of any other *third person* so affected, with this advantage in his favor: the same court (or a majority of it) stands instructed to take up his case as soon as he shall choose to present himself, and then he will have the full right to explain, to contradict, or to refute, by all legal and honorable means, any part of the record in my case which he may deem unjust to himself.

"The 74th article of the Rules and Articles of War permits depositions to be taken in cases like those to be investigated by this court. To give validity to a deposition, legal in other respects, notice of the time and place for taking the same must always be given to the adverse party. Now, even if it were admitted that this court were about to try an issue between Major General Gaines and myself, instead of two or more several-issues between the United States and as many distinct individuals, still it would be sufficient to say that the orders appointing this court, and specifying the subjects for its investigation, give ample notice to Major General Gaines that, in inquiring into my conduct as one of the conductors of the still existing war in Florida, the testimony might naturally be expected to touch, incidentally at least, his conduct in the same war, particularly as we were both operating against the same enemy at one particular time. The orders for this court he acknowledges himself to have received. He has, therefore, even in this view of the subject, had sufficient notice that incidental evidence might be expected to be received against him by this court, and at this time and place, in the act of investigating my conduct in the war against the Seminole Indians. All this is clear from his protest which has just been read. He has, however, not thought proper to appear in person, either as a defendant or as a spectator, but has

appointed a commission of several individuals to represent him, it would seem, in the investigation of my conduct. In this particular investigation, Mr. President, I have already said General Gaines cannot be allowed to take any part other than as a *sworn* witness, either in person or by deputy, for I do not understand that he claims the right to be my *prosecutor* before this or any other court. If *that* could be supposed to be his wish, I should be happy to meet him.

"In conclusion, sir, I have no sort of objection, even if I had the right to object, that the highly respectable gentlemen named by General Gaines to represent him before this court should be permitted to be present as spectators to the investigation into my conduct, with the admitted right to make such notes and reports for Major General Gaines as they may think proper."

Major General Macomb, president of the court, then made the following answer to the objections offered against himself as a member of the court by Major General Gaines:

"Gentlemen of the court: I do not entertain a doubt but that a challenge, upon good and sufficient grounds, may with propriety be sustained before a court of inquiry, although perhaps this is the first instance of a challenge being made to a member of such a court. It certainly was not of my seeking that I was placed on the court; it is a duty from which I would most willingly withdraw on a decision of the court to that effect.

"As it regards my having harbored against General Gaines any hostile or unfriendly feelings, or feeling any disposition to do him any wrong, I do most conscientiously deny; and as for interest in the issue of the investigation ordered by government, I have none other than that which concerns the honor and character of the army.

"It is proper that I should state that it was the desire of the President of the United States that the court should assemble at as early a day as possible; and I believed that the day appointed for assembling the court was not too early for commencing the inquiry, and it would seem by the attendance of the witnesses from a distance, and the fact of the receipt of General Gaines's communications now before the court, that he had ample time to get here, if he had set out for that purpose in season."

The court, being cleared, determined that a member of a court of inquiry may be objected to for good and sufficient cause; but this is not the proper time to consider the objections of Major General Gaines, as the party objecting is not at this time before the court; and as the court has been directed to inquire into subjects other than those referring to Major General Gaines, the court determined to qualify and proceed to the investigation having reference to the campaign under Major General Scott, against the Seminole Indians in 1836; pending which investigation, Major General Gaines, it is believed, will have ample time to reach the court before any matters touching himself shall be brought to the notice of the court.

The court, being resumed, was duly sworn in presence of Major General Scott, who had previously stated that he had no objection to offer to any member of the court.

The judge advocate then proceeded to read the documentary evidence which will be found with these proceedings.

The hour for adjournment having arrived, the court adjourned to meet to-morrow at 11 o'clock.

NOVEMBER 29, 1836.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

The court was occupied on this day, and on every subsequent day to the 3d of December, inclusively, in the examination of the documentary evidence referred to in the proceedings of the 28th of November.

MONDAY, December 5, 1836.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

The judge advocate presented to the court the depositions which here follow.

Deposition of Charles Dimmock, esq., late captain and assistant quartermaster of the United States army.

Question 1, by Major General Scott. Where were you stationed, and in what capacity, during the latter part of the last winter and the following spring months?

Answer. I was stationed at Savannah, in Georgia, from the 7th of February to the 23d of May, 1836, in the capacity of assistant quartermaster.

Question 2, by Major General Scott. Were you advised by a quartermaster of the army, in the month of February, that a shipment of wagons with harness had been made, or was about to be made to you from Baltimore, for the use of the army in Florida? Please annex the letters of advice to your answer.

Answer. I was so advised, and here are the letters of advice from Major T. Cross, quartermaster, dated Baltimore, January 30, 1836, and Washington, February 8, 1836, both addressed to me at Savannah, Georgia:

"BALTIMORE, January 30, 1836.

"SIR: Enclosed is a bill of lading of two wagons, shipped on board the brig 'Oglethorpe.' On their arrival please acknowledge them to me at Washington.

"I am ordered to send out ten wagons; only four new ones could be found in the city, and it becomes necessary to buy at second hand. They are the best I could pick up in a hurry.

"The brig 'Arctic' will sail in a few days, with three companies of troops, some provisions, and a large supply of corn. She will take as many wagons as she can stow, and the remainder will follow in a packet soon after.

"I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"T. CROSS, Major and Quartermaster, United States Army.

"Lieut. CHARLES DIMMOCK, Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. A., Savannah, Georgia."

"WASHINGTON, February 8, 1836.

"SIR: Annexed is a bill of lading of six wagons, shipped to you on board the schooner 'Ida.' On their arrival please send me a receipt for them, and also for the two previously forwarded. There are on board this vessel two extra covers and two extra fifth chains, spreads, and swingletrees, for the wagons shipped by the 'Oglethorpe,' thus making eight wagons complete. Some of them are poor things, but ill suited to the service for which they are designed. I could do no better, however, under the circum-

stances of the case. There are two more new ones in preparation, which will be shipped in a few days, making ten in all, and corresponding with the ten sets of harness for five horses each sent by the brig 'Arctic.'

"I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"T. CROSS, *Major and Quartermaster, United States Army.*

"Lieut. CHARLES DIMMOCK, *Assistant Quartermaster, Savannah, Georgia.*"

Question 3, by Major General Scott. Did you communicate the advice so received to Major General Scott—where, and about what time?

Answer. I did so, at Savannah, soon after his arrival at that place, by showing him the letters of advice above mentioned.

Question 4, by Major General Scott. What number of those wagons, with sets of harness, came to you at Savannah? About what time were they respectively received and shipped by you to Florida?

Answer. Two of them I found on my arrival at Savannah on the 7th of February; these two were shipped on that or the next day to Picolata. On or about the 7th of March I received six more; they were shipped on or about the 8th of March, to Lieutenant Dusenbury, assistant quartermaster at Picolata. About the 1st of May I received two more wagons, which were shipped within a day or two thereafter to Lieutenant Dusenbury, at Picolata. All these were received from Major Cross, and were those referred to in his letters of advice. All the wagon fixtures came with the wagons, but not the harness. By the brig 'Arctic,' which arrived on the 24th of February, there came fifty collars, fifty pairs of hames, one box of harness, and other articles. These were passed immediately from the brig into a steamer destined for Picolata. The box of harness was, in consequence of haste, not examined.

Question 5, by Major General Scott. About what time did the first shipment of bacon, destined for the army in Florida, reach you at Savannah, and when was the first transshipment of bacon for Florida made by you?

Answer. On the 3d of April I received the first shipment of bacon, which came by the ship "Newark" from New York; this was marked for Lieutenant Searight, assistant commissary of subsistence at Savannah, without invoice or instruction. The invoices addressed to Lieutenant Searight went to that officer at Gary's Ferry, and were sent to me by that officer ten days after the arrival of the bacon. The first transshipment of bacon made by me for Florida was on the 4th of April. The quantity thus transhipped was very small, in consequence of the means of transportation being very limited at the time. No more was made, except upon order, as that was the instruction received from Colonel Crane, then commanding at Picolata.

Question 6, by Major General Scott. Are you aware that any bacon had been previously shipped direct to the St. John's or St. Augustine?

Answer. I have no knowledge of any having been previously shipped.

Question by the judge advocate. What amount of transportation in horses, mules, oxen, wagons, carts, or other vehicles, was furnished by you and sent to Florida between the 7th of February and, say, the first week in March? Please specify the time the articles were respectively sent, and whether they were furnished on the requisitions or orders of Major General Scott; and, also, whether all the requisitions or orders for transportation made on you by Major General Scott were complied with.

Answer. All the requisitions or orders of Major General Scott, or other officer connected with the Florida campaign, for means of transportation made on me, were complied with, with the exception of two boats, which could not be obtained.

From the 8th of February to the 31st of March I purchased	7 wagons.
Received from Major Cross.....	8 wagons.
	—
Making a total of.....	15 wagons.
	==

These were all the wagons required of me during that time. They were sent to Florida as follows: On the 7th or 8th of February two were sent to Lieutenant Dusenbury, at Picolata. On or about the 4th of March two were turned over to Captain Wharton, at Savannah, who was then on his march to Florida across the country. On the 8th of March six were sent by steamboat to Lieutenant Dusenbury, at Picolata. Finally, on or about the 16th of March five were sent to Lieutenant Dusenbury, at Picolata. These were all four or five-horse wagons except two, which were two-horse wagons.

I received, on or about the 10th of February, from Augusta—

Purchased there by order of Major General Scott.....	151 horses.
Purchased by me at or near Savannah.....	65 horses.

Making in all.....	216 horses.
	==

Of this number I turned over to Captain Gibson, of the South Carolina volunteers, on his march to Florida across the country, on or about the 2d of March, fifteen pack-horses. On the 4th of March I sent across the country to Florida, in charge of conductors, fifty-eight horses. On the 4th of March, again, I turned over to Captain Wharton, for his command, in all one hundred and six horses. On the 8th of March I sent by steamboat to Picolata eight horses. On or about the 16th of March I sent to Picolata eighteen horses; making in all forwarded two hundred and five horses. Two died under my charge at Savannah, and nine were retained sick and disabled; making in all the two hundred and sixteen as above. Harness in excess was sent for all the wagons at the time the wagons were forwarded. This means of transportation was furnished at the time ordered, and forwarded as soon thereafter as possible. The horses received from Augusta I was ordered by Major General Scott to retain until Captain Wharton's command of dragoons should arrive at Savannah; out of them he was to select his mounts, which he did on or about the 4th of March.

Sworn to before me.

S. COOPER, *Judge Advocate and Recorder.*

Deposition of Colonel James Gadsden, late quartermaster general in the army of Florida.

The undersigned, having been summoned as a witness on a court of inquiry in relation to the operations conducted by Generals Scott and Gaines during the Seminole war in Florida, and being unable to attend, submits to the court, in writing, the recollection of events, so far as they came under his personal observation.

He joined the army as a volunteer, and at the request of Major General Scott; on his route to headquarters at Picolata, on the St. John's river, he ascertained at Newnansville that General Gaines had marched from the bay of Tampa to the Withlacoochee; was there entrenched with his whole force, and reduced to extremities by the enemy. The undersigned, therefore, turned from his direction and proceeded to Fort Drane. At this post he found General Clinch deliberating on General Gaines's communications, and, after some consultations with the officers in camp, it was determined to march to his relief. Provisions to the extent of the transportation to be obtained were taken with us. On our approach to General Gaines's camp a party of Indians were seen moving with a design to turn our left flank or to retreat before us. They were promptly charged by Major McLemore's mounted men, and driven into an adjacent hammock. While preparations were making for dismounting and continuing the pursuit an officer appeared from General Gaines's command, and reported that the general was in consultation with the Indians, and about concluding a treaty with them. General Clinch therefore desisted from any further hostile movement, and took up his quarters on the left, on General Gaines's entrenched position. That night a messenger from the Indians hailed from the opposite side of the river, asking whether they should come on the next morning and continue the talk, and whether Clinch's men would be pacific and not fire on them. Having been assured as to the latter, and replied to affirmatively as to the former, an inquiry was then made whether the day after would not answer, as it was the wish of the Indians on the Withlacoochee to hold a conference with their head chief, Micanopy, then thirty miles off, before they could come to any terms with the white men. General Gaines replied, through his agent, that he would prefer their coming over the next morning; but if that could not be done, the day after he would positively expect them. The next day and the day after expired, but no Indians made their appearance, and every indication in the vicinity of their camps was that the hostiles had vanished. The army remained in position three or four days, when General Gaines concluded to transfer the command to General Clinch, and proceed with his staff to the western frontier. On assuming the command, General Clinch evacuated the post on the Withlacoochee and retired on Fort Drane. The army had exhausted their scanty supply, and were suffering before the movement was made. General Gaines's portion, which had been marched from Tampa, had endured heavy privations, and the officers and men were so reduced that it was by *short* marches and at a slow pace that they could gain the depot at Fort Drane. A day after our return General Scott arrived at Fort Drane, having moved from Picolata and Black creek, with all the disposable force at those places, and as such provisions as transportation could be provided for, with a view of supporting General Gaines, or of relieving him from his position on the Withlacoochee. Learning, however, that this had been effected, he halted these additional troops at plantations in the rear, where the supplies had not been exhausted, and recommenced the work of preparing for a campaign against the hostiles. The deposit of provisions at Fort King had been consumed by General Gaines, and those at Fort Drane were reduced to the last extremity. General Gaines's army added, unexpectedly, upwards of 1,100 officers and men to be provided for, on a frontier already exhausted, and which could only be supplied from depots from 65 to 70 miles distant, by land carriage. In deposit at this time at Fort Drane, the supply did not exceed six or eight days' rations, for about one-half of the force which was intended to compose Clinch's command, and General Scott seemed strongly impressed with the opinion that to move against an enemy whose plan was concealment and retreat, with less than thirty days' rations, would render the issue very doubtful. The provisions which he had thrown in advance had been unexpectedly consumed, and his remaining reliance was on what he could transport in time from the rear. To make the movement to accord with those ordered by the other portions of the army, moving from other quarters on the Withlacoochee, after fifteen or eighteen days' toil, with everything put in requisition by the quartermaster, something like sixteen days' supply was brought to Fort Drane; and as the season was getting late for operating in Florida, General Scott concluded to move on this supply. Previous to leaving Fort Drane, he despatched a Major Watson, from Georgia, to the Creek nation for a detachment of friendly Creek warriors, with directions to join him at Tampa, (early in April,) believing that they were essential as bloodhounds would be to trail out the hostiles, who had been too successful hitherto in eluding the white man. On the 26th General Scott, with the right wing, marched with the Withlacoochee, crossed that stream on the 28th and 29th, encountered a small party of Indians the next day, pursued them through the labyrinths of the Holathlekaha, and drove them across the Withlacoochee, and in the direction towards which the left wing of the army was supposed to be moving. As Eustis's signal gun had been heard that morning, little doubt was entertained that he would encounter the fugitives. Scott continued his examinations through the thickets and windings of the river and Lake Holathlekaha for three or four days, burning the deserted villages, when, not meeting with or hearing from either Eustis or Lindsay, he presumed that in flushing the enemy they had been encountered by those officers who were in hot pursuit of them to the Everglades. Having reached the south end of the lake, and our supplies nearly exhausted, Major Cooper, with his battalion of Georgia volunteers, was left with twelve or fifteen days' rations, in position, to watch the reappearance of the enemy in that quarter, while General Scott continued his march for Tampa, by the route of the Chickuchatty settlements, all of which were destroyed. At Tampa, Eustis's and Lindsay's commands arrived on the same day. At this point Scott expected, as he had ordered, fresh horses for transportation and the arrival of the friendly Creeks, but was disappointed in both—the former denied in consequence of a report at New Orleans, confirmed by his reception in Tallahassee, that Gaines had closed the war, and the latter prohibited by the United States agent from joining us, as reported by Major Watson. Scott was therefore compelled to remain longer than he had intended, to recruit his animals, then not in a condition to resume operations. On the return *hunt* after Indians the army was divided into several parts, so as to multiply the chances of success. Colonel Smith, with the Louisiana volunteers, was directed to Charlotte's harbor, where some depredations had been committed on one of the islands, and the custom-house officer murdered; he was likewise directed to penetrate Pease creek, and to give that coast a general examination. To General Clinch was assigned the duty of relieving Major Cooper, and on his march to scour the south bank of the Withlacoochee. Colonel Lindsay was to penetrate between the Withlacoochees, the forks of which had been represented

as one of the hiding places of the Seminoles; and General Eustis, after making a detachment towards the settlements on the heads of Pease creek, was to return by Pelaklikaha and the Ochlawaha to Volusia. Major Read, with the Florida detachment, was assigned to the service of looking into the mouth of the Withlacoochee, and of penetrating that river as far as was found practicable or deemed prudent on his part. How these movements were executed the reports of the respective commandants will explain. They were, however, without favorable results; and after many weeks of trials, privations, and sufferings, particularly among the Floridians and Carolinians, who were subjected to the additional affliction of sickness in camp, originating in measles, which assailed, without discrimination, nearly one-third of the respective commands, we found ourselves in the same position from whence we started—the enemy unsubdued, because he could not be found, the season too far advanced for another *hunt*, and the times of service for the volunteers and drafted militia on the eve of expiring. They were dismissed, and such a disposition given to the small army of regular troops, reduced alike by sickness and suffering, as was supposed calculated to cover the frontier, until other arrangements could be made for resuming operations.

The history of the block-house, on the Withlacoochee, in which a gallant body of men so nobly sustained themselves for upwards of six weeks against the combined force of the Seminoles, is this: Major McLemore *sought* the service, by a private letter to the undersigned, stating that he had, on the Suwannee, a boat suitable for the expedition, and supplies, which he could bring with him to that point, if with the consent and approbation of General Scott. The following is the reply penned by me, and by the direction of the general, to whom it was read before transmitted:

“FORT DRANE, *March 25, 1836.*”

“*Sir:* I am directed by Major General Scott to inform you that this division of the army will advance to the Withlacoochee to-morrow. The other wings are approaching the same point from the respective rendezvous at Volusia and bay of Tampa, and the whole army will probably form a junction at or near that river by the 29th or 30th instant. It is impossible at this time to anticipate the ulterior operations of the army, after it has encountered and defeated the enemy in their probable stronghold in the *cove* or swamp of the Withlacoochee. It is more than probable, however, that we may be detained in that vicinity many days, reconnoitring the hammocks and searching for Indians in the jungles and thickets of that section of country. If so, your co-operation, and the supplies which you report you can bring, may prove of essential service. I am directed, therefore, by the general commanding, to say that after securing the post on the Suwannee with an adequate garrison, you *may* proceed with the remainder of your command, in the boat you have prepared for the service, provided, in addition to your supplies, you can transport from seven hundred and fifty to one thousand bushels of corn, at least, for the use of the army. Should your boat be properly secured, as you report, with bulwarks, you may enter the river and ascend to the rapids at or near Lieutenant Graham's old camp, which will be within ten or twelve miles at furthest from Camp Izard, General Gaines's entrenched position, and where this wing of the army will probably cross the Withlacoochee. You must be at that point by the 30th *instant*, or you will probably be too late to afford any aid to this wing of the army—the sole motive which sanctions the service to which you have been called. You will fire a volley of musketry as you enter the river, and volleys each morning at 9 o'clock, as you ascend, and after you have reached the *point* to which you have been directed, until responded to by a gun from the right wing of the army. It is expected that you move with great caution, in no instance exposing your men unnecessarily, or your boat or command to capture. It is possible that you may meet at or near the Withlacoochee, with the cutter Dallas, Captain Green, ordered by the governor of Florida on the same service now assigned you, and if so, you will communicate with him, and co-operate in the duties which may be so important to the military operations now carrying on in Florida.

“As your movement is intended to assist and not to embarrass this wing of the army, you must not move without an adequate supply of ammunition, and from thirty to forty days' rations for your whole command, at the least, in addition to the corn you may transport for our relief. If, after providing for your own subsistence and that of the detachment left for the defence of the Suwannee old town, there be a surplus of pork or bacon at the posts, it would be very acceptable to this army, marching, as it has been forced to do, on supplies reduced below the quantity which otherwise would have been desirable. On reaching the point on the Withlacoochee designated, you will use all due precautions to secure your boat and command by building a block-house, or by the construction of some other defence, until you hear from or of the army. If, after, however, the 2d or 3d of April, you receive no tidings of or from this wing, under the command of General Clinch, you may be sure it has proceeded *south* to unite with Eustis and Lindsay; and having left the Withlacoochee, your detention on its waters will be no longer necessary. You will therefore return without delay to your post on the Suwannee, and there await the future orders of the commanding general, or those which may be transmitted to you by the executive of Florida.

“By order of Major General Scott.

“JAMES GADSDEN, *Quartermaster General and Inspector General.*”

“Major McLEMORE, *Suwannee old town.*”

It appears, however, from information received from one of the men who was in the block-house, that the detachment did not reach the mouth of the Withlacoochee until the 4th or 5th of April, two days after it had been ordered to quit it, and when General Scott had crossed that river and was many miles *south* on his march to Chickuchatty. Notwithstanding, however, its fearless commander, and on his own responsibility, penetrated the river, established a block-house, and left it garrisoned, with a promise to return and relieve it in eight or ten days. Unfortunately, however, as he entered the Suwannee, he was assailed with a fever, and fell a victim to its effects. His successor, not advised of his intentions, never sent the boat back, and to the above melancholy event (the unexpected death of Major McLemore) may be justly attributed most of the misfortunes and sufferings of the gallant little band in the block-house.

The above are matters of narrative and fact. If opinions are sought or expected on this occasion, I can only give those as of a private individual—that the failure of the campaign is to be found in a combination of causes, of which the principal are—

First. The premature, ill-advised, and ill-organized movement of General Gaines; his leaving New Orleans without adequate transportation; his abandoning the most ample resources at the bay of Tampa, and from whence a blow might have been struck with effect against the Pease Creek and Tohopkelika Indians, to march upon an exhausted point, consuming supplies in depot for other troops, and demon-

strating on the Withlacoochee, without decisive or favorable results. The route of his march to the Withlacoochee was unnecessarily lengthened, adding to his embarrassments, and by heading the river, placing that stream between him and the enemy—while at Tampa he was on the same side of the river with the enemy, and not more than seventy-two miles from their supposed concealment on the Withlacoochee. By the route of Fort King he had one hundred and thirty-one miles to march, and was opposed, finally, by the river to meet the enemy. Intrenching himself was strongly recommended as giving security, particularly at night, to his men; but not to sally out and offer battle, and drive the Seminoles from before his camp when annoying it, operated most unfavorably on the confidence of our own troops, while it emboldened that of the enemy. General Gaines had the opportunity offered him of striking a blow which might have terminated the war.

Second. False and unfavorable positions assumed on which to base offensive operations against the Indians. They were interior, too far from the supposed strongholds of the enemy, and too remote from the depots of supplies. Forts King and Drane being about thirty to thirty-five miles from the Withlacoochee, and the former eighty-five and the latter sixty-five from the points of deposit on the St. John's; the road likewise unfavorable, rotten, and muddy in some places, and exceedingly sandy in others. It was next to impossible to supply an army under such embarrassments and from such remote points with the limited means at command. The true positions would have been on the Withlacoochee and higher up the St. John's; both points to be supplied by water, and both within the limits of the nation, from whence a *hunt* could have been taken at any time, and trails of Indians pursued with success whenever discovered.

Third. Insufficiency of transportation, both in animals and vehicles—many of the latter furnished were ill calculated for the object.

Fourth. Insufficiency of the proper rations for Indian wars; flour, pork, and beans sent, instead of hard bread and bacon; the latter not only more acceptable to the troops engaged in the contest, but as lighter, admitting of the greater quantity being carried in the smaller compass. Had we had these, it is very possible the war might have been terminated, as we could, with the transportation at command, have marched into the nation with twenty-five days' rations instead of but sixteen, on which we were compelled to move, and the army would have had nine days longer to operate—multiplying the chances of falling in with and overtaking and beating the enemy.

Fifth. The want of the friendly Indian allies, who were not only important in communicating with the enemy and as guides, but indispensable as bloodhounds to trail the enemy to their concealments. There would have been no doubt of the issue could we have discovered the enemy; but understanding their game, they eluded our strong parties; took to the jungles and the hammocks of the country, and disappeared when pursued. The troops we had, though always ready for the combat, were little possessed with such instinct, so necessary in Indian wars, of finding and following the moccasin track. Had the Creeks been with us to search out the enemy, the *white man* would speedily have disposed of them; but their aid was denied, and by the government agent.

Sixth. A general mistake as to the character of the contest, and a belief that the enemy would combine, and that the contest would be terminated by an operation or a battle. The Seminole understood his *play* better, and soon found where his strength lay. With great capacity for combining and for dispersing, he adopted at will that which would best secure him victory over small parties or insure retreat before the larger. It was an insurrection among the Indians, with a design of strengthening their power by a servile contest. Settlements were attacked, the negroes carried off, and the masters murdered. The guerilla warfare was resorted to; every hammock echoed with the war whoop, and from every bush flashed a rifle. The contest on our part degenerated, therefore, from a *war* into a *hunt*, in which the enemy had to be sought as you would seek for the lion or the tiger, with the hazard of being sprung upon from every jungle or thicket. Our true game, therefore, was not to move in masses, but in parties of sufficient strength, thus multiplying the chances of flushing the enemy and of keeping him at bay, if you could not whip him, until reinforced by one or the other of the hunting parties. In this opinion, however, though often expressed, I was not supported in the army generally. The massacre of Dade and other successes of the enemy had produced impressions unfavorable to dispersion. General Scott's plan of campaign, therefore, was generally approved, and was certainly well devised to catch and enclose the enemy on the Withlacoochee, but *badly* or *not* executed at all. The right wing, where Scott was personally present, performed its part; was true to *time* in its movements, and not only flushed the enemy and drove them across the Withlacoochee, but scoured the south and west bank of that stream, with most of the swamps and intricacies of the Holathlekaha lake. The other two wings did not advance to the points to which they were directed, on the eastern and southern swamps of the cove—the causes explained, I presume, in the official communication of the respective commanders.

This want of concert and co-operation was fatal to the plan, however well conceived. In the latter operations the army was divided into five instead of three parts; but the lateness of the season, the reduced condition of the men from privations and sickness, and of the horses from starvation and work, all precluded those vigilant and active movements so necessary to find an enemy determined to avoid us, and in possession of a country affording such facilities for concealment.

JAMES GADSDEN.

Sworn to before—

THOMAS GADSDEN, *Notary Public.*

Deposition of Francis D. Newcomb, late a lieutenant of the 4th regiment of infantry, and assistant quartermaster at Tampa Bay.

Question 1, by Major General Scott What was your official connexion with the army at Tampa Bay in April, 1836?

Answer. I was assistant quartermaster, and in charge of all the duties of the department at that place.

Question 2, by Major General Scott. If any, what means of land transportation for army supplies had you received from the quartermaster, then at New Orleans, in March and up to the 17th of April?

Answer. I had received none within that time, but subsequently to the departure of the army with General Scott there were received at Tampa Bay, about the 1st of May, sixteen mules and a few carts or

wagons, These, however, would not have been sufficient for the purpose for which they were required. They were sent in answer to a letter calling for about fifty wagons and two hundred horses.

Question 3, by Major General Scott. What was the cause, if you know any, why the means of land transportation which had been demanded of the quartermaster at New Orleans, expected at Tampa Bay, were not received at the latter place before the 17th of April? If the witness received on the subject any letter from the quartermaster at New Orleans, please produce the letter, or state where it is at present, and give its contents from memory.

Answer. From a communication which I received from New Orleans in relation to transportation I believed the reason for its non-arrival at Tampa Bay was caused by an impression received by the quartermaster at New Orleans that the war had been terminated, and that impression I communicated to General Scott. The reason that this impression was conveyed to my mind is this: in the same communication, speaking of other means of transportation, to wit: the schooner "Motto" and her equipment, the writer recommended a reduction of the number of hands employed on board of that schooner, assigning as a reason that he had understood from good authority that the war was over, or words to that effect. I received the letter alluded to above from the quartermaster at New Orleans, and I suppose it to be now with some papers belonging to me at my father's, in Massachusetts. I have written to my father to send the letter to my address at this place, (Frederick, Maryland,) to the care of General Scott, who is authorized to open it in my absence.

[The letter referred to was subsequently to the taking of this deposition received by Major General Scott and by him handed to the judge advocate of this court. It is in the following words, to wit:

"ASSISTANT QUARTERMASTER'S OFFICE, *New Orleans, March 25, 1836.*

"DEAR SIR: Enclosed you will find the receipts of Captain Gaty, of the schooner 'Motto,' for seventy-five dollars, which I have advanced to him on your account, as I have no papers to enable me to make a settlement with him. I fear he has not sufficient command over his crew, and as they say he knows nothing of navigation, perhaps on his return you can get a more suitable person. The crew can be very much reduced now, as the war is over. I wish you to look to the armament of the schooner. I am responsible for all. Please send me receipts for seventy-five dollars.

"I am yours, truly,

"J. CLARK, *Assistant Quartermaster.*

"Lieutenant F. D. NEWCOMB, *Assistant Quartermaster United States Army, Fort Brooke, Florida.*"]

Question 4, by Major General Scott. What was the quality or condition of the corn received by you from the quartermaster at New Orleans, and by you issued to the horses of the army at Tampa Bay in April last?

Answer. A great part was very bad, and had been damaged, some probably on shipboard, and some probably before leaving New Orleans. It was all more or less damaged, except some bags, which were clean and sound. I was compelled to give the supply to the army, because there was none other.

Question 5, by Major General Scott. State generally what means of water transportation and debarkation were provided by you, by order of Major General Scott, for the expedition commanded by Major Read, and which proceeded by water from Tampa Bay to the Withlacoochee river.

Answer. I provided, for the transportation of the troops under Major Read, two schooners of probably about 200 tons burden, at any rate amply sufficient for the number of troops to go on board. They had with them each a ship's boat, as means of debarkation. I also provided, for the latter purpose, a small schooner of about three feet draught of water, equal to 200 barrels burden, having also with her a yawl. I further provided, for the same purpose, a small sloop, of light draught of water, carrying a pilot for the expedition; this sloop had also a yawl. As a further means of debarkation, I expressly caused to be built a scow capable of carrying upwards of 100 barrels, which was put on board of one of the transports in pieces, all marked, so as to be put together in two hours' time by the ship-carpenters who were hired expressly for the purpose, and who accompanied the expedition, being provided with pitch, oakum, nails, and everything necessary to make the scow complete. Before the scow was put on board I had it put together, to be certain that every part fitted. In addition to these means, provided by me as quartermaster, there was a large ship's boat furnished by the United States ship *Vandalia*, with a midshipman and crew. The pilot mentioned as being on board of the sloop was Captain Bunce, of Florida, one of the most intelligent men on the coast in that country, and highly respectable. I was sent for by General Scott to his quarters, and directed by him to make immediate and sufficient provision for the transportation for Major Read's command to the mouth of the Withlacoochee, and provide the means for their debarkation. There was an unusual degree of earnestness in General Scott's manner of communicating this order. When I suggested some difficulties that lay in my way for such provision, he replied to me: "Sir, you must move heaven and earth to accomplish it." When it was first mentioned to me, I did not think it was possible, but by borrowing a little spirit from the general, I succeeded. From General Scott's manner, I satisfied myself that the expedition was of great consequence, and on which he had placed his strongest hopes.

Question 6, by Major General Scott. With reference to the time and place, could better means have been provided to convey Major Read's detachment by sea to the Withlacoochee, and to enable it to ascend that river?

Answer. I certainly could not have made better provision elsewhere than I there made, nor should I have felt it necessary to make better had I been where the most ample means could have been had.

Question 7, by Major General Scott. At the time Major Read's expedition left Tampa Bay did you yourself entertain a reasonable doubt, or are you aware that any other officer doubted, that the means of transportation and debarkation were sufficient to give success to that expedition?

Answer. I did not doubt the sufficiency of the means myself, nor do I know that anybody else did. I do not think that Major Read himself doubted, although he attempted to find some fault with the means. Sworn to before me.

S. COOPER, *Judge Advocate and Recorder.*

Owing to the absence of two important witnesses, whose testimony General Scott was desirous of obtaining before taking other parol testimony, and as these witnesses could not reach the court before to-morrow, the court adjourned to meet at half-past ten o'clock to-morrow morning.

DECEMBER 6, 1836.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

The court was occupied to-day in examining documentary testimony presented by Major General Scott, which will be found accompanying these proceedings.

The court adjourned to meet to-morrow at half-past ten o'clock.

DECEMBER 7, 1836.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

Colonel WM. LINDSAY, of the 2d regiment of artillery, a witness on the part of Major General Scott, having been duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by Major General Scott.* Where was the witness stationed at the commencement of present hostilities with the Seminole Indians, and what measures in general did the witness suggest and recommend to the authorities at Washington and of Georgia on account of those hostilities?

Answer. I was stationed at the arsenal, Augusta, Georgia, and hearing of the massacre of the party under Major Dade, together with a rumor that General Clinch was surrounded and beset, I deemed it proper to make a call upon the governor of Georgia for 3,000 troops. I invited the assemblage of two volunteer companies, and ordered off to the relief of General Clinch. These companies were from Augusta, and were Robertson's and Bone's. They were forthwith sent off. I made an application to the War Department for 3,000 knapsacks, to be forwarded to Savannah or Picolata, I do not recollect precisely which, for the 3,000 men, should the governor of Georgia send them into the field. I received for answer to this application, from Major Garland, having charge of the Clothing bureau, that my application for knapsacks had been referred to the Secretary of War, who decided that there was no law authorizing the furnishing the militia or volunteers with knapsacks. The corporation of the city of Augusta, through the banks, (the Bank of Augusta principally,) advanced \$10,000 for the purchase of the necessary equipments for the two companies mustered by me into service and sent off to the relief of General Clinch. I also sent to General Hernandez, in East Florida, a number of cartridges, such as the arsenal afforded, which he reported to be unfit for use. I had furnished also, on the requisition of Governor Eaton, something like 600 or 700 stands of arms, together with ammunition for them, and the transportation (by wagons) for them to Tallahassee. I take occasion here to observe that this transportation, which I then procured from Tallahassee, were the only wagons or teams I saw on the campaign; none others were furnished by the quartermaster's department to my portion of the army. These wagons and teams which I sent to Tallahassee were taken up by Colonel Gadsden and sent to Tampa Bay. These were the only arrangements which I recollect to have made prior to the arrival at Augusta of Major General Scott.

2. *Question by Major General Scott.* In asking for the knapsacks, was it because you knew that the militia in that part of the Union were generally without knapsacks, and do you consider knapsacks as necessary for militia as for regular troops?

Answer. I knew they were without knapsacks, and that they could not procure them. I consider knapsacks as necessary for militia as for regular troops; even indispensable.

3. *Question by General Scott.* What was the amount of fixed musket cartridges in the Augusta arsenal at the beginning of this year, and what was the quality of the musket powder there?

Answer. I cannot answer the first part of the question precisely as to the number. The musket cartridges which I found there, and which I distributed to General Hernandez and sent to Governor Eaton, had been in the arsenal, as far as I could trace, about sixteen years; the powder out of which they were probably made was subjected by me to the proof of the eprouvette. A good deal of it was found to be proof powder, but it was so much decomposed by age that it was not rapid enough for muskets or rifles; in fact, it would hang fire so much as to destroy its utility for small arms.

4. *Question by General Scott.* Did the witness purchase powder for musket cartridges, and why that purchase?

Answer. I did cause to be purchased powder for muskets and rifles, for the reason that the powder at the arsenal was unfit for the use of muskets and rifles, although it might answer for cannon.

5. *Question by General Scott.* Did the witness serve in the Seminole campaign of 1818?

Answer. I did.

6. *Question by General Scott.* You have also served against the same Indians in the present war? State the comparative difficulties presented to our troops in the two wars by the difference in the nature of the country west of the Suwannee and southeast of the Withlacoochee.

Answer. I have. The country east of the Suwannee is infinitely more impracticable than the country west. In the first place, the country is intersected by a river—the St. John's—running from south to north nearly its whole length, which is exceedingly difficult to pass under any circumstances, but almost impracticable in the presence of an enemy. Nothing is more easy than for the natives of the country to evade an army operating upon either side of the river, say the western, by passing over to the eastern side of the river. The country is also intersected in its greatest length by the Withlacoochee river, which is also an impracticable stream, difficult to cross under any circumstances, but more particularly in the presence of an enemy. The banks of both these streams are lined with extensive marshes and hammocks, and the whole country is interspersed with extensive hammocks, savannahs, and marshes. These hammocks constitute so impenetrable a thicket as that an Indian who gets perhaps ten feet in them is not to be seen afterwards, and cannot be overtaken. The country west of the Suwannee had partially some of these features, but the hammocks, swamps, and savannahs are comparatively insignificant. As regards facilities for obtaining forage, the country west of the Suwannee abounded with reed-brakes, which constitute fine food for horses. I have never seen one east of the Suwannee. The only resource we found for our horses east of the Suwannee was fresh burns, as they are termed, affording a very scanty supply of young grass.

Question by the court. Do reed-brakes furnish food for horses at all times of the year; if not, at what periods?

Answer. They furnish food for horses at all seasons of the year.

8. *Question by General Scott.* On the arrival of General Scott at Augusta, towards the end of January last, had you a very particular conversation with him on the subject of the war he was about to conduct—on the possible numbers of the enemy—his mode of warfare—the number and description of troops necessary to put down the war; and what was the information and advice you gave on that occasion?

Answer. I had a conversation with General Scott on the subject of the war he was about to conduct. Our conversation was directed to a consideration of the probable force of the enemy. I thought it seemed to be the impression of General Scott, as derived from the War Department, and, as I understood, explicitly communicated to him by the War Department, that a small force and a small expenditure of money would only be required to put down the Seminole Indians. From my previous knowledge that one of our most successful commanders, General Jackson, for the purpose of conducting a war the principal object of which was to drive the Seminoles from the Georgia frontier, had carried into the field a force amounting to perhaps six thousand men, I was induced to represent to General Scott that the nation had not diminished in numbers, and that if such a commander as General Jackson deemed it necessary to carry such a force against the Seminoles, I begged him not, by any means, to attempt the reduction of that nation or tribe with a much inferior force, and that I thought he ought to have at least five thousand in the field, a large portion of which should be mounted infantry. I then asked him for what term of service he had been permitted to call out his troops; he answered that he was permitted to call them out for three months only. I earnestly requested him to try and obtain an extension of the term, alleging that nothing but defeat and disaster could follow military operations which were to be carried on by men having only three months to serve. He replied that he was not permitted to make a requisition for a military force for a longer term.

9. *Question by General Scott.* What advice did you give General Scott on the subject of *detachments* in the proposed campaign, and on whose practice was that advice founded?

Answer. I advised him never to detach under any circumstances. I believe I mentioned to General Scott, at the same time, that I had derived that advice from General Jackson, who, upon some occasion, when I wanted to go upon detached service, made use of this emphatic expression: "Sir, I never detach against Indians." I had landed with a regular force at Fort Gadsden, which I thought competent to take the garrison of St. Mark's. General Jackson's destination was at that time in another direction, and I begged permission to go and take the garrison of St. Mark's, which was a Spanish post. I was left at Fort Gadsden, with my force, which was about 130 or 140 regulars, and the general directed me to stay there, and not move until I was joined by 1,200 mounted Tennesseans; and he then observed that he never detached, or never suffered small parties to march through the Indian country. I don't think that the post of St. Mark's was defended by more than sixteen men at that time; it was taken three or four days afterwards by General Jackson's army, and I don't think we found more than sixteen men in it.

10. *Question by General Scott.* Among the examples of General Jackson's practice in respect to *detaching*, did you not, in the same conversation and advice, mention the case of sending a detachment with the sick of the army; and what were the circumstances of this particular detachment?

Answer. I did. After the battle of Micasuky, as it was called, I was ordered down from the neighborhood of the Micasuky ponds to assume the command of Fort St. Mark's, and was directed to take charge of the sick and wounded of the army, amounting to about sixty, and carry them to St. Mark's, where there were hospitals and comforts for the sick. I received my order about *reveille* in the morning from General Jackson in person, who said to me, "I put the sick and wounded in your charge, and require you to take them to St. Mark's. As you are marching with so small a force, (I had the same command, about 130 or 140,) I think it proper to inform you that you will be perfectly safe from attack, as Captain Gordon, of the spies, has explored the route on both sides of you from here to St. Mark's, (distant about 35 miles,) and has seen no signs of the hostiles."

11. *Question by General Scott.* Was no additional force added to your own 130 or 140 men for escorting the sick on that occasion?

Answer. I think not. Out of the sixty sick, it was calculated by myself that probably forty would be capable of bearing arms in case of attack.

12. *Question by General Scott.* Was your march on that occasion in the rear of the main army?

Answer. Precisely; for the main army had just before marched from St. Mark's to Micasuky; had an engagement there with the enemy, and was passing on to the Suwannee river when I was detached back to St. Mark's.

13. *Question by General Scott.* In your first advance from Tampa Bay, in March last, what were your means of land transportation?

Answer. I carried over thirty horses, which I purchased in Mobile myself. I think I found there perhaps eight or nine wagons, being the same which I had sent from Augusta to Tallahassee. It required two wagons to conduct the ordinary business of the post of Tampa Bay, as the road was two or three miles distance, and a great deal of hauling at the post required. I think I found there six wagons for the purposes of the campaign, capable of averaging about 1,600 or 1,700 weight apiece with the teams which we had. It was reported to me there that General Gaines had carried off all the available horses; and if it had not been for the horses which I brought with me I could not have used the wagons at all.

14. *Question by General Scott.* Were your means of transportation for your expedition into the interior from Tampa Bay, in the month of April, about the same, or greater?

Answer. I think I had one or two wagons more. Everything was called a wagon; some two-horse wagons, and some nondescripts, which might have been peddlers' carts for what I know.

15. *Question by General Scott.* Had you, on either expedition from Tampa Bay into the interior, all the necessary means of transportation required by your column; and if not, what proportion of your wants had you in the means of transportation?

Answer. These wagons constituted, together with a few pack-horses, my whole means of transportation. One of them for each expedition was devoted to the carriage of ammunition, (musket-ball cartridges and rifle powder;) the rest, after carrying as many rations as they would carry, each had to carry the corn and hay for its horses; the tents for the party, such as we could procure; camp equipage for the command, consisting of camp kettles and a variety of cooking utensils; such spades as might be wanted, if any; and, with my command, axes—for I was afraid to trust the militia with them, because they would lose them or throw them away. The consequence was, that the only provisions which could be carried on a march consisted of what could be carried on the soldiers' backs, together with what could be carried in these wagons. As the militia invariably threw away their provisions, more particularly when they were required to carry more than, say, four rations, I had to look to these six or seven wagons for carrying the provisions for my army, to enable my army to keep the field. On my march to Chick-chatty my provisions were out on the tenth day; and had it not been for accidentally killing Indian cattle, I should have been compelled to return to Tampa Bay without reference to the enemy or his movements. I was unable to keep the field for want of transportation.

16. *Question by General Scott.* In the arsenal at Augusta, at the time you left, in February, were there any musket accoutrements; and if so, how many?

Answer. I think there were none.

17. *Question by General Scott.* What does the witness know of the quantity of hard bread and bacon at Tampa Bay between the 5th and 17th of April, 1836, (independent of what the witness brought with him from Mobile;) and was the hard bread and bacon equal to more than a few days' supply for the different columns?

Answer. I had brought a supply of hard bread and bacon for my own command. General Scott, in failure, I presume, of adequate supplies for the armies of Generals Clinch and Eustis, ordered me to give up to the common stock the hard bread and bacon which I had brought for the use of my own force. I don't know what supply General Scott had; but I do know that I had not more than five days' supply after the redistribution made by General Scott of the bacon and hard bread which I had brought with me.

18. *Question by General Scott.* Is the witness aware that General Scott failed in any particular, in point of zeal, activity, and judgment, to do all that was possible, under the circumstances, to give success to the war against the Seminole Indians?

Answer. In respect to General Scott's activity and zeal, I bear testimony to his unbounded devotion to the interests and honor of the service, disregarding on his own part every sacrifice which was involved by the calls upon him for labor and privation in a course of the most severe and perhaps arduous duty in which an officer could be engaged. With respect to his judgment, I cannot conceive a more judicious plan of operations than that which was concerted in the movement of the three columns; and had it been possible to coerce such an enemy, who fled before us in all directions, into an actual conflict, the measures adopted by General Scott would seem to me to have been the only ones which were capable of producing that result. I therefore cannot consider that there was a failure of the campaign, but that the public was necessarily disappointed when they formed the belief that a country four hundred miles long and one hundred and eighty broad could be reduced by a *coup de main* with troops called out for only three months, but who actually served only thirty days, and the means of transportation for keeping which in the field, and in the presence of the enemy, even during that thirty days, were always inadequate.

19. *Question by General Scott.* It has been said that the war against the Seminole Indians was successfully ended on the west bank of the Withlacoochee before the 10th of March last. Did the Seminoles meet at different times by your command show that they had been previously subdued, or the reverse?

Answer. I had nothing but evidences of unabated hostility from them to the very last moment I staid in Florida.

20. *Question by the court.* Will you state to the court your opinion of the causes that prevented the subjection of the Seminole enemy in the campaign conducted by Major General Scott in 1836?

Answer. I have already stated that to reduce a nation occupying such an extent of territory, with the peculiar topographical features belonging to it, was necessarily a work of more time than was allotted to General Scott for the performance of it. I mean in respect to the term of service of the militia. I will explain what I mean by the limit of time. This consisted, first, in the short duration of the term of service of the force with which he was operating. It would have been, however, limited also by the nature of the climate, which is so prolific of disease from the month of April as that military operations, could they be carried on, would be necessarily attended with great waste of human life; but, in all probability, would be necessarily suspended by the climate. But in addition to these circumstances, General Scott found himself hampered by acting upon a scale of things which had been laid down for him by others, and which scale of things he could not alter. For instance, he was acting upon a base-line of operations of two hundred miles in length with the single advantage of a depot at each extremity of this line—say one at Picolata, and the other at Tampa Bay. His intermediate depots, if any such had existed, must necessarily have been supplied from either Tampa Bay or Picolata. The only means of carrying these supplies, as there was no water communication on the whole route of two hundred miles, was by wagonage, in a country which had neither horses nor wagons, other than such as the quartermaster's department might supply. I myself attempted, with the inadequate transportation which I found at Tampa Bay, previously to receiving any definite instructions from General Scott, to establish two depots in advance of my position—one on the Hillsborough, twenty-three miles from Tampa, and one on the Withlacoochee, twenty-five miles beyond the Hillsborough. Could I have succeeded—had I had adequate transportation—I should have enabled General Scott's army to keep the field as long as he might think proper, and also General Eustis's army as long as he might choose to keep the field. But for want of the transportation to establish these two depots, I could not effect the object; and General Scott, for instance, having no intermediate depot between Fort Drane and Tampa Bay, nor General Eustis between Volusia and Tampa Bay, both were prevented by the exigency of circumstances from continuing as long on the fighting ground as would have been necessary to strike the enemy with any considerable effect. It is a fact that most of our parties were capable of carrying not more than about ten days' provisions; that it generally took us five days, say, to get within striking distance of the enemy, who had only to keep himself in covert for two days before his invader was forced to retire from his presence to avoid starvation. It is my belief that General Scott, having found this base of operations thus constituted, had not the means of altering the position of things beneficially—he had not the means of establishing the intermediate depots, or the time, if he had had the means, to effect the change in the existing disposition of things. As it regarded the country covered by General Scott's troops, I do not hesitate to say that no army ever sent out by the United States has ever covered more ground and made more active and painful marches. But from the simple fact that the Indians had only to remain two or three days under cover, without fighting, until our provisions were exhausted, we were never able to bring them to battle.

The court adjourned to meet to-morrow at half-past ten o'clock.

DECEMBER 8, 1836.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

Colonel Lindsay's testimony continued, in answer to the last question.

Amongst the causes which would operate to prevent the reduction of the Seminole nation by rapid military movements, it may be stated that, from the nature of the climate, they have no towns or villages, and very little agriculture, as the earth and the waters spontaneously produce all the food necessary for their subsistence in the field. They were hemmed in on no frontier by the whites. In this respect they

differed from the Creek Indians, for instance, who, if beaten on the Georgia frontier, would be equally repulsed on the Alabama frontier, should they seek refuge there. But the Seminole Indians might flee from the Gulf of Mexico to the Atlantic, and from the Wacassa to the Everglades, without meeting with a white enemy. In consequence of the climate, they could construct temporary habitations with the palmetto, which would keep out the sun and turn the rain, in less time than a white man could pitch a tent, if he had it. Heretofore our operations against Indians have been successful in proportion as we could move in upon their villages and cornfields and burn or destroy them; but the Seminole climate and country left us no such means of military coercion. Another cause of the failure of our operations against the Seminole Indians may be found in our total ignorance of a country which, although near to us, was as much unknown as the interior of Africa. Neither could we procure guides who were at all acquainted with the country. The friendly Indians alone presented themselves to us for that service, who I conscientiously believe were interested in misleading us; consequently, as it regarded my own movement, I never knew anything of the country in advance of my pioneers. In the conversation with General Scott at Augusta I suggested to him the propriety of organizing a spy corps, to consist of some two hundred or three hundred mounted men. I endeavored, in reference to my own movements, to form a spy corps, in order that I might see a little in advance of my pioneers. I issued an order to organize such a corps, and I found, from the scarcity of horses, that I could not mount nine men. So small a corps being totally inadequate for the purposes which I wished to effect, I abandoned the attempt. I was also so scarce of horses that though frequently on my march I could see to the right and left droves of Indian cattle, I was compelled to suffer them to pass; and only in a few instances, where the officers of the command lent their horses to the persons ordered to drive these cattle into camp, could I obtain any at all. I do conceive that the transportation was totally inadequate to the wants of the campaign.

21. *Question by General Scott.* The witness spoke of the want of a sufficient number of competent guides. Was it practicable for the witness to have found at Tampa Bay, or in Florida, better or more competent guides than those he actually obtained?

Answer. When I arrived at Tampa it was stated to me that General Gaines had taken off all the guides, Indians and others, upon his march to the north. I found actually none there, although I hired some individuals, who pretended to some knowledge of the country, in the capacity of guides, though they were actually as ignorant as myself of the topography of the country, and none better or other could be obtained.

22. *Question by General Scott.* Did you find any road open in your operations in Florida, (other than the Fort King road,) or had you to open roads for your marches?

Answer. I found no other road open than the Fort King road, and my pioneers early opened all the roads over which I marched.

23. *Question by General Scott.* What was your observation in respect to the capacity of troops, regular or militia, to march, each man with a knapsack, musket, ammunition, and four days' subsistence on his person, as late as the 20th or 25th of April, in reference to the heat of the climate in the country southeast of the Withlacoochee?

Answer. I think about that time both description of troops became so much exhausted by four o'clock in the day (for both had been *bivouacking* for about ninety days, and whether they were marching or at rest were equally exposed to the weakening influences of the climate) that a much inferior force at that hour of the day, fresh, would have had decided advantages in a conflict with any portion of the army with which I was in contact. The heats of Florida from April out are exhausting and desolating.

24. *Question by the Court.* If the country furnished ample means of cover and of subsistence by the spontaneous productions of the earth and water for the Seminole warriors, why could not the white troops in the same country cover and supply themselves by the same means, and thus pursue the enemy and keep the field?

Answer. The subsistence said to be obtained by the Seminoles consisted principally in a root called "conte," which, by a certain preparation unknown to soldiers, and which is withal very tedious, yields a farinaceous substance called arrowroot. Few of our troops were acquainted with the plant when they saw it, nor do I think any but an Indian could have subsisted upon it. The Indians, besides, have resources of fish and game which we had not leisure to take. With respect to the habitations constructed of the palmetto leaf, I anxiously endeavored to induce the company officers to have their men instructed in the construction of these habitations; but, after weaving the thatching for a roof, we found in no instance that they would turn rain, and we abandoned the attempt for want of skill. One other resource of the Indians consisted in large herds of cattle, which were driven into the swamps and hammocks, in advance of all our movements, for concealment; and so successful had they been in hiding this property that, although I subsisted my own army on junk beef for four days, all that time I never killed a bullock or anything but a milch cow.

25. *Question by General Scott.* Were not many of the Alabama regiment discharged by you in the month of April on account of disability; and was not that disability produced by the effects of the heat and the climate?

Answer. Yes. I marched out with the Alabama regiment, something like 812 strong, on my first march; on my last, the same regiment consisted of about 460, and at this last period there were 400 sick with the dysentery at Tampa Bay; all of which I attributed to military movements in a malignant climate.

26. *Question by General Scott.* The witness has spoken of the dispersion of the Indians—was not that state of dispersion favorable to the subsistence of the enemy?

Answer. Highly so. They had only to retreat upon their swamps, where they had plenty of cattle; upon the ponds, where they had plenty of fish; and upon the woods, where they had plenty of the "conte;" and in no instance did I ever learn that any portion of the hostile force carried provisions with them on their march.

27. *Question by General Scott.* In reference to the surface of the Seminole country, what were the facilities of the enemy in concentrating after dispersion?

Answer. They were very great, as connexions of hammocks and swamps would enable them to traverse the country in almost any direction concealed from us.

28. *Question by General Scott.* In any instance was the column under your command, or any part of it, on meeting the enemy, defeated or repulsed, or was the enemy in every case repulsed or driven?

Answer. In every case the enemy was repulsed and driven.

29. *Question by General Scott.* What sutler's stores did the witness find at Tampa Bay; did any arrive during his stay there, and did not the troops, officers, and men suffer much from the want of such stores?

Answer. When I first arrived at Tampa Bay, which was about the 6th of March, there were the remains of the sutler's stock, and I understood that the sutler had gone to New Orleans to replenish that stock. On my march to Fort Alabama and return, I found the stock had diminished considerably. On my march to Chickuchatty and return, about the 4th of April, I found the stock entirely gone—that is to say, I could get a gill of whiskey for half a dollar; and with regard to all those articles of comfort which a soldier might want, whether of clothing or diet, there was literally nothing in the sutler's store. I did understand that Mr. Morris, the sutler, had gone to New Orleans to replenish his stock, and learning there that General Gaines had subdued the Indians and forced them to sue for peace, he did not think it necessary to bring on another supply, and none was brought during my continuance at the post. There was considerable suffering among the troops and officers for want of sutler's supplies. There was not, within my knowledge, any other shop or store of any sort at the post.

Brevet Brigadier General ABM. EUSTIS, a witness on the part of Major General Scott, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by General Scott.* How many days' subsistence was the witness enabled to take with his column on its advance from Volusia upon Pelaklikaha, and why was the quantity limited to — days?

Answer. Thirteen days; no more could be carried for want of means of transportation. Five days' rations were carried by each individual, and subsistence for eight more for each man was carried in the wagons.

2. *Question by General Scott.* Was there a full supply of hard bread for witness's column on the St. John's at the commencement of his advance on Pelaklikaha, or was he obliged to substitute a portion of flour; and had any bacon arrived before the commencement of that march?

Answer. The column under my command never had a full supply of hard bread. It was not to be obtained. I had no bacon. I was of course obliged to take a portion of flour.

3. *Question by General Scott.* Did the enemy meet with by the troops under the witness's command show a disposition to treat or surrender, or the reverse?

Answer. The appearance of an enemy was always announced to me by their firing upon my advanced guard. There was no disposition shown to treat with us, or to have any communication with us.

4. *Question by General Scott.* In respect to hard bread and bacon, what were the means of supplying the witness's column found at Tampa Bay?

Answer. I received at Tampa Bay, by dint of great solicitation, from the commanding general, about five days' rations of bacon for the column under my command. There was still a deficiency of hard bread; but it is my impression that I marched from Tampa Bay with about eight days' rations of bread and some flour. A considerable portion of the hard bread was baked by the men of my command in ovens which were constructed at Tampa Bay while we were there.

5. *Question by General Scott.* Had not the witness reason to believe that the hard bread and bacon issued to his column were in exact proportion to the issues made to the other troops?

Answer. I believe so. I know that a portion of the bacon was taken from Colonel Lindsay's command, which he considered as belonging exclusively to them.

6. *Question by General Scott.* What part of your column was marched by you to Tampa Bay, and what portion halted in the interior; how long did your mounted men and wagons remain at Tampa Bay; and did you consider that delay as indispensable in order to recruit your cavalry horses and those of the baggage train?

Answer. The part of the column that was marched into Tampa Bay consisted of Colonel Goodwyn's regiment of mounted South Carolina volunteers; the portion halted sixteen miles distant from Tampa Bay consisted of a battalion of 1st regiment United States artillery, under Major Kirby, about 190 men; a company of South Carolina volunteers, (Captain Elmore's) about 100, and Colonel Brisbane's regiment of South Carolina volunteers, about 500. The horsemen remained at Tampa Bay about 12 days, from about the 5th to the 16th of April, inclusive; during that time the wagons belonging to my column, or a portion of them, made one trip from Tampa Bay to Fort Alabama, on the Hillsborough, to make a deposit of provisions and forage, and one trip to the camp of the foot soldiers, with provisions for them. When I reached the camp, within 16 miles of Tampa Bay, the horses of the mounted Carolina regiment, of the wagon train, and of the artillery, (for I had two pieces of artillery,) were so much exhausted for want of forage that I found it necessary to cause them to be led, not ridden, to Tampa Bay for forage. I consider the delay at Tampa Bay as having been indispensable, in order to recruit those horses, and that they were not fit to move one day earlier than they actually did move.

7. *Question by General Scott.* How did you find the grazing for horses generally in your marches through Florida?

Answer. Almost none. The grass was so scanty upon the burns that it required a range of at least three acres to afford subsistence for one horse. This was on the march downward. It was somewhat lessened on the return march.

8. *Question by General Scott.* What was the quality of the corn and long forage issued to the horses of your command at Tampa Bay?

Answer. The hay was very good generally; the corn, much of it, heated, and so bad that the horses refused it.

9. *Question by General Scott.* Do you recollect anything of a proposition submitted through the officers of Colonel Goodwyn's regiment at Tampa Bay to take on the horse of each officer and man three bushels of corn in the next movement from that place; and what was the result of that proposition?

Answer. I remember such a proposition being made, and conversing with Colonel Goodwyn about it. The result of the conversation was, that if such order were given, it would not be obeyed, and could not be enforced.

10. *Question by General Scott.* What quantity of corn was finally taken, upon an average, by the mounted men of your column, on the march from Tampa Bay?

Answer. They were ordered to take five pecks for each horse, but it is my belief that they did not actually carry more than three.

11. *Question by General Scott.* What detachments were made from the witness's column on the return march from Tampa Bay?

Answer. Colonel Goodwyn's regiment was detached to Pease creek, about fifty miles from our line of march to the south. I do not recollect any other detachment until we arrived at Volusia, when a detach-

ment of two companies of mounted men, and about sixty in boats, was ordered to Spring Garden, on the St. John's. The party in the boats did not succeed in reaching the point of destination; the horse, however, did succeed, and scoured the neighborhood. General Scott also moved himself with a detachment in a steambot up the St. John's. I had forgotten to mention that two days before I marched for Volusia General Scott had gone in advance, with two companies of mounted men, to Volusia.

12. *Question by General Scott.* What does the witness recollect of General Scott's wish that the left wing should extend its search for the enemy as far to the east as Lake Tohopkelika; and was it possible, with the means of transportation and subsistence at the witness's command, to make that swamp without imminent hazard of being several days without subsistence?

Answer. General Scott more than once expressed a wish that the wing under my command should strike a blow upon the party of Philip, the Indian chief, who was said to reside near to the Lake Tohopkelika. During my stay in Florida I never was able to find an individual who had ever been at that lake. I am not sure now that it is not an imaginary lake. I am certain there was no individual with the left wing of the army who knew where to find it. With the means of subsistence and transportation within my control, and without a guide, I thought it little less than madness to attempt to go in pursuit of a lake of which nobody knew anything but by report, and I feel quite sure that the troops under my command would not have gone.

13. *Question by General Scott.* The witness has spoken of the proposition made to his mounted regiment in respect to corn to be taken on horseback. Was not that proposition connected with the proposed march around the supposed Lake Tohopkelika?

Answer. My impression is, at this moment, that Colonel Gadsden, who was the chief of General Scott's staff, and who appeared to be better acquainted with the topography of Florida than any individual I saw there, wished the column under my command to march southerly from Tampa Bay, by a lake which he described to be the headwater of Pease creek, and thence round the headwaters of the Ocklawaha, so as to endeavor to find this said Lake Tohopkelika; but he did not pretend to know precisely where Lake Tohopkelika was. I think it was in accordance with this wish of Colonel Gadsden that the proposition was made to Colonel Goodwyn.

14. *Question by General Scott.* What guides had the witness for his movements in Florida? Were they in sufficient number, and qualified for the service, and could the witness have obtained better guides?

Answer. The only guide whom I could procure was a drunken negro, named Ben Wiggins. I offered high prices but could obtain no other. His knowledge of the country extended as far as Pelaklikaha. I had not an individual with me who could lead my column one step beyond the road to Fort King, southwest. I had no friendly Indians with me, no scouts, no spies, no guides, except the one named, and he would get drunk whenever he could get liquor.

15. *Question by General Scott.* With a full supply of hard bread and bacon, how many days longer could you have kept the field in your march upon Tampa Bay, with your means of transportation, and how many days longer on your return march to the north?

Answer. I could, as it was, have kept the field longer than I did, in marching to Tampa Bay; my subsistence would have lasted two days longer; I could have kept the field with bacon, I suppose, about three additional days. I mean that the weight of nine days' rations of pork in barrels would have been equal to twelve days' rations of bacon, I think. I tried to lessen the weight of the pork by drawing off the brine, and also by taking it out of the barrels and carrying it in bulk in the wagons; but the heat of the climate at mid-day spoiled a good portion of that which was thus treated.

The court adjourned to meet to-morrow morning at ten o'clock.

DECEMBER 9, 1836.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

General Eustis in continuation.

The detachments which I have already mentioned as being made from my column on the return march from Tampa Bay were made by the express command of General Scott. When Colonel Goodwyn received an intimation that his regiment would be ordered to Pease creek, he came to me to request my intercession with General Scott that they should be excused from that duty, expressing great doubt whether his horses would be able to accomplish it, and the extreme reluctance of his men to go upon the expedition, assuring me, however, that if they were ordered they would obey. After conversing with General Scott, I informed Colonel Goodwyn that my intercession was in vain, and advised him to wait on General Scott in person on the subject. He did so, and immediately after his interview with the general, he informed me that General Scott was bent on the expedition, and that he must obey, however reluctant. The companies composing the detachment spoken of from Volusia for Spring Garden were designated by General Scott himself before I reached Volusia; and it was only with great difficulty, by an urgent appeal to the patriotism and State pride of the South Carolina brigade, that I could induce them to obey the order, the terms of service having nearly expired, and all being anxious to return home.

16. *Question by General Scott.* What sutlers' stores did the witness find at Tampa Bay? Did any arrive during his stay there; and did not the troops, officers, and men suffer much from the want of such stores?

Answer. I found no sutlers' stores at Tampa Bay when I arrived there; none arrived while I was there, and both officers and men suffered for the want of them. For myself, from the time I marched from Volusia to my return to it, I had nothing but the soldier's ration, carrying no personal supplies for the want of transportation.

17. *Question by General Scott.* Was there any suffering among the troops of your column—volunteers and regulars—for the want of shoes, jackets, shirts, &c., articles usually found in sutlers' shops or stalls?

Answer. Not to my knowledge.

18. *Question by General Scott.* What practicable road, other than the one from Tampa Bay to Fort King, did the witness find in his operations in Florida, or did he cause roads to be opened by his troops?

Answer. I found a tolerable road from St. Augustine to Picolata, and from St. Augustine south to Tomoca creek; none other than those I have mentioned, except the Fort King road. I did cause roads to be opened by the troops, and bridges to be made. The bridge over the Ocklawaha cost me one entire day, or eighteen hours incessant labor in going to Tampa Bay, and about half that time in returning, part of the bridge being destroyed by the enemy. I had also great difficulty in crossing the two branches of

the Withlacoochee and the Hillsborough; the Big Withlacoochee I bridged; the banks of the line branches of the Withlacoochee and the Hillsborough were so precipitate that horses could not be used in crossing the wagons—they were obliged to be hauled over by the soldiers. The same difficulty also occurred in a palmetto swamp of considerable extent where horses could not be used on account of the bog; the difficulty of crossing this swamp was such as to consume nearly the whole day in getting the wagon train across it; the column, starting at an early hour, was, on account of the difficulties presented by this swamp, unable to accomplish more than four or five miles march on that day.

19. *Question by General Scott.* Some of the witness's troops were a little delayed in arriving at his advance depot, Volusia, and the column delayed beyond the time first proposed for its reaching its position at Pelaklikaha. Will the witness state to the court the accidents which caused these delays?

Answer. Before I had received the orders of General Scott to concentrate my force at Volusia, a portion of the troops constituting the left wing had been extended through a chain of posts as far south as Williams's plantation, on Mosquito inlet, where a small depot of provisions had been established, and where Major Kirby, with two companies of artillery, was posted. A few days after the arrival of the mounted regiment of South Carolinians at St. Augustine, I detached Lieutenant Colonel Butler with four companies (mounted) with orders to pass by the four posts occupied by Colonel Brisbane's regiment, and proceed on to Kirby's post, and thence pursue his route, taking Kirby with him, to Spring Garden, with orders, also, to follow any fresh Indian trail until he could come up with the Indians supposed to be in that neighborhood. I had myself proceeded by water, in a steamboat, by the Mosquito inlet, to Kirby's post, expecting to meet Colonel Butler there, and to give him further instructions. After waiting there twenty-four hours, and Colonel Butler not having arrived, I hastened back to St. Augustine, and there found General Scott's instructions of the 14th of March, directing me immediately to concentrate my force at Volusia. Orders were immediately sent to the advanced posts to hasten their march, and an express was despatched in pursuit of Colonel Butler. I then proceeded to Picolata to execute the instructions of General Scott at that post, and thence by steamboat to Volusia. I reached Volusia about the same time that the head of the column from Tomoca arrived there. The route from Tomoca to Volusia was so very difficult that several wagons were destroyed and left on it, and many of the horses completely knocked up. On my arrival at Volusia, I learned that Colonel Butler with his battalion had been there, and gone off with the only guide, nobody knew where; neither had anything been heard of Kirby's battalion. After waiting several days, and having crossed a considerable portion of my force and baggage train over the St. John's, I ordered a detachment of twenty mounted men, under a subaltern, to pursue Colonel Butler's trail, until he was overtaken, and deliver him my order for his immediate return. This was on the 24th of March. This detachment, after proceeding about four miles, fell in with a small party of Indians, and, after a skirmish with them, returned to my camp without having executed the order. The next day a second detachment was sent on a similar errand, which met Colonel Butler's battalion a few miles from my camp, on their return. On this day, also, the 25th of March, Kirby's battalion reached me by a forced march, having abandoned all its baggage in the swamp. Colonel Butler informed me that on his arrival at Tomoca from St. Augustine, with his battalion, he reported himself to Brigadier General Bull, of the South Carolina volunteers, who was then in command at Tomoca, and communicated to him my orders, directing him to proceed on to Kirby's station; that General Bull countermanded those orders, and peremptorily directed him to proceed immediately to Volusia; that, in obedience to the order of General Bull, he had come to Volusia, and thus having executed General Bull's orders, he left Volusia to execute mine, and proceeded by the way of Spring Garden to Williams's plantation, on Mosquito. On his arrival there he found that the post had been evacuated by Major Kirby; but finding forage and provision for his men, he remained there a day or two to scour the country and refresh his men and horses. During the week that I was thus detained at Volusia, in waiting for the detachments under Colonel Butler and Major Kirby, I was receiving accessions to my means of transportation, to wit: wagons and horses sent by steamboat from Picolata, without which I should not have been able to have carried more than four days' subsistence for the troops under my command. The last of these wagons and horses reached me on the evening of the 25th, and I marched from the west bank of the St. John's on the 26th. The weather for a month preceding had been so very rainy that the whole country was under water, and the first night, after crossing the St. John's, every man in my camp literally slept in the water.

20. *Question by General Scott.* In the witness's operations south of Volusia, had he reason to believe the enemy to be collected into a few considerable bodies, or dispersed into many small parties?

Answer. It is my belief that the enemy was not concentrated in any considerable party. Very small parties and the trails of such were discovered by the troops under my command; but I have no reason to believe, at any time during my operations in Florida, that a party larger than one hundred ever approached any portion of my command—perhaps I should speak within bounds if I were to say fifty. The enemy appeared to be gifted with ubiquity: he was to be found everywhere and nowhere.

21. *Question by General Scott.* What were the witness's observations on the capacity of the troops to execute marches south of the Withlacoochee, loaded with arms, ammunition, and knapsacks, and four days' subsistence, as late as the 20th of April?

Answer. On the return march from Hillsborough river to Volusia, which commenced, I think, about the 20th of April, the troops under my command suffered exceedingly from the heat of the weather, and though the column was generally in motion at the rising of the sun, I was obliged to make long halts at noon, so that I could rarely accomplish more than fifteen miles per day.

22. *Question by General Scott.* In your operations southwest of the St. John's river, from what sources did your men and horses generally derive water for drinking, and what was the state of the ponds on your return march upon Volusia?

Answer. The water was generally obtained from ponds, or, as they are generally termed there, "sink-holes;" and on the return march, the water was very bad, from the ponds being much dried and the great growth of the vegetation around them, the water being nearly a mass of animal life.

23. *Question by General Scott.* About what number of sick and disabled were left by your column at Volusia, Tampa Bay, and Fort Alabama?

Answer. I cannot speak with any certainty, but imagine about three hundred. The measles prevailed more than any other disease. I think that in the course of the three months' service of the South Carolina brigade, (consisting of at first sixteen hundred men,) there were nearly five hundred cases of measles. I should think about one out of five or six who had had the measles was able afterwards to perform duty.

24. *Question by General Scott.* Is the witness aware that General Scott failed in any particular, in point

of zeal, activity, and judgment, to do all that was possible, under the circumstances, to give success to the war against the Seminole Indians?

Answer. I am not aware of any deficiency in the conduct of General Scott, as commander of the forces. I believe that he did all that man could do under like circumstances.

25. *Question by General Scott.* In reference to the surface of the Seminole country, what were the facilities of the enemy in concentrating after dispersion?

Answer. The facilities were very great, owing to the numerous covers, such as hammocks and swamps, which were generally connected as a chain, through which the Indian trails led, so that if small parties were discovered in the pine openings, they could generally take cover before they could be attacked.

26. *Question by the court.* What were the principal causes that prevented the subjection of the Seminole enemy in Florida, in the campaign conducted against him by Major General Scott, in 1836?

Answer. The want of time during which operations could be carried on in the Seminole country; the deficiency of all supplies appertaining to the quartermaster's department, especially the means of transportation; the peculiar nature of the country and of the climate, and the character of the enemy, exhibiting the finest traits of partisan warfare; the peculiar nature of the principal part of the forces employed, and their very limited term of service; the country which was the scene of operations being one entire unexplored wilderness, furnishing neither subsistence nor shelter for man or horse; the want of depots of provisions and forage, prevented the operations of the army being continued to any considerable extent; the entire want of guides and an impossibility of procuring them at any price or by any inducement. When I said the country was unexplored, I meant to convey the idea that it was utterly unknown to the whites in all its features. I have objected to the kind of troops employed during the campaign under General Scott in Florida. Eight-ninths of the troops under my command were militia volunteers, mustered into the service of the United States for three months, more than half of which term had expired before they crossed the St. John's to march into the enemy's country. There were very few individuals among them who had ever seen an Indian, or had ever passed over an Indian boundary. I have said that I had but one guide; there were, however, five other individuals attached to my command who were paid as guides, but who knew literally nothing of the country west of the St. John's, having, I believe, never been there, with the exception of one who had driven a carriage from Fort King to Tampa Bay, on the military road, but had never deviated to the right or left of the road. I have heard the testimony of Colonel Lindsay to a similar question, and I concur fully in the opinion he has expressed.

27. *Question by the court.* Was there a sufficient number of troops at the disposal of General Scott, and under his immediate command, to subdue the Seminoles, had the operations been commenced at an earlier day, and the supplies of every kind amply furnished for the war?

Answer. It is my opinion that there was a sufficient number of troops under the control of General Scott for any operations in Florida against the Seminole Indians. As to the power of subduing them I cannot answer, for they never could be found in numbers to combat; neither do I believe they ever will be found concentrated again.

28. *Question by the court.* Was the supply of arms and ammunition abundant and of good quality?

Answer. So far as related to the troops under my command, yes. I cannot answer for others. With regard to the ammunition, a large proportion of it was prepared at the State arsenal in Charleston, South Carolina, and by Captain Van Ness's company of artillery, which had been detained at Fort Moultrie for the purpose of making cartridges. All my tents and most of my camp equipage, including knapsacks, were obtained on a loan from the State of South Carolina.

29. *Question by the court.* Were the provisions furnished the troops as rations good, wholesome, and abundant?

Answer. I believe so.

CHARLES M. THRUSTON, esq., late a captain in the army, a witness on the part of General Scott, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by Major General Scott.* In what capacity did the witness serve with the Florida army, between, say, February and June, 1836?

Answer. Up to about the 15th of March I was commanding a battalion at Fort Drane, and about that time I began to act as assistant adjutant general of the right wing of the Florida army, and continued so to act until about the middle of May. General Clinch was the commanding officer of that wing of the army throughout the campaign, though General Scott, the commanding general, in person, marched with it to Tampa Bay.

2. *Question by General Scott.* What was the condition of the troops brought by Major General Gaines from Tampa Bay on their arrival at Fort Drane from Camp Izard, and was their strength sufficiently recruited for active operations before the 20th or 25th of March?

Answer. Those troops appeared to have suffered very much by exposure, fatigue, and want. Many of them, upwards of one hundred of the sick and wounded, were left behind at Fort Drane, when the army marched on the 25th of March. The troops of General Gaines's army that did march with us were never, in my estimation, sufficiently recruited to undertake that march. This impression I derived from my own observation, and information derived from the officers belonging to those troops on the march to Tampa Bay.

3. *Question by General Scott.* When the right wing of the army commenced operations from Fort Drane, what was the general belief at the headquarters of the wing, and at General Scott's headquarters, as to the enemy's then position and concentration?

Answer. I did not entertain a doubt, myself, that the enemy was still concentrated about the Withlacoochee, where I believed, and I think it was the impression of others who had the best opportunities of information, that the women and children were there placed for security by the enemy; that they would defend the passage of the river with all their force, as they had done when threatened by General Gaines. I heard no other supposition than that there we should be resisted, and that there the principal battle would be fought. That impression continued with me and others, and I believe generally throughout the wing, until our advance had landed on the opposite bank. I will mention, in support of this opinion, the fact that one of our men was cut off by a small party of Indians, said to be five, within eight miles of Fort Drane, on our first day's march.

4. *Question by General Scott.* Was not the general impression just stated by the witness increased by the *bravado* discharge of arms by the enemy on the arrival of General Clinch's column on the Withlacoochee?

Answer. When we arrived on the Withlacoochee, a single discharge of a six-pounder was given as a

signal gun. It was immediately replied to by a rifle on the opposite side of the river. In the course of that afternoon some volleys were fired by the enemy on the opposite side of the river, and during the night they fired into the camp, from what point I do not know; but, I presume, a distance of from three hundred to four hundred yards.

5. *Question by General Scott.* About what day did the last train of wagons, with subsistence, arrive at Fort Drane, prior to the march of General Clinch's column to the southeast?

Answer. I don't remember the precise day. The wagon-trains, from the 5th day of January, when the train consisted of not more than five wagons, were kept plying between the St. John's river and Fort Drane with the greatest activity and despatch possible with our means, averaging a trip, I think, once in eleven or twelve days, for the purpose of subsisting the few troops there during the great part of the winter, and accumulating a supply to open the campaign with whenever reinforcements might arrive. The train alluded to in the question must have arrived at Fort Drane within two or three days before our march; because it had been arranged that not a single day's subsistence should be consumed there, if it could be avoided. The day appointed for the march was the 25th day of March; but a torrent of rain fell the whole of that day, and prevented until the next morning. For a month, or perhaps more, before the 25th of March, the train had been increasing in strength, by horses and wagons supplied at Picolata and Black creek.

6. *Question by General Scott.* What was the general character of the weather from about the 25th of February to the 25th of March at Fort Drane?

Answer. We had, between those points of time, several, at least five or six northeast storms, very distressing to troops exposed, accompanied with a great deal of rain. We had some cold weather, with ice an inch thick. I will go on to state that there is only one other condition of circumstances (the summer climate) connected with that country so hostile to military operations as that produced by these rains. In the portion of Florida of which I am speaking there may be said to be but one road, that from Tampa Bay to Fort King, which would be greatly injured by them; but where new roads are to be made and marches to be performed the difficulties are immensely increased by them, as we found by subsequent experience.

7. *Question by General Scott.* At Fort Drane, and thence on the march of the right wing upon Tampa Bay, did not the witness participate much in the conferences between General Clinch and General Scott, and in the confidence of both?

Answer. I was honored by the confidence of both those gentlemen. I was very frequently present, by invitation, at such conferences, and at other times both Generals Scott and Clinch expressed themselves, informally, about the condition of things and the operations of the campaign, to me.

8. *Question by General Scott.* What did the witness understand to be the motives and calculations upon which the post called *Fort Cooper* was established?

Answer. According to my understanding at the time, that post was established as a post of observation. In passing up the Withlacoochee river, on the east side, a country of great impracticability against military operations, and therefore highly advantageous to the enemy for his position, presented itself to us. This country, until we saw it, was entirely unknown to us. Not having found the enemy concentrated in any large force, it was thought by General Clinch, I am sure, certainly by myself, that they were still secreted in this pond or cove country. I understood the object of establishing that post there to be to make observation of the enemy's country. Another inducement may have been that many men began to report sick, and became applicants for transportation in the wagons; which state of things, had it increased in the ratio of the previous day, would have prevented our reaching Tampa Bay without establishing a post somewhere on the route. On the morning of the day of establishing that post the wagons began to be so loaded down with sick, and some wounded, that it became necessary to eject from them every article of camp equipage, of the small supply of camp equipage that we had with us, to reduce it to the lowest possible quantity for troops. A strict scrutiny was ordered by the surgeons to discriminate between those of the sick who could march and who could not; General Scott himself, in person, superintending that examination.

The court adjourned to meet to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock.

DECEMBER 10, 1836.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

Brigadier General Eustis again before the court.

26. *Question by General Scott.* Had you any regular staff officer of the adjutant general's, inspector general's, quartermaster's, or commissary's departments, with your wing or column?

Answer. No; with the exception of the adjutant of the 1st regiment of artillery, who was charged with the duties of assistant adjutant general. There were so few officers attached to the battalion of regular troops that I could not withdraw one to serve as quartermaster; but was compelled to intrust all the duties of the quartermaster's department to the regimental quartermaster of one of the volunteer regiments.

27. *Question by General Scott.* In the operations of your column, did it, or its detachments, meet with any repulse or check from the enemy, or was the enemy on every occasion repulsed or driven?

Answer. The column under my command never met with any check from the enemy, and the enemy was always repulsed whenever he appeared, unless the attack upon the post of Volusia, as reported by Major Gates, be considered an exception.

Captain Thruston again before the court.

9. *Question by General Scott.* About what time did General Clinch's column reach Tampa Bay; how many days did it remain in that vicinity, and was that delay greater than was absolutely necessary to recruit the men and horses for renewed operations?

Answer. It reached the Hillsborough river, opposite to Tampa Bay; on the morning of the 6th of April. It remained in position there until the 14th. The delay was not greater than was absolutely necessary to recruit the men and horses. The horses were very little, or not at all, recruited; the corn received at Tampa Bay was so bad that many of the horses refused it; I know that several died in consequence of eating it, and the horse-power of the train was not stronger when we left the position than when we

reached it. On the morning of the day before leaving Tampa all the sick and all the feeble who might be considered unable to undergo the fatigues of another march, in the advanced stage of the season, were carefully selected out and left at Tampa Bay. For the purpose of this selection a board of medical officers was appointed. Many of the volunteers were discharged on account of sickness; such as preferred returning home by water to remaining at Tampa. I don't recollect the number left at Tampa; but I think of "C" and "H" companies of the 3d artillery twelve or fourteen men were left at Tampa. I mention this fact in order that it may be judged of the number of sick generally left there, as I can't recollect the number. These companies were reduced by the action on the 31st of December, in which they had about twenty-five wounded, and some left behind sick at Fort Drane. I think they wanted one-third of being full, each. I speak entirely from memory, without reference to any notes, in respect to all the numbers in this answer.

10. *Question by General Scott.* The wing or column under General Clinch entered and scoured the cove of the Withlacoochee about the end of March. When that column withdrew from the cove, what was the impression of the guides and of headquarters as to the column having scoured the cove to its head?

Answer. I will remark, in the first place, that we had no guides who knew anything of that part of the country. We entered what is termed the cove of the Withlacoochee on the 31st of March, when we were met by the enemy. They were driven across the river some three or four miles, when, believing that we had passed through the ground which appeared to be the most difficult to us and most favorable to them, we returned to pursue our original route, it being impossible to pass any kind of vehicle over the ground through which we chased the enemy. In pursuing our route we discovered a continuation of the same difficult and impracticable country. Finding that description of country continued for twenty miles, and believing then that the body of the enemy might be still secreted there, the post of Fort Cooper was established. There was another motive for leaving a battalion in that country, as we might there deposit the remains of our subsistence, and, by leaving them, return with a larger supply in our train from Tampa, to what we then supposed would be the scene of further operations. I will state, generally, as to guides, that the only person with us who had any knowledge of the country was Colonel Gadsden, who, several years before, had run a line from the Withlacoochee to Tampa; but not by the route which we pursued. We were so ignorant of the country that we arrived and encamped within a mile of Tampa Bay without knowing of our proximity; and it was only by accident that we discovered that night that we were within a quarter of a mile of the Hillsborough. I have heard, from individuals in Florida, that no white man was ever known to have been admitted into what is termed the cove of the Withlacoochee; that the Indians had always been jealous of exposing that country to the knowledge of the white man. That cove is not further from Fort King, at its nearest point, than eighteen miles. Troops have been stationed at Fort King three or four years during the friendly intercourse with the Indians, and not one of them had any knowledge of that cove country. The cove appeared to me, from the knowledge I had of it, to be a large shallow lake, about twenty-two or twenty-three miles in length, occupying a bend of the river, and communicating with the river by cypress swamps on its banks at many places. The breadth of the lake is generally from one to five miles, interspersed with islands of hammock growth and apparent fertility. The peculiar impracticability against military operations arises from the water being too shallow for boating, and the impossibility of passing to the islands, except on foot, through morasses of such depth that our troops, at the three points at which it was passed, were nowhere less than up to the middle. After seeing something of this country, I remember asking General Scott himself if any description could have given him an adequate idea of the difficulties which presented against a military approach. He replied, it could not.

11. *Question by General Scott.* Was the enemy met in the cove, defeated, driven, and dispersed; and what were his probable numbers?

Answer. The enemy was driven and dispersed, at all points, instantly, and chased until he crossed the Withlacoochee river, between three and four miles from the ponds at which the skirmish began; making a stand on his retreat at some two or three points most favorable to him. I estimated the numbers by the firing, and by what I saw, at about one hundred and twenty.

12. *Question by General Scott.* Could the cavalry and artillery have followed the foot of our column in the pursuit; and were not the mounted officers, generally, obliged to dismount and leave their horses?

Answer. The difficulty was so great, although we passed at the most favorable point of the three at which the morass was passed, that only one horse was got over, and he was dragged through by the men. Every officer was obliged to dismount and wade through. The depth of the morass where I passed was about up to the middle, and miry, so that some of the feebler men were obliged to be assisted through by the stronger. General Clinch, himself, was assisted through by the aid of two men. At the other two points at which the morass was passed they had still greater difficulty. This appeared to be the character of the approach to the islands in the lake which we afterwards saw in passing up the outer border of it. These morasses are wet savannahs, grown up with tall saw-grass, ten or twelve feet high in most places.

13. *Question by General Scott.* State to the court the roads, if any, found by General Clinch's column in the Seminole country; and what roads, causeways, and bridges, the column had to open and to construct?

Answer. The road from Fort Drane to the Withlacoochee was known to us, having been made, by General Clinch's command, in the two former expeditions. Beyond the Withlacoochee, towards Tampa Bay, we had to cut out and bridge every step of the road, our route being pursued by a compass. On our first day's march from Fort Drane the road had been rendered so nearly impassable by the heavy rains which I have spoken of, that it was only by the united exertion of the whole column that the train could be passed, being obliged to lay down a considerable portion of the road with small pines. A march of twelve miles on the first day injured the horses and teams more than three days' march would have done over average roads. The route to the Withlacoochee was in very bad order for nearly the whole distance. The route afterwards, to Tampa Bay, was hilly and sandy, and of course very exhausting to the horses of the train.

14. *Question by General Scott.* Please state to the court the quality of grazing, and, generally, the water for men and horses found by General Clinch's column in its operations upon and from Tampa Bay?

Answer. The grazing was very meagre and insufficient on every part of the route; the Indians had been very cautious that the country should not be burned, as is the immemorial custom annually, and without which the grazing generally amounts to nothing. Orders were given on the march to Tampa to fire the country at every half mile, that we might find grazing on our return. On the march to Tampa the water we found tolerable; on the return from Tampa very much worse, unfit for use where any other might be had. A difference of twelve or fourteen days of hot sun occasioned a great difference in the

quality of the water. Our dependence for water was on the wet savannahs and limestone sinks, "sink-holes," as they are termed in that country, all of them grown up with vegetation and teeming with insects. For the want of wholesome water I ascribed, in a great measure, the sickness which occurred on our return march. The number of sick was such that on the third day, on our return march from Tampa, although everything was ejected from the wagons, by a board of officers appointed for the purpose, except such articles as were absolutely necessary for the subsistence of the troops, and retaining only one-tenth per company, (three having been the number per company originally allowed,) that the wagon train could not transport more than two-thirds of the sick; many of the sick horsemen who could ride on horseback not being taken into the account.

15. *Question by General Scott.* In respect to heat after the early part of April, what was your observation as to the capacity of men and horses to take on each, say, four days' subsistence, and to execute ordinary marches thus loaded?

Answer. On our first day's march from Tampa, thus loaded, we had not proceeded five miles before the men began to be greatly fatigued; and although men and horses had been recruited at Tampa by eight days' rest, our return to the Withlacoochee occupied one day more than our march from the Withlacoochee to Tampa. We had not proceeded ten miles on the first day's march before the broken down footmen began to be taken into the wagons. This arose from the heat of the climate and the insufficiency and bad quality of the water. The horses suffered equally with the men; several died on the road in the first three days, and on the morning of the fourth day I remember that five or six were found dead in camp; some were turned out as of no further use.

16. *Question by General Scott.* From what you saw and knew of General Scott's plans, arrangements, and personal conduct, is the witness aware of his failing to do or to attempt all in his power under the circumstances to give success, if possible, to the campaign with which he was charged against the Seminole Indians?

Answer. I can only answer that everything which I saw about General Scott evinced the greatest zeal and devotion for the service. His anxiety appeared at times to amount almost to distress. I believe that no man could have done more. I know that no man could have labored more for success. The delay of a day at Fort Drane, occasioned by the rain, he considered and spoke of at the time as a misfortune to him.

17. *Question by General Scott.* The witness became acquainted with the general plan of operations projected by General Scott, with the benefit of the witness's subsequent knowledge of the enemy and the country occupied by him—what is the witness's opinion of that general plan of operations?

Answer. When I first heard General Scott detail his plan of operations, I thought he had taken more than necessary precautions for advancing into the country with three columns from different points of the peninsula, not doubting that our wing of the army would be met by the enemy in force on the Withlacoochee. Nor did I believe that a nation of five thousand people could conceal itself so effectually in the peninsula south and east of the Withlacoochee that they could not be traced and found by our army. My subsequent experience taught me my error, and to consider General Scott's plan of operations as the only true one.

18. *Question by General Scott.* What, and probably how many Indian villages were destroyed by General Clinch's column; and if any were spared, what was the motive of sparing them?

Answer. I don't remember the precise number destroyed; there were few, probably five or six—I think not so many. The most considerable and the greatest number of villages which we saw on our route had belonged, as it was said, to the families of friendly Indians at Tampa. Those villages were spared because it was thought that their destruction might give them pain. Indian villages are such trifling structures, and so easily replaced, that I did not deem their destruction of the least consequence.

The court adjourned to meet on Monday morning at half past 10 o'clock.

DECEMBER 12, 1836.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

Colonel WILLIAM DE PEYSTER, a citizen of Florida, and witness on the part of Major General Scott, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by General Scott.* In what capacity were you with the army in Florida, and were you not much about the headquarters of General Scott, from his arrival at Tampa Bay till towards the middle of May?

Answer. I was a volunteer aid to General Eustis, and was frequently in company with General Scott at his quarters after his arrival at Tampa Bay, sometimes during the presence of General Eustis.

2. *Question by General Scott.* Did the witness happen to be present when Major Read called on General Scott on the subject of the expedition to the mouth of the Withlacoochee, and what were the instructions reiterated by the said Scott on that occasion?

Answer. I was present when Major Read called there the day before he embarked. On the subject of transportation he wished to procure more. After that subject was discussed, General Scott commenced giving him instructions concerning the examination of the mouth of the Withlacoochee, and its soundings and course up to the first obstruction, which I believe is twelve miles. General Scott tried to impress on him the extreme importance and absolute necessity of having a sketch of the river to the falls or obstruction. He requested him to make a sketch of it; if he could not do it himself, he might have some one under his command who could; and however rough it might be, it would be of importance. General Scott likewise, in the most impressive manner, particularly so, urged the importance of selecting a situation where wood was convenient, to establish a post or depot for a future campaign. General Scott's manner was such as was likely to have great effect on Major Read, and was evidently so intended.

3. *Question by General Scott.* Was nothing said to Major Read of selecting a site as high up the river as practicable, with reference to wood, for any post that might become necessary in future operations?

Answer. The instruction given to Major Read was to select a site for a post as high up the river as the obstruction or falls—twelve miles from the mouth; the object being to have a post as far up the river in the interior as practicable.

4. *Question by General Scott.* Were there sutlers' stores and supplies found by the troops with which you served at Tampa Bay; and if not, did you learn the cause of the deficiency?

Answer. There were very few sutlers' stores there, and on inquiring of Lieutenant Morris, the commissary, and brother of the sutler, how it occurred, he told me that information had been received at New Orleans, whence the stores were to be shipped, that the war in Florida had been terminated by General Gaines on the Withlacoochee. I got the same information from a storekeeper at Tampa, who stated to me further that, but for the disappointment in not receiving goods, he might have made ten or twenty thousand dollars. There were no stores there except a very scant supply of groceries, which did not last two days.

5. *Question by General Scott.* Was the witness in the way of learning the wants on the part of both officers and men of sutlers' goods at Tampa Bay and the complaints made on this subject?

Answer. I saw and felt the wants. We had absolutely nothing but the ration. We were in want of clothing of every description, both officers and men. Our transportation was so limited that I was forced to carry my own clothing and bedding, which consisted of a coat and blanket, on my horse. The soldiers suffered extremely for want of shoes, jackets, hats, and other articles. We were consequently much worse off on our return march from Tampa.

Question by the court. What soldiers suffered for the want of hats, shoes, and shirts; were they the regular or volunteer forces?

Answer. The volunteers suffered more than the regulars on account of not having a knowledge of campaigning, and were less provident of clothing. I am not certain that the regulars suffered from want of clothing, perhaps they did in the article of shoes.

6. *Question by General Scott.* Did not the volunteers suffer from the want of thin jackets and pantaloons in the place of the woollen brought from the north?

Answer. The volunteers and regulars both suffered on that account; they had no thin clothing.

In consequence of the absence of several important witnesses the court adjourned to meet to-morrow at half past 10 o'clock.

DECEMBER 13, 1836.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

Owing to the absence of several important witnesses, and in order to save time, the court determined to go into the investigation relative to the Creek campaign, and was occupied until the 15th instant in examining the documentary testimony offered by the judge advocate, having reference to that campaign.

DECEMBER 16, 1836.

The court met. All present.

The investigation into the failure of the Seminole campaign was again resumed.

Captain GREEN, of the revenue service, a witness on the part of Major General Scott, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by General Scott.* In what capacity was the witness employed in the months of February, March, April and May, 1836?

Answer. In the months of February and March last I commanded a revenue cutter on the coast of Florida, and was generally in the neighborhood of Tampa Bay and St. Mark's, and on the coast between those two points. The object of my being there was to co-operate with the army, and to render every assistance in my power. From April to May I was employed in conveying transports containing the Louisiana volunteers from Tampa Bay to Charlotte's harbor. From thence we went on an expedition up the Mica or Pease creek.

2. *Question by General Scott.* Did the witness happen to be at Tallahassee about the 16th March last; and what propositions were made by him to the territorial authorities respecting the lower part of the Withlacoochee river?

Answer. I was at Tallahassee about that time, and at different periods. I made an application to the adjutant general of Florida, who was acting in the absence of the governor, for permission to visit the Withlacoochee and to reconnoitre in that vicinity. I was desirous that he should furnish me with small vessels for that purpose. He gave me full authority to do so, and I proceeded immediately to St. Mark's, and was making preparations to proceed on the expedition, and obtained a pilot who was familiar with the waters in that neighborhood. I had contracted likewise for a vessel, and was ready to proceed.

3. *Question by General Scott.* Was it the purpose of the witness to enter and explore the Withlacoochee for some distance up, and with what views?

Answer. I was anxious to explore the Withlacoochee and in that vicinity, as I thought it an important position in the operations of the army. I thought it the best point that supplies could be taken to the army in its operations at that particular time, in consequence of General Gaines's position. We had just received information from Tampa Bay, just before I arrived at St. Mark's, that he was on the Withlacoochee, surrounded by Indians, without provisions, and cut off from all communication.

4. *Question by General Scott.* What prevented the witness from proceeding from St. Mark's on his proposed expedition to the Withlacoochee?

Answer. The day that I should have proceeded I received letters from Tallahassee from the adjutant general informing me that it was then unnecessary to visit there, and directing me to another quarter to convey a letter to Tampa Bay. I sent that letter, however, by one of my boats to Tampa, and still kept the cutter at St. Mark's. I received likewise a letter from Major Willis, the collector at St. Mark's, but who resided at Tallahassee, stating that it was unnecessary to proceed on the expedition; that General Gaines had beat the enemy, and put an end to the war, and would be in Tallahassee on that or the next day.

5. *Question by General Scott.* Does the witness mean to say that his purpose in wishing to go on the expedition to the Withlacoochee was merely to convey supplies to the troops of General Gaines, or was it also to reconnoitre that river with a view to the pending war in general?

Answer. It was for both reasons. In the neighborhood of the Withlacoochee is the Anclote keys, and we were some time in doubt whether the Withlacoochee emptied itself into the Gulf just at the Anclote keys, where there is a fine harbor. I have since discovered, however, that that is not the case. I wished to reconnoitre the place for information generally in reference to the campaign. We could get no information unless by actual observation, as the maps and charts I found were all very inaccurate. I

was induced to think, from one of the maps in my possession, that the Withlacoochee emptied itself into the Gulf near the Anclote keys; but that is incorrect; it does not enter there, but, on the contrary, about thirty or forty miles from them, and in the direction of St. Mark's.

6. *Question by General Scott.* Was not the report mentioned by the witness, that the war had been finished by General Gaines, generally believed at St. Mark's and Tallahassee, and particularly after the arrival of that officer at Tallahassee?

Answer. I returned from St. Mark's to Tallahassee, and there I understood generally that the war was terminated. General Gaines arrived while I was at Tallahassee, and I saw his *entrée* into the town. There was much rejoicing, and everything was calculated to induce the belief that the war with the Indians was terminated. This was the prevailing opinion, although I myself was not decidedly of that opinion.

7. *Question by General Scott.* But for the belief that the war had terminated, would not the witness have proceeded on his expedition, notwithstanding that General Gaines's troops were no longer on that river?

Answer. Certainly; I should have proceeded but for this belief.

8. *Question by General Scott.* To what place did the witness next proceed in his cutter from St. Mark's, and for what purpose?

Answer. I went from St. Mark's to Tampa Bay. I had with me one of General Gaines's staff, Captain McCall, and Captain Armstrong, of the transport schooner "Motto." I took them to Tampa Bay. Captain McCall had accompanied General Gaines on the campaign in Florida, and had arrived with him in Tallahassee.

10. *Question by General Scott.* Did not the witness, on a subsequent visit to Tampa Bay, state to General Scott generally the substance of his testimony relative to the witness's desire to visit the Withlacoochee, for the purposes which have already been stated by the witness?

Answer. When I met General Scott at Tampa Bay I found him exceedingly anxious to obtain information respecting the Withlacoochee and the coast along and in that direction. I informed him that I had made repeated application to be directed to reconnoitre in that direction, and was once on the eve of proceeding from St. Mark's to do so; but that my destination was altered in consequence of information received respecting General Gaines's movements on the Withlacoochee—I mean I was prevented at the time I was at St. Mark's. I was always anxious to make this reconnoissance, but some contingency or other prevented it.

Question by the court. You stated that you had letters from the adjutant general and Major Willis informing you that General Gaines had terminated the war, and that in consequence it was not necessary for you to proceed. Have you those letters with you?

Answer. I have not. I believe those letters are with my baggage, which is expected daily in Baltimore. The letter from the adjutant general did not state that the war was terminated, but that the expedition was unnecessary. The letter from Major Willis stated that the Indians were flogged, or something to that amount, and that, "thank God, the war was over."

Captain THISTLE, a citizen of Louisiana, and witness on the part of General Scott, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by General Scott.* In what capacity did the witness serve in the war against the Seminole Indians, and between what dates did the witness serve in that war?

Answer. I commanded a company from Louisiana called the Louisiana Volunteers, Colonel Smith's regiment. We commenced raising on January 23, and we were on our march February 3. I think it was on the 4th I was introduced to General Gaines on board the steamboat on our way to Florida. I continued under the command of General Gaines until March 9, when he turned his command over to General Clinch. I continued in the campaign in Florida until some time in May, when I embarked at Tampa Bay on my return home.

Question by the court. What knowledge have you of the campaigns in Florida? Be pleased to state, by way of narrative, what you saw, and what part you took in those campaigns.

Answer. We took up our line of March from Tampa Bay to the Alafia river, and from thence to Fort King. Nothing particular happened on our march; we saw no enemy. We buried Major Dade's command on February 22, and arrived at Fort King on the 23d. We were all destitute of provisions; some companies had been out of provisions three days before our arrival at Fort King. This was because we were in want of transportation from Tampa Bay. We had been informed before we arrived at Tampa that there was plenty of transportation there. On our arrival at Fort King we found the fort destitute of provisions and ammunition, except a few barrels of sour corn meal and a few barrels of rusty pork, which did not add much to the health of our half-starved men. General Gaines, at Fort King, sent a despatch to General Clinch, at Fort Drane, for provisions, and General Clinch arrived at Fort King with seven days' supply. I understood from General Clinch that these provisions were sent on for the use of General Scott's army, and that he (General Clinch) did not know of our being in the country until a few days previous. I understood also from General Clinch, and from his aides, that every effort was making to get provisions from Picolata to Fort Drane, and that the roads were at the time almost impassable. We started from Fort King on February 26 with seven days' rations; we had received no ammunition there. On the morning of the 27th we arrived on the bank of the Withlacoochee. The advance guard, as they were reconnoitring the bank for a crossing-place, were fired on by the enemy; one man was killed and several wounded. On the 28th a detachment under Lieutenant Izard was sent down five miles below, at Camp Izard, for the same purpose. That detachment was also fired on, and Lieutenant Izard killed. On the 29th I was called on early in the morning by General Gaines's aide to take command of a detachment of 160 strong, (50 volunteers from the regulars and 110 from the volunteers, part from my own and part from other companies.) I was charged by General Gaines to use a good deal of caution in getting on the river bank undiscovered. We were sent there for the purpose of watching the movements of the enemy while we were erecting a block-house near the river bank. I had succeeded in getting my men well secured (hidden) when I heard a heavy fire in the rear, which I took to be an attack on the camp, and it proved to be such. After one or two volleys the enemy made their appearance on the opposite side of the river in front of the men I had secreted. The fire was immediately opened by my men, and a very brisk fire from the enemy was returned; they numbered, I suppose, at that time about 400 Indians. About half an hour after a recall was sounded, but the fire was continued so briskly that I did not think it

prudent to withdraw my men from their cover. About half an hour after a second recall was sounded, when the enemy having withdrawn from the river bank I returned to camp with my detachment, and there learned from Colonel Twiggs that the camp had been surrounded (on three sides) by the enemy, and that they had come to the conclusion that my party had been cut off and was massacred. On my return to camp there were 250 to 300 Indians firing scattering shots into the camp from a considerable distance. General Gaines was wounded on that occasion. We were fired on also that evening and the next day, (March 1.) It appeared to me that on March 1 there were about 1,200 Indians and negroes surrounding the camp. Some scattering shots were fired on March 2. I think it was the evening of the 2d or 3d that the negro Abraham hailed the camp, and said they were tired of fighting and wished to make peace. He requested that the next day, being Sunday, we should do no work; he then withdrew, and afterwards hailed us a second time, and remarked that on Monday they would meet at 10 o'clock and have a big talk and make peace. On Monday they met about 250 yards from the camp. Captain Hitchcock and Captain Barron went out and held a conversation with them; they inquired particularly as to our situation, whether we had provisions, and brandy, and tobacco; they said they could supply us with provisions in abundance; that we could fish on the river bank if we chose; and that they would fight no more if they were permitted to keep the opposite side of the Withlacoochee, making that river the boundary. Our provisions gave out about March 1, and it was on the 2d we commenced killing our horses and one dog for subsistence. The men all appeared in good spirits, and willing to bear starvation if they could have the honor of conquering the Indians. On the 4th the Indians again met and wished to hold a conference with us; but they were informed by General Gaines that he could not make a treaty unless they laid down their arms. He advised them to keep peaceable, to kill no more inhabitants, and to submit to the agents who would be sent on by the government; that a large army was expected on every day, which would kill and destroy the whole of them if they did not submit. During the different parleys held with the enemy they had always from about 250 to 400 of their people in the neighborhood. During the time we were at Camp Izard we had no more than about twenty-three rounds of ammunition to a man. We had many wounded, in all about forty or forty-three. It was on the 5th or 6th, perhaps the 9th of March, while General Gaines, through his staff officers, was again holding a conversation with the Indians, that General Clinch's advanced guard came up and fired upon the enemy, who immediately withdrew. The Indians hailed us again that night about 10 o'clock; their object was for peace, as their conversation seemed to denote; they requested two days to enable them to go and see their governor, Micanopy, which would take that time to consult with him. During this time our men fished on the river bank without being molested. I was informed about this time by many of the Florida volunteers that our presence in the country had diverted the attention of the Indians from their families, and was no doubt the means of saving many from massacre as well as their property from destruction. We remained at Camp Izard three or four days, and not hearing anything further from the Indians the command was turned over to General Clinch by General Gaines, and we took up our march for Fort Drane. I had a conversation with General Clinch about provisions at Fort Drane. He said he had a small supply there, and that General Scott was at Picolata sending on provisions as fast as possible, and that he himself was collecting all the transportation he could for the same purpose; and that what provisions had been furnished us had been drawn from supplies furnished for General Scott's army, which circumstance would keep General Scott's army back probably ten, fifteen, or twenty days longer, on account of the difficulty of transporting provisions. The main army from Camp Izard arrived within three miles of Fort Drane on the second day about sundown, and it was 10 o'clock before I got up with the rear guard. We received a small supply of provisions the next day. About the 13th or 14th I made some inquiries of General Scott about provisions and ammunition. He informed me that he was doing all in his power to procure provisions; but the roads were so bad, and he was so short of transportation, he could not get provisions on as fast as he wished; that he had to detain his own army on account of our arrival, and of our using the supplies furnished for his own troops; but that he would issue to us freely as long as he had a mouthful. I know of a provision wagon being six hours in endeavoring to get from Fort Drane to Camp Smith, a distance of three miles, and then the wagon was obliged to be left and the load shifted to a lighter wagon.

The court adjourned to meet to-morrow at half-past 10 o'clock.

FREDERICK, *December 17, 1836.*

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

Lieutenant Colonel JAMES BANKHEAD, of the 3d regiment of artillery, a witness on the part of Major General Scott, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by General Scott.* In what capacity did the witness serve in Florida against the hostile Seminoles, say from about the middle of February till towards the end of May last?

Answer. About the middle of February I was ordered by General Scott from Savannah to Picolata, on my way to take up the battalion of Georgia volunteers at Darien, to muster them into service, and to take the command of the troops that might assemble at Picolata. I remained at Picolata in command until March 9. I believe about that period, perhaps that day, I received an order from General Scott to proceed with expeditious haste with a body of troops, consisting of two companies of United States artillery and several companies of mounted men, to Fort Drane with the wagon-train of provisions to give succor and relief to General Gaines, General Scott having about that time heard it rumored that General Gaines was in a very precarious situation, and destitute of provisions. I immediately on that day commenced the movement by Black creek, having understood that the route from thence was better than the route from Picolata, which was almost impracticable. Some short distance before we arrived at Fort Drane I learned that General Gaines had been relieved by General Clinch, and had turned over the command of the troops to General Clinch. I served up to that period in command of the troops as chief commandant of artillery. On my arrival at Fort Drane General Clinch assigned to me the command of all the troops encamped in the neighborhood of that post. I remained in that command until the army moved from Fort Drane, when I was assigned to the command of the left column of the right wing of the army, which command I continued to hold until the end of the campaign.

2. *Question by General Scott.* Were you accompanied in the movement from Picolata by General Scott, and to what point?

Answer. I was accompanied by General Scott to some point a short distance north of the Santa Fé

river, and General Scott, anxious about the rumor respecting General Gaines, moved on to Fort Drane with a detachment of mounted men. Some four or five miles this side of Micanopy I received an order from General Scott, sent back to me, directing me to send the mounted men in the neighborhood to a plantation where there was corn, and to move slowly on with the artillery, as the object for the haste which I had been previously directed to make had been accomplished.

3. *Question by General Scott.* On what day did the movement from Picolata commence; on what rumor; and were not certain letters received some hours after the rumor which confirmed that rumor?

Answer. I think on the 9th of March. I was ordered to make this movement on that day, in consequence of a rumor which had reached us by a steamboat from Jacksonville, that General Gaines was surrounded by the enemy, and in a starving condition. There were some letters received after this rumor by an express, confirming the rumor. General Scott manifested great anxiety and solicitude that the greatest expedition should be made by me in giving this relief to General Gaines.

4. *Question by General Scott.* Were you not fully, at the time, in the confidence of General Scott, and what did he state to you to be the object of the forced movement upon Fort Drane, and his purpose of taking from the latter place the wagons loaded with subsistence to the relief of Generals Gaines and Clinch?

Answer. I was at the time in the confidence of General Scott, and was living with him. I understood from him that the object of this forced movement upon Fort Drane was for the purpose of extending relief to General Gaines.

5. *Question by General Scott.* As chief of artillery, what were the expedients resorted to at Fort Drane, to have a sufficient number of rounds of ammunition fixed for the two six-pounders which accompanied the army from that fort?

Answer. We had little or no fixed ammunition at Fort Drane, nor had there been any at Picolata when we left there, except some for the howitzer, and we had no horses to convey that howitzer with us. I had to procure flannel shirts and gowns belonging to the officers and men, to make bags for the powder, and to cut up bars of lead as a substitute for grape shot. This was the principal ammunition which we had for the artillery. General Scott offered his own flannel for this purpose.

6. *Question by General Scott.* From what you saw and knew of General Scott's plans, arrangements, and personal conduct is the witness aware of his failing to do or to attempt all in his power, under the circumstances, to give success, if possible, to the campaign with which he was charged against the Seminole Indians?

Answer. I was made acquainted by General Scott with his plan of operations, and, in my judgment, I thought it the best that could have been devised, and I believe, but for unforeseen accidents which General Scott could not control, more likely than any other to insure success. General Scott's zeal and activity were constant and unabating to the end of the campaign. General Scott failed in nothing, in my estimation, to give success to the campaign.

Question by the court. What, in your opinion, were the causes that prevented the subjection of the Seminole enemy, in the campaign conducted by Major General Scott, in Florida, in 1836?

Answer. The first cause, in my opinion, was the lateness of the season in which operations could be commenced under General Scott; the delay in receiving the necessary supplies for the army; and I think the most powerful cause which prevented the success of the campaign was the movement of General Gaines; that delayed the commencement of operations from early in March to the latter part of the month, as General Gaines had taken or consumed a large portion of the supplies (provisions) in depot at Fort Drane, the most difficult point of the Territory to which supplies could be conveyed, from its distance from water communication, and the almost impassable state of the roads between the St. John's river and that point. These causes delayed the commencement of operations; and the failure to receive fresh horses and refreshments for the army at Tampa Bay prevented more continued operations from the time we left Tampa Bay. The limited term of service of the militia; the extreme heat and insalubrity of the climate in April, as was proved by its effects on the troops; the scarcity and impurity of the water throughout the country, and the general character of the country.

Question by the court. What prevented the reception of the supplies that were expected at Tampa Bay?

Answer. I heard, I think, Lieutenant Morris say that he had received a letter from his brother, who was, I think, sutler at Tampa Bay, and then in New Orleans, that he had declined forwarding his stores in consequence of the information that he had received that the war had been terminated by General Gaines. I learned also from several sources, particularly from Captain Shannon, that he had heard that the quartermaster at New Orleans had declined sending the horses for the same reason.

7. *Question by General Scott.* Did any conversation take place between the witness and General Gaines on the subject of the termination of the war, and what was the substance of that conversation?

Answer. The day that General Gaines left Fort Drane for Tallahassee, I met him, between Micanopy and Fort Drane, when he said to me, "You may go on, colonel, there is nothing to be done now; it is all finished;" understanding that the war was at an end.

Captain Thistle, again before the court, was interrogated as follows:

2. *Question by General Scott.* The witness was in Camp Izard during the attacks made upon it by the enemy, at the end of February and the beginning of March last. Did the witness conceive that the war was terminated at that time and place?

Answer. In my opinion, it was not. Having been among the Indians a good deal, and knowing their character, it was my opinion that they wished to lull us into an idea (finding our camp too strong to storm) that they wished for peace, for the purpose of getting a good opportunity to massacre the whole camp. It was also my opinion that they had spies out and had discovered the reinforcement of General Clinch; and that if they failed in their first object, their next was to get their women and children out of danger.

3. *Question by General Scott.* It has been said that the Louisiana regiment would not have proceeded beyond Pensacola without being accompanied by Major General Gaines. What does the witness know of the dispositions of that regiment in this respect?

Answer. For my own part, when I was raising the men for my company, I did not know there was such a man as General Gaines in the country. Colonel Smith and Colonel Lawson, I understood, were to take

the command. I speak only in reference to my own company, my own officers and men. When at Pensacola I never heard anything of the kind mentioned; nor did I ever hear there that General Gaines was about to leave us. When we got acquainted with General Gaines, the officers and men were well pleased with him.

4. *Question by General Scott.* Did your regiment, as far as you know, obey with equal cheerfulness every officer of superior rank, whether of the regulars or volunteers?

Answer. They did so. I never heard the least murmur, either among the officers or men, nor the first word of dispute. They were always ready to obey orders, both the regulars and volunteers, from all officers placed over them.

5. *Question by General Scott.* What sutlers' stores did the witness find at Tampa Bay, and what does the witness know of the sufferings among the officers and men, from the want of light clothing and groceries generally?

Answer. We found nothing there in the way of sutlers' stores, except a little whiskey, which sold for fifteen to twenty dollars a gallon; nor clothing of any description, not even a pair of shoes, was to be found in the place. I know that many of the men had to go barefoot in consequence. Some of the men who, in New Orleans, were worth \$25,000, were so badly off for shoes that they had to tie them round their feet with strings in order to keep the soles and upper leathers together. I marched two days myself in my stocking-feet. I had the means about me to buy shoes if any had been for sale. I believe, also, the regulars suffered in a great degree for want of clothing. I have seen them badly off for want of shoes. I went to General Scott myself and told him that my own men were in want of shoes; that there were about twenty who were generally in want, some barefoot, and others nearly so. He told me there were no shoes to be had; that shoes and clothing had been expected, and also that horses had been expected, but that he had been disappointed in all.

Question by the court. Why did not your men provide themselves with sufficient clothing for the campaign when they set out from New Orleans?

Answer. The men were all provided each with a new pair of shoes, and a new suit of clothes throughout, and they also took extra clothing with them. When we took up the line of march from Tampa Bay we had to leave our clothing, such as we could not carry on our persons, for want of transportation, which we buried; it was afterwards dug up by the Indians, and of course we lost it. My own clothing I sent back to New Orleans, expecting we should not return by Tampa Bay, and so did a great many other officers and men. The palmetto cuts the clothing in such manner that it will not last in marching through that country more than four weeks. Shoes are destroyed in the same way by exposure to the sand, mud, and water.

6. *Question by General Scott.* Has the witness had any conversation with the officer (Captain Morrison) who was commissary at New Orleans during the past winter and spring, relative to subsistence which that officer ought to have sent to Tampa Bay; and what was the reason given by Captain Morrison for not having sent all the supplies required of him for Tampa?

Answer. I had a conversation with him after my return from Florida some time in May, about the 16th. I went to draw back-rations that were due to the men of my company, and he turned over a hogshead of bacon and remarked that he had purchased this to send to Florida; that he had bread likewise, which he turned over to me several barrels. On his saying that this was for Florida, I asked why it was not sent, and to the best of my knowledge he said there had been some delay on account of there being a report that the war was at an end. He further told me that he had been to a good deal of trouble in getting the bread baked, and he could not send previously to this as fast as he wished.

7. *Question by General Scott.* When Captain Morrison said that he had not sent all the bread and bacon purchased for the troops at Tampa, because he had heard that the war was at an end, where did he say that he supposed the war had been terminated?

Answer. I don't know that I asked the question, and I have no recollection that he made any reply to that effect.

8. *Question by General Scott.* What did the witness himself understand by what Captain Morrison said about the war being at an end?

Answer. I understood that it was from the report in Camp Izard. It was generally believed by the officers and men in our camp (Camp Izard) that the Indians would not fire another gun in the way of hostility. On my return, under the command of General Scott, from Fort Drane to the Withlacoochee, Adjutant Barron offered to bet a hundred dollars that the Indians would not fire another gun. My reply was, that I had not money to stake, but that I should not like to make money faster than by taking such bets.

9. *Question by General Scott.* On your return to the Withlacoochee, under the command of General Scott, did you find the enemy subdued or ready to surrender, or did you find the reverse?

Answer. I found the reverse; ready to fire upon the rear guard the best opportunity that suited their convenience. Previous to this, they fired upon our baggage-wagon, seven miles from Fort Drane; they killed a negro, wounded a horse, and carried away and destroyed the provision that was in the wagon.

Major General Scott here presented to the court a paper, (document No. 65,) being a letter from General P. F. Smith, dated February 25, as evidence that the Louisiana volunteers were under no pledge to General Gaines or to any other person, in proceeding to Florida.

The court adjourned to meet on Monday morning at half-past 10 o'clock.

MONDAY, December 19, 1836.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

The judge advocate read to the court the letter (document No. 144) addressed by the Hon. Joseph M. White, delegate in Congress from Florida, to the president of the court, which the court determined should accompany the record.

The court was occupied the remainder of this day in taking testimony having reference to the Creek campaign.

The court adjourned to meet to-morrow at half-past 10 o'clock.

DECEMBER 20, 1836.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

Captain G. A. McCALL, of the 4th infantry, a witness on the part of Major General Scott, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

Question by General Scott. In the Army and Navy Chronicle, printed at Washington city, dated Thursday, August 11, 1836, and bearing the number 84, there is a letter with your signature. Was the original of that letter written by you?

Answer. It was.

[The paper referred to in this question accompanies these proceedings, and is numbered —.]

Captain E. A. HITCHCOCK, of the 1st infantry, a witness on the part of Major General Scott, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by General Scott.* In the Army and Navy Chronicle, printed at the city of Washington, "whole No. 67," and under date of April 14, 1836, there is a letter addressed to the "honorable Francis S. Lyon, M. C.," and signed "E. A. Hitchcock, captain U. S. army." Was the original of that letter written by the witness?

Answer. It was.

2. *Question by General Scott.* Was the "staff officer" therein mentioned in that letter the witness now before the court?

Answer. He was.

The court adjourned to meet to-morrow morning at half-past 10 o'clock.

DECEMBER 21, 1836.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

Captain G. S. DRANE, of the 2d artillery, a witness on the part of Major General Scott, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by General Scott.* Has the witness any recollection of a conversation with Major Read, then in command of a battalion of Floridians, relative to a detachment it was said had been sent by Major McLemore from the Suwanee to the Withlacoochee river, and what was the substance of that conversation?

Answer. I distinctly recollect a conversation I had with Major Read at Tampa Bay, I think two days before the right wing of the army marched from that place. We were passing from Fort Brooke down to the encampment of the right wing of the army, where Major Read wished to have an interview with General Clinch, to solicit that his battalion might be attached to the right wing of the army, that he might the sooner cross to the Withlacoochee to the relief of the Floridians. In the course of that conversation I informed him, myself, that there was a detachment of Floridians at the Withlacoochee with provisions; that I believed that Major McLemore was there with them, but was not certain. He said he was sure they could take care of themselves until the right wing of the army passed on that route again, and that was one great reason why he wished to join the right wing of the army. He informed me that he had heard at Fort Brooke that morning that a portion of the right wing of the army was to go by boats to the mouth of the Withlacoochee, and pass up the mouth of that river. His remark was, "I should like very much to be placed on that command." I laughingly told him that I thought it would suit him better than me, as I did not consider it a very desirable duty. He remarked that he was content himself, and that he should like to go. He expressed some uneasiness about the frontier settlements. I informed him there was no danger; that the Florida volunteers, who had been assembled at Fort Drane, had been sent to their homes. I don't recollect that I had any other particular conversation with him respecting that matter, but it was generally understood that that duty had been assigned to him.

2. *Question by General Scott.* How or in what manner did the witness learn that it was likely that Major McLemore had sent a detachment from the Suwanee to the Withlacoochee?

Answer. I heard it at Fort Drane, and I think General Clinch stated to me that Major McLemore had volunteered his services to go to the mouth of the Withlacoochee in boats with subsistence and forage. On the march it was frequently spoken of, and frequently mentioned, also, at Tampa Bay; and I recollect Major Dill's mentioning the subject to me before I left Fort Drane, that McLemore had gone.

The court was occupied the remainder of this day with the subject of the Creek campaign.

The court adjourned to meet to-morrow at half-past 10 o'clock.

DECEMBER 22, 1836.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

JOSEPH L. LOCKE, esq., late an officer of the army, and a witness on the part of Major General Scott, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by General Scott.* In what place and in what capacity was the witness on duty in the months of February, March, and April?

Answer. I was in those months, from the 7th of February to the end of April, stationed at Picolata, as assistant commissary of subsistence.

2. *Question by General Scott.* About what period did the first bacon sent by the subsistence department arrive at Picolata?

Answer. My memory does not serve me accurately on that subject. It was somewhere between the 15th and 25th of April. It was not certainly before the 15th.

3. *Question by General Scott.* Had the witness sufficient hard bread to supply the columns commanded by Generals Clinch and Eustis, respectively, before the march of the former from Fort Drane and the march of the latter from Volusia?

Answer. By referring to my monthly returns I find that I invoiced to the commissaries of those columns of the army in the interior both hard bread and flour, my instructions from General Scott being to furnish as much hard bread as could be procured. I was also instructed not to supply the troops at Picolata with hard bread, but to reserve it for the marching army. I cannot state the ratio between hard bread and flour sent to Volusia. That sent to Lieutenant Dancey, at Fort Drane, during February, was in the ratio of twenty-seven barrels of flour to seventy-three of hard bread; and in March, forty-nine barrels

of flour to one hundred and twelve of hard bread to the same officer. My impression is, that the breadstuff sent to the Volusia consisted principally of hard bread.

4. *Question by General Scott.* In the weight to be transported, what is the difference between pork and bacon?

Answer. It is about 51 per cent. in favor of bacon; that is, a wagon which is capable of carrying 2,000 pounds of net pork would carry 3,000 pounds, or a little more, of bacon; the difference is in the wood and brine.

General DUNCAN L. CLINCH, late of the army, and a witness on the part of Major General Scott, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by General Scott.* Was the delay, after the arrival of General Scott at Fort Drane, more than the witness deemed necessary to enable the troops, which had marched with General Gaines from Tampa, to recruit their health and strength, and to enable the last train of wagons, loaded with subsistence, to arrive from Garey's Ferry?

Answer. It was not.

2. *Question by General Scott.* In reference to the term of service generally of the volunteers of your column, and the temperature of the weather, could that column have kept the field with any prospect of advantage later than about the 25th of April?

Answer. In reply to the first part of this question, I state that the term of service of the most part of the volunteers expired on or about that time. As respects the temperature of the weather, I believe, with experienced and acclimated troops, a campaign might be carried on during the month of May, without any great risk to their health, but no longer. The state the column was in at the time we reached Fort Drane, nothing more could have been done.

3. *Question by General Scott.* What was the general quality of the water, other than river water, drank by your men and horses, on your return march from Tampa towards the north of Florida?

Answer. It was generally excessively bad, taken from stagnant pools and ponds, and frequently so thick with mud and scum that it was drank with difficulty. Taken from ponds or pools, it was of course in a warm state, and by no means palatable, and often very scarce. In fact, both men and horses suffered very much for the want of even such water as was generally met with. There were animalcula occasionally in this water. Most of the water in those ponds have more or less of animalcula.

4. *Question by General Scott.* Were there many sick in the witness's column, both in his operations south and those returning north, and does the witness attribute that sickness to the warmth of the weather, and generally to the badness of the water.

Answer. There was a good deal of sickness in the column I commanded, in both going to and returning from Tampa. It was attributable, in my opinion, to several causes: excessive fatigue and exposure in scouring through the swamps and hammocks, opening and bridging the road, and in some measure to the bad state of the water and the heat of the climate.

5. *Question by General Scott.* Was the column under the command of the witness, or any detachment from that column, on any occasion beaten or repulsed by the enemy, or was the enemy, as often as met, repulsed and driven?

Answer. The column was never beaten or repulsed by the enemy. It was always successful whenever it met the enemy. The troops always evinced the greatest gallantry, both regulars and volunteers, in pursuing the enemy through hammocks that were almost impenetrable by man.

6. *Question by General Scott.* The witness's column lay at or near Tampa — days. What was the principal object of that halt; and was it more than sufficient to recruit the health and strength of men and horses?

Answer. The column remained at Tampa several days; but not longer than was absolutely necessary to recruit the men and horses.

7. *Question by General Scott.* Whilst he was within your observation, did you observe any deficiency in the zeal, activity, or judgment of General Scott, in the prosecution of the campaign against the enemy?

Answer. I did not. He was always active, and sometimes, I thought, rather over-zealous or restless in pushing on the operations of the campaign.

Question by the court. What were the causes, in your opinion, that prevented the subjection of the hostile Seminoles in the campaign conducted by Major General Scott in Florida, in 1836?

Answer. In reply to that question I am compelled to state that I am of the opinion that the failures of and the disasters attending the operations in Florida were mainly to be attributed to the want of energy and military forecast in the late head of the War Department, and in failing to order a larger force and a greater quantity of military supplies, &c., into that country in 1835 and early in the year 1836. In illustration of this opinion, and to show that the late Secretary of War was not entirely uninformed as to the state of things in Florida, I beg leave to submit to the court extracts from several letters addressed to the adjutant general of the army by the officer then commanding in Florida. When, at last, the late honorable Secretary awoke from his dreams of political preferment, and turned his attention to bleeding and suffering Florida, it was too late, owing to the peculiar nature of the country, to effect a great deal before the hot and sickly months set in; hence, in a great measure, may be attributed the failure, as it has been termed, of the campaign conducted by Major General Scott in Florida.

[The extracts alluded to in this answer were here read to the court, and accompany these proceedings, document No. 151.]

Question by the court. What did you estimate the force of the Seminoles, including negroes? State the number of each.

Answer. It is very difficult to come at anything like the number they have in the country. I never believed, however, that they could have concentrated more than from 1,200 to 1,500, including negroes.

Question by the court. What is the character of the Seminole Indians as warriors?

Answer. I think they have proved, whenever they have had any advantage, that they are good soldiers. They never fight without decided advantage.

Question by the court. How, and by what means, were they equipped and furnished with arms and ammunition?

Answer. I am not able to answer that question. There were a number of arms furnished them, I believe, by government, and they were permitted to purchase whenever they pleased. Their arms were generally kept in good order by the government agents, as far as came under my observation.

Question by the court. Do you think that hard bread and bacon were absolutely necessary for the subsistence of the troops in prosecuting the campaign in Florida?

Answer. It was desirable to have it; but I believe the army could have got along with good fat pork and good flour, with a plenty of good transportation.

8. *Question by General Scott.* In a former answer made by the witness to a question put by the court the witness spoke of *disasters*. Is the witness aware of any *disaster* that befell our arms during the operations conducted by the witness or General Scott?

Answer. I spoke generally of the disasters that had befallen the country. I know of no disaster which befell the army commanded by General Scott or by myself, except the melancholy one which resulted in the massacre of the command under Major Dade.

9. *Question by General Scott.* Do not southern troops very generally prefer bacon to pork, and with or without vegetables?

Answer. I believe they generally prefer it.

10. *Question by General Scott.* Is it not extremely difficult for troops in a wild country to execute full marches and bake their own bread?

Answer. It is very difficult for troops to make full marches in Florida with or without baking their bread. I don't think hard bread absolutely necessary to carry on a campaign, although it is desirable to have it.

11. *Question by General Scott.* Cannot troops execute full marches with more sleep and less fatigue to themselves with hard bread, than with flour to be baked into bread?

Answer. Yes.

The court adjourned to meet to-morrow at half-past 10.

DECEMBER 23, 1836.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

The testimony of General Clinch resumed.

Question by the court. What influence had the movement of General Gaines against the Seminole Indians in 1836, on the results of the campaign conducted by Major General Scott against that enemy in Florida in the same year?

Answer. I am of the opinion that the movement of Major General Gaines's command through Florida did not materially affect the operations of Major General Scott. General Gaines's command did consume several thousand rations; but the material of that command was of the best kind, and would have been of advantage to the commander of any army.

12. *Question by General Scott.* The subsistence drawn from the depot at Fort Drane by General Gaines's troops was not the train obliged to replace from the St. John's, and did not this extra labor contribute much to break down and to weaken that train?

Answer. The provisions furnished General Gaines were drawn from the St. John's, and the train must have been more or less affected in performing the route.

13. *Question by General Scott.* By the addition of the troops of General Gaines to your column, was not the right wing rendered somewhat stronger than had been intended, and stronger than was found to be necessary?

Answer. I thought myself that the addition of those troops strengthened the column I commanded very much; but I believe the troops composing the right wing, independent of that number, could have performed the route they did. It was rendered stronger than was the original intention of General Scott. I, myself, think that they were an acquisition, as they were experienced regulars, and gallant and efficient volunteers from Louisiana.

Owing to the absence of witnesses, (several of the most important not being expected to reach here before the early part of January,) the court adjourned to meet again at this place on the 4th of January next, at half-past 1 o'clock.

JANUARY 4, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Owing to the absence of Brigadier General Atkinson the court adjourned to meet to-morrow at 1 o'clock.

JANUARY 5, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

The witnesses expected not having yet arrived, the court adjourned to meet to-morrow at 11 o'clock a. m.

JANUARY 6, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

The judge advocate presented to the court the following deposition of General CLINCH, taken during the recess of the court:

1. *Question by General Scott.* Did not General Clinch visit Major General Gaines at Fort King, about the 24th of February, 1836, soon after the arrival of the latter at that place from Tampa Bay?

Answer. Yes.

2. *Question by General Scott.* Did not the witness at that interview communicate to Major General Gaines the outline of Major General Scott's impending plan of operations against the hostile Seminole Indians, together with the probable force that the said Scott expected to employ in his operations; and was not that outline substantially the same as that which the said Scott subsequently pursued against the said Indians?

Answer. During the short stay I made at Fort King, I had various conversations with General Gaines on the subject of our Indian difficulties, and believe I showed him a letter from General Scott, containing the outline of his impending plan of operations against the Seminole Indians, as well as the probable

force he expected to have in the field. There was no material change in the original plan, as well as I recollect.

The judge advocate also read to the court the following deposition of Major LEON DYER, of Louisiana:

1. *Question by General Scott.* In what capacity did you serve in the Louisiana volunteers in the Florida campaign?

Answer. I served as private in the first instance; afterwards was promoted to be regimental quartermaster and assistant commissary, and also went out on several occasions as aide-de-camp to General Smith.

2. *Question by General Scott.* What did you hear of an unwillingness among the Louisiana volunteers to serve, except under the command of General Gaines, either at Pensacola or any other place, on the passage between New Orleans and Tampa Bay?

Answer. I never heard of any unwillingness on their part to serve under the command of any officer whatever. I never heard of any pledge given by any of the Louisiana volunteers to serve under the command of General Gaines.

Sworn to before the judge advocate.

[Major General Gaines here presented himself before the court and addressed the court to the following effect:

The undersigned, having been notified by the Department of War that his protest, bearing date the 29th of October, 1836, objecting to Major General Macomb as president or member of the court, had not been complied with, and being convinced that the President of the United States possesses the only power to change the organization of this court, the undersigned has now the honor to notify the court that he attends its sessions for the purposes prescribed in the order of the Department of War, and he claims the right, pursuant to the ninety-first article of war, to cross-examine and interrogate the witnesses, and of examining the record of the court, with a view to ascertain what measures have been adopted by the court, in order to enable him to prepare his list of witnesses and arrange his vindication.

Respectfully,

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General by Brevet.*

The court was cleared and determined that Major General Gaines cannot take any part in the matter now under consideration; that when the subjects referring especially to his campaign in Florida shall come before the court, he will be at liberty to examine witnesses and documents, and even the testimony which has been taken in the present investigation, the court considering the two campaigns under Major General Gaines and Major General Scott separate and distinct subjects of investigation.]

The court being resumed, General Scott presented to the court, in evidence, certain papers which will be found accompanying these proceedings.

Lieutenant GOVERNEUR MORRIS, of the fourth regiment of infantry, a witness on the part of Major General Scott, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by General Scott.* Where was the witness stationed in March and April last, and in what capacity?

Answer. At Tampa Bay, as commissary of that depot.

2. *Question by General Scott.* What amount of hard bread and bacon was received at Tampa Bay, from the commissary or quartermaster at New Orleans, for the use of the army in March and April, up to General Scott's departure from Tampa with the troops, April 17?

Answer. I made a return to General Scott at the time, which shows the amount received and issued from the 10th of February to the 8th of April, 1836. I submit the return as the best evidence on the subject. It shows the amount of hard bread on hand on the 8th of April to be about 12,720 pounds, and of bacon 21,600 pounds. After this return was made out, on the 8th of April, and, I think, after General Scott left Tampa Bay, there was received, within the month of April, about 15,000 pounds more of hard bread.

(The return alluded to in this answer will be found among the papers accompanying these proceedings.—See document No. 100.)

3. *Question by General Scott.* Was the issue of hard bread and bacon at Tampa Bay confined to troops about to march, and by whose order?

Answer. Yes, it was, and by General Scott's order.

4. *Question by General Scott.* Were new ovens commenced at Tampa soon after General Scott's arrival; by whose order, and were they completed much before the departure of the troops with him?

Answer. Yes, they were, and by General Scott's order. They were only completed two or three days before his departure. Colonel Lindsay, commanding the centre column, was directed to cause them to be erected. There was a difficulty among the volunteers who were at work on the ovens, between them and the commanding officer of the garrison at Tampa Bay. After that difficulty I believe the volunteers did not continue on the work, and it was finished by the regular troops.

5. *Question by General Scott.* How much bread in a day could the old oven supply by ordinary working?

Answer. Of hard bread, I suppose it might make up a barrel of flour, about 300 pounds. It would make more of soft bread, as it would not take so long to dry.

6. *Question by General Scott.* What sutler's stores were on hand when General Scott arrived at Tampa Bay with the troops?

Answer. There were scarcely any; a very limited supply.

7. *Question by General Scott.* About what time did the sutler leave Tampa for New Orleans, and for what purpose?

Answer. On or about the 3d of March; to purchase a supply of sutler's stores.

8. *Question by General Scott.* Did the sutler return with or send a fresh supply of goods in March or April; and if not, what did the witness understand was the reason?

Answer. He did not send the supply of stores. I received a letter from Mr. L. Morris, acting sutler, on the subject, which letter, I have reason to believe, has been destroyed among other papers which belonged to me. This letter enclosed a paragraph from one of the New Orleans papers. I do not recol-

lect exactly the words of the paragraph; its purport, however, was, that "the war in Florida was ended," which deterred the sutler from sending the supplies.

The court adjourned, to meet to-morrow morning at 11 o'clock.

JANUARY 7, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

Owing to the indisposition of Major General Scott and the absence of witnesses, the court adjourned to meet on Monday morning, the 9th instant, at 12 o'clock.

JANUARY 9, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

[The judge advocate presented to the court a communication from Major General Gaines, dated the 7th of January, (document B,) whereupon the court was cleared, and directed the judge advocate to furnish Major General Gaines with a copy of the decision of the court made on the 6th instant, in answer to his application of that day to become a party in the case now under investigation, and to inform the general that that decision will not be departed from. All which was accordingly done.]

Owing to the indisposition of Major General Scott, and his request that his case might be laid over till Monday next, to enable him to make his final address to the court, his case was accordingly laid over to that day.

MONDAY, January 16, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

The judge advocate presented to the court a letter from Major J. Clark to the quartermaster general, dated August 16, 1836, which, being received as evidence, was placed among the documents, and is numbered 152.

Captain A. VAN BUREN, of the 1st regiment of dragoons, a witness, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by General Scott.* What does the witness recollect as to the time of arrival of the first train of wagons at Picolata (opposite to) from Fort Drane, after General Scott reached Picolata?

Answer. The train of wagons from Fort Drane arrived on the west side of the river (opposite to Picolata) about the 1st or 2d of March.

2. *Question by General Scott.* Who was charged with the loading of that train? What exertions were made by that officer to get over some wagons and horses to add to that train, and to get over subsistence and other stores for loading the wagons?

Answer. The officer charged with the loading of that train was Captain and Assistant Quartermaster Shannon. His exertions were unremitting in passing the subsistence and other stores across the river, as well as in passing over some wagons and horses to add to the train.

3. *Question by General Scott.* What does the witness recollect of the state of the weather, and the difficulty of passing the St. John's at Picolata about the end of February and the first eight or nine days in March?

Answer. There was an unusually severe storm at about that time—so severe as to render it impossible to pass the subsistence across the St. John's in the flats prepared for that purpose. One of these flats, loaded with subsistence, was sunk in attempting to get across. A small steamboat, the "Essayons," was then used for the purpose; but considerable delay arose from the fact of the boat not being able to get near to the opposite shore. A battalion of artillery, under Major Gates, which arrived at Picolata about that time, was seven or eight days in passing from Savannah to that place, in consequence of the severity of the weather, as I was informed by Major Gates himself.

4. *Question by General Scott.* When did that train loaded for Fort Drane leave the St. John's, and what did the witness understand General Scott's motive to be in marching with a small detachment on the 9th of March, in respect to that train and the joint forces of Generals Gaines and Clinch on the Withlacoochee?

Answer. The train left the point opposite Picolata about the 6th of March. The motive of General Scott, as I understood it from what he said, was to reinforce or rescue the forces of Generals Gaines and Clinch on the Withlacoochee. The subsistence sent by the train was intended for those troops and the detachment which marched.

Colonel DE PEYSTER again called.

Question by General Scott. Did the witness happen to be at Picolata once or oftener pending the storms about the end of February and the beginning of March; and what were the difficulties of passing the river at that time in boats and scows?

Answer. I was there twice during the stormy weather. The river there is about two miles wide. There is a long stretch of the river which enables the northeast winds to have a full sweep, and, consequently, raise a very heavy swell. I crossed the river in a very fine boat, I think belonging to the cutter; was coxswain of her myself in crossing, and had a great deal of difficulty in preventing her shipping the sea. I saw a flat or scow, which had been towed there by a steamboat, empty, and sunk in towing; and it was, in my opinion, impossible for a loaded flat to cross the river at that time with any chance of safety, owing to the storm. The storm continued six or seven days.

Major General Scott represented to the court that he would not be prepared with his final address until Friday, the 20th instant. Whereupon his case was laid over to that day.

FRIDAY, January 20, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

The following deposition from Colonel GADSDEN was here presented to the court by the judge advocate:

1. *Question by General Scott.* In what capacity did you serve in Florida with Major General Scott, say between the 14th of March and the end of April, 1836?

Answer. I held the commission of quartermaster general of Florida, but within the periods named was attached to General Scott as chief of his staff.

2. *Question by General Scott.* Were you not in that period fully in the official confidence of the said Scott, and was he not almost constantly in your view, or within speaking distance?

Answer. I answer in the affirmative.

3. *Question by General Scott.* As far as known to you, and in reference to the number and description of his forces—their respective terms of service, the season of the year, the character of the country, and the means of subsistence and transportation provided—did the said Scott fail, in any particular, to adopt the best plans and movements, according to the information possessed at headquarters, or fail in zeal and diligence to bring the war to a successful conclusion?

Answer. General Scott labored under many and complicated embarrassments in maturing the plans of his campaign, growing out of an *insufficiency of transportation*; the *want of supplies* adapted to Indian warfare, (having received pork and flour, instead of bacon and hard bread;) the lateness of the season, it being late in March before he could commence operations; the limited period (three months) for which the volunteers and militia had to serve; and the uncommon prevalence of debility and sickness among the troops, particularly in the commands under Eustis and Lindsay. The measles made their appearance in camp, and from one-fourth to one-half of the effective force of the South Carolina, Alabama, and Florida requisitions were, at an early period, rendered unfit for active service. At the Bay of Tampa, after the three divisions of the army met there, the spectacle was more that of a camp of hospitals than of an assemblage of troops preparing for the active operations which were necessary to circumvent and subdue a vigilant and active savage foe. General Scott was active, zealous, and anxious; failing in no degree to adopt and execute those plans which circumstances would permit and his own judgment approve. Trammelled in many instances by insufficiency of resources, he was compelled to abandon operations which otherwise would have been executed, and might have eventuated more favorably than his general operations. I answer, therefore, unhesitatingly, that General Scott did not fail, to my knowledge, in adopting and prosecuting the plans which were generally deemed most judicious, and which, if executed by all parts of the army, might have eventuated very differently. But they were not executed. Neither Eustis nor Lindsay's commands ever came to the point ordered; and as the right wing, with which Scott was personally, performed its assigned part in crossing the Withlacoochee, and in *driving* between the river and the lake, the failure of the other two in not being in position on the east of the Withlacoochee, and in the forks, prevented that thorough exploration of the swamps and strongholds of that singular river which was necessary to find the enemy, *surround* and *conquer* him, which were the objects of the campaign. I believed General Scott's plans generally good: I differed with him in some of the details—better calculated, in my opinion, to secure the objects contemplated.

4. *Question by General Scott.* Should his answer to either of those points of inquiry be, on its face, unfavorable to the said Scott, will the witness have the goodness to give the grounds of his opinion, in order that it may be explained and reconciled with the testimony of other witnesses in the case?

Answer. I was in favor of more dispersion of the troops; viewing the war as an Indian or a wild-beast hunt, in which the chances of ferreting him out, surrounding, overtaking, capturing or destroying him, would be multiplied in proportion to the number of parties we could set in motion. In these views, however, I must say, in justice to General Scott, that I was not sustained by either him or others, and that the opinion generally prevailed that it would be as unsafe as it was unmilitary to disperse and expose our army to be beat in detail. As I have been asked for my opinion and reasons, I have given them; subsequent operations and events have confirmed, in my judgment, the correctness of them; but they do not detract from operations which have been so generally sustained by others, and particularly by the conduct of those who have followed in succession, and who have been equally as unfortunate, from moving in masses. We must meet the enemy as they meet us, disperse when they do, and concentrate as quick.

5. *Question by General Scott.* By whom and under what circumstances was the letter written to Major McLemore, permitting or directing him to send a detachment of Florida militia, by water, with subsistence up the Withlacoochee river?

Answer. The letter to Major McLemore was written by me. He sought the service, and my letter was in reply to a friendly one from him. As I have previously transmitted a copy of the letter to the court, let the document speak for itself. I assume the responsibility.

6. *Question by General Scott.* Was any copy of that letter entered on the record books at headquarters?

Answer. I answer in the negative.

7. *Question by General Scott.* What limitations as to the time of arrival on the Withlacoochee, and the length of stay there, did that letter to Major McLemore impose? If the witness kept any copy of the letter, or has since obtained the original, he will please annex it to the answer under this interrogatory.

Answer. I refer to the letter, a copy of which is in possession of the recorder.

8. *Question by General Scott.* Does the witness recollect any conversation between him and the said Scott, or with General Clinch, about the time they crossed the Withlacoochee, or at Tampa Bay, respecting the possible or probable execution of Major McLemore's proposition to send supplies up that river, and the probable length of stay of the detachment which might accompany those supplies?

Answer. The witness recollects a conversation held at the Bay of Tampa between General Scott and General Clinch. It was in relation to orders issued to the latter, directing him to send the fourth regiment of infantry and some other troops from his wing to penetrate the Withlacoochee as far as practicable by water; General Clinch meeting them with his main force at some designated point on his return march by land. General Clinch seemed not to think, by his remarks, the operation either necessary or practicable; and to sustain the latter he introduced a witness, a soldier who had ascended the Withlacoochee, and who represented the ascent with troops by water *exceedingly hazardous*, if not *impracticable*, unless covered and protected by troops on land. General Scott expressed some anxiety to have the operation executed, lest McLemore should be on the river; but Clinch spoke very positively that that must be impossible; that he was convinced McLemore had not attempted the expedition, and that if he had he must have failed, and returned to the Suwanee; that he (Clinch) had every confidence in the information of his witness, (the soldier above adverted to,) and was satisfied the river Withlacoochee could not be penetrated if an enemy opposed. By reference to me in the course of the conversation I could only state what were the orders to McLemore: "that he must not come unless he could reach the river by the 29th of March; must be very prudent in attempting to ascend it; hazard nothing, and by no means to remain on the river after the 3d of April; but to return to the Suwanee." It appears McLemore did not reach the Withlacoochee until

the 2d or 3d of April; persisted in ascending, and on his own gallant responsibility established the block-house, and resolved to maintain it. The result of this conversation was an abandonment of the enterprise contemplated by a part of General Clinch's command, and a subsequent order to Major Read, which was drawn up with great prudence and caution in consequence of the information given by General Clinch and his witness.

9. *Question by General Scott.* What were the impressions expressed in those conversations by the witness as to the execution of that enterprise, and the length of time that the detachment, if it arrived at all, would remain on the Withlacoochee?

Answer. There was no doubt expressed but that McLemore had not penetrated the Withlacoochee, and that if he had within the times limited, in obedience to his instructions, he must have returned on the day ordered. Subsequent facts show that he did return with a part of his command to the Suwanee, and could have brought back the whole of his force, had not a part of them preferred remaining and braving the enemy. They voluntarily sought the hazard.

10. *Question by General Scott.* By whom were the instructions to Major Read, the commander of the expedition by water from Tampa Bay to the Withlacoochee, drawn up; and did the said Scott fail to provide everything in his power to give success to that expedition?

Answer. The order was drawn up by me; and I am not aware that General Scott restricted or withheld any of the means necessary to the success of the expedition. Major Read was directed to make the necessary requisitions on the quartermaster at the Bay of Tampa; and I have some indistinct recollection of hearing (for I was not present at the conversation) of his, Major Read's, desiring a howitzer, or a piece of artillery, which, it was said, General Scott did not think essential; however, I do not know that the piece of ordnance required was denied or not. I know that the quartermaster was very much engaged for some time in building boats adapted to the ascent of the river, so that there should be no failure in the requisite transportation. I do not know whether they were taken or not.

11. *Question by General Scott.* According to the best intelligence possessed at headquarters at the time, and in reference to the means provided, was there room for a reasonable doubt that Major Read's expedition ought to succeed?

Answer. There was not a doubt entertained at headquarters that the nature of the service was distinctly understood, and that it was assigned to an officer and troops who would execute it. Indeed, it was a confidence reposed by the general in Major Read that induced him to assign to him so responsible a duty. The general was aware of the difficulties and hazards of the enterprise; and while it was committed to an officer who had been highly recommended by the superiors with whom he had served, it was deemed necessary (after the conversation held with Clinch previously adverted to in reply to question 9) to draw up the order under the precautions which characterize it. The order was, however, discretionary: Major Read to be the judge on his arrival at the mouth of the Withlacoochee on the hazard or not of his ascending it. The order, however, speaks for itself, and I have only deemed it necessary, under the facts detailed, to advert to the causes of its general prudent and cautious character.

The testimony having here closed, Major General Scott made the *address* which accompanies these proceedings, after which the court adjourned this case to a future day.

JANUARY 30, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

The court proceeded to pronounce its opinion in the foregoing case, as follows:

The court, after a careful review of the great mass of testimony taken in the foregoing investigation, finds that Major General Scott was amply clothed with authority to create the means of prosecuting the Seminole war to a successful issue, but is of opinion that at the time he was invested with the command the season was too far advanced for him to collect, appoint, and put in motion his forces till a day too late to compass the object. It appears that, after using great diligence and energy, he was not in a condition to take the field and enter the enemy's strongholds before the 28th of March, and then without sufficient means for transporting the necessary supplies to enable him to remain there long enough to seek out the scattered forces of the enemy.

The court, therefore, ascribe the failure of the campaign to the want of time to operate; the insalubrity of the climate after the middle of April; the impervious swamps and hammocks that abound in the country occupied by the enemy, affording him cover and retreat at every step; an absence of all knowledge by the general or any part of his forces of the topography of the country, together with the difficulty of obtaining in time the means of transporting supplies for the army.

The court is further of opinion, from the testimony of many officers of rank and intelligence who served in the campaign, that Major General Scott was zealous and indefatigable in the discharge of his duties, and that his plan of campaign was well devised, and prosecuted with energy, steadiness, and ability.

As connected with the Seminole campaign under Major General Scott, in 1836, the attention of the court has been called to the tone and language of his "Order No. 48," dated the 17th of May, and of his letter of the 11th of May to the adjutant general, now on the file of this court, (see documents Nos. 138 and 119,) the first reflecting on the people of Florida, and the latter on the conduct of Major Read, of the Florida volunteers. The tenor of these are not considered a military offence, but an indiscretion that it were better to have avoided.

ALEX. MACOMB, *Major General, President of the Court.*

S. COOPER, *Captain U. S. Army, Judge Advocate and Recorder of the Court.*

CONTINUATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE FOREGOING CASE.

FREDERICK, *February 22, 1837.*

The court met pursuant to notice. All present.

The following communications were submitted for the consideration of the court:

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 18, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a copy of an order of the President of the United States, on the proceedings of the court of inquiry of which you are president, relative to the campaign against the

Seminole Indians under Major General Scott, and, in compliance with the direction of the close thereof, to transmit the proceedings, with the documentary evidence referred to therein, (except such as was selected and taken back by the judge advocate) for the future action of the court. I forward, also, "Major General Scott's address, or summary of evidence taken in his case."

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War ad interim.*

Major General ALEXANDER MACOMB, *President of the Court of Inquiry, Frederick, Maryland.*

(COPY.)

The proceedings of the court of inquiry recently assembled and still sitting at Frederick, by virtue of Orders No. 65 and 68, so far as the same relate to the causes of the failure of the campaign of Major General Scott against the Seminole Indians in 1836, were heretofore submitted to the President, and the examination thereof suspended, in consequence of the necessary connexion between the case of Major General Scott and that of Major General Gaines, also referred to the same court and not yet reported on. Certain other proceedings of the same court having been since examined by the President, and having been found defective, and therefore remitted to the court for reconsideration, the President has deemed it proper, in order to expedite the matter, to look into the first mentioned proceedings, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the like defects existed therein. On this inspection of the record, he perceives that the court has not reported, except in a few instances, the facts of the case as required by the order constituting the court, and in those instances, the facts found by the court are stated in a very general form, and without sufficient minuteness and precision; and he therefore remits the said proceedings to the court, to the end that the court may resume the consideration of the evidence, and from the same, and from such further evidence as may be taken, (in case the court shall deem it necessary to take further evidence,) may ascertain and report with distinctness and precision all the facts touching the subject to be inquired of, established to the satisfaction of the court by the evidence before it, and especially the times when and places where the several occurrences which are deemed material by the court in the formation of its opinion actually took place, with the amount of force on both sides, at the different periods of time embraced in the transaction, and the positions thereof, and such other circumstances as are deemed material by the court; together with its opinion on the whole subject for the information of the President.

The Secretary of War *ad interim* will cause the proceedings of the court in the case of Major General Scott, first above mentioned, with the documentary evidence referred to therein, and a copy hereof, to be transmitted to Major General Alexander Macomb, president of the court, for the proper action thereon.

ANDREW JACKSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 18, 1837.*

The court proceeded, in conformity with the foregoing instructions of the President of the United States, to take up and review the documentary and oral testimony taken on a former decision in the investigation of the failure of the campaign under Major General Scott against the Seminole Indians in Florida, in 1836, and submits the following synopsis or condensed view of the testimony on which the court formed its opinion.

DOCUMENTARY TESTIMONY.

January 21.—General Scott ordered to Florida, with full power to raise a volunteer force, &c.—(Doc. 4.)

January 31.—General Scott writes from Augusta that he is making preparations for the campaign, by raising a force and collecting supplies; finds muskets in the Augusta arsenal, but no accoutrements or cartridges; the powder unfit for service—no knapsacks, &c.; shall go to Milledgeville to consult the governor on the subject of the Creek difficulties.—(Doc. 18.)

February 2.—General Scott reports from Augusta; wants patent rifles—none in the southern arsenals; shall arm with muskets; not a sufficient number of accoutrements; shall borrow from South Carolina; deficiency in camp-kettles, &c.; shall have them made; wants more tents, musket-cartridges, &c.—(Doc. 20.)

February 6.—General Scott writes from Augusta that he has just returned from Milledgeville, where he believes he has quickened the measures for obtaining the force from Georgia; progress making in raising force and collecting supplies for the campaign, &c.—(Doc. 34.)

February 16.—General Scott arrives at Savannah on the 9th; has been fully occupied in regulating the supplies and movements of the troops for Florida; part of the South Carolina force on the way to Florida; others expected soon to assemble, &c.; expects by the end of the month to have in the field a force of about 4,600, 1,400 of which mounted; shall arrive in Florida in advance of more than half of the forces called for from South Carolina and Georgia, and before the Alabama regiment has reached its destination, (Tampa Bay,) and expects towards the end of the month to commence operations.—(Doc. 38.)

February 20.—General Scott reports from Savannah the arrival of a detachment of recruits from the north; has been waiting for the return of a steamer, &c.; sets off in a few moments for Florida.—(Doc. 44.)

February 22.—General Scott arrives at Picolata; a battalion of Georgia foot in position, another of mounted men on this side of the St. Mary's, and presumes another battalion of mounted Georgians are in march from the interior of Georgia. The head company of South Carolina mounted regiment has reached the Ogechee; the regiment of South Carolina foot at St. Augustine; shall await the arrival of at least a portion of the mounted force before commencing operations. General Clinch has at Fort Drane 523 men, and reports the enemy about 1,500 warriors, and 200 or 300 negroes.—(Doc. 46.)

February 26.—General Scott at Picolata; reports the regiment of South Carolina foot moving from St. Augustine, *via* Tomoca, upon Volusia, where it is expected to arrive by 3d March; the South Carolina mounted regiment may be expected at Volusia about the 7th; these two regiments, with five companies of United States artillery, will constitute the left wing. Only one company of mounted Georgians has arrived; a battalion of Georgia foot (340 strong) now in route for Fort Drane, distance sixty-five miles, and a bad road; has been occupied in devising means to send to Fort Drane large supplies; is waiting the arrival of means of transportation from Augusta and Savannah; some wagons have arrived but no

horses; the remainder of the baggage train not expected in less than ten days; is using every means to hasten on supplies; embarrassed by the arrival of General Gaines at Fort King with 1,100 men, and who has called upon General Clinch at Fort Drane for 1,400 rations, which will leave only 5,000 rations at Fort Drane, *i. e.*, about eight days' subsistence for the force there, say 650 men; recalls the Georgia battalion now on the march for Fort Drane; sends 20,000 rations to Volusia, which is about fifty miles from Fort King, and seventy from Fort Drane; shall hasten to Fort Drane, although his presence still necessary at Picolata; all his plans thwarted, the principal of which was to move in concert from Fort Drane, Volusia, and Tampa, on the 8th March, upon the enemy, who are supposed to be on the Withlacoochee.—(Doc. 47.)

March 2.—General Scott at Picolata; reports difficulty in obtaining means of transportation; some of the Georgia volunteers refuse to be mustered into service; four other companies just arrived; the United States dragoons may not arrive in a month. The left wing will probably reach Volusia by the 8th or 10th. Colonel Lindsay's forces cannot be at Tampa before probably the 15th; he cannot be in position in time, and General Eustis cannot cross the Ocklawaha before the 14th.—(Doc. 52.)

March 6.—General Scott at Picolata; reports he has no recent intelligence of the movements of General Gaines later than the 29th ultimo; important for his combinations that he should speedily learn what has become of General Gaines's column, and whether the position and numbers of the enemy have been materially changed by its operations. Part of the foot of the left wing now occupy Volusia and positions on the coast as far as Tomoca; four other companies are engaged in scouring the country between the Atlantic and St. John's; the left wing cannot be at Volusia before the 12th. The forces in vicinity of Picolata and known to be coming up are 140 men under Major Gates, just landed, and eight days from Savannah, through a most unusual storm; 320 Georgia foot; 140 Georgia mounted men at Garey's Ferry; Captain Wharton's dragoons, ninety strong, expected at Garey's about the 11th; 16,000 rations just despatched for Fort Drane; the wagons will return to be reloaded; in the meantime wagons and horses may be expected from Savannah. The wagons reported to have been shipped at Baltimore have been left behind, &c.; shall send no more troops to Fort Drane on account of difficulty of subsisting them there.—(Doc. 68.)

March 9.—General Scott between Picolata and Garey's Ferry; reports on his way to Fort Drane, *via* Garey's, taking a force of about 240, which may be important to rescue General Gaines. The left wing cannot be in force on the Ocklawaha before the 17th, and Lindsay cannot operate more than two days' march from Tampa, for want of means of transportation; no transportation yet arrived from Savannah. The amount of subsistence that will be at Fort Drane on the 8th, 17,497 rations of bread and flour, and 11,000 rations of pork, with beef cattle in the neighborhood, &c. The troops about to proceed as far as the Withlacoochee will not have the means of taking with them rations for more than six days; recapitulates the cause of his deficiency in the means of transportation.—(Doc. 71.)

March 14.—General Scott at Fort Drane; reports the force from the Withlacoochee fallen back on Fort Drane; has directed General Eustis, after scouring the country through which he will have to pass, to place his column in the neighborhood of Pelaklikaha by the 25th instant; Colonel Lindsay by the same day to be at Chickuchatty. The right wing will move from Fort Drane about the 24th for the Withlacoochee; this time is appointed to give Eustis and Lindsay time to put themselves in position, to recruit the forces lately under General Gaines, and to receive subsistence from Garey's Ferry.—(Doc. 77.)

March 13.—Fort Drane; the plan of campaign to move in three columns from Fort Drane, Volusia, and Tampa, upon the Withlacoochee, where they will co-operate, &c.—(Docs. 81, 93.)

March 20.—General Scott at Fort Drane; reports he shall probably be obliged to move from Fort Drane on 24th or 25th, with less than eighteen days' subsistence for the right wing, which will consist of about 1,700 fighting men. Some wagons and horses arrived at Picolata from Savannah about the 12th instant; General Eustis does not expect to be at Pelaklikaha with his wing before the 27th or 28th; without more wagons and horses, has no hope of accumulating at Fort Drane, beyond the current consumption, more subsistence than they shall have on the 24th.—(Doc. 94.)

March 25.—General Scott at Fort Drane; the right wing moves to-morrow; reports a skirmish between General Eustis's advance guard and a small party of Indians; Lindsay arrived at Tampa on the 5th, and expects to march on Fort King with a force of about 1,120 men; Captain Wharton, with his dragoons, has reached Fort Drane.—(Doc. 97.)

April 12. General Scott at Tampa reports the greater part of the right wing reached that place the 5th; half of the left wing arrived the same day, and the centre the day before. All compelled to go to Tampa for subsistence, &c.—(Doc. 103.)

April 8.—General Clinch reports the movement of the right wing from Fort Drane to Tampa; left Fort Drane March 26, with 450 artillery, 270 4th infantry, 75 United States dragoons, 171 Augusta volunteers, Louisiana regiment of volunteers, 321 Cooper's volunteers, and 230 Georgia mounted men—aggregate, 1,968; with two six-pounders and eighteen days' rations in wagons, pack-horses, &c. The route in direction of Camp Izard, on the Withlacoochee; difficulty in forwarding the wagon-train; the road new, country wet and deep; obliged to lay logs to make them practicable; reached Camp Izard on the morning of 28th; the enemy gave notice of his presence on the opposite bank by firing into camp; preparations immediately made for forcing the passage in boats brought from Fort Drane.

At 4 o'clock a. m. of the 29th the bank of the river occupied by sharpshooters and the two pieces of artillery; at daylight the advance, consisting of two companies of artillery, crossed, followed by the Louisiana regiment and the fourth infantry; the train then crossed; in the meantime two companies of mounted men crossed at a difficult ford one and a half miles below; another swam the river near the ferry. The rear division, while crossing, was attacked; the enemy driven off by discharges from the field-pieces and a volley from the rear guard. Except this attack the passage was unmolested. The enemy fired a few shots into camp during the night from the northern side of the river. On the morning of the 30th proceeded up the river in search of the enemy, and at 10 o'clock discovered him in small parties on an island in a chain of lakes; the baggage train drawn up in compact order and left with a guard of 300 men. The troops advanced to the attack; the enemy retired; were pursued about four miles, when, it becoming late, the troops encamped; marched early next morning (31st) and soon discovered the enemy on another island; dispositions immediately made for attack with the right column on one end of the island and the left on the other; the approach at both points impracticable to any but infantry, and extremely difficult for them, the island being surrounded by very broad and wet savannahs, and so boggy that it was with difficulty the men could struggle through it. As the head of the right column approached firm ground, received a sharp discharge of rifles from the enemy, but, dashing forward,

the enemy was soon dislodged and pursued three or four miles, and driven across the river; the column halted and remained on the bank of the river until recalled, an hour after. In the pursuit which succeeded the first charge a portion of the right column became several times engaged, whenever thick cypress or hammock growth favored the enemy, but in every instance he was promptly expelled and pursued. The left column approached the island simultaneously with the right, and received a hot discharge from the enemy as it arrived within rifle-shot of the hammock, and at the moment when the advance was plunging through a deep and difficult morass; a few discharges from a six-pounder silenced the enemy, when the advance, &c., charged the hammock and the enemy fled and were actively pursued for two miles, until the left came up with the right column, and, finding it impossible to penetrate the cypress swamp on its left, halted. Finding it impossible to follow the enemy across the river, and being twenty-four hours without provisions, the troops returned to the baggage train and encamped. On 1st April marched along the lakes and reached the next morning what appeared to be their southeastern extremity, where they established a post of observation under Major Cooper, leaving him seventeen days' provisions, and reserving only enough to carry the troops to Tampa, where they arrived on the 5th April, after a fatiguing and difficult march, making the road the whole distance. The fatigue and exposure increased the sick list to 150. The killed and wounded in the several rencounters were four killed and nine wounded.—(Doc. 104.)

April 10.—General Eustis reports the operations of the left wing. Arrived at St. Augustine February 15; commenced the establishment of a chain of posts at intervals of from ten to twenty miles, extending south as far as Mosquito inlet, in order to cover the southern plantations, &c., and drive off the predatory bands of savages. On the 9th March Colonel Goodwyn's regiment of mounted South Carolinians marched to St. Augustine. On the 10th three men of Brisbane's regiment were killed within two hundred yards of his intrenchment at Tomoca; the enemy fled before he could rally upon them. On the 15th the several detachments of the column put in motion for Volusia, *via* Tomoca. On 22d all had reached that point but Colonel Butler's battalion and two companies of artillery, both which had operated as far south as Smyrna. The route to Volusia was exceedingly difficult and injurious to wagons and horses. On 22d commenced crossing St. John's; about 3 p. m. the advanced guard, after crossing briskly, were attacked by a considerable party of Indians; the guard maintained itself until reinforced by two companies, when, a charge being made, the enemy was repulsed at all points, and retreated to his fastnesses. In the encounter our loss was three killed and nine wounded; one Indian found dead, and evidences of four others being thrown into the river. On 24th a subaltern's command of mounted men fell in with a party of twelve or fifteen Indians and killed two. On 25th the left wing, consisting of four companies of United States artillery, Colonel Goodwyn's mounted regiment, and Colonel Brisbane's regiment of foot, and Elmore's volunteers concentrated, and on 26th commenced the march for Pelaklikaha by the upper crossing of the Ocklawaha with 1,400 men and thirteen days' rations, leaving at Volusia two companies of Brisbane's. The route very difficult; made only seven miles by the evening of 27th; the route becomes better; obliged to build bridges on the Ocklawaha, the Withlacoochee, and one intermediate stream; found no serious impediments to the march to Tampa. On 29th, after crossing the Ocklawaha, an Indian of note, Ayah Hajoe, was killed by Colonel Shelton, who was wounded. On 30th the advance was attacked at Okihumpky swamp, and three men wounded. The hammocks were scoured and the Indians found behind some pines, from which they were soon driven into the depths of the swamp, inaccessible to the troops; one of our men wounded. The enemy retreated whenever our line approached two hundred yards. These were the only Indians seen on the march. On reaching Pelaklikaha, found the villages abandoned, and no sign of their having been occupied for several weeks; cattle and ponies abundant in the neighborhood; caused the houses and fences to be burned. On 31st despatched an express to Fort King, who returned the night of 1st April with information that General Scott with the right wing had crossed the Withlacoochee on 28th March; that no communication could be held with him on that route; and no provisions could be obtained at Fort King. It being impracticable, in the exhausted state of the horses, to draw provisions from Volusia, and having no guide who was acquainted with the country south of Pelaklikaha, determined to move south on the main road from Fort King to Tampa; fired signal guns at 10 a. m. on four successive days without hearing any response. On 3d fell upon Lindsay's trail returning to Tampa, and sent an express to him; on 4th received his answer; on 5th, leaving the foot fifteen miles from Tampa, arrived at Tampa with all the horse and wagons.—(Doc. 105.)

April 10.—Colonel Lindsay reports the operations of his command, (the centre.) On 2d March embarked at Mobile with three companies of Alabama volunteers—seven other companies sailing about same time; the first eight companies reached Tampa on 6th March, and the two others, with horses, provisions, and ammunition, did not arrive until the 13th; found a battalion of Florida volunteers on the west side of the Hillsborough, and about the 10th was joined by a company of Louisiana volunteers. On the 12th discovered large fires in the direction of the Alafia river. The Florida battalion directed to scour that section of country, which duty was successfully performed by a night march, by which the Indians were surprised in their camp and driven across the river, with a loss of three of their party killed and six of their ponies captured; determines to make a forward movement and construct a stockade on the Hillsborough, where it is crossed by the main road from Tampa to Fort King, with a view of bringing subsistence nearer to the scene of operations; and, with this view, marches on the 15th. The bridges having been destroyed by the enemy, the march was much embarrassed, and did not reach the Hillsborough until the 17th; from which time to 20th was engaged in constructing the stockade called Fort Alabama. The Florida battalion, under Major Read, left this post, and the remainder returned on 21st to Fort Brooke; received there a despatch from General Scott, giving the plan of campaign, and requiring him to be at Chickuchatty on the 25th to co-operate. On 22d commenced the march, taking up the battalion at Fort Alabama, and leaving there one company and 30 sick; the route lay through a hilly country, abounding in hammocks. After passing Elochuteka, the Indians, taking advantage of their coverts, began to annoy the rear and flanks. On the 26th a flanker was killed and another wounded while passing a dense hammock nearly a mile in length; the hammock was entered, when a brisk fire was kept up between the rear and the enemy; directed a company to charge into the hammock, with a view to ascertain the force of the enemy; the Indians were driven off to the distance of a quarter of a mile in the open woods. During the night, at the encampment, parties of our men were fired upon by the Indians from a hammock contiguous to a pond which furnished water to the troops. Finding the position of the enemy was too distant to be reached by musketry, a round of canister was thrown in, which dispersed them. On the 27th the enemy still continued their annoying attacks, always lying in ambush; one of our men killed and two wounded. At noon halted, and a smart attack was made on the rear; but upon a brisk return of the fire

the Indians disappeared. On 28th, when encamped at Fort Broadnax, near Chickuchatty, the Indians commenced a fire on our horses and the party guarding them, when a detachment was ordered to drive them, which was done without loss on our side. On the 30th, provisions beginning to be scarce, two parties of mounted men were sent in pursuit of cattle, covered by a force of 250 men; they brought in a supply sufficient for four days, although without bread or salt. During the day the friendly Indians killed a chief called Charley Fixico, a leader of about 85 men. At night the sentinels were occasionally fired on, and also during the 31st, but without injury. On 31st made an attempt to procure more beef. Being 60 miles from our depot, with barely enough provisions in store to march to it, without any prospect of being able to keep the field for the purpose of co-operating, as contemplated in the plan of campaign, and having obtained no response to the signals made for eight days in succession, deemed it advisable to return to Tampa, where he arrived at night the 4th April. In the interval, between the departure from and return to Fort Alabama, that post was attacked by a force of between 300 and 400 Indians. The attack commenced about eight a. m., and continued, without intermission, for two hours and twenty minutes. Our loss, one killed and two wounded; that of the enemy supposed to be 15 killed. Notwithstanding their defeat in the main attack, they continued to lie around the work in considerable force, both day and night, until the return of the main force of the centre, when they moved off on the same road by which we marched, and the sign made on that road furnishes the means of estimating their numbers.—(Doc. 106.)

April 30.—General Scott at Picolata; reports the movement of the troops from Tampa on the 14th instant; accompanies the left wing *via* Pelaklikaha and the upper crossing of the Ocklawaha. On the night of the 22d the camp was fired upon by a party of six or eight of the enemy. They were pursued at day-light; no result. A party of the enemy was met on the 24th, which might have been cut off but for a false movement of a company of horse; the horses and packs of the enemy captured; after scouring a succession of hammocks, which were, as far as practicable, surrounded by the horse, were eluded by every Indian. Goes to Volusia and embarks on board a steamer and ascends the St. John's, 60 miles above Volusia, to the head of Lake Monroe; cannot cross the bar, but takes a canoe and ascends yet further; attacked by a party of the enemy. The object of this *reconnaissance*, &c. A body of the left wing reached Volusia on the 25th. All the volunteers of the left wing marched under Colonel Goodwyn, on 28th, for St. Augustine, *via* Tomoca; the regulars left to garrison Volusia and superintend the evacuation of the post, which had become extremely sickly; the evacuation may be completed in a week. Believes the whole force of the enemy, including negroes, does not exceed 1,200 fighting men, and that not 500 have, at any time since the commencement of hostilities, been brought within the same ten miles square. In all our operations within the last thirty days have not found a party of more than 130; but parties of from 10 to 30 have been encountered almost everywhere. His views in regard to future operations, and the force necessary to subdue the enemy. Operations cannot be carried on except between the 20th November and the end of April, the intermediate period being too hot or sickly. At the end of January he asked for troops of the governors of the several States. The last of the South Carolinians arrived at St. Augustine the 9th March, and at Volusia the 25th. The Georgians, in part, arrived at Fort Drane about that time: but six companies of horse not till the 9th April, after the campaign was nearly over. The Alabama regiment that was expected at Tampa about the 25th did not reach the place till the 13th of the month. These extraordinary delays it was impossible for him to foresee or guard against.—(Doc. 116.)

May 5.—The adjutant general writes to General Scott that the President approves of General Scott's proposed plan of operations from Tampa, &c. The Secretary of War thinks it probable that, owing to the approaching season of the year, the campaign in the field cannot be much longer vigorously pushed, in which event General Scott is to make a judicious selection of posts necessary to be occupied by the troops, &c.—(Doc. 118.)

May 11.—General Scott, at St. Augustine, writes that he is much indispensed. From Clinch's report, the Indians have recommenced depredations and murders in the vicinity of Fort Drane. There is little hope of embodying a respectable number of inhabitants as mounted men to aid in their own defence; has authorized Clinch to raise 80 or 100, in addition to the regular force (nine companies) at Fort Drane. Eustis engaged in mounting two companies of his regiment. Captain Dimmock's company hastily mounted and despatched in pursuit of a party of the enemy at Montangas; overtakes them, kills three, and wounds several; our loss, one killed and four wounded. The Indians fled to a hammock. The South Carolina volunteers will not consent to remain longer, their time having expired. Has been using every means to raise a company of mounted volunteers this side of the St. John's; doubts if he shall succeed in raising even forty men. The steamer *Essayons* will be useful by frequently passing up the St. John's as far as Lake George, in preventing Indians from crossing the river and joining in depredations; speaks of the conduct of Major Read as disgraceful, &c.—(Doc. 119.)

April 27.—General Clinch at Fort Drane; reports the return of the right wing from Tampa; on 14th of April his force, consisting of 278 artillery, 43 dismounted dragoons, 202 infantry, 139 Augusta volunteers, and 140 mounted men, left Tampa, on its return to Fort Drane, *via* Fort Cooper, on the Withlacoochee, making short marches, in consequence of the heat of the weather and debilitated condition of the horses, &c. On the 18th, within three miles of Fort Cooper, despatched two companies, with light wagons, with instructions to Major Cooper to join him; the detachment fired upon from a hammock, and a lieutenant and private severely wounded; the enemy fled. Major Cooper had been invested by the enemy from 5th to 17th of April, and had lost one killed and five wounded; estimated the force around him at 250. On the 22d one of the flankers fired on as he passed near a hammock; prompt pursuit made, but without effect, the Indians retreating through the thick undergrowth. 25th, reached Fort Drane, men and horses much exhausted by sickness and heat of the weather; another day's march would have occasioned the abandoning the train; fifteen horses and mules died on the road, and eight were turned out that could not be got along by leading.—(Doc. 120.) Reports the volunteers returning to their homes; recommends disposition to be made of the regular troops. On the 20th Indians made an attack on Fort Drane, but were met and repulsed by the garrison; carried off some negroes and horses.—(Doc. 121.)

April 26.—Governor Call reports the situation of the troops in the block-house on the Withlacoochee, and proposes the relief of the garrison, &c.—(Doc. 122.)

April 29.—Council of war at Fort Drane; determine that relief cannot be afforded to the garrison on the Withlacoochee from Fort Drane; the reasons given.—(Doc. 124.)

May 1.—General Scott differs from the council in opinion; thinks that 250 men would be sufficient to relieve the garrison on the Withlacoochee, and that that number might be safely sent from Fort Drane;

orders that the largest practicable force be immediately sent from Fort Drane, provided Governor Call has not been advised that relief cannot be afforded from Fort Drane.—(Doc. 126.)

May 5.—General Clinch reports that Governor Call has made arrangements for relieving the garrison on the Withlacoochee from Suwanee, &c.—(Doc. 127.)

May 7.—Colonel Lindsay reports that the force under his command moved from Tampa for the forks of the Withlacoochee on the evening of the 14th of April. In passing over the Hillsborough a wagoner was killed by the Indians, and that night the Alabama regiment was fired on, and a sentinel wounded; the remainder of the march effected without disturbance from the enemy; arrives at the Withlacoochee; his dispositions there; no sign of Indians; encumbered by the sick of his command; returns to Fort Alabama. His wagon train insufficient for the removal of the sick alone to Tampa, and the abruptness of the post necessarily deferred until the army could return with its transportation relieved from the encumbrance of the sick. The march to Fort Brooke uninterrupted by the enemy, and after resting a day and a half returned to remove all the public property and stores from Fort Alabama. Colonel Chisholm ordered, with the Alabama regiment, a battalion of 4th infantry, and twenty artillery, to remove the troops at Fort Alabama, break up the post, and bring away all the property. The command scarcely proceeded three miles from Fort Brooke when they discovered considerable signs of Indians, the trails leading towards Thlonotosassa creek, and after passing that creek it was apparent that a party had crossed from the Hillsborough. The troops moved on unmolested to Fort Alabama, and on the return march were attacked about 3 o'clock p. m. On the 27th, as the advanced guard was preparing to cross Thlonotosassa creek, the Indians firing from a dense covert on the front and back flanks of the column, which killed and wounded a considerable number of the troops. The fire was vigorously returned by the troops, and by the 6-pounder, &c. After twelve or thirteen rounds from the piece, Colonel Foster, at the head of the infantry, charged into the hammock, attacked and drove the Indians, estimated at 300, and they put an end to the conflict, which had been kept up for one hour. The Indians fled through the cover of thick hammocks, and the troops marched to Tampa, where they arrived the next day; five of our troops were killed, and twenty-four wounded. The volunteers are returning to their homes. The rainy season has set in, and the weather so hot as to render it impossible to keep the field without a great sacrifice of life, &c.—(Docs. 129, 131, 132.)

April 26.—Colonel Smith, of Louisiana volunteers, reports his expedition, accompanied by a naval force; to Charlotte harbor and up Pease creek; nothing of interest.—(Doc. 133.)

May 17.—General Scott's Order 48. Speaks of the panic of the people of Florida.—(Doc. 138.)

May 20.—General Scott at St. Augustine. Reports he has been sick since the 11th; is recovering slowly, &c.—(Doc. 146.) Has received instructions from the War Department, which obliges him to leave Florida; turns the command over to General Eustis.—(Doc. 148.)

May 16.—Secretary of War directs General Scott to take the direction of the Creek war.—(Doc. 155.)

ORAL TESTIMONY.

. *Deposition of Charles Dimmock, late quartermaster, (page 131.)*

To question 1. Stationed at Savannah, &c.

To questions 2 and 4. Submits letters of advice from Major Cross; two wagons shipped by brig Oglethorpe, ten others to be shipped, 30th January; six wagons shipped in schooner Ida in February; two wagons shipped in February from Savannah to Picolata, six more on the 8th March, and two others about May 1; all these received from Major Cross. Harness, &c., for the wagons arrived on February 24, and shipped to Picolata.

To question 5. First bacon received April 3, reshipped to Florida April 4; limited transportation.

To question 6. No knowledge of bacon being shipped before April 4.

To question 7. All the requisitions of General Scott for transportation complied with, except two boats, which could not be obtained. Purchased seven wagons, and received eight from Major Cross, making fifteen in all. On or about February 10 purchased, by order of General Scott, 151 horses at Augusta and 65 near Savannah—in all 216; turned over to Captain Gibson 15 horses; March 4, sent 58 across the country to Florida; on March 4, 106 to Captain Wharton; March 8, sent 8 horses by steamboat; on March 16, sent on 18—making in all 205 horses. Harness in excess were sent for all the wagons.

Deposition of Colonel Gadsden, (page 133.) So full of incident that it must be read to a full understanding of the campaign.

Deposition of F. D. Newcomb, late of the army, (page 135.)

To question 1. Was assistant quartermaster at Tampa.

To question 2. Received no transportation from New Orleans in March and up to April 17. Subsequent to the march of General Scott from Tampa, there was received at Tampa, about May 1, 16 mules and a few carts or wagons; they would not have been sufficient for the purpose required. They were sent from New Orleans, in answer to a letter calling for 50 wagons and 200 horses.

To question 3. The reason transportation was not forwarded to Tampa from New Orleans, the impression that the war had been ended by General Gaines; communicated the same to General Scott; received the information from the quartermaster at New Orleans.—(See letter of Major Clark, page 136.)

To question 4. Corn for the horses damaged, except a few bags sound.

To question 5. Furnished ample transportation for Major Read's command. Expedition of great importance. General Scott evinced great solicitude on the subject.

To question 6. No better transportation could have been furnished Major Read, and that furnished ample.

Colonel Lindsay's testimony, (page 137.) Necessary that the whole should be read, as it embraces important information in reference to the whole campaign and the causes of failure.

General Eustis's testimony, (pages 141 and 145.) The whole should be read; important in facts.

Captain Thruston's testimony, (page 144.) Should be read, being important as to facts, &c.

Colonel Bankhead's testimony, (page 150.) Should be read; important to an understanding of the operations of the campaign.

Captain Thistle's testimony, (page 152.)

To question 8. Impressions as to the Indians being still hostile.

To question 9. Indians found ready to fire; fired upon the rear guard; killed a negro.

Mr. Locke's testimony, (page 153.) Relating to supplies of provisions.

General Clinch's testimony, (page 154.) Necessary to be read, embracing a view of the campaign.

Lieutenant Morris's testimony, (page 156.) Relative to provisions; erection of bake-ovens, &c.; sutlers' supplies, &c.

Letter from Major Clark. Page 67, (Doc. 152.)

Captain Van Buren's testimony, (page 157.)

To question 1. Train of wagons arrived at Picolata from Fort Drane, March 1 or 2.

To question 2. Captain Shannon, quartermaster, charged with loading the train with unremitted exertions.

To question 3. Stormy weather; difficulty of crossing the St. John's river.

To question 4. Train left Picolata March 5. General Scott marches with a small detachment March 9; object to rescue Generals Gaines and Clinch on the Withlacoochee; the subsistence by train for them.

Colonel De Peyster's testimony, (page 157.) In reference to the difficulty of crossing the St. John's with supplies in consequence of stormy weather.

Colonel Gadsden's second deposition, (page 157.) Should be read to a full understanding of the operations of the campaign.

The court, in proceeding to review the Seminole campaign under Major General Scott in Florida, and the opinion it has formed as to the causes of its failure, already submitted to the President, will remark that that opinion was formed upon a careful examination and a comprehensive view of the oral and documentary testimony taken in the case, as cited above, applying the same in its general and particular bearing upon the subject submitted for its examination and inquiry.

In conformity with the instructions of the President, the court, after stating the above facts in reference to the manner its opinion was formed, proceeds to review the whole of the testimony, documentary and oral, and embodies such facts deduced therefrom, and applies the same to the several causes enumerated in its opinion as to the failure of the campaign.

1st. As to the want of time to operate—see order of the Secretary of War of January 21, (doc. 4;) also documents 18, 20, 24, 38, 44, 46, 47, 52, 68, 71, 77, 81, 93, 94, 97; also testimony of General Clinch, page 154, in answer to the first question of General Scott, and in answer to the first question by the court on page 154; deposition of Colonel Gadsden, page 135, line 2 of last paragraph; General Eustis's testimony; page 144, line 12, and Colonel Bankhead's testimony, page 151.

2d. As to the insalubrity of the climate—see Colonel Lindsay's testimony, pages 139, 140; also Colonel Bankhead's testimony, page 151; General Clinch's testimony, page 154, in answer to the third and fourth questions by General Scott; and General Eustis's testimony, page 143, in answer to the twenty-second question by General Scott.

3d. As to swamps and hammocks—see testimony of Colonel Lindsay, page 137, in answer to General Scott's sixth question; page 140, in answer to General Scott's twenty-seventh question; also General Eustis's testimony, page 144, in answer to General Scott's twenty-fifth question.

4th. As to a want of a knowledge of the topography of the country—see Colonel Lindsay's testimony, page 140; also General Eustis's testimony, page 144, in answer to question by the court.

5th. As to the difficulty of obtaining in time the means of transportation for the army—see testimony of Charles Dimmock, page 132, in answer to a question by the judge advocate; also Colonel Gadsden's testimony, pages 135 and 158, in answer to the second question by General Scott; F. D. Newcomb's testimony, page 135, in answer to questions two and three by General Scott; Colonel Lindsay's testimony, page 138, in answer to questions 13, 14, and 15 by General Scott; and General Eustis's testimony, page 141, in answer to question first by General Scott, and page 144, in answer to question by the court.

The court, in thus resuming the consideration of the evidence as directed by the President, and in reporting with distinctness all the facts touching the subjects of inquiry, as well as the times when and places where any material occurrence took place, with the amount of force on both sides, at the different periods of time embraced in the transaction, and the positions thereof, and all other important circumstances, believes it has fulfilled the instructions of the President; and, further, the court considers that its opinion, already given, is fully sustained by the facts and circumstances herewith submitted.

The court adjourn *sine die*.

ALEX. MACOMB, *Major General, President of the Court of Inquiry.*
S. COOPER, *Judge Advocate, Recorder of the Court.*

CONTINUATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE FOREGOING CASE.

WASHINGTON, *March 2, 1837.*

The court met pursuant to notice. All present.

The following order from the Secretary of War was laid before the court :

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *March 2, 1837.*

SIR: You will reassemble the court of inquiry in the city of Washington, in order that it may reconsider and review the proceedings in the cases of the campaigns in Florida and in the Creek nation, conducted by Major General Scott, so as to embrace facts in the opinion of the court as required by the order of the President organizing the court, and by his orders of the 14th and 18th of February last.

B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War ad interim.*

Major General MACOMB, *President of the Court of Inquiry*
directed to be convened at Frederick, Maryland, by General Order No. 65.

In obedience to the foregoing order, the court was occupied until the 8th of March in reconsidering and reviewing its proceedings and in reporting the following facts :

The court finds, from a review of the testimony, that Major General Scott was ordered on the 21st of January to take the direction of the Florida war, with full authority to organize a regular and volunteer force sufficient, in his judgment, with a view to bring the war to a speedy termination; that, under this order, he proceeded to Augusta, Georgia, where he arrived near the last of January, and commenced organizing the service ; that he proceeded thence to Milledgeville for the purpose of consulting with the governor of Georgia on the subject of the Creek difficulties, and hastening the preparations for operations in Florida; that he returned to Augusta on the 6th of February, and arrived at Savannah on the 9th, where he was occupied in regulating the supplies and movements of the troops for Florida until the 20th; that he arrived at Picolata on the 22d, and was detained there until the 9th of March awaiting the arrival of troops, both regulars and volunteers, also transportation and supplies, and in forwarding the same to Fort Drane and Volusia, his plan of campaign being to move in three divisions simultaneously from Fort Drane, Volusia, and Tampa, upon the Withlacoochee, the stronghold of the enemy; that on the 9th of March General Scott proceeded to Fort Drane with a small escort, with supplies for the relief of General Gaines's forces on the Withlacoochee, and arrived at Fort Drane about the 14th, where he was detained until the 25th to give time for the left wing and the centre of his army to put themselves in position, and also in awaiting the arrival of supplies to enable him to commence operations. These supplies were delayed for the want of additional means of transportation momentarily expected from Savannah, the few teams already in use being nearly exhausted by the bad state of the roads and the constant and heavy labor imposed on them. On the 26th of March General Scott commenced his movement from Fort Drane for the Withlacoochee with the right wing of his command, consisting of about 1,968 regular and volunteer troops, and with 18 days' rations; that he reached Camp Izard, on the Withlacoochee, on the morning of the 28th, where the Indians from the opposite bank of the river fired into the camp. Preparations being made, the troops commenced crossing the river the next morning at 4 o'clock; during the crossing the rear division was attacked, but the enemy was driven. On the morning of the 30th, the army having crossed, proceeded up the river in search of the enemy, whom they discovered about 10 o'clock in small parties on an island in a chain of lakes; the troops advanced to the attack, when the Indians retired and were pursued about four miles, but not overtaken. The next morning the Indians were again discovered on another island, surrounded by broad and wet savannahs, and so boggy that it was with difficulty the troops could struggle through them. The Indians were attacked, dislodged, and pursued three or four miles, when they eluded the pursuit by crossing the river. In this pursuit the troops became several times engaged, but the enemy was always dislodged and driven from the hammocks. Finding it impossible to pursue the enemy across the river, and being twenty-four hours without provisions, the troops returned to their baggage train and encamped. On the 1st of April the troops proceeded on the march, and established a post of observation, called Fort Cooper, at the southeastern extremity of a chain of lakes, leaving there a part of the force with 17 days' provisions, and reserving only enough subsistence to carry the remainder to Tampa Bay, where they arrived on the 5th of April after a fatiguing and difficult march, making the road the whole distance. The loss of the troops in the several encounters was four killed and nine wounded.

The left wing, under General Eustis, after scouring the country between St. Augustine and Volusia, *via* Tomoca, commenced crossing the St. John's at Volusia on the 22d of March, when it was attacked by the enemy, who was repulsed at all points, and retreated to his fastnesses after a loss on the part of the troops of three killed and nine wounded. One Indian was found dead, and evidences of four others being thrown into the river. On the 24th a subaltern's command of mounted men fell in with a party of twelve or fifteen Indians, and killed two. On the 25th the left wing, consisting of four companies of United States artillery, Colonel Goodwyn's mounted regiment, Colonel Brisbane's regiment of foot, and Elmore's volunteers, concentrated, and on the 20th commenced the march for Pelaklikaha, by the upper crossing of the Ocklawaha, with 1,400 men and thirteen days' rations, leaving at Volusia two of Brisbane's companies. The route being difficult, the troops made only seven miles by the evening of the 27th, and were obliged to build bridges over the Ocklawaha, the Withlacoochee, and one intermediate stream. On the 29th, after crossing the Ocklawaha, an Indian of note, Ayah Hajah, was killed by Colonel Shelton, who was wounded. On the 30th the advance was attacked at Oakahumpkey swamp, and three men killed. The hammocks were scoured, and the Indians discovered and driven into a swamp inaccessible to the troops, one of whom was wounded. The enemy retreated whenever the troops approached to within two hundred yards. On reaching Pelaklikaha, the villages were found to have been abandoned perhaps for several weeks; cattle and ponies were abundant in the neighborhood. The houses and fences were burned by the troops. It being impossible to obtain provisions from Fort King, and the horses being too much exhausted to draw provisions from Volusia, and General Scott having crossed the Withlacoochee south, on the 28th, with the right wing, the left wing moved on the main road from Fort King to Tampa, where the horse of that wing arrived on the 5th of April, leaving the foot at a position fifteen miles from that place.

The centre, under Colonel Lindsay, consisting of from 1,000 to 1,200 men, organized at Tampa about the 13th of March. Large fires being discovered in the direction of the Alafia, the battalion of Florida volunteers was sent in that direction, where they surprised a party of Indians, killing three and capturing six ponies. On the 15th the centre moved upon the Hillsborough, on the main road to Fort King; and on the 20th established a post, called Fort Alabama, with a view of bringing supplies near to the scene of hostilities in the direction of the Withlacoochee, leaving there the Florida battalion under Major Read, the remainder of the troops marching back to Fort Brooke, (Tampa,) where a despatch was received from General Scott giving the plan of the campaign, and requiring the centre to be at Chickachatty by the 25th, to co-operate. On the 22d the march was commenced; the battalion at Fort Alabama was taken up, leaving at that post one company and thirty sick. The route lay through a hilly country, abounding in hammocks. After passing Elochucto, the Indians, taking advantage of their coverts, began to annoy the rear and flanks of the column; a flanker was killed and another wounded whilst passing a dense hammock. The hammock was scoured, and the Indians driven out. During the night, at the encampment, parties of the troops were fired on by the Indians from a hammock contiguous to a pond which furnished water for the troops; the Indians were dispersed by a round of canister. On the 27th the Indians still continued their annoying attacks, always firing from ambush; one of our men was killed and two wounded. The column halted at noon, when an attack was made upon the rear; but upon a brisk return of the fire the

Indians disappeared. On the 28th, when encamped at Fort Broadnax, near the Chickuchatty, the Indians commenced a fire on the horses and the party guarding them. A detachment was sent out, which drove the enemy without loss to the troops. On the 30th, provisions being scarce, two parties of mounted men were sent in pursuit of cattle, covered by a force of two hundred and fifty men; they brought in a supply sufficient for four days. During that day the friendly Indians attached to the command killed a chief called Charley Fixico, a leader of about eighty-five men. That night the sentinels were fired upon occasionally, and also on the 31st, but without injury. On the same day an attempt was made to procure more beef. Being sixty miles from the depot, with barely enough provisions to reach it, without any prospect of being able to keep the field for the purpose of co-operation, and having obtained no response to the signals made for eight days in succession, Colonel Lindsay deemed it advisable to return to Tampa, where he arrived on the night of the 4th of April. In the interval between the departure from and return to Fort Alabama that post was attacked by a force of between three hundred and four hundred Indians, which resulted in a loss on the part of the troops, after an action of two hours and twenty minutes, of one killed and two wounded; the supposed loss of the enemy was fifteen killed. The enemy continued to lie around the work in considerable force, both day and night, until the return of the centre column.

The several columns which arrived at Tampa about the 5th of April remained at that place until the 14th, for the purpose of recruiting the men and horses, which had become much exhausted from the heat of the weather and the fatiguing and difficult marches. The army was here divided into five detachments. Colonel Smith, with the Louisiana volunteers, was detached to Charlotte harbor and up Pease creek, accompanied by a naval force, where, after operating some days up the country, and discovering no Indians, he returned to Tampa, and thence to New Orleans, where the volunteers were discharged.

The Florida volunteers, under Major Read, were sent to the mouth of the Withlacoochee, to operate up that river. The object of this expedition was not effected, and the troops were conveyed to St. Mark's and Tallahassee, where they were discharged.

The right wing, under General Clinch, consisting of 278 artillery, 43 dismounted dragoons, 202 infantry, 139 Augusta volunteers, and 140 mounted men, marched for Fort Drane, *via* Fort Cooper, on the Withlacoochee, making short marches in consequence of the heat of the weather and the debilitated condition of the horses. On the 18th, three miles from Fort Cooper, General Clinch despatched two companies, with light wagons, with instructions to Major Cooper to join him; the detachment was fired upon from a hammock, and one lieutenant and a private severely wounded; the enemy fled. Fort Cooper had been invested from the 5th to the 17th of April with a loss of one killed and five wounded; the force of the enemy estimated at 250. On the 22d, one of the flankers was fired on from a hammock, when prompt pursuit was made, but without effect, the Indians retiring through a thick undergrowth. The troops reached Fort Drane on the 25th, the men and horses much exhausted by sickness and the heat of the weather; another day's march would have occasioned the abandoning the train; 15 horses and mules died on the road, and eight were turned out that could not be got along by leading. The term of service of the volunteers having expired they returned to their homes. On the 20th the enemy made an attack on Fort Drane, but were repulsed by the garrison; they carried off some negroes and horses.

The left wing, accompanied by General Scott, moved *via* Pelaklikaha and the upper crossing of the Ocklawaha, for Volusia. On the night of the 22d of April the camp was fired upon by a party of six or eight Indians; they were pursued at daylight without any result. On the 24th, a party of the enemy was met, but with no other result than the capture of their horses and packs, the enemy escaping into the hammocks. A body of the left wing reached Volusia on the 25th. All the volunteers of the left wing marched under Colonel Goodwyn for St. Augustine, on the 28th, *via* Tomoca. The regulars were left to garrison Volusia and superintend the evacuation of the post, which had become very sickly.

The centre column, under Colonel Lindsay, moved for the forks of the Withlacoochee. Passing over the Hillsborough, a wagoner was killed by the Indians, and on that night the Alabama regiment was fired on and a sentinel wounded. The remainder of the march was effected without annoyance from the enemy. No signs of Indians were discovered on the Withlacoochee. Being encumbered with the sick, the troops returned to Fort Alabama. The wagon-train was insufficient for the removal of the sick alone to Tampa, and the abruptness of the post of Fort Alabama was necessarily deferred until the army could return with its transportation from Tampa, relieved from the encumbrance of the sick. The march to Tampa was uninterrupted by the enemy, and after resting a day and a half Colonel Chisholm, with the Alabama regiment, four companies of infantry, and twenty artillery, returned to remove all the public property and stores from Fort Alabama. The troops reached Fort Alabama, and on their return march were attacked about 3 o'clock in the afternoon of the 27th as the advance guard was preparing to cross Tlnonotosassa creek; the Indians firing from a dense covert on the front and both flanks of the column. The fire was vigorously returned by the troops, and after twelve or thirteen rounds from a field-piece Colonel Foster, at the head of the infantry, charged into the hammock, attacked and drove the Indians, estimated at 300, and thus put an end to the conflict which had been kept up for an hour, resulting in a loss on the part of the troops of 5 killed and 24 wounded. The troops reached Tampa the next day, and the volunteers returned to their homes, the rainy season having set in, and the weather so hot as to render it impossible to keep the field without a great sacrifice of life.

The strength of the enemy during the campaign is estimated by General Scott not to exceed 1,200 fighting men, and he is of opinion that not more than 500 had, at any time since the commencement of hostilities, been brought within the same ten miles square, and that in all his operations for thirty days no party larger than 130 had been found, but that parties of from ten to thirty had been encountered almost everywhere.

After the return of the troops from Tampa to their several positions General Scott deemed it necessary, in consequence of the extreme heat of the weather and the sickness of the troops, to put them into summer quarters, which was approved by the Secretary of War in a letter of the 5th of May, from the adjutant general, and thus closed the campaign.

The court, after a full consideration of the foregoing facts, and the testimony from which they are drawn, comes to the same conclusion as expressed in its opinion already given, in the following words, to wit:

"The court, after a careful review of the great mass of testimony taken in the foregoing investigation, finds that Major General Scott was amply clothed with authority to create the means of prosecuting the Seminole war to a successful issue, but is of opinion that, at the time he was invested with the command, the season was too far advanced for him to collect, appoint, and put in motion his forces until a day too late to compass the object. It appears that after using great diligence and energy he was not in

a condition to take the field and enter the enemy's strongholds before the 28th of March, and then without sufficient means for transporting the necessary supplies to enable him to remain there long enough to seek out the scattered forces of the enemy.

"The court, therefore, ascribe the failure of the campaign to the want of time to operate—the insalubrity of the climate after the middle of April—the impervious swamps and hammocks that abound in the country occupied by the enemy, affording him cover and retreat at every step—an absence of all knowledge by the general, or any part of his forces, of the topography of the country, together with the difficulty of obtaining in time the means of transporting supplies for the army.

"The court is further of opinion, from the testimony of many officers of rank and intelligence who served in the campaign, that Major General Scott was zealous and indefatigable in the discharge of his duties, and that his plan of campaign was well devised, and prosecuted with energy, steadiness, and ability."

A. MACOMB, *Major General, President of the Court of Inquiry.*
S. COOPER, *Judge Advocate, Recorder of the Court.*

No. 2.

PROCEEDINGS OF A COURT OF INQUIRY IN THE CASE OF MAJOR GENERAL SCOTT.—DELAY IN OPENING AND PROSECUTING THE CREEK CAMPAIGN.

PART SECOND.

Continuation of the proceedings of a court of inquiry held at the city of Frederick, Maryland, by virtue of Orders Nos. 65 and 68, dated Adjutant General's Office, Washington, October 3, 1836, and October 14, 1836.

FREDERICK, December 13, 1836.

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Macomb, president; Brigadier General Atkinson and Brigadier General Brady, members; Captain Cooper, judge advocate and recorder.

The court was occupied from this day to the 16th of December in examining the documentary testimony having reference to the campaign against the hostile Creek Indians in 1836.—(See papers accompanying these proceedings.)

DECEMBER 19, 1836.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

The subject of the Creek campaign being resumed—

Major EDMUND KIRBY, paymaster of the army, and a witness on the part of Major General Scott, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by General Scott.* Did the witness serve with General Scott in the late Creek war; in what capacity, and for what length of time?

Answer. I did. I was announced in orders for staff duties generally, and accompanied General Scott from St. Augustine, on the 21st of May, and remained with him at Columbus to the 17th of June, when I returned to Florida.

2. *Question by General Scott.* By what general officer of the army was the witness and General Scott joined at Augusta, Georgia, and by what high public functionary at Milledgeville?

Answer. General Scott was joined at Augusta, on the 27th of May, by Major General Jesup, and was accompanied from Milledgeville to Columbus by Governor Schley, together with General Jesup.

3. *Question by General Scott.* Does the witness recollect any conversation at Milledgeville, on the road, or at Columbus, between his excellency the governor of Georgia, General Jesup, and General Scott, respecting the best plan of operations against the hostile Creeks; and what were the outlines of that plan?

Answer. Previous to arriving at Augusta, General Scott had explained to me that his plan of operations would be, first, by troops placed on the left bank of the Chattahoochee, and steamboats to cruise upon that river, to prevent the escape of the enemy into Florida; then, with such forces as could be spared, to commence operations below the enemy, in Barbour county, Alabama, and drive the enemy before him upwards, or capture him. After being joined by General Jesup and Governor Schley, he explained to them, in my presence, his plan of operations. General Jesup remarked that the same plan had occurred to him, and had been discussed by him with the President and the Secretary of War. Governor Schley also remarked that the same general plan had occurred to him as the most proper.

4. *Question by General Scott.* Is the witness aware that General Jesup, in any subsequent conversation with General Scott, that is, before the former set out for Tuskegee, ever expressed a doubt as to that plan of operations, or suggest any modification of it?

Answer. I am not.

5. *Question by General Scott.* Did General Scott, up to the time the witness left him, steadily adhere to the same plan of operations in all his conversations, instructions, orders, and arrangements?

Answer. He did.

6. *Question by General Scott.* Will the witness state, after looking at the letter-book of headquarters, whether the originals of the two letters to his excellency the governor of Alabama, therein copied, were duly despatched, and by what several conveyances?

Answer. The originals were placed in the hands of Captain Page, to be transmitted, by an Indian runner, from Fort Mitchell, across the nation to Tuskegee; a duplicate set was handed to the express rider, who brought a letter from Governor Clay, by the upper route, through Chambers county, addressed to the commanding officer of the Georgia militia, at Columbus, to be conveyed by that route to Governor Clay. Both of these letters are dated the 31st of May, the day after the arrival of General Scott at Columbus.

7. *Question by General Scott.* Had, at the time the witness left General Scott, as far as he knows or believes, any answer to, or acknowledgment of, those letters been received by General Scott?

Answer. Many of the letters received by General Scott were opened by me, and all official ones, I believe, were placed in my hands. I have no knowledge or belief that he received one from Governor Clay up to the time I left him.

8. *Question by General Scott.* Does the witness recollect any letter from Governor Schley to Governor Clay of the same date with those from General Scott to the latter, and does the witness know by what conveyance or conveyances Governor Schley's letter was sent to Governor Clay?

Answer. I believe that Governor Schley wrote to Governor Clay by the same conveyance, and perhaps by both conveyances by which General Scott's letters were sent.

9. *Question by General Scott.* What does the witness recollect as to General Scott's calling for a return from the arsenal near Augusta, while passing through that city, and of his marking upon that return the number of arms and ordnance stores which he wished to be sent to Columbus?

Answer. At Augusta, on the 26th of May, General Scott sent to Major Baden, the commanding officer at the arsenal, who was too unwell to leave his quarters, for a list of all the arms and ordnance stores at the arsenal. He marked upon the list such articles as he deemed would be useful for the campaign, and directed Lieutenant Dimmock, the quartermaster, to have them forwarded without delay to Columbus.

10. *Question by General Scott.* Had General Scott any staff with him at Augusta, other than the witness and Captain Dimmock, and were not the witness and General Scott greatly occupied at the time?

Answer. Lieutenant Dimmock accompanied General Scott from Savannah to Augusta, and was left at the latter place on duty, as assistant quartermaster. I was the only other staff officer with the general at the time, and we were both constantly occupied by official duties.

11. *Question by General Scott.* Does the witness recollect whether any copy of the return received from the Augusta arsenal was retained by the witness or General Scott, and what became of the return which was marked by General Scott, as the witness has already stated?

Answer. I believe no copy was retained, but the original was placed in the hands of Lieutenant Dimmock, with orders to have the articles which the general marked forwarded.

12. *Question by General Scott.* Up to the time that the witness left General Scott at Columbus, and when the latter was not quite ill in bed, is the witness aware that the said Scott failed, in point of zeal or judgment, in preparing for prompt and active operations against the hostile Creek Indians?

Answer. I am not. The general manifested great and incessant solicitude for the arrival of the necessary arms and other supplies, to enable the troops to take the field.

13. *Question by General Scott.* What does the witness recollect of arms and accoutrements having been ordered by General Scott from St. Augustine and Picolata to the Chattahoochee river, before the said Scott left Florida?

Answer. Very soon after leaving St. Augustine the general informed me that he had, previously to leaving that place, ordered all the surplus arms and accoutrements at St. Augustine and Picolata to be forwarded to the Chattahoochee.

14. *Question by General Scott.* Is the witness aware of any failure on the part of General Scott to hasten by all the means in his power the arms and accoutrements necessary for the Georgia quota of troops?

Answer. I am not. He manifested constant anxiety for their arrival, and used every means in his power to hasten it.

15. *Question by General Scott.* The witness saw, or mustered into service, the greater part of the Georgia line of troops; what portion of those troops brought with them arms and accoutrements, and what was the condition of those arms and accoutrements?

Answer. I mustered into the service of the United States forty-five companies of the Georgia troops, at Columbus, early in June. They were generally entirely destitute of arms and accoutrements. The few arms they had were generally unfit for service in the field.

1. *Question by the court.* How many days were the Georgia militia waiting for their arms, or detained for the want of them?

Answer. The Georgia troops had nearly all arrived at Columbus by the 12th of June. Some arms had arrived previously, and had been placed in the hands of the militia, who were ordered immediately to take post below Columbus, on the Chattahoochee.

2. *Question by the court.* Do you not think that those who brought with them their fowling-pieces and ordinary rifles might have been sent forward and been fit, with these arms, to meet the Indians successfully?

Answer. The troops who brought arms with them were immediately ordered to take post on the Chattahoochee, below Columbus, and occupied several positions on the left bank of that river; ammunition for them was purchased in Columbus. In my opinion, if these men, thus imperfectly armed, had been sent across the river into the enemy's country, they might have been flogged and driven out of it. Their arms were of different calibre, and not in order. They had no accoutrements, no fixed ammunition, no camp equipage, and no adequate supply of provisions.

3. *Question by the court.* Were the Creek Indians better armed than they?

Answer. I had no means of knowing.

16. *Question by General Scott.* Was the portion of the Georgia militia, already armed at the time the witness left Columbus, (June 17,) sufficient in number to guard the left bank of the Chattahoochee, and at the same time to operate against the enemy in his own country successfully?

Answer. It was not. The Georgia troops posted on the left bank of the Chattahoochee, below Columbus, were fully occupied in repelling the efforts of the enemy to escape across the river in the direction of Florida.

The court adjourned to meet to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock.

DECEMBER 20, 1836.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

The examination of Major Kirby continued.

17. *Question by General Scott.* When the witness arrived with General Scott at Columbus, Georgia, what was the state of the stores and supplies generally found there for the army?

Answer. There was a destitution of all supplies. Subsistence for the troops was purchased by me from day to day, through the agency of Major Huson, in the streets of Columbus, and in the neighboring country. Camp-kettles, mess-pans, tents, and haversacks were also made, under the orders of the general, for the troops arriving. Drag-ropes for the wagons, and ferry-ropes were made, and scows were con-

structed; and all the powder and lead to be found in the place was also purchased. The powder and lead were made into cartridges and distributed to the militia.

18. *Question by General Scott.* What does the witness recollect of a conversation between Generals Jesup and Scott, respecting a letter from the said Scott, dated at Augusta, May 26, 1836, and addressed jointly to the quartermaster and commissary at New Orleans, and which letter is copied into General Scott's letter-book, in the handwriting of the witness?

Answer. Upon General Jesup's informing General Scott of the arrangements made by him previously to leaving Washington, it appeared that he also had instructed Major Clark to forward supplies of provisions from New Orleans to the Creek nation. On a comparison of dates, it was deemed extremely probable that the communications from Generals Scott and Jesup to Major Clark must both have reached him at New Orleans by the same mail.

19. *Question by General Scott.* Was the conclusion just stated by the witness arrived at both by the said Jesup and the said Scott?

Answer. The calculation was made by General Scott, and I understood it to be assented to by General Jesup.

The court was occupied the remainder of this day, and the whole of the next, in prosecuting the inquiries into the Seminole campaign.

DECEMBER 22, 1836.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

The judge advocate presented to the court the following depositions:

Deposition of A. H. Kenan, a citizen of Georgia, taken by the judge advocate on the 27th of November, 1836.

1. *Question by General Scott.* You served with General Scott against the Creeks; in what capacity, and for what time?

Answer. I served with General Scott in the late Creek campaign as volunteer aide-de-camp, under a commission of colonelcy from the executive of Georgia. In this capacity I was with General Scott from about the 4th of June, 1836, until his recall, which was about the 6th of July, 1836.

2. *Question by General Scott.* Early in June, at Columbus, did you frequently hear General Scott develop, for discussion, his plan of campaign against the hostile Creeks; and what was that plan?

Answer. I joined General Scott two or three days after his arrival at Columbus. The general and Governor Schley, and others of the army and town were in frequent conversations upon the subject of the campaign and the defence of the Georgia and Alabama lines. I cannot more intelligibly or more definitely and concisely give the plan of campaign than by a reference to General Scott's letter of instruction to Major General Jesup, upon his departure from Columbus to assume the command at Tuskegee of the Alabama troops. This letter to General Jesup, bearing date the 1st of June, 1836, contains the prominent features of General Scott's contemplated movements. In the frequent conversations between General Scott and Governor Schley and others, in my presence, it was deemed all-important, preparatory to any offensive movement upon the enemy, to cut off his retreat to Florida. To secure this object, it was the plan of General Scott to station troops upon the eastern bank of the Chattahoochee river, from a point 18 or 20 miles below Columbus, to Roanoke—a course which would not only intercept the enemy's retreat to Florida, but which would protect the frontier of Georgia, and keep open the navigation of the Chattahoochee. In addition, it was urged by General Scott that this course or plan of operations would not only give defence and protection to the frontier of Georgia, and prevent the escape of the enemy, but, by commencing his operations in the vicinity of Irwinton, Alabama, and moving upwards, the disembodied parts of the hostile Creeks would be driven to the interior of the nation, and most probably embody for battle or surrender. It was also urged by General Scott that this plan of operation would not only intercept the flight of the enemy, and give immediate defence to the frontier counties of Georgia, but that in its beneficial results the health of the army would be consulted in passing in the early part of the season from the swamps to higher and healthier parts of the nation.

3. *Question by General Scott.* To whom did General Scott develop his plan of campaign for discussion; and was General Jesup one of those present?

Answer. General Scott developed his views fully and freely to Governor Schley, and to the officers of the army, and many of the officers of the volunteers, all of whom gave their concurrence. I arrived at Columbus the day previous to General Jesup's departure for Tuskegee, and consequently know but little of the concurrent views of General Jesup. The only interview between the two generals in my presence was upon the morning of General Jesup's departure for Tuskegee, at which time General Scott gave the general the letter of instructions previously referred to.

4. *Question by General Scott.* Did General Jesup, in terms or in manner, dissent from that plan and its supposed advantages; or did he, in terms or in manner, assent to the one or the other?

Answer. General Jesup made no objection to the plan or its supposed advantages. From the conversation which passed I received the impression that the plan was a mutual one.

5. *Question by General Scott.* Did General Scott steadily adhere to that plan of operations in all his conversations, acts, and arrangements, without deviation, up to the time of General Jesup's march upon and personal arrival at Fort Mitchell?

Answer. He did.

6. *Question by General Scott.* Were you not almost constantly with General Scott by day and by night, and fully in his confidence?

Answer. I was constantly with General Scott, and had the pleasure of believing I possessed his confidence.

7. *Question by General Scott.* Was the conduct of General Scott, in preparing for the campaign and its prosecution, marked by zeal, activity, and judgment, or the reverse?

Answer. Could the conduct of this distinguished officer in the late campaign, for zeal, activity, and judgment, require the favorable opinion of a junior in military science, I would beg leave to superadd to its testimony the results of his plan of campaign, and the approbation of the executive and the officers of the volunteers of Georgia.

Deposition of Major General J. W. A. Sanford, formerly of the Georgia line, taken by the judge advocate the 17th of December, 1836.

1. *Question by General Scott.* In what capacity or station did the witness serve in the recent war against the hostile Creek Indians, and what was about the number of the Georgia line, under the orders of the witness (say) on the 20th of June last?

Answer. On the 27th of May last I was appointed by his excellency Governor Schley, of Georgia, to the command of the Georgia militia, ordered to rendezvous at or below Columbus, and, in a few weeks thereafter, to the entire command of all the militia called out to defend its western frontier. From the time I was thus invested with the command up to the period (the 20th of June) when I was ordered by Major General Scott to descend the east bank of the Chattahoochee, there had probably arrived thirty-five hundred men. This number had, however, been so far reduced by the policy which had been adopted in guarding the passes of the river, that when I received this order there was not exceeding twenty-one or two hundred men in my camp.

2. *Question by General Scott.* Up to about the time that the witness marched with a part of his division towards the place called Roanoke, with a view of crossing the Chattahoochee into the enemy's country, what portion of the division in the vicinity of Columbus, and above, had received arms and accoutrements, and what portion was without arms and accoutrements?

Answer. Of the troops remaining under my immediate command less than one-third were armed, and these variously and indifferently with shot-guns, rifles, and muskets. Our miserable deficiency in this respect was most strikingly displayed to my view when, upon the occasion of an alarm, and it was expected the enemy would be upon us in full force, I had the mortification of beholding within my lines fifteen or sixteen hundred men with no weapons of defence beyond their side-arms, clubs, and club-axes.

3. *Question by General Scott.* Prior to the witness's march from Columbus down the country (say) about the 21st of June, had not the greater part of his division, having arms and accoutrements, been previously distributed along the left bank of the Chattahoochee, in order to defend the Georgia settlements, and to prevent the enemy from escaping across that stream in the direction of Florida?

Answer. The weak and almost defenceless condition of my camp, alluded to in my last answer, in a great measure resulted from our efforts to guard the east bank of the Chattahoochee; to restrain the enemy from crossing that stream; to prevent him from depredating upon Georgia, and escaping to Florida. The men were no sooner armed than they were despatched in that direction for this purpose.

4. *Question by General Scott.* Was the number of armed men of the Georgia line retained in the vicinity of Columbus (say) up to the 21st of June, more than was deemed necessary at the time to guard that place and the unarmed men in the witness's camp or camps?

Answer. The number of troops (Hoxey's battalion) stationed at Columbus for the protection of that place, considering its commercial importance, and the number of lives and amount of property at stake, was not more than sufficient for that object. Many, indeed, doubted its adequacy in this respect, in the event that the enemy had attacked that place.

5. *Question by General Scott.* Was any time lost after the arrival of arms, about June 21, in putting the whole disposable force of Georgia in movement for active operations?

Answer. Not one solitary moment was lost or delayed, after arms were put into the hands of the men, in marching directly to the point whence it was intended that active operations should commence against the enemy. Such, indeed, was the anxiety of General Scott to put the troops in motion, and so promptly was he seconded by their enthusiasm, that a portion of them who had received muskets alone marched to Roanoke without any accoutrements whatever.

6. *Question by General Scott.* Does the witness know, did he hear, or had he reason to believe at the time, that a single white inhabitant or white person was murdered in the Creek country by the Indian enemy, between the arrival of General Scott at Columbus and the commencement of active operations under his orders on the west side of the Chattahoochee?

Answer. The witness does not know, nor does he remember to have heard of any white person being killed on the west bank of the Chattahoochee by the Indians after the arrival of General Scott at Columbus; on the contrary, he believes that such was the consternation and alarm created by the first outbreaking of hostilities, that all who had any reason to believe themselves endangered by the proximity of the Indians immediately fled from their homes to places deemed secure against their approach; this was particularly the case with those who had established settlements south of the Federal road. The nation below this point was decidedly hostile, and this fact was universally known. I cannot, therefore, conceive any one so reckless of life as to be guilty of the suicidal folly of remaining when its destruction was inevitable.

7. *Question by General Scott.* Had the whole of the white inhabitants of the then Creek country, not previously murdered by the hostile Indians, evacuated that country before the arrival of General Scott at Columbus about the end of May?

Answer. I consider this question already answered in my reply to the last interrogatory.

8. *Question by General Scott.* What, in the opinion of the witness, were the relative advantages or disadvantages between a plan of operations beginning on a line at or a little above Irwinton, and below the hostile Creeks, and acting up the country; and beginning (say) on a line from Tuskegee to Fort Mitchell, above the greater number of the enemy, and thence operating down the country?

Answer. The principal advantage which the former would have over the latter of the two plans proposed in this question would be, (the passes of the river being properly defended,) that if a competent force were introduced below the enemy his retreat into either Georgia or Florida would be effectually cut off. By constantly advancing upon him upwards, he would be daily restricted to less and less space; and as he receded from our approach he would of necessity, from the nature of the country, be compelled to occupy ground in every respect favorable to our troops, until, hemmed in and pressed at every point, he would be forced either to an unconditional surrender or to fight with but little prospect of success; and if defeated, with no hope of escape. The navigation of the river promised also to be a powerful auxiliary in this system of operation, by furnishing supplies in a short time at any given point between Fort Gaines and Columbus, whence, if it became necessary, they could be readily transported into the interior of the nation. By the contrary movement, that is, commencing at Tuskegee and progressing towards Fort Mitchell, this advantage would have been lost, and whether you would get in gunshot of the hostile party would depend entirely upon their inclination. If the experiment of waiting your approach was considered too hazardous, free from all apprehension, as he would move downward, he would consult his safety in

his flight, and every step that he would thus take would be attended with accumulating difficulties in the pursuit; for experience has demonstrated that, after reaching the dense swamps of Georgia and Florida, he would have been scarcely less secure than if defended by regular intrenchments and fortifications. Independently of the embarrassments likely to be thus produced, the movement of the troops downwards in the summer months, so far as it might affect their health and efficiency, was liable to objections not applicable to that made in a different direction.

9. *Question by General Scott.* If the whole disposable force of Georgians, Alabamians, and regulars, with the friendly Indians acting as auxiliaries, had been placed in line below the enemy, and had operated up the country, whilst the frontier settlements of Georgia and Alabama were guarded by competent detachments, is it not probable that fewer of the enemy would have escaped across the Chattahoochee in the direction of Florida than actually did so escape, and also that the war would have been earlier finished than it actually was?

Answer. Had the first plan of operations alluded to in my last reply been fully adopted, the troops now mentioned would have been able to have carried it out. The enemy being encompassed in every direction by superior numbers, defeated in his hopes of escape, and defeated in the field, must have immediately sued for peace, and the war would have very probably terminated without those straggling parties which invaded Georgia the latter part of July last.

10. *Question by General Scott.* Is it not probable or certain that the movement of General Jesup, and the forces under his immediate orders from Tuskegee upon Fort Mitchell, and from that line below, before all the other forces (upon the Chattahoochee) were ready to take their positions on that river and the base-line below the enemy, put the enemy upon the endeavor to escape in the direction of Florida, and led to the many severe conflicts which took place on the soil of Georgia?

Answer. The Indians were doubtless apprised of the great force assembled upon the borders of the nation, and must have watched its movements with great anxiety. Any demonstration in the direction of their camp must have brought them at once to a determination in their course of conduct. The very near approach of General Jesup, therefore, whilst it may have perhaps intimidated a portion of them into a surrender, certainly admonished those who were disinclined to that measure of the necessity of a retreat; and they did retreat a few days thereafter through the lower part of Georgia, murdering men, women, and children before they were themselves overtaken and beaten.

11. *Question by General Scott.* Which of the two plans of operation—that of operating with the whole disposable force, under the general command of the said Scott, upwards, from a line below the enemy, and beginning (say) about the 25th of June; and the plan pursued by the said Jesup, viz: beginning an isolated movement (say) about the 12th of the same month, from Tuskegee towards Fort Mitchell, and thence operating down the country—would, in the opinion of the witness, have the sooner terminated the war by the capture of the great body of the enemy?

Answer. I consider this question answered in my reply to the 8th interrogatory.

12. *Question by General Scott.* Will the witness be pleased to state his recollection of the length and degree of the said Scott's illness, at Columbus, in the month of June, 1836?

Answer. I do not recollect the precise duration of General Scott's illness whilst at Columbus. He was attacked a few days after he arrived there, and was confined to his bed for several days. During this time I more than once had occasion to visit him, and generally found him prostrate—his feelings greatly distressed at his situation, and at the continued delay of the arms which had been ordered to that place. Upon the latter subject he spoke with great emphasis, and his mind was so much worried at the disappointment, that I did not doubt that his own anxiety in this respect had a tendency to protract his illness.

13. *Question by General Scott.* Is the witness aware that the said Scott, in any particular, when not ill in bed, failed, in point of zeal or judgment, in the direction of the war against the hostile Creek Indians?

Answer. The plan of operations devised by General Scott was, in my opinion, founded in great wisdom; and I know of no instance in which he wanted zeal, energy, or judgment, in any measure essential to its entire success.

14. *Question by General Scott.* With a reasonable doubt whether the volunteers and drafts of Alabama would come under the rules and articles of war, and into the service of the United States, was it not more important not to commence active operations until all the volunteers and drafts of Georgia, on the Chattahoochee frontier, should receive arms and accoutrements, and the greater part of the regulars expected should arrive?

Answer. The great extent of frontier to be protected, the uncertain number of the enemy to be encountered, the scale of operation laid down, rendered it proper that we should not commence active operations until our troops were armed and in sufficient force to occupy every point where their presence might be found to be necessary.

15. *Question by General Scott.* Is the witness aware of any failure on the part of the said Scott to hasten, by all the means in his power, the arrival of the arms and accoutrements necessary for the Georgia quota of troops?

Answer. In the frequent conversations which ensued between General Scott and myself upon the subject of arms, his feelings seemed to be absolutely tortured by their non-arrival. He spoke of the frequent and urgent solicitations he had made to those in whose care they were intrusted to have them forwarded with all possible expedition; and I recollect when it was reported that the wagons containing them were not as near us as they should have been, from the length of time they had been upon the road, he despatched a special messenger with orders to have them move by night and day until they should arrive at Columbus.

Deposition of Major Marcus D. Huson, of Georgia, taken by the judge advocate December 17, 1836.

1. *Question by General Scott.* In what capacity was the witness with the army on the Chattahoochee in May and June last, and where principally stationed?

Answer. Under the appointment of the governor of Georgia, I acted as quartermaster and commissary to the volunteers and drafted militia assembled on the Chattahoochee, principally at Columbus, in May and June last, till the arrival, in the early part of June, of the disbursing officers of the United States army; and subsequently, I assisted them in the performance of their duties.

2. *Question by General Scott.* Had the witness occasion in that period to purchase, for the troops, rations for men and forage for horses?

Answer. I had.

3. *Question by General Scott.* What resources remained within — days' reach of Columbus for men and horses, which it was possible to purchase even at high prices, as late as the 17th of June last?

Answer. I could have purchased a limited supply of flour and bacon in Columbus, such as had been previously bought up by speculators for the express purpose of selling to the commissary department; but both were so damaged as to be unfit for use. The resources of Columbus and its vicinity, in provisions and forage of good quality, up to the 9th of June, were so far exhausted that it took the wagons from six to ten days to make the trips to and from the places where the articles were to be found in the neighboring country.

Captain C. A. WARRE, of the 2d regiment of infantry, a witness on the part of Major General Scott, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by General Scott.* Where, and in what capacity, were you on duty in June last?

Answer. I arrived at Columbus on the 9th of June, and from that time until the 10th of July I was on duty at that place as the senior officer of the quartermaster's department.

2. *Question by General Scott.* What does the witness recollect of his being sent for by General Scott, on the receipt of the news that General Jesup was approaching Fort Mitchell (say) on the 17th of June, and what passed between the witness and General Scott at that interview?

Answer. I recollect being questioned by General Scott at that time (I think I was sent for by the general) in relation to the supplies of forage, &c., of the quartermaster's department. In answer, I stated that the quantity of forage on hand at that time was not more than sufficient for two or three days' consumption. From the supplies on hand I was directed to send to Fort Mitchell a supply, for the Alabama troops, of some 400 or 500 bushels of corn. I recollect General Scott's stating that the movement of General Jesup was contrary to the original plan of the campaign, and that his arriving there without supplies would be the means of retarding the operations of the Georgia troops. General Scott expressed much anxiety to commence the campaign immediately, and appeared much embarrassed by the movement made by General Jesup.

3. *Question by General Scott.* Does the witness recollect what directions were given on the same occasion to Lieutenant McCrabb, the assistant commissary of subsistence?

Answer. I recollect that Lieutenant McCrabb was directed to forward supplies of provisions to Fort Mitchell for the Alabama troops, and that they were forwarded.

4. *Question by General Scott.* Does the witness recollect that Lieutenant McCrabb had any difficulty in obtaining the subsistence then forwarded, or that that officer had had any difficulty just before in obtaining articles for the subsistence of the troops at Fort Mitchell prior to the arrival of General Jesup?

Answer. I don't know what difficulty Lieutenant McCrabb there had in procuring the supplies then forwarded to General Jesup; I recollect hearing Lieutenant McCrabb say that he found difficulty in procuring some parts of the ration; but whether it was prior or subsequent to the time alluded to in this question, I am unable to say. At the time I was at Columbus I was the only regular officer of the quartermaster's department, and my duties were so exceedingly arduous that my time was entirely engrossed in attending to the duties of my particular department, so much so that I knew very little of what was doing in the other departments.

5. *Question by General Scott.* At the period referred to had any subsistence arrived by the way of the Chattahoochee or Ockmulgee rivers, or by land from Augusta?

Answer. No supplies had arrived at that time by the way of the Ockmulgee, nor am I aware that any had arrived by the way of the Chattahoochee; supplies had arrived from Augusta, but I am not able to state the quantity.

Owing to the absence of witnesses this case was laid over to a future day, and the court adjourned.

MONDAY, January 16, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

The judge advocate here presented to the court the following depositions:

Deposition of the honorable William C. Dawson, of the House of Representatives.

1. *Question by General Scott.* In what capacity did you serve in the late campaign against the hostile Creek Indians; and on what particular duty from early in June, 1836, to about the 20th of that month?

Answer. I commanded a volunteer company; the particular duty which I was ordered to perform (and the orders were given me in a few hours after I reported to headquarters) was, to take the command of a detachment composed of the "Fanche volunteers" (my company) and a part of the Columbus artillery company, go immediately aboard the steamer *Metamora*, and cruise up and down the Chattahoochee, and prevent the hostile Creeks from crossing, either to plunder or escape, or for any other purpose, and to destroy all their canoes, batteaux, flats, rafts, &c.; I was also directed to call at the stations on the river and render them any aid or assistance they might require, and communicate to them any discovery I might make in passing up and down the river; in this particular service I remained until about the 20th of June; other detachments were on the same service.

2. *Question by General Scott.* As far as may be known or believed by the witness, what portion of the Georgia line *with arms* was placed in defensive positions on the left bank of the Chattahoochee, including the companies engaged in cruising on that river on board of steamers; what portion retained in the vicinity of Columbus for the defence of that city, and the *unarmed* troops of the same line; and was the portion of *armed* so retained greater than was generally deemed necessary for the two latter objects?

Answer. I cannot positively say what portion of the Georgia line *with arms* was placed in defensive positions on the left bank of the Chattahoochee river, including the companies engaged in cruising on that river on board of steamers; *all* were placed in defensive positions on the left bank of the river which were not retained in the vicinity of Columbus for the protection of that place and the troops *who had no arms*. The portion retained was not greater than was generally deemed necessary for that purpose.

3. *Question by General Scott.* Was any time lost in pushing detachments (regulars and volunteers) from the neighborhood of Columbus down the left bank of the Chattahoochee, to take up defensive positions, in proportion to the arrival of armed companies and of arms to be distributed; and was any time

lost, after the arrival of arms for the remainder of the Georgia line, in putting in march for active operations on the side of the Chattahoochee the whole disposable force, regulars and volunteers?

Answer. When I reached Columbus with my company, I found energy and despatch in the organization of the army, and in ordering to defensive positions *all* that prudence would permit to be sent, reserving a sufficiency of arms to protect the *unarmed army* and defend the city of Columbus. My company being chiefly armed, having carried the arms with it, I was ordered immediately into active service; some of my men being unarmed, I had to select muskets from a few old ones found in Columbus; so soon as the arms arrived, regulars and volunteers were put in motion.

4. *Question by General Scott.* Did the witness once, or oftener, hear General Scott develop, for inquiry and information, his plans for defensive and offensive operations on the eastern, western, and southern sides of the enemy, including all the forces, Georgians, Alabamians, and regulars; and will the witness please state his opinion of those plans?

Answer. I heard General Scott, I think more than once, develop his plans for the campaign, and the way he intended to conduct it, for inquiry and information. His plans for offensive and defensive operations then were considered best calculated to effect the objects intended. At the time his plans were presented to me I thought them correct, and still think so, for I know of nothing to change that opinion.

5. *Question by General Scott.* Supposing the eastern and southern sides of the enemy to have been sufficiently guarded to prevent his escape in either of those directions, and the western side sufficiently guarded for the protection of our settlements—which was the better plan of offensive operations: to begin (say) about the 25th of June, at the south, just below the enemy, and with our whole disposable force, Georgians, Alabamians, regulars, and friendly Indians, operate upwards; or to begin (say) about the 12th of June, on the line from Tuskegee to Fort Mitchell, nearly above the whole of the enemy, and with the Alabamians and friendly Indians operate downwards?

Answer. In my opinion, "upwards."

6. *Question by General Scott.* To what does the witness principally attribute the many partial and successful attempts of the enemy to force their way across the Chattahoochee in the direction of Florida, between the 12th and 25th of June?

Answer. To the movements of that portion of the troops which had been stationed at Tuskegee, I then partly attributed the many attempts (which seem to have been frequently successful) of the Indians to force their way across the Chattahoochee. The march of that portion of the army I then thought put in motion the Indians, and hastened their efforts to escape towards Florida. This is my opinion.

7. *Question by General Scott.* Which of the two plans stated in the fifth interrogatory would probably have best prevented parties of the enemy from escaping across the Chattahoochee, and have the sooner terminated the war, or the capture of the greater number of the enemy?

Answer. "Upwards."

8. *Question by General Scott.* Is the witness aware, from personal observation or otherwise, that General Scott failed in any instance in point of judgment, zeal, or activity, as the director of the late war against the hostile Creek Indians?

Answer. General Scott's conduct during the late campaign against the hostile Creeks was marked by zeal and activity, and the result of that campaign has evinced his judgment and foresight.

Sworn to, January 6, 1837, before

S. BURCH, *Justice of the Peace, Washington, D. C.*

Deposition of his Excellency William Schley, governor of the State of Georgia.

1. *Question by General Scott.* About what time, at what place, and accompanied by what general officer of the army, did General Scott, on his way to the then Creek country, wait on your excellency?

Answer. On the evening of the 28th of May, 1836, Major General Scott and Major General Jesup, of the United States army, called on me at the executive office, in Milledgeville, Georgia.

2. *Question by General Scott.* At that interview, does the witness recollect any conversation respecting the plan of campaign, or of operations, (first suggested in a letter to the witness, dated May 26,) which General Scott thought it probable he would find it the best to adopt against the Creek enemy; and what were the principal features to that plan?

Answer. During that interview I stated to Generals Scott and Jesup my views and opinions in regard to the proper course to be pursued against the Creek Indians, which was this: that the troops should be placed in the line of the Chattahoochee on the Georgia side, in numbers sufficient to prevent the escape of the enemy to Florida, and that no demonstration should be made on him in Alabama, until his retreat to Florida should be by these means effectually cut off. When I had thus stated my opinion, General Scott expressed to General Jesup his surprise and satisfaction that he, General Scott, at Savannah, General Jesup at Augusta or at Washington, I do not recollect which, and the governor of Georgia at Milledgeville, should all, without concert or consultation, have determined on the same plan of operations. If General Jesup made any reply, I do not now recollect it. In a letter addressed me by General Scott, dated at Savannah, on the 26th of May, the following language is contained: "I presume it will be best to assemble the great body of our forces as low down as Irwinton, and operate thence up the country." This course of operation, when the river should have been sufficiently guarded, I approved as the proper plan, and the events of the war have satisfied me that, if our views had been carried out, much human life would have been saved.

3. *Question by General Scott.* Upon the development of the said Scott's suggested plan of operations, did one or more individuals present remark that it was a singular coincidence that such had been his or their own preconceived plan or notion on the subject; and who was that individual, or who were those persons?

Answer. The substance of this question is answered in my answer to the second interrogatory. I understood, during the conversation, that there was no disagreement between the two generals and myself. If General Jesup did not in so many words agree with us, he certainly did not express any dissent, and thereby left me under the impression that he approved the plan.

4. *Question by General Scott.* With what army officers did your excellency proceed from Milledgeville to Columbus, in May last, and did any similar conversation and concurrence of views on the same subject take place between the same parties on the route to Columbus, or after their arrival at that place?

Answer. On the morning of the 29th of May, 1836, I left Milledgeville in the public stage for Columbus, in company with Major General Scott, Major General Jesup, Major E. Kirby, and, I think, Captain

Parrott. During the journey we spoke freely of coming events, and the proper course to be pursued in regard to the campaign, and, as far as I could understand the views of the officers, we all concurred in opinion.

5. *Question by General Scott.* Was not the same plan of campaign frequently developed in conversation by the said Scott at Columbus, in the presence of Major General Jesup, and many others, and did the said Jesup, before his departure west from Columbus, at any time, although the subject was always proposed for discussion, intimate any modification of or objection to that plan?

Answer. The plan was spoken of in Columbus, and if General Jesup disputed, or made any different proposition, I did not know or hear it.

6. *Question by General Scott.* Did the said Scott, in all his orders, instructions, conversations, and arrangements, as far as they were known to the witness, steadily adhere to the same plan of operations up to the time when it became known to the witness and said Scott that the said Jesup had with his forces, or a great part of them, approached Fort Mitchell from Tuskegee?

Answer. Major General Scott made no alteration in the original plan of operations, but steadily adhered to it, as far as I know or believe, until after General Jesup's movements in Alabama.

7. *Question by General Scott.* What, in the opinion of your excellency, were the relative advantages or disadvantages between a plan of operations beginning on a line at or a little above Irwinton and below the hostile Creeks, and acting up the country; and beginning, say, on a line from Tuskegee to Fort Mitchell, above the greater number of the enemy, and operating down the country?

8. *Question by the same.* If the whole disposable force of Georgians, Alabamians, and regulars, with the friendly Indians acting as auxiliaries, had been placed in line below the enemy, and had operated up the country, whilst the frontier settlements of Georgia and Alabama were guarded by competent detachments, is it not probable that fewer of the enemy would have escaped across the Chattahoochee in the direction of Florida than actually did so escape, and also that the war would have been earlier finished than it actually was?

9. *Question by the same.* Is it not probable or certain that the movement of General Jesup, and the forces under his immediate orders, from Tuskegee upon Fort Mitchell, and from that line below, before all the other forces upon the Chattahoochee were ready to take their positions on that river and the base-line below the enemy, put the enemy upon the endeavor to escape in the direction of Florida, and led to the many severe conflicts which took place on the soil of Georgia?

10. *Question by the same.* Which of the two plans of operation—that of operating with the whole disposable force under the general command of the said Scott upwards from a line below the enemy, and beginning, say, about June 25; and the plan pursued by the said Jesup, viz: beginning an isolated movement, say, about the 12th of the same month, from Tuskegee towards Fort Mitchell, and thence operating down the country—would, in the opinion of the witness, have the sooner terminated the war by the capture of the great body of the enemy?

Answer to the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th questions. These questions all relate to the same matter, and ask my *opinion* of the probable effect of a different course from that pursued by General Jesup. It is an unpleasant task to give an opinion on a subject of which I cannot be supposed to know much *scientifically*. But as I felt a deep interest in the events of the war, and had much to do with the plans and arrangements of the campaign, I feel that I cannot be justly charged with presumption in saying that I believe the plan of cutting off the retreat of the enemy to Florida, and attacking him from below and driving him up the country, would have been decidedly preferable to a movement such as General Jesup made from Tuskegee through the nation in the direction of Fort Mitchell; because, by having the river properly guarded, and attacking the enemy below, he would have been compelled to a conflict or capitulation; whereas the other course left him free to fight or retreat through a sparsely populated country to Florida, as a considerable portion did when it was known that the army under General Jesup was in motion. But if there had been concert of action between the two divisions of the army, so that both would have moved at the same time, the one down the Chattahoochee on the Georgia side, and the other from Tuskegee down on the western side of the Creek nation, and a junction had been formed below the hostiles, (in the meantime having left a sufficient force on the line of the Chattahoochee to guard the passes to Florida,) I believe that the war would have been sooner effectually closed, and with less bloodshed; for in the retreat of the Creeks through the lower counties of Georgia many families and persons were murdered.

11. *Question by General Scott.* How were the rooms occupied respectively by the witness and the said Scott situated in respect to each other, when the latter happened to be in Columbus in May, June, and July, 1836?

Answer. Major General Scott and I occupied the second story of a house in Columbus during the time he remained there. There were two rooms, with a door between them. I occupied the eastern or front room, and he the western or back room. The weather was extremely warm. The middle door was generally open, and we had mutual access to each other's room without ceremony.

12. *Question by General Scott.* Had your excellency any reason to believe that, when within your reach, the said Scott withheld from your knowledge any important paper or information received by him, or that he withheld from you any important letter or order written by him or in his name?

Answer. I had no reason to believe that General Scott withheld from me any facts, letters, orders, or information of any kind connected with or having relation to the Creek war. On the contrary, I believe he concealed nothing from me on that subject.

13. *Question by General Scott.* Does your excellency recollect being shown a letter from the said Jesup to the said Scott, dated on the waters of the Hatchchubby, June 17, in which it is said: "I would have struck the enemy to-night but for your letter; if he is not struck to-morrow morning, he will escape for the present;" which letter was in reply to instructions from the said Scott to the said Jesup "to stop all offensive movements (if you are in command) on the part of the Alabamians until the Georgians are ready to act, say on the 21st instant, when the greater number of them will be armed and ready for the field?"

Answer. I remember seeing a letter written by General Jesup to General Scott, containing the substance of the remarks quoted, but cannot remember the date or the precise words used, and that it was in reply to General Scott's order to stop all offensive movements.

14. *Question by General Scott.* Has the witness reason to know (and how) that that instruction from the said Scott to the said Jesup was disobeyed, and the effect upon the enemy, if any, of such disobedience?

Answer. This question I am unwilling to answer, unless it should be necessary to do so for the purposes of justice; because, whatever information I may possess on the subject, was received at a time and

place that, in the ordinary intercourse among gentlemen, may be considered as forbidding a disclosure, except it be absolutely necessary to the protection of innocence.

15. *Question by General Scott.* Does the witness recollect that letters were written, both by him and the said Scott, about the 31st of May, to his excellency Governor Clay, of Alabama, on the subject of co-operation against the hostile Creek Indians; and if the witness retained a copy of his letter to that governor, will he have the goodness to annex it to the answer he may give to this interrogatory?

16. *Question by the same.* Before the 8th of July, when the said Scott left Columbus for the north, had the witness received any reply to the said letter written by him to the governor of Alabama?

Answer to 15th and 16th questions. I have a distinct recollection that General Scott and I wrote to the governor of Alabama on the 30th of May, on the subject of co-operating against the enemy. No answer was received by me, and I learned from General Scott that he had received none. After my return to Milledgeville, I inquired of Governor Clay, in a letter I addressed him on another subject, whether he had received mine of the 31st of May, to which he replied that he had, and that he should have answered it, "but for the want of any safe and direct communication between Montgomery and Columbus, and for the further reason that the management of the war had then devolved on Generals Scott and Jesup, which seemed to render any further correspondence between us upon that subject unnecessary."

17. *Question by General Scott.* Did not the said Scott frequently express, in conversations with the witness, much regret and some surprise that neither of the two had received any reply to, or acknowledgment of, the letters written by the witness and the said Scott to the governor of Alabama about the end of May?

Answer. Yes; we frequently talked of the matter, and were at a loss to account for the silence of Governor Clay. This, however, has been explained to me, as stated in my answers to the 15th and 16th interrogatories.

18. *Question by General Scott.* Does the witness recollect, in any letter from the said Jesup to the said Scott, written from Tuskegee, an expression of a doubt to this effect: "I have not yet obtained the command of the troops; but if I obtain it at all, I shall probably enter on duty to-morrow;" and was it not rendered still doubtful, from the oral reports made to the witness and the said Scott by several officers and others who accompanied the said Jesup from Columbus to Tuskegee, whether the Alabama volunteers and drafts would consent to be mustered into the service of the United States, and come under the orders of the said Jesup?

Answer. I do remember the remarks quoted from General Jesup's letter, written at Tuskegee, I think, on the 8th of June; and General Scott and I were in doubt, from that letter and the statements of several gentlemen who accompanied General Jesup as an escort to Tuskegee, whether he had obtained the command of the Alabama troops, until General Scott received his letter giving an account of his march from Tuskegee towards Fort Mitchell.

19. *Question by General Scott.* Has the witness received a letter from General Jesup, enclosing another to the witness, said to have been written some time before, but not sent; and will the witness be pleased to annex a copy of the first letter here alluded to, in answer to this interrogatory?

Answer. Yes; I have received such a letter, a copy of which is annexed.—(See docs. Nos. 267, 268.)

20. *Question by General Scott.* Will the witness be pleased to state his recollection of the length and degree of the said Scott's illness at Columbus, in the month of June, 1836?

Answer. General Scott was attacked with fever a few days after his arrival at Columbus, and was confined to his room and bed for ten or twelve days, the precise time not recollected; during a part of which he was considered by his physicians very ill, so much so that I was requested by one of them to prevent persons from going into his room, as they considered it necessary to his recovery that he should be kept quiet, and not permitted to be excited by conversation.

21. *Question by General Scott.* Is the witness aware that the said Scott, in any particular, when not ill in bed, failed, in point of zeal or judgment, in the direction of the war against the hostile Creek Indians before mentioned?

Answer. I am perfectly satisfied that General Scott was not, at any time, wanting in zeal or judgment in conducting the Creek war, except when he was so ill in bed that he could not act at all. I believe that his great anxiety to labor in the cause had a tendency to protract his confinement; and when he mounted his horse and took the field, I thought him physically unable to do so without great hazard.

22. *Question by General Scott.* With a reasonable doubt whether the volunteers and drafts of Alabama would come under the rules and articles of war, and into the service of the United States, was it not more important not to commence active operations until all the volunteers and drafts of Georgia on the Chattahoochee frontier should receive arms and accoutrements, and the greater part of the regulars expected should arrive?

Answer. With the great uncertainty in regard to the course of the Alabama troops, and the situation of General Jesup, I considered it all-important that the whole of the Georgia troops should be prepared to take the field. And, even if we had known that General Jesup had command, and was ready to act, I should, with my views of the proper course to be pursued, have deemed it proper to wait for arms to supply the troops on the eastern side of the Chattahoochee, that they might guard the passes to Florida, and co-operate with General Jesup in attacking the enemy in Alabama, after a junction was formed between the troops of the two States below the enemy.

23. *Question by General Scott.* Is the witness aware of any failure, on the part of the said Scott, by all the means in his power, to hasten the arrival of the arms and accoutrements necessary for the Georgia quota of troops?

Answer. No. On the contrary, everything was done that could be; for when the arms did not arrive as soon as we expected, General Scott employed and sent Mr. Crowell, an active and intelligent young man, in pursuit of them, with instructions to get other wagons as lighters, and to force them on with all possible speed, which he did.

Sworn to the 3d of January, 1837, before

D. B. MITCHELL, *Justice of the Inferior Court, Baldwin County.*

Lieutenant WILLIAM H. BETTS, of the 1st regiment of artillery, a witness on the part of Major General Scott, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by General Scott.* In what capacity did the witness serve in the Creek war with General Scott, and between what periods?

Answer. At the request of Major General Scott I joined him at Columbus, Georgia, about June 2, 1836, and acted in the capacity as aide-de-camp to that general from that time, (though not placed in orders to that effect until about the 20th of June,) in all his operations against the Creek Indians, until the 6th of July, when he was recalled.

2. *Question by General Scott.* What does the witness know, or what was reported at headquarters, on the subject of accidents happening to steamboats with arms, ammunition, accoutrements, and other army supplies, between Darien and Hawkinsville, which caused delays in June last?

Answer. It was reported at the headquarters of Major General Scott at Columbus that a steamboat, loaded with arms, accoutrements, and other army supplies, had burst her boiler in the month of June, on the Ockmulgee river, between Darien and Hawkinsville, some distance below the latter place; that in consequence the agent of the quartermaster's department at Hawkinsville had to hire another boat that had been laid up for the summer, to cause it to be refitted and despatched down the river after the above-named supplies. Much time was delayed in the arrival of the news of the accident at Hawkinsville, and for the other boat to reach the scene of disaster to the transfer of the arms. It was also reported that another boat, similarly laden, had met with an accident between Darien and Hawkinsville, that delayed, for several days, her arrival at the latter place.

3. *Question by General Scott.* What does the witness remember of his being, by General Scott's instruction, about to proceed on the road to Hawkinsville, to hasten on the arms and accoutrements to Columbus, and what prevented the witness from proceeding on that service?

Answer. Unaccountable delay having been experienced in the arrival of the arms expected by the way of Hawkinsville, I was directed by General Scott, about the 18th of June, to proceed on the road to Hawkinsville, by day and night, until I should meet the train of wagons by which they were being conveyed to Columbus, and to hasten their arrival by every possible means. I had mounted my horse to execute this order, when Major Beard arrived in the public stage from Hawkinsville, by the way of Macon. He assured both General Scott and myself that he had the most perfect confidence in the zeal and activity of the conductor; that their arrival could not be expedited by my trip, and that they would certainly be there in two or three days. They did not, however, arrive until about a week from this time.

4. *Question by General Scott.* What does the witness remember of any delay that subsequently occurred in transporting the same arms, accoutrements, &c., from Hawkinsville, in wagons, to Columbus?

Answer. I have stated in my third answer that they did not arrive until three or four days after the expected time; the reason assigned for which, on the arrival of the train, was a letter written by Major General Irwin, of the Alabama militia, to Brigadier General Wilcox, of Georgia, who had been charged with the protection of the district of country on the route of the enemy to Florida. This letter stated that about two thousand hostile Creek Indians had crossed the Chattahoochee, and were laying waste the lower counties of Georgia, murdering men, women, and children indiscriminately. On the appearance of this letter in the public journals the inhabitants of this portion of the State fled for protection to the interior. The conductor of the train from Hawkinsville was seized with the same panic, and changed his direction so as to pass entirely above the supposed enemy, thereby delaying the arrival of the arms some three or four days.

5. *Question by General Scott.* On receiving despatches from General Jesup, about the 17th of June, what does the witness remember of Mr. Waite and Mr. McCrabb (the quartermaster and commissary) being sent for to come to headquarters, and what passed between General Scott and those officers on that occasion?

Answer. On the receipt of a letter from Major General Jesup, about the 17th of June, Major General Scott sent for Lieutenant Waite and Lieutenant McCrabb, assistant quartermaster and assistant commissary at Columbus, and questioned them with reference to the supply of forage and provisions on hand, and what amount they could probably furnish the troops under the command of General Jesup; to which Lieutenant McCrabb replied that he had but a small supply of provisions on hand, and that he had nearly exhausted the market in furnishing the troops at Fort Mitchell and on the river below with provisions. General Scott directed him, in the strongest terms, to use every exertion to supply the troops under the command of General Jesup, and, if necessary for this purpose, to place the Georgia troops on half or quarter rations.

6. *Question by General Scott.* What does the witness remember of the state of the roads and bridges between Augusta and Columbus, and between Hawkinsville and Columbus in June last?

Answer. I recollect distinctly that much rain fell in the month of June, and know from personal observation that the road between Columbus and Augusta was in very bad condition.

Major General Scott having requested until Friday, the 20th instant, to prepare his final address, the court adjourned to that day, at 10 o'clock, a. m.

JANUARY 20, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

The following deposition of F. P. Blair, esq., was here presented to the court.

1. *Question by General Scott.* Is the deponent one of the editors of the newspaper called "The Globe," published at Washington city?

Answer. Yes.

2. *Question by General Scott.* In "The Globe," dated September 26, 1836, there is a letter addressed to the deponent, and signed "Th. S. Jesup," followed by four others, signed, respectively, "Winfield Scott," "Th. S. Jesup," "Winfield Scott," and "Th. S. Jesup," with notes to the two signed "Winfield Scott." Was the first of the five letters written by Major General Jesup; did the five, with the notes mentioned, constitute one or more communications for publication, and by whom were they communicated?

Answer. All the letters alluded to were received through the mail from General Jesup. The first, this deponent believes, was written by him; the rest communicated at the request of this deponent. For this request the reasons are assigned in the editorial preface to the publication. They were doubtless sent with an expectation that they would be published.

3. *Question by General Scott.* If the letters, with the notes mentioned, were not expressly communicated for publication, was permission to publish them impliedly given, and by whom?

Answer. The letters, with the notes, this deponent understood (from their communication, in compli-

ance with the request for the copies) he had the permission of General Jesup to make public; but the publication was made on the responsibility of this deponent. He published them as an act of justice to General Scott as well as to General Jesup, having published General Jesup's letter referring to them, with editorial remarks also referring to them. General Scott had written a letter to a friend, which he was authorized to show to this deponent, speaking of this as an unjust course to him, and calculated to prejudice his cause before the country and the court. This deponent conceived there was no other mode in which he could repair the wrong but that of publishing the correspondence between the parties. Although he had not the express direction of either for doing so, he supposed, from the circumstances alluded to, that he had the implied consent of both.

4. *Question by General Scott.* It is stated in "The Globe," dated August 8, 1836, under the editorial head, in reference to "General Scott's orders and letters," that "some were sent to us for publication, as we understood, at his instance." Will the deponent be pleased to inquire into and state the grounds of this understanding.

Answer. This deponent occasionally received articles from the War Department introducing letters and despatches from General Scott, of which the following, prefacing the letter inculcating Major Read, is an example: "As an act of justice to General Scott, we publish the following official letter, recently received at the War Department from that officer." The impression made by the phraseology, that the publication was required as "an act of justice" to General Scott, was, that he had requested it as due to him from the department. This impression, growing out of frequent communications from the department, explanatory of General Scott's conduct of the war, was confirmed by a brief conversation with Major Van Buren in relation to the publication of the letter which speaks so harshly of Major Read. Falling in casually with Major Van Buren in the street, after a few words between him and deponent in relation to the contents of that letter, he inquired if it would appear in "The Globe;" he was told that it had not yet been communicated to the editor for that purpose. He said he hoped the publication would be *countermanded*. This deponent understood him to mean *countermanded* by some subsequent letter from General Scott. Upon inquiry of General Jones this deponent is now informed that he (General Jones) and Major Van Buren both thought the publication likely to produce unpleasant consequences, and expressed an opinion against the publication, but that it was ordered, notwithstanding, by the Secretary of War, who said he thought General Scott expected its publication. This statement will explain the misunderstanding of facts under which the article of "The Globe" of the 8th of August, 1836, was written, in which it is said of the publication made of General Scott's orders and letters that "some were sent us for publication, as we understood, at his instance."

Sworn to the 17th of January, 1837, before

ROBERT GETTY, *Justice of the Peace.*

The testimony having here closed, Major General Scott made the *address* which accompanies these proceedings; after which the court adjourned this case to a future day.

JANUARY 30, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

The court proceeded to pronounce its opinion in the foregoing case, as follows:

Upon a careful examination of the abundant testimony taken in the foregoing case, the court is of opinion that no delay, which it was practicable to have avoided, was made by Major General Scott in opening the campaign against the Creek Indians. On the contrary, it appears that he took the earliest measures to provide arms, munitions, and provisions for his forces, who were found almost wholly destitute; and as soon as arms could be put into the hands of the volunteers, they were, in succession, detached and placed in position to prevent the enemy from retiring upon Florida, and whence they could move against the main body of the enemy as soon as equipped for offensive operations.

From the testimony of the governor of Georgia, of Major General Sanford, commander of the Georgia volunteers, and many other witnesses of high rank and standing, who were acquainted with the topography of the country and the position and strength of the enemy, the court is of opinion that the plan of campaign adopted by Major General Scott was well calculated to lead to successful results, and that it was prosecuted by him, as far as practicable, with zeal and ability, until recalled from the command, upon representations made by Major General Jesup, his second in command, from Fort Mitchell, in a letter bearing date the 20th of June, 1836, addressed to F. P. Blair, esq., at Washington, marked "*private*," containing a request that it be shown to the President; which letter was exposed and brought to light by the dignified and magnanimous act of the President in causing it to be placed on file in the Department of War as an official document, and which forms part of these proceedings.—(See document No. 214.) Conduct so extraordinary and inexplicable on the part of Major General Jesup, in reference to the character of said letter, should, in the opinion of the court, be investigated.

ALEX. MACOMB, *Major General, President of the Court.*
S. COOPER, *Judge Advocate, Recorder of the Court.*

Continuation of the proceedings of the court of inquiry in the case of Major General Scott, in reference to the delay in opening and prosecuting the Creek campaign.

FREDERICK, *February 18, 1837.*

The court met pursuant to notice. All present.

The president of the court submitted the following communications:

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 15, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a copy of the opinion of the President of the United States on the proceedings of the court of inquiry of which you are president, relative to the campaign against the Creek

Indians, and, in compliance with the direction at the close thereof, to transmit herewith those proceedings, with the documentary evidence referred to therein, for the further action of the court.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant.

B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War ad interim.*

Major General ALEXANDER MACOMB, *President of the Court of Inquiry, &c.*

P. S.—The proceedings and a portion of the documents accompany this. The balance of the documents (except Nos. 204 and 209, which will be sent to-morrow) are in a separate package, and sent by the same mail.

[Copy.]

The President has carefully examined the proceedings of the court of inquiry recently held at the city of Frederick, by virtue of Orders Nos. 65 and 68, so far as the same relate to the causes of the delay in opening and prosecuting the campaign in Georgia and Alabama against the hostile Creek Indians in the year 1836, and has maturely considered the opinion of the court on this part of the subject referred to it.

The order constituting the court directs it, among other things, "to inquire and examine into the causes of the delay in opening and prosecuting the campaign in Georgia and Alabama against the hostile Creek Indians in the year 1836, and into every subject connected with the military operations in the campaign aforesaid; and, after fully investigating the same, to report the facts, together with its opinion on the whole subject, for the information of the President."

It appears from the proceedings that, after the testimony of nine witnesses had been received by the court, and after more than one hundred documents bearing on the subject had also been produced in evidence, and after Major General Scott had addressed the court on the subject, the court proceeded to pronounce its opinion, as follows:

"Upon a careful examination of the abundant testimony taken in the foregoing case, the court is of opinion that no delay, which it was practicable to have avoided, was made by Major General Scott in opening the campaign against the Creek Indians. On the contrary, it appears that he took the earliest measures to provide arms, munitions, and provisions for his forces, who were found almost wholly destitute; and as soon as arms could be put into the hands of the volunteers, they were, in succession, detached and placed in position to prevent the enemy from retiring upon Florida, and whence they could move against the main body of the enemy as soon as equipped for offensive operations.

"From the testimony of the governor of Georgia, of Major General Sanford, commander of the Georgia volunteers, and many other witnesses of high rank and standing, who were acquainted with the topography of the country and the position and strength of the enemy, the court is of opinion that the plan of campaign adopted by Major General Scott was well calculated to lead to successful results, and that it was prosecuted by him, as far as practicable, with zeal and ability, until recalled from the command upon representations made by Major General Jesup, his second in command, from Fort Mitchell, in a letter bearing date the 20th of June, 1836, addressed to F. P. Blair, esq., at Washington, marked '*private*,' containing a request that it be shown to the President; which letter was exposed and brought to light by the dignified and magnanimous act of the President, in causing it to be placed on file in the Department of War as an official document, and which forms part of these proceedings.—(See document No. 214.) Conduct so extraordinary and inexplicable on the part of Major General Jesup, in reference to the character of said letter, should, in the opinion of the court, be investigated."

The foregoing opinion is not accompanied by any report of the *facts* in the case, as required by the order constituting the court; on the contrary, the facts are left to be gathered from the mass of oral and documentary evidence contained in the proceedings; and thus a most important part of the duty assigned to the court remains unexecuted. Had the court stated the facts of the case, as established to its satisfaction by the evidence before it, the President, on comparing such state of facts found by the court with its opinion, would have distinctly understood the views entertained by the court in respect to the degree of promptitude and energy which ought to be displayed in a campaign against Indians—a point manifestly indispensable to a correct appreciation of the opinion, and one which the President's examination of the evidence has not supplied, inasmuch as he has no means of knowing whether the conclusions drawn by him from the evidence agree with those of the court.

The opinion of the court is also argumentative, and wanting in requisite precision, inasmuch as it states that "no delay, which it was practicable to have avoided, was made by Major General Scott in opening the campaign against the Creek Indians," &c.; thus leaving it to be inferred, but not distinctly finding that there was some delay, and that it was made by some person other than Major General Scott; without specifying in what such delay consisted, when it occurred, how long it continued, nor by whom it was occasioned. Had the court found a state of facts as required by the order constituting it, the uncertainty now existing in this part of the opinion would have been obviated, and the justice of the opinion itself readily determined.

That part of the opinion of the court which animadverts on the letter addressed by Major General Jesup to F. P. Blair, esq., bearing date the 20th of June, 1836, and which presents the same as a subject demanding investigation, appears to the President to be wholly unauthorized by the order constituting the court, and by which its jurisdiction was confined to an inquiry into the causes of the delay in opening and prosecuting the campaign against the hostile Creeks, and into such subjects as were connected with the military operations in that campaign. The causes of the recall of Major General Scott from the command, and the propriety or impropriety of the conduct of General Jesup in writing the letter referred to, were not submitted to the court as subjects of inquiry. The court itself appears to have been of this opinion, inasmuch as no notice was given to General Jesup of the pendency of the proceedings, nor had he any opportunity to cross-examine and interrogate the witnesses, nor to be heard in respect to his conduct in the matter remarked on by the court.

For the several reasons above assigned, the President disapproves the opinion of the court, and remits to it the proceedings in question to the end that the court may resume the consideration of the evidence, and from the same, and from such further evidence as shall be taken, (in case the court shall deem it necessary to take further evidence,) may ascertain and report with distinctness and precision, especially as to time, place, distances, and other circumstances, all the facts touching the opening and prosecuting of the campaign in Georgia and Alabama against the hostile Creek Indians in the year 1836, and the

military operations in the said campaign; and touching the delay, if any there was, in the opening or prosecuting of said campaign, and the causes of such delay; and to the end, also, that the court, whilst confining its opinion to the subject-matters submitted to it, may fully and distinctly express its opinion on those matters for the information of the President.

The Secretary of War *ad interim* will cause the proceedings of the court, on the subject of the campaign against the Creek Indians, with the documentary evidence referred to therein, and a copy of the foregoing opinion to be transmitted to Major General Alexander Macomb, president of the court, for the proper action thereon.

ANDREW JACKSON.

WASHINGTON, *February 14, 1837.*

The court, in proceeding to give the facts upon which its opinion is founded, would respectfully state that the proceedings and opinion of the court were made up in the usual form, and according to the rule of service, and were transmitted to the Secretary of War, accompanied by all the testimony offered in the case, which testimony contains all the facts brought to the notice of the court, and upon which the opinion of the court was founded. But, in obedience to the directions of the President, the court has proceeded to state the facts embraced in the testimony, both documentary and oral, referring to "time and place, distances, and other circumstances," and which will be found in the following synopsis :

DOCUMENTARY TESTIMONY.

On the 23d of May the Secretary of War instructs General Jesup to station a sufficient force at the south point of the Creek nation, to prevent the retreat of the Indians to Florida, &c.—(Doc. 161.)

On the 25th of May General Scott arrives at Augusta, on his way to take the direction of the war.—(Doc. 164.)

On the 26th he informs the governor of Georgia that he has ordered essential stores from Picolata, St. Augustine, Charleston, and Savannah, &c., which will be immediately shipped to Hawkinsville, on the Ockmulgee, within 75 miles of Fort Mitchell; has also ordered 250,000 complete rations from New Orleans to the highest navigable point on the Chattahoochee, and shall take measures for the supply of 200 bushels of corn meal daily on the same river. Ten wagons, loaded with subsistence, will leave Augusta for the same destination to-morrow; a small detachment of recruits has arrived at Augusta from the north.—(Doc. 165.)

On the 27th of May appoints Major Beard agent of quartermaster's stores, and sends him to Hawkinsville to hasten on supplies, &c., and to purchase subsistence.—(Doc. 167.)

On the 31st of May Major Baden, in charge of the arsenal at Augusta, notifies General Scott that he has turned over to the quartermaster at Augusta, on the requisition of Governor Schley, 1,000 muskets, to be sent to Columbus.—(Doc. 168.) No ammunition or flints appear to have been sent with these arms, although the governor's requisition (Doc. 169) calls for them.

On the 29th of May Quartermaster Dimmock notifies General Scott that ten wagons with supplies left Augusta the day previous; anticipates difficulty in procuring wagons in forwarding supplies, &c. Captain Monroe's company arrived at Augusta from the north; the companies of Major Pierce's command with Monroe's have 75 days' subsistence with them; this will require five wagons per company. The rifles ordered from Charleston, *via* Savannah, left Charleston on the 27th. Major Garland directs that camp equipage be furnished from Savannah; there is none there. Three hundred wagons will be required to forward all the supplies on.—(Doc. 171.)

On the 2d of June General Scott informs the adjutant general that he arrived at Columbus on the 30th May; the troops are being mustered into service; the frontier of Georgia, above and below Columbus, is guarded to prevent escape of the Indians towards Florida, &c.; shall take additional measures by employing a steamer hourly expected, with a company on board, and by pushing some mounted companies fifty or sixty miles below; supposes 1,500 Georgia troops to have arrived on the frontier, distributed over a line of forty miles on the river; as many more expected; companies arrive daily; all are not expected before the 12th, perhaps 15th. The governor of Alabama, with about an equal number, will be ready to march upon the enemy by the 5th; doubts if he has subsistence for more than five days. No magazines on the Georgia side; the supplies precarious, which state of things must continue at least eight days longer, when 100,000 rations from Picolata, St. Augustine, Savannah, and Charleston may begin to arrive from Macon and Hawkinsville by wagons; the supplies from New Orleans cannot arrive before the 20th; late, long, and heavy rains in this quarter have injured the roads. General Jesup leaves to-morrow (3d June) for Montgomery. If we fight the Indians with inferior numbers we shall probably beat them, but with a great loss of valuable lives on our part; if we wait for the arrival of all our forces, and till we have ample means of subsistence secured for twenty days in advance, the war may be successfully terminated on our part with but a small loss of lives. This consideration has great weight with General Scott, and has been developed to Governor Clay. A delay of ten days has therefore been urged.—(Doc. 172.)

On the 28th May Governor Clay invites the co-operation of the forces on the Georgia side by the 5th June.—(Doc. 173.)

On the 31st May General Scott notifies Governor Clay that 1,000 regulars are expected to begin to arrive at Columbus in eight days; learns that on the 29th some individuals were murdered, and several houses burned on the Georgia side; is opposed to all premature operations; forces must first be assembled and organized, magazines established, &c. In ten or fifteen days everything will be in readiness on this side; gives his plan of campaign, and proposes how the Alabama troops shall co-operate.—(Docs. 174, 175.)

On the 1st June General Scott instructs General Jesup to proceed to Montgomery, &c., and take command of the Alabama troops, and operate *up* the country from a point below Irwinton.—(Doc. 176.)

On the 3d June General Scott directs Captain Harding, in charge of the Mount Vernon arsenal, Alabama, to send to Columbus 4 pieces of ordnance, complete; 150 rounds of canister for each; 3,000 stands of muskets, complete; 100,000 rounds of musket cartridges, and 50,000 flints.—(Doc. 178.)

On the 14th Captain Harding replies that he has not the articles; that the governors of Alabama and Florida have completely exhausted his stock, &c., the former having received 6,800 muskets, 4 six-pounders, &c.; has sent General Scott's requisition to Baton Rouge arsenal, to be supplied from thence.—(Doc. 179.)

June 3.—Further instructions to Major Beard at Hawkinsville to hasten on supplies, &c.—(Doc. 180.)

June 2.—Quartermaster Dimmock reports twenty-four wagons with provisions on the road from Augusta to Columbus; also five companies of regulars; finds it difficult to get wagons, &c.—(Docs. 182, 183.)

June 3.—Quartermaster Dimmock directed to forward no more subsistence from Augusta to Columbus; the state of the roads and difficulty of procuring transportation, &c.; the country about Columbus not yet exhausted, and the 100,000 rations ordered by the Ockmulgee will begin to arrive in seven days.—(Doc. 184.)

June 5.—Major Beard, at Hawkinsville, reports the difficulty of sending on the supplies; none have yet arrived at that place, (Doc. 186,) and none arrived as late as 8th June.—(Doc. 188.)

June 10.—General Jesup reports to the Secretary of War that he shall move against the enemy to-morrow or next day; has 900 Alabama volunteers, and expects to be joined on his route by 500 mounted men and 200 Indians, and hopes to strike the enemy in less than five days, (Doc. 190;) shall occupy a position on Fort Mitchell road, twenty miles in advance, and there await the arrival of the Indian warriors, or, if he can find the enemy, attack him immediately. The country almost without supplies; none of those ordered yet arrived, &c.—(Doc. 191.)

June 10.—Further instructions from General Scott to Major Beard to hasten on the supplies, &c.; rifles, muskets, accoutrements, and tents, much needed to complete the equipment of the troops, a portion of whom are without arms and shelter; General Scott extremely anxious on the subject.—(Doc. 192.)

June 10.—General Scott writes to General Jesup that, for want of arms, accoutrements, &c., it will be impossible for the Georgians to commence operations from the neighborhood of Irwinton in eight or ten days, nor even then, unless the arms, &c., should arrive. The regulars are advancing from Augusta; all but a small detachment of marines had reached that place at the last dates; has more than doubled the force placed in the lower counties of Georgia to prevent the Creeks from crossing to the Seminoles.—(Doc. 193.)

June 12.—General Scott writes to the adjutant general that he has been quite sick since the 2d, but expects to be on horseback to-morrow. Has 3,300 Georgia volunteers, but not more than one-third armed; no accoutrements in any of the southern arsenals; expects in six or eight days to arm and equip the whole of the Georgia forces; and as a respectable number of regular troops may be expected by that time, shall lose no time in commencing active operations. The Alabamians represented to be well armed in muskets, but without accoutrements, cartridges, and flints. As he has been able to obtain *armed* men, has sent off detachments to guard the left bank of the river; some pushed below the country occupied by the Creeks on the opposite bank; some of the middle detachments have within eight or ten days been surprised by small parties, and the advantage has been against us; has two steamers constantly cruising on the river, &c.—(Doc. 194.)

June 11.—Major Baden reports certain ordnance and ordnance stores arrived at Augusta from Charleston, (Doc. 195,) which he is directed to send immediately to Columbus.—(Doc. 196.)

June 11. Lieutenant Deas directed to proceed with all possible haste to Hawkinsville, and send forward immediately all the rifles, muskets, accoutrements, &c., that may be there or on their way to Columbus; also tents and equipage, &c.—(Doc. 197.)

June 12.—Lieutenant Heintzelman, at Hawkinsville, reports the arrival of supplies at that place for the army; has just loaded ten wagons; will supply General Wilcox's force of 260 with arms and provisions; impossible to get sufficient number of wagons, &c.—(Doc. 198.)

June 14.—General Scott reports to the adjutant general that he is still held inactive from the non-arrival of arms, ammunition, &c.; has reason to hope they will arrive in a few days from Hawkinsville, with subsistence in abundance, and from Augusta. Nearly all the Georgians ordered (a little more than 3,000) already on the frontier, but the greater number of companies have come without arms and accoutrements. As fast as the mounted corps can be armed shall send them down on the Georgia side as low as Irwinton, where he shall commence operations. The first company of regulars arrived yesterday, and four or six may be expected to-morrow, and the whole, including marines, may be expected in a week; has not, however, been waiting for them, but for arms and accoutrements for the militia; is without advices from Governor Clay or General Jesup, and is doubtful whether the Alabama forces will come into the service of the United States; they are not prepared to take the field, being in want of ammunition and flints; learns that General Moore, with 750 mounted Alabamians, has arrived at Irwinton, and thinks of commencing operations forthwith; shall write to him to wait his arrival in that quarter.—(Doc. 199.)

June 16.—J. Crowell reports the wagons, with arms and ammunition, on the way, and may be expected in Columbus by the night of the 19th, &c.; difficulty of procuring wagons, &c.—(Doc. 201.)

June 16.—Major Beard reports from Macon that twenty-one wagons and one howitzer, on their way from Hawkinsville, with a great portion of the musket accoutrements, and all the rifles; no ammunition found on board of either boat. The marines are in the neighborhood, and will pass through in the morning.—(Doc. 202.)

June 17.—General Scott reports to the adjutant general from Columbus that the troops are impatient to move, and so is he, but cannot without arms, ammunition, and subsistence, which they shall have by the 21st; no time has been lost since the arrival of arms, &c., at Hawkinsville; the delay occurred with the transportation line between Darien and that point; caused agents to be stationed at both places, and has reason to believe they have been active and pushing; as to arms coming from Augusta, the distance (220 miles) and the badness of the roads, rendered worse by the storms of rain the last of May and the beginning of June, have caused the delay; has no experienced staff officer.—(Doc. 203.)

June 18.—General Scott reports to the adjutant general that he is embarrassed by the unlooked for arrival at Fort Mitchell of General Jesup's forces. If the subsistence from Savannah, *via* Darien, should not begin to arrive to-morrow, all the troops must, in consequence of this movement, be put on short allowance; General Jesup entirely out of position; wants him at Irwinton, in order that he may operate *up* instead of *down* the country, but knows not how to get him there without crossing and recrossing the river. This will create great delay, &c.—(Docs. 205, 206.) General Jesup wants subsistence for his forces, and will be obliged to go to Fort Mitchell, and asks General Scott to supply him there.—(Doc. 207.) General Scott distressed at his arrival there; the difficulties in supplying him, &c.; sends all he can command.—(Doc. 208.)

June 21.—One thousand muskets arrived last night and have been issued to the troops, who will immediately march for the mouth of the Cow-ag-gee creek, on the Chattahoochee, below the enemy. The

accoutrements (expected to-morrow) will be sent after them. Five hundred rifles expected with the accoutrements, and a battalion of mounted men will remain to receive them. The delay in the arrival of these supplies has been owing to steamboat accidents and the difficulty of procuring wagons. The horse will probably overtake the foot; shall march with the former. The enemy are above the Cow-ag-gee creek; if so, shall cross the troops to Alabama side at that point. A battalion of artillery marched down on this side of the river yesterday; another follows closely. The first detachment of marines will be here to-morrow and will immediately take the same route, and so with the remaining detachments of regulars. After leaving the necessary guards on the left bank of this river, above, and particularly below Columbus, may have left about 2,000 Georgians, besides the regulars, that may be up in time for commencement of active operations, together with 100 friendly Indians. Shall now be obliged to give General Jesup instructions to act *downwards* from his position simultaneous with the forces to be landed below the enemy.—(Doc. 209.)

June 23.—Sets out in a few minutes to overtake General Sanford. Accoutrements and rifles will not be here (Columbus) in two or three days, the conductors of the wagon train having took a panic and turned from the direct road, &c. General Sanford has with him about 150 unarmed men; has reason to believe the enemy is embodied between the Hatchychubby and the Cow-ag-gee creeks; shall cross the river below the latter; is confident no Indians have yet escaped across the Chattahoochee towards Florida, &c. The first detachment of marines just arrived.—(Doc. 215.)

June 22.—Lieutenant Heintzelman, at Hawkinsville, reports the arrival of stores at that place, and shall forward them immediately in wagons.—(Doc. 224.)

June 24.—General Scott, at Fort Mitchell, reports to the adjutant general that he left Columbus yesterday, and is here to consult with General Jesup. General Jesup, and many of the officers with him, consider the war as nearly over. They estimate that there only remain out some 150 hostile warriors, under Jim Henry, besides Neomico's party, who have for some time stood fast in their camp in a state of neutrality. They will probably soon surrender themselves. They are nearer Tuskegee than the Chattahoochee. There must be about 1,000 who are yet to come in or be subdued. The hostiles are among the most desperate of the nation; they are between the Hatchychubby and Cow-ag-gee creeks, and hope to escape to Florida, &c., but which is impossible, from the means adopted to guard the river. The Georgia line and two battalions of regulars below will cross below the enemy and scour the country *upwards*, whilst General Jesup moves with his forces *down*, &c. The flats for crossing the river will pass down to-day. The movements of General Jesup; the strong guards placed on the river below, rendering escape towards Florida hopeless; and the large assemblage of troops all around the Creek country, showing that their early subjugation was inevitable, has caused the early surrender of the hostile parties who have come in. Besides those who gave themselves up to the Alabamians and friendly Indians, between fifty and seventy came into this place previously without any escort. The number of warriors now in confinement here is more than 300, &c.—(Docs. 237, 238, 239.)

June 26.—General Scott, opposite Roanoke, directs General Jesup to discharge the Alabamians, except a detachment of mounted men to escort the Indian prisoners as far as the dense settlements of Alabama, whence the Indians may be escorted to the Mississippi by the regulars, &c.—(Doc. 241.)

July 2.—General Scott, at Fort Mitchell, reports to the adjutant general that he has just returned from Irwinton; represents the movements of the troops below, &c. It is thought that there cannot be in the late Creek country more than 40 or 60 hostile warriors; some of these have sent word that they will soon be here, &c. Nineteen hundred prisoners will be emigrated as soon as the streams shall have subsided, &c. Detachments have been sent in pursuit of some of the hostiles who have crossed the river in the direction of Florida, &c.—(Doc. 243.)

July 4.—Just returned from Roanoke, where he made arrangements for closing the campaign, &c.—(Doc. 248.)

July 6.—(At Columbus,) reports the Indians, who had retreated towards Florida, overtaken and surrounded in a swamp, &c.—(Doc. 249.)

June 25.—The Secretary of War directs General Scott to dispose his force so as to prevent the Creeks from retiring towards Florida, &c.—(Doc. 255.)

June 28.—General Scott recalled.—(Doc. 256.)

July 8.—General Scott turns over the command to General Jesup.—(Doc. 258.)

ORAL TESTIMONY.

Testimony of Major Kirby.

Accompanies General Scott from St. Augustine, 21st of May.—(Question 1.) General Scott's plan of campaign concurred in by Governor Schley and General Jesup.—(Question 3.) On the 26th of May General Scott directs Major Baden to furnish certain arms and ordnance stores, and instructs Quartermaster Dimmock to forward them without delay to Columbus.—(Question 9.) Up to the time witness left General Scott at Columbus (June 17) he manifested great and incessant solicitude for the arrival of the necessary arms and other supplies to enable the troops to take the field.—(Question 12.) Soon after leaving St. Augustine General Scott informed witness that he had, previously to leaving that place, ordered all the surplus arms and accoutrements at St. Augustine and Picolata to be sent to the Chattahoochee.—(Question 13.) General Scott manifested constant anxiety for the arrival of the arms and accoutrements, and used every means in his power to hasten it.—(Question 14.) Witness mustered into service 45 companies of the Georgia troops early in June; they were generally entirely destitute of arms and accoutrements; the few arms they had were generally unfit for service in the field.—(Question 15.) The Georgia troops had nearly all arrived at Columbus by the 12th of June. Some arms had arrived previously, and had been placed in the hands of the militia, who were ordered immediately to take post below Columbus, on the Chattahoochee.—(Question 1 by the court.) The troops who brought arms were immediately sent to take post on the Chattahoochee, below Columbus, and occupied several positions on the left bank of the river. Ammunition for them was purchased in Columbus. Their arms were of different calibre, and not in order. They had no accoutrements, no fixed ammunition, no equipage, no adequate supply of provisions.—(Question 2 by the court.) The Georgia militia, already armed by the 17th of June, were not sufficient in numbers to guard the left bank of the Chattahoochee, and at the same time to operate against the enemy in his own country successfully. The Georgia troops were fully occupied on

the left bank of the Chattahoochee, below Columbus, in repelling the efforts of the enemy to escape across the river in the direction of Florida.—(Question 16.) When witness arrived with General Scott at Columbus (May 30) there was a destitution of all supplies. Subsistence was purchased from day to day in the streets of Columbus and the neighboring country. Camp-kettles, mess-pans, tents, and haversacks were made, and scows for crossing the river constructed; all the powder and lead to be found in the place was purchased, made into cartridges, and distributed to the militia.—(Question 17.)

Colonel Kenan's testimony.

The importance of cutting off the retreat of the enemy to Florida, preparatory to any offensive movement upon him, to secure which it was General Scott's plan to station troops upon the eastern bank of the Chattahoochee, from a point 18 or 20 miles below Columbus, to Roanoke; the reasons for this plan given.—(Question 2.) General Scott strictly adhered to this plan of operations till General Jesup arrived at Fort Mitchell with his forces.—(Question 5.) General Scott discharged his duty with great zeal and judgment.—(Question 7.)

General Sanford's testimony.

States the amount of his force (3,500) and its disposition.—(Question 1.) Less than one-third of the troops were armed, and those variously and indifferently, with shot-guns, rifles, and muskets. On an occasion of an alarm, when the troops were paraded, there were 1,500 or 1,600 men with no other weapons of defence beyond their side-arms, clubs, and club-axes.—(Question 2.) To restrain the enemy from crossing the stream, to prevent him from depredating upon Georgia and escaping to Florida, the men were no sooner armed than they were despatched in that direction for that purpose.—(Question 3.) The number of troops stationed at Columbus up to the 21st of June was not more than sufficient to protect lives and property.—(Question 4.) Not a solitary moment was lost or delayed after arms were put in the hands of the men in marching directly to the point where it was intended active operations should commence against the enemy.—(Question 5.) If the plan of operations alluded to in the last reply had been fully adopted the troops would have carried it out. The enemy, encompassed in every direction, &c., must have immediately sued for peace.—(Question 9.) General Scott quite ill at Columbus a few days after his arrival there; confined to his bed; feeling greatly distressed at the continued delay of the arms ordered to that place; doubted not but that his over-anxiety in this respect tended to protract his illness.—(Question 12.) The plan of operations devised by General Scott was, in witness's opinion, founded in great wisdom, and knows of no instance of his want of zeal, energy, or judgment in any manner essential to its entire success.—(Question 13.) The great extent of frontier to be protected; the certain number of the enemy to be encountered; the scale of operations laid down rendered it proper that we should not commence active operations until our troops were armed, and in sufficient force to occupy every point where their presence might be found to be necessary.—(Question 14.) In free conversations with General Scott on the subject of arms, his feelings seemed to be absolutely tortured by their non-arrival. He spoke of the frequent and urgent solicitations he had made to those to whose care they were intrusted to have them forwarded with all possible expedition. He despatched a special messenger with orders to have them move night and day, until they should arrive at Columbus.—(Question 15.)

Major Huson's testimony.

Purchased rations and forage. Could have purchased a limited supply of bacon and flour in Columbus, such as had been previously bought up by the speculators for the purpose of selling to the commissioners, but both were so damaged as to be unfit for use. The resources of Columbus and its vicinity, in provisions and forage of good quality, up to the 9th of June, were so far exhausted, that it took the wagons from six to ten days to make the trips to and from the places where the articles were to be found in the neighboring country.—(Questions 2 and 3.)

Captain Waite's testimony.

States the difficulty of supplying General Jesup's forces at Fort Mitchell with provisions, forage, &c., from Columbus.—(Questions 2, 3, 4, 5.)

The Hon. Mr. Dawson's testimony.

Was employed on board of a steamboat with a company of artillery, cruising up and down the Chattahoochee, to prevent hostile Indians from crossing, and to destroy their canoes and rafts; remained on this service to 20th June; other detachments were employed on the same service.—(Question 1.) The volunteers were all placed in defensive positions on the left bank of the Chattahoochee, and in cruising on the river on board of steamboats, which were not retained in the vicinity of Columbus for the protection of that place.—(Question 2.) When he reached Columbus with his company, found energy and despatch in the organization of the army. As soon as arms arrived regulars and volunteers were put in motion.—(Question 3.) Thought General Scott's plans for offensive and defensive operations to be correct, &c.—(Question 4.) The plan of operating *upwards* preferable, &c.—(Question 5.) To the march of the troops from Tuskegee he attributes the attempts of the Indians to force their way across the Chattahoochee, &c.—(Question 6.) Thinks the plan of operating *upwards* would have best prevented the enemy from crossing the Chattahoochee, and sooner terminated the war.—(Question 7.) General Scott's conduct during the campaign was marked by zeal and activity, and the result of the campaign has evinced his judgment and foresight.—(Question 8.)

Governor Schley's testimony.

States his views and opinions given to General Scott and General Jesup in regard to the proper course to be pursued against the Creek Indians, and the concurrent views of General Scott.—(Question 2.) Was under the impression General Jesup approved the plan of campaign of General Scott.—(Question 3.) Travelled in company from Milledgeville to Columbus, in May, with General Scott, General Jesup, and

Major Kirby; spoke freely of the coming campaign, and, as far as he understood the views of the officers, all concurred in opinion, &c.—(Question 4.) General Scott made no alteration in his original plan, &c.—(Question 6.) Gives his reasons why a movement *up* the country was preferable to that *down*, &c.—(Questions 8, 9, 10.) General Scott was confined to his room and bed, soon after his arrival at Columbus, for ten or twelve days, and his physicians considered him very ill, &c.—(Question 20.) General Scott was not wanting in zeal or judgment in conducting the Creek war, except when he was so ill in bed that he could not act at all, &c.—(Question 21.) The importance of waiting until the Georgia troops were armed before acting, &c.—(Question 22.) Everything was done by General Scott to hasten the arrival of the arms; he sent Mr. Crowell to hasten them on, &c.—(Question 23.)

Lieutenant Bett's testimony.

States that a steamboat loaded with arms and accoutrements and other army supplies had burst her boiler on the Ockmulgee, between Darien and Hawkinsville, and the delay occasioned thereby in refitting and despatching another boat down the river after said supplies; also an accident to another boat similarly laden, consequent delay, &c.—(Question 2.) Was ordered about 18th June on the road to Hawkinsville, to hasten the train of wagons with supplies, &c.—(Question 3.) The delay of arrival of arms for three or four days, caused by a report of the Creek Indians having crossed the Chattahoochee, causing a panic to the drivers, &c.—(Question 4.) States the condition of the roads and bridges to have been bad, &c.—(Question 6.)

After a careful review of the testimony which contains the facts on which the court has formed its opinion, above recited, the court is compelled by a conscientious sense of duty to adhere to the opinion already given as to the causes of the delay in opening and prosecuting the campaign in Georgia and Alabama against the hostile Creek Indians in 1836.

The court in expressing its opinion that "no delay, which it was practicable to have avoided, was made by Major General Scott," had reference to the impracticability of collecting arms and munitions for the volunteers as early as they were assembled and mustered into service, in consequence of the accidents which happened to steamboats by which part were being conveyed; the difficulty of procuring wagons, by which others were transported, and the badness of the roads, rendered particularly so at the time by heavy rains. In support of which the court refers particularly to documents No. 171, 172, 182, 183, 184, 186, 192, 197, 198, 201, 203, 209, and 215, and to General Sandford's answer to the 15th interrogatory, Governor Schley's answer to the 23d interrogatory, and to the whole of Lieutenant Bett's testimony.

ALEX. MACOMB, *Major General, President of the Court of Inquiry.*
S. COOPER, *Judge Advocate, Recorder of the Court.*

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT IN THE FOREGOING CASE.

WASHINGTON, *March 2, 1837.*

The court met pursuant to notice. All present.

The following order from the War Department was laid before the court:

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *March 2, 1837.*

SIR: You will reassemble the court of inquiry in the city of Washington, in order that it may reconsider and review the proceedings in the cases of the campaigns in Florida and in the Creek nation, conducted by Major General Scott, so as to embrace the facts in the opinion of the court, as required by the order of the President organizing the court, and by his orders of the 14th and 18th of February last.

B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War ad interim.*

Major General MACOMB, *President of the Court of Inquiry directed*

to be convened at Frederick, Md., by General Order No. 65.

In obedience to the foregoing order, the court was occupied until the 8th of March in reconsidering and reviewing its proceedings, and in reporting the following facts:

The court finds, from a careful review of the testimony, the following facts: That, under instructions from the War Department of the 16th May, General Scott arrived at Augusta from Florida on the 25th May, on his way to take the direction of the Creek campaign, having, previously to leaving Florida, ordered essential stores from Picolata, St. Augustine, Charleston, and Savannah, to Hawkinsville, on the Ockmulgee, within seventy-five miles of Fort Mitchell; and had also ordered 250,000 complete rations from New Orleans to the highest navigable point on the Chattahoochee; that he despatched ten wagons with subsistence from Augusta on the 28th May, for Columbus, and appointed an agent, and sent him to Hawkinsville to hasten on supplies and purchase subsistence; that he proceeded himself to Columbus, where he arrived on the 30th May, and directed the Georgia volunteers already assembled there, about 1,500, to be mustered into service, and distributed over a line of forty miles on the river above and below Columbus, to prevent the escape of the Indians towards Florida, and also the employment of two armed steamers cruising up and down the river for the same purpose; that on the 1st June he ordered General Jesup to Montgomery to take command of the Alabama troops, and to operate up the country from a point below Irwinton; that he was engaged in organizing the Georgia militia and collecting supplies and arms up to the 23d of June; that on the 12th June there had arrived at Columbus 3,300 Georgia volunteers, but not more than one-third were armed; that General Moore arrived at Irwinton about the 14th June, with 750 mounted Alabamians, with a view of commencing operations forthwith, but that he was instructed by General Scott to await his arrival in that quarter; that General Jesup, unexpectedly to General Scott, arrived about the 17th June in the neighborhood of Fort Mitchell, with the Alabama forces from Tuskegee, calling on General Scott for supplies, which had not then arrived from New Orleans; that on the night of the 20th June 1,000 muskets arrived, and were distributed to the Georgia volunteers on the 21st June, who were immediately ordered to the mouth of Cow-ag-gee creek, on the Chattahoochee, below the enemy; that companies of the regular troops commenced arriving on the 14th, and to the 20th,

when two battalions were marched down the river; the first detachment of marines arrived on the 23d and marched immediately below; the last detachment of marines arrived some days after; that General Scott left Columbus on the 23d to commence operations below, and was actively engaged from that time until the 6th July, when he was recalled from his command by the instructions of the President of the 28th June, and that he turned over his command to General Jesup on the 8th July.

The court, after a full consideration of the foregoing facts, and of the testimony from which they are drawn, comes to the conclusion already expressed in its opinion, given in the following words, to wit:

"Upon a careful examination of the abundant testimony taken in the foregoing case, the court is of opinion that no delay, which it was practicable to have avoided, was made by Major General Scott in opening the campaign against the Creek Indians. On the contrary, it appears that he took the earliest measures to provide arms, munitions, and provisions for his forces, who were found almost wholly destitute; and as soon as arms could be put into the hands of the volunteers, they were in succession detached and placed in position to prevent the enemy from retiring upon Florida, and whence they could move against the main body of the enemy as soon as equipped for offensive operations.

"From the testimony of the governor of Georgia, of Major General Sanford, commander of the Georgia volunteers, and many other witnesses of high rank and standing, who were acquainted with the topography of the country and the position and strength of the enemy, the court is of opinion that the plan of campaign adopted by Major General Scott was well calculated to lead to successful results, and that it was prosecuted by him, as far as practicable, with zeal and ability until recalled from the command."

ALEX. MACOMB, *Major General, President of the Court of Inquiry.*
S. COOPER, *Judge Advocate, Recorder of the Court.*

MAJOR GENERAL SCOTT'S ADDRESS OR SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE TAKEN IN HIS CASE

Mr. President and gentlemen of the court:

When a Doge of Genoa, for some imaginary offence, imputed by Louis XIV, was torn from his government and compelled to visit France to debase himself before that inflated monarch, he was asked, in the palace, what struck him with the greatest wonder amid the blaze of magnificence in his view? "To find myself here!" was the reply of the indignant Lescaro. And so, Mr. President, unable as I am to remember one blunder in my recent operations, or a single duty neglected, I may say, that to find myself in the presence of this honorable court, whilst the army I but recently commanded is still in pursuit of the enemy, fills me with equal grief and astonishment.

And whence this great and humiliating transition? It is, sir, by the *fiat* of one who, from his exalted station, and yet more from his unequalled popularity, has never, with his high displeasure, struck a functionary of this government, no matter what the office of the individual, humble or elevated, who was not from the moment withered in the general confidence of the American people. Yes, sir, it is my misfortune to lie under the displeasure of that most distinguished personage. The President of the United States has said, *Let General Scott be recalled from the command of the army in the field, and submit his conduct in the Seminole and Creek campaigns to a court for investigation;* and lo! I stand here to vindicate that conduct, which must again be judged, in the last resort, by him who first condemned it without trial or inquiry. Be it so. I shall not supplicate this court, nor the authority that has to review the "opinion" here to be given. On the contrary, I shall proceed at once to challenge your justice to render me that honorable discharge from all blame or censure which the recorded evidence imperiously demands. With such discharge before him, and enlightened by the same mass of testimony, every word of which speaks loudly in my favor, the justice of the commander-in-chief of the army and navy cannot hesitate. It must acquiesce; and then, although nothing may ever compensate me for the deep mortification I have been recently made to experience, I may hope to regain that portion of the public esteem which it was my happiness to enjoy on past occasions of deep moment to the power and the glory of these United States of America.

I.—THE FAILURE OF [MY] FLORIDA CAMPAIGN.

Permit me here, Mr. President, to offer a preliminary remark: If by *failure* the common idea of *disaster, defeat, or repulse* be understood, then that term does great injustice to me and the brave regulars and volunteers whom I had the honor to command. Sir, we suffered no defeat, check, or repulse. The enemy, encountered by the several columns and detachments, were, in every instance, beaten, driven, and scattered beyond the reach of possible pursuit;* and if we had chosen to imitate, in our reports, the example of many others engaged in similar operations, we might no doubt have figured much more largely in the public journals. But in every instance, as far as I know or believe, though our affairs were numerous, and not deficient in danger and brilliancy, we always declined substituting imagination and conjecture for ascertained facts. Perhaps, by the discoveries of history, the high reputations gained before and since, by the arts alluded to, may, in time, be brought down to the humble level of myself and companions.

It is true, sir, that we did not succeed in sending off the great body of the Seminoles to the west of Mississippi. In this object, ardently desired by all, there was certainly a failure, and the same thing may be said of the summer and autumn campaign which followed; although the commander or commanders—for it seems there were two, Governor Call and General Jesup—had the benefit of the knowledge of the country and the enemy, acquired by previous operations; the benefit of the roads recently opened; the plans which had been essayed and suggested; longer time for preparation and operation; an auxiliary Indian force, which was denied me;† and, above all, the power of inviting the enemy to surrender, and of holding negotiations. With this great power, Mr. President, I was not armed. My instructions were to *reduce the enemy to unconditional submission;* to hold no parley, no negotiation—not even to say, as the price of surrender, that kind treatment might be expected, much less that the beneficial stipulations in the last treaty in favor of those Indians should be carried into execution by the United States; because, sir, any such assurance, on my part, would have been a *condition*.

* See testimony of Generals Clinch and Eustis; of Colonel Lindsay and Captain Thruston.

† Docs. Nos 82 and 92, inclusive.

Have my successors in Florida the "diplomatic" faculty that was withheld from me? If the letter-writers in the newspapers are to be believed, that faculty has been either expressly conferred or usurped with impunity. It would seem that wheedling messages have been sent to the enemy by everybody—from the two commanders down to a captain. Still no great result has been obtained, and now another, or winter campaign has been for some time on foot; the sole director of which, besides all the advantages over me which have just been enumerated, has had from the beginning the further prospect of ending the war by the failure of the enemy's ammunition,* and the known want of long perseverance on the part of *all* Indians.

But notwithstanding all those advantages, it would seem that up to the last dates from Florida not a Seminole had been sent out of the Territory since I caused four hundred to be shipped from Tampa Bay. These, it is true, were called *friendly* Indians. Yet if it had not been for the awe inspired by the presence of the army, and some little decision on my part, this detachment would long ere this have been merged in the great body of the nation.

But to take up my personal movements, my arrangements, and operations, in the chronological order.

Being in Washington in January, 1836, on other duties, I was, on the 20th, sent for by the Secretary of War. I found him in his office at four o'clock p. m. I was asked when I could set out for Florida, and answered that night. I was told that my instructions could not be got ready for me so early. All the letters (four in number) from Governor Eaton and General Call, dated the 8th and 9th of the same month, and now in evidence,† had, I think, been just received. I foresaw, at once, all the difficulties and hazards of the service which was thus assigned to me, and an immense pecuniary loss that I should inevitably sustain if not in New York in a week from that time. I had, moreover, the highest confidence in the judgment and abilities of General Clinch, independent of his better knowledge of Florida and of the enemy to be combated. I mention these circumstances, Mr. President, to show that I did not *solicit* to be sent to supersede that excellent officer. I was not, however, as a soldier, at liberty to decline any appropriate duty that might be required of me, and, of course, did *not* decline this. Accordingly, I left Washington on the night of the 21st, and, notwithstanding an accident on a railroad, by which I lost twenty-four hours, the court will find me addressing a requisition to the governor of South Carolina on the 29th from Columbia, and *at* Augusta the 30th.

At this place my occupations were numerous and important, as my letter-book, the contents of which are mostly in evidence, will show; requisitions for troops, addressed to the governors of South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama; letters to the governor of Florida, to Generals Eustis and Bull, Colonel Lindsay, &c., besides horses and wagons purchased for the United States cavalry and the general baggage-train.

On the 2d of February it has been seen that I set out for Milledgeville in order to confer with the governor of Georgia, according to my instructions, on the subject of the Creek Indians. Having adopted precautionary measures in relation to the latter, I returned to Augusta, and reached Savannah on the 9th.

Here, again, I was incessantly occupied in regulating, by correspondence, the movement of the troops, and making other arrangements for the campaign, till the 20th, and might have been usefully so engaged for a week longer; but wishing to be nearer to Generals Clinch and Eustis, with a view to more rapid communications, I reached Picolata on the 22d of February.

At this time General Clinch was at Fort Drane, with about five hundred regulars and volunteers, unmolested by the enemy, but not in strength to take the field with any prospect of advantage. I had written to him from Savannah, and he knew of the heavy reinforcements which were approaching. Two companies of Augusta volunteers, under Captains Robinson and Bones, had already reached Fort Drane, and are included in the above estimate. These two companies did not strictly make part of the Georgia quota.

General Eustis, Colonel Brisbane's regiment of South Carolina foot, and a company of Columbia volunteers under Captain Elmore, all arrived by water at St. Augustine about the 15th. This independent company (Elmore's) was over and above the quota called for from South Carolina; but, like Robinson's and Bones's, it went through the campaign with zeal and distinction.

With the volunteers under his command, and a few companies of regulars, General Eustis soon gave tranquillity and confidence to all the inhabitants between the Atlantic and the St. John's, whose dwellings and other fixtures had not been previously destroyed. No devastation was committed after his arrival.

The first battalion of Georgia foot, under Major Cooper, had also preceded me a few days. I found it at Picolata, with a company of regulars, and Colonel Bankhead in the command of both.

It was my intention, Mr. President, to have remained but a few days at Picolata, merely long enough to organize the service, to give a fixed plan of campaign, and, on the arrival of some additional troops, wagons, horses, and arms, to have commenced operations. The court has seen, in part, what embarrassments kept me there no less than fifteen days.

The 22d of February I received, through General Clinch, the letter‡ to him from General Gaines, dated at New Orleans the 2d of the same month, proposing a plan of co-operation between the two generals, which letter confirmed the previous *rumor* that a large force was to be expected at Tampa Bay from New Orleans; and to this letter there is a postscript by Governor Eaton, saying that a battalion of 250 Floridians would sail in a few days from St. Mark's for the same destination. To prevent too great a concentration of troops at Tampa, I instantly, by express, desired Governor Schley to keep at home the second battalion of Georgia foot that was about to proceed by the Chattahoochee, Apalachicola, and the Gulf, to that point. Fortunately my letter reached his excellency just in time to prevent the movement. That battalion was discharged; and, but that it was too late, I should have taken a similar step in respect to the Alabama regiment which Colonel Lindsay had received my instructions to raise and to conduct to Tampa.

To show the apprehensions which General Gaines's letter excited in me at the time, and the temper in which I spoke of his movement, I beg leave, Mr. President, to embody an extract of my letter§ to General Clinch, dated the 25th of February:

"The movement from New Orleans, although highly worthy of praise, under the circumstances, [the massacre of Dade's detachment, and General Gaines's necessary ignorance of the measures of govern-

* May 17. I wrote to Governor Call: "I will beg your excellency to urge upon Commodore Dallas the importance of keeping the revenue cutters and the smaller United States vessels constantly cruising around Florida to prevent the escape of captured slaves, and to prevent the Indians from receiving arms and ammunition from traders."

† Docs. Nos. 6, 8, 9, and 10.

‡ Doc. No. 48.

§ Doc. No. 58.

ment,] may, if it should lead to a premature advance from Tampa, be productive of a result the most unfavorable. If the advance, for example, should fail to crush the enemy and terminate the war—and without mounted men I suppose such result can scarcely be hoped for—the enemy may be scattered and put upon his retreat to the southeast. To follow him in such retreat might be almost impracticable, and to prevent the escape in that direction Colonel Lindsay has my instructions in detail.”

The court has seen, Mr. President, how soon those prophetic apprehensions were accomplished! Of course, I had not the time to communicate with General Gaines; and Colonel Lindsay, to whom my instructions had been addressed, arrived at Tampa *after* the advance of that general.

The very next day after the above was written, and whilst I was in the act of reporting* to the adjutant general, for the information of government, among other difficulties, the means I was devising for sending further supplies to Fort Drane, I received from General Clinch a letter† enclosing one‡ from General Gaines, showing that the latter was actually at Fort King on the 22d, where he arrived without subsistence, and instantly, as General Clinch reported in his letter, called for “nearly all” the provisions at Fort Drane, intending with that supply to return to Tampa across the Withlacoochee, near the battle ground of the 31st of December! I shall, in the sequel, notice the evidence which shows that General Gaines knew at Pensacola that I had been ordered to Florida, and that he learned§ of General Clinch, before leaving Fort King, that I was soon expected, and with large reinforcements.

Before the receipt of those despatches I knew that there were at Fort Drane about 20,000 rations for men; and expecting to send thither and to Fort King in a few days, by wagons and boats, (through the Ocklawaha,) two or three times as many rations, I had, on the 24th, put Major Cooper’s battalion of Georgia foot in march to join General Clinch, intending to follow with the first company of mounted men that might arrive, and one was then daily expected. Those means of land and water transportation not being as yet at hand, all hope of early operations was now frustrated, and I was obliged to recall|| Major Cooper’s battalion, then distant two days’ march over a wretched road, as it was easy to subsist the battalion on the St. John’s, and infinitely difficult to do so at Fort Drane.

The same embarrassment (the arrival of the troops at Fort King from Tampa) caused me to issue the Order No. 4, ¶ and to write the letters** of February 26 and March 1 to General Clinch. He, however, had no means of sending either of those papers to General Gaines, who, I think, had marched from Fort King (20 miles from Fort Drane) on the 25th of February.

March 2d †† I learned, with great distress, that the Ocklawaha could not be used for transporting supplies. From a few months’ disuse, this narrow, crooked, and shoaly river had become obstructed by fallen timber, and the Indians had, at Payne’s Landing, near Fort King, destroyed the peculiar boats expressly constructed for that navigation. We were now reduced to the necessity of using only land transportation for about seventy tons of supplies, and over bad roads, and I had not ordered all the wagons and horses which I should have required but for a reliance, to some extent, on that river.

A summary of my embarrassments, in respect to the means of transportation, the court will find in the fifth paragraph of my letter †† to the adjutant general, dated March 9. Of the ten or fifteen wagons therein mentioned, and which I learned officially at Savannah were ordered to be shipped from Baltimore by the quartermaster general in January, it seems, by the deposition of Captain Dimmock, that two of them had reached Florida in February, six about the 11th of March, and two reached Savannah about the 4th of May. §§

As early as the 26th of February I had, however, requested |||| General Clinch to send down all the means of land transportation he could command. The train sent arrived at the point opposite to Picolata on the 2d of March; ¶¶ was loaded with about sixteen thousand rations, and other essential supplies, and despatched for Fort Drane the 6th. The delay in this operation was caused by the width of the river and the violence of a long storm, which rendered it hazardous, and a part of the time impracticable, to pass over the supplies to the wagons. The train was slightly augmented ¶¶ by wagons and horses, which had arrived principally from Charleston, *via* St. Augustine.

As a proof of the extreme tempestuousness of the weather, Major Gates, with a battalion of three companies of regulars, was at this time more than eight days*** in coming from Savannah to Picolata in a good steamer, which ordinarily made the trip in less than three days.

A company (Kenan’s) of Georgia mounted men arrived opposite to Picolata on the 26th of February. With this company I had intended ¶¶ to march immediately to Fort-Drane; but, with the exception of its gallant captain, Second Lieutenant Huson, and, I think, nineteen men, it refused to be mustered into the service of the United States, and returned home. Four other companies of this, first, battalion of Georgia horse arrived about a week later. One of them, (Allen’s,) with the exception of two or three privates, followed the example of Kenan’s company. Douglass’s, Malone’s, and Sweeney’s, from the first, showed better dispositions. These only I was enabled to see, having, at the hazard of life, crossed the river in the storm for the purpose; when, after a short harangue, every man came under the rules and articles of war with loud cheers. The well-disposed men, both of Kenan’s and Allen’s, generally joined those companies which entered the service; and it is due to the disaffected of Kenan’s to say that, having seen their error, every man, I believe, nobly served in the subsequent campaign, (against the Creeks,) under Captain Gaither. It is probable that many of Allen’s men did the same.

The 2d of March I received, through General Clinch, General Gaines’s letter ††† to him, dated the 29th of February; and not another word did I hear of the troops with the latter general till the 9th of March. During this interval, nay, from his arrival at Fort King, the state of my mind, or generally my embarrassments, may be inferred from the efforts to hasten ††† the train loaded with subsistence, and from my orders and correspondence, which are in evidence, on the subject of General Gaines’s movement.

The 26th of February §§§ I wrote to General Clinch: “I have heard, with equal astonishment and regret, that Major General Gaines, without reference to my movements—perhaps in ignorance, possibly in defiance of them—should have made a premature movement from Tampa Bay; and having arrived within twenty miles of Fort Drane, should have called for nearly three-fourths of the subsistence in deposit at that place, and on which I had relied for the movement of the right wing in concert with the

° Letter of Feb. 26, Doc. No. 47

† Dated Feb. 24, Doc. No. 50.

‡ Dated Feb. 22, Doc. No. 49.

§ Clinch’s answers to interrogatories.

|| Order No. 5, Doc. No. 56.

¶ Doc. No. 55.

°° Docs. Nos. 59 and 60.

†† Doc. No. 52.

††† Doc. No. 71.

§§ Deposition of Captain Dimmock.

|||| Doc. No. 59.

¶¶ Letter to adjutant general, March 2, Doc. No. 52.

°°° Letter to adjutant general, March 6, Doc. No. 68.

†††† Doc. No. 63.

††††† Testimony of Capt. Van Buren.

§§§§ Doc. No. 69.

other parts of the army." * * * * "To remedy this unexpected embarrassment, I send you two copies of Orders No. 4, one of which you will despatch to the commander of the detachment from Fort Brooke, [Tampa Bay,] whoever he may be, with all speed, and limit the subsistence called for from Fort Drane according to the intention of those orders." * * * * "Major General Gaines, I presume, will have heard of the order which ought to take him to the Mexican frontier. If he should prefer to remain, he must obey my orders."

Orders No. 4,* of the same date, direct that General Gaines's detachment should remain at Fort King until further orders; that current subsistence only should be issued to the detachment; direct that the peculiar boats believed to be at Payne's Landing should be sent to Picolata (or to meet a steamer at the mouth of the Ocklawaha) to receive subsistence. If the boats could not be sent, the troops were to march without delay to Volusia, on the St. John's, whither twenty thousand rations were about to go up in a steamer. And the detachment was enjoined not to attempt any *offensive* movement, except so far as might be necessary to carry into execution those, my orders.

March 1† I again wrote to General Clinch: "I regret, in every point of view, the premature and unauthorized movement from Tampa Bay by that general, [Gaines,] and the very awkward and responsible position he has placed himself in by his subsequent march from Fort King." * * * * "In any event, the responsibility of his movement and actual position is his own, for he must have known as early as the 10th ultimo, if not before, that I had been charged with the general direction of the war in Florida, and that by interfering he constituted himself an interloper. Even if you had sufficient stores and means of transportation, I should command you to send no subsistence to him—unless to prevent starvation; but you have neither. Let him, therefore, in time extricate himself from the embarrassment he has placed himself in, by marching upon Volusia, where I have no reason to doubt that twenty thousand rations, sent hence on the 27th *ultimo*, have safely arrived. As he appears to have his retreat open to him, or is in no peril to prevent his taking that step, you of course will make no detachment to join him."

This letter is an answer to one received by express, and which enclosed General Gaines's communication to General Clinch, dated February 28.‡

In a third letter§ that I caused to be addressed to General Clinch, March 2, he was told: "If Major General Gaines should fall back upon Fort King or Drane, it is presumed that he will proceed to execute the orders of the government, which will carry him to another quarter. In that event, you will be the senior officer; and I am instructed by Major General Scott to say that you are at liberty to detain the troops from Fort Brooke [Tampa] at either of the forts mentioned—Drane and King. Subsistence will reach you in five or six days."

A fourth letter|| on this subject (in part) was addressed by me to General Clinch, dated March 4, in which it is said:

"I still presume that Major General Gaines will be obliged to fall back upon Fort Drane, which increases my anxiety to send the wagons, with some additions, loaded. I would prefer much that the force brought with him were back at Tampa Bay, or rather that it had not marched from that place, provided that the movement fails to crush the enemy or to terminate the war. The worst result, next to the loss of that fine body of men, or a third of it, would be the mere success of driving the enemy into the lower country, where I suppose it would be almost impossible for us to follow; I mean *below* the waters of Charlotte harbor. Hence my indignation that an isolated attack should have been made from your vicinity well calculated to produce that result, and at a time when you knew, and Major General Gaines must have known through you,¶ (and before) that my plan, with ample means, was to move simultaneously upon the Withlacoochee in three columns—from Tampa Bay, the upper crossing on the Ocklawaha, and Fort Drane—so as to make it impossible for the enemy to escape to the lower country."

"I have not *yet* supposed that Major General Gaines has not his retreat upon Fort Drane or King perfectly in his power. On account of subsistence, if he can cut his way through the enemy to Tampa Bay, I much prefer that his force were there; and when I wished him to march or send that force to Volusia, it was because it could be infinitely more easily subsisted there than at Fort Drane. Should he, however, be in any difficulty in operating a retreat from the Withlacoochee, I certainly wish you to afford him any *succor* that the slender means within your reach may allow; and this, doubtless, you would render without any special permission to that effect. If the force return to Fort Drane or King, it must be subsisted for at least five or six days upon means derived from this place, [Picolata,] and hence I *now* prefer that it should become a part of the right wing [General Clinch's command] rather than take that quantity of subsistence [from you] and march back to Tampa Bay."

And, finally, I caused a fifth letter** to be written to General Clinch, March 6, in which will be found this paragraph:

"Major General Scott is exceedingly anxious to hear the result of the operations on the Withlacoochee. The last intelligence from that quarter (through you) was only to the 29th ultimo."

My reports on the same subject, addressed to the adjutant general, for the information of government, dated at Picolata, the 26th of February, the 28th, (notes on my Order No. 4,) March 2 and 6, are to the same effect—all showing the embarrassments and delay which the isolated movement from Tampa upon Fort King and the Withlacoochee caused in my plan of combined operations.

In the notes†† of the 28th February, after recapitulating many of the facts already brought into review among them, the arrival of General Gaines at Fort King with 1,140‡‡ men, without bringing more rations than sufficed for his march, although he came from Tampa, where the amount of subsistence was great. After noticing his having drawn from Fort Drane nearly all the food for men collected there, together with the baggage train necessary to transport that subsistence to him at Fort King, and which train in the whole had been required at Picolata to take further supplies to Fort Drane, the point the most difficult to supply in or about the whole theatre of operations, I add:

"It will be seen from the foregoing that, to re-establish my plan of campaign, viz: to move simultaneously from Fort Drane (or Fort King) from Volusia and Tampa—say about the 8th of March—the great difficulty will be to send supplies for the right wing [Clinch's command,] and the bad road from Picolata to Fort Drane, 65 miles, has, by a heavy rain which has now been falling for 46 hours, been rendered infinitely worse."

In the report of the 2d of March to the adjutant general, I said:

* Doc. No. 54. † Doc. No. 60. ‡ Doc. No. 62. § Doc. No. 64. || Doc. No. 69. ¶ Clinch's answers to interrogatories.
** Doc. No. 70. †† Doc. No. 55. ‡‡ Captain McCall's requisition for subsistence, document No. 51.

"By reference to the map it will be seen that, even if Major General Gaines could succeed in driving the enemy from the Withlacoochee, there is no force to prevent the retreat below Charlotte harbor, or to any point in the lower [part of the] peninsula. A small guard only was left [by him] at Tampa; Colonel Lindsay will not be in position in time, and Brigadier General Eustis cannot cross the Ocklawaha earlier than the 13th or 15th instant. The retreat, it will be seen, is therefore open to the Indians. In this point of view, then, it would be better for the public interests that the Indians should drive Major General Gaines than that he should drive them. The war, in fact, would be forwarded by his being forced back upon Forts Drane and King. In truth, according to his own showing, he ought to have fallen back on the evening of the 28th or the morning of the 29th* [of February.] The lives which he has lost have promoted no end; he must, I think, still fall back, and I wish to heaven that it may be without further loss. Brigadier General Clinch, from his present want of wagons, can send him no efficient aid, and the wagons cannot be back [from Picolata] in four or five days. If the force with Major General Gaines were now back at Tampa Bay, it would be in its true position; but he cannot retreat thither; for it will be seen by his letters [enclosed] that he has not the means of passing the river [Withlacoochee.] He found the enemy where all my arrangements presumed the enemy would be found, and in the position the most favorable to us."

And, on the 6th of March, I again write to the adjutant general on the same subject, thus:

"No intelligence has been received of the movements of Major General Gaines of a later date than his letter of the 29th ultimo, a copy of which has been forwarded. He cannot, therefore, have fallen back upon either Fort Drane or King, or have marched upon Volusia. In either case I should, doubtless, have received a further report of him from Brigadier General Clinch. It may then be hoped that he has beaten the enemy, or at least has succeeded in effecting his return to Tampa Bay. In this state of doubt and anxiety I know not how long I may have to remain; yet it is important that I should speedily learn what has become of his column, and particularly whether the position and numbers of the enemy have been materially changed by its operations.

"I send no more troops, for the present, to Fort Drane, on account of the difficulty of subsisting them there. If Major General Gaines shall not fall back on that point, it will be indispensable to wait for Captain Wharton [with his company of United States dragoons.] In the meantime, it is easy to subsist the forces here and at Garey's Ferry."

On the 9th of March I reported† to Washington as follows:

"I have just set out for Fort Drane, *via* Garey's Ferry, on Black creek, [just established as an army depot,] with two companies of regulars, [foot,] and intending to take with me, from the latter place, the small battalion of mounted Georgians (heretofore mentioned) under the command of Major Douglass. Lieutenant Colonel Bankhead is at the head of the first detachment, and the two together may make a total of about 240; but even this small force may be important to rescue‡ Major General Gaines."

"I had not received the slightest information of the operations on the Withlacoochee (official or otherwise) of a later date than the 29th *ultimo*, up to this morning, and had concluded that he had effected his march, with more or less success against the enemy, upon Tampa Bay, when, at daylight, the steamer that I am now in arrived and brought the rumor, which is confirmed by the two accompanying notes§ from Paymaster Lytle, received about six hours afterwards. On the reception of the rumor I immediately commenced preparations for this movement; but being delayed by the necessity of unloading and relading the boat, I am now at anchor at the mouth of Black creek. I hope to put the troops in march from Garey's Ferry early in the day of to-morrow, and to reach Fort Drane with a small escort the day following. It is possible that even these little detachments of horse and foot may reach the Withlacoochee in time to render a valuable service."

The parts of Major Lytle's notes relative to this subject are—on the 5th of March he writes to me—"I have been directed by General Clinch to inform you that your communication of yesterday's date reached him at this place, [Fort Drane,] after he had mounted his horse and was on the move, with the forces under his command, to escort supplies to General Gaines." * * * * "Colonel Gadsden arrived here from Tallahassee on the 4th, yesterday, and accompanied General Clinch this morning to the Withlacoochee." And Major Lytle says, on the 8th, "by direction of General Clinch, I opened your communication of the 6th instant, which arrived late last night in advance of the wagons, [from Picolata, loaded with subsistence, &c.] You will perceive, by my letter of the 5th, that General Clinch, with all the forces at this post, and 100 mounted men from the vicinity, had left for the Withlacoochee to escort a small supply of cattle, ammunition, &c., to General Gaines, having received, the night before, a third express from that officer. No word has been received from either of those generals since the 5th." * * * * "N. B.—The amount of General Gaines's last express to General Clinch, dated the 3d instant, was merely copies of his previous letters, with a note, stating that the Indians were still around him; but little or no fighting had taken place since his last communication"—that, it is presumed, of the 28th of February.

I beg the court to observe that those two notes of Major Lytle, as has been shown in evidence, reached me "at the same moment,"|| at Picolata, about meridian, on the 9th of March.

I shall proceed to give further extracts from my report to the adjutant general, of the same date—March 9:

"I am aware that the movement I am making may be condemned, if regarded in any other light than a *rescue*,¶ as premature. Colonel Goodwyn's mounted regiment [of South Carolinians] only arrived at St. Augustine last night or this morning, and consequently the *left* wing [General Eustis's command] cannot be in force on the Ocklawaha, in the direction of Pelaklikaha, earlier than the 17th, or *up* with the enemy before the 20th instant. Colonel Lindsay, who may have already arrived at Tampa Bay, cannot operate more than two days' march from that place, from the want of means of transportation—Major General Gaines having taken away the horses which were there; and the basis of the right wing [Clinch's command] is merged in the force brought by that general [Gaines] into the field, and must participate in his success or failure. If it falls back with him on Fort Drane it must suffer great loss; and if it follow him to Tampa Bay it [the *basis* of the right wing] will be wholly out of position.

"In this, and even a greater state of uncertainty, I have been held since the 26th ultimo. The day

* See his letters of those dates, documents Nos. 62 and 63.

† Doc. No. 71.

‡ See testimony of Captain Van Buren.

§ Doc. No. 72.

¶ Indorsement of Lieutenant Van Buren, aide-de-camp, &c.

|| Colonel Gadsden's deposition and Captain Van Buren's testimony.

after I ordered back Major Cooper's battalion of Georgia foot, to prevent starvation at Fort Drane; and though daily, from that time, in the expectation of receiving from Savannah horses and serviceable wagons, not one has arrived. The quantity of subsistence that will be at Fort Drane, say to-morrow, will only be that sent from Picolata on the 6th instant, viz: 17,497 rations of bread and flour; 11,000 rations of pork, (with beef cattle in the neighborhood;) 8,000 rations of beans; some coffee, vinegar, &c. And the troops now about to proceed, [with me,] perhaps as far as the Withlacoochee,* will not have the means of taking with them rations for more than six days [extra.]

"I beg leave to recapitulate the causes of my great deficiency in means of transportation: 1. The wagons and horses which I knew Brigadier General Clinch to possess, early in February, have been more broken down by hard service and bad roads than I had expected to find them; 2. I had, upon what was considered in Georgia, and even at Picolata, the best information, confidently relied upon the use of the Ocklawaha, as late as the 2d instant; 3. No bacon has arrived, and the difference between it and pork, including wood and brine, is fifty *per centum* against the latter; 4. The [two-] horse wagons purchased at Charleston and Augusta, by Assistant Quartermasters L'Engle and Peyton,† are generally poor, and many of them unserviceable; 5. The ten wagons actually reported to have been shipped at Baltimore, in, I think, the Arctic, with Major Gates, were all left behind; 6. Of the 19,000 rations known to be at Fort Drane, about the 25th *ultimo*, nearly the whole have been drawn by a force not expected by the government or myself to appear in that quarter; and 7. Not a horse for the baggage-train, left by me at Savannah, or which I have since ordered to be purchased by Assistant Quartermaster Dimmock, has arrived in Florida."‡

"Instructions have been left behind me to send forward rations, should the means of transportation arrive in time, and the troops already in the neighborhood of Picolata—Major Cooper's and the remaining company of Major Gates's battalions. I have also desired Brigadier General Eustis to order to Fort Drane two companies of Colonel Goodwyn's regiment, and a further order will go back in this boat to Lieutenant Dimmock on the subject of horses and wagons.

"Some rifles and the tents arrived this morning at Picolata; but Colonel Goodwyn's regiment had marched through six or eight storms without cover, and now all companies in march are to be reduced to three tents each."

The following is the *postscript* to the foregoing report :

"Please remark that in his letter to Brigadier General Clinch, dated at New Orleans the 2d *ultimo*,§ Major General Gaines speaks of 'an efficient *co-operation*,' promises to be 'in readiness' at Tampa Bay 'by the 8th of the present month [February] to form a *junction at or near* that place with your command whenever, and as soon as, *in your judgment*, your force shall be sufficient to justify the movement;' and concluded by saying 'a sufficient quantity of ammunition and *provisions* have been transported to Fort Brooke [Tampa] to *divide* with you until further supplies are received.' Yet he did *not* wait till the brigadier gave notice that he was in 'force'—came to Fort King and swept nearly the whole of the subsistence collected at Fort Drane. A copy of that letter is in your office, and I now enclose one from Governor Eaton,|| from which it will appear that Major General Gaines knew at Tampa Bay, about the 14th *ultimo*, that I had been charged with the direction of this war. He first heard this at Pensacola, and received Governor Eaton's despatch at Tampa, as I can establish; hence his haste and neglect of the *assurances* given to Brigadier General Clinch, his isolated attack," &c.

MR. PRESIDENT: I am not, nor desire to be, the prosecutor or accuser of Major General Gaines, either before this or any other court, nor before the public. In respect to the latter tribunal, I have not published, nor caused to be published, a word against any human being whatever, or even a word in self-defence, since, at the latest, I was ordered to Florida, unless, indeed, two simple notes of explanation may be regarded as exceptions. The first, in May last, on the subject of a term hastily, and I may say accidentally, applied by me in an official report to the volunteers I then had the honor to command; and the second, written for publication within a few days past, repudiating certain language which I saw myself reported as having applied, before this court, to a high political functionary. If many of my official reports, written in the field and transmitted for information of the government, have, at Washington, been printed in whole or in part, the act was done in every instance without my knowledge, or the expression of the slightest wish to that effect on my part. The officers of my staff, sir, so far as I know or have seen, have been equally silent.

And what outrages have I not suffered from the publications of others during this period of silence? I shall speak in this place only of Major General Gaines. I complain not that he and his staff should occasionally fill up a column or two of the newspapers in praise of the hero of Camp Izard; but what right or justice was there in the outbreaks against me on the part of that chief on the Withlacoochee, at Tallahassee, Mobile, and I know not at how many other places? All these effusions of spleen, whether in the form of orders, speeches, or letters, have been carefully obtruded upon the public. I have heard of many of those melancholy exhibitions, but have only read one—the order of the 9th of March, turning over the command of the troops on the Withlacoochee to Brigadier General Clinch. It is, without any immediate agency of mine, in evidence¶ before this court. In that paper I am very facetiously denominated "the officer charged with the diplomatic arrangements of the War Department," approaching, as it is obliquely intimated, only to receive the formal surrender of that enemy whom he had, without a sortie, most strangely, but happily, conquered or subdued!

It has been seen, Mr. President, in every form, that this was a slight misapprehension to which the enemy was by no means a party, and that no military or *diplomatic* blunder of mine was necessary to resuscitate a war that had not then, nor has yet been terminated. It would be superfluous to quote the evidence—it abounds on the records of this court, and, what is worse, it yet abounds in unhappy Florida.

The judge advocate has read in evidence, furnished for the purpose by the War Department, the official reports written by me at the time for the information of government, in several of which Major General Gaines's movements are mentioned. Those particular reports, in common with the others, it was my right and duty to make, being charged at the time, by seniority in commission and special assignment, with the chief direction of the war against the Seminole Indians. Several passages of that part of the testimony have already been embodied in this *summary* to show how far I was, in my plans and

*Colonel Gadsden's depositions and the testimony of Captain Van Buren.

†Though bad, it has since been ascertained that better *two-horse* wagons could not be purchased at those places.

‡Some soon arrived. The storm and the want of sufficient steamers delayed Captain Dimmock.

§Doc. No. 48. ||Dated February 24, Doc. No. 73. ¶Doc. No. 78.

operations, hindered, crippled, or defeated by the movements of that general. Without departing from the strict line of defence that I have prescribed to myself, and which no doubt this court would otherwise have imposed, it remains for me to show that Major General Gaines, in his operations in Florida, so far as they embarrassed mine, constituted himself an intruder—that is, that he came into the field *in his own wrong*.

It has been seen, Mr. President, in what terms of praise (in my letter* to General Clinch of the 25th of February) I bore my humble testimony to General Gaines's movement from New Orleans, provided that, in violation of his express assurance previously given to Clinch, that he would wait for a junction with him at or near Tampa, it did not lead to a premature advance into the interior; but I then did not know the fact, so clearly disclosed in Captain McCall's letter,† republished in *The Army and Navy Chronicle*, (whole number 84,) which has been verified, and is now in evidence.

Captain McCall was, at the time, with General Gaines, and his acting assistant adjutant general. He says, in his letter, that "on the route, and within two days' march (by steam) of the Indian borders, he [General Gaines] received a notification that General Scott had been ordered to repair from the city of Washington to Florida, 'and to take command of the troops operating against the Indians in that quarter.' At the same time he [General Gaines] was informed that 'the state of affairs west of the Mississippi might soon require his attention, if not his presence in that quarter,' and he was directed to await further orders in the city of New Orleans."

The point at "two days' march by steam" from Tampa Bay, was evidently Pensacola, where we know, by Governor Eaton's letter, above noticed, (incidentally,) that General Gaines touched on his way from New Orleans to Tampa Bay.

But the captain argues, in the same letter, and no doubt after General Gaines, that had the latter "obeyed the order, [received at Pensacola,] and, by so doing, left General Clinch in expectation of a promised co-operation, to extricate himself as he could from any difficulty into which the failure, on the part of General Gaines, in preconcerted movements, might, peradventure, have thrown him," (Clinch,) "it is difficult to say whether the historian would have approved or condemned" General Gaines. But we have seen (and I have probably already assigned the true motive) that the "promised co-operation" and "preconcerted movements," commencing with "a junction at or near" Tampa, was not observed by General Gaines.

The captain's letter continues: "And, without General Gaines, the volunteers, [the Louisiana regiment,] his principal force, were unwilling to proceed; for, before they left New Orleans, he had pledged himself to accompany them whithersoever they went, and to stand by them," &c. These again are evidently General Gaines's own pretexts for his intrusion.

First, *the unwillingness of the Louisiana regiment to proceed without General Gaines to command it.*

Finding at this place Captain Thistle, who commanded a company in that corps, in Florida, from some day in February to the end of its term of service, I caused him to be summoned as a witness, and to be interrogated on this point. To my (third) question he answered: "For my part, when I was raising the men for my company I did not know there was such a man as General Gaines in the country. Colonel Smith and [Lieutenant] Colonel Lawson, I understood, were to command. I speak only in reference to my own company—my own officers and men. When at Pensacola I never heard anything of the kind mentioned, nor did I ever hear there that General Gaines was about to leave us. When we got acquainted with General Gaines, the officers and men were well pleased with him."

"Question 4. Did your regiment, as far as you know, obey with equal cheerfulness every officer of superior rank, whether of the regulars or volunteers?"

"Answer. They did so. I never heard the least murmur, either among the officers or men, nor the first word of dispute; they were always ready to obey orders, both with the regulars and volunteers, from all officers placed over them."

The same disposition on the part of the regiment may be inferred from the letter of its commander, Colonel Smith, to Captain Shannon, dated at Fort King, February 25. In this the writer says:

"I find it is General Gaines's intention to go down to Tampa Bay, by the scene of General Clinch's fight, and then to quit Florida. I would wish you to say to General Scott that if he thinks my regiment can be of use to his operations, I would rather remain with it in Florida than go back without having seen a fight; though, to tell the truth, I would rather have the fight before the grand army comes up. I would like, therefore, before we can be shipped back from Tampa Bay, to be ordered on some active duty by General Scott." (Colonel Smith has been summoned as a witness, at my instance, but has not arrived.)

Who, Mr. President, would infer, from the spirit of this excellent letter, that the patriotic Louisiana regiment was a body of vassals who only owed allegiance or service to a particular chief; or, rather, who would not affirm that it continued in the field to the last moment, and, in the language of Captain Thistle, "always ready to obey orders, with regulars and volunteers, from all officers placed over them?" (The deposition of Mr. Dyer, then quartermaster and commissary of the Louisiana regiment, strongly supports what is said under this and the next head.)

The other pretext, as we learn from Captain McCall's letter, is: *General Gaines had pledged himself to accompany the Louisiana regiment, &c.*

It seems, from Captain Thistle's testimony, that this corps was raised in part, and that arrangements were made to complete it (no doubt by his excellency Governor White) as soon as the news of the massacre of Major Dade had reached New Orleans, and before it was known that General Gaines was in that part of the country. Colonel Smith's letter equally excludes the idea of a pledge. He speaks of General Gaines's intention of returning to Tampa, and thence embarking for New Orleans, and the wish of himself and regiment to remain. The pledge, therefore, seems to have been a mere gratuitous flourish, made without any moving consideration, without acceptance, and without being known or remembered in the regiment. The troops, both regulars and volunteers, might very well have proceeded from Pensacola to Tampa Bay under Colonel Smith, who was fully qualified to direct and command them. In this way, sir, I show that General Gaines came upon the theatre of operations as an intruder, and in his own wrong.

In my report‡ of March 14 I said, for the information of government, that "I have every reason to hope that the enemy remains nearly in the same position as before the isolated, and therefore false, movement of Major General Gaines." An adroit and faithful negro spy, the same who had "been sent over the river"§ by General Gaines for a like purpose, was again despatched to ascertain the correctness of the impression so reported, but this spy never returned. We afterwards learned that he fell under

* Doc. No. 58.

† Doc. No. 150.

‡ Document No. 77.

§ Document No. 149.

suspicion and was confined. The impression, however, was universal in the right wing, (with which I marched,) up to its passage of the Withlacoochee, as is stated by Captain Thruston, the very intelligent chief of General Clinch's staff. This witness says: "I did not entertain a doubt myself that the enemy was still concentrated about the Withlacoochee, where I believed, and think it was the impression of others who had the best opportunities of information, that the women and children were then placed by the enemy for security; that they would defend the passage of the river with all their force, as they had done when threatened by General Gaines," [and, it might have been added, when previously approached by General Clinch, December 31.] "I heard no other supposition than that *there* we should be resisted, and that *there* the principal battle would be fought. That impression continued with me and others, and, I believe, generally throughout the wing, until our advance had landed on the opposite bank. I will mention, in support of this opinion, the fact that one of our men [a black wagoner] was cut off by a small party of Indians, said to be five, within eight miles of Fort Drane, on our first day's march."

According to my report* dated the 12th of April, and the testimony of Captain Thruston, General Clinch's column, with which I marched to Tampa, passed the Withlacoochee (that stopped General Gaines) with but little molestation; that we entered and scoured *the cove*, the enemy's strongest hold, to its head, as we believed at the moment, and without encountering a force of more than 130. Indeed, in the whole period of my operations, as may be seen by the written reports made to me by Clinch,† Eustis,‡ and Lindsay,§ and of mine to Washington,|| neither of those principal commanders, under me, at any time met with a larger body of the enemy at any one place—that which attacked Colonel Lindsay's column on its last return to Tampa Bay excepted, and which was estimated at about three hundred. By the term *principal commanders*, just used, I of course do not mean to include the officers who respectively commanded the two small posts established in the interior, denominated Forts Alabama and Cooper. These, from the enemy's perfect knowledge of his own most difficult country, and his consequent facilities of concentration, were reported to have been repeatedly attacked, and by several hundreds each time.

It has been further shown in evidence that the many columns and detachments under my orders traversed an immense space in a short period, and visited many of the enemy's favorite haunts and strongest holds, and I now read this passage from my report to Washington of the 30th of April:

"I am more than ever persuaded that the whole force of the enemy, including the negroes, does not exceed 1,200 fighting men. It is probably something less. Of that force I am equally confident that not 500 have, at any time since the commencement of hostilities, been brought within the same ten miles square. In all our operations within the last thirty days, [known to me,] we have not found a party of probably more than 130; but parties of from ten to thirty have been encountered almost everywhere. No Indian woman, child, or negro, nor the trace of one, has been seen in that time. Those non-combatants, it has been evident to us all, have been removed beyond the theatre of our operations. They were, no doubt, even while the parley was going on with General Gaines, on the 7th of March, moving off to the southeast beyond Pease creek and Lake Tohopkelika, and in that almost inaccessible region they are now concealed. That officer, it is said, caused Powell and his chiefs to be informed, by way of inducing them to accept the Withlacoochee as a temporary boundary, that large armies were approaching which would fill up the Indian country and crush everything in the way. The wily chiefs profited by the information, sent off their families, and dispersed their warriors into small parties. In this way Powell expects to make good his threat, viz: that *he would protract the war to three years.*"

Except on the suppositions of this extract, how was I, Mr. President, to account for our not finding, three weeks after General Gaines, any considerable body of the enemy? He supposed himself to have been surrounded in his breastwork with his 1,000 or 1,100 men, by 1,200 or 1,500 warriors. What had become of them? He certainly killed but few, and captured not one. Whence, then, the subsequent dispersion? My supposition is rendered more than probable by Captain Hitchcock's letter to the honorable Mr. Lyon, member of Congress, dated Fort Drane, March 11, 1836, since published, and now in evidence.¶ In this letter the captain says "a staff officer" (himself) was at Fort Izard, sent out by General Gaines to hold a parley or negotiation with the hostile chiefs, "and in the plainest language to tell them the exact truth as to the force ordered into the country to subdue them; that additional force was expected every day; that the time was near when every Indian found with a rifle in his hand would be shot down. This was communicated with such explanations as were deemed necessary to give it force," &c.

And what, sir, were the objects of that parley, or "diplomatic" transaction? It seems, according to the published letters of Captains Hitchcock and McCall, "that the Indians did not wish to fight any more, but they wanted him [General Gaines] to retire from the Withlacoochee;" and in the general narrative of Captain Thistle, commenced under a question put by the court, this witness said: "Captain Hitchcock and other officers (Adjutant Barrow) went out and held a conversation with them [the Indians;] they inquired particularly as to our situation—whether we had provisions, and whether we had brandy and tobacco. They said they could supply us with provisions in abundance; that we could fish on the river bank if we chose; and that they would fight no more if they were permitted to keep the opposite side of the Withlacoochee, making that river the boundary."

Was this the language of a *subdued* people *humbly suing for peace*? They had commenced the war without owning an acre of ground in Florida. They had ceded every foot. The time had arrived for their emigration to the west. Sooner than quit their natal soil they had appealed to arms; they had massacred a detachment of a hundred men; they had held their country notwithstanding the gallantry of Clinch and his handful of troops on the 31st of December; they had even held General Gaines himself, with his strong and excellent column, penned up under their fire from the 27th of February; they had, in short, glutted their revenge, conquered the country up to the left bank of the Withlacoochee, gained all they wanted, and felt themselves in strength to dictate the terms of peace. Hence the overture to make the Withlacoochee the future boundary—to treat on the basis of the *uti possidetis*—each party to hold what it possessed; and accordingly we find Captain Hitchcock instructed to reply on the part of General Gaines, "that if they would engage to cease from all acts of hostility, retire south of the Withlacoochee, and promise to attend a council when called upon by the United States commissioners, they should not for the present be molested." Just at this critical moment General Clinch arrived with the needed succor, and we hear of no further negotiations!

Well, sir, General Gaines now left the theatre of operations. Near Micanopy he met Colonel Bankhead's column coming up, and, as the latter has testified, said: "You may go on, colonel. There is

* Doc. No. 103.
† Doc. No. 104.

‡ Doc. No. 105.
§ Doc. No. 106.

¶ Doc. Nos. 103 and 116.
‡ Doc. No. 149.

nothing to be done now; it is all finished." His order of the 9th of March, boasting, among "the important objects" he had "accomplished," that "the principal force of the enemy had been beaten and forced to sue for peace," preceded or accompanied him. His progress towards Tallahassee and Mobile was one continued triumph. But, it may be asked, what had all this self-felicitation, and those public gratulations, to do with my operations? This, Mr. President, is precisely what I am about to show.

It will be remembered that two of the columns, those of Generals Clinch and Eustis, of the army under my command, respectively, from Fort Drane and Volusia, arrived at or near Tampa Bay on the 6th and 5th of April; and the third, or Colonel Lindsay's column, returned from the interior about the same time. All, much harassed and worn by long and fatiguing operations, looked to this great southern depot for the supplies and refreshments so greatly needed to enable men and horses to return to the field. To give some idea of what we were here doomed to experience, I will recall parts of my official report,* written at Tampa the 12th of April, for the information of government, and which letter has been given in evidence by the judge advocate.

"My disappointments on the Gulf have been as great as those experienced on the St. John's. The latter were pretty fully reported at the time," &c.

"Please now refer to my joint letter† to the quartermaster and the commissary at New Orleans, dated at Savannah, February 14, and acknowledged‡ on the 26th of the same month. A copy was transmitted to you for the information of the proper departments at Washington. The letter, it will be seen, is both specific and urgent. Yet, instead of my finding here about 50,000 rations of hard bread and about 90,000 rations of bacon, I found but 12,740 pounds of the former and 21,600 pounds of the latter! Not an additional ration of either has arrived since I came." (Both the quartermaster and commissary, here alluded to, I have caused to be summoned as witnesses, and neither has appeared.)

"Colonel Lindsay," the report continues, "had required for the use of his column, of the quartermaster at New Orleans, a number of wagons and horses, and not one has been sent. Again: the sutler (the person next in importance to the quartermaster and the commissary with every army) left this place more than a month ago for New Orleans, to bring back with him a large supply of goods for the troops which were expected [here.] Those supplies are exceedingly wanted by every officer and man; but the quartermaster writes that he hesitates about sending the wagons and horses; and the sutler, that he declines sending his stores, because each has heard of Major General Gaines's triumphal entry into Tallahassee, in consequence of his having finished the war! It is *presumed* that the commissary at New Orleans stopped the shipment of hard bread and bacon for the same reason." (This *presumption* is now *fact*, as shown by the testimony of Captain Thistle. Lieutenant Morris, who, at Tampa, had the letter from his brother, the sutler, testified before this court to all that I had alleged in respect to the non-arrival of sutler's stores. See, on this point, the testimony of Colonels Lindsay and Bankhead; and for the sufferings of both officers and men from the want of shoes, shirts, light garments, and groceries, see the testimony of Colonel Lindsay, Mr. De Peyster, and Captain Thistle. In respect to the want and non-arrival of wagons and horses at Tampa, see testimony of Colonel Lindsay; the letter§ of Captain Shannon, chief quartermaster; the deposition of Mr. Newcomb, late of the army, and quartermaster at Tampa, with the letter of the quartermaster at New Orleans to him, annexed.) My report of the 12th of April continues:

"Captain Green, of the cutter Dallas, was at Tallahassee when Major General Gaines arrived at that place. He had been ten days soliciting permission to go and make a survey of the mouth of the Withlacoochee. On renewing his application to some one of the territorial government, he was told the war was over. We have *now* to make the survey for the expedition that has been mentioned, [which sailed under Major Read the 17th or 18th of April.] These are the new disappointments and vexations I have been doomed to experience."

This statement, given in the report from memory, has been fully sustained by the testimony of Captain Green before this court, with this important addition: the captain would have *ascended* the river, having provided the necessary means.

But, Mr. President, to a question put by the court General Clinch replied: "I am of the opinion that the movement of Major General Gaines's command through Florida did not materially affect the operations of Major General Scott."

Sir, no one entertains a more sincere respect and regard for this most excellent commander and citizen than I do, and I am sure that the whole army regrets his retirement to civil life. His opinion is always entitled to great weight, and hence, mainly, the overwhelming facts which I have just embodied, and which otherwise I might have left scattered over your voluminous documents and minutes, to be remembered or hunted up by the court.

It is, moreover, evident to me, Mr. President, from the reply to another question also propounded by the court, that, on the point of interference with my operations, the sound mind of General Clinch was too much influenced, at the moment, by the narrative he had so recently given of the neglects shown him by the War Department, prior to the time when I had the misfortune to be ordered to Florida. If his repeated calls for troops and supplies, and his wise admonitions on the *temper* early manifested by the Seminoles had received but half the attention due to his position, this still-raging war might never have burst upon the country. Under this ruling idea the witness could see nothing but the imputed errors of the War Department. Whilst that was on the throne of his mind, all the subsequent causes of failure in sending the Indians out of Florida sunk into comparative insignificance. Be this as it may, I put, in concurrence with the isolated opinion of General Clinch, on the subject of General Gaines's interference with my operations, the great body of facts already detailed, and the *opinions* of witnesses of no less intelligence and respectability. See the deposition of Colonel Gadsden, the chief of my staff, who marched with General Clinch to the succor of General Gaines, and who knew more of Florida and the Seminoles than, perhaps, any three individuals with the army; and see the testimony of Colonel Bankhead, who marched with me from Picolata to Fort Drane, where he came under the command, and continued with General Clinch. The strong opinions expressed on this point by the two colonels, like the opposing one given by General Clinch, were all elicited without a question put by *me*.

The point which has thus been rather more fully discussed than I had until lately intended, was, however, but the *second* cause of the failure of my operations to send out of Florida the great body of the Seminole Indians, and there were many other causes, besides the *first* in importance, some of which have

* Doc. No. 103.

† Doc. No. 39.

‡ Doc. No. 42.

§ To the quartermaster general, April 11, Doc. No. 154

already been partially, though but incidentally, developed. It is now my purpose to bring rapidly the whole, in the same connexion, under the review of the court.

Of these causes, many, as will be seen, are closely united, and, in the descending scale, consequent upon each other. For these reasons, the analysis and the enumeration will, in some instances, be rather difficult.

1. *The lateness of my orders—12 o'clock in the night of January 21, with notice the day before to hold myself in readiness; and the short term of service of the great body of troops.*

I do not mean to say, Mr. President, that any time was lost by the War Department in putting me in motion *after* the news of Clinch's affair of December 31, which preceded, at Washington, the account of Dade's melancholy fate on the 28th. Nor shall I stop to discuss the question: Why had not *stronger* measures been taken on the receipt of Clinch's warnings and calls for reinforcements, beginning in January, 1835, and reiterated October 8, October 17, December 9, and December 16, of the same year?*

Well, sir, the court has seen that I was promptly at Augusta, where I completed my calls for volunteers or drafted men; two regiments from South Carolina, one of horse and one of foot; the same from Georgia, and one of foot from Alabama, at 740 men per regiment, making a total of 3,700. A fine spirit was abroad in those States, and great exertions made in each to supply its quota. Yet, from many unavoidable causes—the immense spaces to be traversed, and others which I will not stop to enumerate, but not one of which can be charged to me—instead of finding myself in force at Picolata and at Tampa Bay as early as February 20, as I had originally flattered myself, that I might, I arrived in Florida on the 22d, much in advance of three-fifths of those troops. Only the foot of South Carolina and seven companies of Georgia had preceded me. The Georgia horse began to arrive about the end of the month, the three companies before mentioned, and another on March 10, under Captain Nelson, who had made an unparalleled march from the northwest corner of Georgia. I ought, in my previous narrative, to have stated that this fine company joined at Garey's Ferry, and added about 70 men to Colonel Bankhead's little column, which set out with me for Fort Drane. The same day Colonel Goodwyn's fine regiment of South Carolina mounted men reached St. Augustine, over a long road through rain and mud, and, like Nelson's company, without tents, and without a murmur. The Alabama regiment, under Colonel Chisholm, and Major Read's battalion of Floridians, arrived at Tampa Bay, with Colonel Lindsay, between the 1st and 10th of March. (It has been seen that this battalion had not been called for by me, and that it went to Tampa Bay without my knowledge, at the time, and against my wishes; and that the second battalion of Georgia foot was, in accordance with my request, never furnished.) Finally, six companies, instead of four, to make up for the defection of the first two, of Georgia horse, arrived at Garey's Ferry, *via* Middle Florida and Fort Drane, about April 10, whilst I was at Tampa. These six companies were, nevertheless, mustered into service, in accordance with instructions I had left behind, and immediately afterwards discharged, by the advice of Major General Macomb, who then happened to be at Picolata.

All the volunteers called for by me were mustered into service for only three months, according to the instructions I had received from the War Department; and I suppose that the President of the United States had no authority to require the services of militia, by *drafting*, for a longer period.

It has thus been seen that I was not in force to commence combined and efficient operations earlier than March 10, and by this date the mass of the volunteers, owing to the different periods of arrival at the several places of rendezvous, and consequent acceptances, by muster, had only about 60 days to serve. This was the same thing nearly, in a system of combined operations requiring the services of the whole, as if none had had a longer time to serve; and all had been from home, with slight differences, equally long.

But let not these movements of the volunteers excite a smile to their prejudice. The delay in their arrival on the St. John's, as I have said, was unavoidable, and there was even a greater delay in the approach of three companies of regulars, which were ordered to embark at Baltimore in the dead of winter, and with the mercury in the thermometer several degrees below zero. This battalion was delayed by ice in the Chesapeake, I know not how many weeks, and finally reached Picolata on the 6th of March. With all the lights of the quartermaster general, ten wagons were ordered† to be purchased and shipped from Baltimore about the same time; six came to Florida as late as March 11, two earlier, and two in May ‡. Now, if I were expected to make long marches, through a savage country, without road or bridges, why could not those three companies have been marched to Norfolk, or even to Wilmington, and thence embarked? Time would have been saved in either case. And why were not the wagons shipped from some port not obstructed by ice? Again: a detachment of United States dragoons, under Captain Wharton, that received orders for Florida, at New York, about January 24, was delayed several weeks in that harbor, waiting for its arms and horse furniture, and joined me at Fort Drane, (after a short passage to Savannah,) sixty days from the reception of those orders! There was no delay from the want of horses; they had been purchased by my orders, and placed at Savannah as early as February 12.

Let it be remembered, Mr. President, that those shipments and movements were not made under *my* directions; yet I was advised of them, and suffered much embarrassment from not earlier receiving the troops and wagons.

I have said that I was, by the 10th of March, in sufficient force to *commence* operations, and that the mass of the volunteers had then about sixty days to serve—a part more and a part less. This period was rather more than was necessary for the marches and operations actually made under my orders, but wholly insufficient to enable us to scour the country south and east of Pease creek, which is commonly termed the Everglades, even if the lateness of the season, the sickness of the climate in those regions as early as the end of April, and other causes which will be noticed, had not interposed insurmountable obstacles. I ought, therefore, to have given *me* any prospect of success, to have been ordered to Florida several months earlier, and with a force of a much longer term of service. He who now directs the war in that quarter, besides other advantages, has had more time for preparation; has a better season for operations; more regular troops, and volunteers of a longer period of service.

In respect to volunteers for ninety days, the testimony of General Eustis and Colonel Lindsay is strongly in support of what I urge on this point.

* Doc. No. 151.

† General Jesup to Major Cross, January 26.

‡ Deposition of Lieutenant Dimmock.

2. *The unexpected intrusion of General Gaines.*

This was the second cause of my failure, both in point of time and importance.

Now, although I considered myself in strength on the St. John's and at St. Augustine to commence forward movements as early as the 10th of March, the court will please remember that my general plan of operations was to move at the same time, as nearly as practicable, from Fort Drane, Volusia, and Tampa, upon the great body of the enemy, supposed to be about the *cove* of the Withlacoochee; to march in person with Clinch, and to give instructions to Eustis and Lindsay so far to deviate from that approximation of the three columns as to pursue any considerable body of the enemy, or any considerable fresh trail that might be discovered. Hearing of General Gaines's intrusion, and seeing that a consequent delay was inevitable, I called back a detachment already in march to join Clinch, and, through the latter, caused Lindsay to be advised* of that delay, lest he should make an isolated movement. And General Clinch has testified† that a forward movement could not have been made from Fort Drane earlier than the 26th of March, (the day on which he actually moved,) for two reasons: 1. To give time for the troops which had been shut up in Camp Izard with General Gaines to recruit themselves. 2. To enable the last train of wagons sent to return from Gary's Ferry with subsistence. The answer to the second question put to Captain Thruston shows more in detail the reduced condition of those troops. Here, then, was the cause of a considerable delay—from the 10th to the 26th of March, less the time necessary to march from the St. John's to Fort Drane; and Eustis, in the meantime, instead of being forced to Volusia, which was to become his base of operations, was employed in scouring the country between the St. John's and the Atlantic, as far as Tomoca and Volusia. Lindsay was advised‡ of this further delay. The court, too, has seen that it was my intention on the 9th of March,§ to strengthen the right wing by troops drawn from the left, if General Gaines's detachment had not fallen back on Fort Drane.

3. *Insufficient means of transportation.*

This cause of failure in my operations has, like the one just noticed, been pretty fully developed in the former parts of this summary. I shall, therefore, only remark in this place that the means of land transportation would have been nearly sufficient, notwithstanding the intrusion of General Gaines, if we could have used the Ocklawaha for about seventy tons of supplies (as I had expected to do) up to the 2d of March; and that those means, even without the use of the Ocklawaha, would have been sufficient by the 12th, but for that intrusion. The necessity of replacing the subsistence drawn from Fort Drane by General Gaines; of providing for a larger force than was expected there; of transporting articles of subsistence fifty *per centum* heavier than those I had early and specifically called for, both from the St. John's and Tampa, caused our wagons to be overloaded, the horses to be overworked, and many of both to be broken down. The court will further remember *who* took from Tampa the means of transportation which were there early in February, and *what* prevented the arrival of new means from New Orleans.

4. *Insufficient supply of hard bread and bacon for marches.*

On the 21st of January, in his office, the commissary general of subsistence and myself fully concurred as to the advantages of hard bread and bacon over flour and pork *on marches*. Ten days after, in a letter|| to the adjutant general, I recurred to this subject, and required on the St. John's (at Picolata) large quantities of both hard bread and bacon; which passage of my letter, according to request, the adjutant general duly communicated to the commissary general before the 10th of February, as the former reported¶ to me on that day.

Now, it is shown by the testimony of Mr. Locke, who was the assistant commissary at Picolata, that the quantity of hard bread which had arrived prior to the march of Clinch's column from Fort Drane, and of Eustis's from Volusia, was much less than was wanted for those columns, although I had prohibited the issue of hard bread to the troops when at rest on the St. John's. The deficiency was made up, of course, in flour, of which, and of pork, our supply was abundant; and the same testimony is express that not a pound of bacon reached the St. John's from the commissariat earlier than the 15th of April, when all the columns were near the Gulf of Mexico.

Though much embarrassed on the St. John's and the march to the south by the want of those particular items of food, as the court has seen, I have always been unwilling to suppose that the chief of the commissariat was in fault, and am now, since hearing read before this court his instructions to the agents of his department on the subject, yet more unwilling to impute blame to him. His merits are acknowledged by the whole army, and I am free to declare that I have never known a better man or a more faithful public servant. The failure in the particulars stated was, however, not the less embarrassing.

Well, sir, the army, early in April, was compelled to give up, for the moment, the search for the enemy, and to march to Tampa Bay to seek for supplies. The court has seen what orders I had given to the assistant commissary at New Orleans in respect to this depot; the large quantity expected, and the small quantity of hard bread and bacon found there, and that that little would not have been equal to three or four marches of the army if Colonel Lindsay had not brought with him a small quantity from Mobile. On this point the testimony of Lieutenant Morris, the then commissary at Tampa, is more explicit than even that of General Eustis or Colonel Lindsay. And the reason why more of those items of subsistence had not been sent from New Orleans is also pretty fully in evidence. (The then commissary at the latter place was duly summoned to appear here, and has not arrived.)

Mr. Locke stated in his testimony that the difference in weight, owing to the brine and wood necessary to the preservation in warm weather of pork, is fifty-one per centum against the latter in favor of bacon. This difference is known to most marching officers; and that between the ration of eighteen ounces of flour and twelve of hard bread is evident to all the world. To have been obliged, then, as we were, to take with all the columns in their several marches nearly two-thirds of our whole subsistence in the heavier articles, was the same thing as if a larger portion of our otherwise deficient means of transportation had been captured or destroyed; and even this was not the only evil consequent upon that necessity, as will be presently seen.

* Doc. No. 61.
|| Doc. No. 18.

† Answer to the first question.
¶ Doc. No. 36.

‡ March 13, doc. No. 81.

§ Doc. No. 74.

5. *Heat of the climate—badness of water—sickness.*

From the lateness of the season into which we were thrown from the causes already stated, we found the heat, even before the 20th of April, so oppressive that the troops could not execute even ordinary marches from this cause alone.—(Testimony of Clinch, Eustis, Lindsay, and Thruston, also Colonel Smith's report* of his expedition up Pease creek.) The troops had still to wear their winter clothing, from the non-arrival of sutler's goods at Tampa from New Orleans; the sink-holes or ponds, on which both men and horses had generally to rely for water, were now, many of them, dried up, and in the others the water was tepid, besides being filled with vegetable matter and animalcula.—(Testimony of Clinch, Eustis, Thruston, &c.) Add to these causes of distress and disease the swamps and hammocks which were traversed, the deficiency in bacon, to which the volunteers had very generally been accustomed at home, and the necessity all were under the greater part of the time, when in march, to eat unleavened dough partially fried with pork or half-baked before camp-fires, and it will astonish no one to learn from the testimony that we had very many individuals, officers and men, who could neither ride nor march. The only resource was to crowd them into the wagons, for in a savage country we could leave no one behind.

6. *Forage and grazing.*

At St. Augustine, and on the St. John's as high up as the depot at Volusia, there was, on the requisitions of General Eustis and my own, upon Lieutenant L'Engle at Charleston, and Lieutenant Dimmock at Savannah, an abundant supply of both corn and hay, and there was no positive deficiency in forage around Fort Drane. At Tampa we again found an abundance of corn and hay, with a small quantity of oats, all supplied in compliance with my requisition, as I suppose, upon the quartermaster at New Orleans. This corn, however, was generally bad, having probably been sweated on board of vessels. The good was mostly consumed at Tampa during a rest to recruit the horses of eight or ten days at that place. The portion issued for renewed operations was generally the refuse, which killed some horses and injured more.—(Deposition of Mr. Newcomb, and testimony of Captain Thruston.)

The grazing in the interior, as all the witnesses questioned on the subject have testified, furnished but an occasional and a slight resource. Hence the court will not be surprised that General Eustis caused every cavalry horse with him to be led by his owner, on foot, the last sixteen miles of the march from Volusia upon Tampa. The grazing was but little less bad on the return marches.

But, it may be asked, why not have taken more corn with the columns from the depots which furnished that which was good? If our trains had been doubled a sufficient supply could not have been transported, even if there had been good roads. Let any gentleman make the calculation for himself to see how many wagons would be required, for example, to take corn enough for a thousand horses for twenty days, including the consumption of the draught horses so employed, and he will be astonished at the result. Again: why not make every rider put three bushels of corn in his saddle, and lead his horse for seven or eight days? Regular cavalry may be compelled to do this, but I know of no power of persuasion that can induce any body of volunteers whatever, unless it be under the highest calls of patriotic interest, thus in their own estimation to degrade themselves. I made the proposal, and, although I commanded at the time a corps of horse composed mostly of gentlemen of the highest spirit and devotion to country, I was advised not to issue an order to that effect, as it could not be enforced, although I pledged myself that I would do what I wished to require of others. I then reduced the quantity of corn to be so taken in my Order No. 28,† and it is in evidence that considerably less (about an average of three pecks only) was actually put on each horse. And the court will readily conceive that the transportation of hay into the interior, for the consumption of even two days, was wholly out of the question with marching troops, as well on account of its bulk as its weight.

From the foregoing circumstances it resulted that all surviving horses arrived at Tampa in a bad condition,‡ and returned to the north of Florida in a worse, as is shown by the evidence.

7. *Roads—bridges.*

The only road within the theatre of our operations was that made by government, connecting Fort King with Tampa Bay. This road was very partially followed by all the columns under my command. Its three bridges were destroyed by the enemy at the commencement of hostilities. All the other routes were opened by the columns as they marched, and the streams roughly bridged at the same time. These labors were difficult and incessant, as might be supposed, and has been shown in the testimony of Eustis, Lindsay, and Thruston.

8. *Want of an auxiliary Indian force.*

The court has seen by my Order No. 13, (March 14,)§ that I called for 500 friendly Creek Indians, to be commanded by General Woodward, Major Watson, and Major Flournoy. The first two have been summoned here on this and another important point, but have not arrived. The third early fell in the Creek war. Colonel Gadsden's deposition shows the importance of such force, and my successors in Florida have had the benefit of the suggestion. It was denied me by the agent of government, and that denial not even rebuked by the Secretary of War.—See Major Hogan's letter|| to that functionary, and his reply,¶ dated, respectively, March 28 and April 12. For the standing and qualifications of the two majors named by me to bring on the Indians, see Governor Eaton's letter*** to me, dated March 7, and General Clinch's notes†† of introduction. General Woodward is too highly distinguished both as a commander of and against Indians to require a word of support in this place; and it will be seen in the agent's (Major Hogan's) letter‡‡ to me, dated the 1st of February, that he thought he could, "in ten days, raise [me] 1,000 warriors, and be on the march to join" me.

* Doc. No. 133.

† Doc. No. 109.
‡ Doc. No. 86.§ Letter of Captain Shannon to the quartermaster general, April 11, Doc. No. 14.
¶ Doc. No. 87.

** Doc. No. 88.

†† Doc. Nos. 89 and 90.

§ Doc. No. 82.
‡‡ Doc. No. 84.

9. *Want of guides*

Eustis and Lindsay, as shown by their testimony, had no competent guides, and could obtain none. Clinch's column was rather less badly provided in this respect, yet he had not a guide that knew anything of the intricacies of *the cove*, a Cretan labyrinth, held from the knowledge of the white man, as the sacred groves of the Druids were never entered except by the initiated. In short, all the difficult parts of Florida were, to the whole army, one *terra incognita*. Government gave me no topographical information, nor had any to give; and the booksellers' maps only afforded outlines filled up with unlucky guesses.

10. *The limited time for active operations.*

From preceding causes, and deducting the time unavoidably lost at Tampa,* the columns of Clinch and Eustis were actually in the field, beyond Fort Drane and Volusia, only about twenty-two days. The testimony of both Clinch and Thruston shows that I could not have put the right wing in operation from Fort Drane earlier than I did, the 26th of March; and Eustis, with the left wing, crossed the St. John's at Volusia about the same time, to approach *the cove* by the way of Pelaklikaha. Clinch, with his wing, was compelled to return to Fort Drane on the 25th of April, the term of service of a part of his volunteers having already expired, and, as he reported† to me the 27th, "men and horses much exhausted by sickness and the heat of the weather. Another day's march would have occasioned the abandoning of a part of the train. Fifteen horses and mules died on the road, and eight more turned out that could not be got along by leading."

Eustis, with the left wing, (which I accompanied from Tampa,) was, in like manner, and very much in the same condition, compelled to return to Volusia on the same day, April 25.

Colonel Smith, who had, with his regiment, the Louisiana volunteers, been detached by the way of Charlotte harbor up Pease creek, about the 12th of April, returned to Tampa the 26th, and embarked for New Orleans, according to orders, where the regiment arrived, I think, a little after its term of service had expired.

The battalion of Floridians sailed from Tampa about the 17th of April for the Withlacoochee, on its way to St. Mark's, where it was discharged. I do not know when this battalion was mustered into service.

The centre column under Colonel Lindsay, which at first included Major Read's battalion, having arrived by steam from Mobile, at Tampa, was the first of the three columns under my orders in the field. On the 15th of March he put himself in movement, established a post on the Hillsborough, 23 miles from Tampa, called Fort Alabama, as a place of deposit, and advanced towards *the cove* as far as Chick-chatty, which he reached about the 24th, the letter‡ advising him of the delay in the movements of the two other columns, having reached him subsequently.

This column, consisting principally of the Alabama regiment of volunteers, under Colonel Chisholm, and several times changed in its other parts, was also the latest in the field by a few days. By my Orders No. 38, § of April 16, Colonel Lindsay was instructed, on his return to Tampa, after my departure, to make any further movement within the compass of his forces, in the prosecution of the campaign, that might be deemed useful, and then to cause the volunteers with him (the Alabama regiment and an independent company of Louisianians, under Captain Marks) to be embarked for their respective homes. That embarkation was commenced by him, according to his report,|| May 7, "the rainy season having set in," and it being deemed "impossible to keep the field with bodies of troops without great and, for any objects that could be accomplished, a wanton waste of life."

Thus terminated, Mr. President, active operations under my command; and if, from the causes assigned, without decisive results, at least without defeat or check, and without dishonor.

In my report of April 12, from Tampa, I spoke in terms of high commendation of the three principal commanders under me—Clinch, Eustis, and Lindsay. Each continued to the last to deserve greater praise than it is in the power of one, under my present circumstances, to bestow. I also had the benefit of Colonel Gadsden's assistance, the chief of my staff, a volunteer in the war, a soldier, and a patriot, who, independent of his particular knowledge of the enemy and the peninsula, of his services with me, and on prior occasions, is endowed with talents and virtues which give him high claims upon the government and country. The handfuls of regulars who were with me in the field never faltered in difficulty or danger; and if now and then they yielded the post of honor, it was purely in compliment to their countrymen fresh from civil life, who were cherished and assisted on every occasion. Those patriotic volunteers of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, and Florida were, no doubt many of them, sometimes inefficient, from the mere awkwardness of inexperience; but they very generally brought with them to the war high chivalry, which always inspires the wish of personal distinction, and this was frequently and nobly attained by individuals and detachments.

On the principal commanders and the troops which were under me, I have then only to invoke the approbation of their country. Let its censure, through this court, fall on me, and me alone, of that army; if all were not done which it was possible to accomplish under the circumstances.

Some questions, Mr. President, were put to as many witnesses of the higher ranks, who have appeared before this court, to ascertain whether I had failed in any particular, as a commander in Florida, in point of judgment, zeal, or personal conduct. The answers were direct in every instance, but too complimentary to be here reproduced. Let them sleep for the present on your records. They may hereafter be read by those who will not be made to blush for their parent.

A word, sir, as to my *plan of campaign*. I believe that this has been sufficiently developed in the evidence and embodied in this summary. It has been censured by a writer, himself an old officer, and who delights to see himself in print, as being somewhat European, as if it were criminal to import professional knowledge, and who seemed to think that generals ought to make war without plans of any sort. This *vulgar error* has been incidentally but too signally rebuked by an eminent military critic and political functionary to be further noticed in this place. I shall, therefore, here simply quote the opinions of two younger but better soldiers on the particular plan of operations by me laid down and pursued.

After exploring the country to a great extent, and learning much that was new of it and the enemy, General Clinch says to me, in his report,¶ April 27, of his operations returning from Tampa Bay, "that

* Testimony of Clinch, Eustis, and Thruston.
§ Doc. No. 114.

† Doc. No. 120.
‡ Doc. No. 129:

§ March 13, Doc. No. 81.
¶ Doc. No. 120.

the true plan of operations against them [the Indians] will be that first designed by you—that is, by a force from Pelaklikaha, a force ascending by my (late) route, and a corresponding one on the north side," his first route. This, the court will perceive, was the precise plan laid down by me for our first operations.

Captain Thruston, who I knew, in March, at Fort Drane, did not altogether approve of the plan of campaign I was about to follow, and with whom I never again conversed on the subject, was, when before this court, at a venture, asked by me this question:

"17. The witness became acquainted with the general plan of operations projected by General Scott. With the benefit of the witness's subsequent knowledge of the enemy and the country occupied by him, what is the witness's opinion of that general plan of operations?"

"Answer. When I first heard General Scott detail his plan of operations, I thought he had taken more than necessary precautions, by advancing into the country with three columns from different points of the peninsula, not doubting that our wing [Clinch's] of the army would be met by the enemy in force on the Withlacoochee. Nor did I believe that a nation of 5,000 people could conceal itself so effectually in the peninsula south and east of the Withlacoochee, that they could not be traced and found by one army (column or wing.) My subsequent experience taught me my error, and to consider General Scott's plan of operations as the true one."

But, Mr. President, it has been objected to me that in my first operations (towards Tampa Bay) I held the troops in masses unnecessarily large—of 1,900, 1,700, and 1,200 men, respectively. Of this, I became myself early persuaded. But, in connexion with this point, the court will please look at that part of Colonel Lindsay's testimony detailing his remarks and the advice he gave me at Augusta at the end of January, 1836. I regret that I am obliged here to abridge his evidence. Colonel Lindsay had served with Major General Jackson, against a part of the same Indians, in the campaign of 1818; the "principal object of which was," according to the witness, "to drive the Seminoles from the Georgia frontier across the Suwanee; that General Jackson carried into the field a force amounting to, perhaps, 6,000 men." This was in reply to my 8th question. To the 6th, the colonel had previously said "the country east of the Suwanee is infinitely more impracticable than the country west." He adds many striking differences, all against our troops; and it is known that General Jackson's operations terminated on the west bank of that river. In respect to the advice given on the subject of *detaching*, the witness said: "I believe I mentioned to General Scott that I derived that advice from General Jackson, who, on some occasion, when I wanted to go on detached service, made use of this emphatic expression, 'Sir, I never detach against Indians.'" And again, in the same campaign, General Jackson observed to the witness, "that he never detached, or suffered small parties to march through the Indian country." The court will please to bear in mind the official relation that subsisted in January, 1836, between General Jackson, Colonel Lindsay, and myself; that I had never been in the interior of Florida; that Governor Eaton in his letter* to me of February 3, 1836, speaking of hostile Seminoles, said "their numerical force cannot be less than 3,000, probably more;" that Colonel Lindsay has testified, in answer to my 27th question, what must be evident from the surface of the country, that, from dispersion, the enemy had great facilities of concentration; that I had seen, before the columns advanced from Fort Drane and Volusia, by General Gaines's letter† to General Clinch, dated the 29th February, that the writer supposed himself to have been surrounded in Camp Izard by "not less than 1,500" warriors; and that although he had from 1,000 to 1,100 good troops with him, I saw that he neither could pass the Withlacoochee, nor had ventured to make a sortie. All these considerations induced me, Mr. President, to hold the troops under my command, in three columns, until I could feel my way a little, and judge for myself. When I had satisfied my mind that there were not, in all Florida, more than 1,200 Indian warriors, probably less, and that of that force perhaps not 500 had been concentrated at any time in the war, the court will find that I then became a little bolder, and detached freely and far, in all directions; and it is gratifying to recall, that notwithstanding all the bugbears by which I had been for a moment frightened from my bent, not a disaster—not one defeat ensued. I speak, sir, of detachments *beyond supporting distance*; for all the columns were habitually subdivided, within that limit, in searching for and in attacking the enemy.

The first of those distant detachments was that of 340 men left under Major Cooper, only 12 miles south of the Withlacoochee, and which gallantly maintained itself from the 2d of April till the 18th, when it was absorbed on the return of Clinch's column. Major Cooper commenced a work for defence, but the enemy gave him no leisure to complete it. General Eustis, approaching Tampa, brought his mounted men to that depot; but left his foot, from the 5th of April to the 18th, at *Camp Shelton*, under Brigadier General Bull, sixteen miles in the rear, without even a breastwork for defence. With the same body of foot I myself marched to Fort Alabama, whilst the South Carolina horse, under Colonel Goodwyn, was on the distant service of searching for the enemy about the head of Pease creek. At the same time Colonel Smith, and his Louisiana volunteers, fit for duty, (about 400,) with small parties from the United States ship *Vandalia*, under Lieutenant Powell, and from the revenue cutter *Dallas*, under Captain Green, scoured the lower part of that creek, to the extent of about 60 miles from Charlotte harbor. Colonels Smith and Goodwyn thus visited what we had supposed to be among the favorite haunts and strongholds of the enemy. I, myself, on the 20th of April, with a single company of South Carolina horse, marched from the Big across the Little Withlacoochee. Again, on the 24th, with but two companies, I went to Volusia, a day ahead of Eustis's column; sent a small detachment on the 25th to scour the country east of Spring Garden lake, and personally proceeded, with Colonel Gadsden, Captain Canfield, Lieutenant J. E. Johnston, and 17 men, in a miserable little steamer, to explore the St. John's river to the head of Lake Monroe. General Clinch and Colonel Lindsay also made detachments about the same period; and I had detached Major Read, with the battalion of Floridians, by water, to search the Lower Withlacoochee, as early as the 17th.

As this last expedition was the only one made under my command that failed to reach the destination given, and to accomplish its objects, and for that reason alone has brought upon me infinite obloquy, I beg the court will pardon me for dwelling upon it a moment.

It has been seen by the deposition of Mr. Newcomb, the quartermaster at Tampa in April last, that by extraordinary exertions on his part, and not a little energy on mine, ample and even extra means were provided for Major Read's small battalion of, perhaps, about 200 men. First, there were two large and one smaller schooner; two (instead of one) cutters, (under Midshipmen Reid and Drake,) manned and furnished, at my request, from the United States ship *Vandalia*, Captain Webb; a large scow, in pieces, but with mechanics, nails, oakum, and pitch, so that it might be put together and launched in two

* Doc No. 30.

† Doc. No. 63.

hours; many ship boats or yawls, and pilots. The deponent, an experienced and excellent officer, declares, in respect to the sufficiency of those means, both for transporting the troops to the mouth of the river and for ascending it: "I did not doubt, nor do I know that any body else did; I do not think that Major Read himself doubted, although *he* attempted to find fault with the means."

But let us now see what use was made by the major of the outfit thus furnished. I shall quote his report* to me, which is dated April 27. Being himself near the mouth of the Withlacoochee, he says:

"I despatched all the small craft to the transports, with orders to the officers in command aboard of them to commence debarking the men as fast as possible." * * * * * "On the return of the boats, transporting, as I had ordered, as many men as they could receive, the morning reports of the officers in command were handed me, by which the frightful picture of an increase of forty (40) to the sick list, in less than two days, was presented. Special communications from the surgeons were also handed me, in which the most horrible consequences were predicted, unless the men could be taken *forthwith* to some place where medicines and good water could be procured. The water on board the schooner *Caroline*, it was said, had already become putrid. Without going aboard, I despatched an order for [the transports to] hoist all sail, and to proceed with the utmost possible despatch to St. Mark's, the nearest port. I remanded aboard the transports the detachment first ordered to debark, and directed a select number of *ten* [?] to join me on board the small craft for the purpose of making the *reconnoissance* and surveys, which, I find upon perusing my order more carefully than at first I did, were the principal objects of the expedition." * * * * * "When informed by the pilot that we were almost at the mouth, I went myself into the second cutter of the *Vandalia*—it draws less water than the other—taking with me only two of my detachment." * * * * * "When I had gotten over the bar, I proceeded some two miles and upwards, to within a short distance of a large smoke, the fire that afforded which was perhaps three miles distant. I deemed [it] not prudent to go further, and caused the boat to return"—when the major proceeded to St. Mark's after his battalion.

Here I will not say, Mr. President, why all this fire and haste? But I may ask, sir, whence all this smoke and precipitation? Some parts of the report are doubtless as obscure as others are strange. For example, when the major heard of the new cases of sickness, how many *well* men were left? He does not tell us. The water, too, on board of the *Caroline* had suddenly become putrid, and the medicines deficient. How so? Why not have gone to the transports in order to inquire into those extraordinary matters in person? And was there no good water on board of the other vessels, or in the Withlacoochee—at the furthest, within nine or twelve miles, at the fall? We have seen that there were many well men remaining, ten of whom he retained with him, and sent back others in the boats which had brought them from the transports. Why not have retained all these, and have sent for more to enable him to ascend the river in his smaller vessels, scow, &c.? In that case he might have passed through the "large smoke," and have reached the fall. But the major appeals to his "order," and I shall exhibit both his *instructions and orders*.

By my directions, Colonel Gadsden, on the 14th of April, gives Major Read, in a letter† of instructions, among other matters to be attended to, these: You will embark with "your whole battalion, including invalids and sick, for the mouth of the Withlacoochee; that you come to anchor in the nearest and safest accessible harbor to the mouth of the stream, and that you proceed with your effective force, (leaving your sick and invalids on board,) with the boats at command, to examine its entrance, and to *penetrate as far as practicable*, and consistent with the security of your command," &c. "You will preserve notes of your observations, and report" &c., "detailing minutely the character of the anchorage at the mouth of the Withlacoochee; the navigability of that river for boats; the probable distance to which it may be penetrated; the character of its banks; and the facilities generally afforded for the forming of depots, with a view to supplying an army operating hereafter on or near its waters. This duty performed, you will proceed to St. Mark's, Florida, in the transports, where your command will be honorably discharged," &c.

Mr. De Peyster, a gentleman of Florida, and then a volunteer in General Eustis's staff, has said, before this court, that he was at my quarters the day before (April 16) Major Read embarked, when that officer called on the subject of his expedition. The purport of this witness's answers, as the court will perceive, is, that two days after the written instructions to Major Read, I endeavored, in the most impressive terms and manner, to point out to him the importance of the expedition to ulterior operations; called his attention specifically to the necessity of examining the river and making a sketch or draught of its soundings and course *up to the foot of the obstruction or falls*, believed to be twelve miles; and that I desired Major Read to select a point for a future post, with reference to wood, as near those falls as practicable.

In respect to every object, except the mere entrance into the Withlacoochee, we have seen that the expedition was a signal failure.

The first knowledge that I had of this most unexpected result was received May 1, at St. Augustine, through a letter‡ from Governor Call, dated April 26, and which gave me the more astounding intelligence, viz: "A few days since I received a communication from Major McLemore, stationed on the Suwanee frontier, informing me that, under order from General Scott, he had ascended the Withlacoochee river, and erected a block-house on the south bank, some ten or twelve miles above its mouth, and that he had left a garrison of 40 men in the block-house, and a large quantity of corn and pickled beef. This morning, at daylight, Major Read, of the Florida battalion, arrived at [Tallahassee,] bringing the intelligence that he discovered at the mouth of the river one-half of a large flatboat, which had been cut in two apparently with a dull axe, and by an inexperienced hand. His description corresponds with that given of the boat left at the block-house," &c.

As this letter was addressed to me, or the commanding officer at Fort Drane, like the report§ dated April 11, of the establishment of the block-house, and signed by Major McLemore's adjutant, (McCants,) both papers were read by General Clinch, and together transmitted to me. I have said that I received them on the 1st of May.

The court has seen, Mr. President, the correspondence§ between General Clinch, then at Fort Drane, and myself, on this most painful subject. The time of his volunteers having expired, or being about to expire, he had already sent most of them home, and in his attempt to raise a party of mounted men in the Alachua settlements to go to the relief of the block-house he utterly failed. I early became satisfied that General Clinch, under the circumstances, did all in his power in adopting the second suggestion of Governor Call,

* Doc. No. 134.

† Docs. Nos. 112—113.

‡ Doc. No. 122.

§ Doc. No. 123.

viz: "But should it be impracticable for you to send a sufficient force by land to ascertain [the fate of the party in the block-house,] I have ordered a fortified boat to be in readiness at Suwanee Old Town, to proceed with a part of the men at that place to the relief of the garrison, and transport it back to Old Town, unless the commanding general should otherwise direct. You will therefore be pleased to send an express to Major McCants, commanding at Old Town, and inform him whether troops have been sent by land to the relief of the block-house, or whether the boat which will be in readiness shall be sent on that service." General Clinch sent the order for the boat to proceed, and the detachment in the block-house was ultimately taken off by Major Read, and without firing a gun.

It is in evidence that Major Read's report to me, (of his first expedition,) though dated the 27th of April, came to hand at Columbus as late as the 8th of June, when I had not the leisure to give attention to it even if it had been less illegible; and thus it happened that I never knew its contents until, with some accidental assistance, the judge advocate made out to decipher it before this court. The last paragraph of this report appears to be as follows:

"I discovered, at the mouth of the [Withlacoochee,] the half of a flat-bottom boat—a common ferry flat-boat, it appeared to have been. It had been cut asunder," &c. "When I arrived at St. Mark's, I learned, to my astonishment, mortification, and regret, that your excellency [General Scott] had ordered Major McLemore to establish a depot at that place," &c. "All which was studiously concealed from me. I did not learn, either from your order or from the numerous interviews I had the honor to hold with your excellency, that Major McLemore was even in the field—much less that I was going to relieve a detachment of his command ordered out by your excellency."

The court has seen my report* upon this subject to the adjutant general, dated at St. Augustine, May 11, which was founded on Governor Call's letter noticed above, and an article in a newspaper, handed to me as the production of Major Read. I said that he, Major R., "has, at Tallahassee, caused a statement to be made, declaring that I had refused him permission to ascend the Withlacoochee! And, again, presuming the statement to have been furnished by him, he denies having ever heard that, possibly, he might find a block-house and garrison established near the falls of the river. Now, I affirm that it was generally known, throughout the right wing of the army, that it was just possible that Major McLemore, a highly meritorious Floridian, had made such establishment. The possibility was mentioned to Major Read, and although Colonel Gadsden, by accident, omitted the subject in the letter of instruction, yet, when the major saw half of a flat, rudely cut in two, [so Governor Call had written,] *that* which was extremely doubtful before became a matter of the most perfect certainty; and if the major had been bound home, without other orders, it immediately became his imperious duty to go instantly to the relief of his countrymen. The flat could never have belonged to Indians, and it would not have been destroyed if the garrison had returned by water to the Suwanee, and Major Read knew it could only have returned by water."

Now, sir, I did not say in this, or any other letter, that I had told Major Read anything of a detachment having been permitted to visit the Withlacoochee about the end of March. The court will presently learn *how* it happened to be omitted in Colonel Gadsden's letter to Major Read, and by me in conversation with the latter. Nevertheless, the subject was not forgotten† at headquarters, nor had ceased to be occasionally mentioned among the officers who had come down to Tampa from Fort Drane. One of these, Captain Drane, has testified before this court, that he, at Tampa, stated his impression to Major Read that "there was a detachment of Floridians on the Withlacoochee with provisions"—the witness having heard "at Fort Drane, [and thinks] General Clinch had stated it to [him] that Major McLemore had volunteered his services to go to the mouth of the Withlacoochee."

I do not here, Mr. President, embody this testimony to contradict Major Read, but simply to account for the strong language applied to him in the letter last quoted. Two of the harsher expressions therein contained are here intentionally suppressed. I had not, in May, as has been seen, received this report. I at that time verily believed, on the opinion of others, as well as from internal evidence, that the false assertions of the article in the Tallahassee paper were from his pen or his lips; Governor Call's letter had said not one word as to the causes which led to the failure of the expedition—the spread of sickness among the men; the want of medicines, and the want of good water. Now, sir, although I think that at least two of those causes might have been guarded against by due foresight and activity on the part of the commander, and when reported to him, ought to have been closely scrutinized in person before abandoning the great objects confided to his intelligence and conduct, I am not unwilling to reproduce those harsher imputations, but regret that they were ever made. Sir, up to this day I have received no note or message of any kind from Major Read. My recantation is founded on the recent assurance of a friend (General Clinch) that Major Read had no agency in the published article alluded to, and his previous and subsequent gallantry and good conduct in the same war against the Seminole Indians.

In the deposition of Colonel Gadsden, (which is in evidence,) he gives the history of the block-house on the Withlacoochee thus:

"Major McLemore sought the service by a private letter to the undersigned, stating that he had, on the Suwanee, a boat suitable for the expedition, and supplies which he could bring with him to that point—if with the consent and approbation of General Scott. The following is the reply penned by me and by the direction of the general, to whom it was read before transmitted."

I beg, Mr. President, that the court will again read every word of this letter. I regret that I am too much fatigued to embody it entire in this summary. The perusal of it will show how unnecessary it was deemed at Tampa to call the attention of Major Read specifically to the very remote chance of his finding any detachment on the Withlacoochee. Nevertheless, though it was more than a hundred to one that the detachment was not there as late as the 14th of April, or even the 4th, if the major could have ascended only seven miles higher up that stream—and nobody doubted that he *could* and *would*—he would have found the gallant band still firm in its position.

The letter to Major McLemore is dated at Fort Drane, March 25. Colonel Gadsden begins by giving to the major the outline of my plan of operations; says "the whole army will probably form a junction at or near [the cove] by the 29th or 30th instant. It is impossible at this time to anticipate the ulterior operations of the army after it has encountered and defeated the enemy in their probable stronghold, *in the cove*," &c. "It is more than probable, however, that we may be detained in that vicinity many days, reconnoitring the hammocks, and searching for Indians in the jungles and thickets of that

* Doc. No. 119.

† See Colonel Gadsden's second deposition.

section of country. If so, your co-operation, and the supplies which you report you can bring, may prove of essential service. I am directed, therefore, by the general commanding to say that, after securing the post on the Suwanee with an adequate garrison, you *may* proceed with the remainder of your command in the boat you have prepared for the service, provided, in addition to your own supplies, you can transport from 750 to 1,000 bushels of corn, at least, for the use of the army. Should your boat be properly *secured*, as you report, with *bulwarks*, you may enter the river and ascend to the rapids," &c. "You must be at that point by the 30th instant, or you will, possibly, be *too late* to afford any aid to this wing of the army—the sole motive which sanctions the service to which you have been called." * * * * *

"As your movement is intended to assist, and not to embarrass this wing of the army, you must not move without an adequate supply of ammunition, and from 30 to 40 days' rations for your whole command, at the least, in addition to the corn you may transport for our relief." (He is then requested to bring, if possible, extra "pork or bacon.") "On reaching the point on the Withlacoochee designated, you will use all due precautions to secure your boat and command, by building a block-house or by the construction of some other defence, until you hear from or of the army. If after, however, the 2d or 3d of April, you receive no tidings of or from this wing, under the command of General Clinch, you may be sure that it has proceeded *south*, to unite with Eustis and Lindsay; and, having left the Withlacoochee, your detention on its waters will be no longer necessary. You will, therefore, return without delay to your post on the Suwanee, and there wait the future orders of the commanding general, or those which may be transmitted to you by the executive of Florida."

Colonel Gadsden's deposition adds, in continuation of this history: "It appears, however, from information received from one of the men who was in the block-house, that the detachment did not reach the mouth of the Withlacoochee until the 4th or 5th of April, *two days after it had been ordered to quit it*, and when General Scott" had reached the vicinity of Tampa Bay. "Notwithstanding, however, its fearless commander, and on his own responsibility, penetrated the river, established a block-house, and left it garrisoned, with a promise to return and relieve it in 8 or 10 days. Unfortunately, however, as he entered the Suwanee, he was assailed with a fever, and fell a victim to its effects."

Thus perished, Mr. President, a valuable citizen, whose patriotic zeal, pushed a little too far, has brought upon me, unintentionally, I know not what amount of general odium. This I have long borne in silence; but, sir, the star of truth approaches the zenith, and as it sheds its light over this court and the public the deep shades of calumny are made to disappear.

In relation to the Florida campaign, Mr. President, I have one point more to notice, and I shall have done.

Among the prodigious mass of documents, turned over by the different offices of the War Department, to be read by the judge advocate in evidence against me, as if to crush by their physical weight, if they could not otherwise effect their purpose, there is from the Hon. J. M. White, the Florida delegate in Congress, a letter* dated at Washington, May 28, to the President of the United States, with an indorsement in the hand of the latter, which directs—"A copy of this letter to be sent to General Scott, with an order to withdraw from the command in Florida. A. J."

Of this indorsement I had no knowledge until the original was read in this court. What were the feelings which it excited I will not say; but the association of circumstances recalled to my mind may be inferred from the following:

To my elaborate report of what I had done, and of the operations projected, the adjutant general, May the 5th,† replied:

"Your communication‡ of the 12th of April, reporting the operations of the army in Florida under your command, since your departure from Fort Drane, and your arrival at Tampa Bay, has been submitted to the President, and this day to the Secretary of War. I am happy to inform you that the President approves of your intended plan of operations," &c. "I am desired by the Secretary of War to say that, from the tenor of your report, as well as by the communication he has just received from the governor of Florida, it is probable that, owing to the approaching season of the year, the campaign in the field cannot be much longer vigorously pushed. In this event, you will make a judicious selection of the posts necessary to be occupied by the troops during the interval of active operations, which may be best calculated to protect the frontier inhabitants, and prevent Indian depredations of any kind. For this purpose all the regular troops, including the 4th infantry, must be kept on duty in Florida."

As I had intimated in my letter of April 12 would be done, all this had been attended to before the receipt of the adjutant general's communication, and which is here cited principally to show that, certainly as late as the 5th of May, no *displeasure* had been officially expressed against me at Washington.

But in my report§ of the 11th of May, animadverting upon Major Read, and which, according to a note on the original, (now in evidence,) was received at Washington the 21st—seven days before the date of Mr. White's letter to the President of the United States—there is this paragraph:

"I feel and know the risk I incur by the use of this language. Major Read is the favorite of Governor Call, and his excellency's support may well turn the tables against me at Washington."

Sir, I had seen among the papers which accompanied the instructions given me for the Seminole war a letter|| (in evidence with that document) from General Call to the President of the United States, dated January 9, 1836, in which the writer says:

"I should be highly gratified to command the army, and believe that I could soon bring the war to a close. I fear, however, this I cannot do without injustice to General Clinch. He is a brave and good man; but I fear he is too slow in his movements to conduct a war against the Indians."

With an official copy of this letter in my possession, it may be supposed that I knew my danger. But, sir, I do not complain that, soon after my animadversions on Major Read, he was appointed by the President a brigadier general in the militia of Florida; that a lieutenant colonel of the army, whom I reported in my letter of March 20¶ as having left Fort Drane for duty elsewhere, but went off to Washington, was in a little time rewarded with a colonelcy *not* by seniority; nor that the President's indorsement on Mr. White's letter was soon followed by Governor Call's being "gratified" with the direction of the war in Florida. But, sir, I have, in defence, a right to advert to those extraordinary facts to show that if, in my operations to the south, I had the enemy to conquer in my front, I was, at the same time, not a little insecure in my rear. The effect of such position every soldier will readily comprehend; and I respectfully submit the point to the consideration of this court. A yet more extraordinary fact, of

* Doc. No. 142. † Doc. No. 118. ‡ Doc. No. 103. § Doc. No. 119. || Doc. No. 6. ¶ Doc. No. 94.

the same general character, will be developed in the sequel. But at present I will return to Mr. White's letter to the President of the United States

I think, sir, that I have shown that this letter did not do me all the injury that was intended at the time. But why, sir, is it brought here, with its indorsement, in accusation against me? Mr. White, in a letter* to the President of this court, dated December 13, 1836, says:

"This places me in an attitude that I do not choose to occupy." * * * "Since the publication of that letter, [to the President of the United States,] I have, in the National Intelligencer, over my own name, as an act of justice to General Scott, corrected, upon better information, the complaints which I deemed it my duty, as the representative of the people of Florida, to make against him. I am unwilling that the first letter shall be laid before the court without the second; and, as I have no copy of it with me at present, I take this occasion to say that I am satisfied, upon a full and impartial review of the facts and circumstances connected with the Florida campaign, and upon evidence not then before me, that the failure is not to be attributed to Major General Scott, nor to causes which it was in his power to control or to remove."

This voluntary and unsolicited retraction is manly and noble. In my judgment and feelings it shows the correspondent of the court to be worthy of being called *the honorable* Mr. White by a higher claim than that of mere courtesy. It is true, sir, that in his recantation he excepts what he had originally said of my Order No. 48 on the subject of panics. I know not that this reservation ought to break squares between that gentleman and myself. The order, although there were many apologies for the inhabitants, was founded on information at once full and precise; and, as I said of it in my letter to the Secretary of War, dated June 21, "Besides, I was advised by respectable citizens of Florida to come out with an order in that spirit, as likely to rally the inhabitants, and I have reason to know that the order did good." If good resulted, I am content with the enmities I brought upon myself by the act; for, sir, since the war began to rage in that quarter, there has not been a moment, up to this time, when I would not have made any sacrifice of person to have stopped its ravages. I deeply mourn over the many afflictions the good people of that desolated Territory have experienced; and I freely forgive, as I pray that God may forgive, the injustice of laying those evils, in part, to my account.

II.—DELAY IN OPENING AND PROSECUTING THE CREEK CAMPAIGN.

MR. PRESIDENT: Through much labor and several weeks of indisposition, I have at length reached in this summary the second general head of inquiry directed against me; and here, again, the evidence in my favor is ample and overwhelming. The whole of this I anxiously desire to compress and embody, but fear that my diminished strength will prove unequal to the task. The records, however, are before the court, and on its researches, as well as its intelligence and justice, I confidently rely.

On the 15th of April, Mr. Secretary Cass wrote† to me to say that, as soon as the state of affairs in Florida would permit, he wished me to direct my attention to the Creek Indians, and to adopt such measures as I might "find necessary to preserve or restore tranquillity in that part of the country." By accident this letter was not received before the 20th of May, as is shown by Major Kirby's indorsement.

In the Secretary's next letter,‡ dated May 16, my attention was again strongly called to the Creek country, with power to require troops from Alabama.

From the same source I received a third letter,§ dated the 19th of May, transmitting "for [my] information a copy of a letter [that] day addressed to Brevet Major General Jesup," in which copy it is said: "Should Major General Scott, under the instructions he has heretofore received, proceed to the theatre of operations, he will, of course, be entitled to the command, and you will serve under him."

On the 19th of May it was known at Washington that I was, about the beginning of the month, sick at St. Augustine, and hence the doubt whether I had proceeded to the Creek country. The 19th was two days prior to the receipt of my letter|| of the 11th, animadverting on Major Read, and nine before the date of Mr. White's letter to the President of the United States.

On the 12th of June, a fortnight after I had reached the Chattahoochee, I received another letter¶ from the Acting Secretary, (Mr. Harris,) dated the 1st, and directed to me at Fort Mitchell, in which was enclosed a copy of Mr. White's, without the President's indorsement, and without the slightest allusion to it. After adverting to a previous letter (of May 25) enclosing me a copy of the *full instructions* to Governor Call to assume, in a certain event, the command against the Seminoles, Mr. Harris concludes: "I am instructed to inform you that, under these circumstances, the President deems it unnecessary for you to return to the command in Florida."

Now, on the 20th of May, immediately on the receipt of the letter of the 15th of April, I had charged Brigadier General Eustis with the full command in Florida, and had personally set out for the Creek country.

Behold me then, Mr. President, from the 31st of May to the 6th of July, (the day on which the letter of recall reached me,) in the larger and, at the moment, the more important command, against the Creeks, without having heard that my conduct in Florida, even my letter respecting Major Read, or Mr. White's to the President, had led to the expression of one syllable of official displeasure at Washington. On the contrary, sir, the letter from the adjutant general, (of May the 5th,) written by command of the President, on the receipt of my report from Tampa Bay, contained expressions of decided approbation; and the Secretary's letters of the 16th and 19th, written after the receipt of mine of April 30, reporting that active operations in Florida had terminated for the season, contain nothing but the language of consideration and respect. The elements of discontent, it seems, began to lower and mutter between the 21st** and 28th,†† although I heard them not; but when a celebrated letter reached Mr. Blair the storm thickened, the clouds were rent, and I was struck by the winged bolt on the distant banks of the Chattahoochee. I must not, however, sir, anticipate.

Before leaving St. Augustine, as I reported‡‡ from Savannah, May 22, I "ordered the new musket accoutrements, [about eighteen hundred,] the new arms, [seven hundred and fifty of Hall's patent rifles,] and the new tents, from Picolata and St. Augustine to Georgia, and also some spare fixed ammunition from the former place." The route of these articles was immediately changed, after writing this letter, from Savannah, *via* Augusta, &c.; from Savannah, by the way of Darien, the Altamaha, and Ockmulgee, to Haw-

* Doc. No. 144.

§ Docs. Nos. 158 and 159.

** Date of reception of Gen. S.'s letter of May 11.

† Doc. No. 115.

|| Doc. No. 119.

†† Letter to adjutant general, Doc. No. 160.

‡ Doc. No. 155.

¶ Doc. No. 141.

‡‡ Date of Mr. White's, with the President's indorsement.

kingsville or Macon; distant from Columbus, Hawkinsville about one hundred and ten miles, and Macon about eighty-eight. This change of route was made upon the information of the Hon. Mr. Justice Wayne, and the assurance of the agent of the Navigation Company, then in Savannah, that the Altamaha and Ockmulgee would remain navigable for common, if not for steam, boats many weeks longer, and which assurance, aided by a long succession of showers, was more than verified. The court has seen that the rifles, accoutrements, &c., took this latter route instead of ascending the Savannah river, to Augusta, and thence by land two hundred and twenty miles, to Columbus.

Having transacted other business in Savannah, the court has seen that I was at Augusta on the 25th of May. Here I learned that, by orders from Washington, a large quantity of subsistence had been purchased in Charleston, to be transported thence by land-carriage, *via* Augusta, to Columbus, and immediately directed Lieutenant Dimmock, the quartermaster at Augusta, to write to Charleston to cause that subsistence to go by the way of Darien, for the reasons already mentioned. This letter, however, did not arrive at Charleston in time, which produced, at Augusta, a part of the embarrassment experienced at this place in obtaining wagons.—(See Lieutenant Dimmock's to me, May 29.) Subsequent instructions were given by me in respect to all the other heavy articles which, by orders from Washington, were to take the route from Charleston *via* Augusta.

According to the testimony of Major Kirby, I called, when at Augusta, for a return of property at the United States arsenal near that city; marked upon the return the arms (including the only six-pounder fitted for the field) and ordnance stores which I thought might be wanted, and ordered that the articles so marked should be forwarded to Columbus. The arsenal contained no accoutrements, and few or no cartridges for muskets.—(See Colonel Lindsay's testimony.) It contained, however, several thousands of muskets.

But *this*, sir, was my position in respect to arms: 1. I had already ordered, from Florida, seven hundred and fifty rifles, complete, and eighteen hundred musket accoutrements, because I had learned by recent experience, as is in evidence, that the United States southern arsenals contained neither of those articles, and I wanted them to *make up deficiencies*. 2. I did not know, nor could I tell, until I could see Governor Schley, at Milledgeville, what muskets he might want to arm the troops he had ordered to the Creek country. 3. I confidently relied, as a further resource, should it be necessary, on the United States arsenal at Mount Vernon, from which, by steam, arms, &c., might have been obtained more promptly than by wagons from Augusta; and I had then in my possession, transmitted by the adjutant general, a letter† from Captain Harding to Governor Clay, dated February 8, 1836, which showed that there were, at that date, in the Mount Vernon arsenal, "ten thousand superior new muskets, with buck-shot and ball cartridges, and ten pieces of field artillery completely equipped." 4. I arrived at Milledgeville the 28th of May, when I learned that the State arsenal being deficient in arms, the governor had, the day before, required from the arsenal at Augusta one thousand muskets, &c., which his excellency had thought would be enough to make up deficiencies, even before he knew that I had ordered to Columbus the seven hundred and fifty rifles (mentioned above) for a like purpose.—(See Major Baden's letter‡ to me, dated May 31, enclosing the requisition§ of his excellency, dated the 27th. Major Baden said to me, in that letter: "I have this day turned over to the assistant quartermaster here, for transportation to Columbus, * * * * one thousand muskets," but not the accoutrements, (also required,) because there were none in the arsenal.

Well, sir, I reached Columbus on the 20th of May. Many companies of the Georgia line, ordered out by the governor, had preceded me, and others were coming up daily. It was soon ascertained by Major Kirby, the mustering officer, that the troops had brought with them a smaller number of arms, and those of a more inferior quality, than Governor Schley and myself had expected.—(See the testimony of the major under my 15th question, and the question of the Hon. Colonel Dawson, member of Congress, in answer to my third interrogatory.) The heavy rains which had been falling for a week, and which, by carrying off bridges and rendering bad roads worse, also soon alarmed me on the subject of the thousand muskets coming from Augusta, and the rifles and accoutrements from Hawkinsville. Accordingly, on the 3d of June, I addressed the urgent letter,|| of this date, to Captain Harding, commanding the United States arsenal at Mount Vernon, in which I said:

"On the receipt of this you will lose no time in hiring a steamer of light draught of water, and put on board of her, for this place, four pieces of ordnance—two howitzers and two six-pounders, with harness and implements complete, and at least one hundred and fifty rounds of ammunition (fixed) for each piece. If you have no howitzers, you will send four six-pounders. Let the greater number of rounds of fixed ammunition be grape and canister, with some shells for the howitzers, and some round shot for the six-pounders. Put on board the same boat three thousand *stands* of muskets, complete; but I fear you have no accoutrements. Nevertheless, send the arms, with prickers, primers, &c. Send, further, one hundred thousand rounds of fixed musket buck and ball, and some buck cartridges, and fifty thousand flints. I rely upon your using the utmost despatch," &c.

In his reply,¶ dated June 14, Captain Harding said to me that "the governors of Alabama and Florida have completely exhausted my stock of arms and ammunition," and hence he had sent my requisition to the Baton Rouge arsenal; that "Governor Clay has drawn from this depot the following ordnance and ordnance stores, to wit: four six-pounders, complete; six thousand eight hundred muskets, complete; one hundred and seventy-five thousand buck-shot and ball cartridges; three hundred and seven six-pounder canisters; one hundred and five six-pounder strap-shot; nine thousand seven hundred flints; one thousand four hundred and ninety-two sets of infantry accoutrements; fifty yards of slowmatch; one thousand priming tubes, and one hundred and thirty-three portfires. Of the above, six thousand muskets, the four pieces of ordnance, and a due proportion of other stores, were shipped to Montgomery, and the balance were ordered to Claiborne, for the troops called out by the governor, and to be rendezvoused at Irwinton, Barbour county, in this State. I am at this moment engaged in preparing ammunition, and shipping it to Montgomery, which I shall continue to do until the close of the campaign."

Now, when it is recollected that Montgomery is less than fifty miles from Tuskegee, the headquarters of the Alabama line, the court will *begin* to see by what superior energy and despatch Major General Jesup was enabled, without giving me the least intimation, and against my orders, to commence operations on the 12th of June, and to invert my plan of campaign! At Tuskegee he found the troops in great numbers already assembled, and armed from the United States arsenal, conveniently situated in the rear. But to return to my situation on the Georgia side of the enemy.

* Doc. No. 171.
† Doc. No. 177.

‡ Doc. No. 168.
§ Doc. No. 169.

|| Doc. No. 178.
¶ Doc. No. 179.

I have said that I arrived at Columbus on the 30th of May, accompanied by his excellency Governor Schley, Major General Jesup, Major Kirby, and Captain Parrott; the three latter of the army. I had not with me one staff officer—not even an aide-de-camp—except Paymaster Kirby; but he was, as I have elsewhere said, almost a host within himself, performing in rapid succession the duties of adjutant general, inspector general, quartermaster general, &c.; but even his zeal and abilities had their limits, and I found at Columbus no staff officer, and no depots or stores of any kind. On the latter point, see the testimony of Major Kirby. Everything was still to be collected or created, and organized. No assistance, and no stores of any kind had yet arrived, or was near at hand, by any order issued at Washington.

The instructions for General Jesup I hastily drew up, when already much indisposed. I had left St. Augustine in a convalescent state; but travelling night and day from Augusta, in storms of rain, I had now relapsed.* General Jesup set out for the headquarters of the Alabama line, at Tuskegee, on the 4th, and took with him Captain Parrott.

The Georgia troops continued to arrive at Columbus as late as the 23d of June. Of the regulars, one company (Captain Mouroe's) reached that place on the 14th; Major Lomax's small battalion, that of Major Pierce, and Colonel Henderson's first detachment of United States marines, followed at intervals of two, three, and five days. The remainder of the United States troops came even a little later. And here it is proper to say that not a man was in the field by *my* order. The regulars were all sent from the north by directions from the War and Navy Departments, and the volunteers, mediately, at least, by the governors of their respective States.

Hearing from passengers arriving at Columbus in the public coaches from the east that the wagons loaded with the muskets, &c., sent by Major Baden from the Augusta arsenal, were much delayed by the heavy rains and consequent injury to the road and bridges, I despatched on the 13th June an intelligent volunteer, John Crowell, jr., esq., remarkable for his zeal and energy, to proceed rapidly until he should meet the train, and then to hire extra wagons, distribute the loads, and force the whole to move day and night towards Columbus.—See his report† to me, dated the 16th, and the deposition of Governor Schley, (answer to my 23d interrogatory.)

This train, which Mr. Crowell thought would reach Columbus on the 19th, did not arrive until the night of the 20th. On the 18th, not having heard in several days anything of the approach of the rifles, musket accoutrements, &c., which had been expected at Columbus about the 12th, from Hawkinsville, I instructed an aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Betts, to proceed day and night to meet and to hasten on, by similar means, those articles. After he was in the saddle for this purpose, Major Beard, who had been for some time employed in the quartermaster's department on the Ockmulgee, arrived, and assuring Mr. Betts and myself that he (the major) had placed the Hawkinsville train under a most energetic conductor, I permitted Mr. Betts to dismount. Two steamboat accidents had delayed these arms, &c., coming up from Darien to Hawkinsville; and on the road thence a most extraordinary panic seized the conductor and his wagoners, by which several days more were lost.—(See Mr. Betts's testimony.) The rifles, accoutrements, &c., did not reach Columbus till the 24th or 25th, after I had moved with the whole disposable armed force of Georgia, and the regulars, who had come up. Major Alford's mounted battalion was left to arm itself with a part of the rifles, and to follow; and directions were given for sending down the river the remainder of the rifles, the musket accoutrements, &c., for the use of the troops in advance. Major Alford in a few days overtook the foot, and participated in the operations which ensued.

That every exertion and much foresight had been exhibited by me to obtain the arms, &c., needed to equip the Georgia volunteers as early as possible—say by the 12th, or, at the latest, the 14th of June—is further and conclusively shown by the depositions of Governor Schley, Major General Sanford, and Colonel Dawson, in answer to my 23d, 15th, and 3d interrogatories, propounded to those distinguished individuals, respectively; to whose depositions I particularly invite the attention of this court.

If the question be asked why I did not take the field, say as early as the 15th of June, with the armed portion of the Georgia line and the only company of regulars (Monroe's) that had then arrived, the answers are numerous, but I will only here give two: 1. The want of subsistence for four or more days, none having yet arrived, principally from the same causes which had delayed the arms; and this reason will be more fully developed in the sequel. 2. There were not armed men in sufficient numbers (before the 21st of June, the day when the muskets were distributed, and a movement in force actually commenced on the eastern side of the enemy) even to guard the important points on the Chattahoochee; that is, to prevent parties of Indians from escaping across towards Florida.—(See on this point the decisive replies of Governor Schley to the 22d question, of Major General Sanford to the 5th and 2d, and of Colonel Dawson to the 3d, addressed to them, respectively.) And so important was this object considered by government that the unusual course was adopted of causing Major General Macomb to write to me, with his own hand,‡ June 25, as follows:

"The Secretary deems it very important that a strong force should be stationed so as to prevent the escape of the Creeks in that direction, (towards Florida;) it is, therefore, the order of the Secretary of War that you station a sufficient force so as to prevent them making their escape and taking that direction."§

I apprehend, Mr. President, that it would be difficult to employ language at once more urgent and specific. When I received that letter I flattered myself that I had in hand the emphatic approbation of government; for the measures therein enjoined (originally adopted by his excellency Governor Schley before the Georgia troops had been mustered into the service of the United States) was followed out after I had assumed the command in proportion to the arrival of men *with* arms. O! most simple and short-sighted mortal! Only three days thereafter another letter|| from Major General Macomb, dated June 28, followed:

"Sir: I have received, through the Secretary of War, the order of the President to call you to the seat of government. You will, therefore, on the receipt of this letter, turn over to Brevet Major General Jesup the command of the troops serving against the hostile Creeks, and repair to the city of Washington."

This command, sir, was brief and emphatic, and I felt it, as it was intended, a heavy punishment. No cause was assigned; not the slightest explanation of the grounds of offence intimated. I quietly and courteously obeyed; set out for Washington; wearied myself but little with conjectures, and expressed not one. At Norfolk, as I afterwards found to be the fact, the true cause was very fully mentioned to me.

* See Governor Schley's deposition. † Doc. No. 201. ‡ Doc. No. 255. § Doc. No. 256. || Doc. No. 161.

I repelled the rumor which, however, gained at Baltimore; but on arriving at Washington I saw the treacherous instrument which had stabbed me in the dark, the original letter from Major General Jesup to Mr. Blair, marked "private," and only to be shown to the President of the United States!

Since this deep degradation, and lying prostrate under the ban of Executive displeasure, I have been assailed from several quarters without mercy, and with perfect impunity. I shall cite here but two examples of these petty annoyances, both of which are in evidence, as belonging to this branch of inquiry.

1. General Jesup, at his headquarters in the Creek country, found leisure to write a second letter to Mr. Blair, dated September 3, 1836, and published in the *Globe* on the 26th. This letter* was accompanied by two selected letters from me to General Jesup, and his reply, with ingenious notes. To the trick of the publication, and the false impressions given by it as a whole, I may, perhaps, recur before closing this address.

2. A neat little pamphlet,† pink paper, written in the "Creek country, August 8, 1836." This was evidently gotten up with the assistance of General Jesup, and the use of his official papers, and which ingeniously mixes together misstatements of facts with false principles. Among the latter, the Secretary's order and my measures to prevent the enemy from escaping across the Chattahoochee towards Florida are ridiculed and decried.‡ The joint production of the general and his captain aide-de-camp is, however, only signed by the latter. The road to favor had been already discovered, and the captain was soon rewarded with the rank of colonel.

A word more, sir, in respect to arms prior to the arrival of the muskets on the 20th, and the rifles and accoutrements about the 25th of June.

Major Kirby said to this court that he "mustered into the service of the United States forty-five companies of the Georgia troops, at Columbus, early in June. They were generally entirely destitute of arms and accoutrements. The few arms they had were generally unfit for service in the field."

Soon after this period, it ought to be stated, in justice to Governor Schley, that some wagon-loads of *State arms*, which he had mentioned to me at Milledgeville as being already on the road to Columbus, arrived, which enabled us to arm and despatch several reinforcements to guard the passes of the river below, in the direction of Irwinton. I have no memorandum of the number of these arms, and I can only conjecture that it might have been from 600 to 800, that is, muskets, and with few or no accoutrements. But after those arms were distributed, and as many troops sent below, or put on board armed steamers to cruise up and down the river for the important purposes mentioned in Colonel Dawson's answer to the first interrogatory, and on which duties he was himself placed as a captain, Major General Sanford, in reply to the second interrogatory submitted to him, says:

"Of the troops remaining under my immediate command, less than one-third were armed, and those variously and indifferently. Our miserable deficiency in this respect was strikingly displayed to my view, when, upon the occasion of an alarm, it was expected that the enemy would be upon us in full force, I had the mortification of beholding within my lines 1,500 or 1,600 men with no weapons of defence beyond their side-arms, clubs, and club-axes."

General Sanford's camp was, at this time, four miles in advance of Columbus, on the west side of the river, towards the enemy.

But, Mr. President, there was another and a conclusive reason why it was necessary to wait, at least, as late as the 17th of June, for muskets and rifles, with which to arm the whole of the Georgia line before commencing active operations on the east side of the enemy; for as late as the 17th I had cause to entertain serious doubts whether the Alabama troops would consent to enter the service of the United States; that is, to come under the rules and articles of war.

General Jesup arrived at Tuskegee, the headquarters of the Alabama line, on the 4th of June. On the 8th he wrote to me, in advance of the return to Columbus of his escort, a strange letter,§ containing this sentence: "I have not yet obtained the command of the troops, but if I obtain it all I shall probably enter on duty to-morrow;" and not a word of explanation preceded or followed.

Surprised, in the extreme, at this intimation of a want of zeal and constitutional devotion on the part of the Alabama troops, I eagerly inquired, and caused others to inquire among the intelligent officers of the escort, and several gentlemen who accompanied it as individuals, and the apprehensions excited by the letter were much increased.—(See, on this point, Governor Schley's answer to my 18th interrogatory.) Nay, it appeared to me and many others who knew the circumstances, as *certain*, that the Alabamians had, from the 4th to the 8th of June, refused to come into the service of the United States, or at least under the command of General Jesup, and that they would continue so to refuse was even more than probable.

In this state of apprehension I reported|| the circumstances to the adjutant general June the 12th; adverted to the subject in my report¶ to him of the 14th, and again in my report (by means of the paper** enclosed) of the 17th.

In reference to the doubts so reported, the Secretary of War, in his letter†† of the 20th of June, instructed me, in the name of the President, that if, contrary to the confidence reposed "in the well-known patriotism of the governor and citizens of Alabama," the militia of that State should "not have been mustered into the service of the United States agreeably to the requisition of the department," I was immediately to "stop all expenditures and supplies of every kind whatever on the part of the United States for such militia."

The next letters‡‡ from General Jesup were received by me on the 17th of June, and dated the 15th and 17th. These I acknowledged in a letter§§ to him of the 17th, in which I said: "You had not informed me, you do not even now tell me, that you are in command of the Alabamians." It is true that that fact might, on the 17th, have been inferred; but it was not explicitly stated before his report||| to me dated the 20th.

Hence, Mr. President, the justness and force of Governor Schley's answer to my 22d interrogatory, in which he says: "With the great uncertainty in regard to the course of the Alabama troops, and the situation of General Jesup, I considered it all-important that the whole of the Georgia troops should be prepared to take the field." And, sir, it has been shown that the *muskets* arrived on the night of the 20th were distributed on the 21st of June, and a general movement immediately commenced.

* Doc. No. 265.

† Doc. No. 263.

‡ Yet, before it was known that I would be able to go to the Creek country, the Secretary of War, May 23, (Doc. No. 161.) had strongly directed General Jesup to take measures at "the commencement of operations" to "station a sufficient force to prevent the retreat of the Creek Indians into Florida, and also to cut off all communication between them and the Seminole Indians." Connect this with the letter of June 25 (Doc. No. 255) to me, just noticed, on the same subject!

§ Doc. No. 189.

|| Doc. No. 194.

¶ Doc. No. 199.

** Doc. No. 204.

†† Doc. No. 225.

‡‡ Docs. Nos. 206 and 207.

§§ Doc. No. 208.

||| Doc. No. 216.

I have thus, incidentally, shown that I was without any letter from General Jesup after that of the 8th until the 17th of June, when his two letters of the 15th and 17th were received. Whence this long silence, Mr. President. In his *report** of the 20th—the first paper sent by him to me deserving of that name—he said:

“I was not aware, until yesterday, that a letter which I wrote to you on the 9th instant had not been sent to you. It was accidentally put up with a bundle of papers, and I found it only yesterday morning, and from no notice having been taken of my letter of the 12th, I fear it has not been received. It was sent by a runner. I enclose a copy† of it.”

Sir, I am sorry to say that this account of the letter of the 9th is strange, if not altogether improbable; and, I think, for reasons which will appear in the sequel, that it is even doubtful whether the letter of the 12th was ever confided to an Indian runner. Perhaps, on further search, it has been found, like its predecessor, retained among his own papers. And, as the point is far otherwise than trivial, I will here quote, to strengthen my conjectures, what the same writer found himself compelled to say in similar cases to a higher functionary.

From Tuskegee, Alabama, August 2, 1836, General Jesup writes‡ to Governor Schley: “Knowing that I had written to you in reply to your communications, I was surprised when I received a copy of a letter you wrote to the President, in which you declare that I treated with ‘*silent contempt*’ the reasonable request of the governor of Georgia.” I examined my letter-book, and found my letters to you recorded in their proper places.” &c. “I felt indignant that a charge so entirely unfounded, as I then thought, should have been made; but am now induced to believe that by some oversight or omission my letters, or at least one of them, had not been sent to you.” He adds that an officer, late of his staff, “left Fort Mitchell for Washington city on the 1st of July. In looking over a file of papers put up by him the morning he left, and not opened since until last night, I found the enclosed letter. The indorsement is in his own hand, and I think it probable that it was put upon file in place of being sent to you.”

August 28.—The same‡ to the same. “I received your letter of the 15th instant, at the moment of setting out for,” &c. “I was detained longer than I expected, and only returned this morning. Your letter of the 30th of June was not answered; but the omission was inadvertent, not intentional. I had forgotten that letter until I received yours of the 15th.”

Now, sir, I will ask, what credit is to be attached to the declarations of one, upon a subject like the present, who has shown himself so forgetful, and of habits so irregular.

But, bad as was his memory, and disrespectful as were his practices, in matters of imperious duty, towards the chief magistrate of Georgia and myself, it is in evidence, sir, that, when the object was either to give effect to malignity, or to emblazon his own judgment and prowess, General Jesup never forgot, and always had the leisure, to address the President of the United States through Mr. Blair, or the less effective channel—the Secretary of War. See his two letters to “Francis P. Blair, esq.,” dated, respectively, June 20 and September 3, 1836, and his three official communications,|| addressed to the Secretary of War, dated, respectively, the 10th, 11th, and 25th of June, 1836.

These five extraordinary productions, for they may be respectively denominated—the first two mentioned, *private-official*, and the last three, *official-private*, call for a few specific remarks:

1. The whole are highly laudatory of the writer, Major General Jesup himself, to a degree which might have palled upon the palate of his correspondents, but for the equal and happy admixture of censure of me.

2. The two private-official letters have both been printed in *The Globe*¶ newspaper—the first with the President’s indorsement, but without the initial and most sinister word (*Private*) on the face of the letter. Public rumor, without the least agency of mine, and which, indeed, was rife in Washington, Baltimore, and Norfolk, whilst I was yet far to the south, without suspicion or without knowledge of the matter, ultimately forced out this production, but not in all its deformity, for it was mutilated in *The Globe* of that word which gave character to all the others.

3. The letter** of the 3d of September was expressly written in support of that†† of the 20th of June, and accompanied by official documents, with notes; all professedly furnished by General Jesup for publication. As the best evidence, Mr. Blair was summoned as a witness to establish that fact. At first he informed the judge advocate that he would attend on a given day; but, afterwards, wrote to that officer that he would prefer that his testimony should be taken by deposition in Washington. I immediately drew up the interrogatories, which were duly transmitted by the judge advocate. Ample time had elapsed when I was last in court, and no answers having been received, the printed communication and Mr. Blair’s letter‡‡ to the judge advocate, were offered by me, and received in evidence. One important object I had in view remains, however, unaccomplished. *The Globe*, under the editorial head, speaking of my official reports made in the field, said August 8, 1836: “Some were sent to us for publication, as we understood, at his (General Scott’s) instance.” Now, as I knew this was not so, I had uniformly denied the charge, which, moreover, if true, would have rendered me justly obnoxious to the censure of this court, under the instructions given to it by the President of the United States. One of my interrogatories requested Mr. Blair to inquire into the grounds of that *understanding*, and to favor me with his answer. (The deposition of Mr. Blair has but just arrived, and I have but a moment to say so here. If time permitted, it would receive a more particular notice. It shows that he was mistaken in my having requested the publication of my official reports at Washington.)

4. The three letters to Mr. Secretary Cass were given in evidence by the judge advocate. They had never been published, nor had I heard of them until they were read in court. Whether the writer was ever rebuked by that functionary, may be more than doubted. They were certainly not sent back as, at least, they ought to have been, or they would not now have been here. I have denominated them *official-private*; for, sir, it is evident to me that, when severally written, they were, like the celebrated letter to Mr. Blair, of the 20th of June, intended by General Jesup only for particular eyes. Thanks to the Chief Magistrate, he made one official by his indorsement, and thanks to the justice and manliness of Mr. Secretary Butler, the other three were not retained in the secret pigeon-holes of the War Office. And what is the character of these so long held *official-private* documents? That it is now my purpose to expose.

* Doc. No. 216.

† Doc. No. 217.

‡ Letter annexed to the deposition of his excellency, Doc. No. 267.

§ Annexed to Governor Schley’s deposition, Doc. No. 265.

|| Documents Nos. 190, 191, and 210.

¶ Of July 29 and September 26, 1836.

** Doc. No. 265.

†† Doc. No. 214.

‡‡ Docs. Nos. 264 and 265.

It has been seen that General Jesup says he wrote to me on the 9th of June; put the letter in a bundle, and forgot it. No wonder. His vanity was too much flattered with the honor of writing to Mr Secretary Cass for the eye of the President, to think of me, who was charged at the moment with the general direction of the war. On the 10th he made a report to the Secretary, overlooking, as he did me, the adjutant general and the general-in-chief. The next day he made another report to the same functionary. In the first, he says that he has "about 900 volunteers and militia," and "about 200 friendly Indian warriors;" "I shall move to-morrow or the next day, at the furthest, against the hostile Indians;" that he expected "to be joined by 500 mounted men," "and by 200 Indian warriors, and I hope to strike the enemy in five days." Not an allusion is made to me or to the instructions I had given him in this report.

On the 11th, from the same place, Tuskegee, he makes the second report to Mr. Secretary Cass. He says that he has been delayed. "I shall move forward to-morrow, however, and occupy a position on the Fort Mitchell road about twenty-eight miles in advance, and there wait the arrival of the Indian warriors under," &c., "or, if I can find the enemy without Indian guides, attack him immediately."

Now, not a word is said in either of these reports of his having commenced operations "for the purpose of staying the tomahawk and scalping-knife, and of preventing the devastation of entire settlements or neighborhoods on the frontier;" nothing of his having "none of that courage that would enable [him] to remain inactive when women and children are daily falling beneath the blows of the savage." These were flourishes which occurred subsequently—not until I rebuked him for violating my orders; moving prematurely and without notice to me, and for operating on a line which inverted the plan of operations agreed upon between us. From his two reports to the Secretary it is plain that none of those devastations and horrors were then going on. The frontier settlements of Alabama had been tranquillized and rendered secure before his arrival at Tuskegee, and every white inhabitant within the enemy's country, who was at all exposed, had been murdered, or had escaped at the commencement of hostilities.—(See General Sanford's answer to my sixth interrogatory. It is conclusive on this point, for nobody better knew the Creek country.) No, sir; General Jesup commenced operations on the 12th without the crying necessity afterwards invented; without "the altered circumstances of the country" from the date of my instructions, (June 1,) which he alleges in his letter to me of the 17th. He says not a word of the kind in his two formal reports to the Secretary of the 10th and 11th; but, on the contrary, suppressing all allusion to my instructions, shows himself in haste to take the war into his own hands; and the court will recollect how it happened, no thanks to his foresight and activity, that he found the Alabamians amply provided with arms and ammunition.

The court has also seen, by the deposition of Governor Schley under my 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th interrogatories, and the answers of Major Kirby to my 3d, 4th, and 5th questions before this court, that General Jesup not only fully concurred* in my plan of campaign against the Creeks without suggesting a modification, but claimed to have had the same plan in view before he knew what had been my thoughts on the subject; and that I steadily adhered to that plan, in all its outlines and details, until it was inverted or broken in upon by the isolated and unexpected movement of that general. The plan and its details so shamelessly denounced with my Florida operations in his first letter to Mr. Blair will appear in the sequel.

In my instructions† to General Jesup dated June 1, founded on the views so fully and frequently developed in conversations with him, I directed that he should repair to the headquarters of the governor of Alabama, understood to be either at Montgomery or Tuskegee, in order that the former by an interview with the latter might charge himself with the command of the Alabamians and the direction of the war on that side of the enemy. His first step after the interview was to cause the volunteers already called out in sufficient numbers, as we knew, to be mustered into the service of the United States, if the enemy allowed time for that essential measure.

"His excellency the governor of Alabama [I said in continuation] has proposed in a letter that you have seen [to the commanding officer of the Georgia militia who might be at Columbus] to commence vigorous operations against the enemy as early as the 5th instant. You have seen my reply to that letter, and are well acquainted with all the considerations which have induced me to propose a postponement to the 15th. In the meantime, however, and before the regulars and all the forces of Georgia shall arrive, I think something very advantageous may be safely attempted from a point at or below Irwinton, and operating *up* the country." (The court has seen that I then had expectations of receiving at Columbus the arms, &c., ordered by the 12th or 14th. My letter to General Jesup continues:) "I shall wish you, therefore, as soon as you are in command, to send as many of the Alabamians as can be safely spared from other great objects [evidently the defence of the Alabama frontier settlements] to co-operate with any surplus troops of Georgia that we may have for the field after guarding the important points on this river, [the Chattahoochee.] What that surplus may be at the end of (say) eight or ten days I cannot speak with confidence; but, from the expectations of his excellency Governor Schley, I think we shall by that time be able to send to that point from 1,000 to 1,300 men, including horse and foot. With this force, and a little addition to that which Governor Clay, as you have seen, proposes to send to Irwinton, and some four or five companies of regulars which may be here in time, I think we may clear the lower part of this river, that is to say, the whole of Barbour county, of the enemy by the 17th instant, and before the arrival of the last of the regulars expected from the north. By that time all our forces on this side will be up and ready to be thrown across this river for vigorous co-operation; and as we advance up the country a portion of the volunteers guarding the river may be crossed over and united with the pursuing army." The regulars were, however, many of them, unavoidably behind this calculation from four to seven days. The letter concludes: "You will take care to communicate to me fully from time to time your means, your movements, and your plans, and you will hear from me frequently."

Yet the court has seen that after the receipt of the enigmatical and alarming letter of June 8 I did not again hear from General Jesup till the 17th, when he reported himself to be within fourteen miles of Fort Mitchell!

Sir, he not only did not report to me himself until long afterwards any of the important facts which he so fully disclosed to the Secretary of War, as we have seen, but his presence in all probability prevented his excellency Governor Clay, then at Tuskegee, from acknowledging my two letters of May 31, as I now certainly know it prevented any reply to a letter of the same date and tenor from Governor Schley. This fact is established by the answer of the latter to my 15th and 16th interrogatories, in which it is said that Governor Clay replied to another letter written by the deponent many weeks subsequently, "that the

* Deposition of Colonel Kenan also.

† Doc. No. 176.

management of the war had then devolved on Generals Scott and Jesup, which seemed to render any further correspondence between us [the two governors] upon that subject unnecessary." Yet a reply to either the letter of Governor Schley or to the two from me would, under the mysterious silence of General Jesup, have much diminished my embarrassment at the time.

In General Jesup's second report, dated the 11th of June, to the Secretary of War, he says: "I have no means of communicating directly with General Scott. This circumstance inclines me to strike a blow at once, though there is some hazard in it. General Scott, when I left him, expected to be ready to move by the 15th."

Why, sir, had he no direct means of communicating with me? His letter of the 8th came to Fort Mitchell by an Indian runner. He might have sent his communication of the 9th (if not mistaken as to having written it) by the return of his escort, or another Indian runner. My letters to him of the 10th, 16th, &c., were sent by single Indians, and he had a large body of friendly Indian warriors with him. I early caused Captain Page, who was at the time charged with the Indian department, and the transmission, by Indian runners, of my letters to General Jesup, to be summoned here; but the judge advocate informs me that the captain is detained at the south by illness. General Jesup has, however, nowhere remarked the non-reception of one of my letters of this period.

My second letter to him was dated the 10th, alluded to in the third (16th of June) by mistake, as if dated the 12th. In this letter (of the 10th) I said:

"We shall be much delayed in taking the field, on this side, by the non-arrival of our most essential supplies—rifles, muskets, musket accoutrements, ammunition, &c. I had expected these, with subsistence stores, to begin to arrive here from the Ockmulgee by the 7th instant; but here is a letter* from the agent, Mr. Beard, dated at Hawkinsville the 5th, in which he reports that nothing had reached that place. He immediately despatched a boat to Darien to make inquiries, to hasten, &c. We have now on the Chattahoochee about 3,000 Georgians, most of them remarkably fine men. Of the whole number, however, not a third have sufficient arms, and a still smaller number good accoutrements. It will, therefore, be impossible to arm and equip the remaining two-thirds without the muskets, the Hall's rifles, and musket accoutrements, expected by the Ockmulgee. From the foregoing it will be seen that it is impossible for the Georgians to commence operations from the neighborhood of Irwinton, say in eight or ten days, nor even then, unless the arms and accoutrements should have arrived. I have not had a line from Governor Clay," &c. "We have more than doubled the force placed in the lower counties of Georgia to prevent the Creeks from escaping to the Seminoles."

In my third letter† to General Jesup, dated June 16, after telling him (as in my second letter, in order that his own movements might not be precipitated) of the arms, &c., having been heard from, and that they might be expected in a few days, I say: "At present, of the 2,200 men Major General Sanford has in his camp, (on the other side of the river,) only about 400 are armed, (and these but indifferently.‡) All the other armed men have been detached below to guard the river, and which, as yet, from the want of men, (armed,) is but very imperfectly guarded." I then advert to the mysteries and omissions of his letter of the 8th. After animadverting on several, my letter proceeds:

"You further tell me that 'if a movement be determined on, I will send you information of it by a runner.' A movement to be determined on by whom?—the Alabama commanders, or those in conjunction with yourself? Either you were placed in command or you have not been. In the first case, you would certainly determine on no scheme of offensive operations without my previous concurrence and readiness to co-operate; yet, without receiving any runner from you, or communication of any kind since the 8th instant, a passenger in the stage by the upper route,§ just arrived here, reports that you, at the head of about 3,000 Alabamians and 1,000 friendly Indians, were about to march upon Neomico's band, and to commence offensive operations on a grand scale! I have no doubt there is a gross mistake in this report. You may, perhaps, have been about to make some defensive movement or operation to clear a frontier settlement of a portion of the enemy, but I will not believe that you have declared your independence of my authority."

The court will here be pleased to remark that I was until very recently ignorant of the fact that General Jesup, though silent towards me, had been quite communicative, against all regulations and decent usages of the army, to the Secretary of War.

My letter to him of the 16th continues: "It is certain that Brigadier General Moore, of Alabama, has commenced a course of offensive operations from Irwinton up the country. From this fact (alone) I have rather inferred that you have not even yet been invested with the command of the Alabamians, or you certainly would have stopped his premature and isolated movement.|| These doubts and conjectures, in the absence of all direct intelligence from you, are sufficiently harassing."

"I mean to be explicit and precise on my part. I desire you instantly to stop all offensive movements (if you are in command) on the part of the Alabamians, until the Georgians are ready to act, say on the 21st instant, when the greater number of them will be armed and ready for the field. By that time, too, there will be on the frontier the greater part of the regulars and marines ordered from the north. On that day, if the movements of General Moore shall not render a modification of my plan necessary, I shall begin to assemble the troops on this side of the nation, somewhere in the neighborhood of Irwinton, and operate up the country. It is my desire that you meet me about that time and place, and that you bring with you any disposable force you conveniently can, or that you hold the whole of the Alabamians in defensive positions on the frontier settlements till I shall bring the war into their neighborhood, when you can come into the general line of operations with me."

June 17.—I addressed a fourth letter¶ to General Jesup, of which the following are extracts:

"Sir: I have this moment received your two letters of the 15th and 17th instant."

"I am infinitely astonished and distressed to hear of your near approach, and in a starving condition, to Fort Mitchell. You knew that your forces were not wanted there; you knew that no supplies could reach Irwinton from New Orleans earlier than the 21st instant, if so soon; and you knew, by my letter of the 10th, that nothing had arrived as high as Hawkinsville upon the Ockmulgee, and consequently nothing could have reached this place by the present date from that river. I ought also to add that you knew when you left here that the troops, daily increasing, were living from hand to mouth on the precarious supplies of the neighborhood. Under these circumstances, imagine my astonishment to learn that, instead

* Doc. No. 186. † Doc. No. 204. ‡ See General Sanford's deposition. § Why not a letter to me by that?

|| From General Jesup's letter to me, (Doc. No. 217,) dated June 12, and suppressed till the 20th, it would appear that General Moore's movement was part of General Jesup's combined operations. ¶ Doc. No. 208.

of marching the disposable force of Alabama upon Irwinton, with subsistence for at least ten or five days in advance, to hear that you have come through the heart of the Indian country seeking private adventures, which, if successful, could hardly have advanced the war, and against my known plan of operations, to Fort Mitchell, forty-five miles out of position. It is precisely General Gaines's movement upon Fort King, where there was no subsistence, and there is none, as you ought to have known, at Fort Mitchell. My grief and distress are at their utmost height. This strange movement you have made without giving me the slightest notice. You had not informed me, you do not even *now* tell me, that you are in command of the Alabamians, and your last letter stated that it was doubtful whether you ever would be invested with that command. All this is infinitely strange, and was the last thing in the world that was to be expected from *you*."

The letter concluded with these words: "Though in grief, I still remain yours, with great regard."

General Jesup has given this letter, with notes of his own upon it, as part of his communication,* to Mr. Blair, printed in *The Globe* September 26, 1836. In one of those notes he says, to discredit my describing him to be approaching Fort Mitchell "in a starving condition," that at the time "he had subsistence for the troops under his command to the 22d of June."

Now, in his letter† of the 15th, written from the interior of the enemy's country, he had said to me: "I find it impossible to obtain either corn or subsistence here. The hostile Indians have destroyed all that they have not taken away." Same letter: "June 16.—I am now at the Big Spring, within fourteen miles of Fort Mitchell." "I have to request that provisions and corn be sent to Fort Mitchell. I have only five days' rations, and *not a grain of corn*." "I shall probably be compelled to fall back on Fort Mitchell, or to a position near to it. I hope to receive orders from you at that place, to which, if I do not go myself, I shall send wagons for subsistence." And in his note‡ of me of the 17th, received with the letter of the 15th-16th, he says: "I find that we have less than two days' rations in addition to two days' rations in the hands of the men. Whether successful or not against Ne-o-ee-martla, I shall be compelled to go to Fort Mitchell. *Can you give us provisions and corn there? By all means do so.*"

Here, then, Mr. President, is a great general who takes the field against the orders and without the knowledge of his commander; puts himself on a wrong line of operations, without plan or object, without the assured means of subsistence; and when out but from three to five days breaks silence only to call for help, and in piteous accents declares that, whether successful or not, he will be obliged to fall back! We may now see why these letters were not given to *The Globe*; they would have supported every assertion of mine, so indecently contradicted in the printed notes. Take this as a second example: General Jesup says that when he arrived at Fort Mitchell "he found in the neighborhood several thousand bushels of corn which he had directed Captain Page to secure early in June." If so, why the urgent entreaty that I would send provisions and corn there? I again regret the absence, by sickness, of Captain Page. My accuser adds in the same place: "If General Scott was not acquainted with the resources at his command, it was not the fault of General Jesup." This sneer is happy enough; but, unluckily for its author, I myself gave him, in my letter§ of the 19th of June, the first information he had probably ever received, of that *corn*!

In the same printed notes General Jesup says, when he "arrived at Fort Mitchell, on the night of the 18 h June, he found a steamboat with 70,000 rations which he had ordered from New Orleans before he had left Washington city." How exclusive in his foresight! Again: "he expected the arrival of steamboats, with supplies, at Columbus, by the 15th of June."

The court will here please to refer to my letter|| written at Augusta May 26, and repeated¶ from Milledgeville the 28th, addressed jointly to the quartermaster and commissary at New Orleans, and then turn to the testimony of Major Kirby. From the letter it will be seen that, upon a calculation made by General Jesup and myself, we both thought that his letter from Washington and mine from Augusta on the same subject would very probably reach New Orleans together. And, according to Major Kirby's letter** to General Irwin, dated June 2, it was thought the first supplies could not arrive from that city before the 18th or 19th. General Jesup, therefore, could *not* have expected those "supplies at Columbus by the 15th of June;" and he knows, in fact, as I several times told him in my letters, that we both thought it would be fortunate if they arrived by the 21st or 22d. By great good luck, however, the first steamboat did actually arrive at Fort Mitchell on the 18th or 19th of June, whereby the whole army was saved from the misfortune which General Jesup's false movement would otherwise have occasioned, viz: of being reduced to half or third rations for many days.—(See, on this point, the testimony of Major Kirby, Lieutenant Waite, and Lieutenant Betts; also the deposition of Major Huson.)

In all this time, Mr. President, from the 9th of June, when he entered on duty at Tuskegee, to the 17th, it had never once occurred to General Jesup that his march from the frontier settlements of Alabama, upon Fort Mitchell, at the opposite side of the Creek country, had been intended to protect the women and children, whom he had left far behind, against the uplifted tomahawk and scalping-knife; or that he had none of that courage that would enable him to look on such scenes. No, sir; "devastations of entire settlements," as well as women and children, the tomahawk and scalping-knife, are entirely omitted in all his letters; the two to the Secretary of War, dated the 10th and 11th of June; the one to me of the 8th; the copy of that dated the 12th,†† but handed to me by his aide-de-camp on the 21st; and his two other letters to me, dated the 15th-16th and the morning of the 17th. But after he had, to anticipate me, taken the war out of my hands, and found himself "compelled to fall back on Fort Mitchell" for corn and subsistence; when, in short, he had, late on the 17th, received my letter of the day before quoted in great part above, then, and *not* till then, did those moving topics occur to him, in the use of which he has been as happy as in the invention. See his second letter‡‡ to me, dated the 17th of June, in which those weapons are powerfully wielded both for defence and offence, and which letter closes his communication in *The Globe* of the 26th of September. But powerful as that letter may seem, he did not dare to include my reply§§ to it, dated the 19th, and which, in all fairness, ought to have been published at the same time. This the court will perceive from the following extract:

"On my return to Columbus late last evening, I received your second¶¶ of the 17th instant. This is fully as strange as any of your previous communications. In it you repeat nothing of your previous intention of marching upon Fort Mitchell; but you take care to insert two or three topics which would furnish a good basis for a popular appeal against the hardship imposed upon you of undertaking no system of offensive operations without my previous concurrence and readiness to act in concert with you.

*Doc. No. 206.

†Doc. No. 265.

‡Doc. No. 207.

§Doc. No. 212.

||Doc. No. 166.

¶Doc. No. 170.

**Doc. No. 181.

††Doc. No. 217.

‡‡Doc. No. 210.

§§Doc. No. 212.

It would seem to be for this purpose—I can imagine no other—that you tell me that your operations have been ‘commenced and have been continued for the purpose of staying the tomahawk and the scalping-knife, and preventing the devastation of entire settlements or neighborhoods on the frontier.’ Nothing certainly could have been more meritorious. The *direct* protection of the Alabama settlements was within your competency, and, indeed, among your paramount duties. But why commence a grand system of offensive operations which has brought you out on this side of the Creek nation at a point where I did not want you, without giving me the slightest intimation that you were about to commence, and, of course, without waiting for my approbation and co-operation? To have waited for such co-operation, and to have given me notice of your intended movements, were, allow me to say, *also* among your paramount duties.

“Your next popular flourish is in these words: ‘I have none of that courage that would enable me to remain inactive when women and children are daily falling beneath the blows of the savage.’ I certainly believe that you have not, and there was not the slightest objection in any quarter to your protecting the women and children of the frontier, with the defence of which you were directly charged. Again, nothing could have been more praiseworthy; but how does this excuse your leaving those women and children, and, instead of marching upon Irwinton, where you were required—marching in hostile array, seeking battles, upon Fort Mitchell, where you were neither expected nor wanted?”

“On the subject of the Alabama frontier settlements, I am happy to learn by your letter that you made such arrangements for their safety as to leave you assured on that point.

“The last dead point you make, as if it were for future use against me, is this: ‘I would have struck the enemy to-night, but for your letter;’* if he is not struck to-morrow morning, he will escape for the present; but the force I have in the field is sufficient to pursue and to reduce him.’ Here I am made to deprive you and the country of a great imaginary victory. I say imaginary, for I am inclined to think that you are, on this occasion, a little too sanguine in your calculations. But the true answer is this: Who gave you authority to roam at pleasure through the Creek nation, at the head of the Alabamians and a body of friendly Indians, without giving notice to and without concert with the Georgians and regulars, brought to this frontier for the same war, and at an enormous expense to the government? Besides, from the position [now] occupied by you, you are forced to operate *down* the country, instead of getting below the enemy and operating *up*. This precisely inverts what you knew to be my plan of campaign—a plan fully developed in conversation with you, and to which you did not in the least object, although you were invited to discuss it freely!”

Here, sir, it will be seen that I distinctly predicted that General Jesup’s second letter of the 17th, assuming new and unfounded reasons for his false and unauthorized movements, was intended much more for the public than his immediate commander. Hence those topics of appeal, and hence its appearance in his communication to *The Globe*, without my reply.

The court has also seen in that reply that I discredited the idle vaunt that he would have struck the enemy a fatal blow on the 17th or 18th, but for my letter of the 16th. Now, sir, it is distinctly in evidence, notwithstanding that gasconade, that he not only disobeyed my orders, but, in the attempt to strike the blow, egregiously failed! See his third *official-private* letter, † addressed to Mr. Secretary Cass, dated June 25, and which so unexpectedly has been brought within my knowledge. It was on this, and the circumstances connected with the point, that I principally wanted the testimony of General Woodward. ‡ My 14th interrogatory to Governor Schley relates to the same matters.

I have given above extracts of my letter to General Jesup of the 19th of June. The following is a continuation of the same communication :

“Whilst writing the above I received your letter§ of this date, written at Fort Mitchell. You charge me with harshness. I have certainly in previous letters complained heavily of you as in the beginning of this, and have in every instance, I think, given the grounds of those complaints. The facts stated by me, I think, bear the construction that I have placed upon them, and I have infinitely regretted the existence of those facts.

“You are mistaken in supposing that I upbraid you for asking for small supplies of rations and forage for your troops. I *regretted* the scarcity of our resources in such supplies, and apprehended a scarcity bordering on starvation for a few days. Fortunately, 80,000 rations have arrived at Fort Mitchell, (and about 20,000 here,) which yesterday were not expected earlier than the 22d, perhaps the 23d instant, and I am confident that, when here, we both by calculation did not expect anything from New Orleans before the 21st or 22d. I am rejoiced as much on your account as my own that we both have an abundant supply of rations for the present, and we know that 150,000 more will soon follow.” * * * * *

“General, (in haste,) I have not intended to say anything to *injure* you. I have shown in strong terms the construction I had a right to place upon your acts and letters. This I know may appear harsh. But, on the other hand, allow me to say that I have the greatest and an undiminished confidence in your honor, your intelligence, gallantry, and capacity for war. You use the word *friendship*: I have cherished for you for more than twenty-two years a warm and sincere affection, which I would not part with on any consideration. It has been a little shaken since I saw you; but one expression of your letter goes far to recall it. I think you have not been attentive to my plans and instructions. In this I certainly think that you have erred, and also in your failure to report fully to me. Throwing for a moment seniority aside, I ask it of your ancient connexion with me to be more careful in those particulars in future. It will give me sincere delight to put down this war with you, and to give you all the fame which I know you are so capable of winning.”

The letters between General Jesup and myself were duly, from time to time, enclosed by me to the adjutant general for the information of government. In writing|| to the latter on the 21st of June, I enclosed General Jesup’s letter to me of the 19th, and the above reply of the same date, and said to the adjutant general :

“With respect to this distinguished officer (General Jesup) I have every motive in the world, public and private, to act in perfect harmony. All my ancient affection for him is fast returning. I hope it will be entirely restored in a day or two—that is, as soon as I shall learn that he conforms himself to my plans and instructions.”

Having subsequently received General Jesup’s report, ¶ dated the 20th, giving his operations and motives from the 12th to that date, with several other official letters (in evidence;) having, as I passed down the country on the evening of the 23d, met and conversed with him on the subject; confiding in

* June 16, quoted above, Doc. No. 204.
§ Doc. No. 211.

† Doc. No. 240.
|| Doc. No. 209.

‡ See his letter to the judge advocate, Doc. No. 266.
¶ Doc. No. 216.

the facts and motives alleged by him on the several occasions, and being absolutely ignorant then and long afterwards of his letters to Mr. Secretary Cass; and, above all, the dastardly attack through Mr. Editor Blair,* in the since notorious letter of the 20th, the court may imagine how, with my reviving feelings of kindness, I was led to write the voluntary apology† for General Jesup's conduct, dated the 23d of June, and addressed to the adjutant general. In this letter I requested that such of my reports as had animadverted on General Jesup might be returned to me, on the ground that *as we were again friends, no trace might remain on record to show that we had ever been otherwise.* He had met and rode some miles with me that evening. As he entered my room, I finished the letter, handed it to him before I had read it myself, and it was instantly recorded by an aide-de-camp in my letter-book. I did *not* tell him "on the morning of the 24th," as he writes to Mr. Blair, September 3, that I "would ask to withdraw" the letters, &c. The request, and my reasons for it, he had seen the night before. With the letter in his hands, he intimated an objection to the word *explanations* offered by him; but on an admonition, on my part, full of firmness and kindness, he read the letter through, and expressed himself gratified with it. Why, sir, did he not tell me of, or instantly take measures to counteract his assassin-like letter, then so recently written to Mr. Blair, and which, beyond all doubt, he despatched after the receipt of mine of the 19th?

A miserable apology is attempted by General Jesup, for addressing the President of the United States on official matters, through the secret channel of Mr. Blair, in the printed sheet‡ or pamphlet, (before noticed,) signed by General Jesup's aide-de-camp. In this joint production it is said: "The official channel of communication was through General Scott. To make the application through him would have been indelicate," &c. But where was the convenient channel through Mr. Secretary Cass, which General Jesup had twice adopted, (on the 10th and 11th of June,) before the letter of the 20th to Mr. Blair, and once afterwards, the 25th of June, on *other* military subjects? § Have those acts of direct insubordination towards me been ever rebuked? It is to be presumed *not*, sir, or those letters would not have been found in the same department in the time of Mr. Secretary Butler.

The truth is, Mr. President, General Jesup left Washington on the 22d of May,|| the day after the receipt of my letter respecting Major Read; and aware of the displeasure which that letter had brought upon me, he believed himself at liberty to defy my authority, with but little observance, as often as his vanity might dictate. Hence his repeated boasts (in his letters) that he had been sent into the field by the President himself, although in the instructions to him he was expressly told¶ that if he found me there, he was to serve under me and to obey my orders, as the rules and articles of war would have told him, independent of those instructions; and hence, from the same cause or causes, all those letters, *official-private* and *private-official*, with the pamphlet and communication in *The Globe*, which I have brought under the review of this court. The blood of all the Seminoles may be made to crimson the waters of Florida; but neither one nor both can wash away that stain which his conduct to an ancient friend has brought upon him. Sir, a moment more, and I shall have done with his name forever.

Much having been objected to my plan of operations against the Creeks as against that in Florida, and there being really some danger that any plan of campaign may, from the sneers of some of my contemporaries, be in future considered as unworthy of the native genius of American commanders, I beg leave, Mr. President, to fortify my last humble conception of this sort by the opinions of three highly distinguished gentlemen who have favored me with their depositions. The following interrogatories, but slightly and accidentally varied, were propounded by me to each of those deponents:

1. "What, in the opinion of the witness, were the relative advantages or disadvantages between a plan of operations beginning on a line at or a little above Irwinton, and below the hostile Creeks, and acting up the country, and beginning (say) on a line from Tuskegee to Fort Mitchell, above the greater number of the enemy, and thence operating down the country?"

2. "If the whole disposable force of Georgians, Alabamians, and regulars, with the friendly Indians acting as auxiliaries, had been placed in a line below the enemy, and had operated up the country, whilst the frontier settlements of Georgia and Alabama were guarded by competent detachments, is it not probable that fewer of the enemy would have escaped across the Chattahoochee in the direction of Florida than actually did so escape; and, also, that the war would have been earlier finished than it actually was."

3. "Is it not probable or certain that the movement of General Jesup, and the forces under his immediate orders, from Tuskegee upon Fort Mitchell, and from that line below, before all the other forces upon the Chattahoochee were ready to take their positions on that river, and the base-line below the enemy, put the enemy upon the endeavor to escape in the direction of Florida, and led to the many severe conflicts which took place on the soil of Georgia?"

4. "Which of the two plans of operations—that of operating with the whole disposable force, under the general command of the said Scott, *upwards*, from a line below the enemy, and beginning (say) about the 25th of June; and the plan pursued by the said Jesup, viz: beginning an isolated movement (say) about the 12th of the same month, from Tuskegee towards Fort Mitchell, and thence operating *down the country*—would, in the opinion of the witness, have the sooner terminated the war by the capture of the great body of the enemy?"

These questions are here differently numbered from the numbers they bore in the several papers drawn up by me, to be submitted to the witnesses.

I regret, Mr. President, that I have not the time or strength to embody the answers to the several interrogatories given by his excellency Governor Schley, a near, an anxious, and close observer of all that passed; of Major General Sanford, who commanded the Georgia line from an early period to the end of the war, and of the honorable Mr. Dawson, a colonel at home, but a captain in the campaign. Each is clear and emphatic in favor of the plan of operating *upwards*, in preference to the reverse plan; in favor of a delay to about the 25th of June, with a view to a united movement upwards, with all the disposable forces, and of the opinion that the war would sooner have been terminated by that delay, in the beginning, and with better results. I know not an intelligent officer who was with me in the campaign who would not have given like opinions if called upon for the purpose.

To this, or a similar question propounded, viz:

"Is the witness aware that the said Scott, in any particular, when not ill in bed, failed in point of

*Doc. No. 214.

†Doc. No. 221.

‡Doc. No. 263.

§See another official letter from him to the adjutant general, June 28, Doc. No. 242, whilst I was in command.

||General Jesup to Mr. Cass, June 25, Doc. No. 240.

¶Letter to him from Mr. Cass, May 19, Doc. No. 159.

zeal, activity, or judgment in the direction of the war against the hostile Creek Indians, before mentioned?"

The answers of Governor Schley, Major General Sanford, Colonels Dawson and Kenan, and Major Kirby, to this question, are all again too complimentary to be reproduced in this place; and no other officer with me in the Creek campaign was interrogated on the subject.

Mr. President, and gentlemen of the court: I am exhausted; but should do equal wrong to justice and to my own feelings not to return to each and every one of you my hearty thanks for the patience and impartiality you have all shown, including the judge advocate, in this long investigation.

Every material fact which has been given in evidence, that could by mere possibility affect your judgments to my prejudice, and I recollect but few of that character, will be found carefully embodied, or specifically referred to in this summary. Much, I know, to be wholly omitted on the other side. These declarations, I am confident, no examination will be able to controvert. And here, I may add, that there is not an important circumstance in all my recent conduct in the field, which was not duly reported at the earliest moment, and with my own hand, for the information of government. With, then, this overwhelming mass of evidence in my favor, permit me again to ask, by what strange fatality do I find myself here? It is for this court, with the approbation of the President of the United States, to bid me *depart with honor*; and that that decision may be without the further alloy of suspense, in which I have now but too long been held, under circumstances which, perhaps, could not have been controlled, I will ask that *it be speedily rendered*.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

FREDERICKTOWN, *Maryland*, January 19, 1836.

DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE OF GENERAL SCOTT.

A.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *Mobile, Alabama*, October 30, 1836.

SIR: In acknowledging the honor of your letter of the 13th of the present month, which I received on the 28th, I have to desire the favor of you to lay before the court of inquiry, of which Major General Macomb is appointed president, my objections and views of yesterday's date, herewith enclosed.

I am unprepared at this moment to send to you a complete list of witnesses, nor do I think it necessary, even if it were practicable, until I learn the result of my application to change the organization and location of the court.

I am, however, desirous that my staff officers on the campaign in Florida should attend the court of inquiry forthwith. Captain E. A. Hitchcock, acting inspector general, now at New York, with Captain G. A. McCall, aide-de-camp, acting as adjutant general, now at Philadelphia. Be pleased to summon them to attend. I shall desire General P. F. Smith to aid the above-named officers of my staff in acting for me, until I have it in my power to attend the court of inquiry, which I trust will be authorized to adjourn to this place, from whence the court, the witnesses, and all may occasionally pay a hasty visit to the Floridas, or to the western frontier, as occasion may offer.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDMUND P. GAINES.

Captain SAMUEL COOPER, *Judge Advocate and Recorder, &c., Frederick, Maryland*.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *Mobile*, October 29, 1836.

I received yesterday your judge advocate's letter of the 13th of this month, notifying me that the first Monday in November, 1836, is fixed for the meeting of the court of inquiry appointed in General Order No. 65, of the 3d instant, and requesting of me a list of such witnesses as I may wish examined by the court.

In reply, I think it my duty to state to the court, for the information of all concerned, the objections and views which follow:

1. I protest against Major General Macomb being the president, or a member of the court of inquiry, or of any tribunal for the investigation of any matter of accusation or rumor against me, or in which I am in anywise concerned, either directly or indirectly; or in reference to any duty or employment in which I have been or may be engaged during the present year, or at any time since the year 1830; because I have had good reason to believe that the said Major General Macomb has been, at all times, since that period, including the present year, up to the 13th of the present month, inclusively, ready and willing to wrong me; and I am therefore convinced that he would not, as president of the court of inquiry, be impartial, or do me justice. I expect soon to be able to obtain satisfactory evidence, in addition to that which here follows, in support of my objections; and, moreover, to show that Major General A. Macomb is, in fact, a party, and ought to be considered a party interested in, and to some considerable extent accountable for, any failures which may have occurred in the campaigns of the present year against the Seminole Indians

2. By the Order No. 65, I have learned that the court of inquiry would assemble "at the city of Frederick, in Maryland, as soon as the state of military operations against the Indians will permit the witnesses to attend, of which the president of the court is to judge and determine." It seems, then, by your judge advocate's letter above noticed, that ten days after the date of the General Order containing the directions of the President of the United States, and two days after that order was enclosed to me in the letter of the Acting Secretary of War, dated October 11, 1836, (which I shall presently notice more particularly,) and without any known change in our Indian relations by which witnesses could be obtained from the frontiers, the major general has seen fit to fix a day for the assembling of the court on

which he must have known it would be impossible for me (without steam-power applied to vehicles of transportation on railroads yet to be constructed) to attend the court. I advert to this strange arrangement not by any means to manifest on my part any unwillingness to attend the court, (which nothing short of a deep domestic affliction that during two weeks of the present month I have had great reason to apprehend shall prevent, after making arrangements to obtain the requisite testimony,) but to show the court the apparent design of the major general to disregard the orders of the President of the United States constituting the court, and to violate the President's more recent instructions, bearing date the 11th of this month, and of which the following is an extract:

“WAR DEPARTMENT, October 11, 1836.

“I herewith enclose you a copy of Order No. 65, providing for a court of inquiry, to be convened at a proper time, for the purpose of making certain investigations, in one of which you will be a party interested. And I have the honor to inform you that the President, *desirous to afford you an opportunity to prepare yourself for the occasion, by collecting such evidence and getting ready such documents as you may deem necessary*, has instructed me to inform you that General Arbuckle has been ordered to relieve you from your command on the southwestern frontier.

“C. A. HARRIS, *Acting Secretary of War.*

“Major General E. P. GAINES, *Camp Sabine.*”

(The 4th, 5th, and 6th lines underscored by me.)

These orders and instructions appear to have been violated by the president of the court of inquiry, inasmuch as he has taken means to preclude the possibility of my attending the court in its first meetings, and thus depriving me of the right of a personal scrutiny of the incipient proceedings of the court, and subjecting me to the imputation of having neglected to attend.

These objections will appear more obvious and conclusive to the court, and to the Department of War, when it is recollected and seen by the present state of the Post Office Department upon this route that the distance on the nearest mail-route from this place to the city of Frederick, Maryland, is nearly 1,050 miles; that the General Order No. 65, of the 3d instant, did not reach me until the 22d instant, and that the above-mentioned letter from the Acting Secretary of War was accompanied by the letter from your judge advocate, dated October 13, (but two days after the Acting Secretary's,) did not reach me until yesterday, the 28th. Hence it will be seen that the major general must have known that it was not possible for me to attend the court at its first meeting, when I should have been gratified to have made these objections in person, and to have taken other measures and made other objections, at which I have now only time to glance.

3. I deem it to be my duty to protest, and I do hereby protest, against the court of inquiry suffering any documentary or other evidence relating to me, or to any act of mine, or any matter of accusation or rumor against me, to be acted on or received by the court of inquiry, before I shall have it in my power to attend the court and scrutinize such documentary or other evidence, and to cross-examine the witness or witnesses that may be employed or called against me to bolster up the reputation of others, at the expense of mine.

4. In my letter to the adjutant general of the army, dated the 4th of July last, I requested that officer to favor me with all the official statements in his office referring to my conduct in relation to the war in Florida. I have not yet received the papers applied for. I shall insist on receiving copies of all reports, letters, and other statements referring to or calling in question the propriety of my conduct in Florida. I cannot complete my list of witnesses until I learn the names of my calumniators, with the matters of accusation or rumor with which the public offices at Washington may have been made the repository, and upon which the determination to call me before a court of inquiry was based.

5. In objecting to Major General A. Macomb, and pointing out the irregularity of his measures in preventing me from attending the court in its first sessions—an irregularity which of itself renders his continuance on the court repugnant to every principle of natural equity, law, and justice—I take much pleasure in stating that, with the exception of officers who have recently served in Florida, and are therefore supposed to feel some solicitude in the matters of inquiry, one way or another, or those who have expressed or formed opinions inimical to me, tending to condemn me without a hearing, I know but very few others of the general, field, or company officers *of the line of the army** to whom I would make any objection as members of the court of inquiry. I deem the present two junior members of the court to be unexceptionable, viz: Generals Atkinson and Brady.

6. In deciding upon the foregoing objections to the president of the court, the War Department is desired to weigh each objection with a particular view to the latter sentence of the 92d article of war, in the words which follow: “But as courts of inquiry may be perverted to dishonorable purposes, and may be considered as engines of destruction to military merit in the hands of weak and envious commandants, they are hereby prohibited, unless directed by the President of the United States or demanded by the accused.” I have not been *accused* except anonymously, indirectly, or by irresponsible persons, manifestly laboring to conceal their own misconduct by endeavoring to criminate me, and that without a shadow of proof. I have, therefore, seen no proper occasion for demanding the inquiry.

7. Since writing the foregoing six objections, a report has reached me that the forces (principally friendly Creek Indians) under Captain Lane, near Tampa Bay, have been defeated, and that the captain, or colonel, as he has been called, has fallen. Should this report prove to be true, I am sure the Department of War and the court will concur with me in the opinion that the safety of the long-neglected frontier of Florida, the best interest of the service, and the honor of the army, demand that the officers composing the court, the accused, and the witnesses should repair to the frontier or to this place, from whence all may, when needful, fly to the theatre of war in three or four days; and, in place of partaking of the comforts of the city of Frederick, unite in bringing the war once more to a close. I have never, nor can I willingly or voluntarily turn my back upon scenes of war, such as those in Florida, to pass my time in comparative indolence in the interior.

All which is submitted with due respect.

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General United States Army.*

The COURT OF INQUIRY of which Major General Macomb is President.

* I have objections to some few of the officers of the general staff, which I need not now mention.—E. P. G.

B.

FREDERICK, *Maryland*, January 7, 1837.

Pursuant to the orders of the War Department, the undersigned had the honor to present himself yesterday before the court of inquiry now in session in the city of Frederick, as a party interested in its proceedings, and claimed of right, under the provisions of the 91st article of war, the privilege of cross-examining the witnesses called before the court to give testimony in relation to the causes of the failure of the campaigns in Florida, in 1836, under Major Generals Gaines and Scott. The court decided to exclude him from all participation in its proceedings for some indefinite time, advising him that at some future period, when matters touching himself should be presented to the court, to call him to its presence and accord to him the privilege claimed.

The undersigned objects to the foregoing decision, in so far as it discovers a design to prosecute the proceedings in relation to the causes of the failure of the campaigns in Florida to a close in the case of Major General Scott, as a separate and distinct case; inasmuch as such a proceeding would be a violation of the order constituting the court, and would manifestly deprive the undersigned of the privilege guaranteed to him by the 91st article of war; matters touching himself having already been spread upon the record of the court, which, unless subjected to his scrutiny, must necessarily expose him to *ex parte* decisions and comments unfavorable to him; he therefore solemnly protests against any person whomsoever being allowed to sum up the partial and incomplete body of evidence now on the record, or yet to be received, or to present any paper in the character of a defence, commenting upon such evidence, before the undersigned shall have accorded to him the rights and privileges secured to him by the aforementioned 91st article of war, and which are essential to the maintenance of his reputation and honor.

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General United States Army.*

The COURT OF INQUIRY of which *Major General Macomb* is President.

No. 1.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, *Washington*, July 20, 1836.

SIR: I have just seen the private letter of Major General Jesup, dated Fort Mitchell, Alabama, June 20, 1836, addressed to "F. P. Blair, Washington city," in which he complains of my official conduct, and on which the President has indorsed—"Referred to the Secretary of War, that he forthwith order General Scott to this place, in order that an inquiry be had into the unaccountable delay in prosecuting the Creek war, and the failure of the campaigns in Florida. Let General Jesup assume the command."

In compliance with the foregoing direction of the President, I was ordered hither by a letter to me from Major General Macomb, and have now the honor to report myself accordingly.

I am ready to meet any investigation into my official conduct that may be ordered; and if charges and specifications, with a view to a general court-martial, be not preferred against me, I have to request that a court of inquiry may be granted me at the earliest practicable day.

I remain, sir, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General United States Army.*

No. 2.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, *New York*, August 2, 1836.

SIR: In making my report in person, at Washington, (on the 20th ultimo,) in obedience to the instruction that recalled me from the command of the *army of the south*, I requested to be favored with any and all matters of charge or complaint against me, either as the commander of the forces against the Creek or Seminole Indians, in the preceding six or seven months.

With the ready permission of the Acting Secretary of War, I was furnished with a copy of the only paper (as was understood) on file against me—a letter from Major General Jesup, my second in the Creek war, dated at Fort Mitchell, June 20, 1836, and addressed to F. P. Blair, esq., of Washington city.

The original was conspicuously marked "*private*," but contained the insidious direction—"Let the President see this letter." On seeing it, however, the President, it seems, chose to render that which was evidently intended to work my ruin in secrecy, *official* and *public*, by indorsing the paper—"Referred to the Secretary of War, that he forthwith order General Scott to this place, in order that an inquiry be had into the unaccountable delay in prosecuting the Creek war, and the failure of the campaign in Florida. Let General Jesup assume the command."

Thus, on an *intended* confidential communication I have already been once harshly punished by a recall from a high command before it was known at Washington that the war which I had the conduct of was virtually over, (which, fortunately for me, happened to be the case,) and my accuser promoted to my place. But, further, as that accuser equally stigmatized my conduct in the Seminole campaign as in that against the Creeks, the President directs that both shall be investigated.

That direction I did not sufficiently attend to on the 20th ultimo, or the written demand then made for a court of inquiry would have been deemed superfluous. In this opinion I am now confirmed; for, beside the President's full power to order the investigation, without demand, either by a court of inquiry or a general court-martial, I observe in the official newspaper (the *Globe*) of the 29th ultimo, published by General Jesup's correspondent, an editorial article in which it is said, speaking on this very subject—"He [the President] deemed it proper to hold General Scott to accountability, and make General Jesup the accuser."

Learning thus from the official paper that I may expect charges and specifications to be preferred against me in form, and for the other reason suggested above, I now ask leave to withdraw my demand

for a court of inquiry, and to await the further pleasure of the Executive in this case; trusting, nevertheless, that an investigation will be speedily ordered, and in the most vigorous form. I doubt not that the result will be wholly honorable to me, as well in the opinion of the public as in that of the President himself.

I remain, sir, with high respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General, United States Army.*

P. S.—I shall take the liberty to send a copy of this letter direct to the Secretary of War, at Detroit, to save time.

W. S.

No. 3.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, *New York, October 18, 1836.*

SIR: I have to acknowledge the order appointing the court of inquiry, of which Major General Macomb is named as president, and a supplemental order extending the field of its investigations.

I shall seize with gladness any opportunity to repel the unjust imputations under which I have so long labored in respect to my operations against the Seminole and Creek Indians; but, from an article in the official newspaper (the *Globe*) of the 29th of July last, I had been led to hope that a general court-martial would have been ordered for my trial on those imputations; for the *Globe*, in a tone of authority, said *the President had decided to make General Jesup my accuser*. This announcement necessarily pointed to such tribunal, as before courts of inquiry a formal accuser or prosecutor is unknown.

I should certainly greatly prefer to confront General Jesup, in face of a court-martial, to being obliged to encounter in the dark, and at second hand, before a court of inquiry, his false accusations and misstatements, taken from newspapers, pamphlets, and I know not how many "private" letters written to a third person, advantageously situated to render them most effective against me, both with the President and the public. One of these artful missiles, after harshly tearing me from a high and honorable command, which I had every prospect of speedily terminating to the satisfaction of the government and the country, conferred that very command upon my insubordinate junior and accuser. Thanks to the Executive, this letter (of which I had not the slightest suspicion until my arrival at Norfolk) has been forced into light. How many more of the same character may insidiously lurk behind to envenom the inquiry against me I may never learn.

Not knowing what further time might be suffered to elapse in bringing on a judicial investigation of the whole matter in question, and suffering greatly in public opinion under General Jesup's *ex parte* and garbled publications, I was just about to defend myself in the form of an official letter, the publication of which I should have requested, when I received formal notice that the court of inquiry would meet on the 7th of the next month. I shall now forbear going into a detailed exposure and refutation of the injuries complained of, but will still ask, as an intimation of what had been my purpose, and the abundance of my means, that this letter be published.

Of General Gaines's similar acts of outrage against me, I have heard much, but have seen scarcely anything. I shall therefore confine myself in this place to the enumeration of General Jesup's three principal publications which have come to my knowledge:

1. His letter to Mr. Blair of the 20th of June last, and which was printed at length in the *Globe* of the 29th of the next month. This publication, although the letter was originally intended solely for the eye of the President and Mr. Blair, General Jesup evidently sanctions, as may be seen in his letter of the 3d ultimo to the same editor, and also published in the *Globe* of the 26th ultimo.

2. The pamphlet or printed sheet signed and circulated by Captain Lane, of General Jesup's staff, and which is evidently the joint production of the aide-de-camp and his chief.

3. The publication, by General Jesup, in the *Globe* of the 26th ultimo, of a part only of my official correspondence with him on the matters which are to be investigated by the court of inquiry, with false glosses in the form of notes, furnished the editor by General Jesup himself.

Again solemnly protesting that I have not, up to this moment, written or suggested, or caused to be written, a line or word on the subject of the Seminole and Creek campaigns for any newspaper whatever, I think myself entitled to ask respectfully that this letter may be published; and this is the first time that I have requested the publication of even an *official* letter—the assertion of the *Globe* (July 29) to the contrary notwithstanding.

So far have I been from writing military or political articles on recent events, I have scarcely permitted myself to converse with my most intimate friends on the points in controversy. I have held myself in strict retirement, and have at this moment more than forty letters of inquiry from distant friends, some of them written eleven weeks ago, which I have not yet answered, fearing that I might violate the reserve I had prescribed to myself.

With great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General United States Army.*

No. 4.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *January 21, 1836.*

SIR: You will please to repair, without unnecessary delay, to Florida, and assume the direction of the operations against the Seminole Indians.

I enclose for your information copies of the various instructions which have issued from this department for the suppression of the hostilities of these Indians, and of such other papers as may be necessary to put you in full possession of the state of affairs in that quarter. I enclose also duplicate letters to the

governors of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, requesting them to call into the service of the United States such militia force as you may deem necessary, and advising them that the authority thus conferred upon you will enable you to increase, modify, or revoke any requisition which may have been made in pursuance of the powers granted to Generals Clinch and Eustis to call upon the executives of those States and of the Territory for any militia force. Their powers also to call for such force will cease on your assumption of the command.

It is impracticable here to prescribe the amount of force which ought to be carried into the field; that must depend upon the actual circumstances which you may find existing when you reach the scene of operations. It is of course highly desirable that no unnecessary force should be employed, as the expense may be thereby greatly increased. Still I would not have you hesitate for a moment in calling out such a number of the militia as will enable you, with promptitude and certainty, to put an immediate termination to these difficulties. The horrors of such a warfare are too great to run any risk in its immediate suppression. This subject is therefore committed entirely to your own discretion.

The difficulties with these Indians have arisen from their indisposition to comply with the terms of a treaty concluded some time since with Colonel Gadsden. That treaty provided for their removal west of the Mississippi; but, when the period of its execution arrived, it was found that a considerable portion of the Indians were unwilling to remove. As they had ceded their whole country in Florida, it was impossible to permit them to remain there, as they would have become a lawless banditti, liable at all times to commit depredations upon the settlements. After much discussion with the agents of the government, the Indians finally agreed that if their removal were postponed till this winter they would voluntarily emigrate. When the arrangements began to be made for carrying this agreement into effect, a spirit of disaffection appeared, which led first to the murder of one or more of our own citizens, and then of some of their own chiefs who were disposed to carry into effect the agreement that had been made. This state of things was soon followed by open hostilities.

Copies of the earlier communications to and from General Clinch, which are herewith enclosed, will put you in possession of all the necessary facts.

I shall state very generally the measures which have been directed by this department.

General Clinch is in command of the troops in Florida. He has had placed at his disposal fourteen companies of the army; but how many of these have actually reached that part of the country, and are now acting with General Clinch, is not known to this department. He was some time since authorized to call upon the governor of Florida for such militia force as he might deem necessary; and, more recently, similar authority was extended to him to call upon the governors of South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama. A sloop-of-war and two revenue cutters have been ordered to report to General Clinch, and to co-operate with him on the southwest coast of Florida, and another revenue cutter on the eastern coast.

You will perceive, by the accompanying copy of a letter to General Eustis, that, in consequence of the unofficial (but no doubt authentic) statements which reached here a few days since, respecting the recent action with the Indians, and the destruction of the settlements, authority was given to him to call upon the governor of South Carolina for what militia force he might require, and to accept such volunteer corps as might offer, and to proceed with this force, and with the garrisons of Charleston and Savannah, to St. Augustine, and there to assume the command, and open a communication with General Clinch. You will also see that General Eustis has detached one company from Charleston to St. Augustine. In addition to the duplicates herewith enclosed to the several executives above mentioned, another will be transmitted to each of them by mail. On your arrival at Charleston you will probably be able to ascertain the precise state of affairs in Florida and to take measures accordingly. These you will please adopt without delay.

Should you deem it important to have a personal communication with the governor of South Carolina or Georgia, you are at liberty so to do. Your own route, however, to the scene of operations in Florida must depend upon another circumstance. Letters from Governor Eaton, General Call, and Colonel Gadsden, copies of which are enclosed, leave but little doubt that some of the Creek warriors have joined the Seminoles. To what extent this disaffection may have proceeded we have not here the means of ascertaining; but, from the number and position of the Creek Indians, it is highly important, if they evince any disposition to join the hostile Indians in considerable numbers, that the most vigorous measures should be adopted to check this spirit. It is probable that you will be able to obtain such intelligence in South Carolina as may enable you to form a correct estimate of the danger to be apprehended from this source; and if there is reason to believe that the Creeks are in a hostile state, or that they meditate it, you will then call into the field such militia force as may be necessary to occupy the Creek country in Alabama, and immediately to reduce these Indians to submission. Should, however, there be no cause for alarm on this subject, your undivided efforts will be directed to the Seminoles.

Whatever expenditures may be rendered necessary you will please to direct, and the proper staff officers under your command will be furnished with such funds as may be required to meet them. One hundred and twenty thousand rations were some time since ordered, as a precautionary measure, to the St. John's. Whatever additional supplies may be required from the subsistence department will be procured upon your orders. The arsenals at Augusta, in Georgia, and at Mount Vernon, in Alabama, and the ordnance depot in Charleston, will issue such arms and ammunition as you may find necessary.

I have to request that you will ascertain from the various staff departments at this place the arrangements which have been made, and which are necessary for the transportation, pay, subsistence, and operations of the regular force and militia which will be under your command. The great expense and inefficiency of the militia, when called out for too short a time, renders it indispensable that no force of that description should be received into service for a shorter period than three months from the time of their arrival at the place of rendezvous, to be disbanded previously if their services should not be so long required.

You will take care to have the militia regularly mustered into service, and that the number of officers is in proper proportion to the number of men.

I have also to request that you will give the necessary instructions for the preservation and accountability of the public property. There is upon these occasions, too often, so great a waste, particularly where a militia force is brought into the field, that great circumspection should be used.

You will see by some of the accompanying documents that many of the negroes have been captured by the Indians, and that there is reason to apprehend that they will be transported to Cuba. I have to ask your particular attention to the measures indicated to prevent the removal of those negroes, and to insure their restoration. You will allow no terms to the Indians until every living slave in their possession belonging to a white man is given up.

Governor Eaton has also suggested, as his letter will show, that some of the fishing vessels on the coast of Florida are engaged in co-operating with the Indians. This subject should be immediately investigated, and I refer you for the proper measures to the suggestions contained in the letter of yesterday to General Clinch.

I have also to request that you will communicate freely with Governor Eaton and advise him of your movements; so far as any expense may have been encountered, by his direction, in the defence of the Territory, which can be met by this department, agreeably to the usages of the service, you will order to be paid on the proper vouchers. But if doubts exist as to whether they are legally payable without a specific appropriation therefor, you will refer them here for consideration.

The line dividing your own department from that of General Gaines is at present an imaginary one, and probably would, if run, actually pass through the scene of hostilities. You will pursue your operations, therefore, without regard to any such visionary line.

General Clinch has been instructed to allow the Indians no pacification till they are unconditionally subdued, and till they consent to an immediate embarkation for the country west of the Mississippi. This point you will particularly advert to, as also to that branch of the instructions to General Clinch which directs him to deliver over to the civil authority such of the Indians as were guilty of individual outrages before the commencement of hostilities. If the Creeks have engaged or should engage in these hostilities, you will, in like manner, promptly subdue them, and make it an indispensable condition of peace being granted to them, that they depart as soon as the government can make the proper arrangements for their country west of Arkansas. In both of these cases it will be proper that a vigilant supervision be exercised over these Indians till their removal, and that they be accompanied by such a force as will keep them quiet. Their arms and ammunition will be taken from them and not restored until they shall have reached their new country. And even then a discretion must be exercised by the military commanding officer in that quarter to withhold them for as long a period as he may think proper, if the Indians evince any spirit of disaffection. Colonel Hogan is the principal agent for the removal of the Creek Indians. He will be directed to report to you, and to receive your instructions; and he will be able to communicate to you all the necessary information respecting the views of the government on the subject of the removal of these Indians, and their mode of proceeding.

General Clinch will give you similar information concerning the Seminoles, as he has been for some time in communication with them, and understands fully the views of the department. General Thompson, the principal removing agent, has been killed, and General Clinch has been requested to assign an officer to do his duty.

Reposing entire confidence in the arrangements you may make, and in the promptness and vigor of your movements, I remain, sir, &c.,

LEWIS CASS.

Major General WINFIELD SCOTT, *Washington City.*

No. 5.

HEADQUARTERS FLORIDA VOLUNTEERS, *Camp near Fort Defiance, December 22, 1835.*

SIR: Having heard of the distress and alarm on this frontier, occasioned by Indian depredation, I raised a detachment of 250 volunteer mounted riflemen from my brigade, and, under the orders of the acting governor, proceeded to this border, where I found about the same number of men, under the command of Colonel Warren, of the East Florida militia. I have assumed command of the whole, making my force about five hundred men. They were raised, however, for only four weeks; and many of them are badly armed and equipped. The services of these troops have been tendered to General Clinch and accepted, for the prospect of protecting the frontier. I can, sir, scarcely give you an adequate description of the frontier inhabitants. The whole country between the Suwanee and the St. John's rivers, for the distance of fifty miles above the Indian boundary, is abandoned; the frontier inhabitants shut up in a few miserable stockade forts, and the Indians traversing the country at will, burning and destroying wherever they appear. Before my arrival a number of skirmishes had taken place, in which the Indians were invariably successful. A few days since a detachment of Colonel Warren's command, while on their march in the margin of the Alachua savannah, was attacked by a party of Indians. His baggage guard was defeated and his baggage captured. Two days after, I marched on the same ground, recovered one wagon, a carryall, and the greater part of the baggage. I had intended to camp that night at a house within one mile of Fort Defiance, formerly called Micanopy, where there was a supply of corn and fodder. When my spies and advanced guard approached they observed a house on fire; they pressed forward and found the trail of a small party of Indians leading into a thick hammock; they gave pursuit and drove them into a pond, in which there was a thick undergrowth and a number of trees, in which the Indians were concealed. The volunteers, led by Colonel Read, the brigade inspector, gallantly entered the water and fought most bravely, at half pistol-shot, as long as an Indian or the flash of his gun could be seen. When the fight was over we found but four of the enemy killed. My loss was four wounded; among these was Captain Lancaster, of the first regiment, and George Johnson, of the second regiment of volunteers, while fighting bravely in the front of the action. They are all doing well, except one of the privates, whose wound I fear is mortal. I have this moment received an express, informing me that the Indians have crossed the Suwanee river, and are now burning and destroying at the old town. Many of my men are drawn from that quarter and a short distance beyond it; they feel much alarmed for the safety of their families, and I much fear many of them will leave me to-night. I assure you, sir, the country requires immediate protection, and it cannot be given too promptly.

Very respectfully, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

R. K. CALL, *General Commanding in Florida.*

The PRESIDENT of the *United States.*

No. 6.

TALLAHASSEE, *January 9, 1836.*

MY DEAR GENERAL: In my last I informed you of the situation of the frontier of East Florida. I succeeded with the volunteers under my command in driving the enemy within his boundary along the whole line between the Suwanee and the St. John's. Having accomplished this important object, we united with General Clinch, who commanded the expedition into the enemy's country, the result of which, I presume, has been communicated to you through the Secretary of War.

The time for which the volunteers engaged having expired, I have returned to this place to obtain from the governor the necessary force to prosecute the war. As yet, nothing has been done. When I left General Clinch, on the 3d instant, he could not have brought into the field more than one hundred and fifty efficient men. Four additional companies were said to be at Tampa Bay, on their march from that place to Fort King, but no certain intelligence had been received from them. One hundred and fifty mounted volunteers marched from this place a few days since. I ordered the commanding officer to report himself to General Clinch, by whom they will be employed as a protection to the frontier until we are prepared for a campaign. To put a prompt and successful termination to this war we require an army of 2,500 or 3,000 men. About one-third of this force can be raised in the Territory, the balance must consist of regulars and militia from the neighboring States. I shall return to the frontier in some capacity or other, so soon as I can raise a force of any description. I should be highly gratified to command the army, and believe I could soon bring the war to a close. I fear, however, this I cannot do without injustice to General Clinch. He is a brave and good man, but I fear he is too slow in his movements to conduct a war against the Indians.

I had many difficulties to contend with in my late expedition, and, among others, mutiny and desertion among my troops; but the examples I have made of the offenders will have a salutary effect hereafter.

The power of the enemy is variously estimated, by those best informed, at from 1,200 to 2,000 warriors; and it is confidently believed that a large number of the Creek Indians have united with them. They are well armed; they are waging a war of extermination, and will fight desperately.

The enclosed letter from Colonel Fitzpatrick, the president of the legislative council, will inform you of the manner in which arms have been furnished to the Indians. It contains other valuable information, which I beg leave to lay before you.

Very, &c.,

R. K. CALL

General JACKSON.

No. 7.

TALLAHASSEE, *January 8, 1836.*

SIR: Previous to my leaving Key West information was received from Tampa Bay that a Spanish vessel had landed arms and ammunition in the neighborhood of a Spanish fishery at Charlotte harbor, to supply the Indians on the coast. The surgeon of the post at Key West, Dr. Nourse, accompanied Major Dade's company to Tampa and returned in the transport *Motto*, and communicated the information to several persons, and said he got it from Captain William G. Ganders and others at Tampa, and that there was proof of the fact, as he understood from them. I well recollect that, previous to my leaving Key West, I one morning observed a Spanish vessel coming in at the northwest passage, from the direction of Tampa and Charlotte harbor, which vessel brought no cargo, nor do I know whether or not she carried any away to Cuba. The collector at Key West, near two months previous to this time, had suspended from duty the inspector of the customs at Charlotte harbor for refusing to permit spirituous liquors to be landed on the island where he lived, and upon which also a Spanish subject named Caldez lives, and who is carrying on a fishery, and has a vessel trading there under Spanish colors, manned, in part, by Seminole Indians. There is but one citizen of the United States attached to the concern, who is the person that brought the charges against the inspector, and who has been going backwards and forwards in the Spanish schooner since that time; with this exception the fishery is carried on by Spaniards and Indians, and is owned by a man named Badia, who lives in Havana. I know that the Spaniards interested in the fisheries have been much dissatisfied on account of the proposed removal of the Indians, and that they have heretofore derived much benefit from the services of the Indians at the fisheries and on board these vessels; and that this man Caldez is more dreaded by and has more influence over the Indians than he ought to have. There being no inspector at this point, and the collector having sent the revenue cutter to New Orleans, arms and ammunition, or anything else, in any quantity, could have been landed there at any time with impunity. As the southern section of Florida is very little known except to the Indians, I take the liberty to offer you such information as a residence of more than twelve years in that section of country has enabled me to obtain. From Cape Roman, on the west coast, to Cape Sable, and from thence to Cape Florida, are innumerable islands formed by rivers and creeks running from the Everglades, (so called,) and having for their source the great Lake Macaco, where the Indians go in their light canoes, and where they have some towns and cornfields. This part of the country is little known to the white man, but the Indians are perfectly acquainted with it, and if they are driven from their present position, they will certainly go there. I have good authority, upon which I can rely, that many canoes with women and children, and some men, have been sent there some time ago; and if the warriors are driven there, they can sustain themselves against four times their number. They can live on the county root, which abounds in the vicinity of Cape Florida and New river, and the great abundance of fish and turtle which are found in the rivers and on the sea-coast, and which they take in any quantity at pleasure. From Cape Sable to Cape Florida, inside of Key Largo, and the other keys, there is but one white man living that has ever penetrated it and passed through; it is there the Indians have their hunting grounds, and from where they can retire into the islands in the Everglades, and can go to the east as far and even beyond New river, and to Charlotte harbor on the west. Steamboats of light draught of water, having plenty of small boats of the least possible draught, is the only means by which you can follow the Indians in their canoes. One should go to Cape Florida and proceed east to Indian river, where she can enter and go up

the lagoon and the St. Sebastian and St. Lucia rivers; another should go down through Key Biscayne bay (where the light-house is) and into Barnes's sound, and pass through in boats to Cape Sable; and another should go through from Indian Key to the Cape Sable, and proceed along the coast to Cape Roman and Charlotte harbor. Those vessels and boats should, by all means, get pilots at Indian Key and the neighborhood, who have a knowledge of the navigation, as any person unacquainted will find the greatest difficulty to get along.

I am thus particular because I know much inconvenience and difficulty will necessarily occur in the fitting out an expedition to go on a coast so little known; and I am certain that if the Indians once get down there, they can sustain themselves for years against a superior force, and that it will be impossible to starve them out. I very much hope that the government will see the necessity of destroying those Spanish fisheries, and of prohibiting their vessels from carrying on any trade on the coast. I tender you my services in any way I can be useful in any expedition which may be sent to any part of the Territory.

Respectfully, &c.,

General R. K. CALL.

C. FITZPATRICK

No. 8.

TALLAHASSEE, *January 9, 1836.*

DEAR SIR: By the enclosed despatch from General Call you will perceive that the volunteers have returned home, and the security of the frontier of this Territory and Georgia is now at the mercy of the Indians. A few regulars, equal to garrison duty, and one hundred and fifty militia, are all the force, by General Call's report, which is now in the field. Militia are few and widely scattered here; and as for arms, there are none. I send to-morrow an express to Augusta, as in my letter I advised you I should do, to procure arms. If successful, an expedition may be gotten up again by the last of this month.

Again let me repeat that a large and imposing force will be necessary, as being the most economical, to put down these Indians. A force barely adequate; men with but little confidence in themselves, and are all the time going to and coming back from the war; such you will see was the case with General Call's volunteers. Their term had expired, and they would come home, with an enemy just in view of them. The country is full of morasses and swamps; and such a force should be ordered that occasional detachments may be sent out in different directions to intercept and cut up the enemy, and parties be left to guard depots that necessarily may be required to be formed in the rear of the advance.

Two or three steamboats to cover the coast, to transport troops, and to furnish supplies, will also be necessary, and will prove economical. Although their cost will be \$1,500 or \$2,000 a month to the government, in the end they will prove cheapest.

I have written to the governor of Georgia to know if he cannot take the responsibility of sending a force into the field. Prompt action and a good force will quiet everything here in forty or sixty days—tardiness and want of decision may make it last a year. Why not order all the Spanish vessels who fish on our coast, and no doubt aid and encourage the Indians under their fishing pretenses, to depart out of our waters? The acts of 1794, June 5, and of 1800, April 24, give the President the power to do so. It is very important, I assure you. If you will authorize me, I have a steamboat, with naval officers on board, to whom I will assign the duty. I think I have already the authority myself, but do not desire to act without the approval of the President.

Yours,

LEWIS CASS, *Secretary of War.*

J. H. EATON.

No. 9.

TALLAHASSEE, *January, 1836.*

SIR: I enclose you herewith my report of the result of the expedition to the Indian country, from which I have just returned. The exposed situation of the frontier, the hostile attitude and warlike character of the Indians, require that the most prompt and efficient measures should be adopted without delay for prosecuting the war in the enemy's country. The precise strength of the enemy has not been ascertained. It is variously estimated by men of intelligence to be from 1,200 to 2,000. It is known they have applied to the Creek Indians for assistance, and no doubt is entertained that a considerable number of warriors from that nation is already in the country. Though I have, with the forces lately under my command, driven back the enemy within his own boundary along the whole line of the frontier, from the Suwanee to the St. John's, yet on the east of the latter river, at the last intelligence, the work of desolation was still progressing, and all the plantations south of Tampa were destroyed. The Indians are resolved not to abandon the country which contains the bones of their fathers. They have raised the tomahawk in despair; they are waging a war of extermination, and the safety of our fellow-citizens requires that not a moment should be lost in carrying the war into their own country. As yet no preparation has been made. General Clinch, when I left him on the 3d instant, could not have carried into the field a regular force of more than one hundred and fifty men; *four* additional companies were said to be at Tampa Bay, or on their march from that place to Fort King. But no certain intelligence had been received, and some fears are entertained that they may have been cut off by the enemy.

The country in which we must meet the enemy is peculiarly favorable to the Indian mode of warfare. It is interspersed with swamps and hammocks, where alone they are to be found, and in which they have a decided advantage. To bring this war to a speedy and successful issue an army of 2,500 or 3,000 men should be immediately ordered into the field. I have written to the President of the United States asking for 1,000 regular troops. I would now recommend that 1,500 foot-men, well armed and equipped,

be requested from the State of Georgia, for the term of six months, and that all the disposable force of the Territory be called into service for the same length of time. With such a force, well employed, the war may be brought to a conclusion in a short time; but it is in vain to think of subduing a fierce and desperate enemy, selecting his own ground for battle, with a force less efficient.

The detachment of one hundred and fifty volunteers which I met on its way to the frontier I placed under the command of Colonel Parish, whom I directed to report himself to General Clinch. They will serve as a guard to the settlement, until an army can be carried into the field.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. K. CALL.

Governor EATON.

No. 10.

TALLAHASSEE, *January 8, 1836.*

SIR: The term of service for which the volunteers from Middle Florida engaged having expired, they are now on their return march to this place, where they will be discharged. They have made a most active and fatiguing expedition. They have rendered faithful and important services. We found the enemy in possession of the country for thirty miles above the Indian boundary. The inhabitants have abandoned their homes, and were collected in a few small forts constructed in their different neighborhoods. The Indians, divided into small bands, were spreading desolation over the whole land. The prompt and rapid march of the troops under my command soon routed and drove them within their own limits.

Having accomplished this important object, the disposable regular force under the command of General Clinch, consisting of about two hundred men, was united with the volunteers at Fort Drane, from where we resolved to make a rapid movement into the enemy's country, and attack them in their towns. The volunteers from Middle Florida had at that time but four days to serve, and we were able to carry with us only a sufficient supply of provisions and forage for that period. Our guide had informed us that in two days' march we should arrive at the Withlacoochee river, at a point where it might be easily forded, and that within a mile from the river we should find a large town of the enemy. On the morning of the 31st of December we —— from our camp before day, and soon after it was light we arrived on the bank of the river, where we were greatly surprised to find, instead of a ford over which to pass, we had to encounter a deep and rapid stream, with no other means of crossing than that of an Indian canoe found at the opposite side. The regulars crossed; and when a very small portion only of the volunteers had gained the opposite bank the Indians in a large body commenced a spirited and unexpected attack, which continued for some time. During the fight the volunteers continued to cross the river and support the troops engaged, until the enemy was driven back. It was owing to their appearance in the field, and the gallant intrepidity with which they fought, that the regular troops were not entirely cut off. It was to them as well as myself a —— of deep mortification and regret that so few of us should have been enabled to participate in the danger and glory of the day; but, from the time of attack, and the circumstances under which it was made, it was unavoidable. I crossed the river myself during the fight, and did not arrive on the field till it was nearly ended.

Colonel Parkhill and Colonel Read were in the staff of General Clinch. They, with my aide-de-camp, Major Wellford, were among the foremost in the field, and were greatly distinguished for their bravery and usefulness during the fight. The loss of the enemy is variously estimated at from forty to sixty killed. Our loss was four killed and fifty-nine wounded. Among the latter was Captain Graham, Lieutenants Campbell, Graham, and Ridgely, of the regular troops, Colonel John Warren, Major Cooper, and Lieutenant ——, of the volunteers. None of the wounds of the officers are considered dangerous, except Major Cooper's. He was shot through the lungs, but hopes are entertained of his recovering.

The number of our wounded, and our want of supplies to enable us to proceed further into the country, compelled us to recross the river. This was successfully done about sundown, in the presence of the enemy, who appeared to have been reinforcing during the whole day. The volunteers formed the right and left flanks, resting on the river above and below the landing. The regulars formed the centre part of the line, uniting with the volunteers. The enemy formed a line some distance from us, covering our whole front. The war-whoop was repeatedly given along the line, and we were in momentary expectation of an attack, while recrossing the river on a log, which in the course of the evening had been prepared for that purpose. We encamped at dark on this side of the river, under the sound of the war-whoop, but the enemy had suffered too severely to renew the attack, and the next day we returned with our wounded to Fort Drane.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. K. CALL.

His Excellency JOHN H. EATON, *Governor of Florida.*

No. 11.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *January 11, 1836.*

SIR: I am instructed by the President to say to you that you will continue your operations against the Indians until they are reduced to submission. You will grant them no pacification but upon their unconditional surrender, and with a distinct understanding that they embark immediately on board the vessels that have been provided, and proceed without delay to the country that has been set apart for them west of the Mississippi river. All the necessary arrangements for that purpose will be made, in conformity with the previous instructions, by General Thompson, in conjunction with yourself. From the state of feeling manifested by the Indians, it will be proper that the necessary guards should accompany them. And for this you will provide as, in your opinion, circumstances will require. When a pacification

is granted to the Indians they must place themselves immediately under your control, and must be properly secured until they can be embarked. Such of them as you can ascertain have been guilty of private murders previous to the commencement of hostilities, or any other infraction of the laws, you will apprehend and deliver over to the civil authorities for examination

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LEWIS CASS.

General D. L. CLINCH, *Fort King, Florida.*

No. 12.

ORDER No. 7.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Adjutant General's Office, Washington, January 21, 1836.*

The commanding officers of the companies at Forts Johnston and Macon, in North Carolina, and at Savannah and Augusta arsenal, in Georgia, will proceed forthwith to Picolata, Florida, with the effective force of their respective companies, leaving only the ordnance sergeants and invalids. The medical officers of the army at the above posts will accompany their respective garrisons.

The detachment of dragoon recruits at New York, and the detachment of recruits for the artillery and infantry at the same place, will proceed to Picolata, Florida; the former under the command of Captain Wharton, of dragoons; the latter under the command of Lieutenant Herring, of 3d artillery. Lieutenants Simonton and Wheelock, of dragoons, and Lieutenant Beall, of 1st infantry, are assigned to the command of Captain Wharton; and Lieutenant Poole, of the 3d, and Lieutenant Humphreys, of the 2d artillery, are assigned to the command of Lieutenant Herring.

The following officers are relieved from the duty to which they are now assigned, and will forthwith repair to Picolata, Florida, on their way to join their respective companies: Second Lieutenant Morris, of the 1st artillery, company C; First Lieutenant Chambers, 2d artillery, company G; First Lieutenant Dancy, 2d artillery, company D; Second Lieutenant Burnett, 2d artillery, company F; Second Lieutenant Stockton, 2d artillery, company A; Second Lieutenant Fuller, 2d artillery, company G; Second Lieutenant Ward, 2d artillery, company G; Second Lieutenant Linnard, 2d artillery, company H; Second Lieutenant Burk, 2d artillery, company H.

Assistant Surgeons Myers, Suter, and Cuyler, will repair without delay to Florida, and report to the officer in command.

Assistant Surgeon Worrell will repair to New York without delay, and there await the orders of the surgeon general.

Major General Scott will repair to Florida, and take command of the troops operating against the Indians in that quarter. Besides his personal staff, he will be joined by Captain Canfield, of the topographical engineers, Lieutenant Van Buren, aide-de-camp, and Lieutenant Johnson, of the 4th artillery.

The commanding officer of Fort Monroe will send two officers from his command, the one to Fort Macon, the other to Fort Johnston, in North Carolina, to take charge of those posts during the absence of their respective garrisons.

The chiefs of the staff departments will make the necessary arrangements for the transportation and supplies for the troops destined for Florida.

By order of Major General Macomb.

S. COOPER, *Acting Adjutant General.*

No. 13.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *January 21, 1836.*

SIR: The recent intelligence which has been received here respecting the state of affairs in Florida has rendered it expedient to order Major General Scott to proceed to that Territory and to assume the direction of the operations against the Seminole Indians, and also against the Creek Indians, should these latter have engaged in hostilities, as, from recent information, there is some reason to apprehend.

I am instructed by the President to request you to call into the service of the United States, and to place under the command of Major General Scott, such portion of the militia of Georgia, Alabama, and Florida as he may require to be employed in suppressing the hostility of the above-mentioned Indians. It is expected that the militia thus called out will serve for at least three months after they arrive at the place of rendezvous, unless sooner discharged.

I beg leave to suggest that the authority thus conferred upon General Scott will enable him to increase, modify, or revoke any requisition which may have been made with Generals Clinch or Eustis, in conformity with the letter which I had the honor to address to you on the 8th instant. This authority will also supersede the powers intrusted to those officers on this subject, as soon as General Scott shall have taken the personal direction of operations.

Very respectfully, &c.,

LEWIS CASS.

His Excellency WM. SCHLEY, *Governor of Georgia, Milledgeville.*

His Excellency C. C. CLAY, *Governor of Alabama.*

His Excellency JOHN H. EATON, *Governor of Florida, Tallahassee.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *January 21, 1836.*

SIR: The recent intelligence which has been received here respecting the state of affairs in Florida has rendered it expedient to order Major General Scott to proceed to that Territory and to assume the direction of the operations against the Seminole Indians, and also against the Creek Indians, should these latter have engaged in hostilities, as, from recent information, there is some reason to apprehend.

I am instructed by the President to request you to call into the service of the United States, and to place under the command of Major General Scott, such portion of the militia of the State of South Carolina as he may require to be employed in suppressing the hostility of the above-mentioned Indians. It is expected that the militia thus called out will serve for at least three months after their arrival at the place of rendezvous, unless sooner discharged.

I beg leave to suggest that the authority thus conferred upon General Scott will enable him to increase, modify, or revoke any requisition which may have been made by Generals Clinch or Eustis, in conformity with the letters which I had the honor to address to you on the 8th and 17th instant. This authority will also supersede the powers intrusted to those officers on this subject, as soon as General Scott shall have taken the personal direction of operations.

Very respectfully, &c.,

LEWIS CASS.

His Excellency GEORGE McDUFFIE, *Governor of South Carolina, Charleston, S. C.*

No. 14.

GENERAL ORDER No. 9

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Adjutant General's Office, Washington, January 25, 1836.*

1. The 6th regiment of infantry will be prepared to move from Jefferson Barracks to Fort Jesup, Louisiana, as soon as the season and navigation will permit. Brevet Brigadier General H. Atkinson will see to the execution of this order as to the time of departure of the regiment, but will remain at Jefferson Barracks and continue in his present command. Surgeon Findlay and Assistant Surgeon Hughey will proceed with the regiment to Fort Jesup.

2. Major A. R. Thompson, now of the 6th infantry, and Captain J. Rogers, of the same regiment, will be relieved from the recruiting service, and join their regiment with all the disposable unattached recruits.

3. Captain H. Smith, Lieutenants Cady, Freeman, and Williams, on engineer service, and Lieutenant Drayton, on topographical duty, all of the 6th infantry, will forthwith be relieved and join their regiment.

4. Fort Armstrong will be evacuated as early as practicable, and the garrison, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Davenport, of the 1st infantry, will be transferred to Fort Snelling, St. Peter's, except one officer, one non-commissioned officer, and ten men, to take charge of the public property at that post till it be disposed of. Assistant Surgeon Emerson will proceed with the command to Fort Snelling.

5. The companies of the 1st regiment of artillery, respectively stationed at Forts Severn and Washington, and the Washington arsenal, will immediately proceed to Fort Monroe, and thence, without delay, to join the army in Florida, *via* Savannah and the St. John's river. The battalion will be commanded by Major Gates. The following officers of the regiment on detached service will forthwith be relieved, and join their respective companies, for active service, without delay: First Lieutenants A. D. Mackay and E. S. Sibley, from engineer duty, and Second Lieutenant D. E. Hale, from ordnance duty. Assistant Surgeon Hawkins will accompany the battalion of artillery under Major Gates to Fort King, and then proceed to comply with his previous orders.

6. Major N. S. Clark, now of the 2d infantry, will assume command at Hancock barracks, and Brevet Major Dearborn, with companies F and K, will proceed to Boston harbor and garrison Fort Independence. The quarters will forthwith be cleared and be prepared for the accommodation of the troops by the proper departments, and when ready the commanding engineer at Boston will notify Major Dearborn accordingly.

7. The officers of the proper departments will furnish the necessary transportation, supplies, and all facilities for the execution of this order.

8. Captain G. W. Allen, 4th infantry, now on recruiting service, will repair to Newport, Kentucky, there relieve Major Thompson, and assume the duties of superintendent in the western department. Lieutenant Barry, of the 1st regiment of artillery, is assigned to duty at Newport, Kentucky.

By order of Alexander Macomb, major general, commanding in chief.

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

No. 15.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *January 29, 1836.*

SIR: By a report from the collector of Key West it appears that much alarm prevails there in consequence of the defenceless state of the island.

I have to request, as soon as you can properly do so, that you detach one of the companies under your command to reoccupy that place.

Very respectfully, &c.,

LEWIS CASS, *Secretary of War.*

Major General Scott, *Augusta, Georgia.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *January 29, 1836.*

SIR: I have been informed by General Hamilton that, under certain resolutions of the citizens of Charleston, volunteers have been called into the service, and provisions, ammunition, &c., purchased, with a view to aid in relieving the inhabitants of Florida from the devastations of the Seminole Indians.

I have to request that, so far as this force may be useful to you, it may be received into the public service, and that you will also authorize the reception and payment of the above-mentioned articles if you

shall need them in the prosecution of the duties intrusted to you. I am desirous that, so far as expenses have been incurred under the above resolutions, and with the generous motive which no doubt prompted them, that can be met agreeably to law and the usages of the service, this should be done; and I presume this object will be most readily effected by taking the volunteers and the *material* provided into the public service. Still this measure must depend upon your own view of your wants and of your means of supplying them.

I have requested the Navy Department to issue the necessary instructions to the revenue cutters employed on the Florida coast to receive your orders, and also to desire Commodore Dallas, with the squadron under his command, to co-operate with you. Be pleased to communicate freely with Commodore Dallas.

Very respectfully,

Major General Scott, *Augusta, Georgia.*

LEWIS CASS.

No. 16.

STEAMBOAT ROANOKE, *river Roanoke, January 25, 1836.*

SIR: General Scott directs me to present his compliments, and begs that you will send to Augusta, Georgia, several sets of infantry tactics—first and second volumes—for the use of the militia, and several other sets of the same to Fort King, Florida.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. CANFIELD, *Captain Topographical Engineers.*

General R. JONES, *Adjutant General United States Army.*

P. S.—We have lost, by an accident on the railroad, fifteen hours. My letter from Petersburg, Virginia, should have been dated January 24.

No. 17.

FAYETTEVILLE, *North Carolina, January 27, 1836.*

SIR: General Scott directs me to say that he wishes a quantity of tents to be sent to the St. John's, East Florida, that will make, with those now there, a sufficient number for 1,500 men, and camp-kettles and mess-pans for 3,000 men.

By the accident on the railroad we have lost twenty-four hours.

We shall probably stop one day at Columbia, two days at Augusta, and then proceed by way of Savannah.

I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. CANFIELD, *Captain Topographical Engineers.*

General R. JONES, *Adjutant General United States Army.*

No. 18.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, *Augusta, Georgia, January 31, 1836.*

SIR: I arrived here yesterday, after losing a day by an accident on the Petersburg railroad, and after stopping another at Columbia.

No important intelligence has reached me from the theatre of war, in Florida, except that the Seminoles are in greater force than was supposed, by the incorporation of captured and fugitive blacks, and the arrival of small parties from the Creeks in Alabama. I am happy to add that it is also reported that Brigadier General Clinch has communicated with the St. John's river, and received from thence several wagon loads of supplies, and a detachment of recruits.

At Columbia I learned from Brigadier General Eustis that he had called upon the governor of South Carolina for a detachment of 600 men. The governor being absent, I addressed a letter to him, requesting that the force might be extended to a *regiment* of ten companies, making 740 men, including sergeants, corporals, and musicians. On my way hither, I found that regimental meetings had been ordered by the governor, for the purpose of furnishing the force required by Brigadier General Eustis, and heard that one regiment had given, by volunteering, the company required of it. In regard to the object of the call—the war in Florida—I witnessed everywhere on my route an excellent spirit on the part of the South Carolinians.

On receiving, at this place, from Colonel Lindsay, and other well-informed persons, better intelligence respecting the force of the enemy, and the character of the country in which I have to conduct the war, my views and measures have been materially modified. It is now my opinion that the Seminoles cannot be promptly reduced to submission by a force much short of 5,000 men, and that the greater part of this force ought to be mounted.

I have accordingly made a second requisition upon the governor of South Carolina, and for a regiment of *mounted* men, to rendezvous at Purysburg, on the lower Savannah river; whence I propose to cause them to march into Florida, *via* Picolata. And I have required of the governor of Georgia two regiments of mounted men, to which I propose to give nearly the same direction—that is to say, Picolata, Fort Drane, or Fort King. For Tampa Bay, and to co-operate thence with the forces to be assembled on the St. John's river and its vicinity, I have further made a requisition upon the governor of Alabama for

a fifth regiment, to serve on foot, and which I have requested him to cause to rendezvous at Mobile. Colonel Lindsay I shall despatch from this place, for the purposes of mustering this regiment into service, and of furnishing it with arms, accoutrements, subsistence, and the necessary means of transportation to Tampa Bay, where, having arrived, he will be instructed to assume the command of the regiment and the companies of artillery now at that post.

I am afraid it will be supposed that I have called for too large a militia force for the suppression of the Seminoles, but I have not conversed with an intelligent person in the south who does not believe an army of 5,000 men indispensable to the speedy accomplishment of that object; and I have required that the greater part of the force shall be mounted, as being infinitely more effective against Indians than the same number on foot. The theatre of operations, also, I learn from persons much better acquainted with it than myself, is much less unfavorable to the movements and subsistence of horses than I had supposed, and I shall take care to have ample supplies of corn placed at Tampa Bay and on the St. John's.

[I find here a large number of muskets, but no accoutrements, and no cartridges for them, and the public powder being utterly *unfit for service*, Colonel Lindsay has, in order to supply the immediate demands of the service, been obliged to purchase powder, and to detain Captain Baden's company to make cartridges. Why we have taken the trouble to build arsenals, and to deposit muskets, without accoutrements, and without cartridges, it is not for me to say. Doubtless the three should always be found together.]

This arsenal is also without knapsacks, and Brigadier General Eustis writes to Colonel Lindsay that there are less than 2,000 in the harbor of Charleston. The latter informs me that he has required of Major Garland 3,500. I hope that they have already been shipped to Savannah or Picolata, together with tents for 1,500 men, in addition to the number now in the use of the troops in Florida, in store at this place and in Charleston. The 1,500 additional tents I asked Major Garland, whilst at Washington, to have sent without delay. Tents, in sufficient numbers to cover at least one-half of the men I shall have in the field; musket accoutrements for every musket, and knapsacks for *every* man, are indispensable. Haversacks are equally wanted; but as it would be in vain, I fear, to inquire for these at any of our depots, I have already given orders to have a sufficient number made.

Lieutenant Colonel Talcott told me, at Washington, that 500 of Hall's patent rifles had been sent to Charleston, and, on inquiring of Colonel Bomford, he stated the number sent thither to be 2,500. He added that every rifle was accompanied with everything necessary to its use in the field. As it is my intention to arm a large portion of the militia called for with this rifle, I shall be infinitely distressed to learn that any part of Colonel Bomford's statement, made to me, shall prove inaccurate.

I shall want, on the St. John's river, say at Picolata, in the next three months, about 320,000 rations, and, in the same time, at Tampa Bay, 160,000—including the number which may now be supposed to be at the two places. Of the meat part of the rations, I wish a third part to consist of bacon, (side pieces,) a third part of salt pork, and the remainder of fresh beef, which I shall cause to be purchased, and to move on the hoof with the army. In respect to bread, I wish at least three-fourths to be in the form called *hard*; for we shall have no time to bake for ourselves, and hard bread is more portable than soft, or the flour necessary for the one or the other. Please give a memorandum to the above effect to the commissary general of subsistence; that will suffice for him.

I think of setting out to-morrow evening for Milledgeville, in order to confer with the governor on the hostile dispositions recently evinced by the Creek Indians on the borders of this State. From the facts which have reached me, I think it probable that I shall deem it necessary to place a body of Georgia militia and another like force from Alabama in observation upon those Indians, as well to hold them in awe as to prevent their sending further reinforcements to the Seminoles.

This letter ought properly to be addressed to the Secretary of War; but as the general-in-chief complained, on a former occasion, that I did not communicate with him, I address myself to you for the information of both the Secretary and the general-in-chief.

I have the honor to remain, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General U. S. Army.*

P. S.—I expect to be back here at the end of three days, and at Savannah in a week.

W. S.

No. 19.

CHARLESTON, *January 31, 1836.*

GENERAL: I have seen General Eustis, and placed him in possession of your letter. I have also said to him what you desired. Colonel Bankhead will leave here probably on Tuesday for Savannah. There is a letter here directed to you from Major Garland, stating that tents for 1,000 men are ordered to Savannah. This letter is enclosed herewith. I am sorry to say that your fears as to the rifles were well founded. Not one of Hall's has been sent here. There are, however, 200 on hand, of the old pattern. There are but 38 common tents on hand, and none of any other kind at this place.

General Eustis is of opinion that both horses and mules should be purchased.

Nothing has been received from Fort King since the 6th instant; not much apprehension, however, is entertained for its safety. Captain Drane, with about 80 men, well armed, left Picolata about the 11th with provisions for that post; of these, also, nothing has been heard. If they had not succeeded in reaching their destination, the bad news would probably have reached this city. With an apology for this scrawl,

I am, general, your most obedient servant,

A. VAN BUREN.

Major General SCOTT, *Augusta, Georgia.*

No. 20.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, *Augusta, Georgia, February 2, 1836.*

Having ascertained that the governor of this State would be absent from Milledgeville to-day and to-morrow, I have delayed setting out to see him till this evening. I shall be back here in two or three days, and then proceed to Savannah, where I shall necessarily be detained longer than I could wish.

As apprehended, of the 500 patent rifles said by Lieutenant Colonel Talcott to be at Charleston, and the 2,500, as reported by Colonel Bomford, not one has arrived! I wish this fact to be distinctly placed under the eyes of the Secretary of War. From the want of rifles we shall be obliged to arm the volunteers and drafts with muskets, and here again, although we have muskets in abundance at this arsenal and at Charleston, we have (as reported to me by Brigadier General Eustis and Colonel Lindsay) but about two thousand five hundred musket accoutrements! It is useless, under such disappointments, to waste time in sending to the arsenal at Mount Vernon. I shall take it for granted that that depot, like all the other ordnance establishments in this quarter, is deficient in its supplies.

In this state of disappointment and vexation I shall endeavor to borrow of South Carolina, say 1,500 musket accoutrements, and twice as many knapsacks; but it is doubtful whether South Carolina has them to lend. Our storehouses are equally deficient in camp-kettles. These I have no hope of borrowing, and shall therefore immediately give orders to have as many made here, at Savannah, and Charleston, as I shall probably want.

I have just received from Major Garland an invoice of tents for one thousand men, ordered to Savannah. I asked him for one-half more, and he has sent no other article of camp equipage.

Musket-cartridges, say 160,000 rounds, I wish to be immediately sent from the north to Picolata. The companies of Captains Baden and Van Ness, here and at Charleston, are now engaged in making a supply for immediate use. On the subject of the strange deficiency under this head I have already (in my last letter) spoken with indignation.

I have to ask that the attempt be yet made to send to the St. John's river twenty-five hundred of Hall's patent rifles, *with everything necessary for their use in the field*. They may possibly arrive in time.

Copies of my letters to the governors of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida; also, to Colonel Lindsay, who will leave here in a day or two, will be sent to you by one of my staff to-morrow, in my absence.

The Seminole force, I have every reason to believe, is much greater than was apprehended at the time I left Washington. Governor McDuffie, among many others, strongly recommends that an overwhelming force should be marched into Florida at once.

I fear that I shall have a difficulty in obtaining the two regiments *mounted*, asked for from this State.

Cannot the 4th infantry be ordered from Louisiana to the theatre of operations? Volunteers to occupy the United States barracks at New Orleans, and to keep guard in that city, might readily be obtained by arrangement with the governor of Louisiana for a few months. I am strongly tempted to carry this idea into execution.

I have reason to believe that the greater part of the Creeks on the borders of this State, now remaining in the nation, are disposed to maintain peace with us. The band called *Eucheas* may be excepted. Between it and the whites, near Columbus, there has been some fighting, six or ten days since, and no doubt many of the young Creeks have gone off to join the Seminoles. All these matters I shall understand better when I shall have conversed with Governor Schley.

On looking again at Major Garland's letter, I do not perceive that the tents are to be sent to New York for shipment, in case the Delaware should be closed with ice. I may not, therefore, hear of them till the next general thaw. I beg that twice that number of wall and common tents be immediately sent to Florida from New York, together with camp-kettles for 1,500 men, as I may not be able to have made here, at Savannah and Charleston, half the number wanted of the latter article.

I remain, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General United States Army.*

No. 21.

AUGUSTA, *Georgia, February 3, 1836.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to transmit, by General Scott's order, copies of his letters to the governors of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, and to Colonel Lindsay.

With the highest respect, your obedient servant,

J. E. JOHNSTON, *Lieutenant Artillery.*

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General United States Army.*

No. 22.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, *Columbia, South Carolina, January 29, 1836.*

SIR: With this I have the honor to transmit to you a duplicate communication from the Secretary of War.

By a letter from Brigadier General Eustis, just received, I learn that he has made a call upon your excellency for 600 men. I will ask that that force be extended to a regiment, and that it consist exclusively of infantry, or infantry and riflemen—that is to say, of ten companies, with the field and staff provided for by the acts of Congress on the subject.

Volunteers will be gladly accepted in lieu of militia drafts, and I presume that they may be more readily obtained. For greater explicitness, I will add that *mounted* infantry or riflemen are not required.

I beg leave to suggest that it would much hasten the arrival of the force on the theatre of operations, say the St. John's river, East Florida, if your excellency would have the goodness to designate for the companies several different points of rendezvous in the navigable waters of the State, convenient for embarkation on board of the steamboats.

Arms and accoutrements shall be supplied by the United States. Any volunteers from the State already accepted to serve for the period of three months, unless sooner discharged, may be considered as a part of the force herein called for.

I shall set out to-night for Augusta, Georgia, where I may be detained several days, and then expect to proceed to Savannah. At the one or the other place I shall be happy to learn from your excellency what points have been given for the rendezvous of the South Carolina regiment.

I have the honor to remain, with high respect, your excellency's most obedient servant,
WINFIELD SCOTT.

His Excellency GEORGE McDUFFIE, *Governor of South Carolina.*

No. 23.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, *Augusta, Georgia, January 31, 1836.*

SIR: Since I had the honor to address you on the 29th instant I find it necessary to provide for a larger force than was then deemed necessary to put down the Seminoles in Florida, and to hold in check the Creeks in Alabama. I have, accordingly, now to call upon your excellency for a regiment of mounted men (to be armed as infantry or riflemen) for service in Florida, in addition to the regiment of foot already called for from South Carolina.

I will ask your excellency to be pleased to order the companies of mounted men, as soon as drafted or raised by volunteering, to rendezvous at Purysburg, on the Savannah river. At that place an officer of the United States army shall be in waiting to muster into the service of the United States the companies as they shall successively arrive, and to furnish the arms and accoutrements which may be required. The period of service for both regiments will be three months, unless sooner discharged. And if your excellency should prefer that the two regiments furnished by your State should be considered as forming a brigade, be pleased to designate the usual general staff for the same, and they shall be accepted and mustered into the service of the United States.

Hoping to hear from you on the subject of this and my former letter, I will add that I expect to remain in this place four or five days longer; and if obliged to visit Milledgeville to procure better intelligence respecting the temper and movements of the Creeks, that I shall return here within the time specified.

I have the honor to remain your excellency's most obedient servant,
WINFIELD SCOTT.

His Excellency GEORGE McDUFFIE, *Governor of South Carolina*

P. S.—But for the impression that the greater part of the expected theatre of war in Florida would be unfavorable to the subsistence and movements of cavalry, I should have asked for none but mounted men. On conversing with Colonel Lindsay and others at this place that impression has been materially changed; and as it will probably be more agreeable to the South Carolinians to volunteer to serve on horseback, I will now say that if any of the companies of the regiment first called for should present themselves at Purysburg mounted, they will be gladly accepted as part of that regiment.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

No. 24.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, *Augusta, Georgia, February 1, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's letter of the 30th ultimo, just brought to me by an express.

It will be quite as well for the whole force asked for in the first instance by Brigadier General Eustis to report to him in Charleston, as your excellency suggests, as for it to proceed by company and by different routes towards the theatre of operations, as was suggested by myself.

By the third section of the "act more effectually to provide for the national defence, by establishing a uniform militia throughout the United States," the organization of the militia was fixed, and has since undergone but slight modifications. Such of these as may be material I will briefly notice. The original act was approved May 8, 1792.

By the said third section "each regiment (shall consist) of two battalions, each battalion of five companies, each company of sixty-four privates." * * * "To each company one captain, one lieutenant, one ensign, four sergeants, four corporals, one drummer, and one fifer or bugler. That there shall be a regimental staff, to consist of one adjutant, one quartermaster, to rank as lieutenants, one paymaster, one surgeon, one surgeon's mate, one sergeant major, one drum major, and one fife major."

The material modification of this act is found in one entitled "An act concerning field officers of the militia," passed April 20, 1816, and in these words: "That from, (&c.,) instead of one lieutenant colonel commandant to each regiment, and one major to each battalion of the militia, as is provided by the act, (May 8, 1792, above quoted,) there shall be one colonel, one lieutenant colonel, and one major to each regiment of the militia, consisting of two battalions."

I will therefore beg your excellency to cause the second regiment I have had the honor to call for from South Carolina to be organized according to the provisions of law; and also the first, as far as may now be practicable without too great a loss of time.

I understood at Washington that mounted men, or mounted infantry and riflemen, were, in respect to pay, considered as cavalry; but that the officers' monthly pay was regulated by that of infantry. In respect to the former, I refer your excellency to the act approved January 2, 1795, sections 1, 2, and 3.

The general staff of a brigade is fixed by the act of April 18, 1814, in these words: "To each brigade an aide-de camp, with the rank of captain; and quartermasters of brigade, heretofore provided for by law," shall have the rank of captain. The fundamental act of 1792 having said that there shall be "to each brigade one brigadier general, with one brigade inspector, to serve also as brigade major, with the rank of major."

Expecting to be back at this place from Milledgeville in a day or two, and to remain till perhaps the 6th or 7th instant, I have the honor to remain, with the highest respect, your excellency's most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

His Excellency Governor McDUFFIE, &c.

No. 25.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, *Augusta, Georgia, February 2, 1836.*

SIR: By returns from Charleston, just received, I have to apprehend a delay in receiving from the north the full supply of knapsacks, musket accoutrements, tents, and camp-kettles, which will be required for the Florida campaign. To save time, I will beg your excellency to instruct the storekeepers of South Carolina, at Charleston or elsewhere, to let the United States have such of those articles as may be upon hand and which may be required.

Receipts shall be given for the articles, and I pledge myself to your excellency to cause the articles furnished to be replaced in kind from the depots of the United States without delay and without expense to South Carolina.

Your excellency will greatly oblige me by causing a note to be written to Brigadier General Eustis, at Charleston, in reply to this request, as I may be absent from Augusta in the direction of Milledgeville for several days. A copy of this letter I shall cause to be sent to Brigadier General Eustis for his information.

I have the honor to remain, with high respect, your excellency's most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

His Excellency GEORGE McDUFFIE, *Governor of South Carolina.*

No. 26.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, *Augusta, Georgia, January 31, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit with this a duplicate communication from the Secretary of War.

In pursuance of the authority conferred upon me, I have now to call upon your excellency to place under my command two regiments of mounted men, (infantry, or infantry and riflemen,) for the period of three months, unless sooner discharged, and which force I will immediately cause to be mustered into the service of the United States.

If it be preferred, the two regiments may be considered as constituting a brigade, and the usual general staff for such a corps will at the same time be mustered into the service of the United States.

The force herein called for is destined by me to act against the Seminole Indians in Florida, and I will beg your excellency to give the regiments one or more places of rendezvous, in the direction of (say) Picolata, where ample magazines shall be provided. The arms (rifles or muskets) and accoutrements which may be required to render the force effective shall be supplied at the same place, or earlier, according to circumstances.

It is my purpose to be in person at Picolata, as early, at least, as the 10th of next month; and I need not add how important it is that the Georgia force should be there as near that time as practicable.

In respect to the Creek Indians on the borders of Georgia, and who are understood to be unquiet, if not in a state of hostility toward the United States, I propose to confer with your excellency in person within the next two or three days.

In the meantime I have the honor to be your excellency's most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

His Excellency WM. SCHLEY, *Governor of Georgia.*

No. 27.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, *Augusta, Georgia, January 31, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit with this a duplicate communication from the Secretary of War.

In pursuance to the authority conferred upon me, I have now to call upon your excellency to place under my command one regiment of infantry, or infantry and riflemen, to serve on foot, for three months, (unless sooner discharged,) against the Seminole Indians in Florida.

I will beg your excellency to appoint Mobile as the rendezvous for the regiment, whither I shall send Colonel Lindsay, of the army, to muster it into the service of the United States, and to accompany it to its point of destination—Tampa Bay.

Colonel Lindsay will also cause the regiment to be supplied with the arms, the accoutrements, the ammunition, subsistence, and whatever else may be necessary to its efficiency in the field.

In respect to the Creek Indians on the borders of Georgia, I will beg your excellency to confer with Colonel Lindsay, to whom I shall give such instructions as may be deemed necessary. If, after conferring with him, a force should be deemed necessary to observe and hold in check the Creeks, I have to request that you will furnish that force, and place it in the position that may be determined upon by that conference. The force shall be mustered and taken into the service of the United States.

In the meantime I need not add how important it is, with a view to the operations against the Seminoles, that the regiment from Alabama destined to act from Tampa Bay should be speedily raised by draft or volunteering, and embark for that place.

I have the honor to remain your excellency's most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

His Excellency C. C. CLAY, *Governor of Alabama.*

No. 28.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, *Augusta, Georgia, February 1, 1836.*

SIR: With this communication your excellency will receive a duplicate one from the Secretary of War.

I am here engaged in procuring forces to suppress the Seminole Indians. With a view to this, I have asked for one regiment of foot and one of mounted men from South Carolina, two regiments of mounted men from Georgia, and one regiment of foot from Alabama. The latter I have requested the governor to cause to rendezvous at Mobile, whence it will proceed to Tampa Bay, when Colonel Lindsay, of the army, who will accompany it, will assume the command of the regiment and the regular companies he may find in garrison there. All the other troops, regular and militia, recently ordered to Florida, or now to be raised, will proceed by the St. John's river, open a communication with Brigadier General Clinch, form a junction with him and Colonel Lindsay, and, having opened a free communication with Tampa Bay, take that line as a new basis of operations, and prosecute the war with the utmost vigor.

The South Carolina regiment of foot will be on the St. John's by the 10th instant; the other regiments will arrive in that quarter later. One independent company has already sailed hence for that destination, and another will follow from this little patriotic town to-morrow. Brigadier General Eustis will accompany the South Carolina regiment of foot, and I shall follow closely.

I ought to add that four additional companies of regulars and one hundred and seven dragoons, recruits from New York, are probably already in movement for the same destination. In respect to the Creeks in Alabama, on the borders of Georgia, whose dispositions are doubtful, I shall take measures, in concert with the governors of Georgia and Alabama, to hold them in check and in awe, and particularly to prevent them from sending reinforcements to the Seminoles. I go for this purpose to-morrow to Milledgeville, and shall write fully to the governor of Alabama.

When I have added that I suppose it will be of great importance to cut the enemy off from his fastnesses to the left of the line from the St. John's river to Tampa Bay, and to throw him to the right, I shall have given you an outline of my means and my views.

In respect to the militia from your Territory, already much harassed by the war, I shall be happy to take into the service of the United States any four or six hundred mounted men who can be spared from the immediate defence of their homes, and whom your excellency may find it convenient to put in the field, but I make no positive requisition to that effect at this time. Any force actually embodied, or which you may cause to be embodied, with not more than the proportion of officers fixed by the act of 1792, for "establishing a uniform militia throughout the United States," shall be considered as being in the service of the United States for the period of three months from the time they embarked at the request of your excellency.

I shall be thankful, and pay the necessary expenses, if your excellency can find an opportunity to communicate the substance of this letter to General Clinch, to whom, though I shall write, I may not be able to reach from this quarter.

I have the honor to remain, with great respect, your excellency's most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Hon. J. H. EATON, *Governor of Florida.*

No. 29.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, *Augusta, Georgia, February 2, 1836.*

SIR: You will please repair to Alabama, without unnecessary delay, and cause to be in readiness at Mobile the arms, accoutrements, ammunition, flints, and knapsacks necessary to equip and render efficient in the field a regiment of infantry, which it is expected his excellency the governor of Alabama will, under a requisition that I have made to that effect, cause to be raised and rendezvous at that city. In the meantime you will correspond with the governor on the subject of the regiment, and endeavor to hasten its arrival at Mobile by any means in your power. As soon as aware of its near approach, you will engage the means of transporting it to Tampa Bay, accompanying it thither, and on your arrival assume the command of all the forces, regular and militia, assembled at that point. But, prior to the embarkation at Mobile, you will muster the regiment into the service of the United States for the period of three months, unless sooner discharged, and immediately after cause the rules and articles of war to be read at the head of the several companies.

In mustering the corps into service, you will be careful to see that there be not an excess of officers compared with the number of men, either in grade or number. In this respect you will take as your guide the act for "establishing a uniform militia throughout the United States," passed the 8th May, 1792, modified, in regard to the field officers, by the act of April 20, 1816.

To procure the arms and equipments mentioned, it may be necessary to visit the arsenal at Mount

Vernon, or to send to New Orleans. In either case, you will require what may be needed in my name and by my authority.

Should you, in your route to Mobile, learn that the Creek Indians are as hostilely disposed against the whites as has been, a little time since, reported, and which reports I do not now credit, you will immediately confer with the governor of Alabama on the subject, by letter, and, if practicable, in reference to the other duties assigned you, in person, on the subject; and in the case of evident necessity, request his excellency to place a regiment or battalion of infantry in observation upon those Indians, and I will, in such case, cause the regiment or battalion to be mustered into the service of the United States.

By the 20th of this month, at the latest, I hope to be in sufficient force on the St. John's river, or at Fort King or Fort Drane, to commence a system of vigorous operations against the Seminole Indians, and by that period you, I think, may be expected to have arrived at Tampa Bay. Your co-operation from that side may have a powerful influence on the result of the campaign, but I do not wish you to put anything seriously to hazard until you shall have heard from me, or until you shall be positively certain that I have pushed the war to within one or two marches of your position. In such case, with or without special instructions, you will press forward with energy until you open a communication with the main army. It is not probable, however, that you will find yourself many days at a time without instructions from headquarters, and I desire that you will avail yourself of all means to report frequently everything that may be interesting at or about your post.

It is unofficially reported that Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs, with a detachment of the fourth infantry, has been ordered from New Orleans to Tampa Bay. If this should be true, your force may be sufficient to enable you to leave the necessary garrison, and to operate a junction with the main army at the distance of three or four marches.

Relying fully on your zeal, gallantry, and judgment for the execution of the duties assigned to you, I remain, with great respect, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Colonel WILLIAM LINDSAY, *United States 2d Artillery, &c.*

P. S.—I have omitted to mention camp equipage, which you will also endeavor to procure for the Alabama regiment, and I will remind you of the great utility of furnishing every man with a haversack.

No. 30.

TALLAHASSEE, *February 3, 1836.*

DEAR SIR: To-night intelligence has reached me, and I greatly rejoice at it, that you are to take command of the Florida war. The authorities at the city of Washington greatly undervalue the power of this foe, taking into consideration the country that is to be operated in. Their numerical force cannot be less than 3,000, probably more. To conquer them, a greatly superior force should be sent to overawe them in the first place, and by garrisons and strong depots to hold the country as an advance upon it is made. It will be folly to move against them except such results can be effected; and short of three or four thousand men they cannot be attained. In an open field Greek may meet Greek, and contend for the palm of victory; but amidst the gloomy covert forests, where the savages can lie concealed, that sort of glory is too insecure and doubtful.

Will you permit me to suggest—and I do it with great respect towards you, for suffer me to say, as I hope you well know, that no one reposes in you more and greater confidence than I do—that the mode of action and operation should be an attack at different points at one and the same time.

General Clinch is locked in by the enemy at Camp King; for the last thirty days he has had no communication with Tampa Bay, distant from him about one hundred miles; the enemy occupies the ground between. Until the 20th of January, which is twenty-three days after the fell disaster of poor Dade, being within thirty-five miles of the conflict, he was without information of the butchery of his detachment. Of course you will perceive that everything of communication is cut off between those points. It is matter of hazard for an express to approach General Clinch either from east or west.

My suggestion to you is this: that the force you can command from Georgia, say 1,000 or 1,200 men, be hastened on to Camp King. General Clinch has only about two hundred regulars under command at this time. A few days' provisions will answer. It need not be a matter of concern with you about supplies. The Secretary of War writes that 120,000 rations are ordered from New York, and here and at Tampa will be found a supply for 3,000 men for forty or fifty days.

The Georgia troops should be advanced to Camp King. You should proceed here, and go by water from St. Mark's to Tampa. The force called out here, 500 men, are coming in; about 200 are already here. I propose sending them by water to Tampa, where there is already about 250 effectives. The governor of Georgia speaks of having rendezvoused at Thomasville (near here) 400 men; these also should be embarked at St. Mark's for Tampa, and thus you will have a force there of 1,200 or 1,400 men. A like force under Clinch, to advance from the north, would enable you to make a junction in three days, and cut off all the Withlacoochee Indians. On the other hand, if the advance be made entirely from the direction of Camp King, the Indians will retreat before you, not meet you, and on their way may destroy the post and friendly Indians at Tampa, and our transports there. Three of our ships-of-war are there, but cannot approach the fort near enough to give aid.

I write in haste, and for any further particulars refer you to Colonel Hawkins.

With great respect,

JOHN H. EATON, *Governor of Florida.*

Major General WINFIELD SCOTT.

No. 31.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 2, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit for your information a copy of a letter this day addressed to the governor of Georgia. If the force called out by the governor of Georgia is, in your opinion, required, you will please receive it into service; and if not, it will be discharged without delay.

So far as the expenditures which have been incurred for the Florida militia, received into service by General Clinch, can, from the state of the accounts, be met with reference to this department, you are requested to direct their payment. Your acquaintance with the laws and usages of the service will enable you to judge what cases may be safely paid without this reference. The paymaster general will give the paymasters the necessary instructions to make such payments to the militia serving under you as you may direct. He will furnish the paymasters with such forms and detailed instructions as, I trust, will enable them to perform their duties in such a manner as will insure the prompt settlement of the accounts.

Very respectfully, &c.,

LEWIS CASS.

Major General Scott, *Augusta, Georgia.*

No. 32.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 2, 1836.*

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 23d ultimo, and, in answer, beg leave to inform you that the arrangements you have made for calling a militia force into the service of the United States for the defence of Florida are approved by the President, and the expense will be met by the United States, so far as the same may be in conformity with the law and the usages of the service.

Agreeably to your suggestion, I have directed a warrant to be issued in your favor for the sum of \$15,000, which will be remitted to you in a draft on the Bank of Augusta, for the purpose of being applied to meet the above expenditures. I have to request that regular vouchers may be taken in all cases, specifying the amount and object, in order to facilitate the settlement of the accounts. Be pleased, also, to cause the men to be regularly mustered into service. It is expected they will serve the term of three months after their arrival at the place of rendezvous, unless sooner discharged. It will be necessary that the provisions should be issued upon regular provision returns, signed by the commanding officer. I have to request that your excellency would communicate freely with Major General Scott, to whom the general operations have been committed, and who will make such a disposition of the forces raised as he may think proper.

Very respectfully, &c.,

LEWIS CASS.

His Excellency WILLIAM SCHLEY, *Governor of Georgia, Milledgeville.*

No. 33.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 6, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to request that the course stated in my letter to you of the 29th ultimo, respecting the supplies furnished by the citizens of Charleston, may be pursued with relation to other places which have, in like manner, voluntarily interposed their means for the suppression of the Seminole hostilities.

Very respectfully, &c.,

LEWIS CASS.

Major General Scott, *Augusta, Georgia.*

No. 34.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, *Augusta, Georgia, February 6, 1836.*

SIR: For the information of the Secretary of War and the general-in-chief I have to report that I returned from Milledgeville last night.

From the governor of the State I was happy to learn that all apprehension of disturbances on the part of the Creeks on the Chattahoochee had entirely subsided. Their chiefs have solemnly pledged themselves to keep their people quiet within the nation; to deliver any property which may be taken or stolen from the whites, &c. The governor concurred with me in the opinion that it would hardly be necessary to station a regiment or battalion in observation upon those people; but it was agreed upon between us that he should adopt that precautionary measure in case of any change in their attitude or dispositions.

By my visit to Milledgeville, I believe I may flatter myself that I have quickened the measures necessary to obtain, by volunteering or drafting, the force required of this State. A most excellent spirit prevails both on this and the other side of the Savannah river. Governors McDuffie and Schley are exerting themselves to the utmost to furnish their quotas of men. The former is now with me for the convenience of arranging certain details. The South Carolina regiment of foot has gone to Charleston, and probably will embark hence to-morrow or the next day. The second call for a regiment of mounted men will also be mainly supplied from the same State by volunteering. Perhaps one or two of its companies will present themselves on foot. They shall be accepted; and the whole number may be expected at the general rendezvous (Purysburg) by the 16th instant.

The call made upon Georgia will be complied with as speedily as possible. Of the twenty companies, (two regiments,) probably only a little more than one-half will be mounted. These are directed to march upon Picolata, *via* Colerain, on the St. Mary's river, where I shall, as at Purysburg, have subsistence for men and horses provided. The companies on foot will proceed from Macon by steamboats to Picolata; five have already taken that route.

By the term *regiment*, in my several requisitions, I had reference to the organization prescribed by the "act more effectually to provide for the national defence by establishing a uniform militia throughout the United States," approved May 8, 1792, modified, in respect to the higher officers, by the act of April 20, 1816, "concerning field officers of the militia." A regiment, therefore, consists of seven hundred and forty-four *enlisted* men, including non-commissioned staff.

If there be any act of Congress respecting the organization or pay of militia, whether cavalry, infantry, or mounted men, not in Cross's Militia Laws, I beg you will point it out to me, or rather send me a copy. Governor McDuffie thinks there is one giving two lieutenants to each company of infantry, and that the South Carolina law, which specifies two lieutenants, is founded on an act of Congress to that effect. The Georgia law is, in this respect, the same, which increases the presumption; but Governor Schley, like Governor McDuffie, could not find the act in the Code of the United States. Out of respect to those States, I suppose it to be my duty to accept of the two lieutenants per company of infantry, and the act of 1792 expressly gives two to each company of cavalry. In fact, four officers per company of sixty-four privates are necessary to its efficiency in the field.

I have caused upwards of one hundred horses to be purchased in this neighborhood, and in two days more the number will be completed to one hundred and fifty. They are designed as mounts for the dragoon recruits and for the baggage-train. The larger portion will be sent off to Savannah the day after to-morrow, and the remainder are to follow closely. The average cost of these horses will be something less, I think, than one hundred and twenty dollars, including a commission to the agent employed of five per centum. They are equal to the service for which they are intended, and are thought to be cheaply purchased at that rate.

I have also ordered the purchase of twenty two-horse wagons, in addition to an equal number purchased by the direction of Brigadier General Eustis below, which will be sent hence to Savannah. Even these and fifty pack-horses will scarcely suffice for the baggage and subsistence train of the army to be assembled in Florida.

My duties on the route of Columbia and Milledgeville have thrown me out of the line of intelligence from the seat of war. To-morrow I shall set out for Savannah, where I may be detained for some days in calculating and arranging the supplies which will be wanted in Florida, and for the troops on their route thither.

[From a letter addressed by Colonel Bomford to the storekeeper in Charleston, I learn that five hundred rifles have been at length ordered to that place, but no advice of the shipment had been received. Five hundred *ordered* instead of the two thousand five hundred *sent*! It will be impossible for me to make war without arms, and I think the troops who are to serve in Florida entitled to the most effective. I trust that a former letter, in respect to these rifles, will have been promptly attended to.]

Brigadier General Eustis will precede me by a few days in arriving in Florida. He will be instructed to occupy himself in organizing the troops as they shall reach the St. John's, the means of transportation, &c. Lieutenant Colonel Bankhead I shall detain to muster into service the mounted regiment of South Carolinians who are to rendezvous at Purysburg, near Savannah.

I have had the honor to receive, this evening, two letters from the Secretary of War, both dated the 29th ultimo. His instructions shall be attended to.

The force that first sailed from Charleston for St. Augustine volunteered for the immediate defence of the latter place, and only for one month. I shall soon cause it to be honorably discharged, for the moment we are in force on the St. John's, and take up the expected line of operations, St. Augustine will become an interior position. That line of operations will probably be first from Picolata to Tampa Bay, in order to open communications with Forts King and Drane, and with Colonel Lindsay. My object will be to cut the enemy off from the country to the left of that line, and to force him to the right. If I succeed, the theatre of operations, though favorable to him, will be much less bad for us than the southern part of the peninsula. No definitive plan of operations, however, will be laid down till I shall have arrived upon the St. John's, and have obtained the best information which can be had.

I am more and more persuaded that I have not called for too large a force. By the 25th instant I may, perhaps, have in Florida, in all, four thousand men, and by March, five hundred more. It is not probable that I shall delay offensive movements quite so long. Whatever may wisely be attempted with smaller numbers shall not be neglected.

I remain, sir, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General United States Army.*

No. 35.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, *Savannah, February 9, 1836.*

Sir: I arrived here this evening, and wrote in haste by the steamer John Stony, just from St. Augustine, bound to Charleston, to take the chance of this letter finding you at the latter place.

It is presumed that the South Carolina regiment of foot has, by this time, embarked for Florida, and I am anxious that you should be there (at St. Augustine or Picolata) as soon as practicable. If I were to send Lieutenant Colonel Bankhead, he would find himself commanded by one or two full colonels, and perhaps by a brigadier general, (from Georgia,) in less than five days after his arrival.

The objects to be accomplished by your early presence in Florida are many: First, your rank, experience, and talents, will enable you to organize the service in that quarter generally. Secondly, to cause to be mustered into the service the militia companies which are there, and those which may be daily expected to arrive, to open communications with Brigadier General Clinch and Fort King, and, in general, to do whatever the good of the service or particular emergencies may require. For these purposes

you will assume the general command of the left wing of *the army of Florida*, and establish your headquarters, for the time, either at Picolata, or St. Augustine, visiting the other place. I shall follow you in a few days; that is, as soon as the greater part of the militia called for from South Carolina and Georgia shall have reached Florida, and I shall have made the necessary arrangements (from this place) for the entire force destined for the war in that quarter.

Five companies of foot embarked on the 4th instant, on board a steamer at Macon for Picolata, and three companies of mounted men were to have marched from the neighborhood of Milledgeville on the 7th or 8th, for the same destination, *via* Colerain, on the St. Mary's river. Other companies of Georgia militia will proceed from day to day by the same routes. Those on foot by the Ockmulgee, and the mounted men by Colerain from the interior of the State, and in a few days the mounted regiment of South Carolinians will begin to arrive at Puryburg, on the Savannah, to march thence, by Colerain, to the same general destination, Picolata.

I shall probably cause the companies of this regiment, as they successively present themselves, to be mustered into the service at Puryburg; but all that shall reach Florida without having been so mustered, will there, by your orders, be formally taken into service.

In compliment to the State laws of South Carolina and Georgia, I wish that every company of militia, whether mounted or on foot, of sixty-four privates and upwards, may be accepted with one captain, two lieutenants, (one first and one second,) and one ensign or cornet. If the excess of privates, per company, be very great, I have no objections that even another lieutenant, per company, should be accepted. For the field officers and the staff of a regiment, see the acts heretofore referred to. The companies being below the standard of sixty-four privates each, I wish to be accepted with some liberality in respect to subalterns.

I am as anxious to see you in person as I am desirous that you should be early in Florida. If you can call here without much delay, do so; if not, proceed at once to your destination. My wish is to converse with you as to the impending campaign in general, and also to learn the precise quantity of forage ordered to Florida, and the number of rations. But I have time to say no more, except that I shall send forage and rations to Colerain for the mounted Georgians, who are to take that route, and the same to Puryburg for the second regiment of South Carolinians. Unfortunately, the quartermaster here is sick in bed.

Twenty two-horse wagons, with harness, I have ordered to be purchased at Augusta. They will pass here in a few days for Florida. I have also caused to be purchased one hundred and twenty dragoon horses, and about thirty for the baggage-train. How many of each have you sent to Florida?

If the cavalry recruits from New York should not touch here, their horses must be sent to Picolata.

With great respect, I remain yours, truly,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General EUSTIS, &c.

No. 36.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, February 10, 1836.*

SIR: Your letter of the 31st of January, from Augusta, communicating the preliminary measures you have taken in reference to the amount of militia force which you have called for, and the proposed military operations in Florida, has been duly received and submitted to the Secretary of War and the general-in-chief.

Those subjects of your letter which refer to the several departments of the staff have been communicated to those departments respectively, with reiterated instructions to furnish all supplies necessary for your operations in Florida. It may be proper to remark, however, that as the law makes no provision for the issue of knapsacks for the militia, these articles cannot be supplied. This subject has this day been referred by the Secretary of War to the military committee, with a request that a law be passed authorizing the issue of knapsacks to the militia.

Since writing the above, I have received your communication of the 2d of February, which has also been submitted to the Secretary of War and the general-in-chief. Orders have been given to the several departments of the staff to furnish as promptly as possible the supplies required by your several communications.

Your suggestion that the 4th infantry should be ordered to the theatre of operations has been anticipated in part by Major General Gaines, who has ordered the companies from Baton Rouge to Florida.

The copies of your letters to the governors of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, also to Colonel Lindsay, mentioned in your communication of the 2d instant, forwarded by Lieutenant Johnson, have also been received.

A letter from Captain Belton, the commanding officer at Fort Brooke, received the 8th instant, reports that he has taken into service about ninety of the friendly warriors, located in his immediate vicinity, with a view to co-operate against the hostile Indians. The government is by no means disposed to employ the Indians in this affair; but as matters may have proceeded so far as to be beyond its control, it is now left entirely to your discretion.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

Major General Scott, *Commanding in Florida, Savannah, Georgia.*

No. 37.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, *Savannah, February 11, 1836.*

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your excellency's communication of the 3d instant by the hands of your aide-de-camp, Colonel Hawkins, whom I have placed in possession of my means and plans for the prosecution of the war against the Seminole Indians. The details he will communicate to you.

I am very thankful for the complimentary expressions contained in your letter, and still more for the valuable information and suggestions it contains. The former I shall endeavor to the utmost to deserve by a prompt termination of the war that has so greatly afflicted a large portion of your Territory.

I have but little to add to my letter to your excellency of the 1st instant. The militia forces called for from South Carolina and Georgia are already in movement by land or by water, and I hope the regiment of Alabamians will soon be at Mobile, so as to arrive at Tampa Bay by the 25th instant at the latest.

With the exception of about 450 Georgians, all the forces destined to act from the St. John's river may be expected to arrive by the same date, and I shall be there about the 18th. Brigadier General Eustis will precede me, and I shall commence operations promptly.

I have preferred to cause the greater part of the reinforcements to assemble at Picolata and St. Augustine, as these places are more accessible from Fort King, and because the magazines will be on the St. John's. Besides, I still entertain the hope of finding the great body of the enemy above the line from St. Augustine to Tampa Bay, and of driving them towards Middle Florida and Georgia. If I succeed in doing so, the theatre of operations will be much narrowed, and, although the surface of the country will be favorable to the enemy, it will be much less bad for us there than that below.

In respect to the Florida militia which your excellency may have, or shall find it necessary to put into the field, defensive positions are suggested; and if I should be able to push the war to their vicinity, the Florida militia would then have an opportunity of assuming the offensive, and of striking to great advantage. All this, however, I will beg leave to refer to your own discretion and better knowledge of the necessity of the case. Whatever may be required on my part in respect to the acceptance and payment of the force detached by you, under the limitations heretofore stated, shall be readily done.

I hope that my letter of the 1st instant was received in time to render it unnecessary, in your excellency's judgment, to send any part of the militia of Florida to Tampa Bay. Even without a reinforcement from New Orleans, (of which I know nothing except by rumor,) Colonel Lindsay will by the 25th instant be in sufficient force at that point.

Hoping to interchange frequent communications with your excellency, I have the honor to remain, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

His Excellency J. H. EATON, *Governor of Florida.*

No. 38.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, *Savannah, February 16, 1836,*

SIR: I arrived here this day week, and have been most fully occupied in regulating the supplies and the movements of the troops destined for Florida. Hence I have not had a moment to look into the subjects referred to me in the letters of the Secretary of War, dated the 29th ultimo and the 6th instant, and apprehend that if I were to undertake to go *thoroughly* into those matters, I should be nothing but an auditor of accounts for the rest of the campaign.

My information from Florida represents a virtual truce between the small force under Brigadier General Clinch and the enemy. The former is too weak to act offensively, and the latter, like all other Indians, never attack field-works, though of the slightest construction. Indeed, of the positions and movements of the enemy there is nothing recent or specific. The route from Picolata to Forts Drane and King seems to be open for even the smallest detachments.

Brigadier General Eustis passed here two days ago with Captain Van Ness's company of United States artillery, on board a steamer bound to St. Augustine. I approve of his detention at Charleston, where he made himself highly useful in preparing the means for the campaign, and in mustering into service the regiment of South Carolina foot. This regiment, or nine of its companies, embarked a day or two before him, and the tenth company has followed. Of the other regiment from that State, which will be mounted, (except one company, and that passed here yesterday in a steamer,) I only know that it was expected to begin to arrive yesterday on the Savannah river. Learning that Purysburg was not so favorable a point for crossing as Hudson's Ferry, twenty-two miles above, I despatched an order by an express, some days ago, to change the direction of the regiment accordingly. Captain Page is gone up in a small steamer belonging to the engineer department, with arms and subsistence for this regiment, and to assist in passing it across the river. He has my instructions to muster it into service.—(See accompanying paper A.)

Of the two mounted regiments asked for from Georgia, probably not more than twelve companies will present themselves on horseback. Five of the latter are now presumed to be at Colerain, on the St. Mary's river, or beyond, and five on foot arrived a few days since from Macon, at Darien. Steamers, with subsistence, have been despatched to take the foot to Picolata, and Lieutenant Colonel Bankhead is gone to muster the battalion into service. A steamer had been previously despatched with subsistence for men and horses to Colerain or Traders' Hill, (within five miles of each other,) and to Jacksonville. All the mounted men from South Carolina and Georgia will pass by those places. The market of this vicinity could not supply the required quantity of grain for that steamer, and I have been obliged to substitute rice-meal for Hudson's Ferry on this river. If the Arctic, supposed to be yet fast in the ice of the Chesapeake, had arrived, we should have had corn for Colerain, Jacksonville, (on the St. John's,) and Hudson's Ferry. I deem it quite unfortunate that some reference to the thermometer had not been made before the shipment of troops and supplies, in the dead of winter, from Baltimore. Every body and thing on board the Arctic I consider as thrown out of the campaign, and I fear the same conclusion would be just if applied to the tents, knapsacks, and rifles expected from the clothing and ordnance bureaus.

In respect to subsistence for men and horses, to be placed on the St. John's and at Tampa Bay, I beg leave to refer to instructions given by me, copies of which (B and C) are herewith enclosed. [The papers A, B, and C, by mistake, have preceded this letter.]

Colonel Hawkins, the aide-de-camp of Governor Eaton, arrived here a few days since, bringing despatches, and he has set out on his return with my answer. I had anticipated his inquiries, generally, by my letter to his excellency, dated the first instant, (a copy of which has been forwarded,) and I have

said to him, more in detail, that it will be preferable to place any force he may have in the field or find it necessary to call out (not exceeding 400 or 600 men) in *defensive* positions for the protection of the settlements of Middle Florida, as it was still my hope to cut off the hostile Indians from the southeast, and drive them towards those settlements. I added that if I could succeed in that wish, the Florida militia might, as approached, pass from the defensive to the offensive, but I have not *required* the levy of a single company in Florida.

I learn by newspapers that from 600 to 1,000 men, mostly volunteers, have sailed from New Orleans for Florida, I think Tampa Bay. I have not called for a single man of the regulars or militia from Louisiana. Perhaps the reported force volunteered for the temporary protection of Tampa Bay, as certain companies sailed hence and from Charleston for the specific defence of Picolata and St. Augustine some weeks ago. Hence I could not rely on the troops from Louisiana for the general purposes of the campaign, and therefore did nothing to arrest the detaching and the march of troops from this quarter. But if Tampa Bay has been reinforced from Louisiana, and to the extent reported, Colonel Lindsay will be in a condition, on arriving with the Alabama regiment, to act offensively in any direction, and independent of support.

His excellency Governor Eaton estimates the enemy's armed force, including blacks, I presume, at 3,000, against which I may have, by the end of this month, something less than 5,000 men in the field, say, 1,400 mounted, and about 3,200 on foot, and not a word has been heard of or from the United States dragoon recruits since I left Washington. The mounts for them, however, have arrived from Augusta, together with about thirty horses applicable to the baggage train. Instructions have been repeated to send those recruits to this place for their horses, should they touch at Charleston.

Nothing has yet been heard from the governor of Alabama, or from Colonel Lindsay, in respect to the regiment asked for from that State, but I do not doubt that the utmost activity and zeal will be displayed by both in complying with the wishes I have expressed to them respectively. I cannot too highly applaud the spirit that has been manifested in South Carolina and Georgia. Governors McDuffie and Schley have lent themselves powerfully to the occasion. The former has made extensive circuits to inspire, to detach, and to organize, and both have thrown open the arsenals and magazines of their States to supply, as far as they could, our wants; but, unfortunately, we shall still be greatly deficient in tents, knapsacks, and rifles, unless supplied from the north. I shall direct returns to be sent to Washington of such articles as we have been obliged to borrow, and hope, for the honor of the United States, as well as to redeem my personal pledge, that each and every one will be promptly replaced in kind. The lower parts of Georgia and South Carolina should not long be left disarmed of the means of putting effective detachments of militia in the field. A like consideration has induced me to leave the feeble company of United States artillery at the Augusta arsenal behind. That city has sent into Florida two fine companies of volunteers and I do not think the United States have the moral right to place the implements and munitions of war in the midst of such a population, without placing at the depot a competent guard. That company is, moreover, still engaged in fixing ammunition for the Florida army.

With my approbation, Brigadier General Eustis accepted the services of a company of Charleston volunteers, to occupy Fort Moultrie in the absence of its regular garrison. This arrangement rendered Captain Van Ness's company disposable for the field.

Brigadier General Eustis has been instructed to send the revenue cutter Jefferson to coast Florida as far as Key West, for information, &c. On the return of the cutter I shall act on the suggestion of the Secretary of War, and send, if necessary, a company to reoccupy the evacuated post.

Hoping by to-morrow, or at the latest the day after, to have done everything here in my power for the good of the campaign, I shall set out for Florida, and occupy myself equally at St. Augustine and Picolata—places only about seventeen miles apart. The post office I understand is at the former.

Captain Page has been ordered to proceed, after a few days, to the Creek nation, stopping on the way to muster into service a battalion that the governor of Georgia, by arrangement with me, has thought it prudent to place in observation upon that people. Should the governor of Alabama have deemed it necessary to adopt a similar measure, Captain Page is also instructed to muster the force put in observation from that State.

I shall arrive in Florida in advance of rather more than half the forces called for from South Carolina and Georgia, and probably before the Alabama regiment has reached its destination. All that may profitably be attempted before the arrival of the rearmost companies from the two former States shall be put in practice; but it is not my expectation to risk any detachment of less than, say, 700 or 1,000 men beyond supporting distance of a like body. At Picolata I hope to find a full report from Brigadier General Clinch in answer to all my inquiries; and finally, I may flatter myself that towards the end of this month I shall be in condition to commence decisive operations.

With great respect, I remain, sir, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General United States Army.*

P. S.—Brigadier General Eustis is fully instructed to do in Florida before my arrival all that I could myself execute if there in person.

Lieutenant Chambers arrived here the night before the last. Have all the other lieutenants who were on the 21st ultimo ordered to join the companies in Florida, or expected to be there, got *excused* from the dangers and hardships of the campaign? I hear nothing of any of them.

February 17.—The steamer in which I am to go to Florida, and which was expected last night, has not arrived. The head of the mounted South Carolina regiment has reached this river above. The rear is expected to follow in six or seven days. I have *heard* of the movement of but ten companies of Georgians, besides the two from Augusta already in Florida.

W. S.

No. 39.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, *Savannah, February 14, 1836.*

SIR: I expect to want at Tampa Bay, between the first of March and the middle of May, for the army to be employed under my command against the hostile Seminole Indians, independent of the wants on account of such of those Indians as may be forced to emigrate, subsistence as follows:

For *men*, two hundred and fifty thousand *complete* rations, and for *horses*, one hundred and twenty thousand rations of corn and oats and forty thousand rations of hay or fodder.

From each of these supplies you will please deduct what you may estimate to be at Tampa Bay on the first of the next month, or on its way thither. The remainder you will immediately begin to purchase and ship to that place, say a third (except the long forage) early in March, another third by the first of April, and the other third by the first of May. The long forage, in the whole, must be at Tampa Bay by the first of April, and begin to arrive by the 10th of March.

To enable you to judge with accuracy the quantity of each kind of subsistence to be sent, you will call for a return from the proper officers at Tampa Bay by the first conveyance that may go to that place and return to New Orleans. This you may do in my name.

As it is feared that the army will be deficient in tents and knapsacks, you will please send any that may be on hand at New Orleans to Tampa Bay—say a number of each sufficient for one thousand men.

I am also ignorant of the number of rounds of fixed musket and rifle cartridges which I may find at the same general depot.

If there should be at New Orleans a supply of either on hand, send to the number of eighty thousand musket cartridges, and twenty-five thousand for rifles, with the first subsistence you may ship; and in lieu of cartridges, an equivalent in powder, lead, paper, and twine. Send, at the same time, say, two hundred rounds of fixed canister for twenty four-pound howitzers, and twice that number of rounds for six-pounders. You may make a partial deduction from each kind of ammunition, according to your knowledge of the quantity supposed to be already at Tampa Bay.

In respect to the rations for *men*, the bread part must, to the extent of seven-eighths of the whole number, be in the form called *hard*. The utmost exertions must be made to have the necessary quantity baked, if the market should not be able to supply it, at once. The meat part of the rations, to the extent of three-fifths of the whole, must consist of well-cured sides of bacon, and the remainder of pork, as it is not expected that many cattle can be purchased in the southern part of Florida.

If there be not tents on hand near you, you will cause the number asked for to be immediately made and shipped.

Show to the commissary of subsistence at New Orleans this letter, on whom it will be as obligatory, in all that concerns his department, as if it were directly addressed to him.

Relying on the zeal and promptitude of you both, I remain, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

The UNITED STATES ASSISTANT QUARTERMASTER, *New Orleans.*

P. S.—Since writing the above I have heard it said, on some uncertain rumor, that six hundred or seven hundred volunteers had sailed from New Orleans for Tampa Bay. This force was not included in the foregoing estimates and requisitions, which were forwarded on the supposition that I should have in the field, say, 900 regulars, 1,480 men (half mounted) from South Carolina, 1,480 (part mounted) from Georgia, and 740 (foot) from Alabama.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

No. 40.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, *Savannah, February 12, 1836.*

SIR: I shall want at Picolata sufficient grain to feed (say about) 1,700 horses for seventy days, and hay for the same number of horses about one-third of that time.

About 4,800 bushels of corn and no pounds of hay have been ordered to Picolata from Baltimore; and you are no doubt acquainted with the quantity sent from Charleston.

To complete the supply of each kind of forage specified above as likely to be wanted on the St. John's river, you will immediately take measures to purchase and to ship thither what may be required. It is not important that all the forage yet to be purchased should arrive at once, as a portion of it will not be wanted in six or eight weeks. You may accordingly regulate yourself in the purchase and shipment, bearing in mind that there are but small means of storage at Picolata.

As Brigadier General Eustis is expected to leave Charleston to-day, I address myself directly to you.

With respect, yours truly,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Lieutenant J. L'ENGLÉ, *Assistant Quartermaster United States Army, Charleston, South Carolina.*

No. 41.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, *Savannah, February 12, 1836.*

SIR: By a letter from the Secretary of War you will have been advised of my approach for the purpose of taking upon myself the general direction of the war in Florida. No mortification ought to be felt by you because the command has been given to me. I am your senior, and it was known that I was your friend. With very limited and, as experience has shown, inadequate means, you have maintained your

positions in the enemy's country, and you have fought a battle with honor to yourself and the handful of brave men who were under you. I shall have an overwhelming force, with ample magazines and means of transportation, together with all the benefits of your better local knowledge and personal services. I have come to this place by the upper route, *via* Columbia and Milledgeville, for the purpose of making arrangements in person to facilitate and hasten the movements of detachments of militia called for from South Carolina and Georgia—two regiments, or 1,480 men, from each, and one regiment, or 740 men, in addition, from Alabama. I have despatched Colonel Lindsay to hasten the embarkation of the latter from Mobile, and to accompany this regiment to Tampa Bay, where he will assume the command, on his arrival, (say from the 20th to the 25th instant,) of all the forces he may find there, and operate thence towards the main army, which will move from Picolata and St. Augustine.

The remainder of the reinforcements ordered to Florida will be assembled at Picolata and St. Augustine. Brigadier General Eustis precedes me by a few days, to organize and place in position the troops which first arrive, and to open a communication with you and Camp King, (at least by letter;) and I am happy to learn, unofficially, that you are in security, and have kept open the communication with Picolata *via* Fort King.

I am unable as yet, from the want of recent information from the theatre of war and better topographical knowledge of that theatre, to lay down any definite plan of operations. I shall rely much on communications to be received from you on all points necessary to the formation of such plan; but my present idea is, that it may be best to move upon the road to St. Augustine to Tampa Bay, until joined by Colonel Lindsay, from the latter place, and, if possible, to cut off the greater number of the Indians from the fastnesses below that line. By confining the enemy above, the theatre will be much narrowed; and, although the country will be favorable to him, it will be much less bad for us than the southern part of the peninsula. What hope is there, say with 3,000 men, of accomplishing this leading object? In the meantime I can make any movement that may facilitate your junction with me at some favorable point; or, the positions of Forts Drane and King being succored, or considered as secure, you may remain at the former till the main army shall reach, in driving the enemy, your immediate vicinity. Let me have, as promptly as possible, and freely and fully, your views on these, and on all other points that may be interesting to the service.

Brigadier General Eustis, with a regiment of foot from South Carolina, will probably be on the St. John's or at St. Augustine about the 15th instant. Three companies of United States artillery and about one hundred dragoon recruits, all from the north of the Potomac, will be there soon after; and two companies of United States artillery, from North Carolina, have already reached the same destination. Some wagons and horses are also gone, and others are to follow. From Georgia, a part of the forces on foot, say five companies, left Macon by steam on the 7th instant, and the remainder of the militia of the same State, mostly mounted, are no doubt now in route. Finally, the regiment of mounted South Carolinians may be expected to pass this place in the next seven or eight days. I therefore hope to be in force at Picolata and St. Augustine by the 25th instant, and personally present before the 20th.

I have this instant learned that I may not expect to have in Florida more than 960 of the Georgia militia before the end of this month. I, however, shall not wait for the remainder, but commence operations probably about the 25th instant, if I shall hear from you by that time.

I have provided about forty two-horse wagons, and shall have (say) about one hundred pack-saddles. Shall I be able to operate with the former, or are the two means of transportation in due proportion to each other? My knowledge of the interior of Florida is yet but very imperfect. Please send me one or more good guides, if you have them, and any good interpreter who may be with you. If those persons join me after I shall have advanced into the interior, it may be sufficient.

Please give me the best intelligence you can as to the distribution of the enemy over the face of the country; his numbers, including blacks, and the proportions of foot and mounted. Where are the women and children probably concealed?

I shall wish to organize a corps of *scouts* or *spies*. Will Colonel Warren (who has been with you) make a good commander of such corps, or can you recommend one? What other individuals can you point out as serviceable members of such corps?

What is your strength in regulars, volunteers, and friendly Indians? What your means of subsistence for men and horses? and what means of transportation have you in wagons, horses, mules, and pack-saddles?

If you, from your better knowledge of the interior of Florida and the probable distribution of the enemy, think it best that I should, with the whole or part of the new forces, operate on the direction of Forts King and Drane, please give me your reasons.

With entire confidence in your abilities, and the highest personal regard, I remain, general, yours truly,
WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General CLINCH, *Fort Drane, East Florida.*

No. 42.

ASSISTANT QUARTERMASTER'S OFFICE, *New Orleans, February 26, 1836.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 14th instant from Savannah. Immediately on the receipt I called upon the assistant commissary of subsistence, and put him in motion. I find there is not a barrel of hard bread to be obtained in the city without having it baked for the occasion. Lieutenant Morrison is exerting himself to get it ready as soon as possible. I fear he will not be able to procure the quantity required in time. Whatever can be done will be done. He will be ready to make a shipment of subsistence on the 1st of March. I am this day shipping hay and corn, which, I trust, will reach Tampa before the 10th of March. I shall continue to ship, as directed by you, and you may depend the forage shall be there in due time, barring shipwrecks. In regard to the ordnance stores, there is none in this city. On the receipt of your letter I immediately addressed the ordnance officer at Mount Vernon arsenal, Alabama, and the ordnance officer at the arsenal at Baton Rouge, requiring them to let me know immediately whether the articles required can be furnished; if so,

they shall be shipped immediately. Rest assured, sir, that no exertions shall be wanting on my part, or the assistant commissary of subsistence, to have you well supplied. I find, sir, that I have but one hundred and thirty-eight tents on hand; these I have shipped this day. I have been advised that a quantity has been ordered from Philadelphia, and I think I can rely upon their reaching here in time for them to reach Tampa Bay by the middle of March. I have issued every knapsack on hand, and have now making in this city 696, to complete the requisition of Colonel Lindsay, for the regiment of Alabama militia. I have also furnished him with tents and camp-kettles, mess-pans, &c., to complete that regiment for the field.

I will assure you, sir, it would give me pleasure to take the field with you. I am intimately acquainted with every part of Florida, the localities of all the Indian towns and villages.

I have the honor to be, sir, with high respect, your obedient servant,

J. CLARK, *Assistant Quartermaster.*

Major General W. Scorr, *Commanding in Florida.*

No. 43.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, *Savannah, February 19, 1836.*

SIR: I am instructed by Major General Scott to acknowledge the receipt, on the 13th instant, of the letter of the Secretary of War of the 5th, transmitting three copies of the regulations prescribed for carrying into effect the resolutions of Congress of the first of February, respecting issues to certain inhabitants of Florida. In connexion with the subject of that resolution, General Scott desires a reference to his letter to the commissary general of the 12th instant. Two letters from the Secretary of War of the 11th, and one of the 12th—one of the former requiring information as to the numerical force of the Seminoles, and the other referring to payments of the militia, have also been received. These were received on the 18th and 19th instant.

I am also instructed to acknowledge your letters of the 2d and 10th instant.

I have the honor to be, sir, yours, respectfully,

A. VAN BUREN.

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington.*

No. 44.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, *Savannah, February 20, 1836.*

SIR: The detachment of United States recruits under Lieutenant Herring, and the medicines, &c., in the charge of Assistant Surgeon Worrel, having arrived in the river below, the recruits will immediately proceed with me to Picolata. The medicines, &c., cannot be got out of the vessel to-day, but will follow.

I have been delayed here waiting for the return of one of three steamers, which sailed hence eight and seven days since for St. Augustine and Picolata. Neither has yet returned, and I can wait no longer. For the reason mentioned I am without late information from either Brigadier Generals Clinch or Eustis.

I have this moment received your letter of the 13th instant, enclosing the copy of one from Major Garland. I requested tents of the major, having no power to order, and concluded that he would obtain the proper authority for causing the tents to be sent by the conveyances and routes *the most expeditious*. It was lucky, however, that I wrote on the subject from Augusta.

On the subject of *knapsacks*, my grief is inexpressible, that the discovery should have been made at a critical moment, that there was no authority to supply them to the militia called into the service of the United States. I suppose it to be the wish that all troops put into the field and in the pay of the Union should be highly efficient. Now, it is known to all who have marched that troops are wholly inefficient without knapsacks, and I presume it to be generally known that the militia of the United States at home are very partially supplied with this essential appointment. Those now in march for or who have arrived in Florida have not, from the necessity of the case, with few exceptions, had time to supply themselves. They have very generally left home on the shortest notice, and in passing through South Carolina and Georgia, I promised to the volunteers everywhere tents and knapsacks. This promise I shall not be able to comply with, and my grief is almost overwhelming. In respect to the rifles, it is but little less; for they, too, were promised to some extent.

Colonel Lindsay had asked for 3,500 knapsacks. In my first or second letter from Augusta, (my papers are on board, and I follow in a moment,) I begged that the whole number might be speedily sent, if not actually shipped. If they had arrived (or arrive) the militia should (or shall) have them.

I have time only to add that no invoice has been received of tents or rifles actually shipped, and that the Arctic has not arrived.

In great haste, I remain, respectfully, yours,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General United States Army.*

No. 45.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, March 2, 1836.*

SIR: Your communication from Savannah of the 20th ultimo has been submitted to the Secretary of War and general-in-chief. With regard to knapsacks, the Secretary desires me to say that a bill is now on its passage through Congress authorizing their supply; and the more promptly to meet the exigency of the service, instructions have been given to the proper department, in anticipation of the passage of

the law, to send to Florida the knapsacks in store, for the use of the militia force under your command. If the law does not pass (of which, however, no doubt is entertained) the Secretary directs that in such event the knapsacks must be withheld.

With regard to the supply of rifles, I can only refer you to Colonel Bomford's communication of the 11th of February, detailing the measures taken by the Ordnance department for supplying arms (including rifles) and ammunition for the Florida campaign.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

R. JONES *Adjutant General.*

Major General SCOTT, *Commanding in Florida, Fort King.*

No. 46.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Picolata, February 22, 1836.*

SIR: I am instructed by Major General Scott to report his arrival at this place last evening, and that he has assumed command of the army operating in Florida. He has found here the first battalion of Georgia foot in position. The first battalion of Georgia mounted men is on this side of the St. Mary's, and it is presumed the second mounted battalion is now in march from the interior of Georgia. The head company of the South Carolina mounted regiment has reached the Ogechee, and the regiment of foot from that State, under Colonel Brisbane, is at St. Augustine. It is probable that General Scott will await the arrival of at least a portion of the mounted force before he commences a system of operations.

A despatch from General Clinch has been found here, dated the 20th instant, and a return of the troops under his command at Fort Drane and its vicinity, dated the 17th instant. His force consisted of 523 men, including volunteers. He states that of the enemy to be about 1,500 warriors and two or three hundred negroes and believes the principal part of it to be concentrated on the Withlacoochee, thirty-five or forty miles southwest of Fort Drane. Brigadier General Clinch also states that on the arrival of Colonel Lindsay at Fort Brooke, with the Alabama regiment, Major General Gaines will have near 2,200 men, and about 100 friendly Indians.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient,

A. VAN BUREN, *Aide-de-Camp.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General of U. S. Army.*

No. 47.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Picolata, February 26, 1836.*

SIR: The regiment of South Carolina foot (Colonel Brisbane's) is under the direction of Brigadier General Eustis, moving from St. Augustine, *via* Tomoca, upon Volusia, (six miles above Lake George,) where it will arrive, say, the 3d of March. In route it will establish one or more small posts, which will be abandoned in succession, to secure the communication with the rear, and to give confidence to the inhabitants heretofore driven from that part of the country. They are already returning to their plantations.

A detachment of South Carolina infantry is at this moment about to embark in a steamer for Volusia, for the purpose of establishing a secure depot for supplies that may be required there to the south and west.

The South Carolina mounted regiment will probably cross the St. John's river at Jacksonville about the 1st of March, and proceed, *via* St. Augustine, &c., to Volusia, where it may be expected to arrive about the 7th. The two South Carolina regiments, and, say, five companies United States artillery, will constitute the left wing.

Only one company (Captain Kenan's) of the Georgia mounted men has arrived here. It reports that it parted with the other four companies of the same battalion at Dublin, in the interior of Georgia; waited for them three days at Colerain, on the St. Mary's, where the whole were to reunite, and then proceeded hither without hearing anything of them. There was no field officer with this battalion, and the companies took different routes from Dublin, in order to multiply the chances of obtaining subsistence for men and horses. To Colerain, from Savannah, I sent two days' subsistence for all the men and horses—that is, all the *mounted men* from Georgia and Carolina, and the United States detachment of dragoons—as the whole were ordered to cross the St. Mary's at that point.

Captain Kenan is somewhat afraid that the remainder of his battalion, or some of its companies, may even turn back before reaching the Colerain, or from that point; and he is still more apprehensive that I may never see any company of the second battalion of mounted men called for from the same State. Yet Governor Schley wrote to me on the 14th instant that he had "a strong hope that (he) shall be able to send you five more companies of mounted men, who will march to Colerain in a few days."

One battalion of Georgia foot (340 strong) arrived here ten days since. It is now in route for Fort Drane, distance 65 miles, and a bad road. I have instructed the commander (Major Cooper) to repair some of the worst places as he proceeds; because by this route all the supplies for Fort Drane must be sent.

The remaining battalion of Georgia foot, which I originally designed should pass this place, and which I afterwards, on the request of Governor Schley, permitted him to send by the Apalachicola, I desired him, by an express that I despatched hence on the 23d, *via* Jacksonville, to stop and discharge. This request was made as soon as I knew with certainty that a large force had sailed from New Orleans for Tampa Bay.

Observing by returns from Brigadier General Clinch, that his supplies were but limited, and desirous of placing at Fort Drane subsistence for the right wing for at least twenty days, in order to give confidence and effect to any movement to be made from that point, I have been occupied in devising means to send thither additional supplies, to the amount of seventy tons. To enable me to do this, I have been waiting for the wagons, horses, and pack-saddles provided at Augusta and Savannah. Some of these

wagons have arrived, but as yet no horses. The remainder of that baggage train cannot be expected here from Savannah in less than ten days. In the meantime Brigadier General Eustis has been able, after providing for the South Carolina foot, to send a few wagons and teams for the Georgia battalion of foot, and for about two and a half tons more. I had also written to Brigadier General Clinch to send down all his spare teams to aid in taking the remainder of the seventy tons; and here are despatches from him which change the whole aspect of affairs, and infinitely augment our difficulties in the way of transportation.

It seems that Major General Gaines arrived at Fort King from Tampa Bay, on the 22d, and instantly called upon Brigadier General Clinch for 14,000 rations, he having brought with him about 1,100 men, and no subsistence except for the troops on the march. This demand will leave only about 5,000 rations at Fort Drane, and will moreover occupy the whole of the baggage train at that place for many days. In other words, there will be left at Fort Drane but about eight days' subsistence for the regulars and volunteers who are there, say 650 men. To prevent starvation, I must therefore instantly recall the battalion of Georgia foot, now about 20 miles from this, and detain it until subsistence in abundance can be sent in advance. I have also ordered twenty thousand rations to be put on board the steamer about to set out for Volusia; but Volusia is about 50 miles from Fort King and 70 from Fort Drane, and the greater part of the route difficult, if not impracticable for wagons. Pack-horses must be used, or the force from Tampa Bay must approach Volusia.

Although my presence here for some days longer is highly necessary, I must hasten to Fort Drane with the company of Georgia mounted men above mentioned, in order to regulate the movements in that quarter. Major General Gaines, if he has not withdrawn, I shall first send to the Mexican frontier.

In a letter from him to Brigadier General Clinch, dated at New Orleans, the 2d instant, and communicated to me by the latter, he says that the New Orleans force is "intended to be in readiness at Fort Brooke, Tampa, by the 8th of the present month, to form a junction at or near that place with the force under your command, whenever, and as soon as in your judgment your force shall be sufficient to justify the movement."

It seems, however, that he waited for no communication from Brigadier General Clinch. He either knew, or did not know, at Tampa, if not sooner, that I had been charged with the direction of the war. In the former case perhaps he hoped to finish the war before the forces I had called for could come up; in both cases he has neglected the assurance given to Brigadier General Clinch, that he would wait till the latter could co-operate. Major General Gaines, however, is at Fort King, having arrived by the usual route from Tampa. He saw no enemy, as I learn by his letter to Brigadier General Clinch; and the only meritorious service performed by him on the route was the burying of the remains of Major Dade and his gallant detachment.

At Fort King, at the latest, he must have learned that I was expected in Florida with a large force; yet it will be seen, by the copy of his letter herewith enclosed, he intended, as soon as he had deprived Brigadier General Clinch of his subsistence, to march in pursuit of the enemy.

I have time to add no more. All my plans are thwarted; the principal of which was to move in concert from Fort Drane, Volusia, and Tampa, on the 8th of March upon the enemy, who are supposed to be (at this time) principally upon the Withlacoochee.

I remain, in haste, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General United States Army.*

No. 48.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *New Orleans, February 2, 1836.*

SIR: With a view to an efficient co-operation of the forces now assembling in the northeast quarter of East Florida, under your command, with those ordered from this city by water to Tampa Bay, against the Seminole Indians and their colored vassals and allies, I take much pleasure in advising you that a fine battalion of the chivalric volunteers of Louisiana, consisting of eight companies, headed by Adjutant General Smith, are engaged to embark to-morrow with the regular troops at this post, under the command of Colonel Twiggs, on board the steamboats the Merchant, Captain Smyler, and the Watchman, Captain Vincent. These forces, amounting to near 700 men, added to 250 artillerists and marines, now at Tampa, to be sustained by an efficient naval force, promptly furnished by Commodores Dallas and Bolton, for cutting off the enemy's boats and other means of escape to the islands on the coast, are intended to be in readiness at Fort Brooke, Tampa, by the 8th of the present month, to form a junction at or near that place with the force under your command, whenever and as soon as in your judgment your force shall be sufficient to justify the movement.

In the interim I shall be governed by such information as I may receive at Tampa, or my voyage thither to effect the desired junction, and as soon as possible to operate against, and take or destroy the enemy.

I advise you to move with great caution, fortifying your camp at night, and marching in open order during the day, so as to be always ready for action at a moment's warning.

The supplies of subsistence and ammunition at Tampa are sufficient to divide with you until additional supplies can be obtained from this place.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDMUND P. GAINES.

Brigadier General CLINCH, *or the officer commanding the army
now at or near Fort King, East Florida.*

To this force may be added 250 men under General Call, as lieutenant colonel, who will proceed to Tampa in two days from St. Mark's.

J. H. EATON.

No. 49.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *Fort King, East Florida, February 22, 1836.*

GENERAL: I do myself the honor to announce to you my arrival at this place this afternoon, my force consisting of an aggregate of near eleven hundred and forty regulars and volunteers, pursuant to my plan of operations communicated to you under date of the 2d of the present month, all in good health, save and except some few cases of chills and colds, which I doubt not that two days' rest will remove.

My march to this place was by the way of Warren's Landing, on the Alafia river, and thence to the "military road," near the burnt bridge, on the Hillsborough river; thence along the road to this post; having found, nearly forty miles south of this post, the deeply afflictive exhibition of the slain and mutilated bodies of the gallant band who fell in battle under Major Dade on the 28th of December, without being able to discover the savage foe by whom this and numerous other acts of barbarism had been perpetrated upon this ill-fated frontier.

Hoping soon to see you, or to hear from you the result of your late movements upon the northern and eastern border of the theatre of the war, with the information obtained by you as to the enemy's late movements and present probable position, that we may concert movements for his speedy overthrow, in which I shall take much pleasure in a cordial co-operation with you, I offer you my best wishes that our joint efforts may turn to a speedy and honorable termination of the war.

My present object is to march from this place, by the way of the lower battle ground, on the Withlacoochee, and thence whithersoever any trail or trace of the enemy may be found, and, finally, to return to Fort Brooke, obtain additional supplies, and then move in a direction to Charlotte harbor, not doubting that after scouring the frontier north and east of this place, you will obtain such information of the movements of the enemy as to lead you from this place, by the way of Tolocchopka, on Pease creek, and thence towards Charlotte harbor, where you will find a supply of subsistence and ammunition, under the protection of a United States naval force. At Fort Brooke you will also find similar supplies, sufficient for your return to this place; or, if necessary, to enable you to remain in that quarter with 1,000 or 1,200 men, until you can obtain supplies from New Orleans.

These suggestions are necessarily imperfect, but this must always be the case more or less, in a war with a people who take no prisoners; who have no fortifications; no intercourse with any other part of the human family; no newspapers, or any post office or intelligence department. I therefore leave you to act according to the best of your judgment, and the information you may from time to time obtain; proceeding, as I shall proceed, upon the principle that, to find the enemy, we must search for him; and when we find him, we must take or destroy him, or he will assuredly destroy us.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brig. Gen. D. L. CLINCH, *or officer on the northwestern border of East Florida.*

No. 50.

FORT DRANE, *Florida, February 24, 1836.*

SIR: I hasten to advise you of the arrival at Fort King, (20 miles south of this,) of Major General Gaines, from Fort Brooke, with a force of about 1,000 men. General Gaines brought provisions only for the march through, and has now required of me nearly all that we have on hand here. I shall send down to-day as much as we can find means to transport to him. I shall also go down myself to Fort King, and return to-morrow.

I am, with high respect, your most obedient servant,

D. L. CLINCH, *Brevet Brigadier General.*

Major General SCOTT, *Commanding in Florida.*

No. 51.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *Fort King, Florida, February 22, 1836.*

SIR: I am directed by Major General Gaines to request that you will cause to be delivered to Lieutenant Colonel Foster, 4th infantry, fourteen thousand rations of salted pork, and fourteen thousand rations of hard bread or flour, or equal quantities of each, with a small quantity of salt, for the troops at this post.

With great respect, I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

GEO. A. McCALL, *Aide-de-Camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

C. M. THRUSTON, *Captain of 3d Artillery.*

No. 52.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Picolata, March 2, 1836.*

SIR: I wrote to you by the last steamer that left this place on the 26th ultimo, and two days after made notes upon an order, (No. 4,) which you will receive at the same time with this.

All hope of sending supplies hence by the Ocklawaha is abandoned. We have to rely solely on the road to Fort Drane, which is bad enough; and the horses and mules which were to have followed me closely from Savannah have not arrived. The quartermaster (Lieutenant Dimmock) of that post had

been in bed the greater part of the time that I was there, but was again on his feet when I left him. It is possible that he may have relapsed.

The correspondence, copies of which will accompany this letter, between Major General Gaines and Brigadier General Clinch, and the latter and myself, will explain the state of affairs in respect to the right wing, or the theatre of war in the direction of those generals.

No calculation can be made on the movements or dispositions of the force under Major General Gaines. He probably got beyond the reach of my Order No. 4 before it arrived at Fort Drane, and therefore he may not receive it before to-morrow. Whether he will obey it, or allow the force he brought from Tampa Bay to march to Volusia, is uncertain. There is no doubt that he will be obliged to fall back upon Fort King or Fort Drane. The whole of Brigadier General Clinch's baggage train will arrive here to-day (on the opposite side of the river) for subsistence, and I shall add a few wagons, for which there are horses here which came from Charleston, *via* St. Augustine.

The company of mounted Georgia volunteers that arrived here about six days ago, and with which I had expected to march to Fort Drane, refused to be mustered into service, and refused to come under the rules and articles of war, with the exception of a small part that remains. The rest went off without leave from their gallant and patriotic captain (Kenan) yesterday and the day before. The other four companies, of the same battalion, are this moment reported to have arrived on the opposite shore. I have sent an officer over to muster them into service; if I can get two of the companies I shall be most happy. I may obtain the four, but will march with one to Fort Drane. Some mounted men are indispensable; and I know not that the United States dragoons will arrive in a month. I wish that I had never relied upon the arrival of that detachment. Expecting it hourly at Savannah (I *had* expected it at Charleston as early as the 4th ultimo) I left all the horses, in order that the mounts might first be chosen, and the remainder of the lot then sent here for the baggage train. That error I corrected, as far as practicable, by an order given to Lieutenant Dimmock on the 21st ultimo. No horses, however, have arrived from Savannah.

Brigadier General Eustis has just come over from St. Augustine. (We have heard nothing recently from Colonel Goodwyn's regiment of mounted South Carolinians, but presume it has reached Jacksonville below.) The left wing will probably reach Volusia by the 8th or 10th instant.

The steamer sent up to Volusia returned last night, having landed the detachment and provisions with success. Indeed, too much praise cannot be bestowed upon the officers and men composing that detachment. Captain Canfield, of the topographical engineers, went up and returned in the steamer, which had to be unloaded to pass the bar at the head of Lake George. Indians were seen going up and returning, and several random shots exchanged. I ordered from Savannah the little steamer belonging to the engineer department, called the *Essayons*, to be sent here for the express purpose of communicating with that post, and of supplying it with stores from Picolata; but that boat, like everything else (almost) left behind, has not arrived.

The river here is nearly two miles broad, and has, on account of wind, been extremely difficult to pass in flats and open boats yesterday and to-day. I am endeavoring to send over provisions for Fort Draue, and the extra wagons. If Major General Gaines falls back upon Fort King or Fort Drane, those provisions will soon be necessary for the current subsistence of the forces which will be assembled in that vicinity, and I should not be surprised if he seize upon the greater number of the wagons with their loads, and endeavor to make his escape out of the Territory by way of Tampa Bay. He brought with him about sixty pack-horses, I understand, from that place, and no wagons. Whether he will carry off the Louisiana volunteers and the regulars with him is uncertain. The former, I learn, (from Captain Shannon, United States 1st infantry, who arrived last night, *via* Tampa and Fort Drane,) were mustered into service for ninety days; and by a letter from Colonel Smith, who commands the regiments, the men are desirous of performing their duty.

I have at length received a letter from Colonel Lindsay, dated at Mobile, the 13th ultimo. He was about to set out for Tuscaloosa to hasten the Alabama regiment. It is now evident that he cannot be at Tampa before the 10th, probably the 15th instant.

By a reference to the map it will be seen that even if Major General Gaines could succeed in driving the enemy from the Withlacoochee, there is no force to prevent the retreat below Charlotte harbor, or to any point in the lower peninsula. A small guard only was left at Tampa. Colonel Lindsay will not be in position in time, and Brigadier General Eustis cannot cross the Ocklawaha earlier than the 14th instant. The retreat, it will be seen, is therefore open to the Indians. In this point of view, then, it would be infinitely better for the public interests that the enemy should drive Major General Gaines than that he should drive them. The war, in fact, would be forwarded by his being forced back upon Fort Drane or Fort King. He ought, in truth, to have fallen back on the evening of the 28th or the morning of the 29th ultimo. The lives which he has lost have promoted no end. He must, I think, still fall back, and I wish to heaven that it may be without further loss. Brigadier General Clinch, from his present want of wagons, can send him no efficient aid; and the wagons cannot be back in four or five days. If the force with Major General Gaines were at Tampa Bay, it would now be in its true position; but he cannot retreat thither, for it will be seen by his letters that he has not the means of passing the river. He found the enemy exactly in the vicinity where all my arrangements presumed the enemy would be found, and in the positions which would have been the most favorable to us.

I cannot close this letter without adding that I have heard nothing of the tents and knapsacks. The rifles, it seems, were to leave Harper's Ferry about the 13th ultimo, and Major Gates, who reached Savannah a week ago, has not since been heard from. Those arrangements and movements are about upon a par with certain militia movements in my rear. The functionaries concerned must feel themselves in the enjoyment of a most profound peace.

I remain, sir, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General United States Army.*

P. S.—I have this moment heard that, of the four mounted Georgia companies just arrived, one, with the exception of nineteen, refuses to be mustered, and that another, that has but forty privates, is ready to enter the service. The two other companies, encamped some miles off, I shall hear from in the morning. I shall endeavor to see all the companies to-morrow, if we can cross the river, and to blend the fragments of companies; but I learn that in that case those fragments will not agree to be consolidated without all their officers and non-commissioned officers!! The *Essayons* is in sight. W. S.

No. 53.

ORDERS No. 1.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Picolata, February 22, 1836.*

Major General Scott, having arrived in Florida, assumes the general direction of the war against the hostile Seminole Indians.

The staff officers attached to general headquarters at present are Captain Canfield, (topographical engineer,) Lieutenant Chambers, (chief of the commissariat,) and Lieutenants Van Buren, Temple, and Johnston, aides-de-camp. All orders and instructions conveyed by either of them in the name of the major general, and whether orally or in writing, will be duly obeyed.

The right and left wings of the army, or the troops on the west and east side of the St. John's river, will be continued under the respective orders of Brigadier Generals Clinch and Eustis; and the forces which are to operate from Tampa Bay, under Colonel Lindsay, will, when they come into line, constitute the centre. The wings will soon be greatly reinforced by the arrival of both regulars and volunteers.

The three immediate commanders of the right, left, and centre of the army, respectively, will generally receive orders direct from general headquarters; but, of course, every junior will obey any senior, according to the rules and articles of war and the usages of the service, whether the parties belong to the militia or to the militia and regular army.

As, for the first time, patriotic volunteers from South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, and Florida, are to come into the same line with a portion of the regular army, it is confidently hoped that a beneficial emulation, without unkindness or prejudice, may animate the different forces. All are equally Americans, actuated by the like determination—to subdue a treacherous and a common foe.

But valor and patriotism alone are not sufficient for that end. Some tactical instruction and an exact obedience to commands are also necessary. Instruction can only be acquired by opportunity and labor. A firm resolution to *obey* accomplishes the other great requisite at once. Let the resolution, then, be promptly taken by *all* who have nobly turned out to avenge their butchered countrymen.

But again: to parade, to march, to mount guard, and to fight, are not the only duties of war. To handle and preserve the supplies of the army, and to construct camp and other field defences, are equally required of every good soldier. A corps of servants for these purposes would be too large and cumbrous. It would double the army, and render one-half too *mean*, and the other too *delicate* for the glory of a well-contested field. Fatigue parties must, therefore, when wanted, be furnished by all the corps in their turn, and proportionally.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

By command of Major General Scott.

A. VAN BUREN, *Aide-de-camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 54.

ORDERS No. 4.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Picolata, February 26, 1836.*

The detachment of regulars and volunteers which has recently arrived at Fort King from Fort Brooke will remain in its present position till further orders. It will from time to time receive from Fort Drane the subsistence which cannot be supplied at Fort King.

Brigadier General Clinch, or the commanding officer at Fort King, will immediately hire or employ any suitable boats which may be found at or near Payne's Landing, to be sent down with a sufficient detachment to receive at Picolata, or, if met, from a steamer which will be despatched to the mouth of the Ocklawaha, the subsistence which will be wanted at Fort King. The steamer may be expected at the mouth of the Ocklawaha with supplies by the 3d or 4th of the next month, and will wait there, if necessary, for the boats till the 8th.

Should it be impracticable to send suitable boats to Picolata or the mouth of the Ocklawaha for the subsistence, the detachment recently from Fort Brooke will march to Volusia without delay, and there wait for further orders. To that point subsistence in abundance will be sent hence to-morrow, to be placed under the cover of a field-work and a strong detachment.

No offensive movement, except so far as may be necessary to carry these orders into execution, will be attempted by the troops at or in the neighborhood of Forts King and Drane, until further instructions from general headquarters.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

A true copy:

A. VAN BUREN, *Aide-de-camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 55.

*Notes for the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief.*HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Picolata, February 28, 1836.*

Fort Drane is the *depot* nearest to the supposed position of the mass of the enemy, and the point the most difficult to supply from Picolata. The right wing was intended to be concentrated at Fort Drane—say by the 8th of March, when it was expected that General Clinch would have had all the Georgia troops, companies of United States artillery, and the detachment of United States dragoons—in all, about fourteen hundred men.

On the 25th instant it was known that General Clinch would have had, but for General Gaines, nine-

teen thousand rations for men and about three thousand bushels of corn for horses. That amount of subsistence at Fort Drane, I should more than have maintained by the 8th of March, by means of the baggage train expected from Savannah and Charleston, and by the aid of *boating* on the Ocklawaha to Payne's Landing. But if only twenty thousand rations for men could have been placed at Fort Drane (including the number there on the 25th instant) by the 8th of March, the right wing might have advanced with confidence on the latter day, independent of further partial supplies from this place.

Boating on the Ocklawaha, to Payne's Landing, is still relied upon with great confidence. General Clinch has there from four to six sugar-lighters, (his private property, I believe,) built expressly for that river, and capable of transporting from forty to sixty tons. Their construction is peculiar; and the boats at Picolata or on the St. John's cannot be used on the Ocklawaha. On the 25th I heard of those boats, and immediately directed General Clinch to send them down. (It is supposed that there is no enemy on the Ocklawaha.) His means of land transportation were to be sent at the same time. But General Gaines not only arrives with eleven hundred and forty men in the meantime from a grand *depot*, bringing with him no supplies, not only calls for all the baggage train and nearly the whole of the subsistence at Fort Drane, but takes General Clinch personally from his position, and I may be thereby delayed three days longer than I should have been in learning whether the boats can come down or not! My Order No. 4 may, in part, correct those evils; and, by Order No. 5, I have recalled the Georgia battalion of foot. A chapter of embarrassments and vexations!

Not a doubt is entertained that the post at Volusia will be established. The steamer Santee went hence on the 27th instant for the purpose, having on board Elmore's company of South Carolina volunteers and a United States company under Lieutenant Irwin—in all, one hundred and sixty men. She also took twenty thousand rations, two scows or flats, two row-boats, tools, nails, &c. If the steamer cannot pass the bar at the head of Lake George, six or eight miles below Volusia, (and it is believed she can, at least by the aid of the lighters,) the lighters and boats will be able to reach the point, &c. Further supplies, of every sort which may be required by the left wing or the troops from Tampa, will from time to time follow from Picolata. But Volusia, though easy of access from this place, is much more distant from the enemy on the Withlacoochee than either Fort King or Drane. The left wing, however, when concentrated at Volusia, will be in position either to march upon the Withlacoochee, the upper crossing on the Ocklawaha to Tampa, Charlotte harbor, or, in general, to prevent the enemy from escaping to the southeast, particularly by a simultaneous movement with Colonel Lindsay and the Alabama regiment from Tampa Bay, and this, too, whether General Gaines marches his column to Volusia, remains at Fort King, or, in a pet, takes it back to Tampa—perhaps, New Orleans, against my orders.

It will be seen, from the foregoing, that, to re-establish my plan of campaign, viz: to move simultaneously from Fort Drane, (or Fort King,) from Volusia and Tampa—say about the 8th of March—the great difficulty will be to send supplies for the right wing, and the bad road from Picolata to Fort Drane (sixty-five miles) has, by a heavy rain which has now been falling for forty-six hours, been rendered infinitely worse.

I beg that this mode of communicating, which accident has thrown me upon, may be excused.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

No. 56.

ORDERS No. 5.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Picolata, February 27, 1836.*

An unexpected and unauthorized arrival at Fort Drane of a heavy detachment of troops from Tampa Bay, without subsistence, being likely to exhaust the supplies provided at Fort Drane for other troops, the Georgia volunteers under the command of Major Cooper will return to the St. John's, and encamp till the embarrassment that causes this retrograde movement can be remedied.

By command of Major General Scott.

A. VAN BUREN, *Aide-de-camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 57.

ORDERS No. 6.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Picolata, February 27, 1836.*

Until the arrival of the other parts of the same battalion, Captain Kenan's company of mounted volunteers will be held as a separate corps.

Every company of mounted volunteers will be supplied with picketing rope, and, to the extent of the supply, with nose bags.

By command of Major General Scott.

A. VAN BUREN, *Aide-de-camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 58.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Picolata, February 25, 1836.*

SIR: I arrived here the evening of the 22d, and had the satisfaction of receiving your letters of the 17th and 20th.

I enclose you a copy of an order that I issued on my arrival.

A battalion of Georgia foot, three hundred and forty strong, crossed the river last evening to join you. Its baggage train being exceedingly indifferent, (nothing better having arrived,) I doubt whether the battalion reaches you in four or five days. Major Cooper is its commander.

The first company of a battalion of mounted men from the same State is expected to arrive opposite to Picolata to-day. The remainder of the battalion (four companies) are supposed to be one, two, and three days behind. This battalion (say three hundred and fifty strong) is also destined to reinforce the right wing under your command, and it shall be despatched as fast as the companies arrive, after leaving time for each company to refresh its horses. A second battalion of mounted Georgians may be expected by the same route, and for the same destination, in ten or twelve days. I shall not wait for it, nor for the detachment of United States dragoons, which has occupied at least twenty-two days in getting horse equipments in New York and Philadelphia, and may occupy three weeks more. I shall join you with one of the companies of mounted men nearest at hand. Another Georgia battalion of foot, that was to rendezvous at Columbus, to go thence, *via* Apalachicola, I hope an express sent by me may arrive in time to keep at home.

Brigadier General Eustis has commenced pushing forward the South Carolina regiment of foot, *via* Tomoca, &c., towards Volusia, where it may arrive by the 3d of March. A steamer will take hence, in two days, a detachment of South Carolinians (Elmore's company, one hundred and ten strong) to the bar, ten miles below Volusia, and thence, with flats and row-boats, proceed to make an establishment at that place. A company of regulars may go with this detachment, and large stores for either wing of the army will be deposited there.

The regiment of mounted South Carolinians began to arrive at Savannah on the evening of the 20th. This regiment (say seven hundred and forty strong) may reach St. Augustine by the 3d of March and Volusia the 7th. It will cross the St. John's at Jacksonville. With the left wing there will be, in addition, five companies of regulars—leaving one here, and perhaps another at St. Augustine; and I propose to send to the right wing at least two of the companies that embarked at Baltimore for this place, *via* Savannah. These companies may now be hourly expected here, having heard that they had got to sea.

According to computation, Colonel Lindsay could not have embarked the Alabama regiment (seven hundred and forty men) at Mobile for Tampa earlier than the 24th instant, probably not so early. I have not had a line from him or Governor Clay. My call on the latter was dated at Augusta, the 31st ultimo, and Colonel Lindsay set out for the same place on the 4th instant.

I am greatly surprised that Governor Eaton should think of sending a single company from Middle Florida to Tampa; for he knew all that I had done in respect to that end of our line of communications, and he knew of the forces sent to the same place from New Orleans, and which did not enter into my estimates for the war. Indeed, I expressly told the governor that it would be best to keep his militia (already much harassed) at home, and in *defensive* positions, as I hoped to drive the enemy in upon the settlements of Middle Florida. The movement from New Orleans, although highly worthy of praise, under the circumstances, may, if it should lead to a premature advance from Tampa, be productive of a result the most unfavorable.

If the advance, for example, should fail to crush the enemy and terminate the war, (and without mounted men I suppose such result can scarcely be hoped for,) the enemy may be scattered and put upon his retreat to the southeast. To follow him in such retreat might be almost impracticable; and to prevent the escape in that direction Colonel Lindsay has my instructions in detail.

To resume: I hope to be personally at Fort Drane before the 3d of next month, and to make the right wing about fourteen hundred strong. Brigadier General Eustis will have at Volusia, four days later, even a larger force, and Colonel Lindsay, (or Major General Gaines,) by the 3d, the largest army of the three. If, therefore, I can send to Fort Drane from this, as I do not doubt I shall, the necessary supplies, say hard bread, bacon, and some corn, (besides what you report,) the 8th of March had best be fixed as the day for the vigorous movement of the right, the left, and the centre of the army upon the enemy. The necessary instructions to Colonel Lindsay I wish you to give by any route in your power—say direct, if practicable, or by Tallahassee and St. Mark's, or both. If the 8th of March be too early a day, you may designate the 10th, 12th, or 15th. Is it not possible to take a portion of the supplies wanted, to give the right wing confidence in its forward movement, by water from this place?

If I had here the sugar-lighters from Payne's Landing they might be loaded, towed to the mouth of the Ocklawaha, and thence poled up to that landing. I estimate that it will be necessary to transport to you before the 8th of March, in order that you may on that day have a balance for fifteen days, about seventy tons of supplies; and I fear that I shall not have of *land* transportation for the purpose, in that time, exceeding, say, thirty-five two-horse wagons. Send down, then, as much of your baggage train as you can spare, and at once; also the sugar-lighters, if you can safely do so.

By the Florida, hourly expected from Savannah, I hope we shall receive about fifteen two-horse wagons and some horses. More of the latter will soon arrive here and at St. Augustine; and five large wagons will come with the troops from Baltimore; but remember that seventy tons will load one hundred and forty two-horse wagons.

I hope to hear from you by the return of the express, and remain, with great consideration, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General CLINCH.

No. 59.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Picolata*, February 26, 1836.

SIR: I have heard with equal astonishment and regret that Major General Gaines, without reference to my arrangements, perhaps in ignorance, possibly in defiance of them, should have made a premature movement from Tampa Bay, and having arrived within twenty miles of Fort Drane, should have called for nearly three-fourths of the subsistence in deposit at that place, on which I had relied for the movement of the right wing, in concert with the other parts of the army. If his demand shall have been complied with in full before my orders on the subject shall arrive, all hopes of putting the right wing in

motion in search of the enemy must be delayed till the rations so withdrawn can be replaced from this point; and the means of land transportation, to a sufficient extent, are not expected to arrive here before the 8th of the next month.

To remedy this unexpected embarrassment, I send you two copies of Orders No. 4; one of which you will despatch to the commanding officer of the detachment from Fort Brooke, whoever he may be, with all speed, and limit the subsistence called for from Fort Drane, according to the intention of those orders.

I hope it may be found practicable to send from the Ocklawaha suitable boats to receive (say) from twenty to eighty tons of subsistence and other supplies at once, which will be wanted to justify an effective movement upon the enemy from your vicinity. If not, send down all the means of land transportation at or near your headquarters which you can spare. We have no suitable boats here, and the horses expected from Savannah cannot be here in the whole before perhaps the 8th of March. The steamer Florida arrived last night with some wagons, but without horses, and but one company of Georgia mounted men has been heard of. With that I shall set out for Fort Drane as soon as I can; perhaps not in four or five days. In the meantime, let me continue to hear from you.

The steamer Santee, with about one hundred and sixty regulars and volunteers, sets out early to-morrow morning to make an establishment at Volusia. She takes twenty thousand rations, lighters, boats, &c. From Fort King to Volusia, I suppose to be about fifty miles, and the route practicable for troops.

Major General Gaines, I presume, will have heard of the order which ought to take him to the Mexican frontier. If he should prefer to remain, he must obey my orders.

In haste, with great respect, I remain truly yours,

WINFIELD SCOTT

Brigadier General CLINCH, *Commanding, &c., Fort Drane.*

No. 60.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Picolata, March 1, 1836.*

SIR: By the arrival, at daylight this morning, of the express from Fort Drane, I have your note of yesterday, accompanied by a letter to you from Major General Gaines, dated the day before.

I regret, in every point of view, the premature and unauthorized movement from Tampa Bay made by that general, and the very awkward and responsible position he has placed himself in by his subsequent march from Fort King. I presume that, as instructed, you sent him my Order No. 4, dated the 26th ultimo. By that he saw that if the troops he brought with him from Tampa Bay could not be subsisted at Fort King by means of supplies derived from this place through the Ocklawaha, it was expressly commanded that the column should march to Volusia without delay, where subsistence in abundance would be immediately provided. But he had, before that order reached him, taken from Fort Drane a large part of the subsistence relied upon for a more systematic course of operations, and decamped; the order, however, I take it for granted, was sent after him, and in time to reach him within twenty miles of Fort King. In any event, the responsibility of his movements and actual position is his own; for he must have known, as early as the 10th ultimo, if not before, that I had been charged with the general direction of the war in Florida, and that by interfering he constituted himself an interloper.

Even if you had sufficient stores on hand, and means of transportation, under the circumstances, I should command you to send no subsistence to him, unless to prevent starvation; but you have neither. Let him, therefore, in time extricate himself from the embarrassment he has placed himself in by marching upon Volusia, where, I have no reason to doubt, that twenty thousand rations sent hence on the 27th ultimo have safely arrived. As he appears to have a retreat open to him, or is in no peril to prevent his taking that step, you, of course, will make no detachment or movement to join him.

The train you have ordered hither is expected to-night. As yet we have here few wagons to add to your number. The whole train shall be immediately loaded with subsistence and sent back to Fort Drane. I have only time to say that, should the troops under Major General Gaines be compelled to march back to Fort King or to Fort Drane, instead of proceeding to Volusia, as heretofore commanded, and as I still wish that they should do, on account of the extreme difficulty of sending subsistence to your neighborhood, you will only issue rations to them for their current subsistence, and not for further false expeditions.

As the first consequence of the arrival of the troops from Tampa Bay to Fort King, and the demand made upon Fort Drane for subsistence, I was obliged to order back a battalion of Georgia volunteers that had then been nearly two days in route to join you.

The company of mounted men from the same State, now on the opposite side of the river, refuse to be mustered into service, and refuse to come under the rules and articles of war. The other companies of the same battalion may follow their example; if they do, I shall lose no time in ordering the whole back to their homes.

Major Gates, with his three companies, has not arrived, and I have no intelligence respecting the United States dragoons of a recent date. Finally, the horses for some days expected from Savannah have not arrived. These embarrassments may detain me here I know not how long.

The left wing is moving upon Volusia with system and success. The South Carolina foot constitutes the advance, and I suppose the mounted regiment from the same State is now crossing the St. John's at Jacksonville.

Send another copy of my Order No. 4 to Major General Gaines, and a copy of Order No. 1, which is enclosed for the purpose. The former is reiterated so far as respects the march to Volusia, if this be practicable; and enclose him a certified copy of this letter for his government and your justification.

I remain, in haste, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

P. S.—I am instructed by Major General Scott to say that the quartermaster's return did not accompany your letter of the 27th ultimo. No return has been received of your ordnance or ordnance stores, particularly the fixed ammunition for muskets. Please to send one.

Respectfully,

A. VAN BUREN, *Aide-de-camp.*

No. 61.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Picolata, March 1, 1836.*

Sir: I have just closed No. 1 to you of this date. It has since occurred to me that Colonel Lindsay may arrive at Tampa Bay and prematurely march to meet the column he will suppose to be in operation from Fort Drane. Such a movement will infinitely embarrass the subsistence department here and with you, on account of the false movement of Major General Gaines, and our want of sufficient means of transportation from this point. Therefore, if possible, and you can best judge, communicate with Colonel Lindsay, and say that a movement from Fort Drane must be unavoidably delayed, for the reasons mentioned, to the 15th instant, when he will, with as many days' subsistence as possible for his command, but with not less than eight or six, march to meet you at such probable point as you may name.

Again, with the highest respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General CLINCH, *Fort Drane.*

No. 62.

HEADQUARTERS CAMP IZARD, *on the right bank of the Withlacoochee, two miles west of General Clinch's battle ground, February 28, 1836.*

GENERAL: I take much pleasure in stating to you that I have reason to believe I have now near me the principal force of the Seminole Indians, with their black vassals and allies. I yesterday afternoon, after halting my reserve and rear guard, with my baggage train, in the upper pine woods, near the encampment north of the battle ground, proceeded with the remainder part of my force to the Withlacoochee, with a view to reconnoitre and inspect in person the adjacent section of the river preparatory to my intended crossing, which I had designed to attempt this morning. I had been at the river only long enough to examine it 250 or 300 yards, about and above the usual crossing-place, when the enemy commenced a spirited firing on my party, and kept it up, with the war-whoop, for half an hour. The fire was, of course, returned.

Having determined this morning, in consequence of the thick woods on the opposite side of the river, to extend my examinations to this point, at which I learned there were open pine woods on both sides of the river, I accordingly marched with my whole force to this place, where I was promptly met by the enemy, whose force appears to have increased very considerably in the course of an hour or two. The river at this place is deemed to be about as wide, but much deeper and less rapid than at the first-mentioned place, with open pine woods on both sides. Neither of the places are fordable. My reconnoissances, in consequence of the narrowness of the river and the impossibility of finding materials for promptly bridging or rafting the stream, have resulted in the loss of two of the Louisiana volunteers killed and ten volunteers and regulars wounded; among the latter I deeply lament to find the gallant Lieutenant Izard, of the dragoons, dangerously.

Being convinced that the principal force of the enemy is now assembled before me, and not doubting that their women and children are placed in a large cypress swamp within a few miles of this place, and that an immediate movement of a force equal or nearly equal to that now with me, consisting in part of mounted men, would enable us to put an end to the war in the next ten days, by a combined and simultaneous movement against them, I have deemed it my duty to propose to you such a movement, should the forces expected at Fort Drane have arrived; otherwise the force there on the 22d would, I think, be sufficient; but this is doubtful, and the case is one of too much importance to leave the question of force at all in doubt. In the expectation of this co-operation, I shall endeavor to amuse the enemy in completing my boats and preparing to cross, but I shall not cross until I hear from you.

In any event, I request of you six thousand rations of pork and flour and sugar, with the quartermaster's stores which follow: 2 whip-saws, 2 cross-cut saws, 2 hand-saws, 6 adzes, 6 frows, augers, assorted, 4 broad-axes, 2 iron wedges, 200 iron spikes; and, if possible, 2 field-pieces, with 150 rounds canister and 50 round shot; 10,000 rounds musket cartridges.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

EDMUND P. GAINES.

Killed: Zeno Boullie, Valentine Beck.

Brigadier General D. L. CLINCH,

Or officer commanding the United States troops assembling at Fort Drane, East Florida.

P. S.—The forces from Fort Drane should cross the Withlacoochee at the ford eight or ten miles above the battle ground or at the point, and more down on the left bank of the river, to this place.

No. 63.

HEADQUARTERS, *Camp Izard, two miles west of General Clinch's battle ground, February 29, 1836.*

GENERAL: I last night stated to you, by express, the occurrence of my meeting the Indians on my arrival at this place, suggesting the expediency of an immediate co-operation on the part of the disposable force under your command, under the strong conviction that, by such co-operation, we should be able in a few days to bring the war to a close, having been convinced that the principal force of the enemy is assembled near me on this river. The occurrences of the day confirm me in the opinion I then expressed to you.

Having occupied myself in preparing a small work to command the crossing-place of the river, and making canoes for the purpose of constructing a bridge, I had not deemed it necessary to strengthen my breastworks, not having apprehended that the enemy would have the temerity to attack me in my position.

In this conclusion, however, I have been disappointed. At 10 o'clock this morning a spirited and vigorous attack was made by the enemy on three sides of my encampment, which continued two hours with little or no intermission, in the course of which they frequently approached so near to my left flank, commanded by Adjutant General Smith, of the Louisiana volunteers, as to wound several men on the opposite flank, a distance of 200 yards. They were, however, repulsed, I have reason to believe, with considerable loss.

The loss sustained by the force of my command was one sergeant killed, and one officer (Lieutenant Duncan) and ten men wounded of the regulars, and one officer and twenty men wounded of the volunteers. The troops having been particularly instructed not to throw away their fire or to fire without correct aim at a short distance, I was happy to find the order was strictly attended to, and consequently but little ammunition was expended. It is impossible to say, with any precision, what was the enemy's force; but the officers best acquainted with the service concur with me in opinion it was not less than 1,500. From the foregoing facts, I have no doubt the principal force of the enemy is now in this vicinity; that they are sensible of the desperate situation in which they have placed themselves, and that their temerity will prompt them to make a resistance commensurate with the circumstances in which they find themselves.

I have abstained and shall abstain from a sortie until I hear from you, in the expectation that this course will contribute to keep them together, whilst a sortie might tend to disperse them. I am now satisfied a movement directly to this place will be more advisable than to attempt to cross the Withlacoochee higher up, as suggested in my letter of yesterday. I am moreover of the opinion that, if mounted men can be procured in the course of a few days, your force should not move from Fort Drane without this description of troops. I repeat my request that I may be furnished 6,000 rations of flour, pork, and sugar, five bushels of salt, some corn, with tools to build block-houses, two field-pieces, 150 rounds of canister, 50 round shot, 10,000 musket ball-cartridges, with as many light wagons as can be spared, as my wounded are increasing daily and my horses decreasing.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

EDMUND P. GAINES.

General D. L. CLINGH, or officer commanding at Fort Drane, Auld Lang Syne.

No. 64.

Extract of a letter addressed to Brigadier General Clinch, by order of Major General Scott, dated

PICOLATA, March 2, 1836.

If Major General Gaines should fall back upon Fort King or Fort Drane, it is presumed that he will proceed to execute the orders of the government, which will carry him to another quarter. In that event you would be the senior officer; and I am instructed by Major General Scott to say that you are at liberty to detain the troops from Fort Brooke at either of the forts mentioned—Drane and King. Subsistence will reach you in five or six days.

A. VAN BUREN, *Aide-de-camp.*

No. 65.

FORT KING, February 25, 1836.

DEAR SHANNON: I received your letter and check, for which I am much obliged. I find it is General Gaines's intention to go down to Tampa Bay by the way of the scene of General Clinch's fight, and then to quit Florida. I wish you would take occasion to say to General Scott that if he thinks the services of my regiment can be of use to his operations I would rather remain with it in Florida than go back without having seen a fight. Though, to tell the truth, I would rather have the fight before the grand army comes up. I would like, therefore, before we can be shipped back from Tampa Bay, to be ordered on some active duty by General Scott. Try and send any news you may hear.

Yours, sincerely,

P. F. SMITH.

Captain S. SHANNON.

No. 66.

ORDERS No. 11.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, Picolata, March 4, 1836.

Captain Shannon, chief of the United States quartermaster's department, will exert himself to start the wagon train (loaded) as early as possible for Fort Drane. He will engage a responsible wagon-master, and obtain the drivers that may be wanted.

Major Cooper will detach a company from his battalion to escort the wagons, which will remain at Fort Drane until the remainder of the battalion shall come up with it.

The commander of the escort will receive instructions for the march from the quartermaster, as will the wagon-master. The latter will be immediately charged with the command of the drivers and the care of the wagons and horses; the whole under the general direction of the commander of the escort.

By command of Major General Scott.

A. VAN BUREN, *Aide-de-camp.*

No. 67.

ORDERS No. 12.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Picolata, March 5, 1836.*

All the troops now in the vicinity of Picolata and Garey's Ferry, on Black creek, as well as those expected to arrive in a few days at the one or the other place, are destined to make part of the right wing of the army, and will constantly hold themselves in readiness to march to Fort Drane.

To make room for subsistence, ammunition, and hospital stores, the wagon train will be relieved of everything that can be dispensed with. Commanding officers of battalions and companies will look closely to this great object, and each is held responsible that everything is left behind not absolutely necessary to the efficiency of officers and men.

A great saving in the weight to be drawn may be made in diminishing the number of tents. One for the officers of a company, and one for every twelve sergeants, corporals, privates, and musicians, will give as many as the means of transportation will permit. This proportion must, on no account, be exceeded. Every intelligent individual will see that it is sufficient when he reflects that there will then be tents enough to cover the sick, the delicate, and all the arms, particularly as near the enemy one-third of every company ought to be on guard from sundown to sunrise.

In order that the wagons and pack-horses may not be broken down by the lazy, no individual, except a sick or a lame man, will be allowed to ride. In cases of doubt, a surgeon, or if there be none, the commanding officer will decide. This rule must be rigorously enforced.

As a general rule, the troops will always commence long marches with four days' subsistence in each haversack. Hard bread, which is the lightest and the most wholesome, has been provided for the purpose, and for the same reasons bacon shall soon be issued; until it shall arrive, boiled pork for two days will be put in each haversack, with bread for four, at the commencement of the march for Fort Drane.

The arms and ammunition of every man must, at all times, be kept in the best possible condition for firing. Both must be carefully inspected by company officers every morning and every evening. Commanders of companies will always see that this is done in every company, and field officers will also look to the execution of this command.

Arms must not be permitted to remain too long loaded. The loads must from time to time be drawn, or, by special permission, fired; all the bad loads of the same battalion or company at the same time. The special permission is indispensable to prevent false alarms; for, near the enemy, a single discharge ought to be a signal for the whole to turn out under arms. For this reason, and also on account of the difficulty of transporting ammunition in wagons, all idle firing in or about camps or columns in march is strictly prohibited.

When access can be had to the ammunition wagon, every man ought constantly to have in his cartridge-box or pocket at least twenty-four rounds of ammunition to fit him for battle. This object ought to be looked to every morning when arms and ammunition are inspected.

Volunteers will seize every occasion that may offer to drill by battalion and by company.

By command of Major General Scott.

A. VAN BUREN, *Aide-de-camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 68.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Picolata, March 6, 1836.*

SIR: No intelligence has been received of the movements of Major General Gaines of a later date than his letter dated the 29th ultimo, a copy of which has been forwarded. He cannot, therefore, have fallen back upon either Fort Drane or King, or have marched upon Volusia. In either case, I should, doubtless, have received a further report of him from Brigadier General Clinch. It may then be hoped that he has beaten the enemy, or, at least, have succeeded in effecting his return to Tampa Bay. In this state of doubt and anxiety I know not how long I may have to remain. Yet it is important to my combinations that I should speedily learn what has become of his column, and, particularly, whether the position and numbers of the enemy have been materially changed by its operations.

I at length know that the South Carolina mounted regiment reached Jacksonville yesterday. It is destined to make part of the left wing. The foot (in part) of the same wing now occupies Volusia, and positions on the coast as far as the Tomoca. Four other companies are engaged in scouring the country between the Atlantic and the St. John's, as far south as the Alachua Ferry, or Pilatka. Several small parties of the enemy have been discovered almost in a line between this and St. Augustine. A few shots have been exchanged but without results. On the supposition that Major General Gaines has left the state of the enemy on the Withlacoochee unchanged, the left wing (under Brigadier General Eustis) need not be concentrated at Volusia until a day or two before Brigadier General Clinch shall be in force to act vigorously from Fort Drane. Besides, Brigadier General Eustis has necessarily been compelled to wait for the South Carolina mounted regiment, which cannot reach St. Augustine before the day after tomorrow, and Volusia before the 12th.

If the column under Major General Gaines had fallen back upon Fort Drane or King, the right wing would have wanted nothing but subsistence, and the forces now in this vicinity, and known to be coming up, to act with vigor and effect. These forces are: 1. Three companies United States artillery, under Major Gates, which landed this morning, about 140 men, and which detachment has been more than eight days in coming from Savannah by steam through a most unusual storm. 2. Major Cooper's battalion of Georgia foot, about 320 men, encamped about $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles west of this, on the Fort Drane road. 3. A small battalion of Georgia mounted men, only about 140 strong, now waiting for orders at Garey's Ferry, or Black creek, distant, by a direct route, say 60 miles from Fort Drane. 4. Captain Wharton's detachment of United States dragoons, about 90 strong, now in march from Savannah, and which may arrive at Garey's Ferry about the 11th. These two small detachments of horse are, on the above supposition, deemed of greater importance to the right wing than the two of foot, and I do not know that any part of the second battalion of mounted men called for from Georgia can now be expected; and, indeed, if this

second battalion were to arrive with no better dispositions than were evinced by the mass of the first, I should regret its appearance.

The first battalion consisted of Captains Kenan's, Allen's, Douglass's, Malone's, and Sweeny's companies. Less than 20 privates of Kenan's and not one of Allen's were willing to be mustered into service—that is, to come under the rules and articles of war. Their zeal and patriotism had evaporated before their arrival, in the opinion of many of their officers, and in that of all the gallant men of the same State who remain. Allen's men, in despite of his patriotic exertions, deserted him in mass the morning after their arrival on the opposite side, and before I could get across the river. The mass of Kenan's company, the one first on the ground, also deserted. This officer's chagrin is as great as his intelligence and general merits. About seven of his men only, who were willing to be mustered, have joined the three remaining companies of the battalion. These (Douglass's, Malone's, and Sweeny's) showed better dispositions from the first. I visited their camp, on the other side of the river, four days ago, in a severe storm of wind and rain, and after a short harangue every man of them answered to his name at the muster, and cheered the rules and articles of war, that were duly read to them. This is the small battalion reported above as being now at Garey's Ferry.

I pray I may be pardoned for accepting this battalion, the companies of which are greatly below the standard of 64 privates, whilst each has its full complement of officers, sergeants, and corporals. No two of the companies were willing to unite into one. I was obliged to have some mounted men for the right wing, and I knew not that another company would present itself from the same State. The 140 or 150 men thus obtained, added to the detachment of United States dragoons, may suffice till the right and left wing shall approximate in the direction of the Withlacoochee or the Ocklawaha.

About 16,000 rations, with a good supply of hospital stores, were despatched this morning for Fort Drane. The same wagons will return here or to Garey's Ferry to be reloaded, and in the meantime both wagons and horses may be expected from Savannah to complete the baggage train. None were brought by the two steamers which arrived last night. They brought Major Gates's detachment, corn, rations, &c., but no bacon. The latter is exceedingly wanted on account of its lightness compared with pork, and also because it is greatly preferred by all the volunteers. Not a pound has arrived here or at St. Augustine. This failure will demand an increase of not less than eight four-horse wagons. To add to my numerous vexations, the wagons reported to have been shipped at Baltimore in the Arctic have been left behind. As connected with the business of transportation, take this in connexion with the unexpected impossibility of navigating with common boats the Ocklawaha, and the extraordinary detention of both wagons and horses at Savannah, and it will be seen that human agents are as little to be relied upon as the winds and waves. All have fought powerfully against me. I am not, however, cast down. My exertions shall be the greater, and there is yet both means and time to prosecute the campaign to a successful termination. The boat is about to depart.

In haste, I remain, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

I send no more troops for the present to Fort Drane, on account of the difficulty of subsisting them there. If Major General Gaines shall not fall back on that point, it will be indispensable to wait for Captain Wharton. In the meantime it is easy to subsist the forces here and at Garey's Ferry.

W. S.

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General United States Army.*

No. 69.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Picolata, March 4, 1836.*

SIR: I caused a letter, dated the second instant, to be despatched to you by a return express that left us yesterday morning.

Before the arrival of the wagon train from Fort Drane, endeavors had been made to put across the river a supply of provisions. The roughness of the river was *then* an impediment. The storm has since increased, and still continues. Even the little steamer (*Essayons*) that has been here these two days can render but partial assistance. Her burden is very small, and yet she draws so much water (more than four feet) that she cannot approach nearer than some hundred yards the opposite shore.

Being informed that Garey's Ferry, on Black creek, furnishes a much better landing, with tolerable storage, and that the road thence to Fort Drane is rather shorter, and less bad, than the route from the point opposite to this, I have ordered several schooners, now here, to proceed thither and to discharge their cargoes of forage and subsistence for men. Three small companies of mounted Georgians, mustered into service yesterday, will return to that ferry, where they had left their wagons. It is my expectation to order the wagons (now to be sent to you) on their return from Fort Drane to that place, to receive their second loads—say of hard bread, bacon, and small rations, with, perhaps, some corn; but I am glad to perceive that the quartermaster with you estimates that about 3,000 bushels of the latter article may be obtained in the vicinity of Fort Drane. Please cause the whole amount of corn estimated to be in the neighborhood to be purchased. Including the United States dragoons, you will have, by the 17th instant, at least 250 mounted men, besides the horses of the baggage train, to subsist; and corn is so heavy an article of transportation that I should be glad not to be obliged to send a bushel from this quarter, except for use upon the road. *Hay* I have never expected to transport by *land*, beyond two or three marches.

I still presume that Major General Gaines will be obliged to fall back on Fort Drane, which increases my anxiety to send the wagons (with some additions) loaded. I would prefer much that the force brought with him was back at Tampa Bay, or rather, that it had not marched from that place, *provided* that the movement fails to crush the enemy, or to terminate the war. The worst result, next to the loss of that fine body of men, or a third of it, would be mere success in driving the enemy into the lower country, where I suppose it would be almost impossible for us to follow—I mean *below* the waters of Charlotte harbor. Hence my indignation that an isolated attack should have been made from your vicinity, well calculated to produce that result; and at a time, too, when you knew, and Major General Gaines must have known through you, (and before,) that my plan, with ample means, was to move simultaneously upon the

Withlacoochee in three columns from Tampa Bay—the upper crossing on the Ocklawaha and Fort Drane—so as to make it impossible for the enemy to escape to the lower country.

I have not yet supposed that Major General Gaines has not his retreat upon Fort Drane or King perfectly in his power. On account of subsistence, if he can cut his way through the enemy to Tampa Bay, I should much prefer that his force should be there; and when I wished him to march or send that force to Volusia, it was because it could be infinitely more easily subsisted there than at Fort Drane. Should he, however, be in any difficulty in operating a retreat from the Withlacoochee, I certainly wish you to afford any succor that the slender means within your reach may allow; and this, doubtless, you would render, without any special permission to that effect. If the force returns to Fort Drane or King, it must be subsisted for at least five or six days from the means derived from this place; and hence, I *now* prefer that it should become a part of the right wing, rather than take that quantity of subsistence from you, and march back to Tampa Bay.

Give me any intelligence you may possess as to the route from you to Garey's Ferry—[near Whitesville, on Black creek.]

All the information obtained here and at St. Augustine represents the route from Volusia to the road between Fort King and Tampa Bay as practicable for troops moving with wagons—certainly, with pack-horses.

No troops have arrived here within two days. The United States dragoons are in march from Savannah. Two or three steamers with troops, wagons, horses, &c., have been expected these five days.

With great consideration, I remain, yours truly,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General CLINCH, *Commanding, &c., Fort Drane.*

No. 70.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Picolata, March 6, 1836.*

SIR: Major General Scott is exceedingly anxious to hear the result of the operations on the Withlacoochee. The last intelligence from that quarter, through you, was only to the 29th ultimo.

Major Gates landed here this morning with three companies of United States artillery, about 140 strong. No horses and no wagons have arrived. Captain Wharton's detachment may arrive at Garey's Ferry by the 11th. It is probable that this detachment and the 140 Georgia mounted men will be the only horse with the right wing; and hence Major Gates's and Major Cooper's battalions are detained near this depot until Captain Wharton shall approach nearer to the above-mentioned ferry.

A baggage train, consisting of seventeen four and five, and twelve two-horse wagons, and six carts, set out for Fort Drane this morning, escorted by one company of Major Cooper's battalion of Georgia foot. They have with them 8,960 rations of hard bread, 8,537 rations of flour, 11,000 rations of pork, 8,000 rations of beans, two barrels of coffee, one barrel of vinegar, eight boxes of soap, three boxes of candles, 5,000 flints, and a large supply of medical stores. In consequence of the extremely bad state of the road, particularly at this end of the route, it is presumed that from four to five days will be required for this train to reach you. General Scott hopes that it may arrive in good time, and the subsistence and stores in good order.

Under the impression stated to you in his last letter, General Scott wishes you, after giving the horses a reasonable rest at Fort Drane, to send back the best wagons and teams to Garey's Ferry, to receive a further supply of subsistence and general stores for the right wing of the army. Should your better knowledge of the route between those places convince you that it will be more advantageous to send the train back to Bayard, (opposite this place,) you will please to do so, giving timely notice thereof to general headquarters.

General Scott bids me ask, will it be necessary, in your judgment, to send an escort with the train from Fort Drane to Garey's Ferry? He supposes not. But you will please, in this case, decide that point for yourself; and if it should be in favor of an escort, he suggests a detachment other than that which is now in march with the train. It will be easy, when the wagons shall be reloaded at Garey's Ferry, to furnish an escort from that point back to Fort Drane. The South Carolina regiment of mounted men will, in all probability, have passed the river at Jacksonville by to-morrow night.

I have the honor to be, sir, with high consideration, your most obedient servant,

R. E. TEMPLE, *Lieutenant and Aide-de-camp.*

Brigadier General CLINCH, *Commanding left wing, &c., Fort Drane.*

No. 71.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *between Picolata and Garey's Ferry, March 9, 1836.*

SIR: I have just set out for Fort Drane, *via* Garey's Ferry, on Black creek, with two companies of regulars, and intending to take with me from the latter place the small battalion of mounted Georgians, (heretofore mentioned,) under the command of Major Douglass. Lieutenant Colonel Bankhead is at the head of the first detachment, and the two together may make a total of about 240; but even this small force may be important to rescue Major General Gaines.

I had not received the slightest information of the operations on the Withlacoochee (official or otherwise) of a later date than the 29th ultimo up to this morning, and had concluded that he had effected his march, with more or less success against the enemy, upon Tampa Bay, when at daylight the steamer that I am now in arrived and brought the rumor, which is confirmed by the two accompanying notes from Paymaster Lytle, received about six hours afterwards. On the reception of the rumor, I immediately commenced preparations for this movement; but being delayed by the necessity of unloading and reloading

the boats, I am now at anchor at the mouth of Black creek. I hope to put the troops in march from Garey's Ferry early in the day to-morrow, and to reach Fort Drane with a small escort the day following. It is possible that even these little detachments of horse and foot may reach the Withlacoochee in time to render a valuable service.

I am aware that the movement I am making may be condemned, if regarded in any other light than a rescue, as premature. Colonel Goodwyn's mounted regiment only arrived at St. Augustine last night or this morning, and consequently the left wing cannot be in force on the Ocklawaha, in the direction of Pelaklikaha, earlier than the 17th, or up with the enemy before the 20th instant. Colonel Lindsay, who may have already arrived at Tampa Bay, cannot operate more than two days' march from that place from the want of the means of transportation, Major General Gaines having taken away the horses which were there, and the basis of the right wing is merged in the force brought by that general into the field, and must participate in his success or failure. If it falls back with him upon Fort Drane, it must suffer great loss; and if it follow him to Tampa Bay, it will be wholly out of position.

In this and even a greater state of uncertainty I have been held since the 26th ultimo. The day after I ordered back Major Cooper's battalion of Georgia foot, to prevent starvation at Fort Drane; and, though daily from that time in the expectation of receiving from Savannah horses and serviceable wagons, not one has arrived. The quantity of subsistence that will be at Fort Drane (say) to-morrow will only be that sent from Picolata on the 6th instant, viz: 17,497 rations of bread and flour; 11,000 rations of pork, (with beef cattle in the neighborhood;) 8,000 rations of beans; some coffee, vinegar, &c. And the troops now about to proceed, perhaps as far as the Withlacoochee, will not have the means of taking with them rations for more than six days.

I beg leave to recapitulate the causes of my great deficiency in the means of transportation: 1. The wagons and horses which I knew Brigadier General Clinch to possess early in February have been more broken down by hard service and bad roads than I had expected to find them. 2. I had, upon what was considered in Georgia and even at Picolata the best information, confidently relied upon the use of the Ocklawaha as late as the 2d instant. 3. No bacon has arrived, and the difference between it and pork, including wood and brine, is fifty per centum against the latter. 4. The wagons purchased at Charleston and Augusta by Assistant Quartermasters LEngle and Peyton are generally poor, and many of them unserviceable. 5. The six or ten wagons actually reported to have been shipped at Baltimore in, I think, the Arctic, with Major Gates, were all left behind. 6. Of the 19,000 rations known to be at Fort Drane about the 25th ultimo, nearly the whole have been drawn by a force not expected by the government or myself to appear in that quarter. 7. Not a horse for the baggage train left by me at Savannah, or which I have since ordered to be purchased by Assistant Quartermaster Dimmock, has arrived in Florida.

On the 21st ultimo, when I was but 20 hours from Savannah, I sent back by a steamer that was met, an order to Lieutenant Dimmock to ship about 40 horses for the baggage train to Picolata. This order was strongly reiterated by a return steamer, five days afterwards; and again on the 2d instant, by another boat, he was instructed to send immediately, and by the speediest conveyance, 70 horses for the train and six four-horse wagons. I had this morning a report from him, saying, after he had received my first and second orders, that he had sent all the horses wanted for draught and packs by land, except a few which were to come as packs with Captain Wharton. Now, as the latter was about 24 days in New York after receiving orders for Florida, and expected to remain so in Savannah, he cannot be looked for in this neighborhood before the 18th or 20th instant. The other parts of the lot were, it seems, given as packs to the tenth company of South Carolina mounted men, and sent forward in a drove. They must, it is feared, arrive in a state unfit for the baggage train (say) about the 16th instant. Such has been the failure of human agents. The weather has been equally adverse.

If the force on the Withlacoochee should fall back on Fort Drane, it will be seen from the foregoing that a part, at least, must probably march upon Volusia or Garey's Ferry, to be within reach of subsistence. Instructions have been left behind me to send forward rations, should the means of transportation arrive in time, and the troops already in the neighborhood of Picolata—Major Cooper's and the remaining company of Major Gates's battalions. I have also desired Brigadier General Eustis, in the same event, to order to Fort Drane two companies of mounted men of Colonel Goodwyn's regiment, and a fourth order will go back in this boat to Lieutenant Dimmock on the subject of horses and wagons.

Some rifles and the tents arrived this morning at Picolata; but Colonel Goodwyn had marched through six or eight storms without cover, and now all companies in march are to be reduced to three tents each.

I have the honor to remain, with respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General U. S. Army.*

P. S.—Please remark that in his letter to Brigadier General Clinch, dated at New Orleans the 2d ultimo, Major General Gaines speaks of "an *efficient co-operation*," promises to be "in readiness" at Tampa Bay "by the 8th of the present month, to form a *junction* at or near that place with the force under your command, whenever *and as soon as* in your judgment *your force shall be sufficient to justify the movement*;" and concludes by saying, "a sufficient quantity of ammunition and *provisions* have been transported to Fort Brooke *to divide with you* until further supplies are received;" yet he did not wait till the brigadier gave notice that he was "in force;" came to Fort King, and swept nearly the whole of the subsistence collected at Fort Drane. A copy of that letter is in your office; and I now enclose one from Governor Eaton, from which it will appear that Major General Gaines knew, at Tampa Bay, about the 14th ultimo, that I had been charged with the direction of the war. He first heard this at Pensacola, and received Governor Eaton's despatch at Tampa, as I can establish. Hence his haste and neglect of the assurances given to Brigadier General Clinch; his isolated attack, &c.

SIR: I have been directed by General Clinch to inform you that your communications of yesterday's date reached him at this post after he had mounted his horse and was on the move with the forces under his command to escort supplies to General Gaines. He directed me likewise to say to you that the

distance from this point to Garey's (on Black creek) is about the same as the distance from here to Picolata.

As you may wish, however, to obtain all the information possible on the subject, I will take the liberty of adding, from my own knowledge, that the road from Garey's to this place is *sandy*, consequently, almost invariably dry; while the road from Picolata here is muddy after heavy rains, particularly such as we have just experienced.

Colonel Gadsden arrived here from Tallahassee on the 4th, (yesterday,) and accompanied General Clinch this morning to the Withlacoochee.

Very respectfully,

J. S. LYTTLE, *United States Army.*

FORT DRANE, *March 8, 1836.*

SIR: By direction of General Clinch I opened your communication of the 6th instant, which arrived late last night, in advance of the wagons. You will perceive by my letter of the 5th that General Clinch, with all the forces at this post, and one hundred mounted men from the vicinity, had left for the Withlacoochee to escort a small supply of cattle, ammunition, &c., to General Gaines, having received the night before a third express from that officer. No word has been received from either of these generals since the 5th. When General Clinch left here he expected to be back on the 9th.

The probability is, that the wagons will return without an escort, there being at present no troops here; and should General Clinch get back before the wagons depart, his men may be too much fatigued to march again immediately; but this, of course, is merely conjecture. I am satisfied, however, that General Clinch would advise that an escort accompany the wagons back to this place, when reloaded.

Captain Graham being directed by General Clinch to send back the wagons for supplies after their arrival here, will send them to Garey's, it being the best road.

Very respectfully,

J. S. LYTTLE.

Major General Scott, *U. S. Army, Commanding in Florida.*

N. B.—The amount of General Gaines's last express to General Clinch, dated 3d instant, was merely copies of his previous letters, with a note, stating that the Indians were still around him, but little or no fighting taken place since his last communication.

No. 73.

TALLAHASSEE, *February 24, 1836.*

DEAR SIR: I have received your letter and enclosure for Colonel Lindsay. To-morrow a despatch vessel will proceed to Tampa, by which I shall send your letter, and hope it will find him there. Ten days ago General Gaines proceeded there, and immediately I forwarded General Scott's letter to me, and the Secretary of War's instructions, that he might be fully apprised. Since that time I have heard nothing from him.

At Tampa, as far as I am advised, there is a force now of about 1,200 or 1,400 men. An express from General Clinch, received last night, states his force at 458, rank and file; in all 538. His provisions will serve about fifteen or twenty days, say to the 10th March. His transportation is twenty-seven horses, thirty mules, nine wagons, six carts.

It is important, I think, that General Scott should agree upon a day of moving, and by some despatch steamboat advise those at Tampa of the time of the day he will march, that both detachments may advance at one and the same time. The day should be fixed so prospectively that no time may be lost or mistake be made as to the day of departure.

Say to General Scott I fear much his Volusia move; it is too low down in the swamps, and cannot, I apprehend, be passed securely. If he had moved from Picolata to Camp King, the country being higher would have afforded a safer and better march, and one, I think, equally advantageous to our military operations.

Colonel Fitzpatrick, speaker of the legislative council of the Territory, will proceed to join General Scott from this place. He well knows the Cape country, is an intelligent man, and will render great service.

I write in great haste. Health and safety to you all, and kind regards to General Scott.

Yours,

J. H. EATON.

Major A. VAN BUREN.

No. 74.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Picolata, March 9, 1836.*

SIR: A rumor has reached me this morning, brought by the Florida from Jacksonville, and to that place by a horseman, (citizen I presume,) that Major General Gaines was still on the Withlacoochee, and had been joined by Brigadier General Clinch, with the forces which were under the command of the latter; that the two had been engaged, more or less, daily with Indians, and that the latter had a fort near the scene of those combats, which Major General Gaines intended to attack on the 6th or 7th instant. I have determined to move with such forces from this neighborhood—say Major Gates's battalion and that of

Georgia mounted men—as I may be able to find wagons for, in the direction of Fort Drane and the scene of operations, governing myself according to circumstances.

The great difficulties consist in supplying subsistence at Fort Drane and beyond. On the arrival (say on the 10th) of the wagon train despatched hence on the 6th instant there cannot be full rations left for all the forces in that vicinity for more than a day or two, and the train took breadstuffs for only about fourteen days for those forces. The pork (there was no bacon here) was but for a little more than half that time. To transport additional supplies, I cannot reckon upon more than two wagons (extra) at Garey's Ferry, and one here, besides the ammunition wagon and the one for general headquarters. I mean wagons to which we can attach teams; and for the ammunition, I shall be obliged to retain the wagon you sent over yesterday, which is now loaded with rifles for St. Augustine. Lieutenant Dimmock has not sent a horse by water, and not a wagon. Contrary to my reiterated orders, he has started the mules and horses by land, giving some as packs to one of Colonel Goodwyn's companies, (which, therefore, will bring no wagon,) some to Wharton, also as packs, and the remainder in (I suppose) a drove. Wharton expected to make good ten days in Savannah; consequently, I know not when the pack-horses will arrive. Some pack-saddles have come in the Florida. Lieutenant Dimmock had not received my letter of the 2d by the Santee. That boat, like all others, for ten days, has been delayed beyond all time. The Florida reports that she must have reached Savannah on the 7th. We shall see what effect the letter she carried will produce.

Perhaps I shall be able to find wagons only sufficient to take subsistence, say for ten days, for but two companies of Major Gates's battalion. I write in haste, and cannot make (yet) the necessary calculations.

I wish you immediately to despatch two or three companies of Colonel Goodwyn's regiment, under a field officer, to follow to Fort Drane, provided that you can furnish the means of transporting subsistence for the men equal to eight days, and forage (corn only) for three or four days. If you cannot furnish the transportation without halting the movement of the left wing in its march to Volusia, then the two or three companies will be put in march as soon as you shall be able by the new arrivals of horses and mules to supply the above amount of transportation.

From the enclosed letter (a copy) from Governor Eaton, I begin to doubt whether the route from Volusia, either by the upper or lower crossing on the Ocklawaha, upon any point in the road from Fort King to Tampa Bay, be as practicable for troops as we have heretofore supposed. I have relied upon you to obtain at St. Augustine the necessary information in relation to that route. I hope that you have satisfied yourself that it is practicable for wagons, or at any rate for pack-horses. Some pack-saddles will be left here for you.

Your arrangements for covering the plantations to the south of St. Augustine, and for scouring the country between you and Volusia, I have highly approved. Colonel Goodwyn's regiment having now arrived, I wish you to begin to concentrate on Volusia; and as soon as your means of transportation will allow, to push forward as large a portion of your force as practicable to the Ocklawaha, at the upper or lower crossing, according to the choice of routes, and there establish a sufficient post; but before you shall have passed Volusia, I hope to be able to give you better *data* for the regulation of your march and operations beyond the Ocklawaha. If a practicable route can be found, I shall probably wish you to march with your whole disposable force, after leaving the necessary garrisons for your small posts in the rear, upon either Okihamky, Pelaklikaha, or Chickuchatty, and extend that force a little to the right and left, (as far as prudence may permit,) as well to prevent the enemy from escaping to the southeast, from the Withlacoochee, as to increase the chances of communicating with the right wing and Tampa Bay.

These are the probable instructions which I may, upon better information, confirm from Fort Drane; and they are intimated in advance to meet the possible case of my not being able to communicate with you again in any short time. In that event you will proceed, if the route will permit, to carry them into execution, and as soon as your means of transportation will allow. I am aware that the latter are not fully equal to the occasion, and may, by the continuation of the series of accidents, not be sufficient in some time. I know, however, that all that may reasonably be attempted will be essayed by you, and I have every confidence in your zeal, as well as abilities. If you had the adequate means of transportation, and I were sure of the practicability of the route indicated, I should be absolutely certain of your executing the part assigned you, and in the shortest time. If in your march to the southwest you should open a communication with Colonel Lindsay, or any other officer junior to you, you will give him any instructions that you may deem necessary to harmonize his movements with the general views which you know me to entertain, and which may not be incompatible with recent instructions from general headquarters. Those views are, first, to pursue and beat the larger bodies of the enemy, and, secondly, to prevent, by all practicable means, the escape of that enemy into the lower parts of the peninsula.

Four companies of Major Cooper's battalion of Georgia foot will be left in position till sufficient means of transportation can be supplied. It will then be my wish that you put those companies in march for Fort Drane.

Captain Wharton's detachment of dragoons, which cannot arrive at Jacksonville or Garey's Ferry before the 16th or 18th instant, is destined to take the same route. I shall leave instructions for its government at the one or other of those places.

I have just opened a letter from the governor of Georgia, advising me of the march from Milledgeville, upon Colerain, Jacksonville, and Picolata, of another company of mounted Georgians. The march commenced on the 28th ultimo. I shall leave instructions here, subject to your control, for its government. My meaning is, that it shall not follow me to Fort Drane till it is known that at least 10,000 additional rations have been sent thither from Garey's Ferry or this place, unless the company should bring with it the means of transporting with it subsistence for itself for at least ten days.

Please call for returns from the assistant quartermaster and assistant commissary left at this place. They both have my orders to make Garey's Ferry the depot for further supplies which may be wanted at and beyond Fort Drane by the right wing. Please see instructions from me to the assistant quartermaster here, and permit him, as far as practicable, to carry the same into execution.

In great haste, I remain, with the highest respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General EUSTIS, *United States Army, Commanding, &c.*

P. S.—I set out this evening *via* Garey's Ferry. Colonel Bankhead accompanies me, at the head of two companies of artillery. Major Gates is left here as the commander of the post for the present, subject, of course, to your orders. The boat to communicate with Volusia has not arrived.

W. S.

No. 75.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *March 9, 1836.*

SIR: Of the wagons and horses that may be expected to arrive here, or at Garey's Ferry, from Savannah and Charleston, I wish as many as possible, with reference to the wants of the left wing, of which Brigadier General Eustis will be the judge, despatched for Fort Drane, with subsistence for men. Hard bread will be sent in preference to flour, and bacon, should any arrive, in preference to pork.

Add, for each train, small rations, (say) one-third as many as you send bread. Should no bacon be on hand, let the number of rations of pork sent be in the proportion of two to three of bread, and one barrel of flour may be sent for every three of bread.

I wish you also to send to the same place, by the first train that you may despatch, a good proportion of the tools expected from Savannah, say saws, augers, and broad-axes.

It is probable that another company of mounted Georgians may arrive in a week at Jacksonville. Show this letter (or send a copy) to both Brigadier General Eustis and Major Gates, that one or other may send orders, in advance, for that company to proceed to Garey's Ferry, and there await further orders.

The same thing of another company of mounted men that may be expected from the same State. A company of mounted South Carolinians may also be soon expected at Jacksonville, destined for the left wing. I mention these companies to you in order that you may take measures to place forage at those places for them, as well as for Captain Wharton's detachment of United States dragoons, which is to march to Fort Drane. Being fully persuaded that Garey's Ferry is the better depot for stores intended for the right wing, you will take care to keep it supplied with whatever you may think will probably be wanted.

The quarter part of the baggage wagon train, lately sent hence to Fort Drane, was ordered to return to Garey's Ferry to be reloaded for the right wing. Events may prevent the execution of that order. Hence the instruction in the beginning of this letter.

In great haste, I remain truly yours,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Lieutenant DUSENBURY, *Assistant Quartermaster United States Army.*

The *Essayons* (steamer) is left under your immediate charge, principally for supplying the depot at Garey's Ferry. Lieutenant Searight, assistant commissary of subsistence, is ordered thither; he will, to any necessary extent, be subject to your instructions. All haversacks and nose-bags here must be put on board the *Florida* to-day.

Any haversacks that may arrive from St. Augustine must be forwarded by the earliest possible conveyance, and if in time, by the wagon-horses about to proceed to Garey's Ferry.

No. 76.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Garey's Ferry, March 10, 1836.*

SIR: As an assistant commissary you are placed on duty at this depot, and you are also charged with the duties of acting assistant quartermaster.

In the two capacities, with the assistance of Mr. Williams, or some other capable person, you are charged with the issue of subsistence and forage to all troops, volunteers or regulars, that may arrive here; also with the delivery of arms, ammunition, accoutrements, and other appointments, to such of the troops as may require them, within the regulations of the service.

Upon all those points you will correspond with Assistant Quartermaster Dusenbury, at Picolata, so as to keep this depot supplied with whatever may probably be required by troops passing on to the theatre of war.

Among the troops that may be expected soon to arrive are four other companies of Georgia mounted volunteers. Such companies, as they successively arrive, you will regularly muster into the service of the United States for ninety days, unless sooner discharged, and cause the rules and articles of war to be read to each and every one. All this you will do by my authority; and such are the instructions given to me by the War Department.

Those companies may probably arrive here without arms. Hall's patent rifles and some of the common rifles are at Picolata, and also some swords, and muskets in abundance.

Write to Lieutenant Dusenbury to send hither some of both kinds of rifles, and also some muskets—say about seventy-five of the latter. With the common rifle, sabres must be issued in equal numbers; but Hall's having a bayonet, no sabre will go with them. Indeed, Lieutenant Dusenbury has, with the number here, not more than sixty or eighty left. Give the companies that may present themselves the choice of arms within your means of supply, and also issue the corresponding ammunition, or powder and lead, in the case of the selection of rifles. Some three hundred or more haversacks and nose-bags will be sent you very soon. Issue to each man either a nose-bag or a haversack, to carry the four days' provisions for himself, required by my orders for marching troops. Tents, at the rate of three per company, will also be allowed, and more for troops whilst here in camp. There are many tents at Picolata.

It is my wish and order that no company or companies that may arrive (till further orders) shall proceed hence to Fort Drane and the theatre of war, with the means of transporting, with it or them, less than eight days' subsistence for men. The reason of this instruction is founded on the fear of scarcity of rations in that quarter; but should the train, soon expected here to be reloaded, be sufficient to take

15,000 rations back to Fort Drane, then the companies may be allowed to proceed to that place, with the means of transporting with them six days' rations. The train may be expected here in five or seven days, and by correspondence with Picolata you will hold yourself in readiness to despatch it back without delay.

I wish you to send not more than one part of flour to three of hard bread; and in pork, two-thirds as many rations as you send in bread and flour.

For the present, and until our means of transportation are better, you will send small rations, in the proportion of one to four, compared with flour and bread.

Other supplies for Fort Drane may be directed, such as carpenters' tools, &c. Lieutenant Dusenbury has my general instructions on the subject.

Some rope for picketing horses, and for helping wagons over bad parts of the route, will be supplied to the wagons of the general train, and any wagon belonging to a detachment, according to your means.

Under the general instructions to me from the War Department, (a copy of which you have,) this place is constituted a place of issue to the distressed inhabitants of Florida. I can leave no officer here but yourself. You will therefore make issues under the printed instructions on the subject, and according to the spirit of those instructions.

If bacon should arrive here or at Picolata, I wish it to be sent to Fort Drane, instead of pork, and as many rations of bacon as of bread and flour.

In proportion to the difficulty of the duties assigned you, will, no doubt, be your zeal and energy in execution.

With respect, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT

Lieutenant SEARIGHT, *United States Army, &c.*

No. 77.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Fort Drane, March 14, 1836.*

SIR: On my arrival here I found that the force which had been upon the Withlacoochee had fallen back on this vicinity.

Brigadier General Clinch, with some means of subsistence, and about 600 men, (of whom 150 were mounted Floridians,) joined Major General Gaines on the 6th instant. The force under the latter had already been reduced to the necessity of commencing on horses and dogs for their subsistence. After receiving that timely and important succor, the army remained in position till the 10th.

It may be remarked that from the time of entrance into the intrenched camp, up to the retreat in this direction, not a sortie was attempted, and that to save the pride of the higher officer, the command was relinquished to the next in rank, in order that *he* might give the order to retreat.

A copy of Major General Gaines's order, yielding the immediate command of their joint forces to Brigadier General Clinch, is enclosed. This extraordinary paper I have but little time to comment upon. The poor sneer against me, as the *diplomatic agent of the War Department*, is in character with all his recent acts; for, at the moment of the arrival of the succor, on the 6th, he had already opened a negotiation with the enemy, in which it is said on good authority he was willing to leave them in the *quiet* possession of the country below the Withlacoochee until the arrival of the "diplomatic agent;" but in which Powell insisted that that river should be the *perpetual* boundary between us and the Seminoles. But for Brigadier General Clinch I have no doubt some treaty, on the one or other basis, would have been formed between the parties. He alleged the positive instructions of the War Department against all negotiating, and he enabled Major General Gaines to save the original force with him. Not a sortie was made from the intrenched camp from the time of its formation up to the retreat; and on the approach of the succor, a large detachment of the enemy had taken a position to intercept the retreat in this direction. How, under such circumstances, it can be alleged that the enemy *has been beaten*, it would be difficult to reconcile with facts.

I have every reason to hope that the enemy remains nearly in the same position as before the isolated, and therefore false, movement of Major General Gaines. This is fortunate.

I have instructed Brigadier General Eustis, after scouring the country through which he will have to pass to some extent, to place his column in position somewhere in the neighborhood of Pelaklikaha about the 25th instant. Colonel Lindsay, by the same day, is to be with his force at Chickuchatty, (about two marches from Tampa,) and means are suggested to each in order to multiply the chances of communicating with each other. The right wing will move hence (say) on the 24th instant, to attack in front. This column will pass the Withlacoochee about half a mile below the late intrenched camp, where there is a good ford, and of which Major General Gaines might have availed himself if he had had the strength or inclination.

The 25th instant is appointed in order that I may be certain of giving Brigadier General Eustis and Colonel Lindsay time to put themselves in position, respectively, and further to give time for the harassed troops lately under Major General Gaines to recruit themselves for effective operations. The same interval is equally important to enable Brigadier General Clinch to receive from Picolata or Garey's Ferry the quantity of subsistence indispensable to give confidence to the movements of the right wing. I have time to add no more.

Enclosed are copies of the order of Major General Gaines, mentioned above, and of Brigadier General Clinch's letter to me.

With great respect, I remain your most obedient,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General U. S. A.*

No. 78.

ORDER No. 7.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Izard, on the Withlacoochee, Florida, March 9, 1836.

1. Called to East Florida by the savage massacres and conflagrations of the 28th December and the following month, the commanding general hastily collected in Louisiana the forces which accompanied him from that patriotic State. These troops, in the short space of thirty-six days, have marched by land and water nearly eight hundred miles, one hundred and forty of which was through the country occupied by the enemy, whose principal force they have met, beaten, and forced to sue for peace.

2. These important objects of the campaign having been accomplished with the hearty and cordial co-operation of Brigadier General Clinch, (to whose sound judgment the defence of this frontier had been wisely confided, and by whose gallantry the enemy had been chastised on the 31st of December, and since held in check as far as his limited means would allow,) the troops from Louisiana are placed under his command, in order to guard against the known faithlessness of the enemy, until the arrival of the forces under the officer charged with the diplomatic arrangements of the War Department. Whenever and as soon as that officer shall mature his plan of operations, and accomplish the duties assigned him, the forces from Louisiana will return to New Orleans.

3. The commanding general cannot, consistently with his views of propriety, take leave of the troops by whom he has been so manfully sustained, without tendering them his grateful acknowledgments for the constancy and courage with which they have performed every duty and borne privations, the recital of which would not fail to command the admiration of the virtuous and wise of every section of the republic. The officers and soldiers of the whole of these forces, (including the artillery from Tampa Bay,) acting as a light brigade, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs, of the 4th infantry, have performed their duty so much to the satisfaction of the general that he cannot discriminate between the relative claims of corps, of officers, or other individuals, without the risk of invidious distinctions. All did their duty cheerfully and gallantly; and when it became necessary to meet the question whether to eat the meat of their own horses or to abandon an important position, all cheerfully preferred this unpleasant subsistence to any movement that would endanger the frontier. The horse-meat was accordingly eaten by officers and men until the enemy was beaten and sued for peace. A timely supply of provisions arrived, escorted by the brave Georgians, Floridians, and regulars, under General Clinch, at the moment the pacific propositions of the enemy were in the act of being answered. The Indians were fired on by the general's light troops before he could be notified of the object of their being near the camp. They have since disappeared.

4. The general deeply regrets the fall of First Lieutenant J. F. Izard, of the dragoons, acting brigade major, and in command of the advance guard. He fell at the head of his corps, and though mortally wounded, had the heroic presence of mind to order, "Keep your positions, men, and lie close." Second Lieutenant Duncan, of 2d artillery, was slightly wounded; Captain Sanders, commanding the friendly Indians, was severely wounded; Captain Armstrong, of the United States transport schooner *Motto*, was slightly wounded. The two last-named officers were in the advance, where their services had been highly useful during the march. Lieutenant Ephraim P. Smith, of Captain Williams's company of Louisiana volunteers, received three wounds. This officer and twenty-nine non-commissioned officers and soldiers of other companies of the regiment evinced their gallantry by their good conduct, as well as by their honorable wounds. The general is convinced that he never commanded a finer corps; its chief would do honor to any service.

The officers of the medical department merit the approbation of the general for the attentive and skilful manner in which their duties were discharged.

List of killed and wounded.

<i>Killed</i> —1st Lieutenant J. F. Izard, dragoons.....	1
Sergeant F. Dunn, of the 2d artillery.....	1
Private Z. Bolie, of Louisiana volunteers.....	1
Private Val. Beck.....	1
Private Henry Butler.....	1
Total.....	5

<i>Wounded</i> —of officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates :	
2d artillery.....	8
4th infantry.....	8
Louisiana volunteers.....	30
Total.....	46

By order of Major General Gaines.

GEO. A. McCALL, *Aide-de-camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 79.

HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING FLORIDA TROOPS, *Fort Drane, March 12, 1836.*

SIR: I returned last night from the Withlacoochee with the troops composing the right wing Florida army. The troops turned over to me by Major General Gaines are stationed four miles in advance of this post, and with a little rest and recruiting will be a very efficient force, and will add much to the strength of the right wing of the army of Florida.

The principal force of the Indians are still on the Withlacoochee, and it is my opinion they will remain there until driven from their strong hold by force.

The enclosed papers, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, will inform you of the principal occurrences that have taken place since my last communication to you.

I beg leave to refer you to Colonel Gadsden for further particulars.

I am, &c.,

D. L. CLINCH, *Brigadier General United States Army.*

Major General W. Scott, *Commander of the Florida army.*

No. 80.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Fort Drane, March 14, 1836.*

SIR: On the 6th instant Brigadier General Clinch, with a considerable quantity of subsistence and about 600 men, (of whom 150 were mounted Floridians,) reached the intrenched camp on the Withlacoochee. The troops there, without having made a single sortie, had already commenced eating their horses and dogs, and the enemy had a large detachment in position to intercept the retreat in this direction.

Major General Gaines had actually commenced a sort of negotiation with the Indians, in which he was willing to let them remain quiet below the Withlacoochee, until "the diplomatic agent of the War Department" (myself) should arrive, but in which Powell insisted on that river as the permanent boundary between the Seminoles and the whites. The arrival of Clinch put a stop to the negotiation, and the higher officer yielded the immediate command to the next in rank, in order that the latter might take upon himself the unpleasant, but necessary step, as was believed by both, of commanding a retreat.

The enemy, as is confidently believed, remains nearly in the position occupied on the 27th ultimo. This is fortunate; the recent operations require ten or twelve days to recruit for active operations. The same time is wanted to bring subsistence to this point, and perhaps to enable you and Colonel Lindsay to place your respective forces in position. The latter, by the way of St. Mark's, and direct from this place, is instructed to be at Chickachatty by the 25th instant. On the same day I wish you to be at or near Pelaklikaha, to act as heretofore instructed.

Brigadier General Clinch, Colonel Gadsden, (who is with me and in my staff,) and others, think there is no doubt but that you will find the route to that place, from Volusia, perfectly practicable with pack-horses, if not with wagons. Take with you, accordingly, all the pack-horses expected at Picolata from Savannah, and you need not send to the right wing any part of the South Carolina regiments.

Colonel Lindsay is instructed, after gaining his position, to fire a gun (if he should have one) every morning at 10 o'clock, to multiply the chances of communicating with you. You will do the same, and at the same hour, for the double purpose of being heard by Brigadier General Clinch and the colonel. Clinch will be instructed (if he can take a gun) to do the same thing.

The instructions to the three commanders of corps is, in one or two particulars, the same—to pursue and beat any considerable body of the enemy, and next to that, if possible, to prevent any such body from escaping to the southeast.

When you and Colonel Lindsay shall have gained the positions mentioned above, I wish each to close upon the enemy in the rear, whilst he shall be vigorously attacked by Clinch in front. The latter will cross the Withlacoochee near the late intrenched camp, about thirty-five miles, and south-southwest from this place. The enemy is supposed to remain in the swamps or hammocks a little above, and on the left bank of the Withlacoochee, near the junction of the branches of that river; that supposed position is also called *the cove*. I left orders with Major Cooper, and at Garey's Ferry, that no troops should march upon this place without arriving here with at least six days' subsistence unexpended. It is now my wish that no detachment shall leave the neighborhood of Picolata or Garey's Ferry before the 19th instant, for this place, and not then without the extra subsistence mentioned.

I wish you to retain the wagons and horses that may arrive in your vicinity which may be indispensable to the left wing, and give the remainder to the right. Many (in addition) will be wanted by Clinch. All the horses brought from Tampa are reported as utterly unserviceable, and by the time the wagon train that left here yesterday for Garey's Ferry shall return with their loads of subsistence, &c., many of them will be broken down. Five or six additional four-horse wagons (with their horses or mules) were required of Lieutenant Dimmock, in my letter to him of the 9th instant, besides the wagons expected from Baltimore, and the wagons, horses, and mules, previously required of that officer; that is, when I left Garey's Ferry, about twenty four-horse wagons, five two-horse wagons, and, in all, 110 horses and mules, for the baggage train, were expected to arrive from Savannah, at Picolata, St. Augustine, and Garey's Ferry. You better know than myself what means of land transportation were then expected from Charleston. I wish not less than two-fifths of those expected means of transportation to accompany the troops which are to join Brigadier General Clinch, and the wagons to be principally loaded with provisions for men. No company is to be allowed to bring with it hither more than three tents; and beyond this point it is not expected to take half so many. You will make a similar calculation for your march from Volusia, and reduce the ration of hard bread to the old allowance (twelve ounces.)

About the 19th instant I wish Wharton's United States dragoons, and one company (only) of Georgia mounted men, to be put in route for Fort Drane. Means of transportation being furnished for those companies, Major Cooper's battalion of Georgia foot will be next supplied, and put in march. Each detachment must bring with it extra subsistence for at least six days—taking enough for the march to this place on each horse or each man.

All the remaining wagons that can be spared, say from four to ten, I wish to be loaded, according to instructions left with Lieutenants Dusenbury and Searight. One of the wagons must be loaded with musket cartridges and some rifle powder.

If you should leave St. Augustine or Picolata before those several objects have been attended to, give the necessary instructions (to carry out my views) to the proper officers at St. Augustine, Picolata, and Garey's Ferry. The route from the latter place to Fort Drane is rather less bad than that from Picolata. No escort is deemed necessary, except to aid the wagons in getting over the bad places in the route.

I left you an ammunition wagon in the place of the one brought with me hither.

If anything material should occur, (and nothing is expected,) I shall write to you hence to Volusia, *via* Picolata.

Wishing you success in your movements, and confident that, if it be possible, you will command success, I remain, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General EUSTIS, *Commanding left wing.*

P. S.—Cause the troops to march here to be supplied with haversacks for subsistence for men, and cornsacks to be used in bringing forage on horseback. Order any remaining haversacks in wagons to this place. W. S.

No. 81.

[Duplicate.]

FORT DRANE, *March 13, 1836.*

SIR: The plan of campaign against the Florida Indians is now sufficiently matured to enable General Scott to set in motion the right and left wings of the army under his command. The former, under the command of General Clinch, is now concentrating at Fort Drane, and will take up its line of march so as to be in position in advance of the Withlacoochee, or Amaxura river, at or near the late battle-ground, by the 25th of March. The left wing, led by General Eustis, and now on its advance to Volusia, on the St. Jehn's river, will move from that point so as to be in position at or near Pelaklikaha, by the above date. With the force you will bring from Alabama, united with Lieutenant Colonel Cal's battalion of Floridians, now at the Bay of Tampa, it is expected you will be able to move one thousand strong, so that the centre may be prepared to co-operate at the above date with the right and left wings of the army, in its position at or near Chickuchatty. As there is no want of subsistence, or the means of transportation, at the Bay of Tampa, it is confidently calculated that you will be able to march within the time designated. The route of your march you will select with discretion, having constantly in view the main object of the movement confided to your judgment—that of *preventing the escape of the enemy, or of its retreat towards the Everglades*, or supposed hiding-places of the savages in the thickets or jungles of the south. The Tampa road, to Fort King, may probably be the best route you can select until you have crossed the Hillsborough river, and have advanced to a point east of Chickuchatty, when you will move *west* upon that village. You will, on your march, keep a vigilant eye for Indian signs, and pursue any trail which may indicate the embodying of a sufficient savage force worthy of your attention. As soon as in position at or near the Chickuchatty village, which, it is hoped, you will accomplish by the 25th of the month, you will fire, at 10 o'clock of each morning, a single gun, from a field-piece, until responded to from either the right or left wing of the army, when you may advance upon the lower Withlacoochee, keeping south of that stream, and so extending to the right as to be able to communicate with General Eustis, on the advance from Pelaklikaha, should he find it advisable and practicable to extend to the left; and thus, by a combined and judicious co-operation of the three portions of the army, enclose the Seminoles in their stronghold in the cove, or big swamp of the Withlacoochee. It may be necessary, while in position at Chickuchatty, to examine carefully the hammocks near that village, and on your march to reconnoitre and even explore the big hammock, near which you will necessarily pass, and which has been represented as one of the strongholds of the Indians, to which they may possibly first retreat, should their present position on the Withlacoochee be found untenable with Clinch in their front and Eustis on their flanks. It is not improbable that, should the Seminoles take the alarm on the advance of the right and left wings of the army and retreat south, they may pass between the column commanded by you and that of the left under Eustis before either of you have approached sufficiently near to admit of such flank extensions as to prevent it. In this event they may pass to Pease creek, and, by the boats said to be on that river and the facilities of its navigation, pass to Charlotte harbor, and from thence, by Charlotte and the Coolsohatchey rivers, to the Everglades. To prevent this it would be advisable, on your march to Tampa, to despatch the revenue cutters on that station, with such boats as the navy can afford, to Charlotte harbor, with orders to take such position on those waters, and so blockade the rivers of that section of country as to cut off most effectually all retreat to or communication with the glades of the south.

In the General Order of the 22d of February you are assigned to the command of the centre of the Florida army, and this designation of your command is preserved in this communication, though you will readily perceive, in the movements now directed, you occupy the left, and, consequently, will operate on the left until, by a union of the whole force, you assume your original assigned position in the centre.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES GADSDEN.

Colonel Gadsden is in my staff.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

The Indian who delivers you this will receive from you a recompense of fifty dollars, as per agreement.

JAMES GADSDEN.

Colonel Wm. LINDSAY, *Commanding left wing, &c.*

No. 82.

ORDER No. 13.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Fort Drane, March 14, 1836.*

General Thomas Woodward, of Macon county, Alabama, is authorized, aided by Majors J. H. Watson and W. B. Flournoy, to accept the services of any five hundred Creek warriors, to be employed as auxiliaries in the present war against the Seminole Indians. Should General Woodward decline taking the

command of these friendly Indians, Major Watson, assisted by Major Flournoy, will take the command of them.

The United States agents in the Creek nation will give every facility in raising and despatching the auxiliary force mentioned above. The force will proceed by water from the Creek country to Tampa Bay, where, on its arrival, it will be reported to any general or colonel who may be in command in that quarter.

Commissions, of course, cannot be granted to the gentlemen who may be employed with this force, but the commander will be considered as having the rank of lieutenant colonel, the next officer the rank of major, and the third that of captain. Should more officers be requisite, one or two lieutenants will be recognized; but this will be a subject for future determination.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

No. 83.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington, January 21, 1836.*

SIR: Major General Scott has been directed to assume the general direction of operations in Florida. Recent intelligence has led to the belief that the Creeks have actively joined, or intend to join, the Seminole Indians in their hostilities. Should such prove to be the case, General Scott has orders to reduce the Creek Indians, as well as the Seminoles, to unconditional submission. In this event you will please to report yourself to him, and communicate to him all the instructions and information in your possession respecting the views of the government on the subject of the removal of the Creek Indians. You will also carry into effect such instructions on this matter as he may give you.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

LEWIS CASS.

Colonel JNO. B. HOGAN, *Columbus, Georgia.*

No. 84.

FORT MITCHELL, *Creek Agency, February 1, 1836.*

MY DEAR GENERAL: I have this day received a letter from the honorable the Secretary of War, of which the enclosed is a copy, from which I have learned that you are again in the field, and that the important duty of subduing the Seminoles has been assigned to you, and that I am ordered to report myself to you, and receive and carry into effect such instructions as you may give me. Now, this is all news to me, and is perfect Hebrew, unless the department meant, in a modest way, to say to me, take a thousand of your Creek Indians and repair to Florida and aid General Scott to subdue these rascally Seminoles. If this was their view, why not say so at once, and you should in a very short time have me again along side of you tugging at the old oar. I have no doubt but that I could in ten days raise you 1,000 warriors, and be on the march to join your army, and in as many more days be with you; all that is necessary is an order to that effect. But the Secretary seems to think the Creek Indians are hostile; this is not the fact, although some little skirmishing has taken place on the Georgia side of the river, and some few lives have been lost on both sides; but a peace has been effected here to-day between two militia general officers from Georgia and the chiefs, and an agreement has been signed by all the chiefs present. I was fifty miles below here night before last, and hearing of these murders I came up yesterday, and to-day effected this peace, which I hope and trust will last at least until we can get them out of the country. I am using every exertion to effect this object, and have no doubt but I shall be successful, in a measure, in the course of this spring. A report is going the rounds of the public papers that a large body of the Creeks have joined the Seminoles; this you may rely on is incorrect. I have recently visited all the lower towns, and there is none of their people absent; and you may rely upon it that, including all the stragglers that may have joined the Seminoles during the last summer, they cannot exceed one hundred in all; but I am told that they are reinforced by a number of runaway negroes, who are decidedly the most active, keen, and intelligent fellows among them. Whatever their strength was before this war, their reinforcements cannot exceed three or four hundred, of every description.

In relation to the Creeks, there would be no difficulty in procuring their services or in depending on them after they were procured. Whether, under existing circumstances, the government would be willing to employ them against the Seminoles is more than I can say; but if they should there would be no difficulty in procuring as many as you might choose to muster into service.

I have the honor to remain your friend and humble servant,

JNO. B. HOGAN, *Superintendent Creek Removal.*

Major General W. Scott, *Commanding in Florida.*

No. 85.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *April 12, 1836.*

SIR: I enclose herewith an extract of a letter received from Colonel Hogan, together with a copy of one this day addressed to him.

As my views are fully expressed in the letter to Colonel Hogan, I need not trouble you with a repetition of them.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

LEWIS CASS.

Major General Scott, *Fort King, Florida.*

No. 86.

Extract of a letter from John B. Hogan to the Secretary of War, dated

TUSKEGEE, March 28, 1836.

SIR: At this council Mr. John H. Watson, the same young man who commenced all the late disturbances at Columbus, by attacking a party of Creeks below Fort Mitchell, in which affair two white men were killed—this Mr. Watson came on the ground with a piece of paper purporting to be a copy of an order recently issued by Major General Scott, authorizing General Woodward, of this place, who is one of the new batch of emigrating contractors, to accept the services of any five hundred Creek Indians, as volunteers. General Woodward declined making any efforts to raise volunteers, by stating that it was a well-known fact that he had no influence with the Indians, but if they were raised, and no better man could be found, he would go with them; but, as far as I could understand his open declarations, he appeared to disapprove altogether of the project, as it was his opinion that it would retard the emigration. Mr. Watson, who appears to be a wild, rash, inconsiderate young man, insisted that I was bound to raise the warriors. I referred him to Captain Page, as a military officer, and who was acting as superintendent, but he seemed to think that a word or two from me would induce the chiefs to jump at the offer. In the meantime I consulted Captain Page, who was decidedly opposed to sending Indians under the orders of such a man, and, indeed, seemed to disapprove of it. I also consulted with Opothleholo, who said he did not want his people to engage in any such war at present; that he was anxious to get off for the west; but if the Secretary of War wanted his people to go, he did not wish them to go with men he did not know, and of course had no confidence in. Other chiefs told me the same thing. Mr. Watson continued to follow me about, and insisting that I must get him Indians to go; and at last he became rude and offensive. I then cut him short by telling him that if he had any communications to make me to do it in writing, and I would in the same manner reply. I also consulted the emigrating contractors, who I had reason to think were pushing on Watson, and asked them if the Indian warriors were raised if they would give me, from under their hands, a relinquishment of any claim they might hereafter choose to prefer for damages on account of those Indians being carried to Florida. They said they would not give any relinquishment, but the Indians might go if the War Department required their services.

Whatever inclination I might have to obey General Scott's orders—and certainly there is no officer I have ever served under that I more highly love and respect, and whose orders at all times afforded me more pleasure to obey—yet, in the present instance, I have deemed it most prudent to refer the whole matter to you. I can easily perceive General Scott's situation when he gave that order to those young men, Watson and Flournoy, who visited him at Picolata, and no doubt made a display of their patriotism and popularity among the Creeks, and urged the general to give them an order to bring into the field five hundred Indians. The general seeing but one side, and being pleased with their spirit, gave the order; you will see, too, that the order, (a copy of which I herewith enclose,) does not embrace an order on the commissariat or quartermaster general's department for subsistence and transportation, or on the ordnance department for arms, or their being mustered into the service of the United States, nor was it personally addressed to Captain Page or myself; nor would Mr. Watson vouch that it was a correct copy of General Scott's order, as he said he wrote it from memory. If it is desirable to have the five hundred Creek warriors engage in this war, I have but little doubt they can be obtained if proper persons are sent to command them, but I do not think that either Mr. Watson or Mr. Flournoy are the right sort of persons to be charged with such a command. I have no doubt of the bravery of either, but I should think that they lack the other requisites of a commander, viz: prudence, temper, caution, and experience. If, however, you wish the order complied with, it shall be attempted and enforced as far as my influence will go. In my first communication to General Scott I made a tender of my services, should he require Indians in this campaign; not having heard from him, I presume the department would not sanction the employment of them, and thought no more on the subject. If, however, I am mistaken, I again tender my services to go as commander of such a body as the department may order. A matter of that sort is much more to my taste than the duties now assigned me.

I have the honor to remain your obedient servant,

JNO. B. HOGAN.

Hon. LEWIS CASS.

No. 87.

WAR DEPARTMENT, April 12, 1836.

SIR: I have just received your letter of the 28th ultimo.

With respect to the employment of the Creek Indians under the orders of General Scott, I am unwilling to give you any definite instructions. I would rather that the campaign should be brought to a successful termination without the aid of the Creek Indians. Still, if from the nature of the operations this cannot be done without sacrificing our own troops to the unhealthfulness of the climate in the sickly season of the year, the department will consent to have a corps of these Indians raised, if they are willing to be so employed. But the time which has intervened since the authority given by General Scott on this subject, and the great changes which may have occurred in the state of things in Florida, render it inexpedient to give directions here to have any measures taken. I think it is best that you should explain to the Creeks the views of General Scott in relation to the employment of these young men, and request them to have in readiness the force which he required to be called out, should General Scott again renew the requisition. In the meantime I shall communicate these views to General Scott, and refer to his own discretion the course which shall be taken.

I have to request your zealous co-operation in whatever measures General Scott may think necessary.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

LEWIS CASS.

Colonel J. B. HOGAN, Columbus, Georgia.

No. 88.

TALLAHASSEE, *Florida, March 7, 1836.*

DEAR SIR: Major Flournoy and Mr. Watson, of Columbus, Georgia, who will hand you this letter, have applied to me to receive into the service two hundred Indians that they have conditionally engaged. It is a matter over which I have no authority, and accordingly have referred them to you. If, as I presume will be the case, the Indians shall betake themselves to hammocks and swamps, and seek for safety there, those Indians may prove highly serviceable in discovering their retreat; besides, as in war times neighboring tribes are not disposed to be inactive, they may join the enemy if you refuse to take them into your service. I should think, therefore, it would be most advisable to authorize those gentlemen to bring them to Tampa. The Chattahoochee river being now in fine order, they could very soon be transported in a steamboat to Tampa Bay.

I have no news either from the army or elsewhere. Our difference with France is adjusted without war and without apology.

In this Territory horses, nor supplies for them, could be procured; accordingly one-half, say three hundred, were sent to Tampa Bay, under Major Read. About two hundred are, or soon will be, on the frontier about the Suwanee, to guard against those marauding straying parties that may attempt any mischief there.

With great respect,

J. H. EATON.

General WINFIELD SCOTT.

Nos. 89 and 90.

HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING FLORIDA ARMY, *Fort Drane, March 13, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to enclose you a letter from General Call, and to introduce to your polite attention, Major Watson and Major Flournoy, of Georgia. These gentlemen come to me highly recommended. I am decidedly in favor of the plan proposed by Major Watson.

I am, with high respect, your most obedient servant,

D. L. GLINCH, *Brigadier General United States Army.*

Major General SCOTT.

No. 91.

ORDERS No. 14.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Fort Drane, March 14, 1836.*

In this vicinity, in the march from Volusia and the march from Tampa Bay, the ration of hard bread will be reduced to the old allowance of twelve ounces, and the ration of flour to fourteen ounces.

This allowance of bread or flour, if used with economy, will be found sufficient, and without care and economy double the quantity might not suffice.

The commanding general will be most happy to extend the allowance the moment that our means of transportation shall permit. In the meantime the reduction is indispensable, to enable the three columns from Fort Drane, Volusia, and Tampa Bay to execute the marches which are soon to be attempted. All good soldiers will, no doubt, cheerfully submit to a regulation founded on the necessities of the service.

Colonel Gadsden, quartermaster general of Florida, is attached to general headquarters. All orders communicated by him in the name of the general-in-chief of this army will be duly obeyed.

By command of Major General Scott.

A. VAN BUREN, *Aide-de-Camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 92.

ORDERS No. 15.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Fort Drane, March 16, 1836.*

All the troops destined to reinforce the right wing left on the St. John's river on the 10th instant, or which, after that date, may have arrived in the vicinity of Picolata or Garey's Ferry, will march for Fort Drane as soon as they can be respectively supplied with the necessary means of transportation, but not earlier than the 19th instant. It will be sufficient if the several detachments arrive here on the 23d of this month.

As cavalry or mounted men are most needed by the right wing, the detachment of United States dragoons will be first supplied with the means of transportation; next, any company of Georgia mounted volunteers that may have arrived at Garey's Ferry; and thirdly, the remainder of Major Cooper's Georgia battalion.

Should there be more than one company of Georgia mounted volunteers at Garey's Ferry, two may be put in march for this place, if it can be done by the 22d instant. All other companies or detachments will remain at that depot until further orders.

No company or detachment whatever will be put in march for Fort Drane without the means of bringing with it to this place six days' subsistence for men, over and above the consumption on the march.

This order will be communicated by Lieutenants Dusenbury and Searight to the troops near them respectively, and rigorously carried into execution.

On every man and horse subsistence will be taken for each sufficient, at least, for the march to Fort Drane; and not more than three tents will be allowed to a company.

By command of Major General Scott.

A. VAN BUREN, *Aide-de-Camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 93.

FORT DRANE, *March 16, 1836.*

SIR: As the period approaches for the advance of the various wings of the Florida army to their previously assigned positions in the campaign, and more minute and accurate topographical information of the probable seat of war is acquired, it has been deemed necessary by the general-in-chief to communicate the contemplated operations more in detail to the commandants of the different portions of the army, so as to insure that co-operation essential to a speedy and successful result. Measures have been sufficiently matured on the right to enable General Clinch to move on his assigned position—in advance of the late battle ground on the Withlacoochee—by the 24th instant; he will reach it on the 26th, and be prepared to cross the river and drive the enemy from his concealment in the cove or swamp of the Withlacoochee on the 27th or 28th of the month. It is confidently expected that the left wing, under your command, though now acting in the centre, and the centre, under the command of Colonel Lindsay, thrown upon the left, will be able to move in time, so as to be in the respective positions assigned them at Pelaklikaha and Chickuchatty by the 25th of the month. The position of Pelaklikaha was deemed important, not merely from its topographical relations to the probable seat of war—on the waters of the Withlacoochee—but as the residence of Micanopy, the head chief of the Seminoles, and his negro population. Micanopy formerly resided at Ocahumpky; but this place has long since been abandoned, and Pelaklikaha is now the joint place of residence of the chief and his slaves. From the last advice he was at home, not anticipating, probably, a movement from the quarter in which your command is now concentrating. You will perceive, therefore, the importance, as you approach the Ocklawaha, of your making a rapid movement in advance, if only with your mounted men and light troops, so as to surprise, annihilate, or capture Micanopy and his negro allies. If successful, it would be striking an important and most effectual blow on the enemy. Pelaklikaha is about fifteen miles from the upper crossing on the Ocklawaha; it may probably be eighteen or twenty, but cannot possibly exceed the latter distance. On your reaching Pelaklikaha, the commanding general, on reconsideration, deems it advisable that you advance your position west to the main road from the Bay of Tampa to Fort King, at or near the fatal battle ground of Dade and his party. The distance from Pelaklikaha is about five or six miles, and at this point you will fire the signal at the hour, each day, directed in a previous communication, until responded to from the other wings of the army, when you will be prepared to advance to that junction, which will close, it is hoped, the war.

On your reaching the road, you will not be more than twenty-five miles from where Lindsay will probably leave it in his march upon Chickuchatty. It will be advisable, therefore, that you push your reconnoitring parties or mounted men in that direction, to ascertain whether the enemy in any force have retreated by or across that route, and to intercept or pursue them if practicable. You will hold steadily in view that, as the object of the combined movement of the army in three divisions from three different points, all converging to a common centre—the supposed stronghold of the enemy—is to enclose, beat, and destroy him in that stronghold, so it is all-important to prevent his retreat and force him to action. It is not probable that a retreat will be attempted by any other route from the cove or Withlacoochee swamp (should the enemy be found there) but eastwardly on Pelaklikaha, by the trail between the Big and Little Withlacoochees, which would throw him in your face; or by the Chickuchatty trail and Big Hammock, which will bring him in contact with Lindsay; or by a route intermediate between your two respective columns. You will therefore perceive the necessity of vigilance, and such extension to the right and left as will enclose or shut up these avenues, and accomplish in the shortest time the objects of this campaign. As the relative positions of the columns under the command of Colonel Lindsay and yourself will not exceed in distance forty miles—a distance which, as you advance upon the cove, will be gradually shortened—it is thought such extension may be made, and such communication preserved between your respective commands, as to prevent all retreat, or, at all events, to so watch the movements of the enemy as to gain the earliest intelligence of his retreat, and to insure the speediest and most effectual pursuit upon his trail. Should the enemy effect escape between your columns, and a pursuit be deemed advisable, it is expected that the earliest intelligence of the fact will be communicated to headquarters, and that no opportunity be lost of communicating as often as practicable with the general-in-chief, now with the right wing, as well as with Colonel Lindsay, operating on your left.

Arrangements have been made to procure, if practicable, a steamboat better adapted to the navigation of the St. John's than the Santee; but should the quartermaster fail in this respect, the Santee will be kept in the public service, so as to insure a supply of provisions, &c., at your main depot on the St. John's, even at the additional labor of lighting her over the bar of the lake. It is the wish of the commanding general that you will detain the boat at Volusia on her last trip previous to your departure, so that you may communicate to him by expresses the movements of the rear of your column on the march to its position in advance of the Ocklawaha. It is not improbable that after you are in motion the commanding general will be able to communicate with you by express direct; and it is thought probable that you may have it equally in your power, by some Indian runner, to keep the general advised direct of your march. If so, it is expected that you will embrace every opportunity of doing so. For your better information I add some distances, which may be important in shedding some additional light on the topographical features of the country—the seat of war—and of exhibiting the relative distances of the respective columns of the army when in their assigned positions:

Distance from Fort Drane to position in advance of the Withlacoochee, from 30 to 35 miles, in SW. or W.SW. direction; from Fort Drane to Fort King, 25 miles, southeasterly direction; from Fort King to Pelaklikaha, 40 miles, southwardly; from Fort King to Dade's battle ground, on main Tampa road, 35 to 40 miles; from battle ground to Little Withlacoochee, from 7 to 10 miles; from Little Withlacoochee

to Big Withlacoochee, 7 miles; to Elochuctu, where probably Lindsay will leave the main road on his march to Chickuchatty, 13 miles; to the Hillsborough, 10 miles; to Tampa, 23 miles. Both of the Withlacoochees, as well as the Hillsborough, were bridged formerly. Those over the former-stream have been destroyed, but the fords were passable by the last information received. The bridge across the Hillsborough had been injured, but will probably be repaired by Lindsay. Those over the Withlacoochees, should you be detained in that quarter and it be found practicable without too much labor, it may be important to restore to their former condition.

By order of Major General Scott.

JAMES GADSDEN.

Brigadier General Eustis, *Commanding left wing of the Army of Florida.*

No. 94.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Fort Drane, March 20, 1836.*

SIR: For the information of the Secretary of War and the general-in-chief, I addressed you a hasty note on the 14th. Nothing material has since occurred. This wing is waiting to give time for Brigadier General Eustis and Colonel Lindsay to gain their respective positions, Pelaklikaha and Chickuchatty; for the arrival of the wagons sent hence to Garey's Ferry for subsistence, the last of which may be expected by the 24th, with (it is hoped) some additional teams from Savannah, and for the troops from New Orleans to recruit their strength. All these objects I have good reason to hope will be accomplished by the 26th or 27th instant, although I have not had a line from Colonel Lindsay later than his letter dated at Mobile, the 13th ultimo. In the meantime it is confidently believed that the great body of the enemy remains in the swamp or cove of the Withlacoochee, about the junction of its three branches, say thirty-five miles from this place. I send a topographical sketch of that vicinity, made by my aide, Lieutenant Johnston, from information received here and principally from Colonel Gadsden, the quartermaster general of Florida, whom I have taken into the service of the United States, and my staff, with that rank. His minute knowledge of the country and the hostile Indians, together with his general military intelligence, render him a valuable acquisition. I also expect to derive much valuable assistance from Colonel Fitzpatrick, the president of the territorial legislative council, particularly if the war should be carried into the lower part of the peninsula, with which he is perhaps better acquainted than any other individual in the Territory. He is with me and is well disposed to render himself generally useful.

You will receive with this copies of several orders. No. 13 was supposed to be necessary in order to be provided with the best kind of means to ferret out of the swamps and other hiding places, small parties of the enemy which may be expected to remain out after the great body of the nation shall be subdued. General Woodward and Majors Watson and Flournoy, mentioned in that order, are strongly recommended to me as suitable persons to direct the detachment of 500 Creek warriors. I trust that this step on my part may meet the approbation of the War Department. It seemed to me to be dictated by a wise discretion, and it will, probably, by abridging time, save many valuable lives from the effects of the summer climate of the lower country.

The order limiting the ration of bread or flour is the direct result of the want of sufficient means of transportation, and we shall probably be obliged to move hence on the 24th or 25th instant, with less than eighteen days' subsistence for this wing, which will consist of about 1,700 fighting men. No murmur has been uttered in consequence of that reduction in the ration. All are disposed to make any sacrifice which the good of the service shall demand.

I have discharged many individuals of the volunteer corps for special reasons, generally on account of disability. Brevet Major Mountford, who had injured a foot, has been permitted to retire. The case of Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs requires a more particular notice. He was neither sick nor wounded. In the presence of Brigadier General Clinch, he demanded whether, if in the course of the campaign, one or more companies of any other corps should be adjoined to, or momentarily attached with the 4th infantry, under his command, brevet rank would take effect on such junction or detachment? I replied in the affirmative. He then said that there was some order or regulation which explained or differently construed the 61st article of war. My ready answer was, that I knew of no order or regulation that was incompatible with that article, and that if one were produced, conflicting with its plain meaning and import, I should deny its power to repeal an act of Congress. Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs added that he knew such would be my course, and that he would ask leave to retire to his post, (New Orleans,) as he was unwilling to be commanded by any brevet lieutenant colonel whatever, no matter what the circumstances. I expressed my unwillingness to lose his services, and said, as far as practicable, I would endeavor to respect his feelings; yet, if he chose to do so, to make his application in form to the commander of the wing, (then present,) and that he should be indulged. Contrary to my expectation, I must confess, that application was made, and the lieutenant colonel was off in an hour, *via* Georgia, and I should not be surprised to learn that he takes Washington also in his route to New Orleans. As this individual is generally believed to rely as much on his *political* as his *military* standing, to carry his particular objects, and as he had not got many miles on his route before he began to utter complaints against the general headquarters of this army, I have gone into a detail of the circumstances of his departure, and have to add another particular: Before Major General Gaines turned over the immediate command of the troops then on the Withlacoochee to Brigadier General Clinch, Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs took care to obtain from the former an order for New Orleans, to go *via* I know not what States and cities. Of this order I heard not a syllable till after the departure of the lieutenant colonel; it was kept a profound secret from me, and I am now morally certain that the point presented to me about rank was but a pretext. I am, however, content that he is gone; the command of the 4th infantry has devolved on an officer at least his equal.

The two officers present who, by the seniority of their brevets, might, in particular cases, have commanded Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs momentarily, are Lieutenant Colonels Bankhead and Foster. The latter is now the commander of the 4th infantry, aided by brevet Major Wilson, on duty as major.

As I am about to plunge deeper into this peninsula, and further from the government, there is another clamor which, as I learn, is now swelling its peals against me in the rear.

It may be remembered that I reported two companies of Georgia mounted volunteers, with the exception of a fragment of one of them, as having refused to be mustered into the service of the United States, that is, as having refused to place themselves under the rules and articles of war. The first was commanded by the patriotic and intelligent Captain Kenan, and the second by Captain Allen. I saw neither of those companies; but both were amply provided for by the governor of Georgia to the St. Mary's river, and there and at Jacksonville each found subsistence for men and horses, which I had caused to be deposited in advance for all the Georgia and South Carolina mounted men. Captain Allen I saw for less than a minute after, as he informed me, his company had refused to serve. As he assured me that he had used his best exertions to change the determination of his men, I expressed the sympathy I felt in his patriotic chagrin; and said that a company might, perhaps, be formed out of the well-disposed men of the two companies, and had my attention called off by the many instructions to be given to persons on board of a steamer then in the act of leaving the wharf, where the momentary interview took place. He added something about volunteering as a private, to which I replied, that *that* was not at all necessary to the vindication of his honor. A few minutes afterwards I turned round to say more to the same effect to the captain, but he had disappeared, and I saw and heard not another word of him, till I heard of his clamors against me at Jacksonville. This is the man whose *patriotic exertions* to induce his men to do their duty I reported both to the War Department and the governor of Georgia! That report was founded solely on his word, and I had soon an opportunity of learning, from the gallant Georgians who remained, that he was as ready to desert as either of his men. His example, however, had no effect on the patriotic companies of Douglass, Malone, and Sweeny, of the same battalion; and, what is infinitely to its credit, none of the fine company of Captain Nelson, of the second battalion of mounted men, from the same State. This company marched with me from Garey's Ferry, having treated with contempt the falsehoods of Captain Allen and the other deserters, whom it passed on the other side of Jacksonville. But it may be doubted whether the four other companies of Captain Nelson's battalion, a few days behind him, have been found equally determined. They had not arrived at Jacksonville on the 15th instant, and, according to a letter just received from Governor Schley, they ought to have been there by the 13th.

Whether the falsehoods of deserters will be credited against me by the government or the patriotic State of Georgia, I know not. The gallant men of the same State who are in Florida cannot be heard till the war is over. With these I am more than satisfied, and in their keeping I am confident that the honor of Georgia and the Union will be upheld.

Major Cooper and four companies of his battalion will, I am afraid, be compelled to remain on the St. John's longer than I could wish, for the want of the means of transportation. One company is here, (Meriweather's,) having escorted the wagon train that left the St. John's on the 6th instant. The remainder of the battalion is, I learn, exceedingly discontented at not being among the foremost troops in battle. The unexpected arrival of the troops from New Orleans, and other causes, so frequently reported, as to the failure of the means of transportation, must be my apology.

Captain Wharton, I have just learned, had not reached Jacksonville on the 15th. I have but little hope of his taking any part in the campaign, although it is yet possible that he may be up in time. His detachment is much needed by this wing, which has only four small companies of mounted men, making a total of about 215.

Some wagons (six) and twelve horses arrived at Picolata from Savannah about the 12th instant, and a few horses as packs, with the last company of South Carolina mounted men, a little before. All those means of transportation were indispensable to the left wing.

Brigadier General Eustis, in a letter just received, doubts whether he can reach Pelaklikaha earlier than the 27th or 28th. The movement of the right wing may or may not be delayed a few days accordingly. This will depend on a calculation of Lindsay's movements and the amount of subsistence that may arrive by the 24th from below. The latter may be so small as not to allow of any delay here, as we must take enough to give the right wing time to beat the enemy and to march to Tampa Bay. Without more wagons and horses from Savannah, we have no hope of accumulating at this place, beyond the current consumption, more subsistence than we shall have on the 24th. Those calculations I shall rigorously make the moment I have despatched the express now in waiting.

The right wing will take with it, on ox wagons, two good boats, just constructed, for passing the Withlacoochee. Nobody here doubts that the enemy will be driven by this wing.

I have the honor to be, with respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General U. S. Army.*

No. 95.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Fort Drane, March 20, 1836.*

SIR: We have good hopes that our wagons will be back here by the 23d or 24th instant, with subsistence enough to warrant a movement on the part of Brigadier General Clinch the moment they do arrive. This prompt movement will be indispensable for two reasons: 1st. Colonel Lindsay will, in all probability, be in advance of Chickuchatty by the 26th; and if Clinch be not on the Withlacoochee by the 25th the whole of the Indians might fall upon Lindsay. 2d. With his means of transportation, Clinch cannot expect to increase his amount of subsistence after the 24th instant, and it is indispensable that he should take enough to last him to Tampa Bay or Volusia, allowing time to beat the enemy on the way.

If you cannot reach Pelaklikaha by the 25th it may suffice if you are there by the 27th. The distance to that place from Volusia is not greater than was represented by Colonel Gadsden in his letter of the 16th instant.

Brigadier General Clinch is confident that Captain Drane can know nothing of the country southwest of Volusia, except from hearsay. He is accordingly ordered to his company.

Why did you not take Captain Dimmock's company with you? With it you would have five, independent of Merchant's, left at Picolata.

I reckon upon your being in force at Pelaklikaha by the 27th at the latest. The dry weather for the last ten days must have allowed the streams to subside, and, I hope, has favored the recovery of the troops from the measles. The sick and wounded in this wing are numerous.

Not doubting that we shall soon meet, after a decisive success, I remain, &c.,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General EUSTIS, *U. S. Army, Commanding left wing, &c.*

P. S.—There is good reason to hope that you will find cattle west of Volusia, and towards the Withlacoochee perhaps some corn and rice.

W. S.

No. 96.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Fort Drane, March 23, 1836.*

SIR: Your inability, duly certified, to perform the active duties of the field, has induced me to order you to Fort Marion or St. Augustine. But it is not my intention to limit your duties to the latter place. You can render important services also at Picolata and Garey's Ferry. Accordingly you will frequently visit the two places last mentioned, and regulate everything at both as the good of the service may require.

Picolata is the principal depot for the army in Florida, and Garey's Ferry the particular depot for the supply of this place and the right wing. The right wing, however, may soon, if successful, be expected to derive its supplies from Tampa Bay, and so may the left wing, which has moved by Volusia. Nevertheless, supplies will soon be needed here for the troops which will be left in the vicinity, and possibly to meet the case of the right wing being forced back upon Fort Drane or King.

If the campaign be successful, in a few weeks the troops of the right and left wings may be expected to pass Volusia on their return to the north or their private homes; besides the greater part of the regulars, all the South Carolinians and Georgians will take that route. Supplies of subsistence and means of transportation will be wanted at that place according to their numbers, excepting means of transportation for the mounted men. The latter I shall probably order to march *via* Volusia, St. Augustine, and Jacksonville. A hospital tent and medicines and hospital stores will be greatly needed at Volusia. All those objects you will cause to be in readiness as soon as you shall learn that the campaign has been terminated.

Without further instructions you need not put in march any company or detachment of troops which may now be in the neighborhood of Picolata or Garey's Ferry, or which may arrive at either place after the date of this letter. Should any company (and three may be expected) of Georgia mounted men be now at those places, or subsequently arrive, you will muster them into the service of the United States for ninety days, unless sooner discharged, and detain the company or companies until further instructions.

In respect to the issues to be made to the distressed inhabitants of Florida, you will be governed by the printed instructions, signed by the Secretary of War, until further orders.

In the hands of Lieutenants Dusenbury and Searight you will find my instructions on the subject of discharged or disabled volunteers. Please cause those instructions to be executed.

Of course, any orders that may reach you from the Brigadiers General Clinch or Eustis will be complied with.

Wishing you a restoration to health, I remain, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Lieutenant Colonel CRANE, *2d Regiment Artillery, Fort Drane.*

No. 97.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Fort Drane, March 25, 1836.*

SIR: I am instructed by Major General Scott to inform you that the right wing of the army will move hence to-morrow. The enemy is supposed to be still in his late position on the Withlacoochee, about two marches from this.

The copy of a letter from Brigadier General Eustis, reporting a skirmish between the advance guard of his column and a small body of Indians, I have the honor to enclose; also, a return of the troops under the command of Brigadier General Clinch, to which are to be added four companies of Georgia foot, amounting to near 220 men. About that number of invalids will be left as a garrison for this post.

A despatch, dated the 10th of this month, has been received from Colonel Lindsay, reporting his arrival at Tampa Bay on the 5th instant, and another, (both *via* Tallahassee,) dated the 12th, stating his design to march for Fort King, with a force of 750 Alabama volunteers, 300 Florida troops, under Lieutenant Colonel Call, and 50 warriors, (say) 1,120 men. No information, however, of any actual movement from Tampa, by Colonel Lindsay, has been received.

Captain Wharton, with his detachment of dragoon recruits reached this the day before yesterday. I enclose, by direction of the general, the report of that officer, containing his reasons for the delay in his arrival here. Major General Scott's remarks upon the report you will find indorsed thereon.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

A. VAN BUREN, *Aide-de-camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General U. S. Army.*

No. 98.

HEADQUARTERS LEFT WING ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Volusia, March 22, 1836.*

GENERAL: Owing to a *misunderstanding* of my orders on the part of Brigadier General Bull, a part of my force, viz: Colonel Butler, with four companies of mounted men, and Major Kirby, with two companies of artillery, have not yet reached this place. I, however, hope to see them to-morrow morning. I have been engaged to-day in crossing my advance guard and baggage train over the river. About an hour ago the guard (two companies) were attacked by a small party of Indians, (about 50,) and a brisk skirmish ensued. The enemy was soon repulsed. I sent more men over the river, one company mounted, and all are now in pursuit. We have had six wounded brought in; none are yet reported killed; none but the wounded have yet returned from the chase; they report two or three Indians killed. I am obliged to send the Santee off for Picolata for more horses *immediately*, that she may return to-morrow evening. I will report further by her next trip.

The only guide on whom I can in any degree depend (Ben Wiggins) is absent with Colonel Butler; still I think I can reach Pelaklikaha by the 27th instant.

I am, very respectfully, your humble servant,

ABM. EUSTIS, *Brigadier General United States Army.*

Major General Scott, *Commanding, &c.*

P. S.—Our parties have returned from the pursuit unsuccessful; they have brought in three (sentinels) who were shot dead on their posts, (all Brisbane's.) With all the firing, I have no evidence that an Indian was killed.

No. 99.

ORDERS No. 16.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Tampa Bay, April 6, 1836.*

All the sick and disabled of the army will be sent as soon as practicable to the general hospital at this place.

Such of the invalids belonging to volunteer corps as are not likely to be fit for duty within their term of service will, on the certificate of the proper medical officers, be honorably discharged by the commanding officer of Fort Brooke as opportunities may offer to send them by water to a port the nearest to their homes.

The quartermaster's department will charge itself with furnishing the means of transportation, and consult the wishes of each individual as to the port of destination, so far as public economy may permit.

Individuals left in hospital will be duly treated and subsisted after their term of service shall be out, and, when fit to be put on board of a vessel, supplied with rations to the place nearest to their homes, as in the case of other discharged men.

Subsistence furnished to all discharged men will be duly noted on the respective discharges.

By command of Major General Scott.

JAMES GADSDEN, *Quartermaster General.*

No. 100.

Statement of hard bread received from Lieutenant P. Morrison, assistant commissary of subsistence at New Orleans.

COLONEL TWIGGS'S REQUISITION FOR LOUISIANA MILITIA.

1836.—February 10.—Invoice No. 1, 166 barrels, containing.....	11, 890 lbs.
March 1.—Invoice No. 2, 118 barrels, containing.....	8, 615 lbs.
March 4.—Invoice No. 3, 26 barrels, containing.....	1, 725 lbs.
March 10.—Invoice No. 4, 164 barrels, containing.....	11, 450 lbs.
March 24.—Invoice No. 5, 126 barrels, containing.....	9, 518 lbs.
Total.....	43, 198 lbs.
Amount on hand April 8, 1836 :	
182 barrels hard bread, at 70 pounds each, is.....	12, 740 lbs.
Bacon: Quantity received.....	23, 101 lbs.
Issued.....	1, 500 lbs.
Balance on hand.....	21, 601 lbs.

GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, *First Lieut., Assist. Com. of Subsistence.*

FORT BROOKE, *Florida, April 8, 1836.*

No. 101.

ORDERS No. 23.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Tampa Bay, April 9, 1836.*

It is indispensable that another regular surgeon should be placed on duty in the general hospital at this place. One will be immediately detailed for the purpose from the right wing.

Every regiment, battalion, or independent company, having sick in the general hospital, will, if it has not already been done, send attendants in proportion to the number of its sick. If there be more than twelve sick, two attendants will be supplied; if more than twenty-four, three attendants, and so on, allowing one attendant for every twelve sick men.

The attendants on the sick, to be left when the troops march, need not be effectives in the ranks. Individuals laboring under slight accidents or disabilities, though unable to march, are the proper attendants on the sick.

Every person in hospital below the rank of officer, whether sick or an attendant, is for the time being under the exclusive command and control of the medical officers. The latter are held responsible for the good order of the hospitals, as well as for the treatment and cure of the sick.

When the different corps next march, all invalids of every rank must be left at this place.

By command of Major General Scott.

No. 102.

ORDERS No. 26.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Tampa Bay, April 10, 1836.*

The arms, accoutrements, ammunition, knapsacks, and haversacks, of discharged volunteers, and of the sick volunteers, (who are likely to be left in hospital at this place,) must be immediately collected and turned over to Lieutenant McKenzie, the ordnance officer at the fort, who will take measures to have the arms put in condition for reissue to other forces which may soon be expected.

Commanding officers of regiments, battalions, and companies, will give prompt attention to the execution of this order, and so will the surgeons at the general and other hospitals.

By command of Major General Scott.

No. 103.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Tampa Bay, April 12, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to report, for the information of the Secretary of War and the general-in-chief, that I reached this place with the greater part of the right wing under Brigadier General Clinch on the 5th instant. Brigadier General Eustis came in with half of the left wing the same day, and Colonel Lindsay, who commands the centre, the day before. This approximation of the greater part of the three columns was the result of no particular instructions. Each found itself compelled to come in for subsistence.

The reports of those principal commanders under me are herewith enclosed, and marked, respectively, A, B, and C.

It will be seen that, although no general battle has been fought, many combats and sharp affairs have taken place; that the boast of Major General Gaines that *he had beaten the enemy, and compelled him to sue for peace*, was but a vain imagination; and that although he told the chiefs, who held him enclosed in a log pen until relieved by Brigadier General Clinch, that *the diplomatic agent of the War Department would soon arrive to settle (amicably) all differences*, not a white flag has been seen by this army, and not an overture of submission or peace heard of. On the contrary, the small parties which have been met with almost everywhere have fiercely resisted, until put in danger of the bayonet. The war, on our part, is, in fact, scarcely begun.

It is not the fault of Clinch, Eustis, or Lindsay, that no important battle has been fought by either. Clinch marched from Fort Drane to the point on the Withlacoochee where Major General Gaines was checked, and thought himself compelled to fortify; the right wing, by an admirable movement, crossed the river at that very point without much molestation, notwithstanding the *bravado* of the enemy of the day before. The wing then passed the recent battle-ground of its brave commander, where again there was, for a moment, a slight hope of resistance, and then scoured *the cove*, (probably the strongest hold in Florida,) to the extent of seven or eight miles. From this point to Tampa Bay, although the column passed through many of the enemy's favorite settlements, not a gun was fired. Several towns heretofore occupied by friendly Indians were left standing. All the others (and there were many) were burned. In approaching this place Clinch kept as far to the west of the Fort King road as practicable, in order to scour a district of country not before visited by our troops. He, throughout the march, commanded his column with judgment and ability, and at the principal combat on the 31st ultimo he bravely dismounted and followed his troops above the knees in mud. No considerable *recent* trail of men, women, children, or cattle, was discovered in the march of more than 100 miles; and it is not believed that the enemy encountered exceeded one hundred and fifty. Colonel Gadsden, of my staff, by his superior topographical knowledge and general intelligence and activity, rendered important services to the column. The commendation bestowed by Brigadier General Clinch on other officers and other corps I know to have been deserved.

The reports of Brigadier General Eustis and Colonel Lindsay will speak for themselves. I have every reason to repose the highest confidence in those able commanders. It will be seen that the former has, like Clinch, executed a long march through the heart of the enemy's country, and with only a few sharp affairs with small parties. The latter is also true of Lindsay, who marched from this place to a point

beyond Chickuchatty (one of the enemy's principal settlements) about sixty miles, where he took a position and remained as long as his subsistence would permit, waiting for instructions from me, or a communication with Eustis. The three columns were for several days within thirty miles of each other. Owing to the direction of the wind, Clinch's column heard the signal-guns fired by the other two, but neither of the latter could hear any response.

From a careful comparison of all the information collected by the three columns, I am now strongly persuaded that not sixty of the enemy have been killed during this war, and that there have not been as many as six hundred imbedded at any one place. The signs about the Withlacoochee do not contradict these estimates; and it is the opinion of all the commanders that the Indians are now dispersed in war parties, or parties of observation, consisting of from sixty to two hundred each, with, however, great facilities of concentration. The women and children are supposed to be concealed in certain places, (which will be mentioned) and engaged, with a portion of the warriors, in planting, fishing, and hunting. The cattle found grazing in some districts, and particularly about Pelaklikaha, were numerous. Some were killed by Brigadier General Eustis for consumption, the remainder left for the future wants of the army. The two other columns found but few cattle, and all not three bushels of corn.

All the horses, draught, pack, and saddle horses, arrived here much reduced. Many broke down on the routes; some died, and a greater number, belonging to the mounted men, have been mustered as utterly incapable of service. Some corn, about a bushel and a half for each horse, was brought from the depots, Forts Drane and Volusia; but the roads have been bad, the weather hot, the loads great, and the grazing indifferent, the Indians having this season but partially burned the woods and savannas. The ponds, too, on which all mainly relied for water, had, many of them, dried up; and on the return march this inconvenience, without heavy showers of rain, (which will spoil many parts of the routes,) will be still more seriously felt. The long halt here has been for the purpose of recruiting the horses a little—corn and hay, though of an indifferent quality, being found in abundance. This forage has been sent from New Orleans by Major Clark, assistant quartermaster, under my orders of the 14th of February.

Many officers and men, besides the wounded, were broken down on the march. The measles early broke out among the South Carolinians, and latterly in the Alabama regiment and Florida battalion. The mumps, too, have contributed to thin the ranks of the effectives. It will be seen by the returns that the number of sick to be left here is unusually great, and many slight cases must be added to the sick reported; for, in a country and a war like this, nobody can be left on the route. All must either march or be placed in the wagons, and every sick man is equal in weight, including his knapsack and firelock, to one hundred rations. Seven or five men, where there are no roads, load up a four or two horse wagon, even if the horses be in full strength.

Colonel Smith, with his Louisiana regiment, is now in two schooners, accompanied by the cutter Dallas, Captain Green, and with thirty-one days' subsistence, bound to Charlotte harbor, and the Meacca or Pease creek. On his arrival in that harbor he will be joined by Lieutenant Powell, of the navy, who is there in two boats, with a small party from the United States ship Vandalia. The schooners will ascend the creek some miles, and anchor, the cutter a little higher up. The troops will then land on the left bank of the creek, and, with the aid of the small boats and haversacks, take subsistence enough to last six or more marches. The day after to-morrow Colonel Goodwyn's regiment of mounted South Carolinians (about 500 strong) will march hence for the upper part of the same creek, and will be followed by the foot of Eustis's wing, at the distance of from fifteen to twenty miles. I shall, for particular reasons, which will be developed, probably march with this column. The distance hence to the lake (Simmons) at the head of the creek is computed to be forty-three miles. The object of this combined movement is to strike at the negroes, women, children, and warriors, who have settlements on the upper and lower part of the creek, and who are now in security, supposed to be engaged in planting, fishing, and hunting. The movement promises better results than we have yet obtained.

The term of service of the Louisiana regiment will expire early next month. When the expedition shall have terminated, the regiment will touch here on its return to New Orleans, and take up its sick.

From Pease creek, Eustis's column united will cross the St. John's, probably at Berrysford, if practicable, and proceed by Spring Garden to the depot at Volusia, having previously visited, if its subsistence will permit, the supposed settlements on Lake Tohopkelika, southwest of Lake Monroe. On the arrival of this column at Volusia the term of service of the South Carolinians will have so nearly expired as to render it improbable that they can be employed on any new expedition.

The right wing, under Clinch, will be put again into the field the day after to-morrow. It will march by the route it came over, absorb Major Cooper's battalion of Georgians left fortified in the interior, re-enter *the cove* it scoured on the 30th and 31st ultimo, whilst Lindsay approaches it from above, and then march to the mouth of the Withlacoochee, (not yet visited,) and there receive from vessels and boats, to be sent from this place, a fresh supply of subsistence for men and horses. On his way he will take up his boats sunk in a lake or pond near Camp Cooper. Having accomplished the objects of the march to the mouth of that river, he will either cross there or return to Blodget's Ferry, at Camp Izard, with the boats, and return to Fort Drane, observing the right bank of the Withlacoochee in ascending, as far as his renewed means of subsistence may allow. His force, however, will be much diminished at the mouth of the river, for he will have instructions to embark the 4th United States infantry for this place; and if he crosses to the right bank, to embark the Florida battalion in one of the schooners for St. Mark's. He will then be left with three companies of Georgia mounted men, Major Cooper's battalion, two companies of Augusta volunteers, a weak battalion of United States artillery, and Captain Wharton's detachment of United States dragoons.

The term of service of the Georgians just mentioned will begin to expire on the 22d instant: Robertson's company having been mustered into service on the 23d of January; Bones's about the 1st of February; Cooper's battalion the 15th, (I think,) and the mounted men ten days later. The whole of these volunteers will be put in march for their homes as soon as they shall reach Fort Drane; the foot, by water from Garey's Ferry or Picolata. The Florida battalion has a longer time to serve, but it is feeble; seven companies, and less than 200 effective men. It was mustered into service under the orders of Governor Eaton, with the companies far below (in privates) the legal standard.

Lindsay, with a feeble battalion of United States artillery, a company of Georgia mounted men, (Nelson's,) the Alabama regiment, and an independent company of Louisiana volunteers, (Marks's,) will march at the same time with Clinch and Eustis. He will be instructed to march into the forks of the Withlacoochees, and thence to penetrate, if practicable, the head of *the cove*, whilst Clinch enters below. Having scoured the country in that direction, he will return to the Fort King road, put Nelson's company

of mounted men in march for Fort Drane *via* Fort King, and return with the remainder of his troops to this place.

The time of the Alabamians and the independent company of Louisianians will not expire as early as that of the other volunteers. Anything that Lindsay may reasonably attempt, after being again compelled to return to this place for subsistence, he will be instructed to attempt. Besides the volunteers mentioned, he will have with him the battalion of United States artillery, and find the 4th infantry here from the mouth of the Withlacoochee. He will, when he sends his volunteers to their respective States, be instructed to leave the artillery here, as a garrison, under Major Zantinger; send a company of the 4th infantry, with sixty or ninety days' subsistence, to Key West; and keep the remaining companies here or send them to Baton Rouge as may seem best.

What may be accomplished by these new expeditions I am unable to say. I have the highest confidence in the respective commanders, and do not doubt that they will be well supported by their officers and men. I am not, however, judging from the past, sanguine as to results. Some new settlements will be visited. The places of concealment for the enemy's women, children, and negroes, may be found on Pease creek, near the mouth of the Withlacoochee, and at the *head of the cove*, to which Clinch's column (we now have reason to believe) did not quite ascend. It is quite a labyrinth of ponds, hammocks, and savannas, with small fields of pines. If the enemy's plantations of corn can be destroyed, together with his cattle, much will be effected, even if his negroes, women, and children should not be captured. The latter, however, it is most important for us to possess.

When the volunteers shall be sent home, if the war be not over, it is evident that the regular force (about 789 effectives) will be inadequate to prosecute the war to any advantage, even if the season of the year would permit. I shall therefore feel myself compelled to place the battalion of artillery that marches with Clinch in defensive positions in the vicinity of Fort Drane, where we left, on the 26th ultimo, only the sick and invalids, with Gates's company of artillery at Fort King. The battalion of artillery that will march with Eustis will be distributed on the St. John's and the Atlantic for a like purpose. Two companies (Dimmock's and Merchant's) were left at Garey's Ferry, Picolata, and St. Augustine; Fort King being twenty-three miles further from any depot (with a practicable route) than the vicinity of Fort Drane, and covering nothing, I expect to abandon. Those views, however, will be modified according to the results of the expeditions which are sketched above.

The five hundred Creek warriors expected here early in this month have not arrived, nor have I heard a word in relation to my order on the subject since its date. They are no longer expected. Should they, however, come by the time that Lindsay will be compelled, for the want of subsistence, to return to this place, he may, in conjunction with the other forces with him, employ those Indians to advantage. He will be instructed accordingly.

I ought to have reported from Fort Drane that, learning from Captain Wharton and his officers that his detachment generally were bad horsemen, and indeed knew little or nothing about the care of horses, I caused a little more than fifty of the men to be dismounted, and the horses were turned over to the quartermaster, by whom they were greatly wanted. The remainder of the detachment (about 28) retained their horses and marched with the right wing, with which they will return, together with the foot, under Captain Wharton.

I shall probably march with the left wing, (Eustis's command,) in order to be at Volusia and Picolata in time to regulate the discharge of the Georgia and South Carolina volunteers and the distribution of the garrisons of regulars to the north of this somewhat in the manner indicated above. It will give me the opportunity, also, of a freer communication with the government, from which I have now been cut off since the 26th ultimo, for a letter cannot be transmitted from this place, or any point in the interior, to Fort Drane or Volusia without the protection of a strong detachment; and since my arrival we have had no vessel that could be spared from the expeditions to the mouth of the Withlacoochee and Charlotte harbor to transmit orders or communications to St. Mark's or New Orleans. This letter will be put in the post office at Pensacola by the United States transport schooner *Motto*, which will be despatched to-morrow to New Orleans.

We found here but one United States ship or vessel, the *Vandalia*, Captain Webb. He has shown the best dispositions towards the land service, and is about to aid us with two boats for the expedition to the mouth of the Withlacoochee. Two other of his boats, as has been stated, are now at Charlotte harbor. No cutter was found here. The *Dallas* came up from Lieutenant Powell a few days since, and is now gone back to co-operate with Colonel Smith. Captain Green, the commander of this cutter, is an intelligent and zealous officer. The cutter *Dexter*, Captain Randolph, arrived yesterday, and is to aid the expedition to the mouth of the Withlacoochee. He came in under the orders of Governor Eaton, whom she had taken from Pensacola to St. Mark's. The cutter *Washington*, I understand, is now down in the direction of Pensacola; I know not under whose orders.

The *Motto* would have been despatched earlier but for the necessity of making for her a new rudder. Besides letters and orders, she will take a number of discharged volunteer officers and men (sick and disabled) to be landed at Pensacola and New Orleans.

My disappointments on the Gulf have been as great as those experienced on the St. John's. The latter were pretty fully reported at the time, and at the last dates not a pound of bacon had arrived on that river or at St. Augustine. Those disappointments may appear to be mere trifles at Washington. I shall demonstrate the most serious influence that they have had on the operations of this army.

First, let it be remembered that one hundred horses will take hard bread and bacon, say for 1,000 men, sufficient to subsist that force as long as the quantity of pork and flour taken by 150 horses would subsist a like force; that is, the difference between pork and flour on the one hand is just fifty per centum, compared with bacon and hard bread, in favor of the latter. Secondly, let it be remembered that the deficiency in our means of transportation was sufficiently great, independent of the addition to the weight to be drawn, created by the necessity of loading the wagons with flour and pork. Besides, all southern volunteers prefer bacon to pork, and no troops can, in the woods, convert flour into wholesome bread. Both time and means are wanting.

Some hard bread arrived in time on the St. John's, but not enough. Thus the last rations of flour and pork consumed by Clinch's wing, the day it arrived here, had been drawn from Garey's Ferry, a distance of 165 miles. Eustis's wing had also to bring with it pork and a portion of flour, owing to the deficiency of hard bread on the St. John's.

Please now refer to my joint letter to the quartermaster and commissary at New Orleans, dated at Savannah, February the 14th, and acknowledged on the 26th of the same month. A copy was transmitted

to you for the information of the proper departments at Washington. The letter, it will be seen, is specific and urgent. Yet, instead of my finding here about 150,000 rations of hard bread, and about 90,000 of bacon, I found but 12,740 pounds of the first, and 21,600 pounds of the latter! Not an additional ration of either has arrived since I came. Colonel Lindsay had required, for the use of his column, of the quartermaster at New Orleans, a number of wagons and horses, and not one has been sent. Again, the sutler (the person next in importance to the quartermaster and commissary with every army) left this place more than a month ago for New Orleans, to bring back with him a large supply of goods for the troops which were expected. Those supplies are exceedingly wanted by every officer and soldier. But the quartermaster writes that he *hesitates* about sending the wagons and horses; and the sutler, that he *declines* sending his stores, because each has heard of Major General Gaines's triumphal entry into Tallahassee, in consequence of his having finished the war!! It is presumed that the commissary at New Orleans stopped the shipment of bacon and hard bread for the same reason.

Captain Green, of the cutter Dallas, was at Tallahassee when Major General Gaines arrived at that place. He had been ten days soliciting permission to go and make a survey of the mouth of the Withlacoochee. On renewing his application to some one in the territorial government, he was told that the war was over! We have now to make the survey for the expedition that has been mentioned. These are the new disappointments and vexations that I have been doomed to experience.

In connexion with the strange imagination that the war was finished at Camp Izard, it may be remarked that Major General Gaines put himself under an escort of some mounted Floridians, to take him from Fort Drane towards the Suwanee, and that Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs, a few days afterwards, although he asserted, with Major General Gaines, that the war was over, did not deem it *safe* for him to take the Tallahassee route. Colonel Gadsden and two other gentlemen came to Fort Drane ten days before in perfect security over that very route, and *before* it was imagined that the war had been brought to a happy conclusion.

In respect to hard bread, it is proper to state that, besides the 12,740 pounds mentioned above, we have about 7,000 pounds brought from Mobile by Colonel Lindsay. The commissary at New Orleans is entitled to no credit for this small supply.

Among other orders, a copy of No. 24 will be found enclosed. The friendly Indians made many difficulties; but I finally told them that they must embark, and Lieutenant Harris has just reported that the whole (399 souls) are actually on board. About a third of the number are warriors. A few (two or three) are retained as guides, and a small number were left at Fort King.

April 13.—Since writing the above, I have been forced, from our ignorance of the mouth of the Withlacoochee, to modify the instructions given to Clinch. From Camp Cooper he is instructed to take a trail that we observed (coming down) which leads into and towards the head of *the cove*. This will bring him near to Lindsay, who will operate between the Withlacoochees, and north of the smaller. The two columns will probably meet or be near enough to each other for the 4th United States infantry to pass to Lindsay, in order to return to this place with him. It is, consequently, now probable that I shall march with Lindsay instead of Eustis, and pass on with Clinch from Pelaklikaha, *via* Forts King and Drane.

After a fuller examination of Indians, (friendly and prisoners,) together with persons *called* guides, and comparing the information so derived with Colonel Gadsden's knowledge of the country, Eustis will be instructed, after he shall have scoured the upper parts of Pease creek, to visit Tohopkelika, (south-west of Lake Monroe,) then turn to the north, pass to the east of Lake Eustis, strike his late trail, and return to Volusia. It is hoped that his means of subsistence will enable him to accomplish the march, and the important objects connected with it.

The vessels and boats prepared for the mouth of the Withlacoochee will take Major Read and his Florida battalion to that place, whence he will survey the mouth, and examine the river to a point as high as practicable. The battalion will then embark on board a schooner and return direct to St. Mark's.

The rudder of the schooner Motto not being finished, I shall despatch the cutter Dexter with this and other letters to St. Mark's.

I remain, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General United States Army.*

No. 104.

A.

HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING FLORIDA ARMY, *Camp Georgia, April 8, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit a report of the operations of this wing of the army since marching from Fort Drane on the 26th ultimo.

On that day it consisted of the following forces, viz: artillery, 450; 4th regiment infantry, 270; Wharton's dismounted dragoons, 57; two companies Augusta volunteers, 171; Smith's regiment Louisiana volunteers, 469; Cooper's battalion Georgia volunteers, 321; and four companies Georgia mounted men, 230—aggregate, 1,968. Two six-pounder cannon, with a wagon-train and pack-horses transporting provisions for 15 days (besides three days in the haversacks,) with the least possible quantity of equipage, not more than three tents being allowed to companies of any size.

The route was in the direction of Camp Izard, on the Withlacoochee, the point at which the enemy would most probably be found, as on all previous attempts to cross that river he had defended the passage with such pertinacity as to lead to the belief that his stronghold would be found in that vicinity.

It was only by the great exertion of the whole force that the wagon-train could be passed over the route, the road being new, and the country wet and deep, so that much of it was obliged to be laid down with logs. The wing reached Camp Izard on the morning of the 28th, and soon after the enemy gave notice of his presence on the opposite bank of the river by firing into our camp. Preparation was immediately made for forcing the passage in boats, which had been constructed at Fort Drane for the purpose, and brought along with us.

Colonel Gadsden, quartermaster general of Florida, acting inspector general, who, throughout the march, displayed great zeal and intelligence, reconnoitred the ground, and selected the point of crossing very judiciously.

The details having been prepared, the river bank was occupied at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 29th by sharpshooters and the two pieces of artillery, and at daylight the advance (companies A and G, 2d artillery) crossed in small detachments under the command of Brevet Major Zantzinger. I must here take occasion to mention an act of personal gallantry on the part of Foster Blodget, a private of the Augusta blues, who volunteered to swim the river and attach a rope to a tree on the opposite side, which greatly expedited the first crossing. After the two companies of the advance had possessed themselves of the southern bank, they were followed by the regiment of Louisiana volunteers and the 4th regiment United States infantry.

A sufficient force having thus been thrown across to maintain the position, the whole train was passed in the course of the day. Two companies of mounted men had, in the meantime, crossed at a very difficult ford $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile below; another swam the river near the ferry. All the train being over, the rear division was crossing under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Bankhead, when it was attacked in rear, but the enemy was driven off by two discharges of the six-pounder under Lieutenant Brooks, and a volley from the rear guard under Captain Belton. Except this attack, the passage was unmolested. The enemy fired a few shots into the camp during the night from the northern side of the river.

On the morning of the 30th the wing proceeded up the river in search of the enemy, and at 10 o'clock he was discovered in small numbers on an island in a chain of lakes running nearly parallel with the river. The baggage train was drawn up in compact order, and left with a guard of 300 men, and the troops advanced to attack. The enemy, however, retired, and pursuit was continued about four miles, when, as it was growing late, the wing encamped. Marched early on the morning of the 31st, and soon discovered the enemy on another island. It will be proper here to remark that the chain of lakes before mentioned is spotted with islands of dense cypress swamps and hammock growth (whence the Indian name *Oloklikaha*, Spotted Lake,) as was afterwards discovered on our march, nothing of the topography being known to us at first.

Dispositions were immediately made for attack by the right column, under Colonel Smith, on one end of the island, and by the left column, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Bankhead, under my own observation, on the other. The approach at both points was impracticable to any but infantry troops, and extremely difficult to them, the island being surrounded by a very broad and wet savanna, and so boggy that it was not without great efforts that men could struggle through it.

As the head of the right column approached the firm ground, it was met by a sharp discharge from the enemy's rifles, but, dashing forward, he was soon dislodged and pursued for the distance of three or four miles, when he was driven across the river, and the column halted and remained on the bank of the river until recalled, an hour afterwards. Colonel Smith and his command conducted with great spirit and courage throughout.

In the pursuit which succeeded the first charge, that portion of the right column composed of the 4th infantry, Wharton's dragoons, and two companies of Louisiana volunteers, under the immediate command of Lieutenant Colonel Foster, became several times engaged, whenever thick cypress or hammock growth favored the enemy; but in every instance he was promptly expelled and pursued. Lieutenant Colonel Foster speaks in very high terms of his officers and men, and mentions particularly the conduct of Lieutenant Barron, adjutant of the Louisiana volunteers.

The left column approached the island simultaneously with the right, and was received with a hot discharge from the enemy as soon as it arrived within rifle-shot of the hammock, and at the moment when the advance under Major Cooper, of the Georgia volunteers, was plunging through a deep and difficult morass. A few discharges from a six-pounder, under Captain Miller, which had been forced to the edge of the morass, silenced the enemy, when the advance, with the 1st battalion of artillery and Captain Robinson's two companies, which had, in the meantime, formed to the front, charged the hammock, and the enemy fled. Active pursuit was made for two miles, until the left came up with the right column, when, finding it impossible to penetrate the cypress swamp on its left, towards the river, it halted. Lieutenant Colonel Foster had taken the only trail leading in that direction. Colonel Bankhead reports that his battalion conducted with great zeal and promptness.

Finding it impossible to follow the enemy across the river, and being for 24 hours without provisions, the troops returned to the baggage train and encamped.

April 1.—Marched along the lakes lying between us and the river, and reached the next morning what appeared to be their southeastern termination, and established a post of observation under Major Cooper, with his battalion, leaving him 17 days' provisions; and reserving only enough to subsist the wing for five days, proceeded to Tampa Bay for further supplies, where it arrived on 5th of April, after a difficult and fatiguing march, being obliged to make the road the whole distance.

The fatigue and exposure of the march increased the sick list to 150. Subjoined is a return of killed and wounded in the battle of *Oloklikaha*:

	Killed.	Wounded.
Artillery.....	0	2 privates.
Fourth infantry.....	0	1 private.
Dragoons.....	1 private.....	0
Louisiana volunteers	3 privates.....	4 privates.
Cooper's battalion	0	2 privates.
Total.....	4	9

C. M. THRUSTON, *Captain, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

The officers of my staff were fully efficient, and carried out with great promptness the dispositions which the circumstances required.

D. L. CLINCH, *Brigadier General United States Army.*

Major General Scott, *Commanding.*

No. 105.

B.

HEADQUARTERS LEFT WING ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay, April 10, 1836.*

GENERAL: In compliance with your directions, I proceed to detail the operations of the left wing of the army, from the arrival of the forces at St. Augustine.

On my arrival at St. Augustine, on the 15th of February, I was informed that the whole country between the St. John's and the sea-coast was in possession of the Indians, and that small bands of them were ranging in all directions, burning houses, and driving off the cattle. I therefore proceeded without delay to establish a chain of posts at intervals of from ten to twenty miles, extending south as far as the Mosquito inlet, in order to cover the southern plantations, and to scour the intervening country, and to drive off the predatory bands of savages. Owing to the extreme difficulty in procuring guides, this latter duty was not as effectually performed as I could have desired, and we doubtless left some small parties of Indians in our rear when the troops were withdrawn from the Atlantic coast.

On the 9th of March Colonel Goodwyn's regiment of mounted volunteers from South Carolina reached St. Augustine.

On the 10th three men of Colonel Brisbane's regiment were killed within two hundred yards of his intrenchment at Tomoca, and the enemy had scalped them and fled before he could sally out upon them.

On the 15th the several detachments of my column were put in motion *via* Tomoca to Volusia, on the St. John's, and on the 22d all had reached that point except Lieutenant Colonel Butler's battalion and two companies of artillery under Major Kirby; both of which parties had operated as far south as Smyrna. The route from Tomoca to Volusia was found nearly impracticable, and was only accomplished by the most persevering exertions, and to the great injury of wagons and horses.

On the 22d of March I commenced crossing the St. John's; about 3 o'clock p. m. my advanced guard on the west side of the river, consisting of Ashby's and Fripp's companies of Brisbane's regiment, was briskly attacked by a considerable party of Indians. These companies maintained their ground with great gallantry and steadiness until reinforced by two others (Henry's and Hibbla's) under Colonel Brisbane, when a charge being made, the enemy was repulsed at all points, and fled to his fastnesses. In this encounter our loss was three killed and nine wounded. Although we found only one Indian dead on the ground, I had satisfactory evidence of four others being thrown into the river.

On the 24th a subaltern's command of mounted men fell in with a party of twelve or fifteen Indians in the open pine land, killed two, and might have destroyed the entire party but for the misconduct of the lieutenants in command.

On the 25th my whole, consisting of four companies of the 1st regiment of artillery under Major Kirby, Colonel Goodwyn's mounted regiment, Colonel Brisbane's regiment, (foot,) and Captain Elmore's Columbia volunteers, was concentrated; and on the 26th, leaving two companies of Brisbane's regiment at Volusia, under the command of Major Gates, United States army, with the wounded and sick, I commenced my march for Pelaklikaha, by the upper crossing of the Ocklawaha, at the head of fourteen hundred men, and with thirteen days' rations. The first part of my route was so difficult for my wagons that, with every exertion of men as well as horses, I had, on the evening of the 27th, progressed only seven miles. As we advanced, however, the country became more favorable, and with the exception of being obliged to build bridges over the Ocklawaha, the Withlacochee, and one intermediate stream, I found no serious obstacle to impede my march to this place. On the 29th, after crossing the Ocklawaha, an Indian of some note, Ayah Hajo, was killed by the gallant General Shelton, serving as a private volunteer, who was himself severely wounded.

On the 30th my advance, consisting of a portion of the mounted regiment under Colonel Goodwyn, was attacked at the Okihumky swamp, and three men were wounded. On my arrival at the spot with Kirby's battalion and the two advance companies of Brisbane's regiment, I caused the hammock to be scoured, and the Indians were found posted behind some pines, from which they were soon driven into the depths of (to us) an inaccessible swamp. Kirby's loss was one wounded, and the enemy retired whenever our line approached within two hundred yards. These are the only Indians I have seen on our march. On my reaching Pelaklikaha, I found the villages abandoned, and no sign of their having been occupied for several weeks; cattle and ponies, however, were abundant in the neighborhood. The houses and fences were burnt by my order. On the 31st I despatched an express to Fort King, who returned to me the night of the 1st of April, with information that you had crossed the Withlacochee with the right wing on the 28th of March; that no communication could be held with you on that route; and that I could obtain no provisions at that post. Deeming it impracticable, in the exhausted state of my horses, to draw provisions over the route I had come from Volusia, and my only guide having reached the extent of the country with which he was acquainted, I saw no alternative but to extend my operations southward on the main road from Fort King to Tampa Bay. Doing which, I fired signal guns at ten o'clock a. m. on four successive days, without hearing any response. On the 3d instant I fell upon the trail of Colonel Lindsay returning hither, and immediately sent an express to him. On the 4th I received his communication in reply, and also yours dated the 2d instant. On the 5th, leaving my foot soldiers and wagons fifteen miles from here, I came to this place with all my horses, and had the honor to report to you in person.

I am, very respectfully, your humble servant,

ABRM. EUSTIS, *Brigadier General United States Army.*

Major General Scott.

No. 106.

C.

HEADQUARTERS CENTRE FLORIDA ARMY, *Tampa Bay, April 10, 1836.*

SIR: I embarked at Mobile with three companies of the Alabama regiment of volunteers, commanded by Colonel William Chisholm, colonel of the regiment, on the 2d of March, five other companies of the same regiment, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Crabb, and two under Major Taliaferro, sailing at or

about the same time. The first eight companies arrived here on the 6th of March, and the two last in transports, bringing our horses, provisions, and ammunition, did not reach this place until the 13th. On my arrival here I found Major Read, with a battalion of Florida volunteers, encamped on the west side of Hillsborough river, and, about the 10th, I was joined by Captain Marks's company of Louisiana volunteers; on the 12th, discovering large fires in the direction of the Alafia river, Major Read was directed, with the Florida battalion, to scour that section of the country, which duty was successfully performed by a night march, by which the Indians were surprised in their camp and driven across the river, with the loss of three of their party killed and six of their ponies captured.

My entire force being collected, in the absence of all instructions from headquarters, I determined to make a forward movement, and construct a stockade on the Hillsborough river, where it is crossed by the main road from Fort Brooke to Fort King, with a view of bringing our subsistence nearer to the scene of military operations, and on the 15th the line of march was accordingly taken up. The destruction of bridges by the Indians delayed and embarrassed our march so much that we did not arrive at the Hillsborough until the 17th, from which time until the 20th we were engaged in the construction of a stockade named by me Fort Alabama. Major Read, of the Florida battalion, was left in command of this post, whilst the remainder of the force returned to Fort Brooke on the 21st.

During my absence a despatch from Major General Scott, announcing the general plan of the campaign, and requiring me to be in position at or near Chickuchatty on the 25th, for the purpose of co-operation, had been received here through the hand of some friendly Indian. In obedience to this order, the line of march was taken up on the 22d. On leaving Fort Alabama I was joined by Major Read and the battalion of Florida volunteers, Captain Marks being left in command of Fort Alabama, with a company of Louisiana volunteers, and about 30 of the sick of the command. Our route lay through a hilly country, abounding with hammocks, and after passing Elochuteka, the Indians, taking advantage of their coverts, began to annoy us with their fire on the rear and flanks. On the 26th a flanker of Cooper's company, Alabama regiment of volunteers, was killed, and another badly wounded. This attack was made on the rear of the flankers, whilst the army was passing a dense hammock of nearly a mile in length, the front and centre of the columns having plunged into the hammock, a small portion of the rear only being left in open ground, skirted by woods, and a brisk fire going on between the enemy and the rear. I directed Captain Bonham, of the Alabama regiment, to charge with his company into the skirt of the hammock from which the fire proceeded, with a view of ascertaining the number and force of the attacking party. This duty was promptly performed, and Major Taliaferro having ordered up Blount's company of the same regiment to sustain Bonham, the Indians were driven off, showing themselves at the distance of a quarter of a mile in the open woods, yelling and dancing. At our encampment this night parties of our men were fired upon by the Indians from a hammock contiguous to a pond which supplied us with water.

Finding that the position of the enemy was too distant to be reached by musketry, I threw in one round of canister, which dispersed them. On the 27th, by the same annoying attack, the enemy always lying in ambush, one private of Campbell's company of Alabama volunteers was killed and two wounded. At noon, whilst halted, a smart attack was made upon our rear, but upon a brisk return of the fire the Indians disappeared. On the 28th, when encamped at Camp Broadnax, (so called in honor of the inspector general of the army of the centre,) near Chickuchatty, the Indians commenced a fire on our horses and the party guarding them, when a detachment of the Florida battalion, under Captains Roulett and Allison, together with Blount's and Nott's companies of the Alabama regiment, were ordered to drive them. This service was performed without any loss on our side. On the 30th, provisions beginning to be scarce, two parties of mounted men, one under the command of Captain Taylor, of the Alabama regiment, and the other under Captain Roulett, of the Florida battalion, were sent out in pursuit of cattle, covered by a force of 250 men, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Crabb, of Alabama regiment of volunteers. These parties were successful in bringing in such a supply of cattle as enabled us to subsist four days longer, although destitute of bread and salt.

During the day our friendly Indians killed a chief called Charley Fixico, a leader of about 85 men. At night the sentinels guarding the flank occupied by the Florida battalion were fired upon, and during the 31st all of our sentinels occasionally received shots, but without any injury. On the 31st I made an unsuccessful attempt to procure more beef, finding myself removed sixty miles from my depot, with bare enough provisions in store to march to it, without any prospect of being able to keep the field for the purpose of co-operation contemplated in the plan of the campaign; and having obtained no response to the signals made by me to the other forces in the field, eight days in succession, I deemed it advisable to commence my return to Tampa Bay, which I effected by the 4th of April at night, having been out fourteen days on ten days' provisions. In the interval between my departure from Fort Alabama and my return to it, that post was attacked by a force supposed to be between three and four hundred Indians. The attack commenced about 8 a. m., and continued without intermission two hours and twenty minutes. The loss on the side of the defenders was one man killed and two wounded, whilst that of the enemy was supposed to be fifteen killed. Notwithstanding their defeat in the main attack, they continued to lie around the work in considerable force, both day and night, until my return, when they moved off on the same road by which I marched; and the sign made on that road furnishes me with the means of estimating their numbers. During the whole time of the siege, Captain Marks, his officers and men, conducted themselves with coolness and courage.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. LINDSAY, *Colonel 2d Artillery, and Commanding Army of the Centre.*

Major General W. Scott.

No. 107.

ORDERS No. 22.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Tampa Bay, April 8, 1836.*

The army will prepare and hold itself in readiness to march in a very few days.

The utmost attention will be given to have the whole baggage train, including carriages, pack-saddles, and horses, fitted and refreshed for the field as soon as possible

The commander of the three principal corps of the army will immediately take measures to ascertain whether the haversacks with which the men have been provided have been preserved. If any have been lost, they must immediately be replaced. The same means will be adopted to cause every mounted officer and man to be provided with a sufficient corn-sack or wallet to carry the necessary corn for his horse.

The hard bread and bacon which have arrived at this place are intended for distant expeditions. Neither will be issued to the troops within two marches of this place, and all the corps will be supplied with those two items of subsistence according to their relative numbers.

By command of Major General Scott.

JAMES GADSDEN, *Quartermaster General*.

No. 108.

ORDERS No. 24.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Tampa Bay, April 9, 1836.*

The embarkation of the friendly Indians for their new country, west of the Mississippi, will commence on the morning of the 11th instant at the latest. It is expected that all who are now here will be on board the transports by the 13th.

The acting superintendent, Mr. Sheffield, will repair to Fort King as soon as practicable to obtain the papers of the agency, and to put in movement the friendly Indians who are at that place, for the same general destination west of the Mississippi, by any route that may be found the most practicable.

At the joint request of Lieutenant Harris, disbursing agent, and of the acting superintendent, Lieutenants Jones and Meade (both of whom are invalids and unfitted for the arduous duties of the field) are assigned for duty with the emigrating Indians at this place.

Acting Assistant Surgeon Hulse is relieved from army duty, and will report himself to Lieutenant Jones as the surgeon and physician to the emigrating Indians now about to embark.

By command of Major General Scott.

JAMES GADSDEN, *Quartermaster General*.

No. 109

ORDERS No. 28.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Tampa Bay, April 11, 1836.*

All the corps of this army will be put in motion, by land or water, on the mornings of the 13th and 14th instant.

Mounted officers and men must provide themselves with the means of taking on horseback the grain necessary for their horses, as the wagons and pack-horses will only take grain for themselves. Two bushels of corn for each horse may easily be carried on his back; but in this case it will be indispensable that the horse should be led and not ridden for at least two days.

The mounted volunteers may deem this order a hardship. Let them reflect on the importance to the service that the horses should have grain for subsistence, and that no grain can be obtained on this side of Volusia and Fort Drane. This fact must be sufficient to satisfy the good sense of every mounted volunteer. It will also be remembered that the mounted men will march towards their respective homes, (with but slight deviations,) to which they will soon be honorably dismissed.

Brigadier General Clinch will send one of his battalions of United States artillery to join the centre, under Colonel Lindsay, and the latter will direct the Florida battalion, under Major Read, to report to Brigadier General Clinch.

By command of Major General Scott.

JAMES GADSDEN, *Colonel in the Staff*.

No. 110.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Tampa Bay, April 10, 1836.*

SIR: The war has not been as yet carried into the enemy's settlements on the Meacca and Pease creek. That country is believed to be one of his strongholds, and the place of concealment for many families and negroes. How far these settlements extend down the creek or river towards Charlotte harbor is not accurately known, and I am in the same state of ignorance as to the number of fighting men that may probably be found in that quarter. His force, however, in that quarter is not estimated at more than two hundred and fifty men. It is probably much less.

It is my wish that you proceed to Charlotte harbor with your regiment, on board the two schooners which have been designated for the purpose, accompanied by the cutter Dallas, Captain Green, which is also put at your disposition for the expedition, and to ascend the Meacca or Pease creek with those vessels, as far as you may find practicable or safe, when you will land your forces on either bank, and march in search of the enemy and his settlements. Lieutenant Powell, of the navy, is now in Charlotte harbor, with two new boats and a party from the United States ship Vandalia. An order will go with you from the commander of that ship, instructing Lieutenant Powell to unite and co-operate with you. On your way thither you will instruct the cutter to keep a lookout for that party, which may be on its return, and if not you will deliver the instructions to Lieutenant Powell, mentioned above. Besides the

boats which that officer has with him, and those belonging to the cutter and the transport schooners, you will engage such other boats and canoes in Charlotte harbor as you may require.

After the two schooners shall be obliged to come to anchor in the Meacca, perhaps the cutter may be able to ascend the creek some miles higher. With those vessels, it is suggested that you leave a competent guard on debarking, when the small boats and canoes may be serviceable in taking subsistence for the troops to a much higher point.

With the aid of the small craft and the haversacks, it is supposed that you may operate effectively to the distance of four, perhaps six marches, (going and returning,) after leaving the vessels. If so, it is thought highly probable that you will be able to reach the settlements of the hostile Indians, and to beat and capture the enemy in that quarter. For this purpose you will pursue any considerable trail you may find to a reasonable distance—having reference to your force and means of subsistence. The capture of the families of the enemy, and the slaves in their possession, as well as the destruction of their settlements, are among the principal objects of the expedition; some, if not all of which, I think you cannot fail to accomplish.

Guides and interpreters you will find with Lieutenant Powell; and you may engage any others that you may find in Charlotte harbor.

A simultaneous movement of 500 mounted men will be made upon the settlements near the head of the same river or creek. It is possible that you may be able to communicate with that force, but it is not expected that you will make any hazardous halt or movement to accomplish that object.

After accomplishing or attempting the objects suggested, you will, at the end of a reasonable time, return to this place, where you will find the quartermaster's department instructed to furnish the best transportation that can be had for the honorable return of your regiment to New Orleans.

Please report to me, in duplicates, by different routes, the results and observations of your expedition, which I do not doubt will terminate as honorably to you, your officers, and men, as any service that has preceded it.

I remain, with the highest consideration and respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Colonel P. F. SMITH, *Commanding Louisiana Volunteers.*

No. 111.

ORDERS No. 37.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Tampa Bay, April 16, 1836.*

The Louisiana regiment of volunteers, under the gallant Colonel Smith, will, on its return to this place, immediately proceed to New Orleans in the best transports the quartermaster's department can supply. It will first turn into store the arms and other property of the United States in its possession, and which may not be necessary to the comfort of the regiment in its passage home.

At New Orleans Major Clark, or other United States officer, will muster the regiment out of the service of the United States, and it will, at the same time, be paid by the paymaster of the army stationed in that city.

What may be the results of the expedition to Charlotte harbor and Pease creek, in which the regiment is at present engaged, cannot be known to the commanding general in some weeks. Judging from the past, those results cannot fail to be highly honorable to the colonel, the officers, and the men, of that efficient corps, which is already entitled to the thanks of the country.

Dr. Lawson, the senior surgeon of the United States army, who, under a commission from the State of Louisiana, has served as lieutenant colonel of this regiment, and who has superadded the distinction of arms to his high medical reputation, will temporarily take charge of the general hospital at this place. As soon as the great body of the sick shall have been restored and sent off to their respective States, Surgeon Lawson will return to his proper station.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

No. 112.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Tampa Bay, April 12, 1836.*

SIR: I am directed by Major General Scott to inform you that the duties of paying off the Louisiana and Alabama volunteers, now in the service of the United States, as discharged, will devolve on you. Colonel Lindsay, commanding the cutter, expects to embark them from this port for Mobile on or about the first of May, so that you may safely calculate on their arrival at that place between the 5th and 10th of the month at latest. It is all-important that you be at that point on the arrival of the Alabama volunteers, so that there be no unnecessary detention in discharging and paying them off. Colonel Lindsay, to whom you will report on your arrival in Mobile, will furnish you the necessary funds, if not already placed at your disposal by the proper authorities at Washington, and will afford you every facility to the speedy and faithful discharge of the responsibilities by this communication imposed on you.

By command of Major General Scott.

JAMES GADSDEN, *Colonel in the Staff.*

Major CHARLES MAPES, *Paymaster, New Orleans.*

No. 112—113.

HEADQUARTERS, *Tampa Bay, April 14, 1836.*

SIR: The imperfect knowledge had of the Withlacoochee river and its entrance from the Gulf, and the impossibility of acquiring, from any source which may be relied on, such information of its accessibility with the interior as to insure the co-operation and junction of forces operating by land and by water, has induced the commanding general so to modify the contemplated movements of the right wing of the Florida army, to which your battalion has been attached, as to devolve on you and your command a very responsible and honorable duty—a service, the performance of which may possibly have an important influence on the results of the closing campaign, and cannot but prove very valuable in any ulterior operations deemed necessary against the Seminoles. The commanding general therefore directs you to embark, as early as practicable, (the quartermaster of this post furnishing on your requisition suitable transports, with a full supply of provisions,) your whole battalion, including invalids and sick, for the mouth of the Withlacoochee; that you come to anchor in the nearest and safest accessible harbor or anchorage-ground to the mouth of that stream, and that you proceed with your effective force, leaving your sick and invalids on board, with the boats at command, to survey and examine its entrance, and to penetrate as far into the interior as may be found practicable and consistent with the security of your command—holding steadily in view that the object of your expedition is one of reconnoissance, more with a view of obtaining information of a part of the probable seat of war unknown to us, than to operate directly against the enemy. There is no evidence, either from discovered trails, or any other source, of the hostile party in any force having gone in the direction of the mouth of the Withlacoochee; yet, in the midst of the uncertainties prevailing as to the directions taken by the different dispersed parties of the enemy, it is not improbable one division may have taken that course.

The general is unwilling, therefore, to expose unnecessarily your small command to either being cut off, as you will be separated from all succor, or from being exposed to an unequal combat on a river, the enemy having possession of the banks, and your command unprotected in your boats. He relies, therefore, on your prudence and discretion, that while in the performance of a service of reconnoissance—one for the obtaining of information—you do not hazard the safety of your battalion in an unequal contest; that all your movements be made with caution, examining well the river before you enter, and not land and penetrate the country to any extent that would jeopardize the same communication with your transports. You will preserve notes of your observations, and report the result of your examinations, directed Garcey's Ferry, Black creek, to the commanding general, detailing minutely the character of the anchorage at the mouth of the Withlacoochee; the navigability of that river for boats; the probable distance to which it may be penetrated; the character of its banks; and the facilities generally afforded for the forming of depots, with a view of supplying an army operating hereafter on or near its waters. This duty performed, you will proceed to St. Mark's, Florida, in the transports, where your command will be honorably discharged by the territorial authorities which mustered you into service, as it will be impossible for the commanding general to detail a regular officer for said service.

Captain Bunce, an experienced pilot of this coast, and who has been in the mouth of the Withlacoochee, will accompany your expedition, and render you every service in the accomplishment of the important duties imposed on you by this communication.

Respectfully,

JAMES GADSDEN, *Colonel in the Staff.*MAJOR L. READ, *Florida Battalion.*

No. 113.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Tampa Bay, April 14, 1836.*

SIR: With the centre under your command, you will march without delay, by the Fort King road, till you shall have passed the Big Withlacoochee; you will then penetrate the forks of the two rivers of that name by any leading trail or practicable route, and open a communication with Brigadier General Clinch, who, in all probability, will have entered the cove of the Withlacoochee on the 19th instant. A junction or close approximation of your force with his is indispensable, as you will have to turn over to his command the company of mounted Georgians and the detachment of United States dragoons, and receive from him the United States 4th infantry, which will return with you to this place.

In marching to communicate with Clinch, you will not neglect to pursue any considerable recent trail of the enemy, as far as you may safely do so without losing the chance of such communication, say between the 20th and 23d instant, somewhere within the forks of the Withlacoochee.

You will take with your command the greater practicable amount of subsistence, so that after, as before communicating with Clinch, you may be in a condition to keep the field as long as possible, and ready to attempt any enterprise that may contribute to the success of the war.

It is not doubted that the force of either Clinch or the centre will be found perfectly adequate to beat any body of the enemy that either is likely to encounter. No junction, therefore, for that specific object is deemed indispensable. The approximation of the two forces is directed with a view to the other objects first mentioned, and also for this purpose, that if Clinch should drive the enemy, you may be in a position to strike a decisive blow, and *vice versa*.

For your government on your final return here, you will receive further instructions or orders.

Relying on a continuance of that vigor and intelligence which you have already displayed in this campaign, and not doubting that you will be well supported by the regulars and volunteers under your command, I remain, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Colonel WM. LINDSAY, *Commander of the Centre.*

No. 114.

ORDERS No. 38.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Tampa Bay, April 16, 1836.*

On the return of the centre of this army, under Colonel Lindsay, he will have at his disposition four companies of United States artillery, seven companies of the United States 4th infantry, the Alabama regiment of volunteers, and Captain Marks's company of Louisiana volunteers, besides the small garrison in Redoubt Fraser.

What more may reasonably be attempted by those patriotic volunteers and regulars in the prosecution of the war, is left to the zeal and judgment of Colonel Lindsay, or the senior officer of the centre. The commanding general will soon be in the northern part of the Territory, and therefore may not have it in his power to give prompt instructions for the movement of those forces.

Besides the train of wagons and pack-horses, water transportation for new expeditions may be supplied by the quartermaster's department.

When the term of service of the volunteers shall have expired, or sooner, if no new expeditions can be attempted with a prospect of advantage, the volunteers mentioned will be embarked for their homes. No doubt is entertained that the two corps will each be entitled to an honorable discharge, and the thanks of the country. The discharges may be given here, or at Mobile and New Orleans, as may be deemed best. In either case, the quartermaster's department will furnish the necessary transportation.

When operations shall be over for the season, the four companies of artillery will be left in garrison here; a company of the 4th infantry, with sixty days' subsistence, will be sent to Key West, to reoccupy the post on that island; two companies of the same regiment will be sent, under a field officer, to establish a post at or in the vicinity of Watson's or Dabney's plantation, on the Suwanee. A good supply of subsistence will be taken by the two companies up that river. On the establishment of the post, any detachment of Florida militia in its vicinity will be discharged and sent home.

Those arrangements being completed, the commanding officers at Fort Brooke, Key West, and on the Suwanee, will report to the headquarters of the western department.

As soon as it may be prudently done, the detachment of United States marines, under Lieutenant Waldron, will be instructed to rejoin the proper naval commander. This officer and his detachment are entitled to the thanks of the army for the zeal and good conduct they have displayed ashore.

Great care will be bestowed by the proper officer to render the horses left here by the army capable of service. As soon as they shall have partially recovered strength, a small detachment of mounted men will be formed for the purpose of occasionally scouring the vicinity, and of keeping prowling parties of the enemy at a distance.

The four remaining companies of the 4th infantry will be detained as a party of the garrison at this place, or sent to Baton Rouge, as Colonel Lindsay or other commanding officer may deem necessary.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

No. 115.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *April 15, 1836.*

SIR: I enclose, for your information, the copy of a letter this day addressed to Governor Clay, of Alabama, and to request that, as soon as the state of your operations in Florida will permit, you will direct your attention to the Creek Indians, and adopt such measures as you may find necessary to preserve or restore tranquillity in that part of the country.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LEWIS CASS.

Major General Scott, *Fort King, Florida.*

No. 116.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Picolata, April 30, 1836.*

For the information of the War Department, I have the honor to report my arrival here yesterday. My last report was dated at Tampa Bay, the 12th and 13th instant.

The right wing and the centre of this army moved from that place on the 14th, as did also the South Carolina mounted regiment. The foot of the same wing (the left) had remained encamped for twelve days, about fifteen miles from Tampa, on the Fort King road, and the Florida battalion commenced its debarkation for the mouth of the Withlacoochee on the 17th. I left Tampa Bay the same day, and joined the foot of the left wing, with which I marched to Fort Alabama, on the Hillsborough. Here, on the next day, we were rejoined by the South Carolina mounted regiment from its expedition to the head of Pease creek, where no Indians and no recent trails were found. Colonel Goodwyn, the commander, however, discovered and burnt an extensive town on the left bank of that stream.

On the 20th the left wing passed the Big Withlacoochee, where we found the centre engaged in constructing a defence for its baggage train, preparatory to entering and scouring the forks of the Withlacoochees, whilst the right wing was advancing by the cove and the left bank of the main river.

I continued to march with the left wing *via* the scene of Dade's massacre, Pelaklikaha, and the upper crossing of the Ocklawaha. On the night of the 22d our camp was fired upon by a party of six or eight of the enemy. One man and two horses were slightly wounded. At daylight a detachment of horse was put in pursuit of the enemy; but at the end of a few miles the trail was lost between some of those hammocks, swamps, and ponds which everywhere abound. Another small party of the enemy was met on the morning of the 24th, and which might have been cut off from the nearest hammock, but for a false move-

ment made by the company of horse constituting the advance guard. The horses and packs of the party were captured; but, after halting and scouring a succession of hammocks, which were, as far as practicable, surrounded by the horse, we found ourselves eluded by every Indian. I mention these mortifying incidents to show the character of the enemy and the nature of the country. The foot broke into hammocks where a goat could not penetrate, and the horse rapidly took up the positions assigned; but the enemy, in all such cases, contrive to escape by secret passages, which afterwards can but rarely be found.

When at the distance of twenty-three miles, I took an escort of two mounted companies, and proceeded to Volusia on the 24th. Finding there the United States steamer the *Essayons*, I embarked in her, and, with a guard of only seventeen men, determined to penetrate by the St. John's the southern part of the peninsula as far as practicable. Colonel Gadsden, Captain Canfield, and Lieutenant Johnston, accompanied me to note the course and depth of the river, together with the general topography of the country. We found no difficulty in passing up to the head of Lake Monroe, and might have carried to that point a draught of eight or nine feet of water. The distance ascended is 200 miles from the mouth of the river, and 60 from Volusia. We found the river beyond the lake nearly as bold as below, and if we could have crossed the bar at the entrance, we do not doubt that we might have gone fifty or seventy miles further towards Cape Florida; but, unfortunately, our boat drew more than four feet, and we only found four on the bar.

This *reconnaissance* was made with a view to several objects. I was anxious to discover whether the Indians had any settlements on the upper part of the river; to find out the place of concealment for their women, children, and negroes; to give to the well-disposed among the latter an opportunity of communicating with us; to observe trails and crossings, and particularly to find a good point, as far in the interior as practicable, for the establishing of a new post before the recommencement of active operations on our part. Such point we found about eight miles below Lake Monroe, on the east bank. A leading trail passes through it. Here we took the ferry canoe in ascending, and here, on returning, a sharp fire was thrown in upon us by a party of ten or fifteen Indians, who lay concealed in high grass on the west side. But for their timidity they might have killed the four officers, who were standing exposed on the bow of the boat. They fired from a distance of 300 yards.

Brigadier General Eustis arrived with the body of the left wing at Volusia on the 25th. The garrison he had left there, under Major Gates, had been sharply attacked on the 14th by, perhaps, 80 Indians. Two of our men, who happened to be outside, were killed, and possibly the enemy lost as many, but no sortie was made.

Before the arrival of Eustis, I had planned an expedition to *Spring Garden*, consisting of the two companies of horse that had escorted me and 60 volunteers of the garrison. The detachment returned without discovering any recent signs of the enemy.

All the volunteers of the left wing marched, under Colonel Goodwyn, on the morning of the 28th, for St. Augustine, *via* Tomoca, &c. Brigadier Generals Eustis and Bull, both being much indisposed, came down the river with me. The regulars were left to garrison Volusia, and to superintend the evacuation of the post, which had already become extremely sickly. Many cases of malignant bilious fever had occurred, which, in the opinion of some of the physicians, threatened the approach of the yellow fever. By the aid of two boats, the *Santee* and the *Essayons*, the evacuation may be completed in a week. Colonel Goodwyn and the two regiments of volunteers may be expected to reach St. Augustine, with the baggage train, in four days from this time. He will pursue any fresh Indian trail he may cross.

I have had, as yet, no report from Brigadier General Clinch. I learn, however, unofficially, that he reached Fort Drane on the 26th, without finding, in his march, any party of the enemy exceeding fifteen or twenty.

From Colonel Smith, who, with the Louisiana volunteers, went on an expedition up the Pease creek, *via* Charlotte harbor, nothing had been heard when I left Tampa Bay. I may receive his report *via* St. Mark's and Tallahassee in ten or twelve days. One, from Major Read, who commanded the expedition up the Withlacoochee (from its mouth) may be expected in the same time, and also a third from Colonel Lindsay. On the receipt of all these reports I shall be able to form a pretty accurate opinion of the measures to be pursued to put an end to this war, which must be recommenced at a better season and with very different means. On our side, so far, nothing of importance has been achieved.

I am more than ever persuaded that the whole force of the enemy, including the negroes, does not exceed 1,200 fighting men; it is probably something less. Of that force I am equally confident that not 500 have, at any time since the commencement of hostilities, been brought within the same ten miles square. In all our operations within the last thirty days we have not found a party of more than perhaps 130, but parties of from ten to thirty have been encountered almost everywhere. No Indian woman, child, or negro, nor the trace of one, has been seen in that time. Those non-combatants (it has been evident to us all) have been removed beyond the theatre of our operations. [They were, no doubt, even while the parley was going on with General Gaines on the 7th of March, moving off to the southeast, beyond Pease creek and Lake Tohopkelika, and in that almost inaccessible region they are now concealed. That officer, it is said, caused Powell and his chiefs to be informed, by way of inducing them to agree to accept the Withlacoochee as a temporary boundary, that large armies were approaching which would fill up the Indian country or crush everything in the way. The wily chiefs profited by the information; sent off their families and dispersed their warriors into small parties. In this way Powell expects to make good his threat, viz: *That he would protract the war three years.*]

To end it in [less time] [I am now persuaded that not less than 3,000 regular troops are indispensable; 2,400 foot and about 600 horse. The country to be scoured and occupied requires that number.] I have no particular desire to conduct the operations of the new forces; that is a duty which I shall neither solicit nor decline.

[Of the above force, 3,000 *good troops*, (*not volunteers*), five hundred will be necessary to garrison five posts for the deposit of supplies. Say one on the St. John's, seven miles below Lake George; one up the Pease creek, say 15 miles above Charlotte harbor; one at Tampa Bay; one 12 miles from the Gulf of Mexico, up the Withlacoochee, and one on the same river, near the Fort King road, with 160,000 rations deposited at Tampa Bay, and thirty or forty thousand at each of the other posts. Five columns with haversacks and a few one-horse carts may operate securely and with every prospect of success, at least to the north and west of Charlotte harbor. For the country below additional means will be wanted, viz: two or three steamers of a light draught of water and fifty or sixty barges of different sizes capable of carrying from ten to fifty men each.

I give these items in order, if approved, that the necessary appropriations may be asked at once. I beg leave to add, in haste, that new regiments, or regiments of recruits, would be worth little or nothing in this war. I will therefore earnestly recommend that the companies of the old regiments be extended to eighty or ninety privates each. Recruits mixed up with old soldiers in June or July would become effective by the first of December; and I repeat that operations cannot be carried on by any troops whatever in this peninsula, except between the 20th of November and the end of April. The intermediate period is too hot or too sickly to be endured.]

The boat is about to depart, and I must for the present conclude.

At the end of January I asked for troops of the governors of several States. The last of the South Carolinians arrived at St. Augustine on the 9th of March, and at Volusia the 25th; the Georgians, in part, arrived at Fort Drane about the same time, but six companies of horse not till the 9th of this month, after the campaign was nearly over. As it was impossible for them to join either of the columns, Lieutenant Colonel Crane sent them back to their homes.

The Alabama regiment, that was expected to reach Tampa Bay about the 25th of February, did not reach that place till (I think) the 13th of March. These extraordinary delays it was impossible for me to foresee or to guard against.

A portion of the Georgians have just arrived here to embark for their homes, and the remainder of the same quota will follow. The South Carolinians will be discharged at St. Augustine and Jacksonville.

I shall write again by the first opportunity. In the meantime I shall, here or at St. Augustine, await the orders of the department.

I remain, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General United States Army.*

No. 117.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 14, 1836.*

SIR: I perceive that Governor Call has obtained permission to make a summer campaign against the Seminole Indians. With all my heart I wish him success, but more than fear, whatever the amount and description of his forces, heat and sickness will defeat him.

I hardly think he will be able to raise, under the late volunteer act, more than 200, possibly 300, men, and they will not be highly effective. Of the regulars left by me in positions on Alachua and Suwanee frontiers, many, I learn, have already fallen sick, and I have reported that no volunteers can be counted on from this quarter. The only reinforcement the governor can, with certainty, expect, in any short time, is the detachment from Baton Rouge, which, at his suggestion, I have ordered back to Florida.

Not doubting, then, that an attempt to operate in the summer as low as the Withlacoochee will be attended with great loss from sickness, and must inevitably fail from that cause alone, however ample the means, I beg leave earnestly to call the attention of the government to the only plan and to the particular means which, in my humble opinion, can give success.

The Seminole Indians are not formidable from their numbers. Of fighting men, including blacks, I do not believe they have more than 1,200 in all Florida, and I am morally certain that, of that number, not more than 500 have been embodied at any time since the commencement of hostilities. The strength of this enemy consists in the extent of the country he occupies, and still more in the frightful nature of its surface. The country west of the Suwanee, in which the campaign of 1818 was prosecuted with success, is a bowling-green compared to that below the Withlacoochee, not to mention that beyond Pease creek and Lake Tohopkelika. Those who have only seen the first can form no idea of the second and third districts mentioned. Fancy a surface checkered at convenient distances for the Indians with hammocks, cypress swamps, savannas, and scrubs. Every hammock and scrub is more difficult, being pre-occupied with Indians, to storm and to carry than any fieldwork it was my fortune to take in Canada. With the advantage of those innumerable fastnesses, if the enemy continues his late policy of sending off to the Everglades his families, and of breaking up his warriors into small parties, who shall say that he can beat such an enemy in a given time? Not a Wayne, nor any other great commander against Indians, living or dead, could venture to say that he could do it in a single season.

The season for operations in Florida is from the 25th of November to the end of April. I assert that an army cannot be safely put into the field earlier nor continued later. With the best possible troops, 3,000 is the *minimum* force required. To obtain the recruits wanted, every man serving in this particular war ought to have pledged to him, at the end of it, a bounty of 160 acres of land, (not Florida land, that would be a fraud,) and every officer should receive a gratuity at the commencement of the campaign of not less than three months' pay; for I repeat that the war against the Seminole Indians is one of unmitigated privation and suffering, without the least possible expectation of fame or glory to individuals. Without the bounty of 160 acres of land to each enlisted soldier, I am confident, from the present high price of labor throughout the country, the number of recruits required cannot be obtained.

I have heretofore stated that five posts ought to be established in the country at or just before the commencement of operations: Tampa Bay, the falls of the Withlacoochee, the great crossing of the same river, on Pease creek, and seven miles below Lake *Monroe*, not Lake *George*, as I wrote in my letter of the 30th of April. Between those posts the troops should operate with such subsistence as they may take in their haversacks and a few one-horse carts, and each horseman taking, at the commencement of each expedition, three bushels of corn in his saddle, and leading his horse for the first eight days.

The one-horse carts (about one hundred) should be light and yet strong, with a water-proof covering. The tire should be four and a half inches in width, and made of rolled boiler iron. These carts ought to be ordered in time, and, when ready, sent to Tampa Bay, Fort Drane, and Picolata; 50 to the first place, 25 to the second, and 25 to the third. Three steamboats of good burden, but of light draught of water, for the Gulf of Mexico, and a fourth, of the same description, for the St. John's river, ought also to be ordered in the course of the summer.

With the forces and means here hastily enumerated, I repeat that, by able combinations, it will be possible, in a single season, to drive the enemy's parties out of the country between the Withlacoochee

and Charlotte harbor, and accomplish something advantageous in the Everglades at the same time, with the further aid of fifty or sixty barges, which ought to be ordered to be provided with the steamboats.

These views I hold it to be my duty again to present. I wish, for the good of the country, that I had the influence with the Executive and Congress to cause them to be adopted. Perhaps, after the trial and failure of other plans and means, they may, by the autumn of 1837, find favor in those quarters.

I have the honor to remain, with high respect, sir, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Hon. LEWIS CASS, *Secretary of War.*

No. 118.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, May 5, 1836.*

SIR: Your communication of the 12th of April, reporting the operations of the army in Florida under your command, since your departure from Fort Drane, and of your arrival at Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay, has been submitted to the President, and this day to the Secretary of War. I am happy to inform you that the President approves your intended plan of operations, and deems it very important that the movement against the negroes, women, and children of the hostile Indians should be vigorously prosecuted, fully persuaded as he is that the capture of these and the destruction of their settlements would best insure the speedy termination of the war.

I am desired by the Secretary of War to say that, from the tenor of your report, as well as by the communication he has just received from the governor of Florida, it is probable that, owing to the approaching season of the year, the campaign in the field cannot be much longer vigorously pushed. In this event you will make a judicious selection of the posts necessary to be occupied by the troops during the interval of active operations which may be best calculated to protect the frontier inhabitants and prevent Indian depredations of any kind. For this purpose all the regular troops, including the 4th infantry, must be kept on duty in Florida.

A bill making provision for the raising of volunteer troops is now pending in Congress, and soon, it is presumed, will become a law; in which case you may expect such reinforcements as may be necessary for the public service, relative to which the views of the department will hereafter be communicated.

The Secretary of War also desires me to communicate to you his wish that you may confer with the governor of Florida, in order that such other measures for the effectual defence of Florida may be adopted if necessary, and which could not otherwise so well be carried into effect as by a co-operation between the territorial government and commanding general in the field. The Secretary of War, reposing great confidence in the judgment and prudence of Governor Call, wishes a mutual interchange of views and opinions, as he has so expressed himself to the governor with regard to the commanding general in Florida.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

Major General SCOTT, *Commanding in Florida, Fort Drane, Florida.*

No. 119.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *St. Augustine, May 11, 1836.*

SIR: Much indisposed, I have been waiting for the arrival of a steamer in order to write to you, for I have much to report and to explain. After a long delay the boat has come, and yet I am scarcely able to hold up my head for twenty minutes at a time.

With this you will receive a copy of Brigadier General Clinch's report of his march from Tampa Bay, and copies of several other letters from same source.

It will be seen from the latter of those communications that the Indians have already recommenced their depredations and murders in the Fort Drane vicinity, and that there is but little hope of embodying any respectable number of the inhabitants as mounted men to aid in their own defence. I had, under the circumstances, authorized Clinch to raise, in the usual form, and to muster into service, eighty or one hundred. Such addition to the nine companies of United States troops there would, I suppose, be sufficient to scour and free that frontier of the enemy, an order having been given by me to remount Wharton's detachment of United States dragoons from the spare horses of the wagon train. I learn that about sixty mounts can be furnished him in all.

I have consented to retain Fort King, and many days ago approved of the reinforcement of an additional company being sent there.

The resignation of Brigadier General Clinch was forwarded a week ago. The army will lose in this officer one of its best commanders. In the same package a like tender on the part of Captain Thruston was forwarded. On the earnest solicitation of each, founded on private interests of the utmost importance, they were allowed to retire (about this time) from the army, and to await the decision of the War Department. I soon afterwards learned that Captain Thruston would have much preferred a leave of absence. If his resignation has not been accepted, I trust that such indulgence may be accorded. He is highly gifted for any kind of war; but, from his knowledge of this country and the enemy, he would be of the greatest value on the recommencement of hostilities. Perhaps, with handsome promotion, he may be permanently retained in the army. He is worthy of a lieutenant colonelcy.

When Clinch shall retire, the command in that quarter will devolve on Lieutenant Colonel Bankhead, every way capable, if his health were better. He is very infirm from extreme fatigue, and I learn can scarcely walk or mount his horse. Brigadier General Clinch recommends him for leave of absence for the recovery of his health; and as soon as I can spare Major Gates or Major Heileman, I shall send a leave to the lieutenant colonel whose recent services, independent of all former claims, entitle him to high consideration.

I enclose a copy of my Order No. 46. General Eustis is engaged in mounting two companies of his regiment, using the horses of his baggage train with wagon-saddles. Some few common saddles will be purchased to complete the number wanted. About eighty-five mounted men may thus be obtained with very little cost to the United States; for the horses will be wanted on the return of cold weather, and in the meantime they could not be sold this side of Tallahassee for ten per centum of their value. The two mounted regular companies will be worth more than twice the number of foot. The men are now a little awkward in the saddle. In a week they will be quite respectable, and after two months twice as effective as mounted volunteers. Forty men of Dimmock's company, the only one here at the time, was hastily mounted on the 7th and sent to pursue a trail seen about five miles from this place. The citizens who went out as guides, after travelling some eight miles, declared that the signs were simply those of the country cattle, and the captain returned. On the morning of the 8th we received a report that a party of Indians were at the Metansas, had captured the slaves of Hernandez and Dupont, and would no doubt destroy the fixtures at both plantations. Captain Dimmock was again hastily mounted and despatched. At a little distance from Dupont's place, a small party of the enemy were overtaken, at least three killed and several wounded. Dimmock lost a private killed, and had a sergeant and three privates wounded. Two of his horses were also killed. The Indians, as usual, availed themselves of a near hammock, and fought better than they have commonly done. They lost their horses and packs, of which they had robbed the plantations. All Dupont's negroes escaped; but the enemy had scoured three belonging to Hernandez. It is hoped they will also escape on being next approached by the horse. Lieutenant Irwin, with Saunders's company, which it is proposed to keep mounted, will march out to-morrow to Dupont's place, where a company of foot will be placed in garrison. The families and negroes I hope will be soon reassured. Everything south has been long destroyed.

The handsome check given to the enemy on the 8th will render him more cautious. Without horses, succor would not have arrived till the neighborhood had been desolated.

Both on the 7th and 8th application was made for volunteers from the South Carolina foot. One man marched with Dimmock the first day; the same man and six others the second. The time of these troops being out between the 8th and the 20th, no more would volunteer, either to go by water, on foot, or horseback. On inquiry it was found useless to issue an order, as the colonel (Brisbane) could not pledge himself that it would be obeyed. He was, on the contrary, certain that it would be disregarded. Goodwyn's regiment of horse was already across the St. John's, at Jacksonville, and the remaining companies of regulars (four) were at Picolata, engaged in handling and securing the public property at that depot. Merchant's company had, a few days before, gone to Garey's Ferry, where it will establish itself for the summer, &c.

I have been using every measure in my power to cause a company of mounted volunteers to be raised on this side of the St. John's, to aid the inhabitants to defend the country. I would prefer that the company should consist of at least sixty-four privates; but have offered to accept one with forty, and give it three officers. It is very doubtful whether even that minimum can be engaged. With such company, under tolerable officers, the two companies of mounted regulars, and the three of foot, I do not doubt that entire security may be given to the whole of the remaining settlements.

The little United States steamer, the *Essayons*, will be useful in effecting the same object. By frequently passing up the river as far as Lake George, it will be rendered very hazardous for parties of Indians to cross the river to join in depredations on the Alachua frontier, or on this side of the St. John's. The parties which infest those districts cannot, I should think, exceed one hundred and fifty in the whole. Sixty Indians, however, but for the presence of regulars, would depopulate this part of the Territory in a season.

I have received no report from Colonel Smith, who, from Tampa, went up the Pease creek. None has been received from Colonel Lindsay, who was left, on the 20th ultimo, on the Big Withlacoochee, preparing a fortified camp for his wagons before scouring the forks. From the bad dispositions of the Alabama regiment, his principal force, I expect to hear that the duty of that column has been slurred over.

But the most extraordinary and disgraceful delinquency committed by any corps has occurred in the expedition intrusted to Major Read. He has not condescended to report to me; but from Governor Call's letter that was forwarded to Washington, I infer that the major scarcely looked into the Withlacoochee.

His written orders, drawn up by Colonel Gadsden, directed him "to penetrate as far into the interior as may be found practicable and consistent with the security of your command." And I said to him on each of the two following days, in the strongest and the most precise terms, that he would ascend the river to the first impediment in its navigation, which was understood to be twelve miles up. I desired him to sketch the windings and the banks of the river, and particularly to note a site, with wood at hand, and as near the falls as practicable, for a *military post*, the importance of which I fully explained. This man has, at Tallahassee, caused a statement to be made declaring that I had refused him permission to ascend the Withlacoochee! and again, presuming the statement to have been furnished by him, he denies having ever heard that possibly he might find a block-house and garrison established near the falls of the river. Now, I affirm that it was generally known, throughout the right wing of the army, that it was just possible that Major McLemore (a highly meritorious Floridian) had made such establishment. The possibility was mentioned to Major Read; and although Colonel Gadsden by accident omitted the subject in the letter of instructions, yet, when the major saw half of a flat, rudely cut in two, *that* which was extremely doubtful before became a matter of the most perfect certainty; and if the major had been bound home, without other orders, it immediately became his imperious duty to go instantly to the relief of his countrymen. The flat could never have belonged to Indians, and it would not have been destroyed if the garrison had returned by water to the Suwanee, and Major Read knew it could only have returned by water.

Associated with such officers and men, no man's honor is safe. An act of sheer cowardice is supported by at least two distinct falsehoods.

I feel and know the risk I incur by the use of this language. Major Read is the favorite of Governor Call, and his excellency's support may well turn the tables against me at Washington.

I must again repeat that, although I believe that eight hundred or fewer regulars might easily beat the whole of the Seminole warriors, *if they would stand*, yet, at least three thousand of the best troops are required to finish this war.

I have written the foregoing sick and in haste. In a few days I hope to be well again, when I shall attempt to give, succinctly, the causes which have defeated the operations; the first of which is, the late day on which I was ordered to Florida.

I remain, with respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General United States Army.*

No. 120.

HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING FLORIDA ARMY, *Fort Drane, April 27, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this wing of the army since marching from Tampa Bay, in obedience to your order of April 11, No. 28.

On the 14th instant the wing, composed of the following force, viz: artillery, 278; dismounted dragoons, 43; fourth infantry, 202; Augusta volunteers, 139; mounted men, 140; total, 802, marched on its return to Fort Cooper, making shorter distances than before, in consequence of the increased heat of the weather and the debilitated condition of the horses. All the sick, to the number of 80, had been left in hospital at Fort Brooke. On the 17th, the fourth day of the march, arrived within three miles of Fort Cooper and halted. On the morning of the 18th despatched some light wagons, escorted by Malone's and Campbell's companies of mounted men, with instructions to Major Cooper to join me. These escort companies had proceeded to within half a mile of his position, when, as they were passing a hammock, they were fired upon by the enemy, and Lieutenant Dawson and private Howard severely wounded. This information being brought back to me, and apprehending that they might have encountered a large body of Indians, I sent out the commandant of the right column, Colonel Bankhead, with a battalion of artillery, to reinforce the detachment; before his arrival the enemy had retired. Major Cooper joined me in the course of the day. My reasons for halting were to give the horses a day's rest, and because near that point the trail which, according to my instructions, I was to pursue diverged to the right and rear.

Major Cooper had been invested by the enemy from the 5th until the 17th of April. In the course of daily skirmishing with them he lost one killed and five wounded. With this you will find a copy of his report. His conduct and that of his officers and men deserves, and I have no doubt will receive, the highest gratitude of their country, as they displayed great coolness and firmness under the most trying circumstances. Major Cooper estimates the force around him at 250; there were probably more, though not in view.

On the 19th marched, and, at the distance of four miles, came to the river, followed the course of the river bend seven miles and encamped; 20th, continued the march up the river seven miles to the Tampa road, at Colonel Lindsay's position, and encamped. The distance from the old Indian town, (my position on the 18th,) three miles from Fort Cooper, on the trail to Camp Ohisholm, to the crossing of the Withlacoochee, on the Tampa road, is eighteen miles. The course for the first fourteen miles, southeast by south, and for the last four northeast. At the distance of three miles above the old Indian town the lake (Olocklekaha) or range of ponds, which we first struck on 30th March, terminates. The approaches toward the river between the ponds (if they be ponds and not a lake) were narrowly searched, with a view to ascertain whether any access to a position for operation between the ponds and the river could be observed; I am satisfied that there is none. The only trail above the Indian town leads across the river at a point which we discovered to be the upper termination of the ponds by pursuing this trail.

The course of my route corresponds very nearly with the course (supposed) given to the river by Colonel Gadsden in his draft. The bend of the river is more regularly curved than he has made it.

No ford practicable for wagons could be discovered, though there are several new-worn trails leading across. I have every reason to believe, from the sign which we observed in the route, that a considerable proportion of the enemy inhabits this region of country, but in detached parties, and that their last place of retreat will be either between the forks of the river or between the ponds and the river, and that the true plan of operations against them will be that first designed by you; that is, by a force from Pelaklikaha, a force ascending by my route, and a corresponding one on the north side. The Indians can cross the river at various places with such facility that no single force can proceed against them with any certainty of success. 21st. Crossed both branches of the river by the Tampa road, having left with Colonel Lindsay the fourth infantry, and taken up the mounted escort and Nelson's company. 22d. On this day one of the flankers (Bostick) was fired on as he passed very near a hammock. His horse was wounded under him. Prompt pursuit was made, but without success; the Indians retreated through the thick undergrowth too rapidly to be overtaken.

23d and 24th. Continued the march to Fort King, capturing and driving along about two hundred head of cattle. 25th. After leaving a supply of ammunition at Fort King marched to Fort Drane. Men and horses much exhausted by sickness and the heat of the weather; another day's march would have occasioned the abandoning a part of the train; fifteen horses and mules died on the road, and eight were turned out that could not be got along by leading.

I must be permitted to express my high approbation of the gallant feeling manifested on all occasions by both officers and men under the most trying circumstances attendant on a long and fatiguing march through a country almost unknown to the white man, and in charging through swamps and hammocks wherever the track of the enemy was visible; all of which they bore without a murmur, and with the greatest firmness. I cannot close this communication without expressing my high gratification at being able to say that not the smallest difficulty occurred in the right wing from the time we left Fort Drane until our return to it, and that the best and kindest feelings existed between the different corps composing the wing; and the only rivalry, who should occupy the post of danger.

I am, sir, with the highest respect and regard, your most obedient servant,

D. L. CLINCH, *Brig. Gen. U. S. Army, Commanding.*

Major General SCOTT, *Commanding.*

No. 121.

HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING FLORIDA ARMY, *Fort Drane, April 27, 1836.*

SIR: My report of this date will inform you of the operations of the right wing since we left Tampa Bay. The four companies mounted volunteers from Georgia have been ordered to return to their homes. The two companies from Augusta, commanded by Captains Robinson and Bones, took up the line of march this morning for Augusta *via* Picolata, and the Louisiana volunteers left sick at this post when that gallant regiment left this will march in the morning under the command of Lieutenant Wight, with the wagon train for Garey's Ferry, there to await your orders and transportation. There will be upwards of one hundred men, who will leave in the morning, that will require transportation on their arrival at Garey's Ferry. This disposition of the regular troops, so as to give the greatest protection and security to the inhabitants and their property, is one of much difficulty; and, owing to my peculiar situation, is one of great delicacy, but it must be met. As it is generally considered that the occupancy and defence of this post is one of much importance to the military operations against the Indians, I have deemed it necessary to garrison it with five companies of artillery, and Captain Wharton's company of dragoons, from which a strong detachment will be sent to protect the property and provisions at Oakland, about six miles northeast from this post. I would strongly recommend the remounting of the whole of Captain Wharton's company with the least possible delay, as I consider it impossible to give quiet and protection to the country without this species of force to aid and assist the troops acting as infantry. I shall order one company to take post at or near Micanopy, and the remaining company to Fort King, and I do not think this force sufficient to keep the Indians within their former limits, without the aid of one hundred and fifty or two hundred mounted men from the adjacent counties. It is believed that if proper encouragement is given, that two or three companies of mounted volunteers can be raised for the period of six months, as many of the inhabitants will be prevented from making crops this year, and will, of course, be out of employment, and, if not employed by the government, will be compelled to leave the country with their families. These men are well acquainted with the country, and could, with the assistance of the regular troops, scour that part of it lying between the settlements and the enemy, so as to deter them, except in very small parties, from harassing the settlements. These men should be permitted to subsist themselves and horses as far as practicable, should they prefer doing so, as it is believed this plan would be most convenient to themselves and less expensive to the government, as their horses could do with very little corn when well grazed. I would, therefore, respectfully but strongly recommend the raising of this force as soon as practicable, and of stationing it at some point that will give the greatest protection to the country. About 2 o'clock on the morning of the 20th instant the Indians made an attack on this place, but were met and repulsed by the garrison commanded by Captain Lendrum. They succeeded, however, in carrying off three of my negroes and seventeen public horses. On the night of the 25th instant the cotton and gin-house belonging to Colonel McIntosh was burnt, and the loss estimated at about five thousand dollars. The accompanying letter contains all the information received from the command established on the Withlacoochee, and unless relieved by Major Read I am fearful their situation will be a critical one. The major must, however, have reached that point long ere this.

I am, with high respect, your most obedient,

D. L. GLINCH, *Brigadier General United States Army, Commanding.*

Major General W. Scott, *Commanding Florida Army, Pensacola.*

No. 122.

TALLAHASSEE, *April 26, 1836.*

SIR: A few days since I received a communication from Major McLemore, stationed on the Suwanee frontier, informing me that, under orders from General Scott, he had ascended the Withlacoochee river, and erected a block-house on the south bank some ten or twelve miles above its mouth, and that he had left a garrison of 40 men in the block-house, and a large quantity of corn and pickled beef. This morning, at daylight, Major Read, of the Florida battalion, arrived at this place from the Withlacoochee, bringing the intelligence that he discovered at the mouth of the river one-half of a large flatboat, which had been cut in two apparently with a dull axe, and by an inexperienced hand. His description corresponds with that given of the boat left at the block-house by Major McLemore, and I have every reason to fear that the block-house has been taken and the garrison massacred by the Indians. Colonel Read reports that he saw a number of fires extending along the coast as far west as the head of Wacassa bay, and has no doubt of there being a large number of Indians in that quarter. I have thought it proper to communicate this intelligence to you, and would respectfully suggest the propriety of sending a force to the block-house to ascertain the fate of the garrison, and if they are still safe, to bring them off, unless it should be deemed more expedient by the commanding general to continue the force at that place. The detachment sent on this service should be strong enough to meet a considerable force, as I have no doubt of there being a large body of the enemy in that neighborhood. The block-house cannot be more than thirty-five or forty miles from Fort Drane; but, should it be impracticable for you to send a sufficient force by land to ascertain its fate, I have ordered a fortified boat to be in readiness at Suwanee Old Town to proceed with a part of the men at that place to the relief of the garrison, and transport it back to the Old Town, unless the commanding general should otherwise direct. You will, therefore, be pleased to send an express to Major McCants, commanding at the Old Town, and inform him whether troops have been sent by land to the relief of the block-house, or whether the boat, which will be in readiness, shall be sent on that service. Major Read was not apprised that there was a block-house and garrison on the Withlacoochee until his arrival at St. Mark's and the disbanding of his command.

The report of his examination at the mouth of the Withlacoochee will be made out in a few days.

It is reported on good authority that the Creek Indians have recently manifested a restless disposition, and some apprehension is expressed of approaching hostility with them.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. K. CALL, *Governor of Florida.*

General Scott, or officer commanding Fort Drane, Florida.

No. 123.

FORT DABNEY, *Suwanee Old Town, April 11, 1836.*

SIR: In accordance with an order received through Colonel James Gadsden from Major General Scott, Major McLemore advanced up the Withlacoochee with provisions, and established a block-house about four miles below the rapids or falls. There are between 500 and 700 bushels of corn at this post, defended by about 40 men. The position is eligible and commanding, and there is no difficulty in transporting any quantity of provisions as far as the rapids in flats or boats defended by bulwarks. There is at the station a fine large flat of this kind. Soon after our arrival at this post we were visited by an Indian dog, once in the morning and a second time in the afternoon, when he was shot by one of the sentinels. With this exception, we saw no sign of Indians recently made.

By order of Major McLemore, commandant.

J. McCANTS, *Adjutant.*

The OFFICER COMMANDANT at *Fort Drane.*

No. 124.

HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING FLORIDA ARMY, *Fort Drane, April 29, 1836.*

At a council convened this evening to consider a proposition submitted by the brigadier general commanding, were present—

Brigadier General Clinch; Lieutenant Colonel Bankhead, Captain Thruston, Captain Lee, 3d artillery; Captain Tompkins, 1st artillery; Captain Foster, Major Cooper, Georgia volunteers; Captain Lendrum, 3d artillery; Captain Wharton, dragoons; Captain Seymour and Captain Brown, Georgia volunteers.

The question proposed was, on information furnished by a letter from Governor Call, that a detachment of Florida militia had ascended the Withlacoochee river, nine miles above its mouth, on the 2d of April, under Major McLemore, and that, after constructing a block-house, had left there forty men, with several hundred bushels of corn and a large supply of salted beef; that Major Read, on his arrival at Tallahassee on the 26th of April from Tampa Bay, had reported that, in passing the mouth of the Withlacoochee, he had discovered a boat cut in two, which he had reason to believe, from the description of the boat left with the detachment, to be the same. Governor Call suggests, in his letter to the commanding general, the propriety of sending a force from this place to the block-house to learn the fate of the garrison; stating also, if that could not be done, that he had directed a force to go from Suwanee Old Town in a fortified boat, (the force to be supplied by a part of Major McCant's command there,) to the relief of the detachment.

The question submitted was on this information, and it was decided unanimously that a force adequate to the purpose could not be marched from this post. Not more than three hundred men could be raised at all capable of marching; that the physical ability of these is questionable, the whole being just returned from a most fatiguing and harassing campaign, in a state too enfeebled by exposure, hard marching, and sickness, to undertake a new expedition of 100 miles; that, admitting them to be capable in those respects, they are not in sufficient number to enter the heart of the enemy's country; there being no other troops now operating in the Territory, they must expect to encounter the whole strength of the enemy, which experience has shown to be competent to resist successfully the attempt of a much larger force to cross the Withlacoochee. The block-house is on the opposite side. The effort to be made from the force here would leave this frontier entirely exposed.

C. M. THRUSTON, *Captain, Acting Adjutant General.*

No. 125.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *St. Augustine, May 1, 1836.*

SIR: Your several letters, dated the 27th and 28th ultimo, were received this morning.

I approve of the disposition you propose to make of the regular companies under your command.

I wish you to cause to be mounted, as soon as practicable, the whole or the greater part of the detachment of United States dragoons. For this purpose you will use the public horses in the neighborhood of Fort Drane which may be fit for service, and not indispensable to transport to that place subsistence from Picolata or Garey's Ferry. If you have not serviceable horses and mules sufficient for both objects, some can be sent from the left wing. The remaining horses and mules with you, you will take measures to have sent to the best district for grazing, and where they may be considered in safety for the summer and autumn, as all will be wanted at the recommencement of active operations. Your report on this subject, together with an estimate of the resources of the country for grazing and foraging cavalry and draught horses, will determine the number of horses I may deem it necessary to send to you.

Your suggestion that one hundred and fifty or two hundred mounted men, in addition to the detachment of United States dragoons, should be immediately called for to aid in the defence of the Alachua settlements during the summer and autumn, I shall refer to the War Department, believing that the force with you, horse and foot, judiciously posted and employed, is sufficient for the present.

I also wish to learn from you what amount of subsistence for men you now have at Forts Drane and King, and what baggage train is deemed indispensable to supply the required subsistence for the men to be posted in that vicinity (say) for the next six months.

You do not give me the number of the Louisiana detachment ordered to Garey's Ferry to seek transportation to New Orleans. I wish you had sent them (if practicable) to St. Mark's, *via* Tallahassee. Perhaps a packet may be found in Charleston to take them home.

Send me a return of the regulars under you.

I still think it desirable, on account of the distance, to abandon Fort King—it covers nothing—but will take no step on the subject till I shall have heard again from you, and shall have received the instructions of the War Department. In the meantime reinforce the post with the additional company, as you have proposed.

You say nothing as to the discharge of Major Cooper's battalion of Georgia foot. It may be discharged and paid at Garey's Ferry or Picolata. Besides Paymaster Lytle, with you, we have here Paymasters Kirby and Muhlenberg, both provided with funds.

By accident, I presume, you omitted to enclose Major Cooper's report of his defence of Fort Cooper. When you shall have made all the arrangements suggested above, you will charge the officer next in rank with the defence of the Alachua frontier, and be yourself at liberty to retire. I shall be glad to see you here or at Picolata on public business. Your resignation I have with sincere regret forwarded for the acceptance of the War Department. The army will lose in you one of its best commanders. I shall probably remain in the vicinity for several weeks.

With high respect and regard, I remain truly yours,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General CLINCH, *Commanding right wing.*

No. 126.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *St. Augustine, May 1, 1836.*

SIR: I have this moment received another express from you, bringing Major Cooper's report, a letter from Governor Call, and the opinion of a council of war, held at Fort Drane on the 29th ultimo.

From the two latter papers it appears that a small garrison, placed in a block-house on the Withlacoochee on the 2d ultimo, may be considered in extreme peril, if not actually lost, and that the council has determined that no succor can be afforded from Fort Drane. It also appears, from Governor Call's letter, that the expedition under Major Read sent by me to the mouth of the Withlacoochee, and to explore that river, with a view to the establishment of a post, at some future-day, as high up as practicable, failed to ascend the stream even to the distance of nine miles; and, what is equally strange, it does not appear that any express has been sent to the Old Town, on the Suwanee, to inform the commanding officer there of the necessity of attempting to succor the party on the Withlacoochee with the means suggested by the governor in case no relief could be afforded from Fort Drane. Instead of adopting one or the other of those measures, the whole difficulty has been referred to me at this distant point, whereby much precious time is necessarily lost.

I differ from the opinion expressed by the council. I believe that two hundred and fifty men would be a sufficient force, (a part being mounted,) and that that number might be safely detached from Fort Drane and its vicinity. If, then, as I have reason to apprehend, no express has been sent on the subject to Governor Call, and the post on the Suwanee, to say that relief cannot be afforded from Fort Drane, it is my opinion and order that the largest practicable and safe detachment be immediately put in march from Fort Drane, including regulars and volunteers, and all the dragoons or mounted men that can be obtained, to march to a point on the Withlacoochee opposite to the block-house, and there, by aid of a raft or swimming, to bring off the garrison, or, at the least, to ascertain its fate. Troops should be instantly sent from this vicinity, but for distance and the consequent delay.

Of Major Read's failure to ascend the Withlacoochee, even to the extent of nine miles, I say nothing at present, his report not being yet received.

Please send a copy of this hasty note to the governor of Florida.

I remain, with much respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General CLINCH.

A few light carts should accompany the detachments to the Withlacoochee.

No. 127.

HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING FLORIDA ARMY, *Fort Drane, May 5, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter (No. 2,) dated the 1st instant, in which you state that these enclosures from me, to wit: Major Cooper's report, a letter from Governor Call, and a copy of the opinion of a council of the officers, highest in rank at this post, convened on the 29th ultimo, had reached you by express.

The language and tone of that part of your letter which relates to the opinion of the council, and the course pursued by the commandant of the right wing in conformity with that opinion, require a few remarks from me. Permit me to quote one paragraph of your letter, entirely at variance with the information officially communicated by me, as you will perceive by referring again to mine addressed to the chief of your staff, which went under cover with the papers acknowledged to have been received by you.

"And, what is equally strange, it does not appear that any express has been sent to the Old Town, on the Suwanee, to inform the commanding officer there of the necessity of attempting to succor the party on the Withlacoochee with the means suggested by the governor, in case no relief could be afforded from Fort Drane."

Now, in my letter to Colonel Gadsden, dated 30th ultimo, I report to you that "*I have this morning sent off an express to Major McCants with a copy of the governor's letter, and informed him that the relief of the block-house on the Withlacoochee could not be undertaken from this point.*" (I also sent a copy of the opinion of the council to Governor Call, with the same information.) If, therefore, the retained copy of my letter of the 30th ultimo be correct, I have "adopted one of those measures" which were held out to me.

It is evident from Governor Call's letter that, considering it doubtful whether succor could be

furnished from this post, he had made other arrangements by which the object in view could be accomplished; and his reputation as a military man stands too high to leave it doubtful as to the probable efficacy of those arrangements. This his letter to you clearly indicated. He had communication with the officers and men who established the post on the Withlacoochee—had full information on the subject, and would not have adopted means not likely to succeed. He certainly knew the difficulties to be encountered, and the means which would overcome those difficulties, as the same party had overcome them before.

Still, thinking it possible that his plan might fail, and feeling satisfied that relief could not be given from this point without great sacrifice, I have called on the citizens of the adjacent counties to rally to the rescue of their fellow-citizens, and have every reason to expect a successful issue to my appeal, for I think I have taken the most efficient means of embodying them. In a day or two I hope to have it in my power to make a strong effort for the relief of the block-house, or at least to learn its fate. The force of which I speak will be mounted—the species of force best calculated for the enterprise.

As to the other of "*those measures*," I am compelled in justice to say that the officers composing the council are gentlemen of talent, high and honorable feeling, and that they were ready to attempt anything within the range of possibility, if there had been, in their judgment, any necessity for doing so. They were, however, perfectly acquainted with the true condition of the men composing this wing—they knew them to be enfeebled and *worn out* by the service in which they had been engaged, and which they had performed in a manner that would have done credit to veteran troops. Many of them were about to return home, and had still a long march before them. These considerations, and the advanced state of the season, forbade, in their judgment, a new expedition to the Withlacoochee, without subjecting it to consequences greatly to be deprecated; and the opinion of the council is sustained by subsequent occurrences; the sick are becoming every day more numerous, and the enemy making incursions upon the settlements on this frontier which require here all the force at this post.

I regret to add that Colonel Fitzpatrick, one of my aides-de-camp, whom I sent into the neighboring counties to endeavor to raise men for the expedition to the Withlacoochee, has returned without the success which I had promised myself. It is now *uncertain* and not probable that the means will be derived from that quarter.

The plan suggested by Governor Call in his letter will, therefore, be the only one certainly to be relied on, and is no doubt now going on. I hope it may prove successful.

Major Cooper's battalion will be at Black creek about the 15th, and will require transportation from that point, which it is desirable, on every account, to have provided against the arrival of the battalion. Its term of service expires on the 18th instant.

With this I send the return of this post, required by you in your last.

With sentiments of high respect, I am your most obedient servant,

D. L. CLINCH, *Brigadier General United States Army, Commanding.*

Major General Scott, *Commanding Florida Army.*

No. 128.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *St. Augustine, May 7, 1836.*

SIR: I have had no intelligence from the vicinity of Fort Drane. The last was orally received by Captain Drane.

On reflection, I am now willing to receive into the service of the United States for six months, unless sooner discharged, one company of mounted Floridians, to aid in the defence of the Alachua settlements. This force, to be accepted, must be strictly organized according to the act of 1792, viz: sixty-four privates, four corporals, four sergeants, two musicians, one captain, one first and one second lieutenant, and one ensign or cornet. The two musicians are not indispensable, and more than sixty-four privates, say seventy or eighty, would be received with the four officers. My meaning is, that the number of officers must not exceed four to sixty-four privates. If a force of that extent can be raised in the Alachua settlements, let it be done as soon as practicable, and let application be made to the governor for the commissions for the officers. Without waiting for the instructions of the War Department, I will instantly cause the company to be mustered into the service of the United States.

With Wharton's detachment of United States dragoons, eight companies of United States foot, and the proposed company of mounted men, I am persuaded that the Alachua settlements may easily be defended until the return of the season for recommencing active operations against the enemy.

Please cause a copy of this letter to be sent to the governor of Florida, and let it be generally known in the neighboring settlements that a company of mounted men are wanted and will be accepted. Correspond with such individuals as may be known to be willing to aid in raising that force, and give all the encouragement in your power.

I have acted on but few applications for leave of absence which have reached me from the neighborhood of Fort Drane.

A few only of the officers who have obtained certificates of disability may be permitted, in extreme cases, to retire, and to make their application to me at this place.

A steamer (the Cherokee) is now at Picolata to receive discharged troops, there or at Garey's Ferry. She will be detained a few days longer to await the arrival of Major Cooper's battalion.

I remain, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General CLINCH, *or United States officer commanding Fort Drane.*

No. 129.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE CENTRE, *Fort Brooke, Florida, May 7, 1836.*

SIR: In obedience to general order, dated at Tampa Bay, April 14, 1836, the force under my command marched for the forks of the Withlacoochee river on the evening of the 14th instant. To protect the wagon train in its passage over the Hillsborough, part of the command, consisting of the dragoons,

United States artillery, and Nelson's Georgia mounted infantry, was detached with orders to cross the river, scour the hammock on the north side, and encamp on the outer edge of the hammock, and there await the coming up of the force the next morning. Notwithstanding this precaution, one wagoner, a private in Campbell's company, Alabama regiment of volunteers, was killed by the Indians, and during the night the Alabama regiment was fired upon, and a sentinel, a private of Captain Cooper's company, severely wounded. The remainder of our march was effected without any disturbance from the enemy, and, on my arrival at the Withlacoochee, not deeming it advisable to pass my wagon train over the river, which was badly bridged, and subject on the approach of the rainy season, now said to be at hand, to great freshets, I determined to pack my wagons and artillery, and pass over a light column of infantry for the purpose of making the required exploration of the country lying in the forks of the river, retaining for the defence of the pack the battalion of the 4th infantry, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Foster, and the battalion of artillery, under the command of Major Belton. Colonel Chisholm was ordered with the regiment of Alabama volunteers to scour the country in the forks, and report all the signs coming under his observation indicating the movement or presence of the enemy. This officer proceeded with his command down the Big Withlacoochee until he came to a point where the two streams were separated from each other by a distance of one and a half mile. He then crossed over to the Little Withlacoochee, and took up that stream until he fell in with the main road leading from Fort King to Tampa Bay, returning to my encampment by that road. For the particulars of his expedition I refer you to his report accompanying this communication, dated Camp Crabb, April 22, 1836. To whatever cause it may have been owing, whether to the knowledge, on the part of the Indians, of the concentration of the three corps of the army at the Withlacoochee on the 21st and 22d, or to the distraction produced in their views by the previous movement of the respective columns towards the point of concentration, I am unable to say; but the fact that there was a total absence of all signs indicating the presence or movement of the enemy near my position was obvious. It did not occur to me until subsequent events revealed it that this tranquillity on the part of the enemy was delusive, and was the mask under which he was preparing to strike a blow which he no doubt trusted would crush us. My attention was directed to the execution of the ulterior duties connected with the expedition, to wit: the abruptness of the post of Fort Alabama, and the more forcibly, as the want of forage and the consequent attenuation of my teams began to admonish me that my transportation would scarcely be adequate to the effecting even of that object. All the disadvantages of inadequate transportation were aggravated by the fact that seventy of the most destitute and helpless of sick of Brigadier General Eustis's army were thrown off upon my corps; two-thirds of this number were so reduced and enfeebled as to require transportation in wagons. My own sick, in the meantime, had considerably increased, and, on my return to Fort Alabama, instead of being able to remove the public property and stores from the post, as I had intended, I was brought reluctantly to the conclusion that the whole of my wagon train was insufficient for the removal of the sick alone to Tampa Bay, and that the abruptness of the post must necessarily be deferred until the army could return with its transportation relieved from the encumbrance of the sick. Our march to Fort Brooke was not interrupted by the enemy; and after resting a day and a half, procuring all the transportation which could be furnished by the quartermaster's department for the removal of all the public property and stores from Fort Alabama, Colonel Chisholm, of the regiment of Alabama volunteers, was ordered, with a detachment composed of his own regiment, the battalion of 4th infantry, under Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Foster, and a party of twenty of the 2d artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Morgan, to remove the troops at Fort Alabama, break up the post, and bring away all the United States property, whether of provisions or ammunition. The command had scarcely proceeded three miles from Fort Brooke when they began to discover considerable signs of Indians, all the trails leading towards Thlonotosassa creek, and after passing that creek it was equally apparent that a party had crossed from the Hillsborough. The detachment, however, moved on unmolested to Fort Alabama, effected the duty on which it had been sent, and on the return march was attacked about 3 o'clock p. m., just as the advance guard was preparing to cross Thlonotosassa creek, a small stream whose banks are lined with hammock and scrub, and whose course at this point presented the form of a horse-shoe, thus furnishing the Indians a dense covert, from which they were enabled to fire almost at the same moment on the front and both flanks of the column of march. The first fire, as is usually the case with Indians lying in ambuscade, and firing, as it may be said, at a rest, was stunning, killing and wounding a considerable number of the troops, and many horses of the baggage train, in the centre column, that they became ungovernable and rushed furiously through the ranks of the flank columns, which were for a moment broken and disordered by them; but it soon occurred to Colonel Chisholm that although the front, rear, and flank were nearly simultaneously and vigorously attacked, the real strength of the enemy was directed against the advance guard and the front of the column. Accordingly, three companies, under the command of Major Taliaferro, were ordered to sustain the companies in the advance and front of the column, who were suffering under a severe and galling fire from the enemy, which they vigorously returned. With a view to the relief of this part of the column, Lieutenant Colonel Foster also directed Lieutenant Morgan, 2d artillery, at the same instant, to open upon the enemy a fire from the six-pounder under his charge. The service was very promptly performed by Lieutenant Morgan, under a very heavy fire from the Indians, who hoped to silence the piece by cutting down the artillerists, and after a discharge of twelve or thirteen rounds, which it is believed galled the Indians very much, Lieutenant Colonel Foster, at the head of the infantry, charged into the hammock, attacked and drove the Indians, and thus put an end to a conflict which had been kept up with unremitting fierceness and rivalry on both sides for one hour. The enemy, as soon as repulsed, became invisible, retreating through the cover of the thick hammock on the right; and the detachment, after being on the ground long enough to provide for the carriage of the dead and the wounded and gather the scattered horses and teams, resumed the line of march, encamped about four miles from the battle ground that night, and returned to Fort Brooke early the next day. It is impossible to read the reports of Colonel Chisholm and Colonel Foster, herewith forwarded, without feeling the highest gratification at the gallantry and coolness of the officers and corps engaged in this action. Without intending to detract from the merits of the regular force by saying such conduct was expected from them, I must be permitted to observe that many of the companies of the Alabama volunteers were placed, for a considerable length of time, under a galling fire, which they sustained and returned with a spirit which would have been highly honorable even to older soldiers. The fury of the onset and the completeness of the repulse leave us at a loss for the motives of the enemy in making the attack with such a disparity of numbers, nor can the difficulty be solved but by the supposition that their recent success on the north end of the Withlacoochee has inspired them with an overweening, insolent confidence in the superiority of their prowess, or that they rely on that power which makes them invisible

in the twinkling of an eye to the enemy which proves too hard for them in the encounter. Prior to the return of this detachment to Fort Brooke, one-half of the Louisiana volunteers, with 120 sick of the Alabama regiment, had embarked for New Orleans and Mobile. Transportation for the embarkation of three more companies of the Alabama volunteers, and the companies remaining of the Louisiana volunteers, being in the bay, they were directed to sail for Key West, and land the company of 4th infantry, ordered to that post. Two companies of the 4th infantry, under the command of Brevet Major Sands, are in readiness to sail for the Suwanee, whenever transportation shall be furnished by the quartermaster's department for that place. Lieutenant Colonel Foster, with the remainder of the battalion of 4th infantry not detained here, accompanied the Louisiana volunteers to New Orleans, on his way to Baton Rouge. A force of 320 regular soldiers, composed principally of the 2d artillery and 4th infantry, commanded by Major Wilson, of the 4th infantry, will constitute the permanent force at Fort Brooke. The rainy season is believed to have set in, and from what I have seen of it, I think it would be impossible to keep the field with bodies of troops without a great and, for any objects which could be accomplished, a wanton waste of life. The weather for some days past has presented an alternation of heavy falls of rain, for one or two hours continuance, succeeded by a hot sun, thus exhibiting the two great agents of disease, heat and moisture, in their most active form. Two stockade redoubts are being constructed and cannon mounted in them, with the view to sweep the entire plain on which Fort Brooke stands. Parties are also detached for clearing off the brush which might cover or conceal the approach of the enemy; and having made all the arrangements for the defence of the post, and the disbursement of the force composing the centre of the army, I shall embark to-morrow for Mobile, in one of the transports which carries Nott's company. I am urged to this step by the state of my health, which unfits me for active duties, and which could not be restored during the continuance of the rainy season. I have turned over the command to Lieutenant Colonel Crabb, who is only waiting for the arrival of transports to take home the remainder of the regiment, Alabama volunteers, to Mobile.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

WM. LINDSAY, *Colonel 2d Artillery.*

Major General W. SCOTT, *Commanding Army of Florida.*

No. 130.

CAMP CRABB, *on the Withlacoochee, April 22, 1836.*

DEAR SIR: In compliance with your order of the 20th instant, directing a movement of the Alabama regiment to be made the next day down the big Withlacoochee, with a view to scour the country in the forks of the river, I proceeded from this place on yesterday at sunrise, across the big Withlacoochee, where the Fort King road crosses the same, into the forks of the two rivers of that name. My course, after leaving the Fort King road, about a mile from the river, was slightly north of west, and down the right bank of the stream just named, until I arrived at a hammock, represented by our guide as the "big hammock." At this place I proceeded with the regiment in nearly a north direction for several miles, until I reached the little or western branch of the Withlacoochee; thence up that stream for several miles, until its course was nearly north; thence, leaving the course of that stream, I proceeded northeast for several miles; thence south of east on my return to the camp. In the course of the scout I crossed several old paths, observing continually the appearance of the trails and woods for sign of the enemy. There appeared fewer evidences of Indians, cattle, or game in the fork of those streams than in any other suspected section of the country through which we have marched. The fresh tracks of a horse proceeding southwest with speed, along one of the trails alluded to, was the only recent sign we discovered of a probable hostile movement. The face of the country over which we passed was generally high and somewhat rolling, with occasional glades, lakes, and small hammocks; the growth was principally pine, with undergrowth of palmetto and other shrubbery, until we reached the big hammock, when there was a continuation of low land from one fork to the other, covered with live-oak, cypress, and forming one of the most dismal places I have ever seen.

Respectfully, &c.,

Colonel WM. LINDSAY.

WM. CHISHOLM, *Colonel of the Alabama Regiment.*

No. 131.

FORT BROOKE, *Tampa Bay, Florida, April 29, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 26th instant, in obedience to your order, I accompanied (in command of the 4th regiment of United States infantry and a detachment of the 2d United States artillery, with one six-pounder,) the Alabama regiment of volunteers on the expedition to break up the temporary fort on the Hillsborough river, and to escort the garrison and the ammunition and provisions in store there to this post. My troops constituted the right column of the army during this operation. The command of the army was intrusted to Colonel Chisholm, of the Alabama regiment. The duty was performed in a *prompt* and *efficient* manner, and in a much shorter time than was supposed it would require.

On the 27th instant, about 3 o'clock p. m., the army, marching in three columns, with the baggage in the centre, and passing over a savanna, approached a hammock, through which ran a creek of considerable depth, but concealed from the view of any one on the plain. The Indians, posted in the hammock, and *mostly* opposite the front guard and right column on the further bank of the creek, opened upon the 4th regiment and the artillery a close, heavy, and well-sustained fire, at a distance in many places (their line not being parallel with ours) of not more than *thirty* paces; in other parts of from thirty to *seventy*, or *one hundred* paces.

Their first and second fires killed and wounded a number of horses of the baggage train, consequently some confusion prevailed there for a few moments. In the meantime I pointed out to Lieutenant

Morgan, of the artillery, the position in which I wished his gun to be placed. Finding the matrosses too few in number to effect this *promptly*, I ordered Lieutenant Alvord, of the 4th regiment, with half his company (B) and the pioneers of the regiment, to assist the artillery. My object was effected; and the gun was well and very successfully served during the action. It was essentially necessary to the army.

The 4th regiment had during this time opened its fire. The left column, composed of a part of the Alabama regiment, had entered the woods on their side. I found my command *alone* on the plain with the baggage—Colonel Crabb having entered the woods on his flank by order of Colonel Chisholm, who believed that position well calculated to defend the train. The fire of the Indians (completely concealed) was heavy; I did not hesitate; I knew my officers and men. During the firing, the regiment being in one rank a pace apart, I could not be heard by the whole line—dismounted, and on foot I passed from company to company and informed them we must *charge* the enemy in his *ambush*.

At the moment I was ready I met Colonel Chisholm, who approved my plan, but informed me the regiment would have to pass — creek, in the hammock. The charge was made, the creek passed, and the hammock won. The success of the 4th was announced to the army and to the enemy by three loud and cheerful huzzas. The battle ended *almost immediately* at all points.

The army was attacked by upwards of three hundred Indians—I judge from their fire and the ground occupied by them. The fire lasted about an hour. I had with me Major Sands, Lieutenants Alvord, Scott, Prince, Mitchell, Tibbatts, and Reeve, of the 4th infantry, and Lieutenant Morgan, of the 2d artillery; and it affords me great pleasure to say to you that *all* in my command did their duty, and did it well; and I deem it a happy circumstance in my life that I had the honor to command officers so brave and men so good. Major Sands had his horse shot under him.

I met Colonel Chisholm twice during the battle. He was calm and determined in his acts, and does credit to his State and regiment; and it is the opinion of a soldier who has seen twenty-four years' service in peace and in war, that Alabama may be justly proud of her regiment

I am, sir, with high respect, your obedient servant,

WM. S. FOSTER, *Lieutenant Colonel, Commanding 4th Infantry.*

Colonel WM. LINDSAY, *United States Artillery, Commanding.*

The 4th infantry lost, during the whole operations, two privates killed and three privates wounded; several severely hit, and two horses shot.

No. 132.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ALABAMA REGIMENT, *Camp Crabb, April 30, 1836.*

DEAR SIR: In obedience to your order, dated at Fort Brooke the 25th instant, requiring me to march on the day following "with the regiment of Alabama volunteers, the battalion of the 4th infantry, under Lieutenant Colonel Foster, and Captain Marks's company of Louisiana volunteers, to bring away the troops, ammunition, quartermaster's stores, subsistence, and public property of every description at that post," I commenced my march on the day following, and with the troops designated, excepting Captain Marks's company—in the place of which I had a piece of artillery, under the command of Lieutenant Morgan—the whole command consisting of little upwards of six hundred men. I pursued the usual route, and reached the fort a little before sunset. The next morning (the 27th) I directed the wagons to be loaded and the two companies which had occupied the fort (Captain Bonham's and Captain Nott's) to be in readiness to march. The wagons, nine in number, were loaded with the ammunition, subsistence, &c., and the pack-horses packed, and it being ascertained that a considerable quantity of pork and flour, (the damaged flour having first been selected and destroyed,) I consulted with the three senior officers in command—Colonel Foster, Colonel Crabb, and Major Sands—and, by their advice, ordered it to be destroyed. I began the march from the fort about 9 o'clock a. m., and continued it without interruption until we arrived at the hammock on the Thlonotosassa creek, about eight miles from Fort Alabama. The order of march was in three columns, the centre in the road, composed of Captain Campbell's company, second battalion Alabama regiment, as advance guard; the artillery, the wagons, and the pack-horses in the order mentioned; and Captain Bonham's, of the 2d, and Captain Martin's, of the 1st battalion Alabama regiment, in the rear, and forming the rear guard. The battalion of 4th infantry, under Colonel Foster, formed the right column, and seven companies of the Alabama regiment formed the left column, three companies of the 2d battalion in front. In this order the advance guard approached near the creek in front, and the whole column extended back through an open prairie, the rear guard just leaving the woods in the rear. A thick hammock, with the creek near its boundary, extended from some distance in front of the advance guard, along near its right and along a portion of the right column. On the right of the rear guard was pine woods and a small hammock, and some thick undergrowth extended on the left of the rear guard, and along a portion of the rear of the left column. Nearly all the intermediate space was an open prairie extending far on the right to a large pond. In this situation a heavy fire of rifles was opened from the hammock on the right upon the advance guard, and on the right of the column of regulars, to which the artillery, wagon train, and pack-horses, and the three or four front companies of the left column, were entirely exposed. This fire was kept up uninterruptedly, and was soon followed by a fire on the rear guard from the right of the road, and a few shots from the small hammock on the left. A well-directed fire was immediately returned by the artillery and the regulars with good effect. The three companies of the left column in front—Captain Waters's, Captain Nott's, and Captain Minter's—were directed, under the command of Major Taliaferro, to extend around in front of the advance guard, where they took a position on the creek and in the pine woods (thinly wooded) over the creek, and returned the Indians' fire, which was kept up in good gunshot distance until the close of the action, and they retreated to the main body. The companies commanded by Captains Blount, Taylor, and Capus, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Crabb, were ordered into the small hammock on the left, and the Indians retreated before them, and finally joined, as was supposed, those who were firing on the rear guard. Captain Dent's company, under the command of Lieutenant Childress, as ordered by Lieutenant Colonel Crabb, supported the rear guard, and they all fired upon, and drove the enemy, which in that place they estimated to have been more than one hundred, entirely off.

Much praise is due to Colonel Foster and to his officers and men, and to the artillery, for the part they took in the action, and the bravery and skill with which they directed a deadly fire on the Indians, and charged the hammock from which they fired—Colonel Foster evincing, during the whole action, the utmost deliberation and coolness. Captain Campbell's company was much exposed, being first attacked, and suffered much, and it is due to them to say that they kept their ground and fought bravely. The adjutant and other staff officers of the Alabama regiment, including the surgeons, were much exposed, and discharged their several duties faithfully. The officers and men, generally, (among whom Lieutenant Colonel Crabb ought to be mentioned for his coolness and intrepidity,) went to the several posts to which they were directed with promptitude, and maintained them with courage, doing all that any troops could do under similar circumstances. Although there was some confusion from the surprise of the first fire—a great number of horses, not less than twenty, being killed or wounded, and the wagons and pack-horses were running in every direction—the men kept their ground until entire order was restored among them, so that all could occupy the best position to defeat the enemy. Colonel Foster, Major Sands, Captain Campbell, and two or three others of his company who were riding, Foragemaster Jamison and some others, had horses shot under them and fell. The action continued for an hour, the Indians fighting bravely and coming out of the hammock in many instances to obtain near positions for firing. Their number is of course unknown; but, from the length of their line and their continued firing, there could not have been less than from 300 to 400—the lowest estimate I have heard being 300, and the general estimate much higher. A considerable number of them must have been killed and wounded, it being impossible to form anything like an accurate estimate, as it is well known that they have some employed in carrying their dead and wounded immediately off.

On their retreat, which was sudden and rapid, I had all the wagons collected, one excepted, which was so broken as to render it necessary to leave it, and all the pack-horses which could be found, and marched on about five miles that evening, passing the large hammock near Simmons's old place, and encamped within ten miles of this place.

The following is a list of the killed and wounded, as reported by Dr. Doric S. Ball, surgeon:

Field and staff—M. Jamison, quartermaster's department, killed.

Captain Dent's company—S. N. Archibald, Henry Webb, slightly wounded.

Captain Capee's company—Benjamin Parker, Joshua McIntyre, slightly wounded.

Captain Blount's company—none.

Captain Taylor's company—none.

Captain Martin's company—James C. Butts, James W. Dodson, Felix G. Dodson, John Morgan, slightly wounded.

Captain Minter's company—W. Randall, badly wounded; H. Racford, slightly wounded.

Captain Nott's company—James Sankey, badly wounded.

Captain Campbell's company—W. J. Couch, dangerously wounded; S. P. Lewis, badly wounded; Daniel Prentice, badly wounded; Peter Feely, killed; Henry Taylor, slightly wounded; Luke White, badly wounded; William H. Orr, killed; L. B. Strange, badly wounded.

Captain Waters's company—Lieutenant B. R. Mobley, J. C. Boyd, Ensign J. Handley, slightly wounded.

Captain Bonham's company—James Vickey, slightly wounded. Three privates of the 4th infantry.

Total, 3 killed and 25 wounded.

Very respectfully, yours,

WM. CHISHOLM, *Colonel.*

Colonel WILLIAM LINDSAY, *Commanding Centre Army, Florida.*

No. 133.

FORT BROOKE, *Tampa Bay, April 26, 1836.*

GENERAL: In conformity with your orders, the regiment under my command was embarked on board of the two transports furnished by the quartermaster. They commenced embarking on the 10th instant about 5 o'clock p. m., and were all on board by 9 o'clock, having been assisted by a boat from the United States sloop-of-war Vandalia, and by one from the United States cutter Dallas. The wind having died away, they did not sail until the 11th about 2 o'clock p. m. I went on board of the cutter Dallas, and hastened towards Charlotte harbor to stop the Vandalia's boats there under the command of Lieutenant Powell. In order to be sure of meeting Lieutenant Powell, whose boats were necessary in ascending the river, I went out of Tampa bay at night, and the next morning had arrived within twenty miles of Boca Grande, and, a few miles further, met Mr. Powell on his way to Tampa bay, with all the fishermen and their boats. We did not get into the harbor until the 12th, when I sent for the boats of the Spaniards and engaged them, and a man for each to manage it. The transports, not having come out the night we did, were later in arriving. As soon as the last one came we immediately stood up the bay with the transports—the Dallas, the two boats of the Vandalia, and fourteen barges; the larger vessels grounded about three miles from the anchorage marked on the map you gave me, being from thirty-eight to forty miles from the bar. As it was near night we debarked but a part of the men, and concluded that duty and issued five days' provisions, and had them cooked the next day. The succeeding morning (the 18th) we started up the river. The boats with the Spaniards and part of the crew of the Vandalia's boats, accompanied by Captain Green, of the cutter Dallas, and eighteen men, took the channel of the river, while my regiment and the remainder of the men under Lieutenant Powell took the route by land, intending to keep the bank of the river in company with the boats. I soon found this impracticable, as it was very seldom, and at remote points, that the marshes and hammocks permitted any approach to the river bank. The weather being excessively hot, and our route being through the pine woods, where there was no fresh water, the men suffered extremely, and some of them, the most robust, fainted in the ranks. We at last struck the river bank at an open spot, and soon saw the boats arrive. As I saw it was impossible to keep up our communication with the boats, and we might be embarrassed by our sick and fatigued men, I ordered the whole to return under Major Marks from this place, (12 miles,) except what could embark in the boats. For this purpose I sent back all the Spaniards, and deposited the surplus provisions

in the bushes, and thus made room in the boats for 152 men and officers, and one day's provisions, besides the five cooked.

We then embarked, and went up the river until we found fresh water, where we landed and encamped. Our force now consisted of ninety-one of my regiment, under Colonel Lawson, forty-one from the Vandalia, and twenty from the Dallas cutter, including officers. The next day we continued up the river and encamped at the site of a deserted Indian village or camp, probably that mentioned by Colonel Gadsden.

Here we found some signs of recent occupation, as if by a passing band of ten or twelve, probably those who burnt Dr. Crain's house. The next morning we continued our course up the stream; but now found it in many places very shoal and obstructed by fallen trees. After cutting away some of these, and drawing our boats over the shoals, I found it would cause too much delay, even if we succeeded in getting up the river in this way. I returned then to our last camp, and left the boats there. We then crossed the river to the southern bank, and passing about two miles through a thick swamp and hammock, intersected with gullies, came out upon the pine hills, and falling into a trail which run about a mile and a half to a cowpen, there encamped on the edge of the swamp. The next day we followed this trail, but finding it led from the river towards the southeast across an immense prairie, and observing that it had not been trodden lately, we left it and returned towards the river, and upwards along its course, but not within sight of it; about noon we descended to the river through the hammock and forded it, and then across the opposite swamp out to the pine woods. After marching about ten miles further about north-east we encamped. The next morning we took up our march in the same direction until 11 o'clock, when we halted, and having no provisions except for this day I determined to return—the men having suffered very much from the heat and the very difficult nature of the country. Our route from the vessels to this point was in length sixty-nine miles, not including that in the shoal part of the river; but, having made a devious course, we returned in a straight line to our boats, and thence descended, with a strong current, to our vessels, making our descending route fifty-two miles. We embarked the next day after our arrival, and now (the afternoon of the 25th) one of the transports is here, and the other, a slower sailer, is off the bar.

There was no one among the fishermen or Indians at Choldez Roncho that knew anything of the river, or who could communicate any intelligence in relation to the country. The Indian prisoner you sent with us had been up the river a short distance, but was unacquainted with any route or shore, and was of no further use except as possessing that sagacity which seems part of an Indian's nature—in finding his way in an unknown country. The result of our excursion is, I am sorry to say, far short of your expectations. We have only found a few deserted villages, and a tract of country without any signs of occupation for several months past, except by a very small party passing through in one direction. I forgot to mention, in its proper place, that just before fording the river the day before the last of our descent, we crossed a trail running from a deserted camp on the river towards the southeast; it appeared to be the path of about one hundred men marching by once, without cattle, but was more than two months old. The river is very crooked, and runs through a tract of swamps and hammocks about two or three miles wide, and which, under ordinary circumstances, would be considered impassable. In meandering from one side to the other of this swamp, it sometimes reaches the pine lands which lie on its outside, and it is only here that the stream can be conveniently approached. It may, therefore, be considered impossible to march troops on the banks of the river. At about two miles back from the swamp is a level tract of pine land, on which are the ponds we see throughout the whole country. These ponds feed a series of sloughs, overgrown with thick woods, and at this point very wide; but as the waters gather together they form little streams, which, as they approach the river, cut deep gullies, but are very narrow, and furnish good water to drink; and it is here that a road running along the river would most conveniently pass. Further from the river are the ponds, which do not, at this season, furnish water to drink, although the earth is moist. Next are the hammocks where the waters are collected, and which are too wide to pass; but where the gullies are deep and narrow the water is very good, and the hammocks very narrow; nearer the river you fall into the swamp. The country seems favorable for the pasturage of cattle, but, unless in the hammocks, the ground is not arable, and on the river all the hammocks seem to be overflowed when the river is high. The Indians seem to have entirely abandoned this part of the country, and the only trails seen seem to indicate they have gone towards the head of the Sanibel.

On our route we observed two considerable branches: one, the smaller, coming in from the north; the other, further up, from the south; the latter, at its mouth, seemed to be the deeper stream. Captain Thistle and two men went some distance up the first, and found it diminish to a small stream at about eight miles.

Lieutenant A. Ross, of the marine corps, accompanied the expedition as a volunteer, and was placed in command of one of the columns. I owe much to his zeal and exertions, and am sure his well-known gallantry would have displayed itself if any occasion had offered. Lieutenant Powell, of the navy, headed a gallant band of forty men from the Vandalia. He took charge of the fleet of boats while we were on the river, and left nothing undone to secure our success, nor was he less zealous when on the land. Captain Green, of the revenue cutter Dallas, also accompanied us the whole of the route, and, when they left their boats, rivalled the best soldiers, not only by their discipline, but their activity. Indeed, the exertions which these officers have made, and the manner in which they have anticipated every wish I have expressed towards the objects of the expedition, merit my warmest thanks; and if ever it should be my lot to co-operate with those branches of the service, I can wish no better fortune than to be connected with gentlemen of their character and abilities.

The Spanish fishermen have, I believe, left Charlotte harbor, but without any good cause, for they have never been troubled by a party of more than six or seven, and they are thirty strong. As soon as the troops can re-embark we will sail for New Orleans. I will, however, pass by St. Mark's, in order to send this report. Although the result of our expedition must disappoint your expectations, you must incur the censure for having intrusted it to one of so little experience.

Your obedient servant,

PERSIFER F. SMITH, *Colonel Louisiana Volunteers.*

Major General WINFIELD SCOTT, *Commanding the Army of Florida.*

No. 134.

SIR: I was directed by his excellency Major General Scott to forward my report to you for your perusal, and to request that you would have it transmitted to him at Garey's Ferry, on the St. John's, if at that place, or wherever else he might be at the time of its reception by you.

I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

LEIGH READ, *Major, Commanding Florida Volunteers.*

General D. L. CLINCH.

TALLAHASSEE, *Florida, April 27, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that I succeeded in getting my entire command aboard of the transports furnished me by the quartermaster, and was off the mouth of the bay on the morning of the 18th instant. Midshipman Reid, of the *Vandalia* sloop-of-war, reported himself to me as in command of two cutters of that vessel, and ready to receive my orders; the second cutter was placed under Midshipman Drake.

I had not the good fortune to procure the personal presence of Captain Bunce, upon whose acquaintance with the coast of Florida and general experience as a pilot I had relied very greatly. He furnished me, however, with a small sloop and three Indian sailors, who were represented as being quite familiar with the coast, &c. I derived no further assistance from them than what, in obedience to the orders of their master, they were obliged to impart, viz: to conduct me to the mouth of the Withlacoochee; and when asked about the character of the interior, no satisfactory information could be procured; it was often contradictory. I resorted to liberal potations of ardent spirits as a means of extracting from them information which I have no doubt they possessed, but the characteristic caution of the people was still observed. Some of them were always sufficiently sober to prevent indiscreet or dangerous communications. In all this they did not, as I believe, and I wish your excellency so to understand me, intend faithlessness to me or the objects of the expedition, as far as they comprehended them, but they were only true to me as far as they understood the letter of their instructions, which, as above remarked, was to pilot me to the mouth of the river. They did not or would not believe that it was any part of their duty to do more, and I could not convince them to the contrary.

I sailed as rapidly for the mouth of the Withlacoochee as the winds would permit me, and as near the shore as the small vessel, aboard of which I was myself, would allow; but could never get nearer than a quarter of a mile. The transports could not approach closer, during the first two days, than about 15 miles; and on the third day, when arrived off the mouth of the river, they were quite out of sight—upwards of 20 miles distant. When informed that the mouth of the Withlacoochee was near, I despatched all the small craft to the transports, with orders to the officers in command aboard of them to commence debarking their men as fast as possible, intending in their absence to make a selection myself of a key among the almost innumerable cluster lying off the mouth of the river, as the point upon which the debarkation was to be effected. On the return of the boats transporting, as I had ordered, as many men as they could receive, the morning reports of the officers in command were handed me, by which the frightful picture of an increase of forty (40) to the sick list in less than two days was presented. Special communications from the surgeons were also handed me, in which the most horrible consequences were predicted, unless the men could be taken *forthwith* to some place where medicines and good water could be procured. The water aboard of the schooner *Caroline*, it was said, had already become putrid. Without going aboard, I despatched an order for them to hoist all sail and proceed with the utmost possible despatch to St. Mark's, the nearest port. I remanded aboard of the transports the detachment first ordered to debark, and directed a select number of them to join me on board of the small craft, for the purpose of making the *reconnoissance* and surveys, which, I find upon perusing my order more carefully than at first I did, were the principal objects of the expedition.

I have found the Withlacoochee to be as difficult to discover as it is to enter after discovery; and in regard to the latter, it is worthy of that which may heretofore have been said of it. It disembogues itself by four large, that is wide, and almost innumerable small mouths, amongst oyster banks, rafts, sand-bars, islands, and without calculation. When informed by the pilot that we were almost at the mouth, I went, myself, into the second cutter of the *Vandalia*—it drew less water than the other—taking with me only two of my detachment, and attempted to enter it, but was under the necessity, in order to do so, to have the boat hauled some fifty yards, the water not being over eight inches on the bar for that distance. I ultimately succeeded in getting over, and after ascending near a mile, found two and a half fathoms. *The mouth, the one on the south of a large island called Amarura island, by which I entered, is much the widest.* The northern one, however, affords the best water, where, when a freshet above and high tide below may unite, four feet may be carried over the bar; but the channel on that side is of very dangerous navigation on account of the number of rocks in it.

The country around the mouth of the river is a low, flat marsh, through which I conceive it impossible to make an ingress with an army into the interior. When once fairly over the bar at the mouth of the river, there would be no difficulty in ascending the stream; but steamboats only, and those must be of light draught, could effect that object.

When I had gotten over the bar, I proceeded some two miles and upwards to within a short distance of a large smoke, the fire that afforded which was perhaps three miles distant. I deemed it not prudent to go further, and caused the boat to return, and went out by one of the small outlets. I had seen fires the night before near the mouth of the *Wa-wau-ciu-a-yu-hacka*, and from that place I discovered smoke during the day and fires at night all round the coast to within a few miles of Suwanee Old Town. The Indians are evidently there in great number, and are, I have very little doubt, engaged in preparing for a crop this season, by burning the old grass from the woods, for the benefit of their cattle, and putting their small potatoes in cultivation.

I saw no smoke west of the *Steinhache*, or, indeed, nearer than fifteen miles of the *Suwanee*. During the whole voyage I kept as near the shore as I could approach from Tampa Bay to St. Mark's, and I am clearly of opinion that there is not, perhaps, anywhere to be found so shoal a coast as the one along which I sailed. The average depth of water from one to the other of those places, where I sailed, cannot

be more than seven feet; and the shore cannot be approached at any place, where I had an opportunity of examining it, or it was deemed important to examine it, with that draught, nearer than two miles.

From Cedar Keys, by a S.S.E. direction, seven feet may be taken up to within two miles of the mouth of the Withlacoochee, but at every other point that might probably be selected to debark troops, reefs and oyster-bars abound. I have seen several islands near the mouth of the river that might possibly do very well for depots, where I have no doubt fifty men might repel any attack that the enemy could make upon them; but I doubt whether it might not be a better fate to send that number into the country, to go the way that Dade's, and I much fear Holcoman's comrades have gone. If, however, the government will employ a steamboat, there will be no difficulty in throwing into the country, either at the Wacassa or Wa-wau-cui-a-yu-hacka rivers, or both, any quantity of supplies, as well as any number of men that may be wanted. The latter river may be approached with five feet, and, as I understand, ascended to its head, some six miles, where a beautiful and elevated country is to be found, and where I am of opinion the women and children of the enemy have been secreted. I should deem the chance of success so great in an expedition up that river that I should be greatly gratified to have command of it. I am confident I should be able to make a good report.

Your excellency did me the honor to desire that I should submit, after surveying the whole grounds as nearly as I could, a recommendation of a plan of campaign against the enemy, from the mouth of the Withlacoochee, should such ever be determined upon. The plan I suggest is this: Let a steamboat of light draught of water be properly prepared with bulwarks, particularly on the hurricane deck; be manned with (say) five companies, and ordered to ascend, first one and then the other of the rivers above named, viz: Wacassa, Withlacoochee, and Wa-wau-cui-a-yu-hacka. They will be able to produce a prodigious effect, I have no doubt. At all events, a healthy site may be found, at which to establish a depot, and from which operations may hereafter be commenced.

I discovered, at the mouth of the river, the half of a flat-bottom boat, a common ferry flatboat it appeared to have been. It had been cut asunder by an awkward hand and a dull axe. When I arrived at St. Mark's, I found, much to my astonishment, mortification, and regret, that your excellency had ordered Major McLemore to establish a depot at that place; and instead of being a "new field," as it was described to be, another had been ordered to precede me. *All of which was studiously concealed from me.* I did not hear, either from your order or from the numerous interviews which I had the honor to hold with your excellency, that Major McLemore was even in the field, much less that I was going to relieve a detachment of his command, ordered out by your excellency.

Your obedient servant,

LEIGH READ, *Major, Commanding Florida Volunteers.*

His Excellency Major General Scott, *Commanding Florida Army.*

No. 135.

ORDERS No. 46.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *St. Augustine, May 11, 1836.*

The commander of the left wing will immediately cause to be mounted two of the companies of United States artillery of this wing, using for that purpose the horses of the baggage train.

The companies, under a system of instructions which will be formed, will be immediately employed in patrolling and scouring the frontiers, and other exposed settlements this side of the St. John's.

The three remaining companies of the same regiment will be placed in such positions as to afford the best point of support for the mounted companies.

By command of Major General Scott.

J. E. JOHNSTON, *Aide-de-camp, and Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 136.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *St. Augustine, May 11, 1836.*

SIR: I have been using my best endeavors since my arrival here to cause a company of mounted Floridians to be raised to aid in the defence of the settlements between the St. John's and the Atlantic. You have been recommended to me as an individual highly qualified to command such corps, and I am also informed that you have already enrolled about twenty-four men. I have to request that you will proceed in the business of enrolment, as it will give me great pleasure to recognize a company with you at the head of it.

A company, according to the act of Congress, (passed in 1792,) must consist of at least sixty-four privates. To that number, a captain, a first and second lieutenant, an ensign, a cornet, four sergeants, four corporals, and musicians, are allowed by the same law. I learn that a new act of Congress, that has not yet reached me, has been very recently passed, which may be more favorable to volunteers.

I would prefer a company of seventy or eighty privates to one of sixty-four, but so important do I deem the company, that I will accept it with forty privates. In this case, however, only a captain, a lieutenant, and a cornet can be accepted with it.

I have to add, that the company, as soon as raised, shall be taken into the service of the United States for six months, unless sooner discharged, and in all respects placed on the most favorable footing. It will be indispensable that I should apply to his excellency the governor of the Territory for commissions for the officers of the company; this can be done after the company is accepted, so as to avoid delay; and under present circumstances, not a day ought to be lost.

I remain, with respect, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

DOUGLASS DUMMETT, Esq.

No. 137.

ORDERS No. 47.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *St. Augustine, May 16, 1836.*

The volunteers having returned to their respective homes, the distinctions of right and left wing, and centre, have ceased in this army.

Major Heileman will repair to Fort Drane, and relieve Lieutenant Colonel Bankhead in the command of the troops on the Alachua and Suwanee frontiers. On being so relieved, the lieutenant colonel will be permitted—reporting himself to the adjutant general—to retire from Florida for the benefit of his health.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

No. 138.

ORDERS No. 48.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *St. Augustine, May 17, 1836.*

The panics which have recently possessed the good people of several large districts of this Territory are infinitely humiliating.

Within a few days just five Indians penetrated a neighborhood in the heart of Middle Florida, and committed a murder. Instead of giving pursuit, the inhabitants abandoned their plantations and fled to Tallahassee and Monticello.

A similar party had but a few days before thrown the Micanopy settlement into the utmost confusion. A gang of cow-stealers adroitly added a report that an immense fresh Indian trail had been observed crossing the Tallahassee road, near the Santa Fé bridge. The whole country from Micanopy to Black creek instantly became wild with fear. The daring falsehood was immediately exposed by Colonel Fitzpatrick and Captain Shannon of the army, who happened to pass that way, together with the motive of the propagators; but the inhabitants could see nothing but an Indian in every bush, and therefore continued to fly.

On this side of the St. John's a keen susceptibility of the same kind prevails. A small party of the enemy lately ventured within the settlements. A company of regular foot was promptly mounted, sent in pursuit, beat the enemy, and secured most of the property the marauders had taken. Now, although it is known to all cool people that the greater number of the party were killed outright, and that a like fate awaits any body of the enemy that may follow, a panic is rife throughout the country. The inhabitants are still flying to St. Augustine, and from St. Augustine to Georgia and South Carolina.

It is evident that no general, even with extensive means, can cure a disease in the public mind, so general and so degrading, without some little effort on the part of the people themselves. Thus the planters in the recent case near Tallahassee, who fled without knowing whether they ran from squaws or warriors, ought first to have ascertained that material fact. If they had turned upon the enemy they would have found the case within the easy compass of any three or four resolute masters, and half as many overseers. This was the simple and manly course. That adopted was to fly, to spread the panic, and to throw execrations upon the general who has the misfortune to command a handful of brave troops in the midst of such a population.

Not a regular company has been sent out of the Territory except possibly three from Tampa Bay. Besides a strong garrison there, two companies were directed thence to occupy a post on the Suwanee; two are posted at Fort King; five at Fort Drane; one (mounted United States dragoons) at Oaklands, six miles off; one at Micanopy, and a twelfth at Garey's Ferry.

These forces ought, in the opinion of the commanding general, to give reasonable security to the Alachua and Suwanee frontiers, particularly if one or two companies of mounted men can be obtained to aid the company of dragoons in scouring the country between the chain of fixed posts. Measures have been taken to encourage the enrolment of mounted men, and it is understood that the governor is exerting himself in the same way. His excellency will, moreover, to complete the means of defence, be requested to hire, on account of the United States, at Apalachicola or elsewhere, a suitable steamboat to cruise from the mouth of the Suwanee up that river as far as practicable. One of the companies supposed to be already on the river will be instructed to embark and remain on board the boat.

On this side of the St. John's the means of defence, though much more limited, are deemed fully adequate, if aided by a single company of mounted volunteers; and one, it is hoped, will soon present itself for the service. Of the five regular companies, one has already been mounted on horses belonging to the wagon train, and in a few days another will be put on horseback by the same means. The commanding general has no power to purchase horses expressly for this purpose. The companies on foot will be posted, whilst the mounted will be kept constantly in movement; and it may be added that the little armed steamer called the *Essayons*, belonging to the United States, will be kept daily cruising up and down the St. John's.

The post and steamboat on the Suwanee, Fort King, Oaklands, Micanopy, and Garey's Ferry, will all be under the immediate orders of the field officer, Major Heileman, stationed at Fort Drane, and he will communicate freely with the governor of the Territory.

Should the post ordered to be established at Watson's or Dabney's plantation prove to be unhealthy, the commanding officer is authorized to remove higher up the river in search of a better position, giving the preference to the left bank of the stream.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

No. 139.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *St. Augustine, May 17, 1836.*

SIR: I had the honor to receive your excellency's letter dated the 28th ultimo a few days ago. I was then too sick to reply, and now with much difficulty hold my head up to write.

I am happy to hear that you have taken measures to put a certain force of mounted men into the field to aid the regular troops in defending the exposed frontiers. One or two companies of that description would be highly effective on the Alachua and Suwanee frontiers, and one other similar company is wanted on this side of the St. John's. I myself had taken such measures as were in my power to effect both objects, intending, of course, to refer the officers at the proper time to your excellency for approval and commissions. Some of my views on those points are stated in my Order No. 48, a copy of which I beg herewith to submit.

Should a larger mounted volunteer force be deemed by you as necessary on either or both of the frontiers, I shall cheerfully yield my judgment on the point to that of your excellency.

Permit me to ask you to carry out the suggestion of the enclosed order in respect to the steamer to be employed in cruising up and down the Suwanee river. Instructions shall immediately go to the commanding officer on that river to place a company on board the steamer, and to take charge of her. His cruising orders will be, besides keeping the post well supplied with provisions, to move continually up and down the river to prevent the enemy from passing to the west side; to land the troops if necessary to reach parties of the enemy; to capture boats and canoes.

All the horses at my disposal and fit for service are required to remount a company of the United States dragoons, to mount two companies of foot on this side of the St. John's, and to supply the vicinity of Fort Drane with subsistence.

Brigadier General Clinch's resignation left Lieutenant Colonel Bankhead in command on the Alachua and Suwanee frontiers; but as his health is bad, I send Major Heileman, a sound and intelligent officer, to replace him.

I have, from rumor, been for some days expecting to hear of your arrival in this vicinity. It would give me great pleasure to meet and to confer with you on all points connected with the defence of Florida, or the best manner of recommencing hostilities.

Major Read, no doubt for good reasons, has neglected to report to me. I can only say to you that he had written and oral orders, explicit and emphatic, requiring him to ascend the Withlacoochee to the highest point of navigation, to ascertain the best site for a military post, &c. He also *unofficially* knew that it was deemed, in the right wing of the army, just possible that he would find a block-house already there, with a garrison. Therefore, when he saw the part of the flat, described in a former letter of yours as being *rudely cut in two by a dull axe*, he must have had all previous uncertainties about such post cleared up at once. I, however, forbear to say more on this point at present. My correspondence with Brigadier General Clinch on the subject of the block-house has been, I presume, sent to you by that general; and I hope daily to learn that the expedition intended for its succor, from the Suwanee, has fully succeeded. The flat I presume got adrift, and thus fell into the hands of the Indians.

I remain, with great respect, your excellency's most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

P. S.—Colonel Lindsay had instructions, on his return to Tampa Bay, not only to send *two* companies of the United States fourth infantry to the Suwanee, but one of the same regiment to Key West. It is presumed that both orders were executed. I will beg your excellency to cause a field-piece to be placed on the bow of the steamer to be hired for the Suwanee. If not nearer, one may be obtained at Tampa Bay.

I have already received a strong demand from the mayor of Savannah for a company to be sent from Florida. Of course I shall not comply.

I will beg your excellency to urge upon Commodore Dallas the importance of keeping the cutters and the smaller United States vessels constantly cruising around Florida, to prevent the escape of captured slaves, and to prevent the Indians from receiving arms and ammunition from traders.

W. S.

His Excellency R. K. CALL, *Governor of Florida.*

No. 140.

TALLAHASSEE, *May 26, 1836.*

SIR: I have the satisfaction to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th instant and a copy of your Order No. 48 by express.

Before your return from the field, having heard that the Indians had reappeared in Alachua, I ordered Colonel Sanchez, of that county, to call out the whole available strength of his regiment, and Colonel Warren to send fifty horsemen from Duval, for the purpose of protecting the frontier. I subsequently divided East Florida into two districts, giving Major Putnam charge of that east of the St. John's and Colonel Warren that between the St. John's and Suwanee rivers, with authority to each of those officers to call from the respective districts such a number of men as would effectually hold the enemy in check and give security to the settlements. The population of that county was fully adequate, with the aid of the regular force, to perform this duty; but it appears that they have retired without resistance, leaving the enemy in undisturbed possession of their homes. A panic highly dishonorable to the whole country has spread over the land, when, by one manly effort, the enemy might have been repulsed and their homes and property defended. I shall adopt the necessary measures to hold the officers accountable for their neglect in not executing my orders. In Middle Florida I shall have in the field in a few days two hundred men, the greater part of whom will be well mounted. This, with the regular force you propose stationing on the Suwanee, I think will give ample protection to this section of country, if we are not invaded by the Creeks. To guard against that contingency, I have sent special agents to confer with the governors of Georgia and Alabama, and to request that each of those States may place on the southern and eastern frontier of the Creek nation a formidable force, to prevent the retreat of the Indians to Florida.

The steamboat sent to the Withlacoochee for the relief of the block-house has orders to ascend the Suwanee as far as the Old Town. She has about one hundred men on board, which, with the detachment of horse I have ordered to that place, I hope will meet them in time to cut off the Indians I mentioned in my last as crossing the river. This boat I will keep employed in the manner you have mentioned until another can be procured. She wants a six-pounder, and can be rendered very efficient.

I shall by the mail of to-night address Commodore Dallas on the subject of guarding the coast from the visits of Spanish fishermen, agreeably to your request.

The plan of defence which I have had the honor of presenting by Colonel Fitzpatrick appears to me to offer the greatest certainty of success, if it can be adopted. This, however, will depend on the number of regular troops you may be able to concentrate at the point designated. Four or five hundred militia can be drawn from the Territory, and if a force of 1,200 men can be assembled, I should think it sufficient; but of this you are the better judge. Should you think favorably of the plan, you will please advise me, in order that I may take the necessary measures for calling out the militia.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. K. CALL.

Major General W. Scott, *Commanding the Army in Florida.*

No. 141.

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 1, 1836.

SIR: I have the honor, by direction of the President, to transmit you a copy of a communication addressed to him by the honorable Joseph M. White, the delegate in Congress from Florida.

You were advised on the 25th ultimo of the arrangements that had been made for the prosecution of the campaign in Florida, in the event of your having left that Territory, and General Clinch's having withdrawn from the service. The intelligence, recently received, of your illness at St. Augustine, rendered it doubtful whether you would be able to continue in the command. The instructions to General Call were therefore full, and gave him authority, if General Clinch retired from the army, to take the general direction of the operations in Florida. I am instructed to inform you that, under these circumstances, the President deems it unnecessary for you to return to the command in Florida.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

C. A. HARRIS, *Acting Secretary of War.*

Major General Scott, *Fort Mitchell, Alabama.*

No. 142.

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1836.

SIR: By orders recently issued from the War Department, it is directed that, should Major General Scott leave the headquarters of the army in Florida and retire from that command, it will devolve on Brigadier General Clinch. This order leaves to the discretion of General Scott the period of his departure. It is with the greatest pain that I feel myself constrained, by a sense of duty to my constituents, respectfully to ask that General Scott be immediately relieved from the command. No man has more admiration for the gallantry or respect for the military achievements of General Scott than I have.

From the present attitude of affairs, and unfortunate and disagreeable occurrences which have happened in that quarter, the public interests, as well as the lives, security, and property of the inhabitants, imperiously require the order I have recommended. There is no harmony between him and the public authorities of the Territory; and it is evident that he is in the highest state of exacerbated feeling on account of an atrocious outrage on all decency and propriety, in burning him in effigy at Tallahassee. This infamous proceeding, which ought to have been arrested and punished by the authorities at the seat of government, does not justify General Scott for the degrading epithets and insults he has offered to a whole population. In his published orders he represents the conduct of the people of Middle Florida as "infinitely humiliating," and the people "wild with fear," possessed of "a disease so general and so degrading."

This is not the usual language of a major general commanding on our frontiers, and should not, under any circumstances, be resorted to, whatever may have been the disappointments and wounded sensibilities of a commanding general. I ask upon what authority he says there were just "five Indians" who have produced that consternation, panic, and flight, of which he has drawn a picture so derogatory to the whole population? It is well known that the Indians never show their whole force, and if five have penetrated into the country from the Indian boundary to within a few miles of the seat of government a much larger number will soon follow. As General Scott did not succeed with *five thousand* men in destroying *five Indians*, he might have spared the inhabitants he has left defenceless such degrading denunciations. As that, however, is an affair between him and the governor, as to the number of the enemy and the defence of Middle Florida, I shall proceed to what is the object of this communication.

My purpose is, most respectfully, to request an inquiry into the manner of conducting the late campaign in Florida, and into the conduct of the major general commanding, for having gone into summer quarters the last of April, leaving the country without defence, and the inhabitants at the mercy of the Indians.

Major General Scott had power to call upon the governors of South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama, for any number of men that *he* might consider necessary to put an end to the war. Congress, by law, had provided ample means; and whilst *he* was in command, the governor of Florida had no power to call for troops. General Scott, after one unsuccessful campaign, *disbanded* the whole militia force; but the term of service of a portion of it had expired, and has neither called, by draft or for volunteers, for any other further military force. He has, on the contrary, *refused* the acceptance of some that was offered, and has disarmed the militia of East Florida.

When called upon now to furnish adequate force for the protection of that frontier, he complains of his limited means; when it is apparent, from the above statement, that his means are only limited by his discretion, and that he has power at any moment to order any number from Georgia or South Carolina. He admits that 3,000 men are necessary to subdue these Indians, and that he has but 1,000 under his command. Now, I ask why it is that he has not these 3,000 men in the field that he deems necessary?

He, and he *alone*, is responsible for all the lives and property of the inhabitants that may be destroyed for the want of that protection and security for which every citizen of the republic has a right to look for from his government. Added to this the feelings of the people are outraged by representations calculated to degrade and expose them to ridicule throughout the United States.

These people, you are aware, are sparsely settled over an extensive territory, in detached neighborhoods, without any dense population to fall back upon, or without any fortified places in which to place their wives and children for safety. If, upon the first sound of alarm, some small neighborhood should go in pursuit of even *five* Indians, they might, as they did with General Scott's grand army, dodge out of the way, and fall back upon the women and children in the rear. It is unnecessary, however, to detain you with these details; the complaint I make is, that Major General Scott has left that country without adequate protection, and has not a sufficient force either for offensive or defensive operations. He has produced a state of feeling that forbids all harmony or concert with the local authorities or people of the country; and the public interests imperiously require his immediate withdrawal.

I have the honor to be, with high considerations of respect, sir, your most obedient servant,

JOS. M. WHITE.

ANDREW JACKSON, *President of the United States.*

No. 143.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 21, 1836.*

SIR: In justice to myself, I beg leave to say a word in defence of my order issued in Florida, and numbered 48, on the subject of panics in several large districts in that Territory. That order was written when I was still quite sick, but upon the most certain and precise information. It has brought upon me much abuse. A copy of it was enclosed by me with a letter to his excellency Governor Call. In reply, I have just received from him a letter, *via* St. Augustine, dated the 26th ultimo, in which he says: "A panic highly dishonorable to the whole country has spread over the land, when, by one manly effort, the enemy might have been repelled, and their homes and property defended." This is sufficient confirmation of my assertions, if any were wanted. Besides, I was advised, by respectable citizens of Florida, to come out with an order in that spirit, as likely to rally the inhabitants, and I have reason to know that the order did good. It further stated what had been done for the defence of the settlements, and what remained for the inhabitants to do for themselves; that is, it was shown that, to complete the defence of the settlements, three companies of mounted Floridians were required.

It is utterly false that I ever offered the slightest disrespect to the civil or political authorities of Florida; and all the candid and intelligent officers of that Territory, with whom I conversed, agreed with me as to the inefficiency of their militia generally.

I disbanded, nor caused to be disbanded, not a company of volunteers, until within a few days before or after its term of service was out. Major Ross's battalion of mounted Georgians, that arrived at Picolata about the 10th of April, having then three months to serve, was sent home with honor by Lieutenant Colonel Crane, after advising with Major General Macomb. I had no hand in that act. On the contrary, I instructed Lieutenant Colonel Crane, that in case more mounted men should arrive from Georgia, to receive them with honor, to muster them into service, and instruct them to wait for orders.

There was one other, and only *one* company (Captain Nelson's mounted men) that was discharged before its time was out, or very nearly out. That company returned to Fort Drane with Brigadier General Clinch, who, on his own responsibility, and without any instructions from me, discharged it, with three other mounted companies of the same State, (Georgia,) and without causing the four companies to be paid. Yet General Clinch detained, at Fort Drane, Major Cooper's battalion of foot some time longer, and quite to the end of the period for which it had been mustered. The reason seems to be that General Clinch, like myself, had not, until some time after the horse had been discharged, the slightest expectation that the frontiers would be seriously annoyed by the enemy in the course of the summer and autumn.

The horse were probably not paid from the indisposition of the paymaster, Major Lytle, an officer of great merit.

I beg that this letter may be laid before the President, and have the honor to be, sir, with high respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

HON. L. CASS, *Secretary of War.*

No. 144.

WASHINGTON, *December 13, 1836.*

SIR: I was informed, for the first time, to-day, that my letter to the President of the United States of May last had been communicated to the court of inquiry, of which you are president, to be used as evidence against Major General Scott, whose conduct is now under examination.

This places me in an attitude that I do not choose to occupy—that of an accuser of the distinguished officer into whose military operations you are now inquiring.

Since the publication of that letter, I have, in the *National Intelligencer*, over my own name, as an act of justice to General Scott, corrected, upon better information, the complaints which I deemed it my duty as the representative of the people of Florida to make against him. I am unwilling that the first letter shall be laid before the court without the second; and, as I have no copy of it with me at present, I take this occasion to say that I am satisfied, upon a full and impartial review of the facts and circumstances connected with the Florida campaign, and upon evidence not then before me, that the failure is not to be attributed to Major General Scott, nor to causes which it was in his power to control or to remove.

It was my intention to have availed myself of the first appropriate occasion in the House of Representatives to have declared this in my place, as an act of justice to a distinguished officer.

In saying this, I confine the corrigendum to his military operations. I neither intend to explain nor retract anything I said of "Order No. 48," reflecting on the people of Florida; and whilst I admit that there is much palliation in the order of a major general founded on the reports of two of the highest officers and most conspicuous citizens of Florida, I can never think that there was any justification for the charge, however it may have originated, or by whomsoever avouched or indorsed.

If my letter has been laid before the court, I have to request that you will present this for their consideration, in explanation of the other.

I have the honor to be, your most obedient servant,

JOSEPH M. WHITE.

Major General MACOMB, *President of the Court, &c.*

No. 145.

HEADQUARTERS, *St. Augustine, May 16, 1836.*

GENERAL: Major General Scott being still indisposed, and having no staff officer near him, has directed me to address this to you by a schooner about to sail for Charleston, and to say that it is his request that all the officers belonging to the companies now in Florida, who are absent from any other cause than surgeons' certificates, may be ordered immediately to join their companies; and, further, that he requests that six medical officers may be ordered to report to him for duty as soon as practicable.

I am, very respectfully, your humble servant,

ABM. EUSTIS, *Brevet Brigadier General.*

The ADJUTANT GENERAL, *United States Army.*

No. 146.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *St. Augustine, May 20, 1836.*

SIR: Since my letter to you of the 11th instant I have been more sick than before; that is, confined to bed the greater part of the time. I am now slowly recovering strength, but still unable to attend to more than ordinary and pressing business.

I enclose the report (of Colonel Smith) of the expedition to Charlotte harbor and up Pease creek. Nothing has been received from Colonel Lindsay; and Major Read, of course, remains silent in order to conceal as far as he can his shameful failure to ascend the Withlacoochee. He seems to prefer to rely on such false statements as he is enabled to impose upon the public through an obedient newspaper. I have none at my command.

I enclose copies of two Orders, Nos. 47 and 48, and of Special Order No. 26.

No. 48, of course, has much excited the good people of this vicinity against me. It contains unpalatable truths, not one of which can be disputed. Good will come out of the order; and if it fail to stop emigration, those who remain will see the necessity of their doing something for themselves. Thus, in a day or two, I have every reason to believe that a company of mounted men, with, however, but forty privates, will be presented to me for service on this side of the St. John's. I propose to accept it with but three officers. - If the number of privates should be carried to the standard, (sixty-four,) I have promised the fourth officer.

I have not heard what progress has been made in obtaining volunteers for the Alachua and Suwanee frontiers; but from the failure of General Clinch, and the absence of all reports, I fear that the inhabitants of the neighboring counties will prefer flight to the defence of their homes.

Among the accompanying papers will be found copies of letters from me to the governor of the Territory, (dated May 17,) and to Major Heileman, (also of May 17.)

From the mayor of Savannah I have received a request for a company, to be stationed in that city pending the ensuing summer and autumn. I have replied that I could not detach one from the defences of Florida.

I shall not be able to mount the second company of regular foot as soon as I had hoped, owing to the condition of the remaining horses of the late baggage train. Many have sore backs, and all are low in flesh, though improving fast. In twelve or fifteen days forty-five may be in a condition to be mounted.

In the meantime the first company (mounted) will be kept in movement. It has now been out on the Metanza frontier three or four days, supported by a company on foot.

I have not received a line from the War Department, or your office, later than the letter advising me that Major General Macomb had been ordered to Florida.

The contrast made by me, in a few words, between regulars and volunteers, in my letter to you of the 30th ultimo, being published, I am, of course, delivered over to the hostility of the whole body of the militia. Now, no one entertains for the volunteers who have recently been under my command, from South Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana, and Alabama, a more cordial and sincere respect than I do. There are hundreds and hundreds of them whom I should be most happy to call friends. They have patriotism, honor, intelligence, and *individual* courage; but *in masses*, but little of the latter quality. They would, however, I have no doubt, even fight in masses with desperation in defence of their own neighborhoods and homes. But, in a distant war like this, I utterly deny their efficiency, after the zeal of the first week or two has subsided. On this subject there are many wholesome, but most unpalatable truths to be told. Exceptions, however, are to be made, I acknowledge. Who shall tell those truths? I know of no commander who has ever yet had the hardihood. Shall I do it? Believing the good of my country calls for it at my hands, if leisure and strength permit, it shall be done. My sacrifice will be inevitable.

Weak as I am, I will make this declaration: If I can be convicted of having committed one serious blunder, in theory or practice, since I left Washington to conduct the war in Florida, let me be shot. No commander ought to escape from misconduct under a less penalty.

What I meant to state at the conclusion of my last letter, was this: the troops called for by me came into the field at too late a period generally to enable me to prosecute the war to a conclusion.

I remain, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General U. S. Army.*

No. 147.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *St. Augustine, May 17, 1836.*

SIR: By the accompanying Orders, Nos. 47 and 48, you will find yourself destined for the highly important command of the Alachua and Suwanee frontiers, with twelve companies of regulars, and a prospect of two or more of mounted volunteers which may be placed under your orders by the governor of the Territory. Endeavors are now making to raise a volunteer force to that, and perhaps a larger amount. Should three companies present themselves, you are authorized to accept the whole, provided that each shall approximate within eight or ten privates the legal standard; that is, sixty-four privates for one captain, one first and one second lieutenant, and one ensign or cornet. If the number of privates be still less than that diminished number, (say only forty,) you will omit receiving the second lieutenant, unless there be something in a late act of Congress in favor of the particular organization of the several States and Territories. The act has not reached me.

With three, and perhaps only two companies, probably a major, adjutant, &c., will be pressed upon you. In the last resort you must yield, although it will be unfortunate to allow the companies to consider themselves a battalion, as from that moment there will be an effort made to make a company act separately, and they cannot be highly useful without so acting almost universally.

My wish is, that you keep the troop of United States dragoons, and any other mounted force that may come under your orders, almost constantly in movement—say, in scouring the country in every direction, and particularly between the fixed posts. You will push the troop, with or without the support of a company of mounted men, occasionally as far as the Suwanee, so as to communicate with the post and the steamboat on that river. At Watson's and Dabney's plantations, thirty-five miles from the Gulf, a good supply of corn may yet be found.

The steamboat mentioned will also be under your orders. You will cause one of the companies of the 4th infantry, now supposed to be on the Suwanee, to embark on board the boat, and the one or other constantly to remain on board. The commander of the company will be the immediate commander, under you, of the boat. You will instruct him to keep pretty constantly in motion, sometimes visiting the mouth of the Withlacoochee, and generally cruising up the river to the head of navigation, and back again towards the mouth, so as to prevent the enemy from passing to the west bank of the river. A primary duty of the detachment will be to capture any party of the enemy found in boats or canoes, or to capture the latter, and when necessary to reach the enemy, the party will land and pursue to a reasonable distance ashore. The object of all the movements of the steamer and the troops will be to give security and quiet to the inhabitants; and these great objects you will endeavor to attain by all the means in your power.

The baggage train now employed in taking subsistence and other supplies to Fort Drane, and its immediate dependencies, it is supposed, will be sufficient to do all the hauling in the next three weeks which will be required before the middle of October. The horses will then, with the exception of a few teams, be sent to Garey's Ferry, or other better place, for forage and grazing.

I ought to have stated that the steamer on the Suwanee must occasionally be sent for the supplies that the troops on that river may require.

On relieving Lieutenant Colonel Bankhead you will receive from him any instructions he may possess or have received from Brigadier General Clinch, relative to the protection and defence of the frontier. Measures of this character should be made generally known, to give confidence to the inhabitants.

Besides corresponding with me whilst I remain in the Territory, you will communicate everything interesting or important to the governor at Tallahassee.

With great confidence in your zeal, judgment, and intelligence, I remain, with much consideration, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Major F. HEILEMAN, *United States Army, &c.*

No. 148.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *St. Augustine, May 20, 1836.*

SIR: Instructions from the War Department oblige me suddenly to leave Florida.

I leave you in command of all the troops in the Territory. You will report directly to the adjutant general of the army, and communicate freely with the governor of Florida.

I have all along endeavored to keep you advised of the measures adopted or contemplated by me for the defence of the several exposed frontiers. Those measures you will carry out, or modify, according to circumstances and your own judgment.

I think it proper, however, to express a decided opinion upon a measure not yet adopted or decided. A council of war recently held at Fort Drane came to a unanimous decision that it is inexpedient to hold and garrison Fort King. For the reasons on which the council grounded that opinion, I fully concur in its decision. I therefore recommend that you cause Fort King to be abandoned, by withdrawing the garrison and all the public property there deposited, with as little delay as practicable, and that one of the companies so withdrawn be ordered to establish itself at Newnansville, and the other at Fort Drane, or the Oaklands, six miles off.

You are aware that I have authorized Captain Dummett, and also Captain Curry, to raise a company of mounted men each, for the defence of this side of the St. John's. If, with me, you should deem one such company, added to the five companies of regulars, sufficient for this district of country, you will, as soon as one mounted company presents itself, take measures to prevent the raising of the other; but if circumstances, in your judgment, should render both necessary, you will accept both, and muster them into the service of the United States for six months, unless sooner discharged. I promised both Captains Dummett and Curry that I would, with three officers, accept a company with only forty privates. You may accept the company or companies with even a smaller number of privates, according to your views of the necessities of the service.

I say nothing of the distribution and employment of the regular forces under your command on this side of the St. John's, and nothing in respect to the volunteers that may be raised for the defence of the same district of country. Your own judgment will govern in these matters, and the same in respect to the west of the St. John's.

Fully relying on your experience, zeal, talents, and energy, I remain, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT

Brigadier General EUSTIS, &c., *Commanding, &c.*

FORT DRANE, *Florida, March 11, 1836.*

SIR: The following statement of facts in relation to the recent movement of troops from Louisiana, under the immediate command of Major General Gaines, you may rely upon, and, if you think proper, may use for the information of the public.

General Gaines left his permanent headquarters at Memphis, Tennessee, on a tour of inspection, and arrived at New Orleans about the 15th of January, where he heard for the first time of a serious disturbance in Florida, and particularly of the melancholy massacre of Major Dade and his command, which occurred on the 28th of December. He immediately communicated with the governor of Louisiana, and requested him to call upon and hold in readiness a body of volunteers for service in subduing the Seminole Indians, and proceeded to Pensacola to solicit the co-operation of the naval force on that station. At Pensacola he found his wishes had been anticipated; Commodore Dallas and Bolton, and Captain Webb, having already directed their attention towards Tampa bay and other inlets of Florida, whither they had ordered marines and munitions of war.

The general, on his way to Pensacola, feeling called upon to take the most prompt and decisive measures to sustain the military post within his command, and secure the peace of the frontier, issued his orders to Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs to receive into service eight companies of the volunteers requested of the governor of Louisiana, and, together with the regular force at Baton Rouge, New Orleans, and other stations in the immediate vicinity of New Orleans, to hold himself in readiness for a movement to Tampa Bay. The whole force amounted to about 1,100 men, including about 700 volunteers. This order was dated at Mobile, the 18th of January.

The general visited Pensacola, as stated, and then proceeded to New Orleans, where he arrived about the 26th. He organized and equipped his force, and moved, on the 4th of February, in three steamboats. He reached Tampa Bay on the 9th, and on the 13th took the field in the enemy's country. It was first designed to search for and defeat a body of Indians reported to have been recently in the neighborhood of Fort Brooke, said to have been in battle, only a day or two before the arrival of the general, with the friendly Indians. Accordingly, the general marched in an easterly direction upon the Alafia river; but at the end of two days, having found two or three fields of turnips and other vegetables, as also fodder tracks, not destroyed by the enemy, it was readily concluded he could not have been in that vicinity in any considerable force; and the general directed his march towards Fort King. He had taken ten days' rations only, but had reason to suppose that a large supply of stores was at Fort King, the quartermaster having shown him an official letter from the quartermaster general, advising him that 120,000 rations had been ordered to that post. The letter was dated the 21st of January.

The march was continued to Fort King, passing on the 20th of February the battle ground of the gallant band cut off under Major Dade on the 28th of December, where we interred the bodies of 106 heroes. No language can do justice to the scene. The remains of our mutilated brothers in arms were found where they had fallen, at their posts—the very position of the advance guard being clearly indicated. Our troops marched to solemn music around the little breastwork which had been hastily thrown up, and where the last of the party were destroyed; each individual lying at the breastworks, where, beyond a doubt, he fell in the execution of his duty. We continued our march a short distance that day; and on the 22d, as if to celebrate the birth of him who was "first in war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen," we arrived at Fort King, and gave an agreeable surprise to one company of artillery, the garrison of that post, which, from its isolated and exposed situation, had been reported in the presses of the country as having been assaulted and destroyed by the Indians. The garrison had, indeed, been exposed but was well prepared to give the enemy a warm reception. The guard, on the approach of General Gaines, was paraded, and the customary honor paid in due form; but where were the hearts of all at that moment? The writer of this confesses "he turned aside to wipe away a tear."

The general, contrary to his reasonable expectations, found no sufficient supply of stores of any kind. The next morning, the 23d, all the horses were sent to Fort Drane, twenty-two miles northwest, with a suitable convoy, for a supply of provisions. The 24th brought us all that could be procured, and it was ascertained to be but seven days' rations, which, with two days' supply found at Fort King, made up all that could be looked for in that quarter. The general had then to decide upon his next movement. To remain at Fort King, without supplies, was out of the question; to proceed further north might embarrass the operations of another officer then ascertained to be employed at Picolata in preparing force and supplies to penetrate the enemy's country. After much and mature deliberation, the general decided to move south again by the battle ground of General Clinch. If the enemy should not be found, the general would, at all events, reach supplies at Tampa Bay. His movements would occupy, and perhaps concentrate the enemy, and tend greatly to give security to the frontier, and enable families to return to their deserted plantations, and in safety recommence their peaceful avocations, the season having arrived for the com-

mencement of planting operations. Lastly, but not the least of the considerations, we might find and beat the enemy.

The general moved from Fort King on the 26th of February, and on the 27th, at 2 o'clock, we were on the right bank of the Withlacoochee, at the place where General Clinch crossed the river the 31st of December preceding. The troops had advanced from Tampa Bay, and to this time the same order of march has been preserved, in three columns, a right, centre, and left, respectively, about one hundred yards distance from each other, with a strong advanced and rear guard—the baggage being in the rear of the centre column. In this order it followed that we struck the river at three points; the advanced guard, as the centre, being at the usual crossing place. The baggage and the rear had been ordered to halt, as the general only designed examining the crossing place. Up to this time no attack or annoyance had been offered us since we left Tampa Bay, and but few of us expected it at the Withlacoochee. We were, therefore, many of us, fully exposed while sounding and examining the river, and our exposure was matter of jocular remark, when, for the first time, on our left flank, a spirited fire was heard, accompanied by the enlivening war yell of the savage. The fight was continued about half an hour, the enemy being on the left bank of the river, when the general ordered the troops to encamp near the river. We lost one killed and eight wounded. On the 28th we moved down the river about two miles, where the banks were less covered with thicket, and the advance guard was here fired upon, and Lieutenant Izard of the United States dragoons, mortally wounded. He fell, but partially recovering himself, commanded his men, with the utmost composure, "to keep their positions and lie close;" a command scarcely less remarkable than that of the lamented Lawrence—"Don't give up the ship." Lieutenant Izard, after five days of suffering, died on the 5th of March, and was buried on the banks of the Withlacoochee—himself a loss too great for the savage foe ever to compensate.

The fight was continued on the 28th, with little or no intermission, from about 9 o'clock until 1 p. m., when we encamped again. During this period the Indians kept up a continuous yell, except during an interval, when they retreated for a short time. We lost this day, beside Lieutenant Izard, one killed, and Captain Sanders, commanding the friendly Indians, and Captain Armstrong, of the United States schooner *Motto*, both volunteers, wounded, the latter slightly. In the evening of this day an express was sent to Fort Drane to report to the officer commanding in that quarter that the enemy had been found in force, and to recommend an immediate movement, crossing the Withlacoochee some distance above, and thence to fall down upon the enemy's rear, which it was hoped would terminate the war.

On the 29th, in the morning, the enemy was silent, but the experience of the general looked upon it as ominous, and he ordered one-third of the command to remain at the breastworks—the remainder of the force being employed in preparing timber and canoes for crossing the river. At about 9 o'clock our working parties were fired upon, and simultaneously a vigorous fire poured into camp from three sides, that nearest the river being the only one not assailed. The firing continued a little over two hours, during which we lost one man killed, and three officers and thirty non-commissioned and privates wounded. The force of the enemy was estimated at twelve hundred or fifteen hundred. General Gaines was wounded by a small rifle ball, which passed through his lower lip, making a very slight wound, but knocking out one lower tooth and slightly fracturing two upper teeth. This was a most startling incident to all as soon as known, but affected everybody more than the gallant hero himself, who, with the most heart-cheering good humor, observed that it was extremely unkind for the enemy to take a tooth from him which he valued so highly. Lieutenant Duncan, of the artillery, was slightly wounded, and Lieutenant E. Smith, of the Louisiana volunteers, was wounded no less than three times. The enemy at length retired in some haste, for, contrary to their custom, they left one of their dead, after dragging the body some distance; they took his rifle, but we found him well supplied with powder and about sixty bullets.

The enemy, contrary to expectation, having crossed the river, it was evidently unnecessary for the troops from Fort Drane to go higher up, and, accordingly, General Gaines sent another express that evening, suggesting the expediency of a movement directly to Camp Izard, (the name he had given his own camp,) requesting, as he had done by the previous express, a supply of six thousand rations of pork, flour, and sugar. On the 2d, 3d, 4th and 5th days of March the enemy fired at intervals, both day and night, upon our camp, which we secured by breastworks of pine logs, within which most of the command enjoyed themselves in conversation, and speculating upon probabilities as to whether supplies would reach us, while our sharpshooters were amusing themselves in picking off the Indians from behind the trees.

As our provisions diminished, we began to inquire into the virtues of roots and the comparative excellence of horse-meat. At a meeting of officers all the corn was thrown into the public crib, and an issue of a pint made to those men whose bread had been exhausted. At length bread, corn, and meat disappeared, and some of the men were two days without food. What was then the feeling in camp? Let it be recorded to the honor of every man, and let no one from false modesty hesitate to yield his feelings to the gratification of noble pride, when he recollects that not a murmur was heard, nor a whisper of retreat circulated from any quarter. Far from it. Some horses were killed, and a very delicate piece was brought to the general at his tent, who found it remarkably tender and well-flavored. We felt very well able to maintain ourselves at least three weeks if necessary, and by that time, at least, the force from above must certainly come down, and the Indians would assuredly be taken. These were our reflections on the night of the 5th, when, at about 10 o'clock, we heard some one calling from the woods and wishing to speak with us. The officer of the guard answered the man, and demanded his designs; he distinctly stated that the Indians were tired of fighting, and wanted to make peace. The general ordered the officer of the guard to answer, that if he wanted to say anything, to come in the morning with a white flag, and he should not be fired upon. He replied, "very well," repeating his desire to come in and have a friendly talk and to shake hands. This was soon circulated throughout the camp, but from the well-known treachery of the Indians we were ordered to be particularly on our guard, and continue so all night.

During the day of the 5th we lost one man killed and had two wounded; the only casualties which had occurred since the 29th. On the morning of the 6th, at about 10 o'clock, about 300 of the Indians filed out from the river and took up a position in our rear, about 500 yards distant. They were armed, and we were fully in the belief that this was a mere feint, supposing the residue of their force in a neighboring hammock, and we were confident of a desperate assault from some other quarter. We were at a stand, waiting their movements some minutes. At length one or two advanced a short distance, and after considerable hesitation on their parts, the result of their fears lest we should entrap them, they approached near enough to be heard, and after being joined by three or four others came within about 200 yards and

repeated what had been declared the night before. The general then directed a staff officer to go out to them and hear what they had to say. It was soon reported to the general that the Indians did not wish to fight any more, but they wanted him to retire from the Withlacoochee. The staff officer was then ordered to return to them, and in the plainest language to tell them the exact truth as to the force ordered into the country to subdue them; that additional force was expected every day; that the time was near when every Indian found with a rifle in his hand would be shot down. This was communicated with such explanations as were deemed necessary to give it force; and they then said they would go and hold a council, and would assemble again in the afternoon to give an answer. In the afternoon they came as before, including, as in the morning, the celebrated Powell, and scarce less celebrated Jumper, with several others, and with the interpreter Abram. The general's staff officer had with him two or three others from our camp at the talk. The Indians repeated much of what they had said in the morning; that they had lost many men by death and wounds, and were tired of the war and wanted peace; but as their governor, as they called him, Micanopy, was not with them, they wanted time to consult him; they therefore asked a cessation of the war. The staff officer, having been previously instructed by the general, told them that if they would engage to cease from all acts of hostility, retire south of the Withlacoochee, and promise to attend a council when called upon by the United States commissioners, they should not for the present be molested. They answered that for themselves they would, and did promise all that was required. At that moment a noise was heard from that portion of the Indians at a distance, and they were seen running towards the river. It was easy to conjecture the cause. Immediately afterwards General Clinch, with 500 men and supplies, came gallantly on; and his advance guard of mounted men, seeing Indians, and not knowing the purpose of their being where they were, formed a line promptly to the left and fired; but the fleetness of the Indians saved them; they were beyond the reach of gunshot, and were soon out of sight and over the river.

Then followed one of the most delightful greetings imaginable. General Clinch's force moved onward, and was soon within hail of friends; and were we not all friends indeed? The new-comers were soon divested of their surplus bread, &c., until their haversacks were emptied and our command feasted. General Clinch brought two days' supply of pork and bread, with sugar, besides about forty head of cattle, many of which did not live out that night.

On the 8th a negro man was sent over the river, who had a wife among the hostiles, with orders to account for his appearance among them in any way he might choose; to see and talk with them; to ascertain their location and wishes. The 9th he did not return, and much doubt prevailed as to the position and disposition of the enemy. On this day, the 9th, General Gaines thought proper to deliver the command over to General Clinch. We all regretted, and yet were pleased with the change; regretted to lose the presence of a tried, experienced, and gallant general, whose deportment commanded respect, whose judgment insured confidence, and whose mild and amiable manners won the affectionate regard of every one; but if a change was deemed a public duty, to whom could the command be assigned with so much satisfaction to his troops as to General Clinch, who came nobly to their aid with all the despatch and all the assistance in his power, and whose manners were an index of his generous and heart-ennobling qualities?

General Clinch, for reasons assigned in orders, directed a movement to this place, to commence on the 10th instant, at ten o'clock. In the midst of a heavy rain the march commenced, and the troops moved about seven miles and encamped. In the evening the negro man who had been sent among the foe came in, and, to our great satisfaction, confirmed in the most precise manner the truth and sincerity of all the Indians had professed. He went among them and found they had moved some fifteen or twenty miles up the river, and had dispersed over a space of some two miles or more, in several encampments. They gave the negro every assurance of a pacific disposition on their part, stated that they had ordered their young men to abstain from war, and that they had seen our men fishing in the river and had abstained from firing upon them. They stated that thirty had been killed in the several battles on the Withlacoochee between the 27th of February and 5th of March. It must be observed that no terms have been offered the Indians; and although there can be no doubt of their having been broken in spirit, it is yet to be seen whether they will suffer the dictation of terms which it is understood are to be imposed on them. It is certainly known through the negro man that they do not wish to go west, and they may refuse to comply with a requirement to do so.

General Gaines arrived at this place to-day, in good health.

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

E. A. HITCHCOCK, *Captain United States Army.*

Hon. FRANCIS S. LYON, *M. C., Washington City.*

No. 150.

CAMP SABINE, *near the Sabine river, May 18, 1836.*

DEAR SIR: I take the liberty to enclose herewith a copy of a letter to a friend on the subject of the late movements in Florida under General Gaines.

I had written nothing relative to that campaign with a view for publication, nor should I now send the enclosed had I not lately seen in some of the papers strange misrepresentations of facts which should not be permitted to pass unnoticed.

I have had time only roughly to sketch the principal features of the campaign, but the letter is at the service of the public, and I shall be obliged by your giving it an insertion in your paper.

I am, with great respect, &c.,

GEO. A. McCALL.

The EDITOR OF THE NEW ORLEANS BULLETIN.

MY DEAR SIR: A rapid change of position and almost constant occupation during the last four months have prevented until now my making the *Florida war* the subject of a letter. The first intelligence of

"actual hostilities" in that section of his military department was received by General Gaines at New Orleans whilst on a tour of inspection to the Gulf posts. The news of the massacre of Dade's detachment had burst like a thunder-clap upon the inhabitants of the great southern emporium. On receiving the official report of this sad disaster General Gaines immediately addressed to the adjutant general at Washington a letter, in which he urged that no time should be lost in applying to the savages on that frontier the last and obvious means of correction, at the same time declaring, from his knowledge of the Seminole Indians and the country they inhabited, his conviction that the only sure means of speedily and effectually terminating the difficulties in that quarter would be to bring into the field an army of at least four thousand men, aided and supported by a strong naval force. Under this impression, he recommended that the sixth and part of the first and seventh regiments of infantry be ordered to Florida, to reinforce the United States troops on the Gulf, and such volunteers from the adjoining States as the emergency might call forth. On the same day he made a requisition on the governor of Louisiana for a regiment of riflemen or infantry, and soon after requested of Commodore Bolton, at Pensacola, the co-operation of such naval force as he might feel authorized to order on that service. Some days subsequent to this, the receipt of intelligence that Fort Brooke (Tampa Bay) was invested by the Indians and negroes, and the garrison in danger of being cut off, determined General Gaines to proceed at once to their relief with what force he might be able to collect at New Orleans. He accordingly wrote by express to General Clinch, who commanded in Florida, and was at that time at Fort King, one hundred miles north of Fort Brooke, that he (General Gaines) would be at the latter post on the 8th of February with seven hundred men. General Clinch, it was understood, would have, by that time, a respectable force (volunteers) from Georgia and the upper counties of Florida. He was accordingly ordered, if strong enough to take the field, to march to the southward in time to effect a junction with General Gaines at or near Fort Brooke. Under these circumstances, General Gaines embarked at New Orleans on the night of the 3d of February, with a brigade of about eleven hundred men—to which number his force had fortunately increased—consisting of six companies of the 4th infantry, under Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs, and a regiment of Louisiana volunteers under the command of General P. F. Smith, adjutant general of the State. The transports, being steamboats, were obliged to touch at Pensacola for wood; and here it was that General Gaines met the adjutant general's letter of the 22d January, which purported to cover the "Order No. 7," directing *General Scott to repair to Florida, "and take command of the troops operating against the Indians in that quarter.*" This Order No. 7 was not enclosed, nor did General Gaines see it until his arrival at Fort King, sixteen days afterwards. This fact may be a matter of no great import, but as the continuance of the movement from Pensacola to Tampa, after his being notified that such an order had been issued, is one of the two prominent features of the campaign that has been very unhesitatingly criticised and condemned in some of the popular prints, it may be well to examine what might have been the consequences had he abandoned the expedition at that advanced stage of its progress.

In command of a military department, he had received at a point far distant from the seat of federal government, whence alone special or new instructions could be sent him, the intelligence of a great and unlooked-for disaster having occurred on the extreme southern frontier of the country, occupied by the left wing of his division; he learned the melancholy news that a large white settlement had been *overrun, sacked, and burnt*, and many of the inhabitants killed; the United States agent of Indian affairs murdered; eight valuable officers and ninety-eight brave soldiers of his division cut to pieces by an overwhelming savage foe! and he was aware that the military posts on the borders of the Indian country, viz: Forts Brooke, King, and Drane, with the station at Key West, all within his military department, were without any other work of defence than such as a daring leader with five hundred men might, at the risk of little loss, take and destroy in a few hours, the garrisons of three of those posts being insufficient for their defence. What, then, was the duty of the commander of the department? Had he hesitated one single moment he would indeed have merited the stern opprobrium of his fellow-citizens. He did not hesitate. He collected what force he could, and marched immediately for the theatre of war. On the route, and within two days' march (by steam) of the Indian borders, he received a notification that General Scott had been ordered to repair from the city of Washington to Florida, "and take command of the troops operating against the Indians in that quarter." At the same time he was informed that "the state of affairs west of the Mississippi might soon require his attention, if not his presence, in that quarter;" and he was directed to await further orders in the city of New Orleans. Had hostilities actually existed on the Louisiana frontier, and General Gaines received an order to repair thither immediately, it is difficult to say whether the historian would have approved or condemned his conduct at that stage of the game, had he obeyed the order, and, by so doing, left General Clinch, in expectation of a promised co-operation, to extricate himself as he could from any difficulty into which the failure on the part of General Gaines in preconcerted movements might peradventure throw him. *And without General Gaines, the volunteers, his principal force, were unwilling to proceed;* for, before they left New Orleans, he had pledged himself to accompany them whithersoever they went, and to stand by them as long as they would stand by him in repressing the rising spirit of savage devastation. Moreover, he was firmly persuaded that the instructions from the War Department, requiring him to await further orders in the city of New Orleans, were forwarded before that department could possibly have received a detail of the circumstances which rendered the *immediate* movement to Florida not only proper, but imperative.

A little reflection determined him to continue the movement until the President should be apprised of all the particular circumstances attending it, or until the officer authorized to operate in his department should make his appearance in person in that part of the country which constituted the principal theatre of the war, or the Indians be subdued and the security of the frontier re-established. This view of the subject is based upon a sound principle of military law, and is supported by the ablest writers of all enlightened nations whose arms have been crowned with success. Had General Gaines failed to comply with this wise precept—had he disregarded this sacred injunction, he well knew that he might suffer the enemy to defeat a body of troops expecting his co-operation, and consequently leave the citizens dwelling within the limits of his command quivering beneath the upraised tomahawk and the blood-stained scalping-knife.

Was it his duty, under such circumstances, to abandon an expedition on the prosecution of which the safety of the border people possibly hung; or was it his duty to strike promptly at the enemy, if possible subdue him, or at all events endeavor to check his devastations until the President should have notice of his strength and the determined spirit with which he seemed prepared to carry on the war?

General Gaines proceeded to Tampa Bay. On his arrival at Fort Brooke, he learned that the day previous a party of about one hundred of the friendly Indians had been attacked near the fort, and driven

in by a superior force. The country occupied by the hostile tribes lying between Forts Brooke and King, no communication had been kept up between those posts since the massacre of Major Dade's command; and, consequently, General Gaines, on arriving at the first-named station, was unable to gather any information from which he could form even a tolerable conjecture of General Clinch's strength or movements; but, relying on the co-operation of that officer, he determined, as soon as his horses could be landed, to place a sufficient garrison in the pickets, and with the remainder of his force march out to meet him.

Owing to the expense and difficulties attending the transportation of horses from New Orleans by sea, the baggage train brought with the brigade was necessarily small, and the expectation that the requisite number to complete the train might be procured at Tampa was not realized; the horses and cattle in that vicinity having been stolen or lost during the alarm which broke up the settlement and drove the families for protection to the fort. Some half dozen Indian ponies were, I believe, all that the quartermaster could procure to add to the number brought from New Orleans. The question, then, among both officers and soldiers was not "what they might get along with," but "what they could do without on their march?" Ten days' rations were issued to the troops, (five of which were to be carried in the haversacks,) and on the morning of the 13th the brigade took the field. The order of march was three columns, with an advance and a strong rear guard. The right was four companies of the second artillery, acting as infantry, commanded by Major Bolton; the centre seven companies of the fourth infantry, under Lieutenant Colonel Foster; the left and rear being composed of the Louisiana volunteers, under Colonel Smith and Lieutenant Colonel Lawson, Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs acting as brigadier.

The friendly Indians, who, to the number of seventy-seven, accompanied the brigade, having reported their belief that the war party which attacked them a few days before was not only formidable, but was probably still encamped on the Alafia river at a point some fifteen miles from Fort Brooke and seven from the main road to Fort King, General Gaines made a detour to the right for the purpose of breaking it up, and driving before him this band of marauders. On the second day's march, however, it was ascertained that the enemy had not been at Alafia in any strength; and the troops, having received two additional rations which had been directed to meet them by water at Warren's, proceeded on their route. On approaching the Withlacoochee, on Dade's line of march, and some thirty miles above Clinch's battle ground, the friendly Indians expressed their firm belief that a vigorous attack would be made the following day, and urged strenuously that they might be permitted to return home, *i. e.*, to Fort Brooke. This faltering on the approach of battle created some surprise, not unmingled with distrust of their fidelity. A half hour's talk, however, reassured them, and they moved on without evincing any further timidity.

The expected attack, however, was not made, and the brigade arrived, without annoyance, at Dade's battle ground, where funeral honors were paid to the gallant band, who had left on the trees around abundant proof of a field nobly contested against an overwhelming foe. The sad scene can never be erased from the memory of those who witnessed it; but its images, still vivid in the mind, recall feelings too painful to permit me to dwell longer upon a scene which has already been described by many.

Up to this time—the eighth day since he marched from Fort Brooke—General Gaines had been in hourly expectation of meeting Clinch; and the fall of a towering pine, which, in those extensive wilds, produces a sound it is difficult to distinguish from the report of distant artillery, was on two occasions the cause of long and animated discussion among all ranks, whilst at the end of every mile some further indication of Clinch's approach was looked for. Knowing the promptness of that officer, General Gaines could not now but apprehend that some serious obstacle had arisen to prevent the desired junction. Being only about forty miles from Fort King, the general felt bound to proceed thither to ascertain the situation of Clinch's command, and, if possible, gain some information with regard to the movements of the enemy. His only doubt with regard to the expediency of proceeding thither was on the score of provisions. This he mentioned to me on Dade's battle ground, while a party detailed for the purpose was collecting the bodies of the slain for burial. He concluded by saying that the men had with them enough to carry them back to Tampa, if he returned immediately, and that there were abundant supplies; but that, if he proceeded to Fort King, he might not find a sufficient provision to make that position the basis of his operations without embarrassing General Clinch, with whom he desired to co-operate, or General Scott, should he have arrived. I then remarked that an officer had just mentioned to me that the quartermaster had received, before he left Fort Brooke, a letter from the quartermaster general, notifying him that 120,000 rations had been ordered to Fort King in January preceding. This letter was immediately called for. It was from the Quartermaster General's office, and dated the 19th (nineteenth) of January. The passage that had been referred to was as follows:

"Large supplies of provisions have been ordered from New York for Fort King, and thirty thousand rations to St. Augustine from the same place."

This was the first time General Gaines saw the letter in question, or knew that a large additional supply had been ordered from New York to Fort King. He had brought a large supply of subsistence and forage to Tampa Bay, and had written to General Clinch to that effect from New Orleans, intending to make Tampa the basis of his operations. But now, unable to gain the least information of General Clinch's strength or movements, or those of the enemy, in any other way than by proceeding to Fort King, the acquisition of the information above detailed removed the only doubt he had entertained with regard to the expediency of the measure. He decided to push on without delay, and the order to march was given the moment the simple but solemn funeral rites of the band of heroes was concluded. I have been thus precise in this part of my narrative, because a want of knowledge of the circumstances attending this measure has caused the whole movement to be so misconstrued as to lay General Gaines liable to the charge of dashing heedlessly into the wilderness without any plan of operations—suffering himself to be separated by a wide district of the enemy's country from the depot of his supplies, and thus exposing his men to hardships and privations as profitless.

But this is the second principal feature of the campaign that has been most unhesitatingly criticised, of which more anon. To return to the thread of my narrative.

The troops reached Fort King on the 22d of February, without meeting with any accident worthy of remark. A single company of the 3d artillery constituted the garrison of this station. General Clinch, with his principal force, was at Fort Drane, twenty-two miles to the northwest. With great regret General Gaines now learned that Clinch had not received the expected reinforcements from the northern borders of the Territory, but two volunteer companies having joined him from that quarter. His force was four companies of artillery and one of infantry, and the two companies of volunteers I have mentioned. General Gaines was not less disappointed when he was told that the supply of provisions at

these two posts (King and Drane) was little more than sufficient for their support. Whether this disappointment was consequent to a reasonable expectation or not I shall not pretend to determine. The simple facts from which must be determined the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the conclusion drawn from the information received by General Gaines on the battle ground are these: The troops had marched from Fort Brooke on the 13th with ten days' rations; at the Alafia they received two days' rations, brought thither by water, making in all twelve—that is, they were provisioned to include the 24th of February. On the 20th of February General Gaines saw the letter of the 19th January, already alluded to. From the date of the letter to the day he saw it, inclusive, is thirty-two days; and to the 24th of February, the day to which his troops had been provisioned, is thirty-six days. The supplies had been ordered on the 19th; how long before that he knew not. The facilities of water transportation from New York to the mouth of the St. John's river, and up that river by steam to Picolata, whence it is about seventy miles to Fort Drane and ninety-two to Fort King, led to the conclusion that, in thirty-six days, the supply would have reached its destination. The roads the troops had travelled were in fine order, the season having been remarkably dry. We were told no rain had fallen from some time in September till the day before we reached Dade's battle ground, when there was a slight rain.

At Fort King it was learned that preparations were making for the campaign at Picolata, under direction of General Scott. It was thought, however, that he would not be enabled to take the field with any considerable force for some time.

Finding he could expect no immediate co-operation from a quarter where he had expected to meet a considerable force, Clinch's command being barely sufficient to supply the necessary escorts to the provision wagons between Picolata and Fort Drane, and unwilling to draw upon the nucleus of supplies here collecting, General Gaines decided on returning immediately to Tampa Bay, and making that the basis of his operations. He informed General Clinch of this, and requested barely a sufficient supply to last him on the march. He had marched from Fort Brooke to Fort King by the main route—the common wagon road. This road is longer by a day's march than the route by Chocochater. He therefore determined to return by the latter. It was, indeed, the opinion at Fort King that the Indians had established themselves near the point at which this track crosses the Withlacoochee, viz: Clinch's battle ground. If so, so much the better—he might beat them by the way; at any rate, the movement of 1,000 men through the country occupied by the Indians would have the effect of keeping them concentrated, and therefore relieve the frontier from petty depredations. Of the 77 friendly Indians who accompanied the brigade from Fort Brooke, ten returned with it, the balance remaining with General Clinch. These men, who acted as guides, promised to find a ford somewhere near the point at which General Clinch had crossed.

On the 27th General Gaines reached the Withlacoochee at this point, and a half hour or more had been passed in searching for the ford, when the enemy opened a fire from the opposite bank. The stream is about forty yards wide, but deep and rapid. A few companies were immediately brought into action, and very soon the fire became general from the left to the centre. This skirmish, the first bush fighting the men had seen, lasted half an hour. The loss of the troops was one killed and seven wounded. The troops encamped near the river, and the guides declared the ford must be about three miles below, where a trail leading to the right struck the river. The next morning, by sunrise, the three columns marched for the point indicated, on reaching which a spirited fire was immediately opened from the opposite bank; it was quickly returned, and continued, with occasional intermissions, till one o'clock. In the early part of this action Lieutenant Izard, a gallant soldier, was mortally wounded. The loss this day was one killed and three wounded. The stream at this point also proved too deep to be forded; and the guides, who had been accustomed to hunt in the lower country, and had not been in this section for many years, were totally at fault. The banks of the stream, however, at this point, were less thickly clad with the customary undergrowth, and the general determined to cross. A detail was accordingly made to prepare canoes, and the flooring of a pontoon bridge; and the cheerful sound of the axe was soon mingled with the crack of the rifle and the animating war-cry. At four o'clock p. m. a distant, but very loud, whooping was heard, which indicated the approach of a large reinforcement to the enemy from the opposite side. The friendly Indians immediately declared it to be Micanopy, whose force they estimated at 800 warriors.

General Gaines, then satisfied that the whole force of the enemy was in the field, considered the opportunity of bringing the war to a close too favorable to be lost. Under this impression he sent an express to General Clinch, recommending an immediate movement of the force under him, with an additional supply of ammunition and provisions. Clinch was desired to cross the river some ten miles above, and move down on the left bank. General Gaines added that he would, in the meantime, endeavor to amuse the enemy, prepare his boats, &c., for crossing, but would not cross until he heard from Fort Drane, where General Clinch expected by this time some accession to his force.

By this movement it was believed the two brigades would be enabled to attack the enemy in front and rear at the same time, and probably terminate the war in a few days. The customary log breastwork was thrown up, about three feet high, and the troops slept undisturbed that night. The following morning an attack was thought not improbable from some quarter, and one-third of the men were kept on duty at the breastwork. At ten o'clock a. m. the working parties were fired upon, and immediately afterwards a dashing attack was made on three sides of the camp. The Indians advanced boldly and fired with great rapidity, but not with precision. At one time they set fire to the high grass and palmetto on the windward side of the camp, and made a bold dash under cover of the smoke, which, mingled with flame, came rolling towards the breastwork like a heavy sea. The fire was coolly extinguished, and the audacity of the assailants punished by Louisiana riflemen. The fight lasted till a few minutes past 12 o'clock m., when the enemy withdrew. Their numbers were estimated, by those considered the best judges, at 1,500. The troops having the advantage of the slight breastwork before mentioned, lost this day only one sergeant killed, and thirty-four officers and men wounded. Among the latter was General Gaines himself. The loss of the enemy was considerable, the troops firing with a coolness and precision that would do honor to veterans. Nor should the 29th of February be passed without bestowing a word of praise on the marked gallantry of these red assailants, who fought—many an old Indian fighter present said—"as Indians never fought before."

As the Indians had crossed the river, a runner was sent that night to General Clinch, informing him of the occurrences of the morning. In concluding this letter, General Gaines said, "I have abstained and shall abstain from a sortie till I hear from you, in expectation that this course will tend to keep them together, whilst a sortie might contribute to disperse them. I am now satisfied that a direct movement to this place is more desirable than to cross the river higher up, as I suggested in my letter of yesterday. I am, moreover, of opinion that, if mounted men can be obtained in a few days, your force should not

move from Fort Drane without that description of troops." The Indians move with too much celerity to be pursued in that country, with any chance of success, by any other than mounted men. The following day, March 1, there was light skirmishing, and occasional shots were fired at those who passed out of camp.

On the morning of the 2d of March an attack was made nearly as vigorous as that of the 29th, and was kept up for one hour; but the troops having raised the breastwork, sustained little loss. It was possible that General Clinch might arrive this afternoon, and many of the men who were getting hungry, began to look eagerly for his appearance; though when they were told that, if he should be detained by the non-arrival of the mounted men, it might yet be some days before they received a supply of provisions, in which case they must be content to dine on horse-meat until they could do better. I do not think there was a man but declared his willingness to do so, as long as there was a prospect of bringing the war to a successful termination by so doing. All the corn in camp was turned in, as common stock, and afforded about a pint per man, and afterwards some horses were killed, and the meat regularly issued. The 3d, 4th, and 5th of March did not produce any incidents greatly differing from those of the preceding days. The Indians were frequently firing into the camp, by night as well as by day, generally selecting the hour of guard mounting or parade, when the men were most exposed. Our sharp-shooters, however, kept them at long shots, and their bullets whistled through the camp without doing much execution. On these occasions, as usual, the woods rung with the animating war-cry. During this time the troops lost but one man killed and two wounded.

At 10 o'clock p. m. on the 5th some one was heard hailing the camp. It was at first supposed to be a return express from Fort Drane, who was thus giving notice of his approach, lest he should be fired on by the sentinels. He was told to advance. In a few moments a negro called out at the top of his voice, "The Indians are tired of fighting, and wish to come in to-morrow to shake hands." He was told that if they had anything to say, they might come in the morning with a white flag, and they would be heard; whereupon he retired, bidding us a hearty "good night." At 10 o'clock a. m. on the 6th 300 warriors, or thereabout, drew up in line facing the rear of the camp, at the distance of 450 or 500 yards. After some delay and apparent hesitation on their part, two or three advanced about half way, with a white flag. Here they were met by Adjutant Barrow, to whom they communicated their desire to have a talk with General Gaines. Captain Hitchcock, acting inspector general, was then sent to hear what they had to say. He returned and reported that the Indians did not wish to fight any more, but that they were desirous that the troops should withdraw from the Withlacoochee. They said they had lost a great many warriors, and were unwilling to lose any more, except in the course of nature, or perchance by the fall of a forest tree. The celebrated Ocoola was much dejected and apparently subdued in spirit. Captain Hitchcock was directed to return and tell them that a large force would soon be in the field, and the inevitable consequence of their refusing to come to terms would be the destruction of a great portion of the nation. They expressed a desire to treat with General Gaines, and said they would hold a council on the subject, and give their answer in the afternoon. They returned at the appointed time, and again expressed their desire to make peace with General Gaines, but said their act could not be binding without the sanction of Micanopy, the principal chief, who had gone to his town. They said they would send for him and then sign a treaty. Captain Hitchcock then communicated to them what he had been instructed to say, viz: that General Gaines had no authority to treat with them, but that if they would return to the south side of the Withlacoochee, and remain there without molesting the inhabitants of the country, until the United States commissioners should appoint a time and place to meet them, they should not for the present be disturbed. The chiefs present gave their promise to do so. At this moment General Clinch's advance came in sight of the party that had accompanied the chiefs, and, not knowing what was passing at the camp, wheeled into a line and poured a volley upon the Indians, who immediately fled and crossed the river, as did the chiefs who were with Captain Hitchcock, fearing, no doubt, they would be shot down. This broke up the conference.

The brigade with Clinch were met with heartfelt greetings. He brought the greater part of the garrison from Fort Drane, and a squadron of mounted men, raised in the counties immediately north of Fort Drane; and with them all the supplies his slender means of transportation would allow, together with 40 head of beef cattle. From this time up to the 9th of March the Indians remained true to their promise to abstain from hostilities, our men having frequently during these days fished and bathed in the river without molestation. Micanopy, however, did not arrive, and General Gaines decided this day (see Order No. 7) to place the troops under the command of General Clinch, whose gallantry and decision had proved him so worthy of the trust, and prepared to return immediately to New Orleans, in pursuance of the instructions he had received at Pensacola.

On the 10th General Clinch took up the line of march for Fort Drane. That night a negro, who had a wife among the hostile Indians, and among whom he had been sent on the 8th, returned and reported that they assured him of their intention to adhere to their promises; and told him they would meet the whites on the Withlacoochee in five days, and bring with them all the principal chiefs. They said they had seen our men fishing, but, desiring to be at peace, did not fire on them.

The troops encamped about three miles south of Fort Drane; thither General Gaines proceeded, and soon after set out on his return to New Orleans, by the way of Tallahassee and Pensacola. At New Orleans he received the instructions from the War Department relative to this frontier, and immediately proceeded to Fort Jesup.

This is a rough sketch, but you may rely on the facts, and you are at liberty to make use of the letter if you think proper, for the information of the public.

With constant regard, I am your most obedient servant,

GEORGE A. McCALL, *Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 151.

Extract from a letter from Brigadier General Clinch to General R. Jones, adjutant general, dated

Fort King, January 22, 1835.

SIR: I wrote you a few days since, *via* St. Augustine, but, as the letter may not reach you as soon as by the regular mail-route, I have thought it proper to write you again, on a subject which formed part of my last communication.

In that communication I stated that if it was the intention of the government to remove the Seminole Indians west in the spring, with or without their consent, it would be necessary, in my opinion, to send four additional companies to this post and two to Fort Brooke, and two six-pounders to each post. The more I see of this tribe of Indians the more fully I am convinced that they have not the least intention of fulfilling their treaty stipulations, unless compelled to do so by a stronger force than mere words. Their minds have been so completely perverted by a set of interested and designing men that no argument or reasoning will have the least influence with them except the argument of *force*; and if a sufficient military force to overawe them is not sent into the nation, they will not be removed, and the whole frontier may be laid waste by a combination of the Indians, Indian negroes, and the negroes on the plantations. It is useless to mince this question—it should be met, and met firmly, if their treaty is to be carried into effect; and I do not hesitate to state, and I do so from some small knowledge of the Indian character, that a large majority of this nation have not the most distant idea of going west, and they will not do so unless compelled by a strong military force. I have therefore felt it my duty to make known to the general-in-chief my views on this subject, and to call for a sufficient military force completely equipped for active field service, (and not with thirteen rounds of cartridges per man,) so as to enable me to assume any attitude that the government may think proper to order me to take in relation to this wilfully deluded tribe.

I am, with high respect, your obedient servant,

D. L. CLINCH, *Brevet Brig. Gen., Col. 4th Infantry, Commanding.*

Extract from a letter from General Clinch to General Jones, adjutant general, dated

St. Augustine, October 8, 1835.

SIR: The time will soon arrive when a large number of the Seminole tribe of Indians have agreed to remove to the west.

There are still, however, a large number that are unwilling to remove, and from recent indications I am induced to believe that force will have to be used to compel them to comply with their treaty stipulations. When the peculiar nature, extent, and exposed state of the Indian frontier are taken into consideration, it will, I think, be readily admitted that the force placed under my command is inadequate to enforce a compliance with their treaty and to give such protection to the frontier settlements as their apprehensions from the Indians, and from *another species of population*, induce them to expect from the government. Under this view of the case, I am induced respectfully to submit a few remarks for the consideration of the general-in-chief, and, if approved by him, for that of the proper department. I consider the force already in Florida sufficient to meet and control the whole of the refractory Seminoles if they could be concentrated. But when scattered over a large extent of country, composed of marshes and swamps that are almost impenetrable to the white man, it is entirely inadequate to give that protection and quiet to the frontier inhabitants which they expect.

Frequent applications have already been made from different sections of the country for protection, in case we should have any difficulty in removing the Seminoles, and some of the most respectable planters fear that there is already a secret and improper communication carried on between the refractory Indians, Indian negroes, and some of the plantation negroes. For the better protection of the frontier settlements, and to stop all intercourse between the Indians and plantations, in case any difficulty should arise in removing the Indians, I strongly and respectfully urge and recommend the calling into the service of the United States, for the terms of two or three months, 150 mounted volunteers, to be stationed at such points as the commanding officer may think best to effect the object in view, and not to be ordered within the Indian boundary unless in case of absolute necessity. This force to be held ready, but not to be called into actual service until required, and to be disbanded as soon as their services could be dispensed with.

This species of force would, in my opinion, owing to the nature of the country, be the most efficient and least expensive, under all the circumstances of the case, that could be employed. Being well mounted, and all of them good woodsmen, good riders, and well acquainted with every part of the country, and many of them deeply interested in its protection, would give them a decided advantage over any other species of troops for the kind of service they would be required to perform, and I have no doubt they could be raised without any difficulty.

I have the honor further to request that one of the revenue cutters stationed on the Gulf of Mexico may be ordered to cruise along the coast from Charlotte's harbor to Tampa Bay, between the first of December and the first of January next, to co-operate with Brevet Major Dade's command in ordering in and securing, if necessary, all the Indians they may find on that coast; and on their arrival at Tampa Bay to remain subject to the orders of the officer commanding the troops in Florida. A small armed vessel of that class would, in my opinion, aid our operations very much, and could be placed on that kind of duty for a short time without the least injury to the revenue service.

The service assigned me and the troops under my command is arduous, disagreeable and perplexing, and without the least prospect of reaping any honor; but it will be cheerfully performed to the best of my abilities.

I feel deeply anxious to remove the Seminole nation without resorting to force; but being on the ground and in possession of all the facts, I feel it my duty to state them for the information of the general-in-chief and the Department of War, and to give it as my opinion that we shall have to strike a blow at the Mickasky tribes before they will surrender the murderers of Dalton, or agree to comply with their treaty. This, however, will be the last alternative; but I earnestly request that the government will place the means in my hands to enable me, when it becomes absolutely necessary, to strike effectually, and to give protection to the frontier settlements; otherwise many lives and much property may be lost.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

D. L. CLINCH, *Brev. Brig. Gen., Col. 4th Infantry, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington.*

Extract from a letter from General Clinch to General Jones, adjutant general, dated

St. AUGUSTINE, October 17, 1835.

SIR: The enclosed copy of a letter from Lieutenant Colonel Fanning is submitted for the consideration of the general-in-chief. My first wish is to carry out the humane and benevolent views of the government in relation to the Seminole Indians, in the way most conducive to their comfort and happiness, and least expensive to the nation. With these objects constantly in view, I may have rather underestimated the means necessary to carry into effect the views and plans of the government. By referring, however, to my letter of the 18th of January last, you will perceive that I requested that six companies might be added to the command in Florida, four of which only were ordered to Fort King. In my communication of the 8th instant I state: "I consider the whole force already in Florida sufficient to meet and control the whole of the refractory Seminoles, if they could be concentrated. But when scattered over a large extent of country, composed of marshes and swamps that are almost impenetrable to the white man, it is entirely inadequate to give that protection and quiet to the frontier inhabitants which they expect."

Since writing the foregoing I have been informed, by Assistant Surgeon Archer, that nearly 100 of the command now at Fort King have been more or less sick, within the last two or three months, and, although many of them are fit for garrison duty, and most of the others are convalescent, they cannot be relied on for active and efficient service. I therefore have the honor respectfully to request that three additional companies be ordered to Fort King, with as little delay as practicable, with an ample supply of ball and buck-shot cartridges.

Should this request be complied with, and the companies ordered from the north, it would be economy of time and money to engage transports, drawing not more than eight feet water, to take the troops direct to the St. John's river, and land them on the west side of that river, opposite to Picolata, where there is a good road leading to Fort King, and from which place transportation could be sent to meet them, if timely notice is given to the commanding officer at that post.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

D. L. CLINCH, *Brev. Brig. Gen., Col. 4th Infantry, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, &c.

Extract from a letter from General Clinch to General Jones, adjutant general, dated

FORT DEFIANCE, *Micanopy, December 9, 1835.*

SIR: The uncertainty as to the time when the companies ordered from Louisiana will reach Tampa Bay, and the distance they will have to march through a hostile country before they can join my command, induces me to request that four additional companies be ordered to join me with the least possible delay, completely prepared to take the field, with a good supply of ball and buck-shot cartridges. It is also very desirable to have fifty good muskets and fifty rifles sent at the same time, as there is a great deficiency of arms in the country.

All the information I receive in relation to the movements of the Indians represent them as being in considerable force, and manifesting a determination to engage in murder and plunder. It appears, also, that they are joined by the negroes, and if they are not promptly put down this spirit may extend to the plantations.

If additional troops should be sent, they should be landed on the west bank of the St. John's, at Picolata, and marched from thence to Fort King.

I am, with high respect, your most obedient servant,

D. L. CLINCH, *Brev. Brig. Gen., Col. 4th Infantry, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

Extract from a letter from General Clinch to General Jones, adjutant general, dated

HEADQUARTERS TROOPS IN FLORIDA, *Fort Drane, December 16, 1835.*

SIR: It is also very much to be regretted, as our Indian affairs have taken the course they have, that the four additional companies had not been ordered from the Atlantic instead of the Gulf, as in that event they could have joined before this, and I should have been in sufficient force to have operated, as soon as a sufficient quantity of provisions could have been placed in store at Fort King. As it is, it is impossible for me to form any idea when they will arrive at Tampa Bay, between which place and Fort King, a distance of 100 miles, through the centre of the hostile part of the Seminole nation, there is no communication, the Indians having, in several instances, stopped the runners, taken and broken open the letters.

Thus, you will perceive, when the seven companies assemble at Fort Brooke, that my force will be equally divided, and neither part strong enough to effect much in a country like this.

I am, sir, &c.,

D. L. CLINCH.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General.*

Extract from a letter from General Clinch to General Jones, dated

HEADQUARTERS TROOPS IN FLORIDA, *January 11, 1836.*

SIR: Commodore Dallas has not informed me what direction he has given to the armed vessel ordered by the Secretary of the Navy to co-operate in the removal of the Indians.

I am prepared to meet, and treat with silent contempt, the thousand false and malicious statements that are going the rounds of the newspapers in relation to the operations of the troops in Florida; but I feel it due to my honor and reputation to say that I consider the Secretary of War has, (although I feel confident it was unintentional on his part,) in his official communication to the President of the United States, under date of the 30th November, 1835, done me a very serious injury. In that report he states that "General Clinch has 14 companies placed under his command," which has induced the people of the United States to believe that I have actually had that number of companies disposable, and prepared to take the field; when, in fact, I have had but six reduced companies, as it required one of the seven companies at Fort King to defend that place.

At the time the Secretary's report was written the 14 companies alluded to by him were stationed at the different military posts as follows :

1 company at Fort Marion, St. Augustine.

6 at Fort King.

2 at Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay.

1 at Key West, (the captain commanding it on leave of absence without my knowledge.)

2 on their way from Fort Pickens, (Pensacola,) and Fort Morgan, Alabama, to Fort Brooke, and 2 waiting orders at Forts Pike and Wood, (Louisiana.)

Seven of the companies were ordered to concentrate at Fort Brooke, 4 of which were ordered to proceed 100 miles, to Fort King, before the Indians commenced their hostile operations. Since which all communication has been cut off between the two places.

The loss of the public supplies, in November last, has caused great inconvenience, as it has taken nearly one-third of the regular troops to guard the provisions, &c., from Picolata to this post and Fort King. I hope a sufficient regular force to enable me to take and keep the field has, ere this, been ordered into Florida.

I am, sir, your most obedient,

D. L. CLINCH.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General.*

No. 152.

ASSISTANT QUARTERMASTER'S OFFICE, *New Orleans, August 16, 1836.*

SIR: I have this day seen a publication, in the National Intelligencer of the 27th July, taken from the New York Star, on the subject of the campaign in East Florida. The writer, in speaking of the arrival of the army at Tampa Bay, says: We there learned that the quartermaster at New Orleans, influenced by the representations made, or caused (as it was said) to be made, by General Gaines, that the war was closed, had abstained from sending on provisions he had been ordered to forward from that place. The whole of this part of his statement is incorrect. When or how he obtained this information I know not. General Gaines, on his return to New Orleans, told me to continue to send supplies, which was done promptly. Every exertion was made, both by myself and the assistant commissary, to obtain and forward the subsistence and forage required. There was great difficulty in obtaining hard bread, and every barrel that could be had was immediately shipped.

On the 31st of March the assistant commissary at Fort Brooke forwarded a statement to the assistant commissary at New Orleans of the supplies on hand—216,750 rations of meat, 304,423 rations of bread and flour, and the small rations in proportion; at this time there were two vessels on the way, laden with subsistence and forage; and the bills of lading show that they were received on the 6th of April, in good condition. Now, it appears the army arrived at Tampa Bay the 3d, 4th, and 5th April, and remained but a few days before they took their departure, and I cannot perceive where was the necessity of provisions, unless it was in the hard bread. This was unavoidable, for it could not be obtained, that is, the quantity required.

My object in making this statement is to correct the error that General Gaines had, in any way, contributed to the withholding supplies from the army in Florida; also to show that there was no cessation on the part of the commissary or myself in procuring and forwarding the supplies at the earliest period possible. The proofs of this are contained in my list of shipments, now at Washington.

I have the honor to be, sir, with high respect, your obedient servant,

J. CLARK, *Assistant Quartermaster.*

Major T. Cross, *Acting Quartermaster General, Washington City.*

No. 153.

PICOLATA, *Florida, March 1, 1836.*

GENERAL: I have to-day reported myself to Major General Scott at this place, after being detained four days by sickness on the way.

The department here is deficient in means of transportation. I am told that wagons and horses are daily expected from Savannah, but cannot ascertain the number so expected. The road from this to Fort Drane (sixty-five miles) is a very bad one, parts of it deep sand, and other parts boggy, so that the teams cannot take more than half loads.

Fort Drane is at General Clinch's plantation, twenty miles nearly north of Fort King. It is the intention of General Scott to organize his principal army at the former place.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

S. SHANNON, *Assistant Quartermaster.*

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Quartermaster General U. S. A., Washington.*

No. 154.

TAMPA BAY, *Florida*, April 11, 1836.

GENERAL: Though I have been five days at this place I have not had time to make even my monthly papers for the last month, but will forward them by the next conveyance that offers.

The right wing of the army, under the immediate orders of General Clinch, arrived here five days ago, having crossed the Withlacoochee at General Gaines's camp, from which point a road was cut for the wagon train, as the army marched to this place on the west side of the Hillsborough river. We found here the central army under Colonel Lindsay, and part of the left under General Eustis; the other part being encamped fifteen miles north of this on the Fort King road.

Yesterday the Louisiana regiment, about six hundred strong, embarked for Charlotte's harbor, where they will be joined by two hundred mounted men from South Carolina, to make a tour to Pease creek, where it is said a few hundred of the hostile Indians are located.

Boats are now constructing here to transport stores up the Withlacoochee; so soon as finished, (will be about three days,) a command will be sent with stores to the mouth of that river, and up it fifteen or twenty miles, to a suitable position for a depot; then the right wing will return by nearly the same route to the large hammocks in the vicinity of the forks of the Withlacoochee; the centre and left will march by the Fort King road, and turn to the left, so as to approach the same hammocks on the east side. The whole will be in motion on or about the 13th instant.

We are still wanting in sufficient means of transportation, and have not now the time to increase it; a number of horses (180) and wagons were required by Assistant Quartermaster Newcomb from Major Clark, which have not yet come to hand, though time sufficient has elapsed; and it is presumed they will not be sent, as we learn that Major Clark has been told by an officer of rank from the seat of war that the war is over, and concludes, of course, that they will not be wanted.

In almost any other country the means we have would be sufficient; having with the right wing, for two thousand troops, about twenty-four four and five horse wagons, besides a small allowance of two-horse wagons to the troops, for the transportation of tents, &c. The other two armies have not quite so much in proportion to their strength. But the state of the roads will not admit of the wagons being over half loaded, and the horses and mules with the greatest care fail and break down to an alarming extent. We have lost many by death on the last march.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your very obedient servant,

S. SHANNON, *Assistant Quartermaster.*

Major General THOMAS S. JESSE, *Quartermaster General, U. S. A., Washington.*

No. 155.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *May 16, 1836.*

SIR: I enclose for your information the copy of a letter this day addressed to Governor Call. The general views of the President as to the measures necessary for the defence of Florida are therein stated; and this letter, together with that to you of May 5, from the adjutant general, will communicate all the information which seems requisite as to the opinions entertained here upon the subject. I have to request that you would make such arrangements as the circumstances call for, so as to afford adequate protection to the settlements until it shall be deemed proper again to renew offensive operations.

General Clinch has tendered his resignation, but the President is not willing to accept it, having confidence in his experience and military capacity. You are at liberty to leave Florida and resume the command of your department, whenever you think you can do so with a just regard to public interest. You will turn over the command to Brigadier General Clinch, or, if he leaves the service, to the next officer in rank, furnishing such instructions as you shall think proper.

The latest information from the Creek country in Alabama leads to the opinion that the Creek Indians meditate hostilities. The governors of Alabama and Georgia have been authorized to call out such militia as may be necessary; and General Fenwick has been ordered to proceed to that country with six companies of artillery. It is desirable that you should direct your personal attention to that quarter, and, if necessary, assume the command, calling for such a militia force, under your instructions of January 21, as you may find necessary.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LEWIS CASS.

Major General SCOTT, *St. Augustine, Florida.*

No. 156.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *May 16, 1836.*

SIR: I have received your letter of May 4. You will perceive that while Major General Scott is in Florida, charged with the general measures of defence, it would not do for this department to authorize the organization and employment of a force independent of his authority. Still, however, if any portion of the frontier is left without defence, and the inhabitants exposed to danger, the President will sanction the calling out by you of a force necessary to repel the attacks of the Indians. You may rely upon every disposition being felt here to afford due protection to the inhabitants of Florida, and to reduce the refractory Indians to submission.

General Scott, by the last advices, was at St. Augustine, awaiting the orders of the department. He will be authorized, after putting the frontier in a proper state of defence, to turn over the command to General Clinch, and to return to his department, if the state of affairs there will, in his opinion, permit.

You will perceive the extreme difficulty of determining here what posts should be abandoned or established, when there is a contrariety of opinion between officers of high rank in that country. My own impression respecting general defensive measures is, that healthful positions should be sought along the lines, and temporary posts established, with slight defences, for the occupation of the troops during the summer season; that it is better to have more posts with fewer men in each than it is to have few posts with large garrisons; that the Indians will scarcely collect in large masses, or attack fortified positions, but that they will spread themselves along the frontiers in small parties, doing all the mischief they can. The troops should at all times be upon the alert, and there should be mounted men employed acquainted with the nature of the country and the habits of the Indians, who can instantly follow any marauding parties which may strike upon the settlements. It is indispensable that the Indians should be pursued. If they find that their expeditions are successful, and that they are not followed to their fastnesses, they will lay waste the whole frontier. Certainly where an Indian can go a white man can follow. It is necessary, however, for this purpose, that a corps of spies and guides should be formed and kept continually in motion. Whenever a hostile party is discovered, their trail should be followed, and the necessary force—infantry and mounted men—kept within supporting distance of these spies. Vigilance, activity, and decision, are essentially necessary to secure the objects in view.

From your representation, I am under the impression that a very small force at Tampa Bay will be sufficient, and that the other troops had better be stationed upon the line of the frontier settlements. I shall transmit to General Scott copies of your letter, and this answer, that he may know the views of the department. He will be authorized to keep in service such mounted men as may be necessary for defensive operations during the summer season.

From what is understood here of the climate, men not accustomed to it cannot with safety carry on military operations. If this be so, the regular troops ought not to be required to do any more than defend their positions, overawe the Indians, and pursue any war parties that may make their appearance, and, perhaps, also, occasionally ranging through the more healthful parts of the country.

I mentioned, in a preceding letter, that there was a bill pending before Congress for raising a volunteer force; and that as soon as it passed, definitive measures would be taken on the subject of your proposition to embody a force of this description. Congress has not finally acted upon this matter; but, in the meantime, you are authorized to take preparatory steps for raising one thousand volunteers, to be employed, whenever required, in operations against the Seminole Indians. I enclose you a copy of the bill for your information; but you will please to observe that, as it has not passed, no definitive measures can be taken upon this subject, nor assurances given. The men may be enrolled and the company officers selected, so as to be ready to be embodied the moment the bill passes. They should be organized with respect to officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, agreeably to the existing militia laws of the United States. The question respecting the appointment of superior officers will be determined as soon as the law passes. All this will be considered as the mere voluntary act of the individuals, and will not subject the government to any expense whatever until the necessary legal provision is made. It is merely preparatory to an organization.

I have shown this letter to the President, who has authorized me to express to you his approbation of it.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LEWIS CASS.

His Excellency R. K. CALL, *Governor of Florida, Tallahassee, Florida.*

P. S.—The President suggests that whenever the Indian ponies and beef-cattle cannot be taken for the use of the army, they should be shot.

No. 157.

HEADQUARTERS, GEORGIA, *Milledgeville, May 18, 1836.*

STR: The Creek Indians are in a state of open war, killing and destroying everything in their way. They have crossed to the Georgia side of the Chattahoochee and burnt Roanoke, and an attack on Columbus is daily expected. All the white people of the nation who have not been murdered have fled to Georgia. The people on our frontier are in a wretched condition, their lives and property being at the mercy of the savages. The militia of the adjoining counties have been called out almost *en masse*, and I have been making exertions to get troops to the field, but the want of proper organization of the militia makes this a difficult task. I am endeavoring for the present to defend Georgia, and as soon as I can obtain a sufficient force I intend to carry the war into the enemy's country.

I should have written you immediately on hearing of these difficulties, but did not know until now where to address you. If you can spare any United States troops for this service they will be acceptable, and I should be glad if you can send an officer to muster the militia I have furnished, and shall furnish, into the service of the United States. If your presence is not necessary in Florida, I shall be very glad to see you on the line of the Chattahoochee. We know so little of military matters and the economy of an army that your presence will be quite acceptable.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM SCHLEY.

Major General WINFIELD SCOTT, *St. Augustine, Florida.*

No. 158.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *May 19, 1836.*

STR: I transmit for your information a copy of a letter this day addressed to Brevet Major General Jesup, and copies of letters to the governors of Alabama and Georgia.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

LEWIS CASS.

Major General W. SCOTT, *St. Augustine, Florida.*

No. 159.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *May 19, 1836.*

SIR: By direction of the President, you are hereby assigned, as a brevet major general, to the command of the troops of the United States, and of the militia which may be called into service from Georgia and Alabama, for the suppression of hostilities in the Creek country. Intelligence just received from that quarter shows that hostilities have commenced on the part of the Creek Indians against our settlements. You will, therefore, repair without delay to that quarter, and take such measures as you may find necessary for the reduction of the Indians. You will receive from the adjutant general a statement of the regular force which has been ordered to that quarter. In addition to this, the governors of Georgia and Alabama have been authorized to call into the field such of the militia as they might find necessary in the event of actual disturbances among the Indians, or of such a state of things as should leave no doubt that they meditate them.

Letters have this day been addressed to the governors of those States, requesting them to call into the field such militia force as you may require. It would be better, on all occasions, that these should be volunteers, and that they should engage to serve for six months, unless sooner discharged. If, however, it is necessary to resort to drafting, the term cannot be prolonged by law beyond three months.

You are aware that a bill is pending before Congress for the organization of a volunteer force. Should this pass in time for your operations, it would no doubt be better that the troops required should be engaged under it.

I have, as you will perceive, stated this view to the governors of Georgia and Alabama, and informed them that as soon as this bill becomes a law I will communicate the fact to them, together with such suggestions as may appear necessary.

Your efforts will be directed to the unconditional submission of the Indians. As fast as this is effected, and as any parties of them can be collected, they must be disarmed, and sent immediately to their country west of the Mississippi. For this purpose you will employ such officers and military detachments as may be necessary.

You will call upon the commissary general of subsistence for a statement of the arrangements that have been made on the subject of the removal of these Indians. Captain Page, of the army, has at present the direction of the matter. A contract with a number of persons in that country has been entered into for subsisting and transporting these Indians. If they are able and willing to go on with their contracts, you will allow them to do so. But immediate action is necessary; and if you experience any delay, you can cause the provisions, means of transportation, &c., to be purchased by the military agents. The great object is to remove them immediately; and to this other considerations must yield. Captain Page will communicate to you all his instructions, and the regulations of the department, by which you will see the system of administration that has been adopted upon this subject. This will be adhered to wherever the new state of things does not require a change. You will take care that all practical economy is preserved, and that the disbursements are faithfully accounted for. And with respect to your military operations generally, I have to request that you would direct your attention to an economical administration of your military expenditures, and a proper preservation and accountability of the public supplies.

Should Major General Scott, under the instructions he has heretofore received, proceed to the theatre of operations, he will, of course, be entitled to the command, and you will serve under him. You will take care and call on the chiefs of the military bureaus for such supplies as you may require; and previous to your departure make all the necessary arrangements, so that you may not experience any delay from want of funds, munitions of war, or other supplies.

It is very probable that portions of the Creek Indians may not as yet have been concerned in actual hostilities, although from the predisposition of the Indians for war there is every reason to believe they will do so, unless prevented by a timely removal. It will be proper, where this is the case, to treat these Indians with the kindest attention, and to send them off as speedily as practicable, in order to get them out of the reach of the scenes around them. Still, however, they must be removed by a military force, if necessary; as all experience has shown that it is difficult, if not impracticable, to keep any considerable part of an Indian tribe at peace while the residue of it is engaged in war. And, besides, it would be impossible to prevent the hostile warriors from taking shelter among the others; or, indeed, to determine with any reasonable certainty, and for any length of time, who are hostile and who are friendly.

The President has been desirous of ascertaining what frauds have been committed upon these Indians, in the sale of their lands, with a view to remedy the evil, as far as possible. But this effort, a succinct account of which will be communicated to you by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, has been now stopped by war. It is still, however, desirable that the friendly part of the Creeks, if in fact any of them should remain friendly, should be relieved from the embarrassments under which they have labored with respect to their lands.

I enclose the copy of a letter from Captain Page, by which you will perceive the views of that officer on the subject, and the proposition made by the Upper Creeks. This proposition has been approved, and Captain Page advised of the fact. So far, therefore, as any part of this division of the Creeks shall remain peaceable, you are authorized to sanction the proceeding recommended. But whatever is done must be done without delay, for it is very important that these people should be immediately sent off. You will assure them that the government is anxious to do them justice, and that the claims of those who remain at peace, and remove to the country west of the Mississippi, will be duly attended to. A descriptive roll of all these persons will be taken, in order to determine their cases hereafter. It is impossible, for the want of time, to cause abstracts to be prepared, showing the sales that have been made by the Creek Indians; and, therefore, no directions can be given for any definite proceedings upon that subject. There is no objection, however, in the cases of these friendly Indians, to permitting them to sell, agreeably to the established regulations, a copy of which you will herewith receive, if the purchaser can satisfy himself that no contract has been heretofore made for the sale of the land. But if this is done, he must do it upon his own responsibility; for if a previous valid contract has been entered into, the first purchaser must hold the land. If the arrangements stated by Captain Page should take effect, you are authorized to select a competent officer, should the Indians desire it, to see that justice is done; and also to appoint a certifying agent, to certify contracts, should any be entered into as above mentioned. His duties and compensation will be governed by the prescribed regulations.

If, however, these matters cannot be satisfactorily arranged previous to the departure of the Indians, you will assure the friendly disposed part of them that measures will be taken as early as practicable to see that justice is done to them, and that the land shall be disposed of at its fair value, and the proceeds paid over to them.

The moment the annuity bill passes, arrangements will be made for paying to the peaceable Creeks their just proportion of it.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LEWIS CASS.

Brevet Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Washington City.*

No. 160.

HEADQUARTERS, &c., *Savannah, May 22, 1836.*

SIR: I landed here from St. Augustine a few minutes since, bound to the Creek nation *via* Augusta and Milledgeville. I wrote to you on the 20th instant; you will receive that letter with this.

The same night I received the letter of the Secretary of War and one from your office, both dated the 15th ultimo. Those papers and others had gone to Newnansville, thirty-five miles north of Fort Drane, where they were heard of by accident and sent for.

My late indisposition is not to be attributed to either fatigue or climate. At the beginning of the month I imprudently threw off my flannel, took a violent cold, and have been prostrate for more than two weeks. I am now fast recovering strength, and do not doubt, by the time I arrive at Augusta, going up by steam, I shall be equal to any service whatever, on foot and on horseback.

My usefulness, however, I am told here, will have been much impaired by the probable general publication, in the interior, of my letter to you of the 30th ultimo.

No doubt seems to be entertained by any one that hostilities have been commenced by the Creeks. I shall spend one day in consultation with the governor at Milledgeville, and proceed to the point where the greatest body of troops may be assembled. If sufficient numbers have not been put in the field, I shall call for the corps I may deem necessary from Georgia and Alabama.

To organize the forces, and to push them on the enemy, will occupy my early attention; but the first object will be to organize a commissariat, and to establish sufficient depots of subsistence. I have but one officer in my staff at this moment, Paymaster Kirby, but he is a host within himself. An assistant commissary I shall certainly find at Fort Mitchell, and may hear of another at Augusta. Funds, by draft on the department, I do not doubt I may raise for the moment, till regularly supplied. Some spare officers I hope will be speedily sent to me for disbursements. Lieutenant Herring will soon join me as an aide-de-camp.

I could not prudently take a single company from Florida. Some regulars I may hope to hear of at Augusta, coming from the north.

I shall send an order for Doctor Lawson, now supposed to be at New Orleans, and hope to obtain the services of Captain Shannon, of the quartermaster's department, who is somewhere in the west of Florida, on the duties he was engaged in before the Seminole war.

If I can recover myself with the volunteers, and I shall make every sacrifice but truth to accomplish the object, I do not doubt of meeting the wishes of the government in this new war. The Creeks are accessible. Troops only are wanted to attack and subdue them.

I have ordered the new musket accoutrements, the new arms, and the new tents, from Picolata and St. Augustine, to Augusta, and also some spare fixed ammunition from the former place.

Four hundred barrels of hard bread found here, and also some bacon, neither of which will be *immediately* wanted in Florida, will also be ordered up the river.

I enclose a copy of my letter of instruction to Brigadier General Eustis, whom I left in command in Florida.

The reasons assigned by the council of war for abandoning Fort King are many: the difficulty of furnishing wagons and escorts for supplies; the post covers absolutely nothing; the want of its garrison (two companies) to occupy more important points, &c. I concur in those reasons. I shall write from Augusta. I do not doubt that I shall overcome all prejudices against me, and then overcome the enemy.

With great respect, your most obedient,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General United States Army.*

No. 161.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *May 23, 1836.*

SIR: I consider it very important that you should, at the commencement of your operations, station a sufficient force at the south point of the Creek country, so as to prevent the retreat of the Creek Indians into Florida, and also to cut off all communication between them and the Seminole Indians. This matter was the subject of conversation previous to your departure, but it seems to me so deeply interesting, as well to the successful result of your operations as to the proper safety of Florida, that I am again induced to present it to your notice.

I have to request that Captain Page may be allowed to devote his exclusive attention to the arrangement of the Indian business and the removal of the Indians. All I can expect from you in this matter is a general supervision. Captain Page is well acquainted with the whole subject, and to him it can safely be committed.

Very respectfully, &c.,

LEWIS CASS.

Major General JESUP, *Milledgeville, Georgia.*

No. 162.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington, May 25, 1836.*

SIR: As from the permission previously given, and the events in the Creek country, there is reason to believe you may have left the Territory of Florida, arrangements have been made, should this be so, for the defence of the country against the operations of the hostile Seminoles. As, however, it is possible this letter may yet find you in Florida, I enclose for your information the instructions in relation to this subject. Should you remain there, you are requested to carry them into effect.

Very respectfully, &c.,

LEWIS CASS.

Major General Scott, *St. Augustine, Florida.*

No. 163.

GENERAL ORDER No. 134.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, May 26, 1836.*

Should Major General Scott and Brigadier General Clinch not continue on duty in Florida, Governor Call, under instructions from the War Department, is, in such event, authorized to take command of the regular troops of the United States and of the militia serving in Florida. The orders of the governor of Florida will be obeyed accordingly, and his requisitions on the several departments of the general staff will be promptly complied with.

By order.

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

No. 164.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Augusta, Georgia, May 26, 1836.*

SIR: I arrived here last night on my way to Fort Mitchell to assume command in that quarter, and am restored to health.

I should have proceeded to-day, but find that I can occupy myself usefully till to-morrow.

I enclose a copy of a letter addressed by me to the governor of Georgia, and a copy of one that I have just addressed jointly to the quartermaster and commissary of subsistence at New Orleans.

I have just had the honor to receive two letters from the Secretary of War, dated the 16th and 17th instant, respectively. According to the permission contained in the first, I shall assume the direction of the war against the Creeks.

I have also received your letter of the 17th instant, addressed to me, and copies of your letters to Brigadier General Fenwick, of the same date, and to Lieutenant Mackay of the 16th.

The latter is temporarily charged with the duty of the quartermaster's department at Savannah, during the absence of Lieutenant Dimmock, who is here. On the return of the latter, Lieutenant Mackay will be ordered to join me for duty on the Chattahoochee. He is a valuable young officer.

I must further acknowledge the receipt of General Orders Nos. 29, 30, and 31.

Colonel Lindsay I have not heard from directly since I saw him on the Big Withlacoochee. Unofficial accounts represent him as sick. He will be instructed to join the army on the Chattahoochee as soon as practicable.

I have time to write no more at present, but will write again to-morrow.

With great respect, I remain your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General U. S. Army.*

P. S.—I received a letter at Savannah from the governor of Georgia, requesting me to hasten to the theatre of the Creek war. I promptly replied that I was on my way thither, but feared that the publication of my letter to you of the 30th ultimo would much impair my usefulness. Hence an allusion to my letter to his excellency, a copy of which is herewith enclosed.

W. S.

No. 165.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Augusta, Georgia, May 26, 1836.*

SIR: I arrived here last night, and intended to proceed to-day to Milledgeville to wait upon your excellency and to arrange everything for the prompt and vigorous prosecution of the war against the Creeks. I am, however, advised to delay my journey twenty-four hours to give time to counteract a strong prejudice against me, growing out of a letter of mine to the government recently published. To effect this object the noble commander of the Augusta battalion, lately under my command, has addressed me a letter, to which my reply, I think, cannot fail to be satisfactory. Both will be, I understand, without any direct agency on my part, immediately published.

My delay here will be of benefit in more important matters to the service.

From Picolata, St. Augustine, Charleston, and Savannah, I have ordered essential stores to be immediately transported towards the theatre of operations on the Chattahoochee. Some arms, ammunition,

accoutrements, tents, and one hundred thousand rations will immediately be shipped from those places, *via* Darien, to Hawkinsville, on the Ockmulgee, which I suppose to be within seventy-five miles of Columbus. From New Orleans I have also ordered to be sent up to the highest navigable point on the Chattahoochee, in light steamers, two hundred and fifty thousand complete rations, and I shall take measures for the supply of two hundred bushels of corn meal daily on the same river. This I shall do on my route between Macon and Columbus, and purchase up all the bacon which the same district of country may furnish. Ten wagons loaded with subsistence will leave this place for the same destination to-morrow morning.

Of the ten companies of regulars expected from the north, one has already arrived here. [A mistake—a detachment of recruits have arrived.]

If I do not find you at Milledgeville I shall soon have the pleasure of seeing you further to the west.

If the forces of the enemy amount to 6,000 warriors I shall wish to oppose to him a rather larger force. A little more than half I shall require of your excellency, and the remainder from Alabama; perhaps a part from Tennessee.

I presume it will be best to assemble the great body of our forces as low down as Irwinton, and operate thence up the country.

I have the honor, &c.,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

His Excellency W. SCHLEY, *Governor of Georgia.*

No. 166.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Augusta, Georgia, May 26, 1836.*

SIR: The Creek Indians on the Chattahoochee river have commenced open war against the United States. The governors of Georgia and Alabama have already put large forces in the field, and I am hastening to the theatre of operations. Ten thousand regulars, volunteers, and drafts may soon be expected to be assembled on that river, and the resources of the neighborhood cannot be expected to supply the necessary means of subsistence for many days. From Savannah and Charleston I have ordered about one hundred thousand rations to be sent, *via* Darien, up the Ockmulgee river to Hawkinsville, distant, by land, about seventy-five miles from Columbus; but our principal supplies of subsistence must be derived from New Orleans.

You will, therefore, immediately on the receipt of this letter, begin to purchase and send rapidly up the Apalachicola and Chattahoochee rivers bread, flour, bacon, and small rations, in all, until further requisitions, say two hundred and fifty thousand complete rations; and I shall soon, no doubt, demand from you other large supplies.

I understand that the Chattahoochee river may be expected to continue navigable for steamboats of light draught of water all the next month, at least as high as Fort Gaines or Irwinton, fifty or sixty miles below Columbus, and I shall take care to have a person or persons on the river, (which I shall first clear of the enemy,) ready to receive the subsistence as it may arrive; but in chartering vessels you will be careful to stipulate that the cargoes shall be delivered at the highest navigable point that may be required.

I look to your zeal and activity to execute this order with the least possible delay. Hard bread is preferred to flour, and bacon to pork; but the rations must be sent, although you may be obliged to substitute large portions of flour and pork. For the second shipment, if not for the first, it is hoped you may cause a sufficient quantity of hard bread to be baked.

I remain, in haste, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Major J. CLARK, *U. S. Quartermaster*, or Lieutenant GRAYSON, *U. S. Commissary, New Orleans.*

P. S.—Cause to be made and shipped as speedily as possible, with the subsistence, say four hundred camp-kettles. Purchase and send at the same time about the same number of felling axes.

W. S.

No. 167.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Augusta, Georgia, May 27, 1836.*

SIR: From my confidence in your administrative talents, derived from your services in Florida, I appoint you agent of the quartermaster's and the subsistence departments, at one hundred dollars per month. I have, from experience, equal confidence in your zeal and integrity.

It is my wish that you proceed as soon as practicable to Hawkinsville, on the Ockmulgee river, to which point large quantities of subsistence, quartermaster's and ordnance stores have been or will be speedily shipped. At that place, on this side, and in its neighborhood, I wish you to engage on the best terms for the United States, say from sixty to one hundred four, five, or six horse wagons, to take those supplies to Columbus and Fort Mitchell, on or near the Chattahoochee river, without delay. Other wagons will be sent back from that river to aid in the transportation of the stores from Hawkinsville to the army on the Chattahoochee.

I shall probably not leave you long stationary at Hawkinsville, for, besides causing the stores to be put into wagons at that place for the army on the Chattahoochee, you will be wanted at or near my headquarters for other purposes. Lieutenant Heintzelman, of the United States second infantry, it is hoped, will soon replace you at Hawkinsville, in the business of forwarding the stores expected there. In the meantime you will purchase in that vicinity any quantity of good bacon which you can obtain at a fair price for the army, and forward the same, without delay, to Columbus or Fort Mitchell.

For the amount of such purchases you may make of bacon, beef cattle on the hoof, and of corn meal for the use of the army—in the purchase of bacon you are limited (for the present) to sixty thousand pounds; in the purchase of beef cattle to 350 head, and in the purchase of corn meal to fifteen hundred bushels. These several items of subsistence you will endeavor to obtain as near to Fort Mitchell or Columbus as possible, so as to diminish the expense of transportation, and it will be better that each should arrive at the army in portions, say, of one-third each, at intervals of from three to five days. Further supplies of bacon, beef cattle, and corn meal, will be wanted; but in respect to these you will receive from me subsequent instructions.

To enable you the better to execute my orders and wishes, five thousand dollars are now placed in your hands, for which you will pass your duplicate receipts to the officer (Major Kirby) from whom you will receive the money.

It is possible that you may find it more economical to transport a portion or even the whole of the supplies ordered to Hawkinsville to Macon. Should you find that the case, you will direct the boats to take the supplies to the higher point on the Ockmulgee, and cause them to be thence transported in wagons to the army on the Chattahoochee river.

In this matter I rely on you to exercise a sound discretion.

Every train of wagons that you may despatch from Hawkinsville or Macon for the army, you will cause to be accompanied by a respectable wagon-master or agent, whom you will engage to be paid by the United States at reasonable prices.

I remain, with great respect, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

JOSEPH A. BEARD, Esq., *Agent for the Quartermaster and Commissary Departments.*

No. 168.

AUGUSTA ARSENAL, *Georgia, May 31, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a communication received from his excellency Governor Schley, and upon this requisition I have this day turned over to the assistant quartermaster here for transportation to Columbus, to the address of Captain R. P. Parrott, ordnance officer, one thousand muskets. I respectfully request to be informed whether the issue will be considered to the State of Georgia for "arming and equipping the whole body of militia," or for the use of the militia called into the service of the United States.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. BADEN, *Major U. S. Army.*

Major General WINFIELD SCOTT, *United States Army.*

No. 169.

HEADQUARTERS, *Milledgeville, Georgia, May 27, 1836.*

SIR: I have not arms enough for the militia called to the protection of the frontier. You will therefore confer a favor on me by furnishing one thousand stand of muskets, &c., with a suitable quantity of flints and fixed ammunition.

Messrs. Stovall and Simmons will employ wagons to transport them to Columbus or to Milledgeville, if anything should occur before their arrival here to render it unnecessary for them to proceed to Columbus.

If General Jesup or General Scott should have made arrangements for these articles before the receipt of this, you will of course not send those now requested.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM SCHLEY, *Governor of Georgia.*

The OFFICER IN COMMAND of the *U. S. Arsenal near Augusta, Georgia.*

No. 170.

Postscript to letter to Major J. Clark, assistant quartermaster, or Lieutenant Grayson, assistant commissariat at New Orleans, dated Augusta, May 26, a copy of which was sent from Milledgeville May 28, 1836.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Milledgeville, May 28, 1836.*

SIR: My letter to you of the 26th instant is of so much importance that, for safety, I send you a copy of it.

Major General Jesup, who is with me, has also made large requisitions upon you. These you will consider in addition to what I have demanded, and send the articles accordingly by both to Chattahoochee and to Fort Montgomery.

In haste, yours, &c.,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

P. S.—Send forty or fifty sacks of salt to the Chattahoochee for the fresh beef that may be issued to the troops, and to be given to horses.

W. S.

No. 171.

ASSISTANT QUARTERMASTER'S OFFICE, *Augusta, Georgia, May 29, 1836.*

GENERAL: I enclose herewith several communications received for you since your departure. Mr. L'Engle writes me, dated the 27th, thus: "Your letter of the 25th instant was received too late to change the direction of a very large quantity of provisions purchased by Lieutenant Simpson, the assistant commissary of subsistence at this place, and forwarded by the railroad to Augusta."

I learn that a large quantity of the provisions here referred to is on the way, and I anticipate much, very much, difficulty in procuring the number of wagons necessary. I shall, early in the morning, despatch agents into the country to engage all to be found on almost any terms. That I shall do all I can the general may be assured. Ten wagons left here on the 28th. Captain Monroe's company arrived here on the evening of your departure. It awaits at the arsenal the arrival of Major Pierce's command. These companies I find have 75 days' of subsistence with them. This requires about five wagons per company. Mr. Mackay writes me the articles *via Darien* can go up to Hawkinsville without difficulty. Mr. L'Engle says "the rifles ordered hence to Savannah left here this morning," (27th.)

Major Garland writes to me to furnish you with camp and garrison equipage from the *accumulation* at Savannah. It is almost needless to inform you there is not even one camp-kettle or mess pan, or anything else of his department at Savannah. I am anxious about the delay which I fear must inevitably occur in forwarding the great quantity of stores coming through me. Three hundred wagons will be required, and where they are all to come from I cannot yet say.

I have again written to Mr. L'Engle to forward all else up the river.

I remain, general, with very great respect, your obedient servant,

CHS. DIMMOCK, *Lieutenant, &c.*

Major General SCOTT, *Commanding Army in Creek War, Columbus.*

No. 172.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 2, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to report, for the information of the Secretary and general-in-chief, that I arrived here three days ago in company with his excellency Governor Schley and Major General Jesup.

No event of importance has occurred in or about the Creek country in a week or two. A small party of the enemy crossed into Georgia the day before I arrived, murdered a few individuals, and burnt some houses. Until the troops are mustered into the service of the United States they are not under my command. This ceremony commenced yesterday, and will proceed as rapidly as possible. In the meantime the governor, whose own military views are excellent, and who has the best possible dispositions towards the general government and its officers, makes me the compliment to consult me on all points of importance. He has already taken measures to guard the frontier of Georgia, above and below this place, against incursions, and particularly to prevent parties of the enemy from escaping across the river in the direction of Florida. Additional measures shall be immediately adopted to effect this great object, first, by the employment of a steamer hourly expected with a company on board, and by pushing some companies of mounted men to points fifty and sixty miles below. It is not thought here that there is any danger of the Indians attempting to cross the river lower down.

The strength of the enemy is variously estimated by well-informed persons at from two thousand five hundred to five thousand. Captain Page thinks that there are at least three thousand hostile warriors.

I suppose there may have arrived on this frontier about one thousand five hundred Georgians, mostly, I think, volunteers. As they are distributed over a line of more than forty miles on the river, the governor has not been able as yet to obtain returns of the detachments. He expects as many more, and the companies almost daily arrive; but it is not expected that all will be up before the 12th, perhaps the 15th instant.

The governor of Alabama will probably have in the field about an equal number of men. By his letter of the 28th ultimo, a copy of which is enclosed, it will be seen that he thinks he will be ready to march upon the enemy on the 5th instant. I doubt, however, whether he has been able to secure subsistence for his men in advance for eight or even five days. On this side there are no magazines. The troops have not suffered, but the supplies have been rather precarious. This state of things must continue at least eight days longer, when the one hundred thousand rations and other indispensable stores shipped from Picolata, St. Augustine, Savannah, and Charleston, may begin to arrive from Macon and Hawkinsville, on the Ockmulgee, by wagons. The supplies ordered from New Orleans cannot be expected before the 18th or 20th instant. Late, long, and heavy rains in this quarter have greatly injured the roads, but improved the navigation of the rivers.

I enclose copies of my two letters to Governor Clay, and a copy of my instructions to Major General Jesup, who will probably set out to-morrow for Montgomery. He will require a good escort to Tuskegee, forty miles. Beyond that point the communication is understood to be perfectly free.

There is an idea that I have not developed in my letters to Governor Clay: If we fight the Indians with inferior numbers, we should, nevertheless, in all probability, beat them, but with a great loss of valuable lives on our part; whereas, if we wait for the arrival of all, or nearly all of our forces, regular and militia, and till we have ample means of subsistence secured for twenty days in advance, I suppose the war may be successfully terminated on our part with but a small loss of lives. This consideration has great weight with me, and it has been developed in a letter from Governor Schley to Governor Clay. A delay of ten days has therefore been urged.

I remain, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General United States Army.*

No. 173.

HEADQUARTERS, *Montgomery, May 28, 1836.*

SIR: You are aware that hostilities have been commenced by the Creek Indians upon the inhabitants of Alabama, as well as those of Georgia. At the commencement they perpetrated many outrages; though they have apparently suspended active operations since a portion of our volunteer militia entered and have occupied several commanding positions within the limits of the Territory over which they are dispersed. The hostile Indians are no doubt still within the limits of Russell and Barbour counties. The important object is to cut off the possibility of their retreat or escape, and terminate the war by a simultaneous movement and co-operation of the several corps which are now and shortly will be in the field.

There are now seven or eight hundred volunteers at Tuskegee; and that number will shortly be increased to twelve or fifteen hundred, besides the friendly Creeks, who will act with us. Colonel McLemore, commanding the regiment of the county of Chambers, has tendered his own and their services, and they have been accepted. He will be notified by express at what time the troops under the commanding general will advance from Tuskegee in the direction of Fort Mitchell and Columbus, and will at the same time move upon the enemy from his quarter.

There is already at Irwinton a battalion of infantry, which will within a week be reinforced by a regiment of mounted gunmen from the fourth division, to be under the command of Brigadier General Moore, besides other troops. This force will be competent to intercept and prevent the flight of the enemy to Florida, on this side of the Chattahoochee. If his retreat across the Chattahoochee and through the southwestern corner of your State could be obstructed, I see nothing to prevent his being at once overwhelmed and reduced to unconditional submission.

The object of this communication is to invite the co-operation of the troops that may be in the service of Georgia. To accomplish the object in view, it is deemed very important to guard the east bank of the Chattahoochee opposite to the whole line of Barbour county.

I would be glad to learn by the return of my express whether these views meet the approbation of the military officer in command, and whether the desired co-operation may be expected. We shall probably be in readiness to advance from the several points mentioned by the 5th proximo at furthest.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. C. CLAY.

The COMMANDING OFFICER of the *Georgia Militia, at Columbus.*

No. 174.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, May 31, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to inform your excellency that I reached this place last night, and shall immediately charge myself with the direction of the war against the hostile Creeks.

His excellency the governor of Georgia arrived here at the same time, as also Major General Jesup, who, in case I had remained in Florida, would, by direction of the President of the United States, have been charged with the chief command.

I am very anxious to send General Jesup to Montgomery, as well to confer with your excellency on all points interesting to the service, as to take command of all the troops assembled, or to be assembled, on that side of the Creek country. He will accordingly pass over to Montgomery as soon as a sufficient escort can be procured from this or that side of the enemy for the purpose. I mean sufficient in my judgment, for General Jesup would be willing to set out with but a small number of men to protect him.

I am anxious to communicate freely and fully with your excellency—first, to learn at what numbers you estimate the hostile warriors; the forces you have in the field, or expect to join you; the present disposition of the forces actually out, whether mounted or on foot, and the number of each; whether fully armed and equipped, with what artillery, &c.

From Washington, about the 18th instant, a requisition went to your excellency for 2,000 men, 500 to be mounted. From my present information, (which as yet is very imperfect,) I do not believe that a larger force will be required of Alabama. I hope, however, that the 2,000 men are already, or soon will be, in the field, and that one-fourth are or will be mounted.

The governor of Georgia, whom I am happy to be with, expects, from the orders which he has given, to have on the Chattahoochee, say in the next ten days, 3,000 men at least, of whom, perhaps, a little more than a fourth will be on horseback. Besides these volunteers and drafts, there are now on this side of Charleston, coming by the railroad, Augusta, Milledgeville, &c., about 1,000 regular troops (including marines) to take part in the war. They may be expected to begin to arrive here in seven or eight days, but the rear cannot be up in twelve or fifteen. Half this force is intended to be placed in line with the Alabamians.

Large supplies were ordered by General Jesup, before leaving Washington, from New Orleans to Montgomery, including subsistence for men and corn for horses. From the same place I have ordered 250,000 rations to be immediately sent to this river, and 100,000 rations, with other stores, are now ascending the Altamaha and Ockmulgee, to be wagoned across to the Chattahoochee. In the meantime the resources of this neighborhood in corn, corn meal, bacon, and cattle may suffice.

Detachments of troops (I have not had time to learn in what numbers) are now taking positions on the left bank of this river, and as low down as Roanoke, to prevent parties of the enemy from crossing, either for the purpose of escaping toward Florida or that of committing depredations. The day before yesterday, I learn, some individuals were murdered and several houses burned on the Georgia side.

I am opposed to all premature operations against the enemy. Our forces must first be assembled (in sufficient numbers) and organized, our magazines established, and adequate means of transportation provided. In this opinion I am fully supported by his excellency Governor Schley, and hope to receive your concurrence. In ten or fifteen days everything will be in readiness on this side; but in the meantime, besides preventing parties of the enemy from escaping to Florida, something may be advantageously

undertaken: for example, as soon as we have a surplus force on this side of the enemy, beyond what is necessary to guard the Chattahoochee, we may with that surplus, in conjunction with the Alabamians, begin operations against the lower hostile bands—say from a point below Irwinton. This, however, must be done after hearing from you, and after I shall be able to send Major General Jesup to cause to be mustered into the service the Alabama forces, and to assume the command in that quarter. I am, besides, yet ignorant of the routes taken by troops from the Tallapoosa and Alabama rivers, to a point on the Chattahoochee as low down as Irwinton, and of the means of transportation with these troops, &c. I do not mean that the Alabamians should march to the Chattahoochee, but that they ought to place themselves below the enemy and act upwards in concert with the Georgians, who will be thrown for the purpose down the river, at least as low as Irwinton.

In haste, I have the honor to remain, with high respect, your excellency's most obedient servant,
WINFIELD SCOTT.

His Excellency C. C. CLAY, *Governor of Alabama.*

P. S.—Besides the information specifically requested above, I shall be happy to receive any views of your excellency on the subject of this war.

Permit me to say that, according to the views expressed above, it will not be necessary to send troops from your side of the enemy to Fort Mitchell.

I have requested Captain Page, of the army, who is here to answer some inquiries contained in your letter to the commanding officer at Fort Mitchell, to save time.

W. S.

No. 175.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, May 31, 1836.*

SIR: Since my letter of this morning your excellency's dated the 28th instant, and addressed to "the commanding officer of the Georgia militia at Columbus," has been received. I have just read it, with his excellency the governor of Georgia, who concurs with me, for the reasons mentioned in my letter to you of this morning, that it is desirable that you should delay vigorous operations against the enemy to a day at least as late as the 12th *proximo*. By that period all the Georgia troops will have arrived and been organized and mustered into service, and the regular troops will be near at hand. Major General Jesup, too, who has funds for the war, and is in possession of the general views of the government and my own, will have, in the meantime, joined you, and have arranged everything on that side of the enemy according to those views.

I am, on reflection, even of the opinion that it will be better to postpone the system of general operations against the enemy to the 15th *proximo*, in order that the regular troops may be up with a good train of artillery, and our magazines of every sort fully supplied. The proposed delay would, in all probability, abridge the period of active operations, and place the successful termination of the war beyond the reach of hazard. To effect this great object your excellency cannot be more desirous than myself. For its accomplishment means and efforts shall not be spared.

My knowledge of the theatre of operations, of the numbers and distribution of the enemy, must, for a day or two longer, necessarily continue imperfect. As I get information, my views and plans may be modified. Every change, and every important fact, shall be freely communicated.

I have the honor to be, with high respect, your excellency's most obedient servant,
WINFIELD SCOTT.

His Excellency C. C. CLAY, *Governor of Alabama.*

P. S.—There is not a steamer here at present. As soon as they arrive, two at least shall be engaged: one to cruise up and down this river with troops on board, to prevent the enemy from crossing; and the other to go immediately to the Mount Vernon arsenal, on the Mobile, for arms, ammunition, &c.

W. S.

No. 176.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 1, 1836.*

SIR: I wish you to repair, by any route deemed by the intelligence of this place as perfectly safe, to Montgomery, in Alabama, or to the headquarters of his excellency the governor of that State, for the purpose of charging yourself with the direction of the war against the hostile Creek Indians on that side of the country occupied by them. Your first step, if there be time, will be to cause all the volunteers and drafted men ordered into the field to be duly mustered into the service of the United States, in the manner indicated in my order of yesterday, numbered *one*.

For the composition of a company, a battalion, and a regiment, see the organic law of the United States passed in 1792, amended in respect to the field and staff of a regiment by an act passed in 1816. Two regiments you may consider a brigade, and two brigades a division. These points are here mentioned, because they are not so clearly settled by the act of 1792 as they might have been.

Sixty-four privates constitute the basis of a company, according to the organic law, and I have the positive instructions of the War Department to see that the number of officers of every grade do not exceed (in proportion) the number of men. Nevertheless, as the forces of Alabama have, no doubt, like those of Georgia, been suddenly pushed upon the enemy's frontier without a nice regard to the organization prescribed by the act of 1792—some companies consisting of more and others of less than sixty-four privates each—I mean myself to look to the average strength, and act liberally in respect to officers; that is to say, I shall not hesitate, if the companies (whether of foot or mounted men) present as many officers, to accept with a company, one captain, one first, one second lieutenant, and one ensign. With a view to uniformity, I wish you to observe a like liberality.

For a regiment of ten companies, you will accept and muster all the field and staff officers provided for by the act of 1816; but should the regiment present only six or seven companies, no colonel can be allowed; to a battalion of four or five companies only, a major can be given, with one adjutant, one quartermaster, one sergeant major, and quartermaster sergeant, and one drum or fife major.

The staff of a division, and of a brigade, you will find clearly fixed by the act of 1792; and I am not aware of any amendment of that law in this respect.

I have given you the above details, in order that all the volunteers and drafted men of this army may be placed on the same footing.

His excellency the governor of Alabama has proposed, in a letter that you have seen, to commence vigorous operations against the enemy as early as the 5th instant. You have seen my reply to that letter, and are well acquainted with all the considerations which have induced me to propose a postponement to the 15th. In the meantime, however, and before the regulars and all the forces of Georgia shall arrive, I think something very advantageous may be safely attempted from a point at or below Irwinton, operating up the country. I shall wish you, therefore, as soon as you are in command, to send as many of the Alabamians as can be safely spared from other great objects to the vicinity of Irwinton, to co-operate with any surplus troops of Georgia that we may have for the field, after guarding the important points on this river. What this surplus may be at the end of (say) eight or ten days I cannot speak with confidence; but from the expectations of his excellency Governor Schley, I think we shall by that time be able to send to that point from 1,000 to 1,300 men, including horse and foot. This force, with a little addition to that which Governor Clay, as you have seen, proposes to send to Irwinton, and some four or five companies of regulars that may be expected here in time, I think we may clear the lower part of this river—that is to say, the whole of Barbour county—of the enemy, by the 17th instant, and before the arrival of the last of the regulars expected from the north. By that time all our forces on this side will be up and ready to be thrown across this river for vigorous co-operation; and as we advance up the country, a portion of the volunteers guarding the river may be crossed over and united with the pursuing army.

In respect to the removal of Indians who have been uniformly friendly, or who may come in or surrender themselves for emigration, you are fully acquainted with the views of the government, and I can only add, carry out those views.

I learn that a body of friendly Creek warriors have been organized into a corps, under General Woodward, to co-operate with our troops as auxiliaries in this war. Their fidelity might be much more safely relied upon if their families were first sent to a secure place beyond the Creek country. On this subject you will please advise with Governor Clay, who will be a much better judge of it than you or myself. You will take care to communicate to me fully, from time to time, your means, your movements, and your plans, and you will hear from me frequently.

Entertaining the highest confidence in your zeal, abilities, and experience, I remain, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *United States Army, &c.*

No. 177.

MOUNT VERNON ARSENAL, *Alabama, February 8, 1836.*

SIR: I am directed by the government of the United States to issue, on the requisitions of the generals or field officers commanding any portion of the forces operating against the hostile Indians, such arms and munitions of war as may be required for this service. Having noticed through the public press that the Creek Indians are likely to become troublesome, I deem it proper to communicate to you, as the chief magistrate of the State of Alabama, the orders of the War Department to me in relation to this matter

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. HARDING, *Captain of Ordnance.*

His Excellency C. C. CLAY, Esq., *Governor of Alabama.*

N. B.—It is proper to acquaint you what kind of stores we have on hand; 10,000 superior new muskets, with buck-shot and ball cartridges, and 10 pieces of field artillery, completely equipped.

No. 178.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 3, 1836.*

SIR: On the receipt of this you will lose no time in hiring a steamer of light draught of water, and put on board of her, for this place, four pieces of ordnance, two howitzers, and two six-pounders, with harness and implements complete, and at least one hundred and fifty rounds of ammunition (fixed) for each piece. If you have no howitzers you will send four six-pounders. Let the greater number of rounds of fixed ammunition be grape and canister, with some shells for the howitzers, and some round shots for the six-pounders.

Put on board the same boat 3,000 stand of muskets complete, but I fear you have no accoutrements; nevertheless, send the arms with prickers, primers, &c. Send further 100,000 rounds of fixed musket, buck and ball, and some buck cartridges, and 50,000 flints.

I rely upon your using the utmost despatch. If you can engage the steamer by the month, on reasonable terms, do so, as I shall require at least two on this river.

Respectfully, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Captain HARDING, *Commanding United States Arsenal, Mount Vernon.*

No. 179.

MOUNT VERNON ARSENAL, *June 14, 1836.*

Sir: Your letter of the 3d instant, making a demand on this arsenal for ordnance and ordnance stores, was received last evening. Not having the articles on hand which you call for, and there being no mail in the direction of Columbus before to-morrow, I despatched at once a trusty artificer with a copy of your order to Captain Newton, the commander of the Baton Rouge arsenal, with instructions to furnish immediately all that was required. By the same messenger I sent another copy of the order to Major Clark, assistant quartermaster at New Orleans, with a request that he would charter a "steamer" in New Orleans, and order her to Baton Rouge for the stores. Captain Newton, by this time, has received large supplies of ordnance and ordnance stores from the Allegheny arsenal, and I have every reason to hope, from the promptness and energy of Captain N. and Major Clark, that you will be supplied from the Baton Rouge arsenal earlier, perhaps, than the limited force at my control would allow, even admitting I had the munitions which you want in store at this arsenal.

The governors of Alabama and Florida have completely exhausted my stock of arms and ammunition, they each had unlimited authority from the Secretary of War to call for whatever they wanted, and I was directed to issue accordingly. Governor Clay has drawn from this depot the following ordnance and ordnance stores, to wit:

Four 6-pounders, complete; 6,800 muskets, complete; 175,000 buck-shot and ball cartridges; 307 6-pounder canister; 105 6-pounder strapped shot; 9,700 flints; 1,492 sets of infantry accoutrements; 50 yard of slowmatch; 1,000 priming tubes; 133 portfires.

Of the above, 6,000 muskets, the four pieces of ordnance, and a due proportion of other stores, were shipped to Montgomery, and the balance were ordered to Claiborne, for the troops called out by the governor, and to be rendezvoused at Irwinton, Barbour county, in this State.

I am at this moment engaged in preparing ammunition and shipping it to Montgomery, which I shall continue to do until the close of the campaign.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. HARDING, *Captain of Ordnance.*

Major General Scott, *United States Army.*

No. 180.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 3, 1836.*

Sir: Of the large amount of stores which must now be high up the Ockmulgee, and which you are to cause to be wagoned to this place, either from Hawkinsville or Macon, as you may find most advantageous to the United States, I wish you to load up the first division of wagons, say sixty or one hundred, with hard bread, bacon, Hall's patent rifles, fixed ammunition for muskets, (if any,) muskets, accoutrements, flints, and a portion of tents. If you are stinted for room in the wagons, it may be sufficient if 15,000 rations arrive here by the 10th or 12th instant; 30,000 by the 15th or 16th, and the remainder towards the 20th or 25th instant.

It is hoped that some ordnance and ordnance stores may come up the Ockmulgee from Charleston; if so, send one howitzer and one 6-pounder without delay, and one hundred and fifty rounds of fixed ammunition for each, together with all their implements. Of the ammunition, I prefer that the greater part should consist of grape and canister.

For each piece of ordnance you will purchase four good horses, and harness for the same, unless harness should come with the pieces; you will also purchase a strong close ammunition wagon for each piece of ordnance. Should those operations be made at Macon, you will turn over to the first detachment of United States troops that passes that place the pieces and their wagons, otherwise you will hire drivers and despatch them to Columbus. I have sent an order to Lieutenant Dimmock, at Augusta, to send no more provisions from that place to the Chattahoochee, except for troops on the march.

I received your letter of the 28th ultimo, which I approve. Mr. Hutchinson left here this morning.

Show this letter to any regular officer that you may see, and particularly to Major Mackay and Lieutenant Waite, United States quartermasters.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

JOSEPH A. BEARD, *United States Agent.*

P. S.—Should Lieutenant Heintzelman arrive in any short time at Hawkinsville or Macon, turn over this letter of instructions to him, and proceed immediately yourself to headquarters.

W. S.

No. 181.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, June 2, 1836.*

Sir: I am directed by Major General Scott to say that the supplies of provisions, &c., may be expected to arrive at this place from the Ockmulgee within ten days, and from New Orleans, by the Chattahoochee, in sixteen or seventeen days. As soon as a sufficient number of men, whether regulars or volunteers, are assembled in this neighborhood, without waiting for those who may still be in the rear, General Scott will occupy several positions on and near the Chattahoochee, below the hostile Indians, and thence move up in conjunction with the troops of Alabama, in a sufficient number of columns to sweep the whole Indian country, and pressing upon the hostiles till they shall be reduced to unconditional submission.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, &c.,

E. KIRBY, *Paymaster United States Army.*

Major General JOHN IRVINE, *of Alabama.*

No. 182.

ASSISTANT QUARTERMASTER'S OFFICE, *June 2, 1836.*

MAJOR: By this day's line of cars from Charleston I received a further quantity of subsistence stores, commissioned through Lieutenant L'Engle. The date of the agent's receipt at Charleston is the 1st of June. Mr. L'Engle writes: "These barrels were delivered at the railroad previous to the receipt of your (Lieutenant Dimmock's) letter of the 27th ultimo, therefore could not change their direction." I shall do all I can to hasten this provision on, and only write now to inform the general of my increased store, without adequate means to transport them.

I am, sir, very truly, your obedient servant,

CHARLES DIMMOCK, *Lieutenant, Assistant Quartermaster.*Major E. KIRBY, *Acting Assistant Adjutant General, Columbus.*

No. 183.

ASSISTANT QUARTERMASTER'S OFFICE, *Augusta, June 2, 1836.*

MAJOR: Will you inform the general that I have now on the road 42 wagon-loads of provisions, in one of which are his articles. I find it exceedingly difficult to obtain wagons, and the same extortion practiced here as at Savannah. Captain Monroe left here this morning with his company and two baggage wagons. Captain Lyon leaves to-morrow morning with four companies, one 6-pounder, one ammunition wagon, and seven baggage wagons, the number required by him. I have furnished funds to each of these detachments as required. I shall charter a steamboat, the moment one arrives, to take a load of provisions from this to Darien, thence up the river. I must do this, or I shall never get all the stores to you in less than six months. I have now ready for the troops coming about 20 or 25 wagons, all I can get, and therefore cannot send any more off till these troops are on the route from here. General Fenwick, with his adjutant, is here. Lieutenant Waite is waiting orders, I hope, to relieve me, for Mr. Mackay writes me he is already mired in papers. Lieutenant Simpson awaits here the sending off the boat of subsistence stores. With the wagons above enumerated are 12 bought by me for the United States, the horses attached to which are branded U. S. I will from time to time inform you how I am progressing. I doubt not, however, but I shall be relieved and sent to Savannah to settle business there, and then go north for a while.

I am, major, your obedient servant,

CHARLES DIMMOCK, *Lieutenant, A. Q. M.*Major E. KIRBY, *Acting Assistant Adjutant General, Columbus.*

NOTE.—General Fenwick desires me to say he has written to General Scott for orders, and awaits them daily.

No. 184.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, June 3, 1836.*

SIR: I am directed by Major General Scott to say that you will not forward any more subsistence from Augusta to this place. It will be sufficient for the troops on the march to leave Augusta with twenty days' rations.

The state of the roads, and the difficulty of procuring transportation, forbid the bringing of large supplies over the long land route from Augusta.

The country about here is not yet exhausted, and abundant supplies can be procured at much less expense from New Orleans. Besides, the 100,000 rations ordered by the Ockmulgee will begin to arrive in seven days.

You will therefore report to General Eustis, commanding in Florida, at St. Augustine, the surplus provisions which shall remain in depot at Augusta, after supplying the troops on the march, and inquire whether they will be wanted in Florida; in which case you will forward them to his order.

Very respectfully, &c.,

E. KIRBY, *Paymaster, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*Lieutenant C. DIMMOCK, *Assistant Quartermaster, Augusta.*

No. 185.

ORDERS No. 1.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, May 31, 1836.*

Major General Scott, in conformity with the orders of the President of the United States, assumes the direction of the war against the hostile Creek Indians.

His staff not being yet organized, the names of the individuals who will compose it will be announced in subsequent orders. In the meantime Major E. Kirby, Captains Page and Parrott, all of the army, will act in the several capacities of assistant adjutants general, assistant inspectors general, and aides-de-camp. Any orders which either of them may communicate, in writing or orally, in the name of the commanding general, will be obeyed as if given under his own signature or in person.

Those officers will proceed without delay to organize and to muster into the service of the United States the Georgia volunteers and drafted men who have arrived, and who are daily expected on this frontier. The volunteers will be accepted, according to their wishes, for a period of not less than three nor more than six months, unless sooner discharged. The drafted companies will be accepted as above, for the period of three months.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

ORDERS No. 2.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 5, 1836.*

The detachment of recruits just arrived under Lieutenant Freeman, 4th artillery, will march to Fort Mitchell; seventeen of the recruits, as designated by the adjutant general, will join company I, 2d artillery. The recruits destined for company F, 4th infantry, at Camp Cass, will be temporarily attached to company C, 4th infantry, at Fort Mitchell, and be mustered as a detachment.

Lieutenant Freeman will report himself for duty till further orders to the officer commanding company I, 2d artillery, at Fort Mitchell.

By order of Major General Scott.

E. KIRBY, *Paymaster, Acting Assistant Adjutant General*

ORDERS No. 3.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 7, 1836.*

Major John Erving, of the army, having arrived, will relieve Major E. Kirby from the duty of mustering into the service of the United States the troops as they successively arrive on this frontier.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

ORDERS No. 4.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 8, 1836.*

Lieutenant J. W. McCrabb, assistant commissary of subsistence, will temporarily take charge of the subsistence department of the army.

He will establish a system of accountability in the issues, and make such purchases as may be necessary for the subsistence of the army till the arrival of the supplies daily expected from the Ockmulgee, from New Orleans, and from Augusta.

By order of Major General Scott.

E. KIRBY, *Paymaster, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

ORDERS No. 5.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 8, 1836.*

The commanding general is happy to announce to the troops that a supply of genuine vaccine matter has been received from the surgeon general of the army at Washington. It is in the hands of Assistant Surgeon Randall, of the United States army, now at this place, who will be ready to distribute the matter among the surgeons of the volunteer corps, or personally to vaccinate any such corps as may require his services.

By order of Major General Scott.

E. KIRBY, *Paymaster, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

ORDERS No. 6.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 9, 1836.*

Assistant Quartermaster C. A. White, of the United States army, having reported himself, will take charge of the quartermaster's department of the army till the arrival of a senior quartermaster. He will establish a system of accountability in that department, and give the necessary instructions to the subordinate quartermasters for carrying the same into effect.

By order of Major General Scott.

E. KIRBY, *Paymaster, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 186.

HAWKINSVILLE, June 5, 1836.

SIR: On my arrival at this town on the 2d instant, I proceeded to act according to your letter of instructions. I find myself surrounded with difficulties I did not anticipate in the first place. Not the first article of the stores or provisions are yet arrived, and I am fearful several days will elapse before I shall receive them. This delay has been occasioned by the circumstance of the two steamboats at this end of the Ockmulgee being dismantled in part for the season. On my arrival application was made through the agent for one, at least, to be despatched with all possible speed to assist the pole boats up the river, and accordingly the *Crockett* steamboat was sent down forthwith, but unfortunately burst her boiler forty miles below this town. In the meantime I have engaged another boat, (the *Darien*,) not belonging to the company's line, to proceed to Darien for a cargo of bacon, hard bread, Hall's rifles, and quartermaster's stores; have advised Lieutenant Heintzelman to have the boat loaded and forwarded with all possible despatch, and hope he has not quitted Darien for this place.

In the interim I have employed several persons in the adjacent counties for the purpose of procuring wagons; have also visited the surrounding country myself for the same purpose. I find nearly the whole force of the farmers engaged on their farms at this season, consequently have considerable difficulty in procuring the quantity I shall require. If, on arrival of the stores, I find the Ockmulgee navigable to Macon, I intend forwarding a portion of the stores to that place.

The first two trains of wagons that may arrive at headquarters I would suggest be immediately forwarded to this place. Should you think it necessary, I would also suggest the propriety of my remaining at this town until I have started at least a portion of the stores for the army, as I understand Lieutenant Heintzelman is in bad health, and it will require great exertions to procure sufficient transportation in time. Rest satisfied, general, my whole exertions shall be used for the public good, and to forward your wishes and commands.

I have the honor to be, with respect, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH A. BEARD,

Agent to the Quartermaster and Commissary Departments, U. S.

Major General WINFIELD SCOTT.

No. 187.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, Columbus, June 7, 1836.

SIR: I am directed by Major General Scott to say that he is anxious to hear from you, and know what progress you have made in the duties assigned to you.

You will please keep the general advised of your operations in detail. State what supplies have been received either at Hawkinsville or Macon—what have been forwarded.

You will purchase eight or ten horses fit for the saddle, (not high priced,) and forward them to this place.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. KIRBY, *Paymaster, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*JOSEPH A. BEARD, *Agent of the Quartermaster and Commissary Departments,*
Hawkinsville or Macon.

No. 188.

DARIEN, Georgia, [should be dated from Hawkinsville,] June 8, 1836.

SIR: I have the honor to report my arrival here from Darien, Georgia, having there made all the necessary arrangements for the forwarding of supplies to this place.

I enclose a list of subsistence and ordnance stores received by me at Darien, Georgia, before I left. Three boats were loaded, including all the arms, accoutrements, camp and garrison equipage, and some of the provisions. The first boats are expected here to-morrow. Mr. Beard, agent for the quartermaster and subsistence departments, is here engaging wagons for their transportation.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. HEINTZELMAN, *Lieutenant, Acting Assistant Quartermaster.*Major E. KIRBY, *Paymaster, Acting Assistant Adjutant General, Army of the South.*

List of articles of subsistence, ordnance stores, &c., received at Darien before the 4th June, 1836, to be forwarded to Hawkinsville, Georgia.

270 barrels of pork; 464 barrels of flour; 417 barrels of hard bread; 29 barrels of vinegar; 16 boxes of candles; 24 boxes of soap; 97 boxes of bacon; 54 barrels of beans; 10 barrels of salt; 2 barrels of sugar; 10 barrels of coffee; 6,984 tent pins; 75 sets wall tent poles; 343 sets common tent poles; 315 common tents; 72 wall tents; 65 tent flies; 1 hospital tent; 517 camp-kettles; 1,800 complete sets infantry accoutrements, including brushes, pricks, and plates; 500 Hall's rifles, complete; 500 Hall's rifle accoutrements.

S. P. HEINTZELMAN, *Lieutenant and Acting Assistant Quartermaster.*

HAWKINSVILLE, Georgia, June 8, 1836.

No. 189.

TUSKEGEE, June 8, 1836.

GENERAL: I have detained the escort until this morning in consequence of the danger of exposing so small a force beyond supporting distance from this post, but the captains are both anxious to return, and I have consented to permit them to proceed by a route which I am assured will be perfectly safe; they have fine companies, and should they meet an enemy on anything like equal terms, I am sure they will give a good account of him. I have not yet obtained the command of the troops, but if I obtain it at all I shall probably enter on duty to-morrow.

I wish a small regular force as soon as possible. If I had only two or three companies I should feel myself able to commence the removal of the Indians at once.

The hostile Indians are committing the most cruel and distressing outrages on the inhabitants a few miles below. A movement in that direction will be necessary, as well to cover the settlements as to hold Nea-Mico in check, who is decidedly hostile, and to obtain forage, which cannot be had here.

I desire that Captain Page, Dr. Randall, and the other officers connected with the Indian service, be sent to me as soon as they can be spared. Their services would be important to me at this time, and will every day become more so.

I learn from the governor that General Moore will arrive at Irwinton about the 10th instant, but it is doubtful, I think, whether he can protect the entire line confided to him.

If a movement be determined on, I will send you information of it by a runner.

I request that Dr. Waite be directed to join me as soon as possible, and I would be glad to be informed at what point provisions and forage can be obtained on the Chattahoochee, either below or above Irwinton.

I am, general, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

TH. S. JESUP, *Major General.*

Major General W. Scott, *Commanding the Southern Army, Columbus, Georgia.*

P. S.—Neah-Mathla is certainly sick, and his next chief was disabled in the skirmish the day I left Columbus, or perhaps the evening before.

T. S. J.

No. 190.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS OF THE SOUTHERN ARMY, *Tuskegee, June 10, 1836.*

SIR: I have here about 900 volunteers and militia of Alabama, and about 200 friendly Indian warriors. I shall move to-morrow or next day, at furthest, against the hostile Indians. I expect to be joined on my route by five hundred mounted men, under Brigadier General Moore, and by two hundred Indian warriors, and I hope to strike the enemy in less than five days.

Captain Parrott and Lieutenant Lane are my aides-de-camp, and I respectfully ask for them the extra pay and emoluments of aides; with that addition to their compensation they will find it extremely difficult in this country, at this time, to keep their expenses within their income. The aides of Major General Patterson, who is serving under my orders, are entitled to the full pay and emoluments of majors, and my aides should, in common justice, be placed upon a footing of equality with them, at least in compensation.

I further respectfully ask that the first vacancy in the quartermaster's department be filled by Lieutenant Chambers.

I have the honor to be, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

TH. S. JESUP, *Major General.*

Hon. LEWIS CASS, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

No. 191.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS SOUTHERN ARMY, *Tuskegee, June 11, 1836.*

SIR: I expected to have moved to-day, but have been delayed in consequence of a heavy rain, and of the Indian warriors not being in readiness. I shall move forward to-morrow, however, and occupy a position on the Fort Mitchell road, about twenty-eight miles in advance, and there wait the arrival of the Indian warriors under Opotheohola, or if I can find the enemy without Indian guides, attack him immediately. The country is almost without supplies, and none of those ordered before I left Washington have arrived. Cartridge-boxes and flints, particularly, are wanted, but that shall not check my movement. The horses must be put on half rations, and the deficiency supplied from the cane swamps. I held a council yesterday with several Indian chiefs, and required them to disarm a party from the hostile camp; thirty-four were disarmed and five escaped. I think it would have a good effect to pay the whole annuity to those who take an active part with us, and I most earnestly recommend the measure, as well on the score of justice as policy. The communication with Columbus is in the hands of the enemy, and I have no means of communicating directly with General Scott. This circumstance inclines me to strike a blow at once, though there is some hazard in it. General Scott, when I parted with him, expected to be ready to move by the 15th; if he should commence operations on that day, he will be within thirty or forty miles of me, and may prevent a junction between the hostile chiefs, and enable me to strike them in succession.

A corps of artificers and laborers is necessary to the efficiency of the quartermaster's department. Southern militia and volunteers cannot be induced to labor. Such a corps, if authorized, should be employed entirely in the southern States.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

TH. S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding 2d Army Corps.*

Hon. LEWIS CASS, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

No. 192.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 10, 1836.*

SIR: Major General Scott is filled with extreme anxiety at the delay of the supplies ascending the Ockmulgee. Many articles expected by that route are of indispensable importance. Hall's rifles, the musket accoutrements, and the tents, are needed to complete the equipment of the troops already assembled, a portion of whom are without arms or shelter. The subsistence and other stores are also greatly wanted. The troops cannot take the field till some portion of these supplies shall arrive.

The general relies upon your zeal and activity in using every possible means for hastening forward these articles. Spare neither pains nor expense by sending agents below to hasten them up the river, and in pushing them forward when they shall come into your hands, and keep the general constantly advised of every circumstance calculated either to advance or retard them.

The general thinks you will be able to procure in the country around Hawkinsville and Macon a sufficient number of wagons for the transportation of these supplies from the Ockmulgee to this place. If you should find this impracticable advise the general.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. KIRBY, *Paymaster, Acting Asst. Adjt. General.*

J. A. BEARD, Esq., *Agent of Quartermaster and Subsist. Dep'ts, Macon or Hawkinsville.*

No. 193.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 10, 1836.*

SIR: I was happy to learn that you arrived safely at Tuskegee. The escort has not yet been able to return. We shall be much delayed in taking the field on this side by the non-arrival of our most essential supplies—rifles, muskets, musket accoutrements, ammunition, &c. I had expected these, with subsistence stores, to begin to arrive here from the Ockmulgee by the 7th instant, but here is a letter from the agent, Mr. Beard, dated at Hawkinsville the 5th, in which he reports that nothing had reached the place. He immediately despatched a boat to Darien to make inquiries, to hasten, &c. We have now on the Chattahoochee about 2,000 Georgians, most of them remarkably fine men; of the whole number, however, not a third have sufficient arms, and a still smaller number good accoutrements. It will, therefore, be impossible to arm and equip the remaining two-thirds without the muskets, the Hall's rifles, and musket accoutrements expected by the Ockmulgee. From the foregoing it will be seen that it is impossible for the Georgians to commence operations from the neighborhood of Irwinton, say in eight or ten days, nor even then, unless the arms and accoutrements should have arrived. I have not had a line from his excellency Governor Clay. The regulars are advancing handsomely from Augusta. I think all but a small detachment of marines had reached that place at the last dates. Brigadier General Fenwick is very anxious, I learn, that the regulars should be held together as a brigade under his command. Major Mackay has been excused from this campaign and nobody substituted in his place. Lieutenant Waite arrived yesterday. I have been obliged to place him on duty here.

I remain, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *United States Army, Commanding, &c.*

We have more than doubled the force placed in the lower counties of Georgia to prevent the Creeks from escaping to the Seminoles.

W. S.

No. 194.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 12, 1836.*

SIR: I wrote to you on the 2d instant with a burning fever on me, which had then continued more than two days. I have since been quite sick, and have passed through a course of medicine that has fully removed the cause of disease, but left me rather feeble. I have, however, already recovered much strength in the last forty hours, and to-morrow expect to be on horseback. My cure has been so systematic that a relapse is deemed impossible.

During my confinement there was but little of importance to do, and the governor very promptly and ably supplied my place.

We have on this frontier about 3,300 Georgia volunteers and drafts; the former contain a large portion of the chivalry, intelligence, and property of the State. Of this force, we have not as yet been able to arm more than a third. Muskets in sufficient numbers are approaching, but no accoutrements, except the 1,800 that I ordered from St. Augustine and Picolata. Without these, which I expect from the Ockmulgee in six days, it would have been utterly impossible to have equipped the Georgians for the field, for there were no accoutrements in any of the southern arsenals.

In six or eight days, then, I hope to be able to arm and equip the whole of the Georgia forces; and, as a respectable number of the regular troops may be expected here by that time, I shall not lose a moment in commencing active operations.

Major General Jesup has joined the Alabamians at Tuskegee. I have letters from him of the 5th, 6th, and 8th instant. Although he does not state the fact, it seems that he met Governor Clay at Line creek, twenty-five miles west of Tuskegee, and thence returned to the latter place, preceding the governor by a few miles. Something unpleasant must have occurred at the interview. In his letter of the 8th General Jesup only says: "I have not yet obtained the command of the troops, but if I obtain it at all I shall probably enter on duty to-morrow."

Some of the very intelligent Georgians who accompanied General Jesup as an escort say that the Alabamians do not wish to come into the service of the United States—that the governor, Major General Patterson, and Adjutant and Inspector General Hogan, are all opposed to the change, &c. It is singular that General Jesup has not been more explicit in his communications with me on these points. In fact, but for the escort that has returned, I should not have known that he had seen the governor at all.

The same letters represent the Alabamians to be well armed with muskets, but to be without accoutrements, without cartridges, and without flints. The deficiency in flints and ammunition I shall be able to supply on the arrival of our stores by the Ockmulgee, in six and eight days.

The governor and myself, in proportion as we have been able to obtain *armed* men, have sent off detachments to guard the left bank of this river. Some of these detachments have been pushed below the country occupied by the Creeks on the opposite bank. Several of the middle detachments have, within eight or ten days, been surprised by small parties of the enemy coming over for marauding purposes, and in each case the advantage has been against us. To keep up a communication all along the river to check and to destroy the enemy, we now have constantly cruising two steamers, both of which are well manned, but only one armed with a six-pounder. We had no other piece of artillery.

I am sorry to say, for the information of the Secretary, that no volunteer force can be sent from this quarter either before or after the Creek war to aid the operations against the Seminoles in Florida. All the Georgians, as Governor Schley informs me, who are now in the field, were expressly called for to put down the Creeks. Many of the companies which first presented themselves for muster made it a point that they should be so and not otherwise employed. This the governor fully assented to in his speeches on the several occasions. The Alabamians, too, I am confident, if they have conversed with the members of Colonel Chisholm's regiment, lately from Florida, will be equally repugnant to a campaign in that country at this season of the year. I passed that regiment on April 20 at the Big Withlacoochee, when all its energies appeared to be entirely prostrated by the heat of the weather.

I enclose a copy of a letter addressed to Lieutenant Colonel Foster, written on a request from Governor Call.

When I ordered the 100,000 rations from Savannah, *via* Darien, Hawkinsville, &c., to this place, I knew that no supplies of that sort could be wanted in Florida in four or five weeks, and I immediately caused notice to be given of the measure. At the time I gave the order I knew that the Altamaha and Ockmulgee rivers were becoming daily lower and lower, and that a sufficient number of wagons could not be found in the country to haul from Augusta to Columbus the immense supplies that would be wanted in this war. No time was therefore to be lost, and the rations were ordered by water to a point only ninety miles from this place. It is true that very heavy and unexpected showers of rain followed for the next ten days, which have kept the rivers up and spoiled the roads.

Beyond those 100,000 rations, provided we receive the supplies demanded from New Orleans, not another pound of subsistence is wanted from the north and east.

In haste, I have the honor to be your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General, United States Army.*

No. 195.

AUGUSTA ARSENAL, *Georgia, June 11, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that the following ordnance and ordnance stores have been received at this arsenal from the Charleston depot, and respectfully request to be informed whether the stores are to remain here or be forwarded on to the ordnance officer at Columbus, Georgia, viz: 500 Hall's rifles (brown) complete; 500 flasks and belts; 500 Hall's rifles (bright) complete; 500 sets rifle accoutrements; 1,000 screw-drivers; 1,000 wipers; 100 spring vices; 100 bullet moulds; 200 pounds rifle powder; 2,500 infantry cartridge-boxes; 2,500 infantry cartridge belts; 2,500 bayonet scabbards; 2,500 bayonet scabbard belts; 2,500 bayonet scabbard plates; 2,500 gun slings; 2,039 brushes and picks.

Very respectfully, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

N. BADEN, *Major United States Army.*

Major E. KIRBY, *Aide-de-camp.*

No. 196.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, June 14, 1836.*

SIR: Your letter of the 11th instant, containing a list of certain ordnance stores received by you at Augusta arsenal, has been submitted to Major General Scott. The general directs that you forward to this place, without delay, the following articles embraced in that list, viz: 500 Hall's rifles (brown) complete; 500 flasks and belts; 500 screw-drivers; 500 wipers; 50 spring vices; 50 bullet moulds; 200 pounds rifle powder; 1,000 infantry cartridge-boxes; 1,000 infantry cartridge belts; 1,000 bayonet scabbards; 1,000 bayonet scabbard belts; 1,000 bayonet scabbard plates; 1,000 gun slings; 1,000 brushes and picks.

The general desires to have these articles disposed in light loads, say, not to exceed two-thirds the ordinary loads, and despatched without any delay to this place. They are immediately and urgently wanted here.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. KIRBY, *Paymaster, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

Major N. BADEN, *United States Army, Commanding Augusta Arsenal.*

No. 197.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, June 11, 1836.*

SIR: You will proceed forthwith to Hawkinsville, hiring such relays of horses upon the road as to proceed expeditiously.

On your arrival, ascertain from Lieutenant Heintzelman, of the army, or Major J. C. Beard, agent of the United States for forwarding supplies, &c., whether any of Hall's patent rifles and accoutrements have been received at that place with other public stores from below. If they have arrived, you will direct, by the authority of Major General Scott, the officer having charge of them to forward those articles to this place with all despatch. Should these rifles and accoutrements have been turned over to General Wilcox, of the Georgia militia, or any other officer, you will recover possession of them, even should it be necessary to pursue them beyond Hawkinsville. These arms are wanted immediately and urgently at this place, to supply the unarmed troops assembled here.

You will also direct that the muskets and musket accoutrements, and ammunition, which have arrived or may arrive at Hawkinsville, be forwarded to this place without any delay. Next to these the tents and camp equipage will be forwarded.

Major Beard will turn over the instructions which he received from Major General Scott to Lieutenant Heintzelman, for whose guidance they are intended; and after completing the duties assigned him by the general in that quarter, will proceed to this place.

You will show this order to Major Beard and Lieutenant Heintzelman, and to General Wilcox, should he have received the arms, who will respectively be governed by it in the premises. Having completed this duty, you will return to this place and report your doings.

By order of Major General Scott.

E. KIRBY, *Paymaster, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

Lieutenant EDWARD DEAS, *United States Army.*

No. 198.

HAWKINSVILLE, *Georgia, June 12, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that the steamboat Comet arrived at this place yesterday, with two boats in tow, containing supplies for the army.

I have just finished loading ten teams, which will leave this early to-morrow for Columbus, crossing the Flint at Traveller's Rest. Enclosed herewith you will receive a list of the supplies sent by them.

General Wilcox, just from headquarters, and on his way to organize a force a little south of this, has called on me for arms for 200 men, and also for a company of mounted men under his command, being sixty more, making 260 in all.

Having no special instructions, and from the necessity of the case, I have promised to supply him with the arms and also with provisions, agreeably to your order to Major Beard.

Major Beard left here a few days ago for Macon, to procure wagons to forward the supplies, on board one boat expected here to-morrow, by the steamboat Crockett, as it is impossible to get a sufficient number of wagons in this neighborhood. He will return to this place in a few days.

Six wagons arrived this evening from Warrenton, and to-morrow we expect five or six more; so I hope to be able by next day to start another train of ten. It will be loaded entirely with provisions.

I have retained the tents, as I supposed the arms, accoutrements, and provisions were more needed. With the tents are poles and pins; the latter are very heavy, and scarcely worth the transportation at the present time with the limited means of transport to be obtained. Would it not be better to retain the pins here?

I have not been furnished with any funds.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. HEINTZELMAN, *Lieutenant and Acting Assistant Quartermaster.*

Major E. KIRBY, *Paymaster and Acting Assistant Adjutant General, Columbus, Georgia.*

No. 199.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 14, 1836.*

SIR: We are still held in a state of inactivity from the non-arrival of arms, ammunition, &c. These essential supplies, we have reason to hope, will be here in sufficient numbers and quantities in a few days from Augusta, and first from Hawkinsville, on the Ockmulgee, to which point shipments, *via* Darien, were made by my orders from Florida, Savannah, and Charleston. Nearly all the Georgians ordered out by the governor—a little more than three thousand—are already on the frontier; but, as I have before reported, by far the greater number of the companies have come without arms and accoutrements. As fast as the mounted companies can be armed I shall send them down the country, on the Georgia side, at least as low as Irwinton, whence I shall commence operations. With the aid of the flats, which I have caused to be constructed, it will be easy, at the proper time, to pass those troops over to the Alabama side; and the foot, regular and volunteer, not wanted to guard the river above and below this place, I shall send to the same rendezvous in steamboats. The first company of regulars (Monroe's) arrived yesterday, and a detachment of four or six, under Major Lomax, may be expected the day after to-morrow. Other detachments will follow at intervals of a day or two, and the whole, including marines, may be expected in a week. I have not, however, all-important as I deem those regulars, been waiting for them. The volunteers cannot march without arms, accoutrements, and ammunition.

Subsistence in abundance will also arrive from the Ockmulgee with the arms, accoutrements, &c.

It is extremely doubtful, judging from circumstances, whether the governor of Alabama will place his forces under the authority of the United States. He was, on the 8th instant, at Tuskegee, only forty-odd miles from this place, and may be presumed to be still there; yet he has not condescended to notice my letters to him of the 31st ultimo, nor that of Governor Schley of the same date and to the same effect. The latter neglect, which I have no right to comment upon, is more extraordinary than the former. Nor can I hear anything explicit from Major General Jesup. His letter of the 8th instant to me, written after he met the governor at Line creek, beyond Tuskegee, and after they had both travelled from the former to the latter place, is absolutely dark and mysterious. I gave a quotation from this letter in mine of the 12th. I have not had a line from him since, although as yet friendly Indian runners have had no difficulty in passing and repassing. One of these runners I sent to him a few days since, and who may be expected back to-night. By his return the mystery that hangs over the intentions and purposes of the governor of Alabama may be removed. I know from many sources that his forces are not prepared to take the field with effect—they at least want ammunition and flints. I also unofficially learn that Brigadier General Moore, of that State, has arrived at Irwinton with a reinforcement of 750 mounted men, and that he thinks of commencing operations forthwith. I shall write to him to-day to say that I have the direction of the war, and request that he may wait till my arrival in that quarter.

I remain, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General U. S. A.*

No. 200.

ORDERS No. 8.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 16, 1836.*

All the troops of the Georgia line will hold themselves in readiness to take the field the moment the arms and ammunition, now daily expected, shall arrive.

As an indispensable preparation, every mounted officer, of every rank, and every mounted man will immediately provide himself with a wallet capable of carrying three days' supply of corn for his horse. Commanding officers will see that this preparation be made at once.

Haversacks are provided for all the volunteers and drafted men, whether mounted or on foot. To obtain them, requisitions will be made on the United States quartermaster at this place. Each man will be careful to mark his wallet and haversack with his name as soon as they come into his hands.

The baggage of officers and companies, at the commencement of the first march, must be reduced to the smallest amount. All heavy and superfluous articles will be left behind. Troops, to pursue an enemy with success, must move lightly; no company, therefore, can be allowed to take into the enemy's country more than four tents for officers and men. Commanders of every rank will look strictly to the due execution of this order, or the army will be rendered utterly incapable of active movements by the overwhelming weight of its baggage train.

Light camp-kettles and mess-pans have been provided for the troops. Cast-iron ovens, skillets, and the like, are too heavy to be allowed to go into the wagons, which are principally to be loaded with ammunition and subsistence for men.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

No. 201.

KNOXVILLE, *June 16, 1836.*

SIR: Agreeably to order, I to-day met the wagons conveying the guns and ammunition to Columbus, between this place. I found it much more difficult to procure wagons as lighters than I had anticipated. I, however, succeeded in procuring two or three, which will take in their loading to-morrow and hasten on to Columbus. Unless some *very serious* accident happens, they will all be in Columbus by the night of the 19th instant. The wagons seem to move at this time with some spirit.

Yours, truly,

JNO. CROWELL, JR.

Major General W. SCOTT, *U. S. A., Headquarters, Columbus, Georgia.*

No. 202.

MACON, *June 16, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to inform you twenty-one wagons and one howitzer was forwarded to headquarters yesterday and this morning from Hawkinsville. An invoice of contents of the wagons will be handed you by the wagon-masters in charge. A great portion of the musket accoutrements you require, and the whole of Hall's rifles, are with these trains. We find no ammunition on either boats or invoices.

The subsistence stores forwarded consist principally of bacon, bread, and flour; also, tents, ball, and cannon in proportion, taken out of tierces to lessen transportation; also, camp-kettles.

According to your instructions, I purchased horses for the howitzer, and have likewise purchased seven wagons and teams.

Lieutenant Heintzelman receipted to me for those articles. After making my arrangements in Hawkinsville for the furling of your orders, I handed your instructions to Lieutenant Heintzelman and left him in charge, and left for this city in the night and arrived to-day, noon, in time to start thirteen wagons laden with subsistence and other stores, viz: 22 barrels of prime beef, (purchased here;) 139 boxes, (contents not known,) a portion of hospital stores; $\frac{1}{2}$ barrel of barley; 23 barrels of pork; 60 barrels of flour; 16 barrels of beans; 12 barrels of hard bread.

The Darien steamboat arrived at Hawkinsville yesterday evening. I ordered her to this place to discharge her cargo. She is under charge of Lieutenant Simpson, A. C. S. I expect her here this night.

I shall proceed to forward her freight immediately, and, after arranging this business to my satisfaction, shall proceed forthwith to headquarters.

My funds are expended. I enclose a hasty statement of my disbursements, and shall draw again on your paymaster for two thousand dollars to meet casualties previous to my arrival at headquarters.

The difficulties I have had to surmount have been far greater than I anticipated. I have been ably assisted in Hawkinsville by Lieutenant Heintzelman. I have not taken rest the last four nights and find myself quite sick, but hope to rise to-morrow with renewed energies.

I wrote Lieutenant Dimmock respecting the fixed ammunition you so much require, and suggested to him to have some forwarded forthwith—viz: canister and grape—*by omnibus or stage*. I find, on looking over the invoices received, no mention made of any ammunition having been shipped.

No six-pounder yet arrived. I found a gun-carriage on board of the Darien, which I ordered on shore at Hawkinsville.

Captain Seymour, of the Macon volunteers, desires me to offer his respects to you, and kindly wishes for your success in the approaching campaign. I think it probable he will accompany me to your headquarters to offer his respects in person.

I would suggest three trains, at least, be sent (on their arrival) back to Hawkinsville.

The marines are in this neighborhood—will pass through in the morning.

I have the honor to be, general, with respect, your obedient servant,
JOSEPH A. BEARD, *Agent to United States Army.*

Major General W. SCOTT, *Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the South, Headquarters, Columbus.*

No. 203.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 17, 1836.*

SIR: I enclose a copy of my letter to Major General Jesup, dated yesterday, and also a copy of my Order No. 8. These papers will show our present condition and prospects. The troops here are becoming impatient to move, and so am I; but I must avoid all premature and false movements. Arms and ammunition are indispensable, and so are a certain number of days' subsistence. All these objects, I think, we shall certainly have in possession by the 21st instant. No time has been lost since the arrival of the arms, &c., at Hawkinsville, on the Ockmulgee. The delay occurred with the transportation line between Darien and that point. I caused agents to be stationed at both places, and have reason to believe that they have been active and pushing. As to the arms coming from Augusta, the distance (220 miles) and the badness of the roads, rendered worse by the storms of rain at the end of May and the beginning of June, have caused the delay.

Paymaster Kirby leaves me to-day (*without an experienced staff officer*) for Florida, according to the reiterated orders of his department. He has been of the greatest use to Governor Schley in matters of accounts, and to me generally. We both part with him with extreme reluctance. Major Erving has been with me since the 7th, and employed as mustering officer. I had designed him for the office of acting inspector general; but he labors under a disability which he thinks will prevent his encountering the fatigues of that office. I have not a regular aide-de-camp. Lieutenant Herring, by the last advices, lay dangerously ill at Garey's Ferry, in Florida. I fear that he is no more.

I remain, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brig. Gen. R. JONES, *Adjutant General of U. S. Army.*

P. S.—Of the officers mentioned in my Order No. 1, for staff duties, Major Kirby has just left me. Captain Page confines himself exclusively to his duties in the *Indian department*, and Captain Parrott accompanied Major General Jesup.

W. S.

No. 204.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 16, 1836.*

SIR: Since I wrote to you on the 12th, [10th,] I have heard of the arrival at Hawkinsville and Macon of most of the supplies I had ordered *via* Darien. These are now in wagons, and within two, three, and four days of this place. I have also just heard that the muskets ordered from Augusta may be expected here perhaps to-morrow. With these arms and the 1,800 accoutrements from Hawkinsville, nearly the whole of the Georgia line may be fitted for the field. At present, of the 2,200 men Major General Sanford has in his camp, (on the other side of the river,) only about 400 are armed. All the other armed men have been detached below to guard the river, and which, as yet, from the want of men, is but very imperfectly guarded.

After writing to you on the 12th, [10th,] I received your letter of the 8th. This would completely have mystified me but for the explanations given by some of the Georgia gentlemen who accompanied

you from this place. For example, you wrote to me on the 6th that you were just about to set out for Montgomery, and yet I find you back at Tuskegee on the 8th. You do not tell me that you had been absent as far as Line creek, and that you there had met the governor. You are silent as to any interview you had with him either at Line creek or Tuskegee, to which place, I understand from others, he followed you. Some difficulties you undoubtedly experienced in getting the command of the Alabama troops; but what these difficulties were you carefully conceal from me. You content yourself with saying: "I have not yet obtained the command of the troops, *but if I obtain it all* I shall probably enter on duty to-morrow." But why you had not at first obtained the command of the troops, and why the doubt whether you would obtain it all, you again carefully conceal from me.

In a subsequent part of your letter you say: "I learn from the governor that General Moore will," &c. How did you learn this from the governor? You do not tell me that you had met him at Line creek, and that, turning back yourself, he had followed you to Tuskegee. It might have been by letter.

Allow me to say that the whole letter is mysterious and enigmatical in the extreme, and that it is not such a communication as you ought to have made me. If the governor made the difficulties about placing you in the command of the troops, *that* important fact ought not to have been concealed from me; and if he did not, who else interposed difficulties?

You further tell me that "if a movement be determined on I will send you information of it by a runner." A movement to be determined on by whom? The Alabama commanders, or these in conjunction with yourself? Either you were placed in command, or you have not been. In the first case you would certainly determine on no scheme of offensive operations without my previous concurrence and readiness to co-operate; yet, without receiving any runner from you or communication of any kind since the 8th instant, a passenger in the stage by the upper route just arrived here reports that you, at the head of about 3,000 Alabamians and 1,000 friendly Indians, were about to march upon Neomico's band, and to commence offensive operations on a great scale! I have no doubt there is a gross mistake in this report. You may perhaps have been about to make some defensive movement or operation to clear a frontier settlement of a portion of the enemy; but I will not believe that you have declared your independence of my authority.

It is certain that Brigadier General Moore, of Alabama, has commenced a course of offensive operations from Irwinton up the country. From this fact I have rather inferred that you have not even yet been invested with the command of the Alabamians, or you certainly would have stopped his premature and isolated movement. These doubts and conjectures, in the absence of all direct intelligence from you, are sufficiently harassing.

I mean to be explicit and precise on my part. I desire you instantly to stop all offensive movements (if you are in command) on the part of the Alabamians until the Georgians are ready to act, say on the 21st instant, when the greater number of them will be armed and ready for the field. By that time, too, there will be on this frontier the greater part of the regulars and marines ordered from the north. On that day, if the movements of General Moore shall not render a modification of my plan necessary, I shall begin to assemble the troops on this side of the nation, somewhere in the neighborhood of Irwinton, and operate up the country. It is my desire that you meet me about that time and place, and that you bring with you any disposable force you conveniently can; or that you hold the whole of the Alabamians in defensive positions on the frontier settlements till I shall bring the war into their neighborhood, when you can come into the general line of operations with me.

No quartermaster has arrived here but Lieutenant Waite. Captain Page says that, under his instructions from the War Department, his presence in this quarter is indispensable. No flints and no ammunition have yet arrived. I have heard of shipments from New Orleans of army supplies; but none have arrived. Subsistence, with arms and accoutrements from Hawkinsville, will begin to come in to-morrow.

I shall cause a large deposit of subsistence to be made at Irwinton, another at Fort Mitchell, and a third at this place. I am inquiring, and may establish a fourth depot at some convenient point between Irwinton and Fort Mitchell.

Six companies of regulars have arrived—five to-day, and Monroe's three days ago. They are sent to guard the Indians, &c., at Fort Mitchell.

I remain, with undiminished confidence, yours, most respectfully,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *U. S. A., Commanding, &c.*

No. 205.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 18, 1836.*

SIR: Enclosed herewith you will receive copies of two letters from Major General Jesup to me, and a copy of my reply. His movement and appearance at Fort Mitchell (whither I go this morning) have embarrassed me exceedingly; and if our subsistence, ordered by me from Savannah, *via* Darien and the Ockmulgee, should not begin to arrive to-morrow, or, at the latest, the following day, all the troops must be put on half or third rations.

I hardly know how to get General Jesup's corps in its true position, from the false one he has placed himself in. I want him down the country at least as low as Irwinton; and if I send him by land, on the Alabama side, he will invert my plan of campaign by operating *down* instead of *up* the country. His foot I may be able to send below in steamboats, and cross his horse to this shore, march it to a point opposite to Irwinton, and thence recross it. But these movements will give me a great deal of trouble and delay. Than to be so embarrassed, I would infinitely have preferred that these Alabamians and Indians had marched five hundred miles in any other direction.

In haste, I remain, with high respect,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General U. S. Army.*

No. 206.

HEADQUARTERS, AT LONG'S, June 15, 1836.

GENERAL: I have received your letter of the 10th since I left Tuskegee for Irwinton, or rather for the lower line of the Creek country. I arrived here about five o'clock yesterday. Having been deceived by the mistake of a guide, I passed the Irwinton road nine miles. I am within four miles of Nehomico's camp. He has gone to the neighborhood of Tuskegee to surrender himself. I received and disarmed thirty-five of his people, who had left his camp, professing to be friendly. I have with me twelve companies—seven mounted and five infantry—and expect to be reinforced by two companies to-night. I have also four hundred Indian warriors, and expect to be reinforced to-morrow by five hundred, under the celebrated chief Opothleyoholo. I find it impossible to obtain either corn or subsistence here, the hostile Indians having destroyed all that they have not taken away.

June 16.—I am now at the "Big Spring," within fourteen miles of Fort Mitchell, and shall move on Nehomico's camp to-morrow. A detachment of Indian warriors from this division captured Nehomico and his son last evening, and they are now prisoners in my camp.

I wish Captain Page to join me as soon as possible. If he had been with me I could have organized before this time an emigrating party of several hundred. I have to request that provisions and corn be sent to Fort Mitchell. I have only five days' rations, and not a grain of corn. My movement to this point has, I understand by a gentleman who arrived to-day, tranquillized the frontier. A party or two came through to-day.

If I should not obtain supplies at Nehomico's camp, I shall probably be compelled to fall back on Fort Mitchell, or to a position near it. I hope to receive orders from you at that place, to which, if I do not go myself, I shall send wagons for subsistence.

I am, general, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

TH. S. JESUP, *Maj. General, Com'g 2d Army Corps of the Southern Army.*

Major General Scott, *Commanding the Southern Army, Columbus, Georgia.*

No. 207.

JUNE 17, 1836.

GENERAL: I find that we have less than two days' rations, in addition to two days' rations in the hands of the men. Whether successful or not against the force of Neho Emathla I shall be compelled to go to Fort Mitchell. Can you give us provisions and corn there? By all means do so. I have an Indian force which will enable you to drive the whole country.

Yours,

TH. S. JESUP.

General Scott, *Columbus.*

No. 208.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 17, 1836.*

SIR: I have this moment received your two letters of the 15th and 17th instant.

I am infinitely astonished and distressed to hear of your near approach, and in a starving condition, to Fort Mitchell. You knew that your forces were not wanted there. You knew that no supplies could reach Irwinton from New Orleans earlier than the 21st instant, if so soon; and you knew, by my letter of the 10th, that nothing had arrived as high as Hawkinsville, upon the Ockmulgee, and consequently nothing could have reached this place by the present date from that river. I also ought to add that you knew, when you left here, that the troops, daily increasing, were living from hand to mouth on the precarious supplies of the neighborhood. Under these circumstances, imagine my astonishment to learn that, instead of marching the disposable force of Alabama upon Irwinton, with subsistence for at least ten or five days in advance, to hear that you had come through the heart of the Indian country, seeking private adventures, which, if successful, could hardly have advanced the war, and against my known plan of operations, to Fort Mitchell, forty-five miles out of position! It is precisely General Gaines's movement upon Fort King, where there was no subsistence; and there is none, as you ought to have known, at Fort Mitchell. My grief and distress are at their utmost height. This strange movement you have made, without giving me the slightest notice. You had not informed me—you do not even now tell me, that you are in command of the Alabamians; and your last letter of the 8th instant stated that it was doubtful whether you would ever be invested with that command. All this is infinitely strange, and was the last thing in the world that was to be expected from you.

Well, to prevent starvation, I have called for the quartermaster and commissary, and demanded of them what rations and forage they could supply. Lieutenant Waite, the quartermaster, has, with great difficulty, provided some corn for my movement at the head of the Georgians, on the 21st or 22d; and Lieutenant McCrabb has just nearly exhausted the market to obtain two or three days' rations for the troops already at Fort Mitchell. At the risk of starving the troops on the river, (the Georgians and regulars,) I have ordered the quartermaster to send you 500 bushels of corn, and the commissary to move heaven and earth to send two or three days' subsistence for the troops brought with you. To prevent, however, all further erratic movements, I desire you to encamp your forces somewhere in the neighborhood of Fort Mitchell till further orders, or until I can see you. We will keep your forces, and those previously on the river, from starving, if possible, till the arrival of the Ockmulgee supplies, which, I suppose, will precede those from New Orleans by some days.

The first and one of the worst effects of your arrival will be to prevent a movement of the Georgians and regulars as early as I intended; the former have pushed their impatience for active operations almost to a state of mutiny—a result which I may not be able to prevent if they should learn that the arrival of the Alabamians is to hold them in a state of inglorious inactivity many days longer.

I wrote to you yesterday, and despatched the letter by a runner from Fort Mitchell.

I shall endeavor to visit Fort Mitchell to-morrow or the next day.

Though in grief, I still remain yours, with great regard,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *United States Army, Commanding, &c.*

P. S.—Some wagons with subsistence are despatched to-night, but cannot arrive, I learn from Mr. Waite, till to-morrow morning. Some corn (250 of 300 bushels) will be down by 10 o'clock to-morrow in the boat.

W. S.

No. 209.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 21, 1836.*

SIR: A thousand muskets arrived here last night, and have been issued to as many troops this morning, who will immediately commence the march for a point on the Chattahoochee, say the mouth of the Cowaggee creek, below the enemy. The accoutrements for those muskets will be here to-morrow, and will be sent down the river in a steamboat the following day. With the accoutrements will come five hundred rifles, and a battalion of mounted men will remain to receive them. The delay in the arrival of those essential supplies I now know has been occasioned by steamboat accidents between Darien and Hawkinsville, and a difficulty in procuring wagons, although I had two agents for the purpose in that neighborhood. The horse will probably overtake the foot (I shall personally march with the former) on this side of a point on the Chattahoochee opposite to the Cowaggee creek. The enemy are understood to be entirely above that creek. If I find this to be so, I shall cross the troops to the Alabama side about that point.

Major Pierce, at the head of a small battalion of artillery, marched down on this side of the river yesterday. Major Lomax, at the head of a similar battalion, follows him closely. The first detachment of marines, under Colonel Henderson, will, I understand, be here to-morrow. He will immediately take the same route, and the same thing of the remaining detachments of regulars. Brigadier General Fenwick is here, and will command all the regulars, formed into a brigade. I shall not hesitate, however, to detach from him freely, according to circumstances, and hence his forces are to be divided into light battalions.

Surgeon Lawson has arrived and entered on duty.

After leaving the necessary guards on the left bank of this river above, and particularly below Columbus, I may have left about two thousand Georgians, besides the regulars, that may be up in time for the commencement of active operations against the enemy, together with one hundred friendly Indians.

From the copies of two letters from Major General Jesup to me, and copies of two from me to him, his position and strength may be inferred. I learn this morning that his fifteen or sixteen hundred friendly Indians have deserted him in whole or great part. This, however, is but a rumor. His exact position he has not communicated to me. I suppose him to have been, on the 19th instant, about twelve miles from Fort Mitchell; and it will be seen that I have suggested that he should, during his halt of a few days, approach nearer to that place for the convenience of receiving supplies.

It will be seen, in his communication of the 17th, that he says: "I would have struck the enemy to-night, but for your letter." I have it from a respectable gentleman, to whom he made the communication on the 19th instant at Fort Mitchell, that he did, nevertheless, attempt the blow, and found that the enemy had fled. We (the governor of Georgia and myself) have great fears that the movements of Major General Jesup will render the enemy more desperate in his attempts to escape in parties across the river towards Florida. Hence, besides sending down to guard the river all the armed volunteers except four hundred, I have hastened in the same direction the two detachments of regulars mentioned above.

My intention is to give Major General Jesup instructions in time to act downwards from his present false position simultaneously with the forces which are to be landed below the enemy. It is now the best disposition I can conveniently make of his forces.

With respect to this distinguished officer, I have every motive in the world, public and private, to act in perfect harmony. All my ancient affection for him is fast returning. I hope it will be entirely restored in a day or two; that is, as soon as I shall learn that he conforms himself to my plans and instructions.

I remain, sir, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General United States Army.*

P. S.—It may be well to contradict a ridiculous letter going the rounds of the public papers, and well calculated to alarm the good people of lower Georgia and of all Florida, from Major General Irvine, of Alabama, to Brigadier General Wilcox, of this State, in which he says, besides many other strange things, that two thousand Creek Indians had escaped across the Chattahoochee towards Florida. There is not the least truth in that formal and pompous statement. From the best information from below, we have reason to be confident that not a party, probably not an individual Creek Indian, has escaped in that direction.

W. S.

No. 210.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS, *Camp on the waters of Hatchychubby, June 17, 1836.*

GENERAL: I have this instant received your letter of yesterday. I regret that my operations have met your disapprobation; but they were commenced, and have been continued, for the purpose of staying the tomahawk and scalping knife, and preventing the devastation of entire settlements or neighborhoods on the frontier. They have had the effect of tranquillizing, in some measure, the frontier people, and of inducing them to remain at their homes. I regret the censure implied in your remarks, because it is unmerited. I acted in accordance with what I believed to be the spirit of your instructions; but even were my conduct in direct opposition to your instructions given at a former period, the altered circumstances of the country are, I should think, a full justification. I consider it so; for I have none of that courage that would enable me to remain inactive when women and children are daily falling beneath the blows of the savage. Writing in the open field, while I am interrupted every moment by matters of detail of every kind even to the placing of a wagon, I cannot now explain the remarks in my letter which you have considered so "enigmatical" further than to say, in justice to Governor Clay, that he made no opposition to my assuming command, but made every effort to sustain me, and to add that, if successful in my present operations, I shall owe much of that success to his able arrangements. The troops, or rather a part of them, were opposed not to me, personally, but to any officer of the United States taking command of them, and I would take command of militia and volunteers on no other terms than their consent. I would resign my commission first.

I am now within five miles of Enea Mathla's camp, with twelve companies of volunteers and four or five hundred Indian warriors. Eleven hundred warriors, under Opotheola, will join to-night, and perhaps five hundred volunteers from Alabama. I made such arrangement for the defence of the settlements in my rear that I feel assured of their entire security. I would have struck the enemy to-night, but for your letter. If he is not struck to-morrow morning he will escape for the present; but the force I have in the field is sufficient to pursue and reduce him.

With every disposition to perform their duty, the volunteers and militia are necessarily extremely irregular in their returns, &c. I am not, therefore, able to send you a return in form of the force under my command.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General.*

Major General SCOTT, *Commanding Southern Army, Columbus, Georgia.*

No. 211.

FORT MITCHELL, *June 19, 1836.*

SIR: I came here with your express, and an escort of an officer and two mounted men, expecting to meet you. I have halted the army under my command on the Irwinton road, below the road to this place. In reply to that part of your letter upbraiding me for asking a small supply of subsistence and forage for the troops and horses of my corps, I owe it to myself to say that I knew supplies ought to arrive from New Orleans before I should want them; and to show that my calculation was correct, I have to inform you that a steamboat is here from New Orleans with supplies. I have ordered eight days' rations for my command. I took, yesterday, from the neighborhood of the hostile camp, upwards of a hundred head of cattle; and as I had a good supply of rice, I could have reached Irwinton without any supply from this place, had I been permitted to proceed. You have treated me with a degree of harshness which is cruel in the extreme. You charge me with deranging your plan of campaign. I understood one part of that plan to be the protection to the frontier settlements of Alabama. I may have failed in judgment as to the proper mode of protecting it; but, give me leave to say, the course I adopted has been successful. That frontier is now secure. I have upwards of twelve hundred Indian warriors in my camp; they will not remain inactive; what shall I do with them? Shall I dismiss or retain them and employ them in scouring the swamps?

You charge me with not communicating with you, and giving you information on several points. With the duties I have had to perform, that was impossible. My occupation has been so incessant that I have not averaged three hours' sleep in the twenty-four for two weeks. I have kept you apprised of everything important to be known. As to the reasons for my own acts, or those of others, I had not thought it necessary to say anything. You knew me; and, from the perfect candor and fairness with which I acted towards you, and the efforts I made to sustain you, both with the Georgians and Alabamians, I had a right to expect different treatment from you. Under the circumstances, the harshness with which you have treated me is the extreme of cruelty. That matters not at this time; we have important duties to perform. If you will move to-day, general, with your disposable force, we can end the war before to-morrow night. Captain Page will give you important information. I am not ambitious of the honors of Indian warfare. I am content that the whole of them shall be yours; but let me entreat you to act promptly. I can prevent the escape of the enemy on this side of the country; and if you attack them in front, they are yours. If you hesitate, you are lost. I felt resentment this morning; I feel it no longer. By our former friendship, let me entreat you again to act promptly.

Yours, truly,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Major General W. SCOTT, *Commanding Southern Army, Columbus, Ga.*

P. S.—Let me have two or three companies of regular troops, if you decide to attack these Indians. Page will tell you where they are.

No. 212.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 19, 1836.*

SIR: In your first letter of the 17th instant, you tell me that you will be compelled to go to Fort Mitchell; and, according to an intimation in my reply to you of the same date, I went down yesterday, with great inconvenience, not doubting that I should meet you or hear of you in the immediate vicinity

of that place. The only news received of you there was a rumor representing you to be on the return march to Tuskegee, which I could not credit, under the positive declaration in your letter of the 17th, quoted above; and Captain Page reported that he had, a few hours before, forwarded a despatch to Columbus from you to me.

Besides some rations sent down the night before in wagons, the steamboat in which I was a passenger took down a further supply of subsistence, and some corn, all for the use of your troops, and in conformity with your requests of the 15th and 17th instant.

On my return to Columbus late last evening, I received your second of the 17th instant. This is fully as strange as any of your previous communications. In it you repeat nothing of your previous intention of marching upon Fort Mitchell; but you take care to insert two or three topics which would furnish a good basis for a popular appeal against the hardship imposed on you of undertaking no system of offensive operations without my previous concurrence and readiness to act in concert with you. It would seem to be for this purpose—I can imagine no other—that you tell me that your operations have been “commenced, and have been continued, for the purpose of staying the tomahawk and scalping-knife, and preventing the devastation of entire settlements or neighborhoods on the frontier.” Nothing, certainly, could be more meritorious. The direct protection of the Alabama settlements was within your competency, and, indeed, among your paramount duties. But why commence a grand system of offensive operations which has brought you out on this side of the Creek nation, at a point where I did not want you, without giving me the slightest intimation that you were about to commence, and of course without waiting for my approbation and co-operation? To have waited for such co-operation, and to have given me notice of your intended movements, were, allow me to say, also among your paramount duties.

Your next popular flourish is in these words: “I have none of that courage that would enable me to remain inactive when women and children are daily falling beneath the blows of the savage.” I certainly believe that you have not—and there was not the slightest objection, in any quarter, to your protecting the women and children of the frontier, with the defence of which you were directly charged. Again: nothing could have been more praiseworthy; but how does this excuse your leaving those women and children, and, instead of marching upon Irwinton, where you were required, marching in hostile array, seeking battles, upon Fort Mitchell, where you were neither expected nor wanted?

On the subject of the Alabama frontier settlements, I am happy to learn by your letter that you made such arrangements for their safety as to leave you assured on that point.

The last dead point you make, as if it were for future use against me, is this: “I would have struck the enemy to-night but for your letter; if he is not struck to-morrow morning he will escape for the present; but the force I have in the field is sufficient to pursue and reduce him.” Here I am made to deprive you and the country of a great imaginary victory. I say imaginary, for I am inclined to think that you are on this occasion a little too sanguine in your calculations. But the true answer is this: who gave you authority to roam at pleasure through the Creek nation at the head of the Alabamians and a body of friendly Indians, without giving notice to, and without concert with, the Georgians and regulars brought to this frontier for the same war, and at an enormous expense to the government? Besides, from the position occupied by you, you are forced to operate *down* the country, instead of getting below the enemy and operating *up*. This precisely inverts what you know to be my plan of campaign; a plan fully developed in conversation with you, and to which you did not in the least object, although you were invited to discuss it freely.

Whilst writing the above, I received your letter of this date written at Fort Mitchell. You charge me with harshness. I have certainly in previous letters complained heavily of you, as in the beginning of this, and have in every instance, I think, given the grounds of those complaints. The facts stated by me I think bear the construction that I have placed upon them; and I have infinitely regretted the existence of those facts.

You are mistaken in supposing that I upbraided you for asking for small supplies of rations and forage for your troops. I regretted the scarcity of our resources in such supplies, and apprehended a scarcity bordering on starvation for a few days. Fortunately, eighty thousand rations have arrived at Fort Mitchell, and about twenty thousand here, which yesterday were not expected earlier than the 22d instant, perhaps the 23d instant; and I am confident when here, that we both, by calculation, did not expect anything from New Orleans before the 21st or 22d. I am rejoiced as much on your account as my own that we both have an abundant supply of rations for the present, and we know that one hundred and fifty thousand more will soon follow. I have ordered twelve thousand to be landed from the steamboat at Fort Mitchell, intending to distribute the remainder of that cargo among the posts below, for the benefit of all the troops in the field, equally.

General, in haste, I have not intended to say anything to injure you. I have shown in strong terms the construction I had a right to place upon your acts and letters. This I know may appear harsh. But on the other hand, allow me to say that I have the greatest and an undiminished confidence in your honor, your intelligence, gallantry, and capacity for war. You use the word friendship. I have cherished for you, for more than twenty-two years, a warm and sincere affection which I would not part with on any consideration. It has been a little shaken since I saw you; but one expression of your letter goes far to recall it. I think you have not been attentive to my plans and instructions. In this I certainly think that you have erred, and also in your failure to report fully to me. Throwing for a moment seniority aside, I ask it of your ancient connexion with me to be more careful in those particulars in future. It will give me sincere delight to put down this war with you, and to give you all the fame which I know you are so capable of winning.

I presume that you have approached a little nearer to Fort Mitchell, for the convenience of obtaining supplies. Some corn has been sent thither for your use, and I understand eight hundred or a thousand bushels may be had at a plantation below.

I shall not detain you in a state of inactivity many days. The arms and some ammunition must reach this place to-morrow, and the troops will march down on the Georgia side to place themselves below the enemy on the 22d. I think we shall cross the river about the mouth of the Cow-ag-gee. It is said there are no Indians below. I wish you could come into line with me there; but as that cannot well be without crossing you over to the Georgia side and thence recrossing the river, I shall wish you to act downwards as soon as the Georgians are in position to march in the opposite direction. More particular instructions you will receive from me on this point in a day or two. In the meantime, I wish you to send a force to the foot of the Uchee shoals, which I understand is just about a mile above the creek of the same name, in order to construct at that place a shed, closed at the ends and sides, capable of receiving

and sheltering (say) one hundred thousand rations, with about five thousand bushels of corn. The lumber, (boards and scantling,) as also nails, shall be shipped from this place to-morrow or the next day. The number of men to be sent for this purpose, and to remain as a guard, you will please designate. Axes, spades, saws, and hammers shall also be sent to the spot by Tuesday evening. A field-work of slight construction will no doubt be necessary for the guard; and you will give instructions accordingly. I shall have to leave not less than fifteen hundred Georgians to guard the left bank of this river. The Alabamians must protect the depot at the foot of the Uchee shoals.

You shall hear from me again, probably to-morrow. Let me have a report from you on the above subjects, and suggestions as many as you please.

With renewed regard, I remain, with great respect, your most obedient servant,
WINFIELD SCOTT.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding Division Army of the South.*

No. 213.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 21, 1836.*

SIR: In my letter to you of the 19th, I requested that you would send a detachment to the foot of the Uchee shoals for the purposes then stated. I have since heard that there is another difficulty in the river, just above Fort Twiggs, called the *Belton Rock*, nearly as bad as the Uchee shoals. I have, therefore, after consulting the best pilots belonging to the river, determined to make the establishment for the shelter and safety of army supplies, including a picket-work for the defence of the detachment, at Bryant's Landing, nearly or quite opposite to Fort Twiggs. To this point, then, I have to request that you will direct the detachment for the purposes mentioned in my letter of the 19th instant; but as it is a few miles nearer to the supposed great body of the Lower Creeks, I suggest the propriety of increasing the strength of the detachment. The lumber (boards and scantling) for the shed for provisions and other stores, together with nails and the proper tools, will all be despatched in a steamboat this morning. The boat will lie at Fort Twiggs until the detachment appears on the opposite side.

A thousand muskets will be distributed to the Georgia line this morning, when the whole will march for Roanoke, and a point below. The accoutrements for those muskets, and the five hundred rifles for the unarmed horse, cannot be here from the Ockmulgee till to-morrow. I propose to send them after the troops in a steamboat. Perhaps a battalion of horse will prefer to remain and receive their rifles here; and in that case I shall personally march with the battalion, at the latest, the day after to-morrow.

I shall cross the Georgians, &c., into Alabama *below* the Indians—say in the vicinity of the mouth of the Cowikee. Major Pierce marched down the river yesterday with four companies of regulars. Major Lomax will follow to-day with a like battalion. I have pushed those troops below, as it is feared that your movements have quickened the desire of the enemy to escape across the river towards Florida. I have determined to keep the whole of the regulars in a brigade together, under the command of Brigadier General Fenwick. When you come into line with me, that brigade may make a part of your command.

About one hundred friendly Indians will march with the Georgia line, under Paddy Carr. I have felt some hesitation about the employment of these friendly Indians.

I shall write to you again respecting your movements. In haste.

I remain, with great respect and esteem, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Major General JESUP, *U. S. A., Commanding 2d Division Army of the South.*

No. 214.

[Private.]

FORT MITCHELL, *Alabama, June 20, 1836.*

DEAR SIR: We have the Florida scenes enacted over again. This war ought to have been ended a week ago. I commenced operations on the Alabama side, and have succeeded in tranquillizing the whole frontier. One principal hostile chief, Enea Mico, came in, with many of his people, to a camp which I had formed for the purpose of feeding the starving Indians preparatory to their removal. Another, Enea Mathla, is a prisoner in my camp; and I was in full march, with a force sufficient to have terminated the war in five days, when my progress was arrested by an order from General Scott. He has censured me in the most unmeasured and unwarrantable manner; and I shall be compelled to have the whole subject of this campaign investigated. There was force sufficient at Tuskegee, Columbus, and this place, one week after our arrival, to have put an end to this war, if it had been properly used; but it was thought necessary to adopt a splendid plan of campaign upon paper, and make everything bend to it. To have waited the developments of that plan would have left nothing to defend—bloodshed and conflagration would have pervaded entire counties of Alabama. If not arrested by General Scott, I shall apply to be relieved; for I disapprove entirely the course he has thought proper to pursue, and believe that his delay has been destructive of the best interests of the country.

Let the President see this letter; he, I am sure, will approve the promptness with which I have acted, when he shall be sensible that I have, by the movement I have made, tranquillized the whole Alabama frontier.

Make my respectful compliments to Mrs. Blair and your family.

Yours, most truly,

FRANCIS P. BLAIR, Esq., *Washington City.*

THOMAS S. JESUP.

[Indorsement.]

[Referred to the Secretary of War, that he forthwith order General Scott to this place, in order that an inquiry be had into the unaccountable delay in prosecuting the Creek war, and the failure of the campaigns in Florida. Let General Jesup assume the command.

A. J.]

No. 215.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 23, 1836.*

SIR: I set out in a few minutes to overtake Major General Sanford, of this State, who marched down on the left bank of the river yesterday with a part of his division. A thousand muskets were distributed among his troops the day before; but the accoutrements and rifles coming from Hawkinsville will not be here in two or three days to come. Major General Irwin's letter to Brigadier General Wilcox, alluded to in my last communication, put the people towards Hawkinsville in such alarm that the conductor of the wagon train took a panic and turned off the direct road, by which two or three days have been lost. I have sent an agent to force the train to this place.

The rifles and musket accoutrements, with many other essential articles expected by that train, will follow in a steamboat; that is, the rifles remaining after arming a battalion of mounted men left here to receive them. Besides this battalion, Major General Sanford has with him about one hundred and sixty unarmed men.

The enemy, I have every reason to believe, is embodied, and principally between the Hatchychubby and the Cowaggee creeks. I shall cross the troops below the latter.

We are confident (the governor and myself) that no Indians have yet escaped across the Chattahoochee towards Florida. By an intelligent negro, who got off from them two or three days ago, we know, however, that the approach of Major General Jesup from above has induced them to make many endeavors to get across with their families. They approached the river, and prepared canoes, (most of which our steamboats have destroyed,) but found the guards on this side too strong to risk a passage and an escape. I speak of the more desperate of the lower bands.

Colonel Henderson has just arrived with the first detachment of the United States marines.

You must pardon me for not sending a return of the troops, particularly of the volunteers and drafts. There are about six hundred above this, guarding the passes across the river, and about eight hundred or a thousand were in positions below, before the march of Major General Sanford. The enclosed is an imperfect return, showing the force he had remaining with him; of which the *unarmed* mounted battalion left here to receive rifles makes part. I will endeavor to have something in the manner of a general return for you in a few days, for it has only been within a few days that I have had an organized staff. Major Ansart is yet in the rear.

I send with this copies of several letters from Major General Jesup to me, and of my replies. I have no doubt that we shall, in future, act together with the best feelings towards each other, and in perfect harmony. In haste.

I remain, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General U. S. Army.*

No. 216.

HEADQUARTERS, *Camp Hatchychubby, June 20, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to report the operations of this corps of the army from the time I assumed the command to the present time.

I assumed the command of the troops on the Alabama frontier on the 9th instant. I was informed, on my arrival, that the volunteers were utterly averse to be placed under the command of an officer of the army, and I determined not to attempt to exercise command over men actuated by such feelings, particularly as I had no means at my disposal of enforcing an order, if given. By the active and patriotic exertions of Governor Clay and Major General Patterson all feeling subsided, and I entered upon my duties, apparently with the best feelings of both officers and men in my favor.

I found, when I assumed the command, the frontier in a blaze, and so great a panic prevailing that the entire abandonment of the country was apprehended. By the aid of Governor Clay, who had arrived at Tuskegee on the 8th, I succeeded in preparing the army for the field in the best manner the resources at my command would admit. To quiet the frontier and to induce the inhabitants to remain at their homes, I took measures to ascertain the dispositions of the Indians, and to employ a portion of them in service. I authorized Colonel Hogan to bring Opoth-le-yo-holo, the chief of the Upper Creeks, into service, with as many of his warriors as possible. I also authorized General Woodward to employ as many warriors as he could raise. He soon engaged about two hundred, and Opoth-le-yo-holo promised to raise five hundred.

On the 10th instant I received information that about a hundred Indians had come in from Enea Mico's camp. They professed to be friendly, and desired to join me in the field. Thirty-nine of them were armed. I refused to permit them to join me, and required the chiefs to disarm them, which was immediately done.

In consequence of information from Pike county of several murders and conflagrations by the Indians, and of the danger of the inhabitants abandoning the country, I considered it my duty to put the troops under my command in motion, for the purpose of taking a position at Long's, on the road to Fort Mitchel

where I was told a large supply of forage was to be found. I was also told that it was on the direct route to Irwinton. My objects in taking this position were, 1st, to give protection to the citizens of Pike county; 2d, to hold the hostile chief Enea Mico in check; and, 3d, to collect the forage said to remain in the country. The first two objects were completely attained; the latter but partially, the Indians having removed or destroyed a large portion of the corn. On arriving at Long's, I ascertained that there were two roads to Irwinton, and that I had passed that which I intended to take (and which I had been assured passed Long's) about nine or ten miles. Finding no forage, I was compelled to proceed or fall back. The latter would have been fatal. After due reflection, I determined to proceed, as the best of two evils, believing that I could reach Irwinton before you would be ready to operate, and could receive your final instructions on my way. The road was so intolerably bad that I was not able to move more than from nine to fourteen miles a day; and in consequence of not finding a fort at Long's, as I had been assured I should, and where I had intended to leave the baggage-wagons, I was compelled to take them on. I risked nothing by my movement, as I was in sufficient force to beat any body of Indians in the Creek country. I was on the shortest route to Irwinton, and so near the enemy as to compel them to remain embodied where they were numerous, and to disperse where they were weak. The effect of the movement has been to put an end to all murders and conflagrations, and tranquillize completely the whole frontier of Alabama.

I received your letter of the 16th on the 17th, being then on the Irwinton road, in a southwesterly direction from Fort Mitchell. I proceeded the next day; and on arriving in the vicinity of Enea Mathla's camp I obtained upwards of a hundred head of cattle and a small supply of corn. In the camp, which had been but recently deserted, I received your letter of the 17th. I hastened to Fort Mitchell to meet you, but you had returned to Columbus. I found the advance of the supplies which I had required to be sent from New Orleans at Fort Mitchell.

On my return to camp I found General Patterson had left early in the morning, with the Indian warriors and mounted men, to make a reconnoissance of the country in advance. He returned in the evening, the Indians having made between thirty and forty prisoners, including negroes.

I am now encamped about twenty-two miles from Irwinton and eighteen southwest of Fort Mitchell. The hostile Indians have dispersed, and, by the advice of the principal friendly chiefs, I have sent runners into their camps to endeavor to induce part of them to come in. I sent the prisoners taken yesterday to Fort Mitchell. Among them is a chief, Kia Mothola, of some importance in his tribe.

The impossibility of obtaining supplies on the Alabama side of the Creek country in sufficient quantity to supply the army has induced me to direct Major Brandt to cause the forage and subsistence collected at Natchitoches for General Gaines's command to be sent to Montgomery or Columbus. There is a large supply of both, and it is feared a sufficient quantity for our purposes cannot be obtained short of that place. I am, through Lieutenants Chambers and Barry and Major Brandt, making every effort to form a depot of forage and subsistence at Tuskegee; but I have little hope of succeeding. The Apalachicola and Chattahoochee are the only routes through which we can calculate with certainty on receiving supplies.

I was not aware until yesterday that a letter which I wrote to you on the 9th instant had not been sent to you. It was accidentally put up with a bundle of papers, and I found it only yesterday morning. And from no notice having been taken of my letter of the 12th, I fear it has not been received. It was sent by a runner. I enclose a copy of it.

Two negroes have just come into camp, who report that the Indians broke up in great consternation yesterday, and are on their way to Florida. Had I not been halted, I would have given you a good account of them.

As I was placed on this service by the express order of the President, I shall apply to him to be relieved, and shall demand a court of inquiry.

I shall await your orders here as to the disposition of the force under my command. Neither volunteers nor Indians can be longer restrained.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General.*

Major General W. Scott, *Commanding the Southern Army, Columbus, Georgia.*

No. 217.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS SOUTHERN ARMY, *Tuskegee, June 12, 1836.*

SIR: I shall move forward this morning, in order to take a position at Long's, on the road to Fort Mitchell, where I shall be able to communicate readily with Major General Moore. From the best information I can obtain, I shall then be within twenty-two miles of Fort Mitchell.

A force of several hundred men, I accidentally learned, are assembled in Pike county, at Watson's, on the Pensacola and Columbus road; they are within two miles of the position I shall occupy. And I yesterday sent a despatch to Brigadier General Moore, directing him, if not otherwise ordered, to take a position in advance of Irwinton, where he may join me by a single march.

Opoth-le-yo-holo will join me on the 16th instant, with from five to twelve hundred friendly Indian warriors. With that Indian force united to the regular and militia force, the war, I should think, may be brought to a close in ten or fifteen days. If, however, the hostile force should be larger than we apprehend, our united force will be sufficient to beat (them) in a month; and, for my part, I should prefer fighting them here than on the western frontier, where, no matter whether they go off peaceably or are removed by force, we shall have to meet and fight them in less than twelve months.

I would be glad to have a few regular troops. If two companies can be spared, I desire that they join me as soon as practicable.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General.*

Major General W. Scott, *Commanding the Southern Army.*

No. 218.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 21, 1836.*

SIR: I have received, by the hands of your aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Lane, your letter of yesterday, and a copy of one of the 12th instant, the original of which has not reached me.

The letter of the 20th is an excellent military report of your operations. I regret the conclusion. I should be sorry to lose your services in the campaign. I am truly of opinion that your assistance cannot fail to be valuable.

I have no objection to your asking for a court of inquiry, or pursuing any other mode of redress against what you may esteem an injury at my hands. I do not think I have injured you. If I could be convinced of the contrary, there is no atonement, public or private, which I should not be ready to make.

I send you a copy of my Order No. 15. It, of course, excuses your command from the establishment of the place of depot at Bryant's Landing, opposite to Fort Twiggs. This is done upon representations made to me by your aide-de-camp, and from a desire to prevent misconceptions on the part of the Alabamians. The duty I shall probably assign to the detachment of marines, which is the next body of regulars expected at this place.

I remain, sir, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding, &c.*

P. S.—I have just learned that the rifles, accoutrements, &c., expected to-morrow from Hawkinsville, cannot arrive here before the 24th instant, the conductor of the train of wagons having heard a ridiculous report of there being Indians in the interior of Georgia, and thereupon changing his route, which will cause a loss of two days. I shall, the day after to-morrow, follow the armed troops, and leave here a body of unarmed horse to receive the rifles.

W. S.

No. 219.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia., June 23, 1836.*

SIR: I have this moment received your letter of this date. There is an expression in it that gives me great delight. I already feel the return of all my ancient affection for you. As to my confidence in your high honor, intelligence, and capacity for war, nothing has ever shaken that.

You must this morning have received my letter of yesterday, and also my Order No. 15.

I am sorry to learn that you are a little indisposed. I trust not seriously so. If well enough, I wish you to conduct the march of the Alabamians and friendly Indians, indicated in Order No. 15.

By what route are the Tennessees approaching? I did not know until the arrival of your aide-de-camp that they were in march. If I knew where an order could find the commander I would send instructions to him. When will he arrive in this neighborhood? Please, if you know his named route, send him instructions to march upon the depot about to be established by the marines for the army opposite to Fort Twiggs, that is to say, on the right bank of this river, at the place called Bryant's Landing.

I shall pass by Fort Mitchell, on this side of the river, between the hours of 11 and 2 o'clock to-morrow. I will not ask you to wait for me; but should you still be there, it would give me great pleasure to see you at the ferry for a few moments. I shall be in a great hurry. If you happen to be too much indisposed to come to the river, send me word, and I will try to cross over to you.

In haste. Very truly, yours,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *U. S. A., Commanding, &c.*

No. 220.

HEADQUARTERS, *Fort Mitchell, June 22, 1836.*

SIR: I arrived here yesterday, on my way to your headquarters, but was so ill with a severe attack of gravel that I could go no further, and I was in so much agony that I could not write. I, however, desired my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Lane, to state to you the difficulties existing in my camp—difficulties which I fear will be attended with serious consequences.

I have despatched an express to Colonel Hogan, who commands the Indians, directing him to make such a disposition of the warriors under his command as to secure the frontier above from the depredations of the hostile Indians who may fly before us; and I have required Opoth Yoholo to disarm all who left my camp contrary to his orders. I have also required him to disarm and send to this place the son-in-law of Enea Mathla, the leading hostile chief.

My report, which Lieutenant Lane was directed to hand to you, was prepared previously to the reception of your last two letters; had those letters been received the last paragraph of the report would have been modified.

I desire to be permitted to place Major General Patterson in the immediate command of his own division, at least so soon as Brigadier General Moore shall come into line. The effect on the service will be beneficial; he is a man every way to be relied on. The regular troops, the marines, the Indian warriors, and the Tennessee volunteers now on their march, will form a large division. If you will allow them to form my division, I will cheerfully go on to the close of the campaign, and afford you every support in my power. General Patterson will not continue in his present situation, nor would I if I were

in his place. He is a plain, sensible man, of great energy of character, and excellent military notions. He served with much reputation under General Jackson in the Creek war. I have no personal objects in view; my only desire is to serve the country in the best manner possible; and if the arrangement which I propose cannot be made, it would be better for the service that I should retire than that General Patterson should.

I am not able to ride on horseback this morning, but hope to be able to join the troops in the afternoon. I sent by express your last letter to General Patterson, with orders to perform the service required.

I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General.*

Major General Scott, *Commanding the Southern Army, Columbus, Georgia.*

No. 221.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Mitchell, June 23, 1836.*

Sir: By another letter of this date you will perceive that I have been stopped at this place, as well to confer freely with Major General Jesup as by the interesting occurrences of the last forty-eight hours.

Permit me to say, though in a public letter, that my friend, General Jesup, has, by fuller explanations, perfectly satisfied me that he moved from Tuskegee and operated in this direction upon what he deemed an imperious necessity, and, although I do not yet altogether concur with him in that conviction, I am satisfied that it was too strong upon him to have been resisted.

Indeed, if I had received his letter of the 9th instant, which, by accident, was never sent, or his letter of the 12th, which, by accident again, came to hand (a copy) on the 21st, no unkind remark on his correspondence or operations would probably have been made by me.

For the above reasons, I earnestly request the permission of the Secretary of War to return any and every letter of mine to the adjutant general, with the copies of General Jesup's letters to me, which were enclosed, containing any animadversion whatever on the correspondence or operations of that distinguished officer and commander, so that, as we are again friends, no trace may remain on record that we ever had the slightest misunderstanding with each other. I trust that the Secretary will allow you to oblige me in this request, which is now equally the wish of Major General Jesup.

I am now further persuaded that, whether his operations were strictly in conformity with my plans or not, very favorable results have followed those operations.

I remain, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General United States Army.*

No. 222.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 17, 1836.*

Sir: I do myself the honor to enclose herewith a copy of an order that I despatched the day of its date to Lieutenant Colonel Foster at Baton Rouge.

It no doubt will be interesting to you to learn the preparations made and making to put down the hostile Creek Indians, who are variously estimated at from 3,000 to 5,000 warriors.

Nearly the whole Georgia quota of volunteers and drafted men are already assembled on this river; but, unfortunately, of the 3,600 men we have not as yet been able to arm and equip quite one-half. Muskets and rifles for the remainder are approaching in wagons and by water, together with accoutrements, but cannot be here before the 21st instant.

Nearly all the companies that have been armed have been despatched to the lower counties on this side of the river, to prevent the hostile Indians from escaping into Florida. Still the force sent in that direction has not been half as large as I could have wished. We have retained here but 400 armed men, with about 19,000 unarmed. I have, however, the consolation of believing that not a single party of the enemy has crossed the river for Florida.

My second object in pushing troops, as fast as armed, below, is to commence operations from a point at least as low as Irwinton, intending them to drive the enemy up the country, taking care not to leave a considerable body, not even a party of twenty or ten behind me. As I advance up the country, and clear the river, it is my intention to call over a portion of the troops posted as guards on this side to join in the pursuit. This plan of operations I have now good reasons to hope I shall be able to command by the 23d instant, having engaged four steamboats to aid in circulating the troops and supplies, and having provided myself with flats for a prompt passage of the river wherever I may find necessary.

Six companies of regulars have already arrived from the north, and eight more with a detachment of United States marines, about 450 strong, may be expected in a few days, but all cannot be up before the commencement of active actions.

Of the force of Alabama assembled below and on the other side of the Creek country I have no official or accurate information. I have sent Major General Jesup, of the United States army, to Governor Clay, who was recently at Tuskegee, 43 miles only west of this place, to muster into service the Alabamians, and to take upon himself, under my orders, the direction of the war in that quarter; but I cannot learn that the Alabamians have consented to come under the laws and authority of the United States. I only know that there was some difficulty on this point up to the 8th instant, and I have no later intelligence from Major General Jesup. As to Governor Clay, he has not answered the letter from Governor Schley, who is here, nor condescended to acknowledge two letters from me of the same date, (May 31st,) in which we requested that no offensive movement should be made on that side until the Georgians and the United States troops should be ready to co-operate. In the meantime, it is known that Brigadier General Moore, of Alabama, with about 1,000 men, has moved from Irwinton upon the enemy; and it is reported that the remainder of the forces of the same State have, within a few days, commenced offensive operations. I have ordered Major General Jesup, if in command, to stop those movements till the 23d,

and have requested Brigadier General Moore, who is presumed not to be mustered into the service of the United States, to desist from his premature and isolated operations. The latter, however, I have since heard, has been stopped by other causes at about fifteen miles above Irwinton. This is all the information I have at present the power to give your excellency. The expresses of Major General Jesup, since the 8th instant, have probably been cut off by the enemy. Our supplies of subsistence in a few days will be ample.

For your operations in Florida it is probable that you may look for reinforcements from this quarter after the termination of the Creek war. I am sorry to inform you that not a Georgian will consent to march in that direction. Before I had received an intimation that reinforcements would be expected in Florida, many companies refused to be mustered into service till the governor assured them that, as the whole quota of Georgia was expressly called into service for the Creek war, they could not be sent into Florida, unless the Creeks fled in that direction.

I shall be happy, as leisure may offer, to keep you advised of every event in this quarter that may be interesting to your excellency.

I have the honor to remain, with great respect, your excellency's most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

His Excellency R. K. CALL, *Governor of Florida.*

No. 223.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 20, 1836.*

SIR: It is probable that the 100,000 rations shipped from Georgetown, District of Columbia, to Darien, to be accompanied thence by an agent to Macon, may now be beyond your control, that is, already beyond Darien. They can hardly be wanted here, as I had previously caused about 100,000 rations from Savannah to take the same route, and about 70,000 have just arrived from New Orleans, to be followed by 180,000 more. Still, if the 100,000 rations have passed Darien, they must come to Macon or Hawkinsville below, and I may have occasion for them in whole or in part; but General Gibson, in his letter to me of the 7th, mentions another 100,000 rations, shipped from New York to Charleston, which he presumes will take the same route. These I wish stopped. The waters of the Altamaha and Ockmulgee are falling rapidly, and the expense of transporting from Hawkinsville to this place (110 miles) very great. Besides the 250,000 rations arrived and expected from New Orleans on this river, a large number has been ordered to Montgomery, on the other side of the Creek country.

With respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

This letter is written in triplicate to Lieutenants L'Engle, Dimmock, and Mackay. W. S.

No. 224.

HAWKINSVILLE, *Georgia, June 22, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that the steamboat Comet arrived the day before yesterday, having in tow a boat partly loaded with United States stores.

The remainder of the howitzer carriage has arrived, and the gun, together with ammunition and quartermaster's stores, provisions, &c.

Enclosed you will receive a list of what I have put in four wagons here now. This evening I expect wagons enough to make up a train of nine and a team for the howitzer; so all will be able to start by evening, or at furthest next morning.

I will forward by this train all the ammunition, hospital stores, the most important of the quartermaster's stores, and some clothing.

Seventeen wagons are expected in a day or two from Augusta; and the teamsters, arrived last night, state that nine wagons are on their way from Columbus. A few more can be obtained in this vicinity.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. HEINTZELMAN, *Lieutenant and Acting Assistant Quartermaster.*

Major E. KIRBY, *Paymaster and Acting Assistant Adjutant General, Army of the South, Columbus, Ga.*

List of stores turned over for transportation to Columbus, Georgia, by Lieutenant Heintzelman, United States army, viz:

16 boxes musket-ball and buckshot cartridges, 2,160 each; 2 boxes buckshot cartridges, 1,680 each; 8 kegs cartridges, (musket-ball and buckshot,) 900 each; 1 box rifle cartridges, 1,100 to 1,200; 1 cask, (supposed to be ordnance stores;) 2 boxes, (supposed to be ordnance stores;) 3 boxes howitzer canister shot, 10 each; 5 kegs howitzer cartridges, 45 each; 1 box artillery equipments; 1 box fuzes; 1 box laboratory tools; 3 boxes small arms; 4 boxes hospital stores; 7½ boxes felling axes; 3 boxes broad-axes; 35 common tents; 21 wall tents; 13 flies for wall tents; 5 boxes camp-kettles; 1 24-pounder howitzer, with implements.

S. P. HEINTZELMAN, *Lieutenant and Acting Assistant Quartermaster.*

HAWKINSVILLE, *Georgia, June 21, 1836.*

P. S.—In addition to the above are 100 howitzers, 6 boxes howitzer canister shot, &c. I have no invoice of the ordnance stores.

S. P. H.

No. 225.

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 20, 1836.

SIR: Your letter of the 12th instant to the adjutant general has been laid before the President.

I am instructed by the President to inform you that he cannot but hope that the well-known patriotism of the governor and citizens of Alabama will prevent a resort to so dangerous a measure as that of withholding the militia from the service of the United States during a period of open hostilities, and when it has become essentially necessary for the protection of the frontiers that the general government should take the direction of the operations necessary to reduce the hostile Creek Indians.

Should, however, the President be disappointed in his just expectations, and should the militia of the State of Alabama not have been mustered into the service of the United States agreeably to the requisition of the department, you will immediately stop all expenditures and supplies of every kind whatever, on the part of the United States, for such militia; and you will, without delay, give instructions to this effect to the disbursing and issuing officers of the United States in that quarter.

Should this course become necessary, you will be pleased to communicate a copy of these instructions to the governor of Alabama.

Very respectfully, &c.,

LEWIS CASS.

Major General Scott, *Fort Mitchell, Alabama.*

No. 226.

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 20, 1836.

SIR: I presume Major General Jesup communicated to you a copy of my letter to him of the 25th ultimo. Lest, however, he should not have done this, a copy of it is herewith enclosed.

By a letter just received from Governor Cannon, it appears that the western brigade of mounted men will rendezvous at Fayetteville on the 1st of July. They will be armed and equipped from the State arsenal, and will proceed, I presume, without delay, to report themselves to you.

Brigadier General Clinch has resigned his commission in the army, and, by direction of the President, the command of the regular forces and militia serving in Florida has been assigned to Governor Call. It was hoped that a body of volunteers, under the recent act of Congress, might have been raised in that Territory; and Governor Call was requested to raise a brigade amounting to one thousand men. I am apprehensive, however, by information received from him, that he will not be able to raise this force. In that event, it will be absolutely necessary that some other aid should be afforded for the defence of Florida; and as it appears in your letter of the 12th instant to the adjutant general that there is no probability that any portion of the Georgia or Alabama troops will consent to serve in Florida, resort must be had to the West Tennessee brigade. You will please to direct at least one thousand of them to proceed without delay and report themselves to Governor Call. If necessary, you will cause them to be met on the road with this information, in order that they may be able to take the nearest route to their destination. I will thank you to communicate freely with Governor Call on the subject of your own operations and his. Should you find, however, by communicating with Governor Call, that he has succeeded in raising such a force as he deems adequate to the defence of the Territory, you will then stop the Western Tennessee troops, and employ them as you deem proper, or cause them to be discharged.

I have to request that one or more of the steamboats authorized to be employed may be placed under the direction of Governor Call, so as to ply in the waters of Florida, if you can spare them. I presume that, as soon as those expected from New Orleans arrive, you will be able to detach some of them to his aid.

Very respectfully,

LEWIS CASS.

Major General Scott, *Fort Mitchell, Alabama.*

No. 227.

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 24, 1836.

SIR: I have received your letter of the 14th instant; and I received some time since your letter of the 30th of April to the adjutant general, suggesting the adoption of such measures as have occurred to you preparatory to operations against the Seminole Indians in the autumn.

As Governor Call has been allowed, upon his suggestion, to conduct an expedition against the Indians during the summer, it would not be proper for this department to carry into effect any arrangements looking to a campaign in the fall until it is ascertained that the state of things will require that measure. The whole matter has, therefore, been committed to Governor Call, with full authority to make such preparations as may be necessary for a vigorous prosecution of operations against the Indians in the autumn the moment he finds that such a course will be required.

I shall state to the proper committee the difficulties that are now experienced in the enlistment of men, in the hope that some arrangements will be adopted to obviate them.

Very respectfully, &c.,

LEWIS CASS.

Major General Scott, *Columbus, Georgia.*

No. 228.

HEADQUARTERS, *mouh of the Cowagee, South Alabama Brigade, June 25, 1836.*

SIR: I received your communication, dated Roanoke, June 25, 1836, in which you express some doubts as to the position I hold in the service. In answer, I have to inform you that I was ordered into service by the governor of Alabama, and blank rolls furnished by his excellency to have the troops enrolled into

the service of the United States; which rolls have been filled agreeably to orders. I was instructed at the same time to obey the orders of Major General Patterson or General Jesup, and that General Winfield Scott would give general direction to the war. I have received orders from both Generals Patterson and Jesup, with discretionary power; all of which I have endeavored to comply with. A return of strength and condition has been made to the governor, to General Patterson, and General Jesup. I was furnished with arms, to a certain extent, from the arsenal at Mount Vernon, Alabama. The strength of my command at this time is about 1,300 privates, of which 600 are mounted infantry. Since my arrival at Irwinton I have occupied a point, with a detachment, on the frontier of Pike county; a detachment at Irwinton; with the main body of my force I have occupied different positions, viz: Irwinton; Cowaggee fort, 12 miles from the river; Fort Barbour, 15 miles from Irwinton; and have visited High Log town; burnt sixty or seventy houses at that place; passed over the south, middle, and north branches of the Cowaggee; encamped twenty-four hours on the Hatchychubby—there was sign of the Indians having made a precipitate retreat from their houses. I am now at the mouth of the Cowaggee, and have just learned from a party of my scouts that a part of your army is at present in position on the upper side of the creek, about two miles distant. I send this letter to the commanding officer of the detachment, with a request that he will forward it immediately to you. I will again remark that I have visited High Log town, burnt the houses, and scoured the creek (Hatchychubby) for eight or ten miles up and down; crossed all the branches of the Cowaggee, and entered their forks. Few Indians were seen. My advance guard fired upon some on the north prong of the Cowaggee. A detachment of my troops arrested and made prisoners of 300 Eufaula Indians, 200 of whom were warriors, and 5 chiefs—Elky-hago, Hartismicco, Tustinuggee-hago, &c. Among them were the two Indians who were identified as the murderers of the Watsons, in Pike county. These Indians were delivered over to Walker, by the order of General Jesup. I think it would be nothing but right that the Indians thus identified should be delivered up to the civil authorities of Pike county.

Your most obedient servant,

JOHN W. MOORE, *Brig. Gen., Com'g Alabama Volunteers.*

Major General WINFIELD SCOTT, *Commanding Army of the South.*

No. 229.

ORDERS No. 8.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 16, 1836.*

All the troops of the Georgia line will hold themselves in readiness to take the field the moment the arms and ammunition, now daily expected, shall arrive.

As an indispensable preparation, every mounted officer of every rank, and every mounted man, will immediately provide himself with a wallet capable of carrying three days' supply of corn for his horse. Commanding officers will see that this preparation be made at once.

Haversacks are provided for all the volunteers and drafted men, whether mounted or on foot. To obtain them, requisitions will be made on the United States quartermaster at this place. Each man will be careful to mark his wallet and haversack with his name as soon as they come into his hands.

The baggage of officers and companies at the commencement of the first march must be reduced to the smallest amount. All heavy and superfluous articles will be left behind. Troops, to pursue an enemy with success, must move lightly; no company, therefore, can be allowed to take into the enemy's country more than four tents for officers and men. Commanders of every rank will look strictly to the due execution of this order, or the army will be rendered utterly incapable of active movements by the overwhelming weight of its baggage train.

Light camp-kettles and mess pans have been provided for the troops. Cast-iron ovens, skillets, and the like, are too heavy to be allowed to go into the wagons, which are principally to be loaded with ammunition and subsistence for men.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

No. 230.

ORDERS No. 11.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia June 20, 1836.*

Major General Sanford will, as fast as he can arm and equip the troops of his division, put them in march by detachments on this side of the Chattahoochee for Roanoke, and a point below, which will be given in time. All the regular troops which have already arrived, and which are daily expected, including the United States marines, will take the same route without delay.

The quartermaster will furnish the necessary land transportation for those several detachments, including three days' subsistence in wagons. Besides this provision, every man will commence the march with two days' rations in his haversack; and every mounted officer and mounted man will take corn in his wallet sufficient for his horse for two days.

Major General Sanford will, as soon as practicable, designate two companies, in addition to the three now in Columbus, to be left for the defence of this city; and he will designate one other company to proceed to Fort Mitchell as a part of the garrison of that place. These companies will all be infantry, and not mounted men. They probably will not long be left stationary, but, if practicable, shall have an opportunity of participating in the events of the field.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

No. 231.

ORDERS No. 13.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 20, 1836.*

Colonel A. H. Kenan, one of the aides of his excellency the governor of Georgia, has been appointed the volunteer aide-de-camp of the major general commanding this army. The regular aides of the latter are Lieutenant T. J. Lee, of the United States 4th artillery, and Lieutenant W. H. Betts, of the United States 1st artillery.

Major Ansart, of the United States 3d artillery, is appointed to act as inspector general.

Any orders, whether oral or in writing, which may be communicated by either of those officers in the name or by the authority of the commanding general, will be obeyed as if they were given by him in person or under his own signature.

Dr. Lawson, the senior surgeon of the United States army, is appointed *medical director* to this army. He will have the general control over all hospitals, and the distribution of duty among the surgeons, assistant surgeons, and surgeons' mates of this army, as well as the distribution among the medical officers of medicines and hospital stores.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

No. 232.

ORDERS No. 15.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 21, 1836.*

Major General Scott has received with great satisfaction a report of the zeal, gallantry, and general good conduct of the Alabama troops in their march through the enemy's country upon the waters of the Hatchychubby, under the able command of Major General Jesup.

Major General Jesup will march his forces by the best practicable route down to the country to a point a little below the enemy, where, in a very few days, he will come into line with the Georgia volunteers and a brigade of regular troops. This brigade is destined to constitute a part of his command.

On the union of the forces mentioned, the whole will move up the country in concert against the enemy, when it is confidently hoped that no feeling other than a generous rivalry will be entertained by the forces of the different States, or between those of a State and the troops of the United States. The whole will be engaged in a common cause against a common enemy, whom all must be equally desirous to punish and to crush for the innumerable atrocities which that enemy has committed.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

No. 233.

ORDERS No. 17.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 22, 1836.*

On the arrival of the wagon train from Hawkinsville, Major Alford's battalion of mounted volunteers will receive the number of rifles with flasks necessary to arm it.

The remainder of the rifles, with their flasks, &c., together with thirteen hundred musket accoutrements, two hundred camp-kettles, a hospital tent, four wall tents with poles and pins, five thousand rifle flints, twelve thousand musket flints, — kegs of rifle powder, and all the muskets cartridges that can be furnished by the ordnance officer here, will be put on board the steamboat Reindeer, and instantly despatched to overtake the army at or near Roanoke.

There will be likewise shipped on board the same boat, which will take two of the new flats in tow, one ferry-rope, and as much corn and other essential supplies as will complete her load. The remainder of the corn collected here will be shipped in other boats and sent to the same destination.

The unarmed troops stationed on the river above will be armed out of the next supply of muskets and rifles which may arrive at this place. The muskets will be accompanied by accoutrements, and a suitable number of cartridges.

By order of Major General Scott.

THOMAS J. LEE, *Lieutenant and Aide-de-camp.*

No. 234.

ORDERS No. 27.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, July 6, 1836.*

Under orders already given, Major Erving's battalion of the United States artillery will take up a good position (with reference to health, wood, and water) at or near Adams's or Elliot's stand, about twelve miles from Columbus, and the battalion of United States artillery under the command of Major Whiting will occupy a position at or near McClellan's or Caswell's, about fourteen miles from Tuskegee.

The objects of these positions are to open and hold secure the communication by mail on the great post road from Columbus to the west.

Both battalions will remain under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Brooks, and each will daily send out patrols to the distance of some miles, both ways, on the post road. They will take subsistence with them as follows: Major Erving's battalion for eight and Major Whiting's for ten days.

Captain Garmany's company of mounted volunteers will march by the great post road from Columbus for Tuskegee on the 8th instant. Each man will take on his horse subsistence and corn for three days. On his return march from Tuskegee he will find similar supplies at McClellan's to last his company back to Columbus, and which supplies will be sent in advance by the United States quartermaster and commissary at this place. The same company will repeat the same tour, after resting two days at Columbus, taking care to report, in going and returning, everything they may observe at all interesting to the service to the commanders at the two ends of the route and at the two intermediate posts.

By order of Major General Scott.

A. H. KENAN, *Colonel and Aide-de-camp.*

No. 235.

ORDERS No. 28.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, July 6, 1836.*

The second regiment of Georgia foot volunteers, under Colonel Williamson, will be immediately mustered for an honorable discharge from the service of the United States, by the acting inspector general of the army, Major Ansart. The companies will be paid off in succession, as fast as mustered, or as fast as practicable, by Paymaster Major Randall. The officers of every grade will lend such assistance in writing to Majors Ansart and Randall as will facilitate the discharge and payment.

The commanding general hopes to be able, in a few days, to discharge the other regiments of volunteer infantry of the Georgia line, and, at a period a little later, to begin the discharge of the mounted troops. But he can give no pledge to that effect, and he is sure that no patriotic Georgian will murmur at any little delay which may be dictated by the high considerations of public safety and public good.

Paymaster Major Muhlenberg will report himself to Major General Jesup for duty in the pay department.

Colonel Williamson's regiment will, upon being discharged, turn over to the United States quartermaster, and the United States ordnance officer, all the public property in its possession.

By order of Major General Scott.

FELIX ANSART, *Acting Inspector General.*

No. 236.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Mitchell, June 24, 1836.*

SIR: I left Columbus yesterday with a small escort, (forty mounted men,) now eight miles below, which I shall overtake this morning, and proceed rapidly to the point of crossing the Georgia line, and some regulars who have preceded me two or three days, to this side of the river. I had arranged a meeting with Major General Jesup, who has been three days at the ferry, a mile and a half from this fort, but missed the turn-off road, and had got five miles below, when I received despatches of importance; turned back, met him, and was induced to come here for the night. Copies of the letters contained in that despatch will be found enclosed.

General Jesup and many of the officers with him consider the war as mainly over. They estimate that there only remain out some one hundred and fifty decidedly hostile warriors, under the noted and atrocious leader Jim Henry, besides the party of Neomico, who have for some time stood fast in their camp, in a state of doubtful inactivity or neutrality. They will probably in a short time unconditionally surrender themselves. They are nearer to Tuskegee than to the Chattahoochee.

The numbers of the hostile parties yet to be compelled to surrender or to be beaten are, however, differently estimated by others. Captain Page, and some other well-informed persons in Indian affairs in this quarter, think that there may yet be outstanding as many as one thousand hostile warriors. As the number, whose hostility was well known a few weeks ago, was certainly as great as two thousand five hundred, if not three thousand, and as not more than eight hundred or nine hundred are known to have surrendered themselves here and at Tuskegee, (not reckoning the principal part of Neomico's band mentioned above, and which may amount to six hundred or seven hundred,) there must be remaining about one thousand who are yet to come in or to be subdued. Of the three hundred and ten who, the day before yesterday, voluntarily gave themselves up to Major General Patterson and Colonel Hogan, both of this State, at the two camps some twenty-odd miles southeast of this place, and who were yesterday put under a strong escort of Alabamians and friendly Indians, to be brought here, it is thought that not less than eighty escaped on the way. At the time of surrender, there were about that number of warriors more than there were arms. It is now believed by Major General Jesup and others that these warriors concealed their arms before the surrender; and their object in coming in was to get information and then to escape. It is admitted by the prisoners themselves that, before coming in, they sold or gave to the hostile parties still out all their powder and lead. These hostile parties, whatever their numbers, are admitted to be among the most desperate of the nation. They are known to be now between the Hatchy-chubby and Cowaggee creeks; principally on the waters and in the swamps of the latter. They still cherish the hope of escaping to Florida, and must give us a great deal of trouble to capture, if they do not voluntarily come in. I think, with the measures already adopted and in contemplation for guarding the river, it will be impossible for them to escape to Florida.

The Georgia line and two battalions of regulars, already below, will still be crossed, as I have heretofore contemplated, below the Cowaggee—that is, below the enemy, to scour the country upwards,

whilst General Jesup moves with his forces in the opposite direction. No time will be lost in putting this combined movement in execution. The flats for crossing the river will pass down to-day.

I am only restrained, since recent events, from discharging a part of the Georgia line—say six or seven companies of horse, left at Columbus, without arms—from the fear of giving offence to brave and patriotic men who have come a great distance to seek an opportunity of distinction. They, moreover, may be useful in guarding the left bank of the river whilst operations are going on on the right; and if the corn expected daily from New Orleans should arrive not sweated, I shall have no difficulty in feeding horses. On this point I shall be better able to decide in a day or two, and after consulting his excellency Governor Schley, still at Columbus, whose judgment and dispositions are worthy of all respect.

General Jesup has received, through Major Brandt, at Montgomery, news of the approach of a body of Tennessee horse, but he does not know precisely by what route. I shall desire the general to write to the commander of the Tennesseans, through Major Brandt, who may have received later and more precise information of the position of those troops. I would prefer to stop them; but if they are near us, measures must be taken for their reception and subsistence.

I remain, with high respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General United States Army.*

P. S.—The movements of Major General Jesup, the strong guards placed on the river below, rendering an escape towards Florida hopeless, and the large assemblage of troops all around the Creek country, showing that their early subjugation was inevitable, has caused the early surrender of the hostile parties who have come in. Besides those who gave themselves up to the Alabamians and friendly Indians, between fifty and seventy came into this place previously without an escort. The number of warriors who are now in confinement here is a little more than three hundred. There are a greater number of their women and children. I cannot get an exact return of their numbers, ages, and sexes.

W. S.

No. 237.

HEADQUARTERS, *Fort Mitchell, June 23, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to enclose copies of reports from Major General Patterson and Captain Parrott, by which you will observe that little remains to be done. Jim Henry is still out, with about one hundred and fifty warriors; but my Indian warriors, who have halted and await my orders at the Big Spring, say they can take him. I have just received information that a Seminole chief, with a number of his warriors, is with Henry. The information comes from a negro taken last night.

I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Major General SCOTT, *Commanding Southern Army on the march.*

No. 238.

CAMP NEAR HATCHYCHUBBY, *June 22, 1836.*

SIR: I have the pleasure to inform you that the hostile Indians, with the exception of a part of the Hitchitees and a small party of the Uchees, under Jim Henry, have all come into camp and surrendered themselves unconditionally as prisoners. Their number, including women and children, is about eight hundred to one thousand. It is stated by the prisoners that the Hitchitees have gone to Fort Mitchell, for which place I shall march with my command, together with the prisoners, on to-morrow morning.

B. PATTERSON, *Major General, Commanding.*

Major General JESUP, *Fort Mitchell.*

No. 239.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS OF THE SOUTHERN ARMY,

Camp on the Hatchychubby, June 22, 1836.

GENERAL: Soon after your departure yesterday the prisoners whom you had despatched the day before to the hostile camps returned. They brought with them a few of the hostile party, and their object appeared to be to understand fully the terms on which the hostile Indians generally would be received. General Patterson repeated to them what had been said by yourself—that they must surrender their arms and submit unconditionally, and that justice should be dealt out to them. Those who came in yesterday represented the Uchee, Hitchitee, and Chehaw towns. They stated the Uchee warriors to be 200, and the Chehaw and Hitchitee 60 each, making 320 in all, and that these composed the great body of the hostile Indians.

To day nearly all of the Uchees have come in, as well as some of the Hitchitees, and many of the Chehaws. The Uchees are the most numerous and warlike of the enemy. We have reports that several of the hostiles have gone to Echa Hadge camp and Fort Mitchell, rather than surrender here. Two have been captured to-day by Opoth Yoholo's Indians, and sent to this camp. General Patterson will march from Fort Mitchell very early in the morning.

There are a great many Indian women and children and many negroes in camp, who have come in with the hostile Indians. It is expected here, from a hasty examination, that two hundred and fifty Uchees

and fifty-four Hitchitees and Chehaws, capable of bearing arms, have surrendered. These are the numbers—very nearly several hundred women and children and about sixty negroes have accompanied them. The best informed in camp consider this a finishing to the war.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

R. P. PARROTT, *Captain and Acting Adjutant General.*

Major General JESUP, *Commanding, &c.*

No. 240.

HEADQUARTERS, *Fort Mitchell, June 25, 1836.*

Sir: In obedience to your instructions and the command of the President, I departed from Washington for this frontier on the 22d of May, to take command of the army and the direction of the operations against the Creek Indians. At Augusta, Georgia, I found Major General Scott, on his way to the same point and for the same purpose. We proceeded in company to Columbus, Georgia, where Major General Scott established his headquarters and assumed the command of the army. He ordered me to proceed to the western frontier of the Creek country and assume the command of the troops assembling in Alabama. The communication between Columbus and Tuskegee being in the possession of the enemy, and commanded by one of his hostile camps, an escort was required to accompany me through.

On the 4th instant I set out, accompanied by about one hundred and twenty mounted men, and dashed directly through the hostile country, passing within three miles of Neah Mico's camp, where there were several hundred warriors assembled. I arrived at Tuskegee on the evening of the 5th instant, where I found Major General Patterson, of the Alabama militia, in command of about seven hundred volunteers and militia. On the 7th I departed for Montgomery, to confer with his excellency Governor Clay. I was so fortunate as to meet the governor at Line creek, and returned with him on the 8th. On the 9th I assumed the command of the frontier. At this time a general panic pervaded the whole country; the Indians were plundering, murdering, and burning in all directions, and there seemed to me to be great danger of several of the frontier counties breaking up entirely unless some decisive movements were made. I determined to move forward to the vicinity of Neah Mico's camp, to hold it in check, to cover the frontier of Pike county, and to obtain a supply of corn for the horses of the mounted men. Major General Patterson had but about seven hundred and twenty men disposable, after furnishing a sufficient garrison to protect the depot and the inhabitants at Tuskegee; but I had previously held councils with the Indian chiefs Opoth Yoholo, Jim Boy, Tucabatchee Hadjo, and others, whom I understood to be favorable to our cause, and had authorized Captain William Walker, formerly an officer of the army, and General Woodward, of Tuskegee, and Colonel John B. Hogan, inspector general of the Alabama volunteers, to raise and bring into service from one to two thousand Indian warriors. I advanced into the Indian country on the 12th, and proceeded about five miles. On the 13th I advanced to Stone's, on the old Federal road, and on the 14th to Long's, the Indian chiefs Jim Boy and Tucabatchee Hadjo having joined, during the march, with about four hundred and fifty Indian warriors. Not finding a supply of corn at Long's, as I had been induced to believe I should, I determined to proceed direct to Irwinton, the point indicated by General Scott as that whence operations should commence. I moved forward on the 15th to the Big Spring, and being then among the hostile Indians, expected an attack during the march; but the conduct and countenance of both volunteers and Indian warriors were such as to give me no apprehension of the result should the enemy venture to dispute the ground. About one o'clock the advance of the army, under General Woodward, succeeded in capturing Enea Mathla, the principal and most determined of the hostile chiefs. I encamped at the Big Spring, and having received information there that the camp of Enea Mathla was directly on our route, the next day was spent at the Spring, waiting the arrival of five companies of mounted men then on their march and reported to be near.

On the morning of the 17th I moved forward (the five companies not having come up) and encamped on the waters of the Hatchychubby, on the Irwinton road, about eight or nine miles from Enea Mathla's camp. Here the Indian chief Opoth Yoholo joined me, with eleven hundred and fifty warriors. On the evening of this day I received a despatch from General Scott censuring me for my movement and directing me to stop all offensive movements. In the situation in which I then found myself, to comply with those instructions would have been fatal. I had fifteen hundred friendly warriors, who, had I halted, would have become dissatisfied, would have lost all confidence in me, and would have left me. The volunteers were animated by the most admirable spirit. To have checked them at that moment would have been productive of the greatest disappointment, and would have depressed their *morale*, if it had not elevated that of the enemy. As General Scott was necessarily unacquainted with the circumstances under which I was placed, I felt it to be my duty to disregard the order to "*stop all offensive movements.*" I accordingly put the army in motion on the morning of the 18th, my force being increased to twenty-three hundred men, including the Indian warriors, and advanced to the ford of the Hatchychubby; the enemy fled before me, and in the afternoon I took possession of Enea Mathla's camp, and obtained there and in the vicinity a small supply of corn and about a hundred head of cattle. Whilst in the enemy's camp I received a second peremptory order from General Scott to halt and "encamp" my "forces somewhere in the neighborhood of Fort Mitchell until further orders." My dispositions at the time I received General Scott's order were such that I could not have failed to bring the enemy to action in twenty-four hours, and victory was certain. I, however, did not feel myself at liberty to disobey the second order, but directed Major General Patterson to encamp the troops and assume the command of them, and I proceeded to Fort Mitchell to confer with General Scott, and to obtain his sanction to the prosecution of the operations which I had commenced. He had returned to Columbus before I arrived at Fort Mitchell, and I was compelled to go to camp without having had an interview with him.

On my return to camp I found that General Patterson, with the mounted men of his division, had made an excursion down the north side of the Hatchychubby, and the Indian warriors had been thrown below, to scour the country on the south side. The latter succeeded in capturing several Indians, among them a principal chief. By the advice of the friendly chiefs, I sent out messengers on the morning of the 20th to advise the hostile Indians to surrender. On the 21st, before they returned, I left the army, and came to this place to see General Scott, and become acquainted with his future plans. On the 22d the

messengers returned to camp, and upwards of three hundred warriors and five hundred and fifty women and children surrendered prisoners, and were sent hither by General Patterson on the 23d, accompanied by six companies of mounted men. I ordered General Patterson to this post with the troops of his division, and the Indian warriors under Jim Boy, where he arrived on the evening of the 24th, Opoth Yoholo with his warriors having been previously ordered to the Big Spring. On the 24th, having received information that one of the hostile chiefs was between the mouth of the Uchee creek and Hatchychubby, below this post, determined to make a reconnoissance of the country in that direction. Accordingly I proceeded with six companies of mounted men, and about sixty Indian warriors under Jim Boy. I scoured the country for many miles, and a part of my force fell in with a party of the enemy, and captured upwards of thirty warriors, which, with the women and children taken at the same time, amounted to one hundred and thirteen.

I consider the war at an end. My operations have broken the power of the hostile chiefs, dissolved their formidable confederacy, and given entire security to the country. The hostile Indians that have not surrendered are wandering without concert or object, and I believe only wait a favorable opportunity to come in.

I have been severely censured by General Scott for my movements, but I feel that I have done my duty to the best of my abilities; to have acted otherwise would have doubled the Indian force against us, and have caused the destruction of the fairest portion of Alabama.

To disregard the positive order of a military superior is, I am aware, a high military offence; but in the circumstances in which I found myself surrounded, the best interests of my country required of me prompt and decisive action. I have acted on my own responsibility, and am willing to meet the consequences; and whatsoever of censure may be cast upon me, I never can regret what I have done. I desire that this communication be laid before the President, that my motives as well as my acts may be understood by him; and I beg you to assure him that whatever his decision in my case may be, I shall be satisfied. I would infinitely prefer to lose my commission for what I have done, than to receive the highest honors of the country, had I remained inactive, and permitted the country around me to have been devastated.

To Major General Patterson, and the officers and soldiers of his division, I feel deeply indebted for their kindness, liberality, and good conduct. Every individual performed his duty with promptness and energy; and I have never served with any body of men in whom I had greater confidence, or who, I am persuaded, would have given a better account of the enemy had he ventured to meet us in battle.

To my acting adjutant general, Captain Parrott, and my acting quartermaster, Lieutenant Chambers, as well as to my aide-de-camp, Captain Lane, and my volunteer aids, Colonel Goldthwait and Major Baykin, I am under the greatest obligations for the promptness and ability with which they have discharged their respective duties, and the good temper and prudence which they have on all occasions displayed in their intercourse with the troops.

To the able arrangements of Governor Clay, made before my arrival, and to the energy and talent of Major General Patterson, and the gentlemen of his staff, much of the success which has attended my operations, it is but justice to say, is due.

To Colonel Hogan, General Woodward, and Captain Walker, who commanded the Indian warriors, as well as to the chiefs Opoth Yoholo, Tucabatchee Mico, Jim Boy, and Tucabatchee Hadjo, I am under great obligations; they all deserve the notice of the government.

The censures passed upon me by General Scott have, I understand from him, been recalled, and his letters to the War Department withdrawn; had this not been done my personal feelings should not have influenced my public conduct. Having no object in view but the public good, I should have co-operated with him, as I shall now co-operate most heartily in the consummation of all his plans. But if a single doubt remains on the mind of the President, or on your mind, as to the entire propriety and necessity of my course, I owe to myself as well as my children, to ask for an immediate investigation.

I have the honor to be, with high consideration and respect, your obedient servant,

T. S. JESUP, *Major General.*

HON. LEWIS CASS, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

No. 241.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Camp Sanford, opposite to Roanoke, June 26, 1836.*

SIR: I have received your two letters of the 24th and 25th instant, and write by the return express who brought me the letters.

I think with you it is time to seize Neo Mico and to disarm his party, and I also highly approve of your proposition to establish stockades on the post road between Columbus and Tuskegee for the deposit of subsistence for men and horses. I shall give instructions henceforth for the next boat that may ascend the river to leave some rations and corn at this place, and to deposit one half of the remainder at Bryant's Landing, (Colonel Henderson's post,) and the other at Fort Mitchell, provided that the boat can ascend so high, or a boat of a smaller draught of water should offer for transhipment.

I think it desirable, under any circumstances, that a part of the Alabamians should be retained, say a detachment of mounted men, to escort, in conjunction with a portion of the regulars, the Indian prisoners as far as the dense settlements of Alabama, whence the Indians may be escorted to the Mississippi or Montgomery for embarkation by the regulars alone. The remainder of the Alabamians you may honorably discharge (and their good conduct deserves it) as soon as you may deem it prudent to do so, retaining the friendly Indians as auxiliaries. But the information received in this vicinity, and from Fort Twiggs by express to-day, represent the outstanding hostile Indians as not contemptible in number. A party of four or five hundred, including women and children, were but a few days ago between the north and middle forks of the Cowaggee creek, and to-day I learn upon good evidence that there was a considerable party opposite to Fort Twiggs yesterday.

Besides the Georgia line, which of itself is sufficient to scour this lower country and rid it of the enemy, (although his numbers were more numerous than estimated above,) I have just learned that

Brigadier General Moore, with some seven hundred or eight hundred troops, crossed the main Cowaggee creek to-day to operate north of all the branches, or between the upper and middle. This is just the direction I was about to give the Georgians and regulars who have crossed, or will cross, the Chattahoochee in the morning. I have written to General Moore requesting him earnestly (I believe that he has not been mustered into the service of the United States) to recross that creek, and to extend his forces well to the west below the south fork. I shall probably see him in the morning. If he should not comply, I shall be much thwarted, and a portion of the enemy may escape below.

I had yesterday undoubted evidence that some forty or sixty Indians, including women and children, had crossed the Chattahoochee one or two days before, three miles below Roanoke, notwithstanding the detachments posted to guard the river above and below. I immediately despatched two parties of horse in pursuit, (the trails pointed towards Florida,) and I hope to hear good news from them in a few days.

I should not have crossed into Alabama above the Cowaggee but for the certainty that I thought I had that General Moore, to whom I had written, was still at or near Irwinton. All the branches of the Cowaggee I have ascertained to be more difficult to pass and to scour than I represented to you a few days ago.

Organize emigrating parties as soon as the contractors shall be ready to take charge of them, and as soon as you can furnish the proper escorts. The two companies of regulars under Major McClintock, and the next detachment commanded by Major Dearborn, are at your disposition for that service. Before, however, sending off the prisoners, I wish you to make inquiries of his excellency Governor Schley whether there be any individuals among them who are amenable to the penal laws of Georgia. If there be any such, you will turn them over to the authorities of that State.

I remain, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Major General JESUP, *United States Army, Commanding, &c.*

P. S.—I wish you to stop the Tennesseans marching to take post against the hostile Creeks at some suitable place in respect to subsistence, to await further orders.

W. S.

No. 242.

HEADQUARTERS, *Fort Mitchell, June 28, 1836.*

GENERAL: Having observed in the Globe of the 20th instant an order directing all officers of the second regiment of dragoons to join their regiment for the recruiting service, I must ask the favor of you to represent to the general and the Secretary of War my extreme desire that Captain Lane be allowed to remain with me until the operations in this quarter be brought to a close. I consider the war over, if ordinary prudence and energy mark our future progress; but there is much to be done before the body of the Creeks be removed; and Captain Lane has that acquaintance with the duties in detail with which I am charged, that I could not, without great inconvenience, dispense with his services. It is the more necessary that he remain, as Captain Parrot's services are required in his own department, and he necessarily leaves me in a day or two.

I hope to hear from you on this subject by the return mail.

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

TH. S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

No. 243.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Mitchell, July 2, 1836.*

SIR: Since my last letter I have been down the river to organize the service as low as Irwinton, and to put the disposable force of Georgia, after nearly doubling the guards on the left bank of this river, handsomely in the field. I am now but just emerged from the creeks and swamps to the south and southwest. The Georgians moved in two columns, with three small battalions of United States artillery, under Majors Pierce, Lomax, and Erving. I retained the immediate command of one of those columns, and gave the other to Major General Sanford. The two amounted to about 1,200 men. We moved with pack-horses, the country being so deluged with rain that no wagon could accompany either column. I shall be back at Roanoke to-night, (by means of a steamboat,) where I shall receive General Sanford's report. I saw no recent trail of more than two or three Indians, which were directed towards this place or Tuskegee, no doubt for the purpose of surrender. One hostile warrior only we picked up, who declared that he was going in to give himself up.

The number of hostile warriors now here in confinement is about 480, most of them with their families. The whole number of prisoners at Tuskegee, the Alabama and friendly Indian camps west of this, Major General Jesup is unable to give me with accuracy. He thinks there might have been yesterday about 350 warriors at the three places, besides women and children, and the party of Neah Mico, (150,) whom I desired him some days ago to cause to be disarmed. This service will probably be performed to-day. I enclose a note from Major General Patterson to Major General Jesup, which shows that 100 warriors may be added to the foregoing number, including a noted leader, Jim Henry.

I received yesterday a letter from Colonel Henderson, who is engaged in erecting a shed, &c., on this side of the river, at the head of the summer navigation, for the reception of army supplies from New Orleans. It contains this paragraph: "I am led to believe that the position you directed my command to occupy has been productive of important results. The day after the expedition of our two companies and part of Captain Love's troop, 250 of the hostile Indians, men, women, &c., belonging to Jim Henry's band, surrendered to General Watson without firing a gun."

I am afraid that Colonel Henderson has written this upon an unfounded report. He does not state where those prisoners are, and General Watson has not taken them to Columbus, or we should know it here. The latter has a farm in the neighborhood of Colonel Henderson, resides in Columbus, and has written to no one at this place on the subject. The transaction, if it occurred at all, took place on the 26th ultimo.

It is now thought by the best informed that there cannot be in the Creek country more than from forty to sixty hostile warriors. Some of these have sent word that they will soon be here, and are probably only delayed by the swell in the Uchee creek, which renders it difficult to pass.

The contractors for removing the Indians west of the Mississippi having reported themselves in readiness, about 1,900, including families, will be put in march, under a suitable escort, as soon as the creeks shall have subsided. A detachment of regulars is now engaged in repairing the bridges across the two Uchees, on the old Federal road, to save time.

A few minutes after my arrival at Roanoke, fifteen miles above Irwinton, on the 25th ultimo, two Indian trails leading to Florida were reported to me—one three and a half, the other one and a half miles below me, and respectively one and two days old. Not a minute was lost in organizing two detachments of horse to give pursuit. I have a note from Colonel Beall, who commanded one of the detachments, (three companies and six friendly Indians, with subsistence for four days,) from which I am afraid he halted at Fort Gaines, and hearing that the fugitives were killing the inhabitants of Baker county, contented himself with sending 30 men to their assistance, instead of marching with his whole force, about 175 men. His note is inexplicable, and I trust I shall not find him as criminal as that would represent him. He was instructed specially and minutely, in a letter written with my own hand, never to give up the pursuit till stopped by starvation. I have better hopes of the other detachment, commanded by an excellent partisan, Captain Jernigan. No report is received from him. It was expected, however, that the two trails would unite and the two detachments become one. I think that no other party has got across the river, and such are now the numbers (since the Georgians got their arms) and the vigilance displayed on the other side, that it would seem impossible for emigrating parties to escape to Florida.

I believe there has hardly been a sharp skirmish on this side of the river, whilst there have been many short rencontres on the Georgia bank. The latter were made by the more desperate of the enemy, and in every instance, probably, to cover the passage of families endeavoring to emigrate to Florida, or to capture the horses, provisions, &c., necessary to facilitate emigration. Partial successes were obtained by the enemy in several of those affairs. In others they were repulsed, and in all it was seen that, to escape with families, packs, &c., it would be extremely hazardous. Consequently the Hitchitees have generally sent in or abandoned their families, and with a few individuals of other tribes have, by some extraordinary neglect at and below Roanoke, succeeded in getting over the Chattahoochee.

The general surrender, in most cases voluntary, of the enemy, may be attributed to many movements and arrangements on our part. It was known that large forces were gathering all around the country; the river was early pretty well guarded by the Georgians, aided by two well-manned steamers cruising up and down. One of these destroyed many canoes, rafts, &c. Major General Sanford crossed the bridge at Columbus and took up his camp four miles further early in June; and although he had about 2,000 unarmed men, with but 400 armed, the enemy thought all Georgia was pouring into their country. About the same time Major General Jesup made his entry into the heart of the nation, with a large force of Alabamians and friendly Indians. This latter movement precipitated and favored a general surrender.

I shall necessarily be absent from this place after a few minutes to complete arrangements below for two days. As it is the centre of correspondence and business, I shall return at the end of that time.

Brigadier General Moore, of this State, whose basis of operations has been at Irwinton, is placed by my order below the south branch of the Cowagee, extending himself far to the right and left. I shall instruct him to send a company of horse or two as far to the southwest as Pea river. He appears, from his movements and correspondence, to be an officer of much merit. His force, mostly mounted, consists of about 1,300 men.

I shall direct Major General Sanford to keep out small detachments on the branches of the Cowagee and on the Hatchychubby to precipitate the surrender of the small parties of the enemy yet out. General Jesup will take measures of a similar character on the upper parts of those streams which are nearer to his depots at Tuskegee, &c.

I have twice written to the governor of Florida in great detail. The copy of my last letter is herewith enclosed, and I would send a copy of the other but that I am separated from my books and papers. A copy of an order is enclosed respecting the West Tennesseeans.

I have directed Major General Jesup to post two small battalions of artillery here in positions on the post road from Columbus to Tuskegee. This will be done in a few days, and I have caused the agent of the General Post Office to be advised of the directions.

On my return to this place I shall open a correspondence with Brigadier General Wool, and hope soon to be able to spare him the detachment of the United States marines, and some companies of Georgia and Alabama volunteers, should they be needed in the Cherokee country.

General Jesup never received the Secretary's original letter to him, dated the 25th of May, and addressed to Milledgeville. The copy that I received last night was immediately shown to him.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General United States Army.*

No. 244.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Mitchell, July 1, 1836.*

Sir: Major General Jesup has just turned over to me the letter of your excellency to him of the 25th ultimo.

The War Department, as I perceive by the copy of a letter to Brigadier General Wool, has charged him with certain duties in the Cherokee country, and has placed the Tennessee troops under his command.

They were to rendezvous at Athens on the 7th instant, and it is possible, though not probable, that, under the instructions of the department, I may have to reinforce him from this quarter.

My last information from the Cherokees, which is not recent, represented them as inclined to be quiet.

In my letter to you, dated some ten or fifteen days ago, (my books and papers are not at hand,) I reported that his excellency Governor Schley had been obliged to pledge himself to the Georgia volunteers and drafts now in the field that they should not be sent to Florida, except in the hot pursuit of the Creeks, to induce those troops to be mustered in the service of the United States. Major General Jesup, who is in the immediate command of the Alabamians, informs me that he was obliged, under the same circumstance, to make the like pledge to the latter.

Should I be obliged to reinforce Brigadier General Wool, I shall send him a portion of the regulars and some part of the Georgians from the upper country. The remainder of the regulars and United States marines cannot fail to be wanted to escort the hostile Indians who have surrendered themselves, and to wind up the war in this quarter, until late in the summer.

Of the hostile Creek warriors, we have here about four hundred and seventy. A part of them have been captured; but the greater number, seeing that they would be inevitably crushed, voluntarily surrendered. How many may be at Tuskegee, under like circumstances, I may not learn in a day or two. This war, however, is believed to be virtually over. Yet there are, doubtless, many small parties yet to come in or to be subdued. Two, making about sixty individuals, succeeded in getting across the Chattahoochee between two of our posts at and below Roanoke on the 23d and 24th ultimo. From that place, the instant that the trails were observed, I despatched two parties of horse in pursuit. Having just emerged from the woods to the southwest of this, I have received no report from those expeditions; but have no doubt, from the strength and character of the pursuing detachments, that the fugitives have been overtaken and captured or killed. I have every reason to believe that not five other Creeks have escaped towards Florida, and from the means now employed it seems almost impossible for another individual to follow. I have more than doubled the forces on the Georgia bank of this river, and steamboats are daily passing up and down.

I have the honor to remain, with high respect, your excellency's most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

His Excellency R. K. CALL, *Governor of Florida.*

P. S.—I have just heard from the prisoners here that if the fugitives who crossed this river should not be overtaken, their object will be to take up a temporary residence in the Opekeenokee swamp.

2d P. S.—I have this moment received a letter from the Secretary of War requesting me to send you one thousand of the West Tennessee brigade, at least, should you not be likely to raise a similar force in Florida. This is the first notice I have had of western and eastern brigades being ordered from that State. The latter is designated to act under General Wool. I shall immediately send orders to the western corps to despatch one thousand men by a route that I shall give them, and order them to report to you for (at) Tallahassee. This brigade we have unofficially heard of before, and by my desire Major General Jesup wrote to the quartermaster at Montgomery to cause it to halt, if coming in that direction, in some place where it could be conveniently subsisted, and to await further orders.

My intention then was to hold in reserve for events in the Creek and Cherokee countries. I am now satisfied that it will not be required in either of those quarters.

I am also directed by the Secretary to send you one or more steamboats from the three ordered to be armed and manned by the navy commander at Pensacola, for this river. I am inclined to believe that but one has been purchased at New Orleans and sent for those purposes to Commodore Dallas. Should she arrive here, I shall send her immediately back to you; and I beg your excellency, if there be any other boat at Pensacola, to take her into the service of Florida.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

No. 245.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Mitchell, July 1, 1836.*

SIR: Major General Jesup has just turned over to me your letter of the 10th ultimo, which probably came to him at this place *via* Montgomery.

I have now employed, partly in cruising and partly in transporting army supplies, four small steamboats belonging to this river, and there are two others, not specially hired, that bring up stores from St. Joseph's.

I heard, a week ago, that a steamer purchased by the United States for the purpose of cruising up and down this river, had gone from New Orleans to Pensacola, to be armed and manned by the United States, under your orders. This boat may now be daily expected below, and I shall send her instructions (to Irwinton) for her government. The war against the hostile Creeks is supposed to be virtually over. Nevertheless, there are several hostile parties which have not surrendered themselves, and who are seeking opportunities to escape across the Chattahoochee towards Florida. The boat last mentioned will be highly useful in observing the river, and giving prompt intelligence to the posts on the Georgia side, in case any such party should succeed in crossing.

The zeal and promptitude which have uniformly been displayed by yourself and officers in co-operating with the land service deserves a higher commendation than any that I could bestow.

I shall therefore subscribe myself, with the highest respect,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Commodore A. J. DALLAS, *Commanding, &c.*

P. S.—If a second or third steamer should arrive at Pensacola, to be armed and manned for this river please report them (or the one) to Governor Call for his orders.

W. S.

No. 246.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Mitchell, July 2, 1836.*

SIR: The enclosed order is issued in conformity with express instructions from the War Department. As brigadier general, you may either accompany the detachment to Florida, or send the officer next in rank to command it

I remain, sir, respectfully, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

The BRIGADIER GENERAL of the *West Tennessee Brigade, expected at Montgomery.*

No. 247.

ORDERS No. 22.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Mitchell, July 2, 1836.*

A brigade of West Tennessee mounted volunteers or militia may soon be expected to arrive at Montgomery. It will probably be at Shelbyville about the 8th instant. On its arrival at Montgomery, Major Brandt will muster it into the service of the United States for three months, unless sooner discharged.

One thousand men of this brigade, with the proper officers, will, without delay, take up the line of march, by the best practicable route, for Tallahassee, in Florida, in order to place themselves under the order of his excellency Governor Call.

The remainder of the brigade will remain in position, in the neighborhood of Montgomery, until further orders.

Before the arrival of those troops at Montgomery, Major Brandt will ascertain the best route to Tallahassee, so as to be able to advise the commander of the detachment destined to Florida, to whom he will give all the aid and assistance that may be required of the quartermaster's department.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

By command.

THOS. J. LEE, *Lieut. 4th U. S. Artillery, Aide-de-camp.*

No. 248.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Mitchell, July 4, 1836.*

SIR: I have this moment returned here from Roanoke below, where I think I have so arranged the service with Major General Sanford, of the Georgia line, and Brigadier General Moore, at the head of an Alabama brigade, as to secure the remaining objects to be accomplished in those directions in this war.

No official report had been received up to the time of my leaving Roanoke from Colonel Beall and Captain Jernigan, who commanded the two detachments of horse sent by me on the 25th ultimo in pursuit of the parties of Indians who had crossed the Chattahoochee on the 23d and 24th. I know, however, through respectable channels, that the two detachments had overtaken the Indians about the 28th, in Baker county, and had surrounded the latter in a large swamp. The fugitives, probably, do not exceed sixty warriors, although represented by rumor to amount to more than three hundred. Colonel Beall, I again hope, will give a good account of them. He was collecting the forces of the neighborhood to make sure of his game. By a singular mistake, into which I was led by a letter supposed to be from this officer, but which was written by another, I did him great injustice in my last report of events in this quarter. I hope soon to be able officially to speak of him with all the praise due to success.

Parties will be continually kept scouring the Indian country to force in the handfulls of the enemy remaining out. Major Generals Jesup and Sanford, as well as Brigadier General Moore, have my instructions to that effect. The former, after a detention here of ten or twelve days, proceeded last evening to the headquarters of Major General Patterson to the west.

Yesterday a party of United States marines, a few mounted volunteers and friendly Indians, scoured the country between the Euchee and Hatchychubby thoroughly, and to the extent of about twelve miles up those creeks. Coming up last night in a steamboat, I learned from Colonel Henderson, at his camp, that sixteen women, boys, and children were captured on the Chattahoochee; the warriors of the same party having escaped across the river, abandoning their families. I immediately sent off an express to give the intelligence to all the posts as low as Roanoke, with precise instructions for discovering the trail and pursuing. I do not doubt that two or three companies of horse were in motion by daylight this morning, in pursuit of the fugitives.

I have not time to add more, nor have I anything material to add, except that the armed steamer the American, from Pensacola, is above, and that I shall immediately order her to Florida to report to Governor Call, and that I shall to-morrow send off Colonel Broome, (a volunteer,) of the marine corps, with a communication addressed to Brigadier General Wool.

With high respect, I remain your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

P. S.—General Scott, who is much occupied at this moment, desires me to add that his objects in sending Colonel Broome to General Wool are to learn the state of things in the Cherokee country, and to say to General Wool that probably the detachment of United States marines (about four hundred) and some companies of Georgia and Alabama volunteers may soon be spared from this quarter to reinforce the Cherokee army, should they be required.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. H. KENAN, *Aide-de-camp*

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General, U. S. A.*

No. 249.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, July 6, 1836.*

SIR: I came up from Fort Mitchell last evening, on business with his excellency Governor Schley, and shall return this evening.

I have had no report from Major General Jesup since he left Fort Mitchell to join the Alabamians, 22 miles west, on the 3d instant.

By a letter just received from Colonel Beall I learn that he has the party of Indians he was sent in pursuit of shut up in a large swamp in Baker county, about 110 miles below this, and a little southeast of Fort Gaines. He has had several affairs with that party—killed nine, and wounded many more. The swamp being long and deep, he has called for reinforcements, and I am in the act of sending off, in two steamboats, which will probably ascend the Flint river some twenty or forty miles, about 160 foot volunteers and 40 friendly Indians to him. The Indians in the swamp, who may amount to about 150 warriors, are supposed to have with them not only nearly all the Creek slaves, but most of the blacks taken in the war from our people.

I think it impossible for the hostile fugitives to escape. Below the swamp, towards Florida, there is a wide tract of open pine-wood country, and Colonel Beall will have, by to-night, about 400 volunteer horse with him, besides many individual volunteers of Baker county.

I send copies of letters addressed by me to Brigadier General Moore and Lieutenant Johnson, of the navy. It seems, however, that I have not brought with me the copy of my communication to Brigadier General Wool, which was despatched from this place yesterday morning. [Perhaps it was sent by my aide-de-camp with a previous letter to you; I shall inquire on my return to Fort Mitchell.]

In that letter I gave him a statement of affairs in this quarter, and said that I should probably be able to send him, if needed, the detachment of United States marines and some companies (belonging to the upper country of Georgia and Alabama) of volunteers.

I have no report from the parties of horse ordered to pursue the sixteen hostile Creeks who got across the Chattahoochee on the 3d instant, eighteen miles below this. This party of fugitives cannot escape.

In haste, I remain, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General U. S. A.*

No. 250.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Mitchell, July 4, 1836.*

SIR: I addressed a letter to you yesterday from Roanoke, and despatched it by a party of Georgia horse.

That letter was, in great haste, an answer, by anticipation, to yours of the 2d instant, which I had the pleasure of receiving this morning by the hands of Major Huger.

If the outstanding hostile parties of Creek Indians can be captured or forced to come in and to surrender in eight or ten days, (and I think they may by great activity on the — of the Georgia and Alabama volunteers,) it will give me great pleasure to have all the volunteers discharged at the end of that time. But little remains to be accomplished, and the mounted troops are the best calculated to perform what remains to be done. I therefore, and I think you will concur with me, adhere to the opinion expressed to you in my letter of yesterday.

I have made many suggestions to Major Huger, which he will communicate to you, respecting, among other things, the payment of your brigade on its discharge from the service.

I remain, sir, with high respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brig. Gen. MOORE, *Commanding Brigade Alabama Volunteers.*

No. 251.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Mitchell, July 5, 1836.*

SIR: I should be glad to avail myself of the services of the armed steamer under your command for a week or two on this river; but apprehending that she will be still more important to his excellency Governor Call in the prosecution of the war against the Seminole Indians, I have to request that you repair to St. Mark's in her, and report yourself to him.

In descending this river, I wish you to stop at Colonel Henderson's post, a few miles below this, and bring up the detachment of United States marines under his command, or so much of it as your boat can conveniently accommodate, to Fort Mitchell.

If, in descending this river, you should discover any party of hostile Creek Indians crossing, I need not say that you will do what you can to capture or destroy them, but I will beg you to give the promptest information of the movement to the nearest military post, that pursuit may be made by land without delay.

I do not know that any other armed steamer may be expected in this river from Pensacola. Should you, however, meet with one, you will direct her to accompany you to St. Mark's, and report her for service as above. If you should speak another, please let her proceed to report to me, or rather send to me the boat of the lightest draught of water of the two. She may be highly useful if here in the next two weeks.

Wishing you a prosperous return to Florida, I remain, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Lieutenant JOHNSON, *U. S. Navy, Commanding the armed steamer the American.*

No. 252.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Mitchell, July 5, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to report, by direction of Major General Scott, that, owing to the position of the troops, and their having been continually in motion, it has been impossible to obtain a correct return of the force under his command.

As an approximation, there are of United States artillery, at and about this post, 547, and 156 of infantry, about 400 United States marines eight miles below, 4,155 of the Georgia line at and between Columbus and Roanoke, including the three companies of mounted volunteers detached in the direction of Baker county, in this State, and about 600 Georgians at West Point, twenty miles above Columbus on this river. Major General Patterson's command of Alabamians at and about Tuskegee consists of about 3,000 men, and Brigadier General Moore's brigade south of the Cowackee of about 1,300 men, making in all an aggregate of 10,158, of whom 1,103 are regulars, 4,755 Georgians, and 4,300 Alabamians.

A return of this force will be forwarded as soon as the necessary information can be obtained.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

THOS. J. LEE, *Lieut. 4th Artillery, Aide-de-camp.*

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General.*

Recapitulation of force serving in the Creek campaign under Major General Scott, in June—taken from the annexed official statement, dated Fort Mitchell, July 5, 1836.

RECAPITULATION.

	Total regulars.	Total militia.	Aggregate regulars and militia.
REGULARS.			
Artillery	547	547
Infantry	156	156
Marines	400	400
MILITIA.			
Georgia line.....		4, 155	4, 155
Georgians.....		600	600
Alabamians.....		4, 300	4, 300
Aggregate regulars and militia.....	1, 103	9, 055	10, 158

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, July 18, 1836.*

No. 253.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Mitchell, July 4, 1836.*

SIR: I have received a copy of your instructions from the War Department, and been directed to open a communication with you. Lieutenant Colonel Broome, of the United States marines, from the mere impulse of patriotism, has volunteered to bear this, my first letter. It will probably be agreeable to him to bring me your reply.

I think it probable that you will find the Cherokees very generally disposed to observe the relations of amity with our people about them. My latest information is to that effect, and I have not the time to refer to his excellency Governor Schley, now at Columbus, for better and more recent intelligence. It is my belief, however, that some, if not many of the hostile Creeks have taken refuge among the Cherokees; and had you not been specially charged with representing the United States in that quarter, I should have inquired at the proper time into this matter, and have marched against the Cherokees, if every fugitive had not been delivered over to my orders. As it is, I can only call your attention to the subject.

By far the greater number of hostile Creek warriors have voluntarily and unconditionally surrendered themselves; another portion has been captured without resistance, and the remainder, probably less than two hundred, are yet to be captured or forced in. Some of the latter, we know, have crossed the river in the hope of finding their way into Florida. I have, in two or three cases, despatched strong parties of horse in pursuit, with, I think, good hope of success; and I shall constantly scour the country lately occupied by them, in search of the handfulls who are lurking in the swamps for concealment, or watching opportunities to get off to Florida. These employments occupy a very large number of troops; for example, the left bank of the Chattahoochee, for more than forty miles, is kept lined with Georgia mounted men; an Alabama brigade, consisting, mostly, of the same kind of troops, is kept extended from east to west a little above Irwinton. Scouring parties are kept constantly out between this place and that line, and two or three small battalions of regulars are immediately to take positions on the great mail road between Columbus and Montgomery, in order to restore the communication between those places. Besides the troops so employed, detachments of regulars are needed to escort the Indian prisoners and emigrants, at least as far as Montgomery, if not all the way to Arkansas. The West Tennesseans have not arrived at

Montgomery. A thousand of these, by direction of the War Department, I have ordered to Florida. The remainder will be held for a short time in reserve.

Notwithstanding all the calls for troops, and which will be continued perhaps for ten or twenty days more, some of them for a much longer period, I shall, I do not doubt, very soon be able to send you very efficient reinforcement: about 400 United States marines certainly; 2d, some three or four companies of volunteers from Georgia, and as many from Alabama, (all from the neighborhood of the Cherokees,) probably; and, 3d, the remainder of the West Tennessee brigade, to be held in reserve, near Montgomery, pretty certainly.

I have requested Lieutenant Colonel Broome, whom I have pleasure in presenting to you, to get, in going and returning, the best information as to the routes leading to the Cherokee country, the means of subsistence, &c.

I remain, sir, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General Wool, *United States Army, Commanding, &c.*

No. 254.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Mitchell, July 6, 1836.*

SIR: With the effective men of your battalion, which has so handsomely volunteered for the service, you will, on board the *Metamora* and *Reindeer*, embark without delay, and proceed by water and land to that part of the Chikashatchee swamp where Colonel Beall, of the Georgia volunteers, is now operating against a party of hostile Creek Indians, who have been pursued to that fastness. In preference you will approach the swamp from *below*, unless the position of Colonel Beall and his forces should take you in a different direction in order to join him; of course you will report yourself to him and receive his orders.

At or before your arrival at Fort Gaines you will inquire and satisfy yourself as to the best route of reaching the theatre of operations in the shortest time. Perhaps the information you may receive will lead you to debark your detachment on the Chattahoochee, and thence proceed by land; but more probably you will find it best to ascend the Flint river as high as practicable, and thence to march to the theatre of operations.

You are at liberty to employ a few wagons from the point of landing, sufficient to take your surplus provisions and ammunition, a portion of which, no doubt, is much needed by the troops already with Colonel Beall.

If you can find the means of communicating to Colonel Beall (or commanding officer) *by express* the route by which you are approaching him, you will not fail to do so. Inform him of the surplus stores you may have with you.

I leave it to your discretion to retain the two steamboats for your return, directing them to meet you at such point as you may designate. The boats may also be needed to bring up all the sick and wounded of the detachments now engaged with the Indians in that quarter.

Wishing you and your gallant battalion success, and fully persuaded that everything will be done to insure success, I remain, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

I have directed the medical director of the army, Dr. Lawson, in concurrence with your surgeon, to have a good supply of medicines and hospital stores to be put on board your two boats.

I have sent Paddy Carr to you to say I have directed him to have ready immediately a party of thirty or forty of his best Indian warriors to accompany you. He will be obliged to obtain a part of them at Fort Mitchell. Please direct one of your boats to stop there a short time to get those warriors. Keep the whole of Paddy's party with your battalion, unless otherwise ordered by Colonel Beall, and please subsist and treat them kindly; they have heretofore behaved well.

W. S.

Major Hoxie, *Commanding Columbus Volunteers, Columbus.*

No. 255.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, June 25, 1836.*

SIR: It is represented to the War Department that a large force of hostile Creek Indians will probably make their way into Florida, and, in consequence, the Secretary deems it very important that a strong force should be stationed so as to prevent the escape of the Creeks in that direction; it is therefore the order of the Secretary of War that you station a sufficient force so as to prevent them making their escape and taking that direction.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALEX. MACOMB, *Major General, Commanding-in-chief.*

Major General Scott.

No. 256.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, June 28, 1836.*

SIR: I have received, through the Secretary of War, the order of the President to call you to the seat of government. You will, therefore, on the receipt of this letter, turn over to Brevet Major General Jesup the command of the troops serving against the hostile Creeks, and repair to the city of Washington.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,

ALEX. MACOMB, *Major General, Commanding-in-chief.*

Major General WINFIELD SCOTT, *Fort Mitchell, Alabama.*

No. 257.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, June 28, 1836.*

SIR: Major General Scott having been ordered to the seat of government, the command of the troops serving against the hostile Creeks is, by direction of the President, hereby vested in you. The instructions which you received from the War Department, on leaving Washington for the Creek nation, will be your guide in executing the important duties which are hereby again devolved on you.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

ALEX. MACOMB, *Major General, Commanding-in-chief.*

Major General JESUP, *Fort Mitchell.*

No. 258.

COLUMBUS, *Georgia, July 8, 1836.*

SIR: Late in the evening of the 6th instant I had the honor to receive your letter of the 28th ultimo, and one of the same date from the adjutant general. I had transacted much business that day, besides issuing the orders, copies of which will be enclosed to the adjutant general.

Yesterday I wrote and despatched to Major General Jesup the order turning over the command to him, and have confined myself to the mere business of advising with Major General Sanford, Brigadier General Fenwick, the quartermaster and commissary, (to prevent the public service from suffering, Major General Jesup being at a distance from this place,) since the receipt of the letter recalling me.

To put my successor fully in possession of everything material to his station, I have carefully looked over my books and papers, and have caused copies of a great many papers to be made out for him which will be transmitted.

Many other copies of papers will be transmitted to the adjutant general to-day by Lieutenant Lee, my late aide-de-camp.

I set out this morning for the north in order to reach Charleston this day week, to take the steamboat of that day for Norfolk, and shall lose no time in presenting myself at Washington.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT

Major General MACOMB, *General-in-chief United States Army.*

No. 259.

ORDER No. 29.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, July 7, 1836.*

Major General Scott has been called to Washington, and the command of this army devolves, from the publication of this order, on Major General Jesup, to whom, in future, all reports and applications will be made.

The Creek war, though yet to be wound up, may be considered as virtually over. Two parties of the hostile Indians, which have escaped to this side of the Chattahoochee, are now hotly pursued. The larger of those parties is shut up in a swamp, and from the strength of Colonel Beall's detachment, that under Captain Jernigan, and the reinforcement sent hence under Major Hoxie, a capture of the whole body of the fugitives seems to be inevitable. The other hostile party will, probably, from the measures in operation, share the same fate. In the late Creek country the number of the enemy to be captured or forced to surrender is considered quite inconsiderable.

Major General Scott regrets that, from the suddenness of his separation from the army, the opportunity is lost to him of doing that full justice to all the corps he has had the honor to command, which their patriotism, zeal, and gallantry claim at his hands, and indeed from the highest sources—the government and country.

To his excellency the governor of Georgia, who has remained on the frontier in order to lend himself in every way powerfully to the prosecution of the war, the particular thanks of Major General Scott are due. Before the Georgia line could be mustered into the service of the United States his excellency had made dispositions of his armed troops, not only to protect his own frontier, but to prevent the escape of the enemy in the direction of Florida. This was the great danger to be guarded against, and all that zeal and ability could effect on his part has been put in practice and accomplished. It is hoped that this slight acknowledgment made to the chief magistrate of a powerful and patriotic State may not be deemed impertinent because coming from a military functionary of the United States. It is eminently deserved. Of the Georgia line, which has constantly acted under the immediate observation of Major General Scott, he will ever be happy to speak in terms of the highest approbation. That line has, under its immediate and able commander, Major General Sanford, throughout evinced the best dispositions—a readiness to obey orders, to march against the enemy, and to win honor for itself, for Georgia, and the Union. The greater part of it for a long time was held inactive for the want of arms which, by a series of strange accidents, failed to arrive, whilst other portions of the same line, in positions on the river, had frequent and severe combats with the enemy. In these, if the Georgian detachments were not always successful, they at least were ready to oppose an obstinate resistance to superior numbers. Captains Garmany, Jernigan, Ball, and Fluellen, with their companies, won for themselves much distinction on those occasions, whilst Captains Dawson and Pearson, cruising with their companies on board steamboats, rendered highly valuable services. Captain Dawson on several occasions displayed the greatest judgment and intrepidity in marching to the relief of the fixed posts, and landing in the presence of the enemy, in order to destroy his means of passing the river.

Of the Alabama line, with the exception of Brigadier General Moore's brigade, Major General Scott cannot speak either from his own observation or on a direct correspondence. Major General Jesup, himself an able commander and a competent judge, in his reports speaks highly of Major General Patterson and his division, and it is directly known that Brigadier General Moore, placed on the lower line of operations, has, acting almost independently, made able dispositions of his brigade, and has captured more than two hundred prisoners.

To the regular troops, including the United States marines, the usual praise is due: they have exhibited steadiness, discipline, and an eager desire to come in contact with the enemy. Although disappointed in that favorite wish, they have in all other respects rendered themselves highly useful.

It is known that the friendly Indians acting as auxiliaries under General Woodward and others have rendered valuable services. To them a great number of the captures and voluntary surrenders are to be attributed.

With his temporary staff—Colonel Kenan, volunteer aide-de-camp; Major Ansart, acting inspector general, and Lieutenants T. J. Lee and Betts, aides-de-camp; also Surgeon Dr. Lawson, medical director of the army—Major General Scott cannot take leave without expressing his hearty thanks for the zeal, ability, and courtesy which each has displayed in the performance of his particular duties.

Major Ansart, 3d artillery, having tendered the resignation of his commission, which will be forwarded to Washington, he has permission to repair to that place, after having performed the special duties in which he is now engaged, and await the decision of the government.

Colonel Kenan, duly mustered into the service of the United States on the 1st ultimo, is hereby discharged with honor and thanks from that service.

Lieutenant T. J. Lee, at the expiration of a week, and Lieutenant Betts, at the expiration of a month, will join their respective companies for duty.

Surgeon Lawson will report by letter to Major General Jesup.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

No. 260.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEPARTMENT, *Washington, July 20, 1836.*

SIR: For the information of the proper authority, I have the honor to enclose a copy of a letter, dated at Tuskegee the 7th instant, from Major General Jesup to me, and which contains important intelligence.

The letter was written before it was known to General Jesup that I had turned over the command of the army of the south to him, and overtook me at Charleston, South Carolina.

I remain, sir, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Brigadier General JONES, *Adjutant General United States Army.*

P. S.—As early as the 26th ultimo, I requested Major General Jesup to order Neo Mico and his band to be disarmed and secured.

W. S.

No. 261.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS SOUTHERN ARMY, *Tuskegee, July 7, 1836.*

SIR: I arrived here yesterday with the volunteers of General Patterson's command, and expected to start a party of four hundred Indians, but at least a thousand of Neo Mico's party went off yesterday and last night, and have proceeded up the country to Tuckabatche, Hajo's camp, or town, in Chambers county. I shall send the mounted men in pursuit to-morrow.

If the marines can be spared, I request that they may be placed on the mail road from Columbus to Tuskegee, subject to my orders, say twelve or fourteen miles from Columbus, at the stage-house. I will place a detachment about twelve miles from Tuskegee. Those posts established, an order or proclamation directing all Indians to go north of the mail road, and confine themselves to their camps or villages, and declaring all to be hostile who shall be found south of it, or traversing any portion of the country north or south, and directing that they be treated as such, would have the effect to close the difficulties in this country.

The negotiation with Neo Mico has proved that the best argument with Indians is formed not of words, but of powder and lead; and I have this moment informed the chief, from whose camp Neo Mico's party has fled, that I shall use no other argument in future.

I enclose a letter from General Moore, referred to me by General Patterson; and I am, sir, respectfully,
TH. S. JESUP, *Major General.*

Major General SCOTT, *Commanding Southern Army, Columbus, Georgia.*

No. 262.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tuskegee, Alabama, September 9, 1836.*

SIR: I have just received from a friend a Richmond Enquirer of the 15th of July, which contains a report of General Scott, dated at Fort Mitchell on the 2d of July. In that report the general has stated, upon the authority of Colonel Henderson, that two hundred and fifty Indians had surrendered to General Watson.

I enclose a copy of a letter from Colonel Henderson and an extract from a letter of General Watson on the subject.

I have to request that this communication, with the papers enclosed, be laid before the Secretary of War and the general-in-chief; and, if General Scott has not corrected his report, I desire that they may be published.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

TH. S. JESUP, *Major General.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General United States Army, Washington City.*

[Memorandum.]

The only reply that I have to make to this letter is to request that the court will refer to my letter, in evidence, to the adjutant general, dated July 2, (document No. 243.)

WINFIELD SCOTT.

FREDERICKTOWN, *Maryland, January 19, 1837.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE MARINE CORPS, *Tallahassee, August 30, 1836.*

GENERAL: I have just received your letter of this date.

In the report made by me to General Scott, dated the 28th June, I was led, by information derived from a lieutenant of Captain Love's company of mounted volunteers, to state to General Scott that two hundred and fifty Indians had surrendered to General Watson without firing a gun. The volunteer officer's statement was so distinct that I did not doubt its correctness.

A day or two afterwards I ascertained that no such event had taken place, and, meeting General Scott on board of a steamboat passing up the Chattahoochee, I told him in what manner I was led into the error. He mentioned at the time that he had seen General Watson, and had found that my statement was erroneous.

I remain, general, with great respect, your obedient servant,

ARCH. HENDERSON, *Colonel Commandant.*

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Commanding Army of the South, Headquarters, Tallahassee.*

Extract of a letter from General J. Watson, of Georgia, to Major General Jesup, commanding army of the south.

TALLAHASSEE, *August 30, 1836.*

I was at the taking of no party of hostiles, except that of Jim Henry, some fifteen or twenty miles south of Fort Mitchell, where you were present yourself, and in command. I was with you without rank, as a volunteer private citizen.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

J. WATSON.

No. 263.

Remarks upon an editorial article headed "The Army," published in the Courier and Enquirer of the 26th of July, 1836.

The article is offensive in the language used, and incorrect in the statements presented, in reference to the difficulties between General Scott and General Jesup.

But for the injurious character of these misstatements, their correction might be left to the anticipated investigation, or to the voluntary action of General Scott, who will, it is hoped, indignantly contradict imputations upon a brother officer which he well knows to be untrue.

A brief sketch of the facts will at least suspend public opinion until official inquiry shall exhibit a conclusive exposition of the questions in issue.

While there was yet a probability of bringing the Seminole war to a close, General Scott was directed to give his attention to the Creek difficulties. Some time after these difficulties grew more serious, and General Scott being deemed fully occupied by the, as yet, unchecked Seminoles, Major General Jesup was, on the 19th of May, specially charged with the direction of the Creek war.

He met at Augusta, Georgia, Major General Scott, who had left Florida, where much certainly remained to be done, to assume the command in the Creek country. General Jesup willingly consented to take the second place; proceeded with General Scott to Columbus, and thence to Tuskegee, Alabama, and assumed command, on the 9th of June, of the western or Alabama frontier, General Scott reserving to himself the immediate command of the eastern or Georgia frontier.

The editorial assertion that General Jesup, "as soon as he found that Scott had been ordered to conduct the war against the Creeks, * * * determined * * * to procure the recall of his superior officer," is not merely incorrect in every particular, but the extreme reverse is truth.

So far from desiring the recall of General Scott, he willingly served under him; and next to his solicitude for the public service, was his anxious desire to enable an old brother in arms to recover in Alabama the military reputation lost in Florida.

Even in the heat and excitement of the collision with General Jesup, General Scott frankly recognized and acknowledged the chivalric courtesy and self-sacrificing spirit which had marked his conduct from the moment of their meeting at Augusta.

As the collision is at present purely official, it is to be regretted that the partisans of General Scott should render the discussion personal. For this error they will merit the censure of the distinguished individual they mean to serve.

Returning to the sketch of operations, we find General Scott's plan of campaign announced to be—*First.* To man the south and southeast frontier, to prevent the Indians from passing to Florida.

Second. The first being accomplished, to unite the disposable forces at the south line and sweep northward through the Creek country.

As a preliminary part of this plan, General Jesup was directed to move southward to Irwinton with such force as he should succeed in raising, and, there uniting with General Scott's forces, move northward.

The number of troops needed to sentinel this extended line of some hundred miles; the time required to raise, organize, equip, and station them; their probable inability when stationed to effect the object proposed; and the intervening unstayed progress of Indian barbarities, were considerations lost on none but General Scott.

It is unnecessary to examine this plan in detail.* Had all the means been in readiness, and had they been energetically and rapidly applied, it is possible that the result might have been successful. As it was, all felt its inapplicability.

The frequent alarms, the excited state of public feeling, the eager restlessness of the volunteer troops, and, above all, the devastations daily reported, called imperatively for immediate and effective action.

The mode of operations kept in view by General Jesup was, to strike the enemy at once, to check barbarities upon the whites by forcing the Indians to defend their own families; and, instead of forcing them from Florida by sentinels posted from Columbus to Flint river, and from Irwinton to Montgomery, to seek them in their camps, find, fight, and capture them.

Anxious to secure the country and General Scott himself from the evil consequences of a plan which there were neither means nor time to execute, General Jesup determined to protect his frontier by prompt movements upon the Indians, in as far as it was possible to make them without disobeying the orders of General Scott.

On the 9th of June he assumed command of the Alabama troops, the disposable force being seven hundred volunteers, under Major General Patterson.

The friendly Indians were ordered to rendezvous, the warriors to join as auxiliaries—their families to remain at the rendezvous and be fed by the government. The hostile and doubtful Indians in the vicinity were disarmed, and placed in charge of friendly chiefs.

June 12.—Pursuant to General Scott's order, he started to Irwinton, *taking in his route* the camp of Eneah Mico and Eneah Mathla, where the hostile Indians were concentrated with their families, property, plunder, &c.

Eneah Mico's camp was broken up; the chief, with a portion of his band, came into a friendly camp, and asked to be treated as hostiles disarmed.

June 15.—While on the march, Eneah Mathla, the active head of the hostile party, was apprehended by an advance scout of friendly Indians, four hundred of whom joined on the 13th.

June 17.—Approached within five miles of Eneah Mathla's camp—was joined by eleven hundred and fifty Indian warriors.

The singular order from General Scott "to cease all offensive movements," was here received. Confident that if General Scott knew his force and position, he would desire him to improve the sought-for opportunity of striking the enemy, General Jesup despatched an express with a letter, from which the sentence below is extracted, and on the morning of the 18th of June pushed forward to the enemy's camp.

General Jesup to General Scott, in reply to first letter forbidding offensive movements.

[Extract.]

"CAMP ON THE HATCHYCHUBBY, five miles from Eneah Mathla's camp, June 17, 1836.

"I would have struck the enemy to-night but for your letter. If he is not struck to-morrow morning he will escape for the present; but the force I have in the field is sufficient to pursue and reduce him."

The answer reached General Jesup in the just-deserted camp of Eneah Mathla, when active pursuit was alone necessary to entire success—containing a peremptory repetition of the order to cease instantly all offensive operations.

General Jesup gave directions for large reconnoitring parties to hold the enemy in check, and hastened in person to Fort Mitchell, eighteen miles distant, to see General Scott. The latter having left for Columbus, a second express was sent to him, with a letter stating frankly General Jesup's opinions, and earnestly entreating him (General Scott) to adopt a different and more efficient course. The question of its publication is referred to General Scott, who can thus satisfactorily answer some of the offensive imputations upon General Jesup's motives.

The memoranda of this date by the writer refute the charge attempted to be made against General Jesup, of taking a position in which subsistence and forage could not be procured. Besides that taken from the enemy, eighty thousand rations ordered from New Orleans, by General Jesup, before he left Washington city, arrived on the 18th of June, five days before his rations were exhausted, within eighteen miles of his camp, and a considerable quantity of forage, pursuant to his previous directions, was provided and ready at a point twenty miles distant.

June 19.—General Jesup returned to camp. The reconnoitring parties brought in several prisoners, and certain information of the hostile parties. This information removed the only serious objection that had been made against General Jesup's operations, viz: that he would force the Indians across the river towards Florida. *Directly the reverse* had actually occurred.

The parties on the river preparing to cross fled inwards to the swamps, under shelter of the main body; in a few instances leaving their families in their flight. Some of them were brought in with the prisoners.

June 20—General Scott continued unshaken in his resolution that the enemy should not be beaten, except by the regular course of his own "plan of campaign."

* General Jesup was understood to disapprove THE DELAY in executing the plan, not the plan itself.

The communications earnestly urging a change of this determination had elicited only replies of the most exceptionable nature.

As the orders were well known to all, an offensive movement could not be made without avowed disobedience of orders, and this in a camp only preserved from mutiny against the "unaccountable firmness" of General Scott by the most strenuous efforts of the officers.

Even had General Jesup determined to disregard the repeated and peremptory order, it would have been impossible to attack and effectually conquer the enemy before an order for his arrest could have reached him from General Scott, (only twenty-eight miles distant.)

Thus compelled to inaction, he sent out some of the prisoners to summon the enemy to surrender, and kept the troops in position to enforce the summons. The consequence was, that, on the 22d, three hundred hostile warriors laid down their arms, and one thousand of the hostile party surrendered themselves unconditionally prisoners.

The position of General Jesup presented no alternative. He could not remain under the command of one who had alike disregarded the good of the public service, and the personal feelings and professional reputation of those who had labored most zealously and efficiently.

In three days after assuming command General Jesup had marched upon the strongholds of the enemy, with a volunteer force not greater than General Scott could have called together at any point of the Georgia line; had checked the devastations, and effectually secured the Alabama frontier; had raised an auxiliary force of fifteen hundred Indian warriors, from materials alike accessible to General Scott and himself; had seized the principal chiefs; broken up the hostile confederacy; taken and disarmed a portion of the hostiles; and, on the eve of closing the war, is arrested from doing it—because, forsooth, General Scott's plan of operations prescribed a later day and a larger force, (facing north instead of south for effecting it.)

In these measures General Jesup had been greatly aided by the judicious arrangements of Governor Clay, and ably seconded by the prompt and energetic efforts of Major General Patterson, his officers and troops, and by the active and efficient corps of Indian warriors he had called into the United States service. By these the advantages had been obtained. And being thus halted in their consummation, General Jesup determined to ask to be relieved, and to place the immediate command of the Alabama troops with the State officers.

June 20, General Jesup made full report of the operations of the 2d army corps, and closed with the following paragraph :

[Extract.]

"CAMP HATCHYCHUBBY, June 20, 1836.

"As I was placed on this service by the express order of the President, I shall apply to him to be relieved, and shall demand a court of inquiry.

"I shall await your order as to the disposition of force," &c.

The channel of official communication was through General Scott. To make the application through him to the President would have been indelicate, if not improper, especially until it was seen whether he would or would not arrest General Jesup for his advance upon the enemy.

An official communication direct to the President, or through any officers of the War Department, must have, in substance, preferred charges against General Scott, and rendered necessary his immediate arrest.

Desirous of withdrawing himself from the duty with the least prejudice to General Scott and the public service, yet without admitting he was in error, he perceived and determined to adopt the only mode that would relieve the subject from all embarrassments, viz: expressing to the President, in a communication which was not of necessity official, his desire to be relieved. This could only be done through a mutual acquaintance—it was so done—by letter of same date with that to General Scott just quoted.

The President thought proper to render this letter an official document, and as such it is to be considered.

The documents forwarded by General Scott, including his letters to General Jesup, attacking him with the severest censures, and in effect preferring the most serious charges, were then before the government, were considered by the President, and on General Scott's own showing the decision was probably founded.

The editor's assertion that the communication to the President was "a stab in the dark," "an attack upon General Scott," "an attempt to procure his removal," can now be understood and appreciated.

General Scott was advised on the 20th that the application to be relieved would be made. As it was not sent through him, HE KNEW it was an UNOFFICIAL communication, and should have appreciated the motive which induced General Jesup to thus decline preferring charges against him.

General Jesup's opinions of his errors and delays were fully, emphatically, and earnestly urged upon him.

The papers containing the whole correspondence were placed by General Scott before the government; his recall was the revulsion of his own attack on General Jesup, or rather the inevitable result of exhibiting the circumstances.

The request to be relieved having been made, General Jesup left Camp Hatchychubby to report in person to General Scott. Illness, the consequence of excessive fatigue, stopped him at Fort Mitchell, and the writer, a member of his staff, was ordered to Columbus to communicate with General Scott.

In the course of the protracted official conversation with General Scott, the considerations bearing upon the unpleasant difference were mentioned and discussed, especially those having reference to General Jesup's request to be relieved. The occasion being presented, it gave the writer great pleasure to bear witness to the unvarying tenor of General Jesup's expressions and conduct toward General Scott, and still greater pleasure to hear them gratefully acknowledged by him.

The subsequent withdrawal by General Scott of what was personally offensive, reduced the differences to questions purely official, and until decided upon by the government, before which General Scott had laid them, both officers continued in the performance of their respective duties.

SECOND ARMY CORPS, June 23.

Hostile Indian prisoners were brought to Fort Mitchell, and retained there nine days, to enable the civil authorities (of Georgia particularly) to identify and demand the offenders against their laws.

SECOND ARMY CORPS, *June 24.*

General Jesup, with a detachment of Alabama volunteers and Indian warriors, seized Jim Henry's party, the chief and a few men only escaping.

FIRST ARMY CORPS.

On the same day General Scott moved south and commenced active operations, pursuant to his plan of campaign, without having received the arms and ordnance stores for which he had been some time waiting.

On July 2 he reached Fort Mitchell; having, by fatiguing and difficult marches, swept the country, as proposed in his plan, from the south northward, and captured one Indian and one Indian negro.

SECOND ARMY CORPS.

The chief Jim Henry, taken by the Indian warriors in the vicinity of General Patterson's camp.

SECOND ARMY CORPS, *July 5.*

A detachment of 600 men passed into the camp where the hostiles had taken refuge. All, with the exception of Neahmicco and thirty men, escaped. Having ascertained their routes, 900 of them were taken on the 9th and 10th of July.

Twenty-seven hundred of the hostile party, including eight hundred warriors, and including forty criminals delivered to the civil authorities, have been taken, sent west, and are now probably at their destined homes.

Their capture closed the Creek war. The subsequent difficulties have grown out of causes connected with the removal.

The incidents of the war are mentioned without any intent to claim credit for any individual—especially not for General Jesup, who, in his official reports, has assigned the merit of what was done by the army corps he commanded, to the officers and soldiers of the Alabama troops, and to the officers and friendly warriors of the Indian bands who composed that corps.

It is doubtless true that the successful issue was aided and hastened by the tone General Jesup assumed towards the Indians, from the day when, to enter upon his command, he, with an escort of 120 men, pushed through the heart of the enemy's country, near the camp of Neahmicco, where were 600 hostile warriors, to the time when his orders were (and are) obeyed by the Indian chiefs with the punctuality and promptness of military discipline; by his measures for raising an Indian force for separating the friendly and the warriors from those decidedly hostile; and by his exertions as commanding general of the corps.

The Georgia troops, however restless under the inaction imposed on them by want of arms, and by Major General Scott's "plan of campaign," have nobly redeemed the time then lost, by their conduct in the Creek country, and more recently in the contest with the Creeks, some of whom, in consequence of the late orders for removal, are endeavoring to make their way to Florida, across the line whose defence General Jesup confided to General Sanford.

The foregoing remarks answer the abusive article of the *Courier and Enquirer*, in all things except the inapplicable epithets which I regret to find in an appeal to "officers of the army" by a person who has served long enough in our ranks to have learned a different language.

I close these remarks as the editor closed his article, by saying they are respectfully submitted to the public, in order that the officers of the army may properly appreciate the conduct of Major General Jesup

J. F. LANE, *Captain United States Army.*

CREEK COUNTRY, *August 8, 1836.*

No. 264.

WASHINGTON CITY, *January 8, 1837.*

SIR: I intended to have attended the court of inquiry at Frederick, in conformity with your notification of the 2d instant, but perceiving from a letter of General Scott, just published in the *Richmond Enquirer*, that interrogatories (by letter) may be propounded to those at a distance who cannot conveniently appear in court personally, I must beg the favor of the court to be permitted to give my deposition in this way. From the circumstance that General Jesup's letter to me (which appears in the *Globe* of September 26) being called for in your summons, I presume that my testimony is only wanted to verify it as his. I know nothing of the causes of the failure of the southern campaigns, and if, as I suppose, the proof that the letter published as General Jesup's is really *his* be all that is expected of me, it can be so readily obtained by my deposition, that I have felt it my duty (being an officer of the House of Representatives and engaged in daily attendance upon it) to decline the journey to Frederick for the present. If it should be the wish of General Scott, at whose instance I am summoned, to interrogate me as to anything I may know of *occurrences in this city*, having relation to the officers, the army, or the campaigns, I will most cheerfully respond by deposition, stating all I know, or respond to particular questions he may propound. If it should turn out that the examination in this way prove unsatisfactory, I will then go to Frederick and answer personally.

I send you the *Globe* of September 26, containing General Jesup's letter, which I am ready to verify as his.

Your most obedient servant,

F. P. BLAIR.

S. COOPER, *Judge Advocate, Recorder of the Court.*

No. 265.

[From the Globe of the 26th of September, 1836.]

TALLAHASSEE, *Alabama, September 3, 1836.*

DEAR SIR: I regret that I should have been the cause of bringing you into difficulty. I wrote to you at the moment information reached me that General Scott had not only sent copies of his extraordinary letters to me to the War Department, but that he was representing me in his conversations as having deranged his plan of campaign, and brought a starving corps of two or three thousand men to consume the small quantity of subsistence and forage which he had collected for the Georgia volunteers and regular troops. Writing under the influence of the exasperated feelings produced by the wrong which I believed he had done me, and which I shall be able to show at the proper time he did me, I used language stronger, perhaps, than I should under other circumstances have thought necessary; but the language used expressed my opinions then; it expresses my opinions now.

Occupied with my public duties, I have no time for defence; and as I do not meddle with the politics of the country, I would not consent to be defended on party grounds. The questions in regard to the campaign should be decided on their own merits. I wrote to you, not as a party man, but as a private friend. It is true, I wrote to you because you happened to be the editor of the *Globe*, in the columns of which I expected to see General Scott's letters spread before the public. I requested you to show my letter to the President, as a measure of defence against the charges contained in General Scott's letters. The result was such as I neither expected nor desired. My command having been halted by General Scott, when in the presence of the enemy's principal force, I believed the Indians would disperse into small parties, and that, in place of fighting their force united, we should have to hunt their parties through the swamps, as had been necessary in Florida. Having been censured for that which I considered the true course of operations, and believing I could render no useful service to the country in chasing small parties through the swamps, I desired, at the time I wrote, to be withdrawn from the army. I informed General Scott officially, on the 20th of June, that I should apply to the President to be relieved, and should demand a court of inquiry. On the evening of the 23d we met, and an explanation took place. About 10 o'clock that night he put into my hands a letter addressed to the Secretary of War or the adjutant general, I do not remember which, to part of which I objected, in the presence of his aide and mine. On the morning of the 24th he informed me he would ask to withdraw from the files of the War Department the offensive letters; and on the 25th I addressed a letter to the Secretary of War, in which I expressed my readiness to continue under his command until the close of the campaign. I considered all personal difference at an end; but I believed, and so expressed myself to those around me, that the government owed it to the country to have the whole subject of the campaign investigated. I considered it no longer a question between General Scott and me, but between him and the country, or me and the country.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

TH. S. JESUP.

FRANCIS P. BLAIR, Esq., *Washington City.*HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 16, 1836.*

SIR: Since I wrote to you on the 12th, I have heard of the arrival at Hawkinsville and Macon of most of the supplies I had ordered *via* Darien. These are now in wagons, and within two, three, and four days of this place. I have also just heard that the muskets ordered from Augusta may be expected here perhaps to-morrow. With these arms and the 1,800 accoutrements from Hawkinsville, nearly the whole of the Georgia line may be fitted for the field. At present, of the 2,200 men Major General Sanford has in his camp on the other side of the river, only about 400 are armed. All the other armed men have been detached below to guard the river, and which, as yet, from the want of men, is but very imperfectly guarded.

After writing to you on the 12th, I received your letter of the 8th. This would completely have mystified me, but for the explanations given by some of the Georgia gentlemen who accompanied you from this place. For example, you wrote to me on the 6th that you were just about to set out for Montgomery, and yet I find you back at Tuskegee on the 8th. You do not tell me that you had been absent as far as Line creek, and that you there had met the governor. You are silent as to any interviews you had had with him, either at Line creek or at Tuskegee, to which place, I understand from others, he followed you. Some difficulties you undoubtedly experienced in getting the command of the Alabama troops; but what those difficulties were, you carefully conceal from me. You content yourself with saying: "I have not yet obtained the command of the troops, but if I obtain it at all I shall probably enter on duty to-morrow." But why you had not at first obtained the command of the troops, and why the doubt whether you would obtain it at all, you again carefully conceal from me.

In a subsequent part of your letter you say: "I learn from the governor that General Moore will," &c. How did you learn this from the governor? You do not tell me that you had met him at Line creek, and that, turning back yourself, he had followed you to Tuskegee. It might have been by letter.*

Allow me to say that the whole letter is mysterious and enigmatical in the extreme, and that it is not such a communication as you ought to have made me. If the governor made the difficulties about placing you in the command of the troops, *that* important fact ought not to have been concealed from me; and if he did not, who else interposed difficulties?

You further tell me that "if a movement be determined on, I will send you information of it by a runner." A movement to be determined on by whom? The Alabama commanders, or those in conjunction with yourself? Either you were placed in command, or you have not been. In the first place you would certainly determine on no scheme of offensive operations without my previous concurrence and readiness to co-operate; yet, without receiving any runner from you, or communication of any kind, since the 8th instant, a passenger, in the stage by the upper route, just arrived here, reports that you, at the head of about 3,000 Alabamians and 1,000 friendly Indians, were about to march upon Neo Micco's band, and to

* NOTE FURNISHED WITH THE COPY.—So the fact was communicated, the importance of adding that it was communicated by letter or orally cannot be perceived.

commence offensive operations on a great scale! I have no doubt there is a gross mistake in this report. You may, perhaps, have been about to make some defensive movement or operation to clear a frontier settlement of a portion of the enemy, but I will not believe that you have declared your independence of my authority.

It is certain that Brigadier General Moore, of Alabama, has commenced a course of offensive operations from Irwinton up the country. From this fact, I have rather inferred that you have not even yet been invested with the command of the Alabamians, or you certainly would have stopped his premature and isolated [movement.] These doubts and conjectures, in the absence of all direct intelligence from you, are sufficiently harassing. I mean to be explicit and precise on my part. I desire you instantly to stop all offensive movements (if you are in command) on the part of the Alabamians until the Georgians are ready to act, say on the 21st instant, when the greater number of them will be armed and ready for the field. By that time, too, there will be on the frontier the greater part of the regulars and marines ordered from the north. On that day, if the movements of General Moore shall not render a modification of my plan necessary, I shall begin to assemble the troops on this side of the nation, somewhere in the neighborhood of Irwinton, and operate up the country. It is my desire that you meet me about that time and place, and that you bring with you any disposable force you conveniently can, or that you hold the whole of the Alabamians in defensive positions on the frontier settlements till I shall bring the war into their neighborhood, when you can come into the general line of operations with me.

No quartermaster has arrived here but Dr. Waite. Captain Page says that, under his instructions from the War Department, his presence in this quarter is indispensable. No flints and no ammunition have yet arrived.

I have heard of shipments from New Orleans of army supplies; but none have arrived. Subsistence, with arms and accoutrements, from Hawkinsville, will begin to come in to-morrow.

I shall cause a large deposit of subsistence to be made at Irwinton, another at Fort Mitchell, and a third at this place. I am inquiring, and may establish a fourth depot at some convenient point between Irwinton and Fort Mitchell.

Six companies of regulars have arrived here to-day, and Monroe's three days ago. They are sent to guard the Indians at Fort Mitchell.

I remain, with undiminished confidence, yours, most respectfully,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *United States Army, Commanding, &c.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Columbus, Georgia, June 17, 1836.*

SIR: I have this moment received your two letters of the 15th and 17th instant.

I am infinitely astonished and distressed to hear of your near approach, and in a starving condition,* to Fort Mitchell. You knew that your forces were not wanted there. You knew that no supplies could reach even Irwinton from New Orleans earlier than the 21st instant, if so soon; and you knew, by my letter of the 10th, that nothing had arrived as high as Hawkinsville, upon the Ockmulgee, and consequently nothing could have reached this place by the present date from that river. I also ought to add that you knew when you left here that the troops, daily increasing, were living from hand to mouth on the precarious supplies of the neighborhood. Under these circumstances, imagine my astonishment to learn that, instead of marching the disposable force of Alabama upon Irwinton, with subsistence for at least ten or five days in advance, you have come through the heart of the Indian country, seeking private adventures, which, if successful, could hardly have advanced the war, and against my known plan of operations, to Fort Mitchell, forty-five miles out of position! It is precisely General Gaines's movement upon Fort King, where there was no subsistence; and there is none, as you ought to have known, at Fort Mitchell.† My grief and distress are at their utmost height. This strange movement you have made without giving me the slightest notice. You had not informed me, you do not even now tell me, that you are in command of the Alabamians; and your last letter, of the 8th instant, stated that it was doubtful whether you would even be invested with that command. All this is infinitely strange, and was the last thing in the world that was to be expected from you.

Well, to prevent starvation, I have called for the quartermaster and commissary, and demanded of them what rations and forage they could supply. Lieutenant Waite, the quartermaster, had with great difficulty provided some corn for my movement at the head of the Georgians, on the 21st or 22d, and Lieutenant McCrabb had just nearly exhausted the market to obtain two or three days' rations for the troops already at Fort Mitchell. At the risk of starving the troops on the river, (the Georgians and regulars,) I have ordered the quartermaster to send you five hundred bushels of corn, and the commissary to move heaven and earth to send two or three days' subsistence for the troops brought with you. To prevent, however, all further erratic movements, I desire you to encamp your forces somewhere in the neighborhood of Fort Mitchell till further orders, or until I can see you. We will keep your forces and those previously on the river from starving, if possible, till the arrival of the Ockmulgee supplies, which I suppose will precede those from New Orleans by some days.

The first and one of the worst effects of your arrival will be to prevent a movement of the Georgians and regulars as early as I intended. The former have pushed their impatience for active operations almost to a state of mutiny—a result which I may not be able to prevent if they should learn that the arrival of the Alabamians is to hold them in a state of inglorious inactivity many days longer.

*NOTE FURNISHED WITH THE COPY.—When General Jesup arrived at Fort Mitchell, on the night of the 18th of June, he found a steambot with seventy thousand rations, which he had ordered from New Orleans before he left Washington city; and he found in the neighborhood several thousand bushels of corn, which he had directed Captain Page to secure early in June. He was surely entitled to some small share of the benefits of his own arrangements. If General Scott was not acquainted with the resources at his command, it was not the fault of General Jesup.

†NOTE FURNISHED WITH THE COPY.—General Jesup knew that the navigation was good, and he expected the arrival of steamboats with supplies at Columbus by the 15th of June. He had subsistence sufficient for the troops under his command to the 22d of June.

I wrote to you yesterday, and despatched the letter by a runner from Fort Mitchell. I shall endeavor to visit Fort Mitchell to-morrow or the next day.

Though in grief, I still remain yours, with great regard,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Some wagons with subsistence are despatched to-night, but cannot arrive, I learn from Mr. Waite, till to-morrow morning. Some corn (two hundred and fifty or three hundred bushels) will be down by ten o'clock to-morrow in a boat.

W. S.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS SOUTHERN ARMY,
Camp on the waters of the Hatchychubby, June 17, 1836.

GENERAL: I have this instant received your letter of yesterday. I regret that my operations have met your disapprobation; but they were commenced and have been continued for the purpose of staying the tomahawk and scalping-knife, and preventing the devastation of entire settlements or neighborhoods on the frontier. They have had the effect of tranquillizing, in some measure, the frontier people, and of inducing them to remain at their homes. I regret the censure implied in your remarks, because it is unmerited. I acted in accordance with what I believed to be the spirit of your instructions; but even were my conduct in direct opposition to your instructions given at a former period, the altered circumstances of the country is, I should think, a full justification. I consider it so, for I have none of that courage that would enable me to remain inactive when women and children are daily falling beneath the blows of the savage. Writing in the open field, where I am interrupted every moment by matters of detail of every kind, even to the placing of a wagon, I cannot now explain the remarks in my letter which *you have considered so enigmatical*, further than to say, in justice to Governor Clay, that he made no opposition to my assuming command, but made every effort to sustain me; and to add that, if successful in my present operations, I shall owe much of that success to his able arrangements. The troops, or rather a part of them, were opposed, not to me personally, but to any officer of the United States taking command of them; and I would take command of militia and volunteers on no other terms than their consent. I would resign my commission first.

I am now within five miles of Enea Mathla's camp, with twelve companies of volunteers and four or five hundred Indian warriors. Eleven hundred Indian warriors, under Hopothle Yoholo, will join to-night, and perhaps five hundred volunteers from Alabama. I made such arrangements for the defence of the settlements in my rear that I feel assured of their entire security. I would have struck the enemy to-night but for your letter; if he is not struck to-morrow morning he will escape for the present, but the force I have in the field is sufficient to pursue and reduce him.

With every disposition to perform their duty, the volunteers and militia are necessarily extremely irregular in their returns, &c. I am not, therefore, able to send you a return in form of the force under my command.

I am sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Major Gen. SCOTT, *Commander of the Southern Army, Columbus, Georgia.*

No. 266.

TUSKEGEE, *November 27, 1836.*

SIR: I have received your note summoning me to attend a court of inquiry at Frederick city, Maryland; and just as I was preparing to take the stage for that place I was served with a notice to attend the district court at Mobile, Alabama, which last summons I must obey. I do not know that my testimony would be of any service to General Scott, though I am certain it could do him no injury. And should the court of inquiry remain in session till after the court in Mobile is over, and General Scott wishes my attendance, and I can be notified of the fact, I will attend without delay. The court at Mobile will adjourn, or at least I shall be able to leave that place about the fifteenth of December next. As you belong to the army, and I in the habit of giving my opinion candidly about men in office, and, moreover, as to what I say is not offered as testimony in favor of General Scott, or against any one else, but merely my statement to you, I will not close this without stating to you one fact: do General Scott justice, and it would not require my testimony, or that of any one else, to place him far beyond the reach of his accusers. One thing I know, and I have the right to say, that General Scott's orders have been violated or disobeyed; he has been censured for the improper conduct of others, and has been badly treated by those on whom he has bestowed honors and favors, and when, I am inclined to think, they were not merited.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. S. WOODWARD.

Captain COOPER, *United States Army.*

No. 267.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tuskegee, Alabama, August 2, 1836.*

SIR: Knowing that I had written to you in reply to your communication, I was surprised when I received a copy of a letter you wrote to the President, in which you declare that I had treated with "*silent contempt* the reasonable request of the governor of Georgia." I examined my letter-book, and

found my letters to you recorded in their proper places in the handwriting of my aide-de-camp, Colonel Goldthwait. I felt indignant that a charge so entirely unfounded, as I then thought, should have been made; but I am now induced to believe that by some oversight or omission my letters, or at least one of them, had not been sent to you. Captain Parrott, who acted as adjutant general of my division during the active part of the campaign, left Fort Mitchell for Washington city on the 1st of July. In looking over a file of papers put up by him the morning he left, and not opened since until last night, I found the enclosed letter; the indorsement is in Captain Parrott's hand, and I think it probable that it was put upon file in place of being sent to you. I will be greatly obliged to you to inform me whether you received a duplicate of that letter. Had I been even hostile to you, which was not the fact, the courtesy due from one gentleman to another would have prevented me from neglecting your communications.

I have thought it due to myself to enter into the particulars above stated; and I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

TH. S. JESUP.

His Excellency W. SCHLEY, *Governor of Georgia, Milledgeville, Georgia.*

No. 268.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tuskegee, Alabama, August 28, 1836.*

SIR: I received your letter of the 15th instant at the moment I was setting out for Tallassee, on duty connected with the Indian emigration, and, expecting then to return in a day or two, I left it in my office here. I was detained longer than I expected, and only returned this morning. Your letter of the 30th of June was not answered, but the omission was inadvertent, not intentional. I had forgotten that letter until I received yours of the 15th. I can only account for the omission to answer it from the fact that I was then actively engaged in measures for the security of about fourteen hundred hostile Indians, who had been allowed to go into the camp of a friendly Indian chief near Tuskegee, and who, I was informed, would, in consequence of my delay at Fort Mitchell, probably escape. They did escape in consequence of that delay; and my division of the army was occupied in recapturing a part of them until the 17th of July. About a thousand were recaptured; and I have been informed recently, by several friendly chiefs, that the party which crossed into Georgia about the 24th of July was that portion of the party referred to who had not been recaptured.

In my movement from Fort Mitchell, I believed that I was performing my duty. I believe so still. And I could not then, nor can I now, perceive any sufficient ground for the censure which has been heaped upon me for that act. The movement of the troops was required, and the Indian prisoners could not be left without them. Besides, my instructions required that I should remove the prisoners as rapidly as possible. That I was disposed to afford every facility in my power to Georgia will have been seen in my communication to your excellency of the 28th of June. I there informed you that three warriors had been identified, and awaited your order. I had not then received the information which rendered the movement to the neighborhood of Tuskegee necessary.

I regret as sincerely as you do that any circumstance should have occurred to interrupt the harmony and good understanding, at least on my part, previously to my march from Fort Mitchell; but, until I found my letter of the 30th of June, I considered myself greatly aggrieved by your letter to the President.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your excellency's most obedient servant,

TH. S. JESUP.

His Excellency W. SCHLEY, *Governor of Georgia, Milledgeville, Georgia.*

No. 3.

Proceedings of a court of inquiry in the case of Major General Gaines.—Failure of the Seminole campaign in 1836.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS.

- No. 1. General Gaines to Adjutant General, January 15, 1836.
2. Requisition for ordnance and ordnance stores, January 15, 1836.
3. Requisition for subsistence stores, January 15, 1836.
4. Requisition for quartermaster stores, January 15, 1836.
5. General Gaines to governor of Louisiana, January 15, 1836.
6. General Gaines's Special Order, January 16, 1836.
7. General Gaines's Special Order, January 16, 1836.
8. General Gaines's Order No. 4, January 18, 1836.
9. General Gaines's Special Order No. 5, January 18, 1836.
10. General Gaines to Adjutant General, January 25, 1836.
11. General Gaines to General Clinch, February 2, 1836.
12. General Gaines's Special Order No. 7, February 3, 1836.
13. General Gaines to governor of Louisiana, February 4, 1836.
14. Adjutant General to General Gaines, January 22, 1836.
15. General Gaines to Adjutant General, February 6, 1836.
16. Adjutant General to General Gaines, February 22, 1836.
17. General Gaines's Order No. 4, February 10, 1836.
18. General Gaines's Order No. 6, February 12, 1836.
19. General Gaines's Special Order No. 11, February 12, 1836.
20. General Gaines's Special Order No. 12, February 12, 1836.
21. General Gaines to Adjutant General, February 22, 1836.

- No. 22. General Gaines to General Clinch, February 22, 1836.
 23. Captain Hitchcock's report, February 22, 1836.
 24. General Gaines's Special Order No. 13, February 22, 1836.
 25. General Gaines's Special Order No. 15, February 26, 1836.
 26. General Gaines's Special Order No. 16, February 26, 1836.
 27. General Gaines's Special Order No. 17, February 28, 1836.
 28. General Gaines to General Clinch, February 28, 1836.
 29. General Gaines to General Clinch, February 29, 1836.
 30. General Gaines's Special Order No. 18, March 9, 1836.
 31. General Gaines's Order No. 7, (see Doc. 78, in General Scott's case,) March 9, 1836.
 32. Adjutant General to General Gaines, March 10, 1836.
 33. General Gaines to Adjutant General, July 4, 1836.
 34. F. Marks to Captain Hitchcock, October 29, 1836.
 35. Dr. Harral to Captain Hitchcock, October 9, 1836.
 36. Map of Florida.
 37. Map of Camp Izard.
 38. "New York Courier and Enquirer" of April 2, 1836.
 39. General Gibson to Lieutenant Morrison, July 1, 1836.
 40. General Gibson to Lieutenant Morrison, September 23, 1836.
 41. Statement of subsistence at Tampa, March 31, 1836.
 42. "New Orleans Bulletin" of September 26, 1836.
 43. General Gaines to General Smith and Colonel Christie, September 18, 1836.
 44. Deposition of Surgeon General Thomas Lawson.
 45. General Gaines to the President of the United States, with General Order No. 37, of June 11, 1836, January 20, 1836.
 46. General Gaines to Secretary of War, enclosing letter from Major Graham, February 28, 1837.

Proceedings of a court of inquiry held at the city of Frederick, Maryland, by virtue of the following orders, to wit:

GENERAL ORDER No. 65.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Adjutant General's Office, Washington, October 3, 1836.*

The following order is published for the information of all concerned:

By direction of the President of the United States, a court of inquiry, to consist of Major General Macomb, president, and Brevet Brigadier Generals Atkinson and Brady, members, is hereby ordered to assemble in the city of Frederick, in Maryland, as soon as the state of the military operations against the Indians will permit the witnesses to attend, (of which the president of the court is to judge and determine, and to give notice to all concerned,) to inquire and examine into the causes of the failure of the campaigns in Florida against the Seminole Indians, under the command of Major General Gaines and of Major General Scott, in 1836; and the causes of the delay in opening and prosecuting the campaign in Georgia and Alabama against the hostile Creek Indians in the year 1836; and into every subject connected with the military operations in the campaigns aforesaid; and, after fully investigating the same, the court will report the facts, together with its opinion on the whole subject, for the information of the President of the United States.

Captain Samuel Cooper, of the 4th regiment of artillery, is hereby appointed to act as judge advocate and recorder of the court.

LEWIS CASS.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 3, 1836.*

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

GENERAL ORDER No. 68.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, October 14, 1836.*

The following order has been received from the War Department, and is published for the information of all concerned:

WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 13, 1836.*

1. It appearing by the public prints that the official report of Brevet Major General Gaines, dated "Headquarters Western Department, Camp Sabine, July 4, 1836," made to the adjutant general of the army, has been published, and the said publication being without the sanction of the War Department or other proper authority, the court of inquiry of which Major General Alexander Macomb is president will, in addition to the duties already assigned to it, inquire into the facts as to the manner and by whose authority the said official report was made public.

2. The court will also report its opinion as to the violation of the rules of the service by such publication, and as to the character of said report, in reference to all its bearings and consequences, as it concerns general military propriety and the discipline of the army.

3. And, further, the court will examine and inquire into any other reports and publications made by Brevet Major General Gaines, or by any other officer of the army, having reference to military affairs, and published without the sanction of the War Department or other proper authority, and give its opinion on the tendency of such reports and publications in the same manner as it is herein required to do in the case referred to in the foregoing paragraph of this order.

C. A. HARRIS, *Acting Secretary of War.*

By order of Major General Macomb.

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

FREDERICK, *January 11, 1837.*

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Macomb, president; Brevet Brigadier Generals Atkinson and Brady, members; Captain Cooper, judge advocate and recorder.

The orders constituting the court having been read, and Major General Gaines making no objections to any of the members therein named, the court was duly sworn in his presence.

The judge advocate then proceeded to read the documentary testimony which accompanies these proceedings.—(See documents.)

The testimony being read, the court adjourned to meet again to-morrow morning at 11 o'clock.

JANUARY 12, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present

Captain E. A. HITCHCOCK, of the 1st regiment of infantry, a witness, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by the court.* Were you with Major General Gaines on his campaign in Florida in 1836; and if so, in what capacity?

Answer. I was appointed by Major General Gaines, at Mobile, on the 18th of January, 1836, acting assistant adjutant general. That order was subsequently superseded by another appointing me inspector general of the western department. I continued with General Gaines, in his military family, from the date of the first order, through the campaign in Florida, and until some time after he left that section of the country.

2. *Question by the court.* Will you state to the court, as nearly as you can recollect, the occurrences that transpired on the march of the army under Major General Gaines from Tampa Bay to the Withlacoochee, and afterwards whilst at Camp Izard?

Answer. The army under General Gaines left Tampa Bay on the 13th of February. There was nothing of material importance occurred until the 17th of the month, when some Indian villages were burned; they appeared to have been abandoned a number of days. At this time there was a general expectation, so far as I know, in the army, that General Scott would be somewhere in that vicinity, in considerable force, within a short time. While these villages were burning, a detachment of the army was distant about two miles from the main force; I was myself about a mile from the main force, when a loud report was heard, similar to that of a cannon. On joining the army I found this report the subject of conversation, and the opinion seemed to be almost unanimous that it was the report of a piece of ordnance with General Scott. I heard, indeed, but one dissenting voice, and one other that was doubtful, among all those I conversed with. The army continued its march, and on the 19th of February encamped about four miles on the north of the north branch of the Withlacoochee, burning another town just previously to occupying that camp, which appeared, also, to have been abandoned several days. We found at this camp the remains of what appeared to have been the encampment of Major Dade, consisting of a small square breastwork. On the following morning about 9 o'clock the army arrived at the scene of the massacre of Major Dade and his command, which was reported to have occurred on the 28th of December previous. The bodies of the dead found at that place received honorable burial, and the army continued its march, arriving on the 22d of the month at Fort King. The day following, to wit, the 23d, a detachment of the 4th infantry, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Foster, was despatched to Fort Drane for information and supplies, there being no supplies adequate to the purposes of a campaign at Fort King. Colonel Foster returned on the evening of the next day by a forced march, bringing with him, I think, seven days' rations for the command of General Gaines. He was accompanied from Fort Drane by General Clinch. On the 26th of February General Gaines resumed his march in the direction towards a point on the Withlacoochee river where, it was understood, General Clinch had fought a battle on the 31st of December. The army arrived at this point on the afternoon of the 27th. While the general was reconnoitring the river a little above the crossing, the centre and the left wing were fired on by the Seminoles from the opposite side of the river. The baggage train had been ordered to halt at a convenient place for encampment, as it was understood not to be the purpose of the general to cross the river that night. The firing of the enemy was, of course, returned, and after continuing perhaps half an hour, the general directed Colonel Twiggs, his second in command, and who had been appointed to the immediate command of the brigade, as a light brigade, to withdraw from the river after the men should have become familiar with the new scene that had been presented to them, or words to this effect. The army withdrew and encamped accordingly, having sustained a loss of one man killed and several wounded. The crossing place, at this point of the river, was covered with a dense swamp of about a quarter of a mile in width. It was understood that a few miles below the open pine woods approached the bank of the river upon both sides, where the friendly Indians with us reported it to be the habit of the Indians to drive cattle across. The army, on the morning of the 28th, moved down to this place, perhaps two miles from the point last mentioned. The advance guard, commanded by Lieutenant Izard, of the dragoons, acting brigade major, was here fired upon, and Lieutenant Izard mortally wounded. The advance was sustained by two companies of the 4th infantry, and a portion of the volunteers were this day also on the bank of the river. The firing continued across the river, I think, until between 12 and 1 o'clock. The Indian yell was continuous nearly the whole of this time. At one time it appeared to be very greatly increased, as if by the accession of new force. This was attributed by the friendly Indians to the arrival of Micanopy, the principal chief of the nation, with his warriors, supposed to be eight hundred in number, and the opinion was general that the main force of the enemy was then in our neighborhood. The army encamped that afternoon, and in the evening an express was despatched by General Gaines to Fort Drane, with a communication for General Clinch, or the officer commanding the forces in that part of Florida. On the morning of the 29th of February the Indian yell, which had continued the principal part of the previous night, ceased entirely, until about 10 o'clock in the morning, when a firing was poured into our camp upon three sides. The firing continued about two hours, or a little over, when the enemy was driven off, leaving, contrary to their custom, one of their killed, who fell into our possession. On the evening of this day another despatch was sent to Fort Drane, directed as in the former instance. From about midday of the 29th of February until the afternoon of the 2d of March there was no firing whatever upon our camp. In the afternoon of the 2d a small party of the enemy, from a westerly direction, threw in a volley and disappeared. This mode of annoyance

continued, more or less, from that time until the evening of the 5th of the month, sometimes at night. Up to this time the loss at that camp, on our side, had been Lieutenant Izard, wounded on the 28th, who died on the 5th of March; one sergeant of artillery killed; two Louisiana volunteers also killed, and thirty or forty wounded. In the evening of the 5th of March, about 10 o'clock, a loud voice was heard from the woods, hailing our camp, and some one declared that the Indians had had fighting enough; that they wanted to come in, have a friendly talk with the white people, and make peace. He was answered, by direction of the general, that if their chief would come in with a white flag the next morning they should not be fired upon. The man from the woods answered: "Very well, they would come in after breakfast," and bade us good night. On the morning following, I think about 10 o'clock, Indians were seen filing from the west and east sides of the camp, several hundred yards distant, passing out from the river, and uniting in the rear of our camp, perhaps six hundred yards distant. They were estimated to be about three hundred in number. From this body a few Indians were seen advancing towards the camp with a white flag. They were first met from our camp by Adjutant Barrow, of the Louisiana volunteers, who reported to General Gaines that the Indians stated that they did not wish to fight any more, but they wished him to go away. I was directed by the general to go out and hear what the Indians had to say. I requested two gentlemen to go with me—Doctor Harral, of the Louisiana volunteers, and Adjutant Barrow, before mentioned—desiring them to bear in mind that I had the instructions of the general and would attend to them, requesting them to witness what passed. On this occasion I met, at the distance of about one hundred and fifty yards from the camp, several of the Indian chiefs, with their principal interpreter; among the former were Jumper, understood to be the principal adviser of Micanopy, the king of the nation, and Ocoela, or Powell, who was regarded to be among the principal war chiefs. There was another, who was called Alligator. The names of the others were unknown to me. On the part of the Indians the council was conducted by Jumper, through his interpreter. I had with me an employed interpreter from our camp, who was directed not to make himself known, but to listen to what might be said among the Indians. Jumper at first inquired of me what I had to say. I answered: "Nothing to him, but that I had come to hear what they had to say." They then repeated the purport of what had been declared the night before from the woods, adding that they had lost many of their warriors, killed and wounded, or disabled; that they did not wish to lose any more, but wanted to make peace. I communicated this to the general.

I will state that I had had many conversations with the general on the subject of the proper manner of treating with Indians. In these conversations he had invariably declared that he would not deal with them on any other than the known and acknowledged principles which should govern in the intercourse of civilized nations; declaring that the ignorance and dependence of the Indians made it more obligatory on our part to deal with them honorably and justly. It was in reference to these conversations, as I understood, that the general had directed me to confer with the Indians, observing: "You know my principles," or something to this effect. In accordance with this, I stated in general terms to the Indians that General Gaines was the commanding officer in our camp. The Indians said they knew General Gaines; had seen him many years before; expressed their confidence in him; that he was a good man; and appeared pleased to find that he was the commanding officer in our camp. I stated to them that General Gaines was but one of several chiefs who had been sent by the President of the United States among them to enforce upon them a peace. I desired to show them that they would of necessity be compelled to submit, and for this purpose I endeavored to give them an idea of the extent of territory occupied by the whites, and of their dense population, using the simile perhaps often resorted to in Indian councils, that the whites covered the country like the trees of their forests. After talking to them some little time in language like this, assuring them over and over again that they would be compelled to submit, they answered that they would take council among themselves, would assemble again in the afternoon, and we would have another talk. At this council with the Indians I stated that General Gaines had not come among them for the purpose of investigating the causes of the war. That possibly they might suppose they had been much wronged; but that if so, I presumed they had satisfied themselves, alluding to the destruction of Major Dade, and the like instances of success on their part. Ocoela remarked: "I am satisfied" as it was interpreted. I supposed he alluded to an act attributed to him near Fort King, by which the Indian agent who had put him in chains came by his death.

In the afternoon the chiefs came to council in the same manner as in the morning. I had in the meantime been advised by the general that he did not feel authorized to make any terms with them; that if, however, they persisted in asking for peace, I must give to them conditions, and require them to pledge themselves to obedience to them. These conditions were, that they should cease entirely from all acts of hostility against the whites; that they should cross the south side of the Withlacoochee, and promise to attend a council, when and where they should be sent for by a chief who was soon expected to be there. This referred to General Scott, who was believed to be in the vicinity of our camp, not more than thirty miles distant. The chiefs answered that their principal chief, Micanopy, was not with them, and had not been with them for several days; they wanted time to consult him; that they could not make any permanent arrangement without doing so; but that, for their own parts, they engaged to comply with the terms dictated to them by General Gaines. To prevent any misunderstanding of these terms, I repeated them, one by one, distinctly twice over. On concluding the last, there was an indication of some approaching force from the north. The Indians at a distance called to those in council, and made signs to them to go away. I immediately supposed this to arise from the approach of troops from Fort Drane, and told the chiefs to hasten their men away and put them in security. They accordingly went off, and went into a hammock to the east of our camp. The force, as I supposed, approached our camp, but, contrary to my expectation, instead of being commanded by General Scott, was commanded by General Clinch. General Clinch brought supplies of two days' rations of pork and flour, with about forty head of cattle. The rations in our camp had become almost entirely exhausted, in so much that some of the volunteer companies, from improvidence, or want of acquaintance with the proper means of taking care of their rations, had been three or four days without the proper army ration; the orders of the general, given, I think, on the 28th of the month, for the command to go on half rations, not having been strictly complied with, it was about the 4th of March, if I mistake not, that some horses were killed, and the meat distributed to those who desired it; and this was again done on the 5th.

After the council, stated in my testimony, the troops continued at Camp Izard until the morning of the 10th, during which time I heard not a rifle or an Indian yell. Our own men were on the banks of the river, at pleasure, without being disturbed. About the 10th the command was assigned to General Clinch, under whose orders the troops marched to Fort Draue.

I will remark that, during the councils held with the Indians, there was much repetition, as is usual, I believe, in Indian councils; but the purport is what I have stated in my testimony. At the time I attended this council, besides the two gentlemen who went at my request, there was another, Captain Marks, who went, I believe, of his own accord. Some few weeks ago I thought proper to address letters to two of these gentlemen, requesting them to furnish me a statement of what took place at the council. I did not write to Adjutant Barrow solely because I did not know where a letter would find him. These are the letters which I have received in answer.

[The judge advocate here read the two letters which will be found accompanying these proceedings, Nos. 34, 35.]

3. *Question by the court.* Were there any sorties made from the camp upon the enemy in any one of the attacks made by him whilst the army lay there; and what was the strength of the army at the time.

Answer. The army was about one thousand strong, a few over, perhaps, and no sortie was made. It may be proper to add to this answer that one wing of each of the several bodies occupying the faces of the square had been ordered by General Gaines to be held in readiness for a sortie, should he think proper to order one. This order was given on the afternoon of the 29th of February.

4. *Question by the court.* When and how many attacks did the enemy make upon the army whilst fortified at Camp Izard, and with what results?

Answer. My answer is embodied already in my testimony. Subsequently to the 29th of February, but very small parties appeared in the neighborhood of our camp, or fired upon us; the largest was on the 3d day of the month, when there was considerable firing, but, I believe no injury was done whatever. During these several days it was a subject of very frequent, and, on my part, anxious [doubt] with the general, as to whether the Indians had not abandoned that part of the country, so few of them appearing about our camp. I was apprehensive that the Indians, finding it impossible to move us, would leave that section of the country and go into what is called the Everglades. I frequently expressed this apprehension to the general, suggesting that activity of movement on his part at that place might be likely to produce that result, in which case the campaign would be lengthened, embarrassed if not defeated, and the blame of it would attach to him. He remarked upon his want of mounted men to pursue any advantage he might gain in a sortie, and referred to his letter of express to Fort Drane, confidently expressing his expectation that General Scott would be there in person to receive his express with the species of force most needed, and that he would certainly come down.

5. *Question by the court.* What effect did it have on the spirit and conduct of the troops, in being held within our lines, when the enemy made his several attacks upon them.

Answer. I am not aware of any special effect produced by that state of things. There was the most perfect order prevailing in camp; a prompt obedience to every order, and, indeed, a spirit altogether worthy the soldier.

6. *Question by the court.* Was the army on the Withlacoochee, under Major General Gaines, strong enough and well enough appointed to have attacked the enemy with a prospect of success?

Answer. In my opinion the army could have beaten the enemy at that place, and driven him at any time; but there were no means for pursuing him with any effect.

7. *Question by the court.* What do you suppose was the strength of the enemy that invested Camp Izard, and how do you form an estimate?

Answer. I believe the enemy was not less than 1,300 strong on the 29th of February, possibly more numerous. This opinion is founded upon the extent of ground occupied by them, to wit: on the east face of the camp, against about the middle of it, rested their left, and from that place they extended around the rear and the right, running into the hammock on the right, at a distance of perhaps from fifty to one hundred yards. The faces of our camp were about two hundred yards in extent. A circumstance occurred on the first of March of this nature: the Indians passed out from the river, east of our camp, in single file, marching past the rear of it about six hundred yards distance, and recrossed the river west of us. They were observed, as I understood from Doctor Heiskell, by a watch, passing a given point of space, and he assured me, on two several occasions, that they were thirty minutes in passing in a rapid movement. From this data it would appear that there scarcely could have been less than fifteen hundred; there might have been four or five hundred negroes among them.

8. *Question by the court.* What was the condition of the troops whilst at Camp Izard in respect to supplies of arms and ammunition?

Answer. At Fort King, previously to marching to the Withlacoochee, there was an average of about fifty cartridges to a man. I derive this from personal inspection of the troops at that place. The field-piece, a six-pounder, was furnished with fifty rounds of grape and a few charges of round shot. The arms were chiefly muskets and yeagers—the yeagers having been issued to perhaps three or four of the companies of the volunteers—they were in good firing order.

9. *Question by the court.* Did you think that Major General Gaines had it in his power at any time, with the means in his hands and the appointments of his forces, to have marched upon the enemy and subdued him, had the enemy availed himself of the fastnesses of the country well known to him?

Answer. I believe they would have escaped any pursuit he might have made with his force. With regard to the effect of a sortie, it is a problem of which, perhaps, any one may form an opinion from a consideration of the facts which I will state. The Indians appeared to have a great facility in crossing the river; the banks of the river above and below our camp were lined with a dense swamp. Had a sortie been made, the Indians would have rushed into this swamp on the one side or the other; and by their knowledge of the best passages through it, and their facility in crossing the river, would, in all probability, have eluded any pursuit that could have been made from our camp. In the event of a sortie, there would, in all probability, have been a loss on both sides, but, it is my impression, without producing any beneficial results. The Indians were expending their ammunition while our fire was reserved, and we were daily in the expectation of force from Fort Drane, especially of mounted men, a species of force of which we had none.

1. *Question by General Gaines.* Was the river passable without boats or rafts at the place first approached?

Answer. It was not.

2. *Question by General Gaines.* Will you state the cause of our eating the meat of horses? whether it was not deemed to be more manly and proper for troops to eat horse-meat than to suffer the enemy to attack the frontier?

Answer. I have always considered that the readiness and willingness with which the men sustained

themselves upon that food rather than fall back from the position assumed did them the highest credit, as evincing a noble spirit.

3. *Question by General Gaines.* The witness is desired to state what he knows in reference to my views and wishes towards Major General Scott relating to the campaign in Florida.

Answer. The first intimation received by General Gaines of the orders assigning General Scott to duty in Florida was at Pensacola about the 6th of February. I saw General Gaines very soon after he received this information. He made no especial remarks that I remember in relation to General Scott himself at that time. On our way to Tampa Bay he frequently spoke of him and of the difficulties which had existed between himself and General Scott in years gone by. He declared many times, indeed, invariably, in effect, that he had outlived all feelings of personal animosity towards that officer; that on no account whatever would he suffer any private or personal feelings to interpose any obstacles to the accomplishment of the duties then contemplated in Florida, declaring it to be his purpose, without making it a question, to relinquish the command to General Scott on meeting him, should he desire it; or, if General Scott pleased, General Gaines would unite with him in efforts to put an end to the war. These sentiments were expressed repeatedly from Pensacola, by Tampa Bay, at Fort King, and on the Withlacoochee river, where, at this latter place, on one occasion in particular, he spoke of the certainty with which he expected the arrival of General Scott at that place, and declared it to be his purpose to offer him his hand in the presence of a common enemy, and endeavor then and there forever to put an end to their personal difficulties as an appropriate place.

The court here adjourned to meet to-morrow morning at 11 o'clock.

JANUARY 13, 1837.

The court men pursuant to adjournment. All present.

Captain Hitchcock's testimony continued.

4. *Question by General Gaines.* What circumstances occurred to change the views and feelings of General Gaines towards General Scott, as expressed by the witness in his last answer?

Answer. When General Clinch arrived at the Withlacoochee river, on the 6th of March, he brought with him certain letters from General Scott, addressed to himself, in which the conduct of General Gaines underwent very severe strictures. It was also reported that General Scott had been much in the habit of making extraordinary remarks upon the movement of General Gaines, even in the hearing of his volunteers. One of the letters alluded to was shown to General Gaines by General Clinch; the other, I believe, was not exhibited, in consequence of the extraordinary nature of its contents, but the purport of it was matter of general conversation in the camp. General Gaines appeared to be much inflamed and highly incensed at these letters and rumors.

[The judge advocate here read to the court the letters (referred to in this answer) from General Scott to General Clinch, dated the 1st and 4th of March, 1836.]

5. *Question by General Gaines.* State what were the motives and circumstances which induced me to undertake the campaign to East Florida against the Seminole Indians in the last winter.

Answer. Major General Gaines arrived at Mobile on the 17th of January, 1836. A few days previous to this intelligence had been received of the entire destruction of Major Dade and his command in Florida, of about eight officers and one hundred men. I received a message from General Gaines, (being in Mobile myself, and on leave of absence,) requesting to see me. I called upon him immediately, and he stated that he had but a short time previously left his headquarters at Memphis, but with no expectation of being required to take the field against an enemy; that he was without his personal staff, and referring to the intelligence stated above, he did me the honor to request me to join his military family, for purposes connected with the protection of the people of Florida. The day following (the 18th January) further intelligence was received from Florida, to the effect that General Clinch had had a meeting with the enemy; had fought a battle with them; had been abandoned by the volunteers who had joined him, (their term of service having expired;) and that, in consequence, he had been obliged to fall back upon Fort King, where, as the report said, he was invested by the enemy and in danger of being cut off. It was in consequence of this new information, as I believe, that the order of that date, addressed to Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs, in New Orleans, was issued. General Gaines proceeded to Pensacola with the view to request the co-operation of the navy on that station, in the purpose he then contemplated of going to Florida. His wishes in this respect had been anticipated. He returned to New Orleans, arriving there about the 26th of January, and the most active exertions were made to receive into the service, and equip for a campaign, the volunteers alluded to in the order above mentioned. The troops, being in readiness to embark, left New Orleans about the morning of the 4th February. During the whole of this period, and for some time after, the prevailing sentiment of General Gaines, as discovered by the whole tenor of his remarks, and by his conduct, was a profound sensibility to the loss of our brave brothers in arms in Florida, and to the exposed condition of the people in that section of the country. Previous to leaving New Orleans, among other reports that were circulated, it was stated that Tallahassee had been burned and destroyed by the enemy. This and other rumors produced a general excitement throughout the section of country in Louisiana, that induced extraordinary exertions on the part of the executive and legislative authorities of the State; and I suppose it would have been impossible for any officer, situated as General Gaines then was, having proper feelings, and a proper sense of his duty, to have hesitated a moment, but that he must have gone on the expedition to Florida.

In consequence of the indisposition of one of the members of the court, the court adjourned to meet to-morrow morning at 11 o'clock.

JANUARY 14, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

The testimony of Captain Hitchcock continued.

6. *Question by General Gaines.* You have said that General Gaines, while at Camp Izard, on the Withlacoochee, expected the arrival of General Scott at that place soon after he should hear that the principal force of the enemy were found upon that section of the Withlacoochee. Will you state to the court

the grounds of this expectation? whether it was that he had expressed a wish to know where the principal force of the enemy could be found, or that it was his duty to hasten to that theatre of the war?

Answer. The expectation alluded to in this question, that General Scott would arrive on the Withlacoochee very soon after receiving the information from General Gaines that the Indians were there in force, was founded, first, upon a letter from General Scott to General Clinch, and by General Clinch shown to General Gaines at Fort King, in which he inquires where the enemy's force may be found, or to that effect, expressing a strong hope that they would be found in the upper part of the Territory, rather than in what is called the *Everglades*; and from information communicated by General Clinch at the same time and place, that General Scott had despatched a force from Picolata, of mounted men, to Fort Drane; that he himself would be there, as nearly as I can recollect, about the time of the arrival of this force. The time of the arrival, in the opinion of General Clinch, would be within the month of February. The mounted force alluded to in my testimony was referred to, I believe, in one of the despatches of General Gaines from the Withlacoochee.

7. *Question by General Gaines.* Did General Gaines express any other reasons for believing that General Scott would not nor could not, upon known principles of military law, hesitate to repair to the Withlacoochee on hearing of the enemy being at that place? If so, what were the reasons so expressed by General Gaines?

Answer. The confidence of General Gaines that General Scott would come down to the Withlacoochee was without reservation. He appeared to have an undoubting belief of General Scott's being at Fort Drane, and often spoke of his duty to come down, under the circumstances, in the most positive terms. His language on the subject was very strong, to wit: that he must come down; he will be disgraced if he does not come down; he will commit suicide upon his military reputation if he fails to come down—or language of similar import. On one occasion I took the liberty of suggesting to General Gaines the expediency of preparing litters to move the wounded, in the event of General Scott's not joining us. He declined authorizing me to give the order, explaining himself by the use of language like that I have stated in reference to General Scott's coming down. In all the conversations had on the Withlacoochee, in reference to the force coming from Fort Drane, General Scott was the officer spoken of as commanding at Fort Drane, and I do not remember a single instance where any doubt was suggested as to his being there. In many conversations with General Gaines at the Withlacoochee, he dwelt with great emphasis upon the great importance and duty of officers complying with their engagements affecting movements in the field, especially in an enemy's country. He considered General Scott under an engagement to be at Fort Drane, the exact day is unknown to me, but about the time of the arrival of General Gaines's despatches to Fort Drane.

8. *Question by General Gaines.* The witness is requested to describe the hammocks near my encampment on the Withlacoochee, and state the time at which that encampment was formed?

Answer. The hammocks bordering the river very nearly united immediately in front of the camp; from this point, both above and below, they gained very rapidly in width and were extremely dense, especially to the east or above the camp, where the hammock extends considerably back from the stream, but at a distance of several hundred yards from the camp. The river itself has not the bend as represented in the map I hold, the curve being much larger. A slight breastwork was made around the camp on the afternoon of the 28th of February, according to custom.

9. *Question by General Gaines.* How many Indians does the witness believe could have secreted themselves in either of those hammocks, and within 200 to 600 yards of my camp, without being seen by my troops at any time during the day?

Answer. An indefinite number. The hammocks were very extensive, and might have contained, perhaps, three times the whole strength of the nation.

10. *Question by the court.* Do you know anything of the motives which induced Major General Gaines to proceed to Florida, after receiving, at Pensacola, the letter of the adjutant general, dated the 22d of January?

Answer. One of the first remarks made by General Gaines on receiving that letter—I mean in the first interview I had with him—he said he believed it to be his solemn duty to go on. I think he spoke of some pledge made, I believe, to the volunteers; but he alluded more particularly to his letter to General Clinch, promising him aid and co-operation. I think all these points were matters of conversation at the very first, and were never deviated from. I took the liberty of urging General Gaines by no means to abandon the expedition at that place, (Pensacola,) giving it as my belief that his presence was necessary to the efficient organization of the troops. I am not positive as to the extent of these remarks at Pensacola; but between that place and Tampa Bay they were more or less referred to. It was my belief that his abandoning the troops would be very nearly equivalent to rendering the expedition fruitless. I placed great stress upon the effect of the reputation acquired by General Gaines during the war with Great Britain, and upon his knowledge and experience as a soldier. I do not wish to imply or convey an idea to the court that the several officers junior to General Gaines were not officers of great merit; but neither one of them possessed all the requisites united in General Gaines for securing success to the campaign.

11. *Question by the court.* What was the amount and character of the force brought by General Clinch to the relief of General Gaines at Camp Izard?

Answer. He brought about five hundred men with him, artillery, infantry, and volunteers, including one troop of mounted men, the number I do not recollect.

12. *Question by the court.* Would not that force, united with the force then at Camp Izard, have been sufficient to meet the enemy successfully, or to have pursued them to their fastnesses, with a prospect of finding and subduing them?

Answer. This question calls for my opinion. I will state that the facility which the Indians seemed to possess renders it, in my opinion, indispensable to have had a force sufficient to occupy both sides of the river at the same time, in order to operate with effect against them. To sustain this opinion, I will refer the court to later operations on the Withlacoochee, about the end of March, when a very much larger force came in contact with a body of those Indians, more or less numerous; being on the same side with them, pursued them several miles, but did not take or subdue them. The more recent operations against those Indians may serve to throw much light upon this question, as in no instance does it appear that a pursuit of the Indians has been successful.

13. *Question by the court.* Do you believe the Indians were sincere in proposing a truce?

Answer. I believe they were perfectly sincere. I will remark, in reference to this question, that there was nothing in the manner or matter of the interview which I had with the Indians on the Withlacoochee to give me the smallest suspicion of their sincerity. There seemed to be a peculiar sadness over them, as

if thoughtful of the misfortunes of their tribe, indicating that further hostility on their part was hopeless. I thought them sincere, and in that opinion all who were present entirely concurred with me; and I am the more inclined to continue in that belief from several considerations. Although wars among Indian tribes are, sometimes, of very long duration, it is seldom that active warlike movements among them continue for any great length of time. With tribes at war, there may be years of cessation of the war, when a war-party, as it is called, is got up, with considerable formality, with a feast and a war-dance, and the party will make what they call a strike at the enemy, return from the expedition, and celebrate their success, if successful, with the scalp-dance. But this kind of war cannot be carried on against the whites. To carry on war against the whites the Indians are compelled to embody themselves in large numbers, making it difficult for them to obtain supplies of ammunition, provision, or clothing. In Florida, the enemy had, I believe, been so embodied for some length of time; they had had, I believe, some special causes for the war, which had in part been removed, especially by the conduct of Ocoola near Fort King, and I believed his language to me in council, that "he was satisfied," had reference to that conduct. I have heard of other similar instances. The Indians had been successful in the destruction of Major Dade's command, and they had killed many more than they had lost. General Gaines having taken a position in their neighborhood, which they had found it impossible to move, they must have seen that they could not, in future, have procured from above the supply of provisions, consisting of cattle, which they had before drawn from thence. The opinion among them that this position was likely to be permanently held was calculated to break down their spirit. I have never doubted that the Indians were informed of the movement of General Clinch from Fort Drane on the 5th of March. I believe that the Indians, in the knowledge of this, saw additional reason to suppose that they could not maintain themselves in the country, and that, taking council on the evening of the 5th, they had concluded to make overtures of peace; and I have always believed they would have accepted terms such as would have been worthy of this great nation to dictate to them had there been authority there to conclude a peace. There was not, in the council I held with the Indians, anything said about the terms of a peace. They made no proposition to me whatever. They asked for nothing; stipulated for nothing beyond what I have stated in my testimony. They were told by me that they should be sent for to council; but that, in the meantime, they must abstain from war, and promise to attend the council when sent for. They engaged to all that freely, and with apparent alacrity. During the time that the troops remained at Fort Drane after that, to wit, from the 11th to the 26th of March, as I have understood and believe, there was no sign of any hostility of the Indians in that part of the country. They had abundant opportunities to annoy the troops at that post, which were scattered over an extent of country of several miles in diameter, accommodating themselves with wood and water. Even before I left there, and as I have heard afterwards, the officers and men were passing, at pleasure, between the several corps of the army thus dispersed, and provisions were sent to these several corps without once being disturbed. General Gaines and his staff, a party of four, during that time, travelled from Fort Drane to Tallahassee, through a country that had been before, and was afterwards, in possession of the Indians, without molestation, and without suspicion of danger, so far as I know. I have always believed that the Indians had a right to suppose that no further hostile demonstrations would be made against them until they should have been sent for and heard in council. When the hostile movement took place from Fort Drane, about the 26th of March, the rear was fired upon by the Indians, and, I have understood, a baggage wagon, or perhaps two, cut off. I have regarded this as an evidence that the Indians were fully informed of the exposed position of the several corps around Fort Drane; but as long as they could hope to be sent for to council they abstained from annoying those corps, in compliance with their engagement on the Withlacoochee river.

10. *Question by General Gaines.* What reason had General Gaines for suspending his operations against the Seminole Indians on and after the 6th of March, 1836?

Answer. The fact that the enemy had raised a white flag; had asked for peace; had been told the conditions; had promised to abide by those conditions, by which they were to have a council with a view to settle the terms of that peace.

14. *Question by the court.* Were they informed, in council, that a large army was approaching?

Answer. I stated, in the body of my testimony, that I informed the Indians that General Gaines was but one of several chiefs sent against them by the President of the United States to enforce a peace upon them. I, of course, intended to convey to the court the fact that those chiefs were not alone, but were accompanied by large forces. The object of this information was that stated in the body of my testimony, to assure the enemy of the great power of the white people; that they, the Indians, could not withstand it, and that they would be compelled to submit. I was not myself informed, and of course did not communicate to the Indians, the time at which these forces would arrive. That information was communicated by the signal guns, which, I have understood, were directed to be fired by the several divisions of the army approaching the Withlacoochee. The Indians occupied a central position, and were much more likely to have heard those guns than the army divisions themselves. I will add to this answer that the Indians are, perhaps, the best scouts and spies in the world, and it would have been next to impossible for a large force to have approached their stronghold, in that stage of the war, without their knowledge.

11. *Question by General Gaines.* Was it or was it not after the Indians sued for peace that they were told that other forces were ordered into the country against them?

Answer. It was after they sued for peace.

15. *Question by the court.* While you were in the fortified camp on the Withlacoochee were there any preparations made for a sortie by order of General Gaines? If so, state the force or corps, and the officers appointed to the command of the troops ordered for that purpose.

Answer. The troops in the camp were disposed in the form of a square. The order was for one wing of each face of the square to be held in readiness for a sortie, directions being given for the other wing to extend. Colonel Foster would have been one of the officers on the right. I believe General Smith himself would have commanded the sortie on the left. I am not able, at this time, to give the names of the other officers. The order was given on the 29th of February, in the afternoon, and communicated by myself to Colonel Twiggs, commanding the light brigade. A previous order on the subject had, I believe, been communicated by some other officer. It is my opinion that, had the attack been renewed, in character like that of the morning of the 29th, a sortie would have been made; but after that attack there was no serious attack made while we were on the Withlacoochee. There were but small parties engaged, from time to time, in endeavors to annoy us. This circumstance was itself a source of alarm, lest the Indians had abandoned that part of the country, to the disappointment of the hope of General Scott, expressed in a letter to General Clinch, and which had been seen at Fort King. The first order for the

preparation for a sortie was, I believe, given, not through myself, but through some other officer. Colonel Foster came to me and made a suggestion as to a mere detail, desiring me to communicate it to General Gaines. I did so, and received his orders thereon, which were communicated as above stated. General Gaines, on several occasions, spoke of the probability of an arrival of troops other than those expected from Fort Drane, especially speaking of Colonel Lindsay, who was supposed to have arrived at Tampa Bay, and declared it to be his purpose instantly to move in any direction from which reports of firing might be heard. Log canoes were constructed, and were then in the camp, with rived boards, to be used for purposes of making platforms on the canoes to cross the river; the general saying that he would cross the river instantly on hearing a gun from the other side.

The court adjourned to meet on the 17th instant, at 11 o'clock.

TUESDAY, January 17, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

Captain G. A. McCALL, of the 4th regiment of infantry, a witness, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by the court.* Will you state to the court, as nearly as you can recollect, the occurrences that transpired on the Withlacoochee, after the army, under Major General Gaines, reached that place, and during the time it remained in Camp Izard?

Answer. The army reached the Withlacoochee between one and two o'clock on the 27th of February. On arriving at the encamping ground of General Clinch the column was halted and the rear guard left in charge of the baggage train. With the advance and main column General Gaines proceeded to the river bank for the purpose of reconnoitring the crossing. A half hour or more had been passed in examining the depth of the water where the trail struck, when the general was fired upon by a party of eight or ten Indians, and immediately after the fight commenced from across the river. In half an hour the firing very nearly ceased, after which the troops encamped on the ground formerly occupied by General Clinch. The Indians who had acted as guides then declared that the ford they were seeking must be some miles lower down. The general determined to proceed to the point indicated, and the next morning, a little after sunrise, the columns were in motion for that point. As the advance guard arrived on the river bank the Indians from the opposite bank opened a fire upon them by which Lieutenant Izard, in command of the advance, was mortally wounded. The advance was immediately sustained by two companies of the 4th infantry, and one company of volunteers was posted higher up the river. The fire was kept up, at intervals, across the river until about one o'clock. In the meantime a working party had been detailed to prepare canoes and flooring for a pontoon bridge, and it was expected that everything would be in readiness for crossing by noon the next day. At about four o'clock that afternoon a very loud whooping was heard, as of a party advancing down the river on the opposite side. This was answered by the Indians opposite to us, and the friendly Indians with us declared it to be Micanopy, whose force they estimated at about eight hundred warriors, coming to reinforce the Mickasuky Indians. They remarked, also, that they must be whipped for three days in succession before they would give up. These circumstances determined General Gaines to write to General Clinch for an additional supply of ammunition and provisions, requesting him to bring down any mounted force he might have with him, as he considered that species of troops essential. The following morning I accompanied General Gaines on a reconnoissance of the ground immediately in front and on the left of the encampment on the river. Very soon after he returned, the working party, which was a short distance to the left of the encampment, was fired upon, and immediately afterwards a heavy fire was opened on three sides of the encampment. The troops had been directed not to throw away a shot, and never to fire without good aim and a fair striking distance. This order was observed with great coolness, and a heavy fire was sometimes sustained for several minutes without a shot being returned. The fight continued without intermission for upwards of two hours, when the Indians retired and did not make their appearance again that day. The loss of the troops this day was one sergeant killed and thirty-odd officers and men wounded; among the latter were General Gaines and Lieutenant Duncan. After the action the work was resumed for the purpose of completing the materials for the bridge. That evening General Gaines sent another express to General Clinch, informing him of the occurrences of the morning, saying that he had abstained from a sortie and should continue to do so until he heard from him, lest a sortie might disperse the Indians without resulting in any important advantage. On the following morning the Indians did not reappear, as was expected, nor did they appear in force again until the 3d of March, when they directed upon the camp, for about an hour, a fire nearly as warm as that of the 29th of February, and, at intervals, until the 5th of March; on which day, at about nine p. m., a voice was heard hailing the camp. It was at first supposed to be a return express, and he was desired to advance. The voice of the negro was then heard to say "that the Indians were tired of fighting and wished to come in in the morning and shake hands." He was told that if the Indians appeared in the morning with a white flag they would be heard. About nine o'clock the following morning a body of about three hundred Indians appeared some four or six hundred yards in the rear of the encampment with a white flag. After some hesitation three of their party advanced and were met by Adjutant Barrow, of the Louisiana volunteers, who, after a short time, returned and said that the Indians told him they had lost many warriors, desired peace, and were willing to shake hands. Captain Hitchcock was then directed to meet them and hear particularly what they had to say. On his return he reported that the Indians were apparently subdued in spirit and seemed extremely anxious to make peace; they had told him they would meet him again in the afternoon and give him their final answer. About the appointed time the Indians returned, and, after some time passed in conference, a party of Indians, who were in their rear, were fired on by General Clinch's flankers, approaching from Fort Drane in that direction, which broke up the meeting. On the morning of the 8th of March, the Indians not having appeared since the 5th, General Clinch sent an interpreter to ascertain their situation, numbers, and disposition. On the evening of the 9th General Gaines turned over the command to General Clinch, who assumed command, in orders, on the following morning. That afternoon the troops took up the line of march, under command of General Clinch, for Fort Drane.

2. *Question by the court.* What was the number of Indians that invested the camp on the Withlacoochee, and how many attacks were made by them?

Answer. The number of warriors on the morning of the 29th was, in my opinion, between twelve and fifteen hundred, including negroes, judging from the extent of ground they covered, their fire, and their

war-cry. On the morning of the 3d their numbers, though apparently not so numerous as on the 29th of February, were greater than at any subsequent time. They made five or six attacks, or fired into the camp five or six times, altogether; occasional shots were fired both by day and night.

3. *Question by the court.* No sortie was made on the enemy at the several attacks made on the camp. What were the reasons that withheld or prevented such a movement on the part of General Gaines?

Answer. He did not explain to me, particularly, his reasons, but my impression was that it would not have resulted in any important advantage.

4. *Question by the court.* Did no officer, during the siege, urge the propriety of making a sortie?

Answer. I did not myself hear any officer, and my impression at the time was that there was no officer there who differed with the general on that point.

5. *Question by the court.* What is your opinion of the ability of the forces under General Gaines to drive and beat the enemy, if a sortie had been made?

Answer. I have not the smallest doubt that they would have been able to do it; but, from the nature of the ground, the hammocks which bordered the river being thick and extremely difficult of access to the troops, would have enabled the Indians, lying concealed, to deliver their fire, and then, owing to their superior celerity and knowledge of the ground, to have passed through the hammock and crossed the river before the troops could have come up with them, their facilities for crossing the river being great, and the troops without the means of following them.

1. *Question by General Gaines.* What part of the force was out of the limits of my breastwork during the action of the 29th of February; and state whether one or two companies were not often engaged in firing at the enemy across the river prior to the 6th of March?

Answer. There was one company without the limits of the breastwork on the 29th of February. Several companies were engaged in firing at the enemy across the river prior to the 6th of March.

2. *Question by General Gaines.* What is your opinion as to the practicability of ascertaining, a week or two weeks after the Seminole Indians had left the battle ground or encampment, what number had occupied said encampment or battle ground? State whether the Indians usually leave at their encampments as much evidence of numbers as the whites usually leave.

Answer. I think it would be impracticable, a week or two weeks after a battle, to ascertain from the signs commonly left by Indians what number had been on the battle ground; and, as a principal object of the Indians in encamping in time of war is to conceal their numbers, it would be extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to make even a tolerable guess at the numbers that occupied an encampment, unless they had occupied it for some length of time. In reply to the latter part of the question, the Indians do not usually leave at their encampments anything like as much evidence of numbers as the whites usually leave.

3. *Question by General Gaines.* What were the sentiments and wishes of the Louisiana volunteers, on board the steamboat Watchman, on the 6th and 7th of February, 1836, as expressed in your presence and hearing, in reference to the continuance of General Gaines to command them in person, on the campaign against the Seminole Indians?

Answer. On the arrival of the steamboat Watchman at Pensacola on the 6th of February, 1836, it was ascertained that the steamboat Merchant, with one battalion of the regiment of volunteers, under the immediate command of Colonel Smith, commanding officer of the regiment, had sailed the day before for Tampa Bay. On landing at Pensacola General Gaines received the letter from the adjutant general, notifying him that General Scott had been ordered to proceed to Florida, and directing him to await further orders in New Orleans. On receiving this letter General Gaines remarked to me that he would go, with great readiness, wherever his services might be most useful to his country, and said then that he thought he should return to New Orleans. I left him immediately to attend to some duties. When the troops learned the purport of the letter received, many of the volunteers collected around me, and inquired if the general intended to proceed or return. I replied, "I believed he would return." They then expressed, in strong terms, their regret at this information, and the general opinion, as far as I learned, was that he should proceed. After this the commanding officer of that battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Lawson, came to me and made the same inquiry. I replied as before. He said "he thought General Gaines was bound to proceed, at least to Tampa Bay; that he would be severely censured if he relinquished the command;" and he requested me to urge the general to proceed. He spoke of the confusion that would probably ensue in the event of his giving up the command. Colonel Smith, the next in rank to General Gaines, was willing, through personal regard to Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs, of the 4th infantry, to waive rank with that officer, for the purpose of giving him the command of the brigade; but if General Gaines relinquished the command of the expedition, Major Foster, of the 4th infantry, and Lieutenant colonel by brevet, would assert his right to the command of the brigade, in virtue of his brevet commission, which was senior to Colonel Twiggs's commission in the line, and contention for the command of the brigade would arise, which might cause the separation of the troops, and, in that way, endanger the success of the expedition." He left me, saying he would call on the general and converse with him on the subject. I saw General Gaines very soon after this, and he told me he had determined to proceed, at least to Tampa Bay, and that he would be governed by circumstances in his future determinations. On the passage to Tampa Bay he showed me the rough draught of a letter which he said he intended to address to General Scott in case he found him in the field. That letter was announcing his arrival with the troops under his command, and proposing a co-operation with those under General Scott. He at the same time remarked to me that if General Scott preferred to take the sole conduct of the war, he would, without hesitation, turn over the command to him.

4. *Question by General Gaines.* Did anything occur at Dade's battle ground which tended to confirm General Gaines in the determination to proceed to Fort King?

Answer. On Dade's battle ground, whilst a party detailed to bury the dead were collecting the bodies, General Gaines expressed to me his anxiety to know where the enemy was, not having met him, as was expected, on the march to that point, and his desire to know the situation of the command under General Clinch. He stated that the surest means of acquiring this information was to proceed to Fort King, but expressed an unwillingness to draw upon the supplies of that post, which might be slender. I then remarked that it had been that morning mentioned to me that the quartermaster present had been notified by his department that large supplies had been already ordered to Fort King. General Gaines expressed great satisfaction at learning this, and the quartermaster was immediately sent for. He produced a letter from the Quartermaster General's office, dated the 19th of January preceding, informing him that a large supply of provisions had been ordered from New York to Fort King, and thirty thousand rations to St. Augustine from the same point. On receiving this information, General Gaines expressed his determina-

tion to proceed forthwith to Fort King, and the order for the march was given the moment the funeral rites were concluded.

5. *Question by General Gaines.* On General Gaines's arrival at Fort King, finding neither the supplies nor the troops he had expected, what plan of operations did he decide upon?

Answer. On arriving at Fort King, finding that the garrison consisted of but one company of artillery, and that the supplies of provisions at that post would only afford him two days' rations, he told me, in conversation, that it was his determination to take up the line of march for Fort Brooke, (Tampa Bay,) where he had supplies; and should he not find the enemy on the route thither, he would then operate in the direction of Talloptchupko, on Pease creek, for the purpose of intercepting the retreat of the Indians towards the Everglades, should they be driven in that direction by the troops operating above. In proceeding to Tampa Bay, the route by Clinch's battle ground was chosen for two reasons: *first*, because it was the shortest route, and, *second*, there was a greater probability of meeting the enemy on that route.

6. *Question by General Gaines.* Was it General Gaines's intention to make a sortie in the event of his hearing General Clinch's or Colonel Lindsay's guns?

Answer. General Gaines remarked several times, while lying at Camp Izard, that he should not be surprised at hearing Lindsay's guns on the other side, and in that event he would cross immediately and march to his aid; or should the Indians engage Clinch on his advance, he would immediately march out and support him.

Captain THISTLE, a citizen of Louisiana, and witness, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by the court.* Were you in the campaign in Florida under Major General Gaines, in 1836; if so, in what capacity?

Answer. I was. I commanded a company of seventy strong, officers included, in Colonel Smith's regiment of volunteers, commanded by Major General Gaines.

2. *Question by the court.* Please state to the court, as nearly as you can recollect, the occurrences that transpired on the Withlacoochee after the army reached that place, and during the time it remained in Camp Izard.

Answer. On the 27th of February, I think, as the advance guard approached the river, it was fired upon from across the river, and sustained some injury. I think there were several wounded. Orders were then given to withdraw, and encamp on General Clinch's old encamping ground. I made some inquiry that evening of the cause of our not crossing the river, (it was understood on our march before we got to the river that we were going to a ford,) and I was informed by Colonel Smith that the Indians had made a mistake in some manner; he was not certain whether purposely or accidentally. They stated the ford was two or three miles further down the river. Next morning, about sunrise or a little after, the order was given to take up the line of march for the ford. We reached the place we started for about 9 or 10 o'clock in the morning. General Gaines and Colonel Smith, with a detachment, went to examine the river, as I was informed by Colonel Smith. As they were in the act of crossing the river, and partly in the water, they were fired on, and, as far as I recollect, the fire was kept up for some length of time, perhaps an hour or an hour and a half, with a tremendous war-yell. It appeared to me to extend for a quarter of a mile up and down the river. Being stationed on a rise of ground, I had advantage in hearing the sound. The firing ceased, and orders were given for us to encamp; whilst there was a party making canoes, and others preparing breastworks. The breastworks were thrown up temporarily for the night, and the canoes principally finished—having worked on them till 10 or 11 o'clock that night. I understood that evening that we would cross the river the next day. Next morning I was called upon early, with an order from General Gaines to have my select marksmen ready to go on the river. About 8 or 9 o'clock I paraded my men opposite to General Gaines's quarters. At that place there were fifty regulars who had volunteered from different companies. Twenty more volunteered from Colonel Williams's company; twelve from Captain Burk's; and from Captain Kerr's and Captain Alexander's enough to make one hundred and ten, including my own men—thirty-six. I was cautioned by General Gaines to use caution; that he did not send me on the river to have my men killed, but to kill the Indians. Colonel Twiggs shook hands with me, and likewise cautioned me to use great caution—to get men on the river bank without being discovered by the enemy, if possible. General Gaines had previously given me the same orders. I was accompanied, for about 150 yards, by Captain Kerr, to show me where I had better enter the hammock, as, the day previously, he had been on the river bank where Lieutenant Izard got his mortal wound. My men were then put in open order. I directed them to get on the river the best way they thought proper, so as not to be discovered—either to crawl or roll, and take their stations as near ten feet apart as circumstances and shelter would permit. I then commenced examining the line, to see if my order had been obeyed. I found that every man had taken caution to get behind a log or tree; and where they had nothing of this kind, they laid up chunks so that they could fire under the chunk and over the bank. I had almost reached the extreme left of my line when one of my men fired. I, being within ten steps of him, asked him, in a low voice, "what he fired at?" He said he saw one Indian, and that, having deliberate aim, fired at him. I returned from him to take my station, when I heard the crack of from fifteen to twenty rifles upon my side. Instantly there was a war-yell, and a heavy fire opened, the whole length of the line, from the enemy on the opposite side of the river. I had a space of about sixty yards of open ground to pass, in which space there was one pine tree standing by itself. I saw one of my men behind that tree. Then I attempted to cross this space, which I did by crawling. I should judge, from the shots fired at me and at this man, partly concealed behind this tree, that fifty or sixty shots were fired during the time I was passing this distance of fifty or sixty yards. I heard a tremendous fire in the rear, which I took to be an attack on the camp. About that time, or a little after, a recall was sounded. I had my non-commissioned officers stationed at intervals, which enabled me to pass the command for every man to keep his place and not leave his shelter, deeming it imprudent to have my men leave their cover under such a heavy fire as was then made on my small detachment. I had estimated the number to be from 375 to 450 of the enemy; across the river, from 35 to 40 yards wide. In about an hour afterwards the Indians principally ceased firing. I had just commenced passing the order to throw out flankers as the second recall was sounded, which was immediately obeyed. I returned to camp in good order; ten men slightly wounded. On reaching the camp I found a number of men that had been wounded, amongst them General Gaines. I perceived that the palmettoes were partly burnt in the enclosure of the camp, on the east side, which was effected by a fire communicated from the outside by the Indians, and, as I was informed, the Indians had come up to

within 30 or 40 yards of the camp, under cover of the smoke, while the palmettoes were burning. That evening I made a verbal report to General Gaines that I was confident that I had done the enemy some considerable injury, for I had seen three fall under my own eyes. He then gave me some instructions, as I was on the reserve, informing me they had had a very severe attack on the camp, and expected one that night; charging me particularly to give orders to my men not to fire in haste; that if the Indians undertook to storm the work, to let them come up to within 25 or 30 yards, so that every man might be sure of his object, as we had not a great supply of ammunition. I was informed that from 1,200 to 1,400 Indians had made an attack on the camp during my absence. The next day we repaired our breastworks, and a few Indians showed themselves and fired on those who were preparing the timber, and the men were driven in. I made some inquiry as to our movements the next day, and I understood an express had been sent to General Clinch to come down with a reinforcement, and that it was not deemed proper to make an attack upon the enemy, or cross the river until such time as we had a force able to pursue him. I will remark, that it was my opinion that we ought not to undertake to charge the enemy unless we had mounted men. My reason for this was that the Indians are lightly clad, and nothing to encumber them but the rifle, powder horn, and the bullet pouch. The general usually cautioned the men, and gave them great praise for not wasting their ammunition. On the 2d of March a few shots were occasionally fired into camp. On the 3d of March a very severe attack was made on the camp. I think it commenced about ten o'clock, and continued for an hour or an hour and a half, keeping at a long distance—some few occasionally coming up under shelter of some underbrush, &c., to within 75 yards of our camp. I took great care that day, as there had been some little argument previously as to the number of the Indians, to estimate their number, and I could not make the number of Indians and negroes less than 1,200 or 1,400. The Indians having ceased firing, the main body of them withdrew; some 15 or 20 would occasionally throw in a few shots on the east side of the camp. I proposed the next day to General Gaines to give me permission to mount about 20 or 25 of my men on the broken-down pack-horses. The general's reply was, that he expected a reinforcement, and this charge which I wished to make could not be very effectual on account of the horses not being in order for a charge. It readily struck me the general was in the right, and I wrong. The next day, the 4th of March, there were a few scattering shots fired, as the staff were dealing out some corn to the troops, but no one wounded to my knowledge. On the 5th, I think, there were some shots fired.

The court here adjourned, to meet to-morrow morning at 11 o'clock.

JANUARY 18, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

Captain Thistle's testimony continued.

On the evening of the 4th or 5th of March some one hailed the camp, which we took to be a reinforcement from Fort Drane. He was answered by Captain Burk, the officer of the day, asking what was wanted. He said the Indians were tired of fighting, and wished to make peace. He was told to come the next morning with a white flag and they should be heard. The next morning, accordingly, at the appointed hour, I saw a group of Indians, about 300, in the rear of our camp, from five to six hundred yards. Then two or three advanced slowly towards the encampment, and hailed the camp. They were answered by Adjutant Barrow to come nigher; that they should not be fired on nor injured. After some conversation with General Gaines, Adjutant Barrow took a white handkerchief, crossed the breastworks, advanced a few yards towards the enemy, and placed himself on a stump and showed his flag.

After some hesitation on the part of the Indians, they sat upon a log about 275 steps from the breastwork. They were then met by Adjutant Barrow, afterwards by Captain Hitchcock, and some others of the staff. I don't know what there took place, as I was not present at the interview. The same evening they met again, about 3 or 4 o'clock. Whilst they were holding the council this time they were fired upon by General Clinch's advance guard, and instantly they fled to the hammock. Colonel Twiggs was standing, at this time, in front of my company, which was a reserve. General Gaines had always cautioned me to have my company always in readiness, especially during the time they were holding the council, lest the Indians should betray their trust. He had not, however, the least idea they would, but he said there was no harm in being prepared for them. Colonel Twiggs, when the Indians were fired upon, expressed "O, my God, what a pity! what a pity!" He said that if it had not been for this unfortunate circumstance everything would have been accomplished in the way of peace. I made observations myself that I wished that General Clinch had had the good fortune to have killed the whole of them, for I did not believe, myself, that there was any sincerity in them—no more than to suit their convenience. But I would state that those officers, according to the best of my judgment, did sincerely believe that the Indians were sincere. That evening, about 9 or 10 o'clock, our camp was hailed in front by the same one who had previously hailed us, asking for two days to see Micanopy and to hold a council amongst themselves; I heard them agree to return at the end of two days to council; the next day I asked permission from General Gaines to take six men and examine the river to find the crossing place; he told me he had no objection, that Colonel Smith would give me permission, which was done; I selected my men and left the camp about 2 o'clock; I took an easterly direction and entered the hammock; I discovered a large Indian trail, it led into a swamp which was very thick with undergrowth and brier vines; you could scarce see a man ten yards unless it was in the Indian trail; I followed this Indian trail for about a mile; it was miry; I then came to a run or branch of an old river; I found one part of the trail led across this branch, on a large log, the other turned to the left; I followed the one that went to the left, about one hundred yards, where I found a ford; I crossed and came on to a small island about twenty yards wide; this descended from the river; the bank on the opposite side of the river was plain to my view, being seven or eight feet higher than the bank on which I stood; I hesitated, for a moment, to approach the bank; I saw the opposite bank was completely fortified by trees which had fallen accidentally; I likewise placed myself behind a large cypress that stood on the summit of the bank; I had no shelter from the opposite bank, except in front, and, from my view of the river, the enemy could have thrown in fires on me right and left; I then discovered several rafts on the opposite side, which appeared to be lashed together with vines or raw hides, and, apparently, extended across the river; the view I took of this position was, that the Indians had selected it, and that they could make good their crossing, and beat us, if we had pursued them to that point, against all our force, provided they had not been more than 500 strong,

but I always judged their force something like three times that number; I returned to camp between 10 and 11 o'clock that evening; I went immediately and reported myself and my men, and learned that it had been suggested by Colonel Lawson, and, I also understood, by General Gaines and Colonel Smith, that they were afraid I had met with some serious accident; nothing more of any importance took place; we waited three days for the return of those Indians in council, as they had promised us; I had often had conversation between that period with a number of the officers, and they all believed the Indians were sincere; some went so far as to say that I was stubborn, and would not believe the truth when it was so plain before me. After the end of two days I asked Adjutant Barrow, who had great confidence in the sincerity of the Indians, what he then thought of their promise to return; he said he would not hesitate to cross the river and go to the enemy's camp; we waited two days longer, no Indians made their appearance; a negro named Primus, I think, was sent on the evening of the 7th, if I mistake not, to see what information he could obtain from the enemy; he had not returned when we took up our line of march for Fort Drane, under the command of General Clinch, on the evening of the 10th; the evening of the 10th I was informed that Primus had returned; I made some little inquiry, and was informed that the Indians had gone thirty miles into the Wahoo or Black swamp, and were there with their warriors and families; we marched to Fort Drane, where we encamped; we lay there for a number of days; while we were on the Withlacoochee, and after the council was held with the Indians, our men used to fish on the river bank without being molested by the enemy.

1. *Question by General Gaines.* The witness has stated that he did not believe in the sincerity of the Indians in suing for peace on the 5th and 6th of March, 1836, and yet that he, on the 6th, asked and obtained leave to go out of camp, and did go some distance out of camp with his six men. The witness is desired to state whether he would have believed it quite safe or prudent to go out so far with so small a detachment if the Indians were indeed insincere in their attempts to sue for peace?

Answer I will first state that I consider myself a first-rate woodsman; I have hunted with the Indians, I have traded with them, and know their character, I think, almost as well as any other person who has not spent the principal part of his life with them; I would consider myself capable of keeping myself concealed from the enemy, if I did not choose to come in contact with them; I would refer to one instance when I was under the command of Major General Scott: after we had effected our crossing, in part, of the Withlacoochee, and the Louisiana regiment of volunteers had crossed the river, my station being on the left, mine was the last company that crossed; I had been previously detailed to cover the landing; after crossing, I took my station on the left; I was ordered to erect a breastwork and send out five or six men as spies or picket guard; after my men had commenced the work, and my picket guard set out, I took the liberty to take with me my first lieutenant; we proceeded in the direction of the crossing place I have alluded to, being then on the opposite side from that at which I had before examined the crossing; we passed between a pond on the right, and the river on our left, about the distance of three-quarters of a mile from camp, where we heard some Indian giving the word of command to his warriors; I took this to be the word of command from the sound rapidly advancing, and being the same tone of voice that we had the pleasure of hearing so often in our camp; we immediately retraced our steps; I gave directions to my lieutenant to tell my picket guard to conceal themselves behind trees; I gave this information of the approach of the enemy to Colonel Smith, and likewise mentioned to him that I concluded this was the Indian's advance guard.

At the request of Major General Gaines, the court here instructed the judge advocate to enter on the record certain extracts from the documents which accompany the proceedings in the case of Major General Scott. These extracts are as follows:

EXTRACTS.

From General Scott to the Adjutant General, dated Augusta, Georgia, January 31, 1836.—(Doc. No. 18.)

"It is now my opinion that the Seminoles cannot be promptly reduced to submission by a force much short of five thousand men, and that the greater part of this force ought to be mounted."

From the same to the same, dated Augusta, Georgia, February 2, 1836.—(Doc. No. 20.)

"Cannot the 4th infantry be ordered from Louisiana to the theatre of operations?"

From General Scott to Colonel Lindsay, dated Augusta, Georgia, February 2, 1836.—(Doc. No. 29.)

"By the 20th of this month, at the latest, I hope to be in sufficient force on the St. John's, or at Fort King, or at Fort Drane, to commence a system of vigorous operations against the Seminole Indians.

"It is unofficially reported that Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs, with a detachment of the 4th infantry, has been ordered from New Orleans to Tampa Bay. If this should be true, your force may be sufficient to enable you to leave the necessary garrison and to operate a junction with the main army at the distance of three or four marches."

From General Scott to the Adjutant General, dated Augusta, Georgia, February 6, 1836.—(Doc. No. 34.)

"The moment we are in force on the St. John's, and take up the expected line of operations, St. Augustine will become an interior position. That line of operations will probably be first from Picolata to Tampa Bay, in order to open communications with Forts King and Drane, and with Colonel Lindsay. My object will be to cut the enemy off from the country to the left of that line, and to force him to the right. If I succeed, the theatre of operations, though favorable to him, will be much less bad for us than the southern part of the peninsula.

"I am more and more persuaded that I have not called for too large a force. By the 25th instant I may, perhaps, have in Florida, in all, 4,000 men, and by March 500 more. It is not probable that I shall delay offensive movements quite so long."

From the same to the same, dated Savannah, February 16, 1836.—(Doc. No. 38.)

"Colonel Hawkins, the aide-de-camp of Governor Eaton, arrived here a few days since, bringing despatches, and he has set out on his return with my answer. I had anticipated his inquiries generally

by his letter to his excellency, dated the first instant, (a copy of which has been forwarded,) and I have said to him more in detail that it will be preferable to place any force he may have in the field, or find it necessary to call out, (not exceeding from 400 to 600 men,) in *defensive* positions, for the protection of the settlements of Middle Florida, as it was still my hope to cut off the hostile Indians from the southeast and drive them towards those settlements.

"I learn by newspapers that from 600 to 1,000 men, mostly volunteers, have sailed from New Orleans for Florida, I think, Tampa Bay. I have not called for a single man of the regulars or militia from Louisiana. Perhaps the reported force volunteered for the temporary protection of Tampa Bay, as certain companies sailed hence and from Charleston for the specific defence of Picolata and St. Augustine some weeks ago. Hence I could not rely on the troops from Louisiana for the general purposes of the campaign, and therefore did nothing to arrest the detaching and the march of troops from this quarter. But if Tampa Bay has been reinforced from Louisiana, and to the extent reported, Colonel Lindsay will be in a condition, on arriving with the Alabama regiment, to act offensively in any direction and independent of support."

General Scott to General Clinch, dated Savannah, February 12, 1836.—(Doc. No. 41.)

"I am unable, as yet, from the want of recent information from the theatre of war, and better topographical knowledge of that theatre, to lay down any definitive plan of operations. I shall rely much on communications to be received from you on all points necessary to the formation of such plan, but my present idea is that it may be best to move upon the road from St. Augustine to Tampa Bay, till joined by Colonel Lindsay from the latter place, and if possible to cut off the greater number of the Indians from the fastnesses below that line."

General Scott to the Adjutant General, dated Picolata, Florida, February 26, 1836.—(Doc. No. 47.)

"Observing by returns from Brigadier General Clinch that his supplies were but limited, and desirous of placing at Fort Drane subsistence for the right wing for at least twenty days, in order to give confidence and effect to any movement to be made from that point, I have been occupied in devising means to send thither additional supplies to the amount of seventy tons. To enable me to do this, I have been waiting for the wagons, horses, and pack-saddles provided at Augusta and Savannah. Some of these wagons have arrived, but as yet no horses. The remainder of that baggage train cannot be expected here from Savannah in less than ten days.

"It seems that Major General Gaines arrived at Fort King from Tampa Bay on the 22d.

"I have time to add no more. All my plans are thwarted, the principal of which was to move in concert from Fort Drane, Volusia, and Tampa, on the 8th of March, upon the enemy, who are supposed to be (at this time) principally upon the Withlacoochee."

Notes appended to General Scott's Order No. 4, dated Picolata, February 26, 1836.—(Doc. No. 55.)

"The right wing was intended to be concentrated at Fort Drane, say by March 8, when it was expected that General Clinch would have had all the Georgia troops, companies of United States artillery, and the detachment of United States dragoons; in all, about 1,400 men.

"On the 25th instant it was known that General Clinch would have had, but for General Gaines, 19,000 rations for men and about 3,000 bushels of corn for horses. That amount of subsistence at Fort Drane I should more than have maintained by the 8th of March, by means of the baggage train expected from Savannah and Charleston, and by the aid of *boating* on the Ocklawaha to Payne's Landing."

General Scott to the Adjutant General, dated Picolata, March 2, 1836.—(Doc. No. 52.)

"All hope of sending supplies hence by the Ocklawaha is abandoned. We have to rely solely on the road to Fort Drane, which is bad enough; and the horses and mules which were to have followed me closely from Savannah have not arrived.

"The company of Georgia mounted volunteers that arrived here about six days ago, and with which I had expected to march to Fort Drane, refused to be mustered into service, and refused to come under the rules and articles of war, with the exception of a small part that remains. The rest went off without leave from their gallant and patriotic captain (Kenan) yesterday and the day before. The other four companies of the same battalion are this moment reported to have arrived on the opposite shore. I have sent an officer over to muster them into service. If I can get two of the companies I shall be most happy. I may obtain the four, but will march with one to Fort Drane. Some mounted men are indispensable, and I know not that the United States dragoons will arrive in a month. I wish I had never relied upon the arrival of that detachment. Expecting it hourly at Savannah, (I had expected it at Charleston as early as the 4th ultimo,) I left all the horses, in order that the mounts might first be chosen, and the remainder of the lot sent here for the baggage train. That error I corrected, as far as practicable, by an order given to Lieutenant Dimmock on the 21st ultimo. No horses, however, have arrived from Savannah.

"We have heard nothing recently from Colonel Goodwyn's regiment of mounted South Carolinians, but presume it has reached Jacksonville below.

"I ordered from Savannah the little steamer belonging to the Engineer department, called the *Essayons*, to be sent here for the express purpose of communicating with that post (Volusia) and of supplying it with stores from Picolata, but that boat, like everything else (almost) left behind, has not arrived.

"I have at length received a letter from Colonel Lindsay, dated at Mobile, the 13th ultimo. He was about to set out for Tuscaloosa to hasten the Alabama regiment. It is now evident that he cannot be at Tampa before the 10th, probably the 15th instant.

"Brigadier General Eustis cannot cross the Ocklawaha earlier than the 14th instant."

General Scott to General Clinch, dated Picolata, March 1, 1836.—(Doc. No. 60.)

"By the arrival at daylight this morning of the express from Fort Drane I have your note of yesterday's date, accompanied by a letter to you from Major General Gaines, dated the day before.

"I regret, in every point of view, the premature and unauthorized movement from Tampa Bay made

by that general, and the very awkward and responsible position he has placed himself in by his subsequent march from Fort King. I presume that, as instructed, you sent him my Order No. 4, dated the 26th ultimo. By that he saw that if the troops he brought with him from Tampa Bay could not be subsisted at Fort King by means of supplies derived from this place through the Ocklawaha, it was expressly commanded that the column should march to Volusia without delay, where subsistence in abundance would be immediately provided. But he had, before that order reached him, taken from Fort Drane a large part of the subsistence relied upon for a more systematic course of operations and decamped. The order, however, I take it for granted, was sent after him, and in time to reach him within twenty miles of Fort King. In any event, the responsibility of his movements and actual position is his own, for he must have known, as early as the 10th ultimo, if not before, that I had been charged with the general direction of the war in Florida, and that by interfering he constituted himself an interloper.

"Even if you had sufficient stores on hand and means of transportation, I should, under the circumstances, command you to send no subsistence to him unless to prevent starvation; but you have neither. Let him, therefore, in time, extricate himself from the embarrassment he has placed himself in by marching upon Volusia, where I have no reason to doubt that 20,000 rations, sent hence on the 27th ultimo, have safely arrived. As he appears to have a retreat open to him, or is in no peril to prevent his taking that step, you of course will make no detachment or movement to join him.

"The train you have ordered hither is expected to-night. As yet we have here but few wagons to add to your number. The whole train shall be immediately loaded with subsistence and sent back to Fort Drane. I have only time to say that should the troops under Major General Gaines be compelled to march back to Fort King or to Fort Drane, instead of proceeding to Volusia, as heretofore commanded, and as I still wish that they should do, on account of the extreme difficulty of sending subsistence to your neighborhood, you will only issue rations to them for their current subsistence, and not for further false expeditions.

"As the first consequence of the arrival of the troops from Tampa Bay to Fort King, and the demand made upon Fort Drane for subsistence, I was obliged to order back a battalion of Georgia volunteers that had then been nearly two days in route to join you.

"The company of mounted men from the same State, now on the opposite side of the river, refuse to be mustered into service, and refuse to come under the rules and articles of war. The other companies of the same battalion may follow their example. If they do, I shall lose no time in ordering the whole back to their homes.

"Major Gates with his three companies has not arrived, and I have no intelligence respecting the United States dragoons of a recent date. Finally, the horses for some days expected from Savannah have not arrived. These embarrassments may detain me here I know not how long.

"The left wing is moving upon Volusia with system and success. The South Carolina foot constitutes the advance, and I suppose the mounted regiment from the same State is now crossing the St. John's at Jacksonville.

"Send another copy of my Order No. 4 to Major General Gaines, and a copy of Order No 1, which is enclosed for the purpose. The former is reiterated so far as respects the march to Volusia, if this be practicable; and enclose him a certified copy of this letter, for his government and your justification. I remain, in haste, your obedient servant, Winfield Scott.

"P. S.—I am instructed by Major General Scott to say that the quartermaster's return did not accompany your letter of the 27th ultimo. No return has been received of your ordnance or ordnance stores, particularly the fixed ammunition for muskets. Please to send one. Respectfully, A. Van Buren, aide-de-camp."

○

General Scott to General Clinch, dated Picolata, March 4, 1836.—(Doc. No. 69.)

"I still presume that Major General Gaines will be obliged to fall back on Fort Drane, which increases my anxiety to send the wagons (with some additions) loaded. I would prefer much that the force brought with him was back to Tampa Bay, or rather that it had not marched from that place; *provided* that the movement fails to crush the enemy, or to terminate the war. The worst result, next to the loss of that fine body of men, or a third of it, would be mere success in driving the enemy into the lower country, where, I suppose, it would be almost impossible for us to follow—I mean *below* the waters of Charlotte harbor. Hence my indignation that an isolated attack should have been made from your vicinity, well calculated to produce that result, and at a time, too, when you knew, and Major General Gaines must have known, through you, (and before,) that my plan, with ample means, was to move simultaneously upon the Withlacoochee in three columns—from Tampa Bay, the upper crossing on the Ocklawaha, and Fort Drane—so as to make it impossible for the enemy to escape to the lower country.

"I have not yet supposed that Major General Gaines has not his retreat upon Fort Drane or King perfectly in his power. On account of subsistence, if he can cut his way through the enemy to Tampa Bay, I should much prefer that his force should be there; and when I wished him to march or send that force to Volusia, it was because it would be infinitely more easily subsisted there than at Fort Drane. Should he, however, be in any difficulty in operating a retreat from the Withlacoochee, I certainly wish you to afford any succor that the slender means within your reach may allow; and this, doubtless, you would render without any special permission to that effect. If the force return to Fort Drane or King, it must be sustained for at least five or six days from the means derived from this place; and hence, I *now* prefer it should become a part of the right wing, rather than take that quantity of subsistence from you, and march back to Tampa Bay."

General Scott to the Adjutant General, dated Picolata, March 6, 1836.—(Doc. No. 68.)

"I at length know that the South Carolina mounted regiment reached Jacksonville yesterday. It is destined to make part of the left wing.

"Besides, Brigadier General Eustis has necessarily been compelled to wait for the South Carolina mounted regiment, which cannot reach St. Augustine before the day after to-morrow, and Volusia before the 12th.

"If the column under Major General Gaines had fallen back upon Fort Drane or King, the right wing would have wanted nothing but subsistence, and the forces now in this vicinity and known to be coming up, to act with vigor and effect.

"To add to my numerous vexations, the wagons reported to have been shipped at Baltimore in the Arctic have been left behind.

"I send no more troops, for the present, to Fort Drane, on account of the difficulty of subsisting them there. If Major General Gaines shall not fall back on that point, it will be indispensable to wait for Captain Wharton."

Aide-de-Camp Van Buren to the Adjutant General, dated Fort Drane, March 25, 1836.—(Document No. 97.)

"Captain Wharton, with his detachment of dragoon recruits, reached this the day before yesterday."

General Scott to the Adjutant General, dated between Picolata and Garey's Ferry, March 9, 1836.—(Document No. 71.)

"I have just set out for Fort Drane, *via* Garey's Ferry, on Black creek, with two companies of regulars, and intending to take with me from the latter place the small battalion of mounted Georgians, (heretofore mentioned,) under the command of Major Douglass. Lieutenant Colonel Bankhead is at the head of the first detachment, and the two together may make a total of about 240. But even this small force may be important to rescue Major General Gaines.

"I had not received the slightest information of the operations on the Withlacoochee (official or otherwise) of a later date than the 29th ultimo up to this morning, and had concluded that he had effected his march, with more or less success, against the enemy upon Tampa Bay; when, at day-light, the steamer that I am now in arrived, and brought the rumor which is confirmed by the two accompanying notes from Paymaster Lytle, received about six hours afterwards. On the reception of the rumor, I immediately commenced preparations for this movement; but being delayed by the necessity of unloading and reloading the boat, I am now at anchor at the mouth of Black creek. I hope to put the troops in march from Garey's Ferry early in the day to-morrow, and to reach Fort Drane with a small escort the day following. It is possible that even these little detachments of horse and foot may reach the Withlacoochee in time to render a valuable service.

"I am aware that the movement that I am making may be condemned, if regarded in any other light than a rescue, as premature. Colonel Goodwyn's mounted regiment only arrived at St. Augustine last night or this morning; and consequently the left wing cannot be in force on the Ocklawaha, in the direction of Pelaklikaha, earlier than the 17th, or up with the enemy before the 20th instant. Colonel Lindsay, who may have already arrived at Tampa Bay, cannot operate more than two days' march from that place, for the want of transportation—Major General Gaines having taken away the horses which were there, and the basis of the right wing is merged in the force brought by that general into the field, and must participate in his success or failure. If it falls back with him upon Fort Drane it must suffer great loss, and if it follow him to Tampa Bay it will be wholly out of position.

"In this, and even a greater state of uncertainty I have been held since the 26th ultimo, the day after I ordered back Major Cooper's battalion of Georgia foot, to prevent starvation at Fort Drane; and though daily from that time in the expectation of receiving from Savannah horses and serviceable wagons, not one has arrived. The quantity of subsistence that will be at Fort Drane (say) to-morrow, will only be that sent from Picolata on the 6th instant, viz: 17,497 rations of bread and flour, 11,000 rations of pork, (with beef-cattle in the neighborhood,) 8,000 rations of beans, some coffee, and vinegar, &c. And the troops now about to proceed, perhaps, as far as the Withlacoochee, will not have the means of taking with them the rations for more than six days.

"I beg leave to recapitulate the causes of my great deficiency in the means of transportation. 1st. The wagons and horses which I knew Brigadier Clinch to possess early in February have been more broken down by hard service and bad roads than I had expected to find them. 2d. I had, upon what was considered in Georgia, and even at Picolata, the best information, confidently relied upon the use of the Ocklawaha as late as the 2d instant. 3d. No bacon has arrived, and the difference between it and pork, including wood and brine, is fifty per centum against the latter. 4th. The wagons purchased at Charleston and Augusta, by Assistant Quartermasters L'Engle and Peyton, are generally poor, and many of them unserviceable. 5th. The six or ten wagons actually reported to have been shipped at Baltimore in, I think, the Arctic, with Major Gates, were all left behind. 6th. Of the 19,000 rations known to be at Fort Drane about the 25th ultimo, nearly the whole have been drawn by a force not expected by the government or myself to appear in that quarter; and 7th. Not a horse for the baggage train left by me at Savannah, or which I have since ordered to be purchased by Assistant Quartermaster Dimmock, has arrived in Florida.

"On the 21st ultimo, when I was but twenty hours from Savannah, I sent back by a steamer that was met an order to Lieutenant Dimmock to ship about forty horses for the baggage train to Picolata. This order was strongly reiterated by a return steamer five days afterwards; and again, on the 2d instant, by another boat, he was instructed to send immediately, and by the speediest conveyance, seventy horses for the train, and six four-horse wagons. I had this morning a report from him, saying, after he had received my first and second orders, that he had sent all the horses wanted for draught and packs by land, except a few, which were to come as packs with Captain Wharton. Now, as the latter was about twenty-four days in New York, after receiving orders for Florida, and expected to remain ten in Savannah, he cannot be looked for in this neighborhood before the 18th or 20th instant. The other parts of the lot were, it seems, given as packs to the tenth company of South Carolina mounted men, and sent forward in a drove. They must, it is feared, arrive in a state unfit for the baggage train (say) about the 16th instant. Such has been the failure of human agents. The weather has been equally adverse.

"If the force on the Withlacoochee should fall back on Fort Drane, it will be seen from the foregoing that a part, at least, must probably march upon Volusia or Garey's Ferry, to be within reach of subsistence. Instructions have been left behind me to send forward rations, should the means of transportation arrive in time, and the troops already in the neighborhood of Picolata—Major Cooper's and the remaining company of Major Gates's battalions. I have also desired Brigadier General Eustis, in the same event, to order to Fort Drane two companies of mounted men of Colonel Goodwyn's regiment, and a fourth order will go back in this boat to Lieutenant Dimmock on the subject of horses and wagons.

"Some rifles and the tents arrived this morning at Picolata; but Colonel Goodwyn had marched through six or eight storms without cover, and now all companies in march are to be reduced to three tents each.

"P. S.—Please remark that, in his letter to Brigadier General Clinch, dated at New Orleans, the 2d ultimo, Major General Gaines speaks of '*an efficient co-operation*,' promises to be 'in readiness' at Tampa Bay 'by the 8th of the present month, to form a *junction at or near* that place with the force under your command, whenever, *and as soon as*, in your judgment, *your force shall be sufficient to justify the movement*;' and concludes by saying: 'A sufficient quantity of ammunition and *provisions* have been transported to Fort Brooke to divide with you until further supplies are received.' Yet, he did not wait till the brigadier gave notice that he was 'in force,' came to Fort King, and swept nearly the whole of the subsistence collected at Fort Drane. A copy of that letter is in your office; and I now enclose one from Governor Eaton, from which it will appear that Major General Gaines knew at Tampa Bay, about the 14th ultimo, that I had been charged with the direction of this war. He first heard this at Pensacola, and received Governor Eaton's despatch at Tampa, as I can establish; hence his haste and neglect of the assurances given to Brigadier General Clinch, his isolated attack," &c.

Paymaster Lytle to General Scott, dated Fort Drane, March 5, 1836.—(Doc. No. 72.)

"I have been directed by General Clinch to inform you that your communications of yesterday's date reached him at this post after he had mounted his horse, and was on the move with the forces under his command to escort supplies to General Gaines. He directed me likewise to say to you that the distance from this post to Garey's (or Black creek) is about the same as the distance from here to Picolata. As you may wish, however, to obtain all the information possible on the subject, I will take the liberty of adding, from my own knowledge, that the road from Garey's to this place is *sandy*, consequently almost invariably dry, while the road from Picolata here is muddy after heavy rains, particularly such as we have just experienced.

"Colonel Gadsden arrived here from Tallahassee on the 4th, (yesterday,) and accompanied General Clinch this morning to the Withlacoochee."

From the same to the same, dated Fort Drane, March 8, 1836.—(Doc. No. 72.)

"By direction of General Clinch I opened your communication of the 6th instant, which arrived late last night, in advance of the wagons. You will perceive by my letter of the 5th that General Clinch, with all the forces at this post, and 100 mounted men from the vicinity, had left for Withlacoochee, to escort a small supply of cattle, ammunition, &c., to General Gaines, having received the night before a third express from that officer. No word has been received from either of these generals since the 5th. When General Clinch left here he expected to be back on the 9th.

"The probability is, that the wagons will return without an escort, there being at present no troops here; and should General Clinch get back before the wagons depart, his men may be too much fatigued to march again immediately; but this, of course, is merely conjecture. I am satisfied, however, that General Clinch would advise that an escort accompany the wagons back to this place when reloaded. Captain Graham being directed by General Clinch to send back the wagons for supplies after their arrival here, will send them to Garey's, it being the best road.

"N. B.—The amount of General Gaines's last express to General Clinch, dated 3d instant, was merely copies of his previous letters, with a note, stating that the Indians were still around them, but little or no fighting taken place since his last communication."

General Scott to the Adjutant General, dated Fort Drane, March 14, 1836.—(Doc. No. 71.)

"On my arrival here I found that the force which had been upon the Withlacoochee had fallen back on this vicinity.

"Brigadier General Clinch, with some means of subsistence, and about 600 men, (of whom 150 were mounted Floridians,) joined Major General Gaines on the 6th instant. The force under the latter had already been reduced to the necessity of commencing on horses and dogs for their subsistence. After receiving that timely and important succor, the army remained in position until the 10th.

"It may be remarked that, from the time of entrance into the intrenched camp up to the retreat in this direction, not a sortie was attempted; and that, to save the pride of the higher officer, the command was relinquished to the next in rank, in order that *he* might give the order to retreat.

"A copy of Major General Gaines's order, yielding the immediate command of their joint forces to Brigadier General Clinch, is enclosed. This extraordinary paper I have but little time to comment upon. The poor sneer against me, as the *diplomatic agent of the War Department*, is in character with all his recent acts; for, at the moment of the arrival of the succor on the 6th, he had already opened a negotiation with the enemy, in which it is said, on good authority, he was willing to leave them in the *quiet* possession of the country below the Withlacoochee, until the arrival of the '*diplomatic agent*;' but in which Powell insisted that that river should be the perpetual boundary between us and the Seminoles. But for Brigadier General Clinch, I have no doubt some treaty on the one or the other basis would have been formed between the parties. He alleged the positive instructions of the War Department against all negotiating, and he enabled Major General Gaines to save the original force with him. Not a sortie was made from the intrenched camp, from the time of its formation up to the retreat, and on the approach of the succor a large detachment of the enemy had taken a position to intercept the retreat in this direction. How, under such circumstances, it can be alleged that the enemy *had been beaten*, it would be difficult to reconcile with facts.

"I have reason to hope that the enemy remains nearly in the same position as before the isolated, and therefore false movement of Major General Gaines. This is fortunate.

"I have instructed Brigadier General Eustis, after scouring the country through which he will have to pass to some extent, to place his column in position, somewhere in the neighborhood of Pelaklikaha, about the 25th instant. Colonel Lindsay, by the same day, is to be with his force at Chickuchatty, (about two marches from Tampa,) and means are suggested to each, in order to multiply the chances of communicating with each other.

"The right wing will move hence (say) on the 24th instant to attack in front. This column will pass the Withlacoochee about half a mile below the late intrenched camp, where there is a good ford; and of which Major General Gaines might have availed himself if he had had the strength or inclination.

"The 25th instant is appointed in order that I may be certain of giving Brigadier General Eustis and Colonel Lindsay time to put themselves in position, respectively, and, further, to give time for the harassed troops lately under Major General Gaines to recruit themselves for effective operations. The same interval is equally important to enable Brigadier General Clinch to receive from Picolata or Garey's Ferry the quantity of subsistence indispensable to give confidence to the movements of the right wing. I have time to add no more.

"Enclosed are copies of the order of Major General Gaines, mentioned above, and of Brigadier General Clinch's letter to me."

General Scott's Order No. 13, dated Fort Drane, March 14, 1836.—(Doc. No. 82.)

"General Thomas Woodward, of Macon county, Alabama, is authorized, aided by Majors J. H. Watson and W. B. Flournoy, to accept the services of any 500 Creek warriors, to be employed as auxiliaries in the present war against the Seminole Indians. Should General Woodward decline taking the command of the friendly Indians, Major Watson, assisted by Major Flournoy, will take the command of them."

General Scott to the Adjutant General, dated Fort Drane, March 20, 1836.—(Doc. No. 94.)

"This wing is waiting to give time for Brigadier General Eustis and Colonel Lindsay to gain their respective positions, Pelaklikaha and Chickuchatty, for the arrival of the wagons sent hence to Garey's Ferry for subsistence; the last of which may be expected by the 24th, with, it is hoped, some additional teams for Savannah, and for the troops from New Orleans to recruit their strength.

"Some wagons (six) and twelve horses arrived at Picolata from Savannah, about the 12th instant, and a few horses or packs, with the last company of South Carolina mounted men, a little before. All those means of transportation were indispensable to the left wing.

"Brigadier General Eustis, in a letter just received, doubts whether he can reach Pelaklikaha earlier than the 27th or 28th. The movement of the right wing may or may not be delayed a few days accordingly. This will depend on a calculation of Lindsay's movements, and the amount of subsistence that may arrive by the 24th from below. The latter may be so small as not to allow of any delay here, as we must take enough to give the right wing time to beat the enemy and to march to Tampa Bay."

General Eustis to General Scott, dated Volusia, March 22, 1836.—(Doc. No. 98.)

"Owing to a *misunderstanding* of my orders on the part of Brigadier General Bull, a part of my force, viz: Lieutenant Colonel Butler, with four companies of mounted men, and Major Kirby, with two companies of artillery, have not yet reached this place."

General Scott to the Adjutant General, dated Tampa Bay, April 12, 1836.—(Doc. No. 103.)

"The long halt here has been for the purpose of recruiting the horses a little; corn and hay, though of an indifferent quality, being found in abundance. This forage has been sent from New Orleans, by Major Clark, assistant quartermaster, under my orders of the 14th of February.

"The three columns were for several days within thirty miles of each other. Owing to the direction of the wind, Clinch's column heard the signal guns fired by the other two, but neither of the latter could hear any response."

General Scott to the Adjutant General, dated Picolata, April 30, 1836.—(Doc. No. 116.)

"That officer (General Gaines) it is said, caused Powell and his chiefs to be informed, by way of inducing them to agree to accept the Withlacoochee as a temporary boundary, that large armies were approaching, which would fill up the Indian country, or crush everything in the way. The wily chiefs profited by the information; sent off their families, and dispersed their warriors into small parties. In this way Powell expects to make good his threat, viz: *that he would protract the war three years.*"

General Scott to the Adjutant General, dated St. Augustine, May 20, 1836.—(Doc. No. 146.)

"What I meant to state at the conclusion of my last letter was this: the troops called for by me came into the field at too late a period, generally, to enable me to prosecute the war to a conclusion."

The court adjourned to meet to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock.

JANUARY 19, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

Captain HITCHCOCK presented himself before the court and asked permission to add to his testimony the following, as a continuation of his answer to the 15th interrogatory by the court:

I will state to the court that yesterday, on referring to some official documents from Tampa Bay, I saw it stated that General Gaines had an escort from Fort Drane to Tallahassee. That statement is not correct; but, I presume, was founded upon this: that Major McLemore was about to proceed from Fort Drane in the direction of Tallahassee, with a mounted troop; that he tendered to General Gaines, unsolicited, as I believe, on the part of General Gaines, a small detachment of his troop, as an escort. This detachment remained a day, or perhaps a day and a half, and commenced its march as an escort to General Gaines. But General Gaines, after the first day's ride, dismissed the escort, halting himself, permitting the escort to leave him, and afterwards moved on without it. I did not refer to this in my testimony, because the escort was entirely unsolicited, I believe, and not even desired. Major McLemore's troop was returning to their homes at the time; they were not detached as an escort.

In consequence of the absence of witnesses, the court adjourned to meet at a future day.

JANUARY 27, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

Lieutenant A. M. MITCHELL, of the 4th regiment of infantry, a witness, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by the court.* Were you in the campaign in Florida under Major General Gaines, and in what capacity?

Answer. I was in the campaign, and was in command of a company of the 4th regiment of United States infantry.

2. *Question by the court.* When, and how many attacks did the enemy make upon the army whilst fortified at Fort Izard, and with what results?

Answer. They fired upon the breastworks, I think, seven days in succession, from the 29th of February until the night of the 5th of March. It was attended with a loss of a few lives and some wounded; and also resulted in their sending in some one to know if we were willing to treat with them.

3. *Question by the court.* What did you estimate the number of the enemy?

Answer. I supposed there must have been seven or eight hundred, judging from the yells and from the firing.

4. *Question by the court.* Were there any preparations made for a sortie, and what were the views of the officers generally on the subject of a sortie?

Answer. My impression is, that the field officers were called together by General Gaines, to consult on the expediency of making a sortie. It was the impression of many of the officers that a sortie should be made, and might be attended with favorable results.

5. *Question by the court.* What is your opinion of the ability of the forces under Major General Gaines to drive and beat the enemy, if a sortie had been made?

Answer. It is my opinion that they could have done it with a great deal of ease, and I don't think it was doubted by any one in the breastwork but that we could have done it.

6. *Question by the court.* Would it have been safe for the troops to have left the breastwork and retired on Fort Drane, without the additional force brought by General Clinch?

Answer. Yes.

7. *Question by the court.* Was it the impression generally that the Indians were sincere in proposing a truce?

Answer. It is my opinion that it was the general impression of those who were inside the breastwork.

1. *Question by General Gaines.* What was the general opinion among the officers at Camp Izard on the 29th of February, 1836, as to the number of Indians engaged in the action that day?

Answer. I heard different opinions expressed. Some supposed that there were one thousand or fifteen hundred; others thought that there were not so many, perhaps not more than five hundred or six hundred. As far as I can recollect, it was Colonel Twiggs's opinion that there were eight hundred or one thousand. As to the opinion of others, I can't recollect their names.

2. *Question by General Gaines.* The witness is desired to state the means he had of judging as to the number of the enemy near Camp Izard, and whether he had ever been much accustomed to seeing large collections of Indian warriors?

Answer. The only means I had of judging was what I could see from the breastwork, from their yells, and from their firing at the breastwork. I have never been accustomed to seeing large bodies of Indians.

3. *Question by General Gaines.* The witness is desired to state what officer, if any to his knowledge, expressed to General Gaines the opinion that a sortie should be made?

Answer. I don't know of any having expressed to General Gaines that opinion. I referred to the conversation of the officers among themselves.

4. *Question by General Gaines.* The witness having stated that the Indians fired on Camp Izard during several days, he is desired to explain whether the actions of the 27th and 28th of February did not take place before Camp Izard was constructed.

Answer. We arrived at the Withlacoochee on the 27th, and approached the river near where General Clinch had crossed it on the 31st of December; and whilst some of the officers were searching for a suitable place to cross the river, (it being very deep, and a very dense hammock on the opposite side,) they were fired upon by the Indians, who were secreted in the bushes. The firing was continued on both sides for, perhaps, two hours. It being late, and not being able to ford the river, it was deemed expedient by the general to march back a short distance, and encamp for the night. On the morning of the 28th we took up the march down the river to seek for a place where there was an open pine woods on the opposite side. After proceeding about four miles, the advance guard, under the command of Lieutenant Izard, whilst marching along the bank of the river, was fired upon from the opposite side by the Indians, and Lieutenant Izard and several others were wounded. The command was then halted at that place, and I think the general called together the field officers to consult whether we should proceed further. This is, however, merely my opinion. The general came to the determination that we should encamp there for the night. The breastwork spoken of was put up that afternoon. We remained there the next day, after putting up the breastwork about three logs high. The Indians commenced firing upon us from every direction about 10 o'clock next morning, after the breastwork was put up; and they fired upon us from that time, as before stated, until the 5th, occasionally, except the first day, when the fire was continuous for three or four hours. On the 5th they commenced firing earlier and continued later than on any previous day—from about 4 o'clock in the morning till about five or six in the afternoon. It was on that night that a negro called to the breastwork to know if a white flag would be a protection to the enemy in case it should be brought in.

5. *Question by General Gaines.* Was the witness with the right wing of the army of General Scott in March and April, 1836; and what is his opinion as to the position of the families of Indians on the Withlacoochee during the movements of that army, and how is the opinion derived?

Answer. I was with the right wing of the army under General Scott. After we had crossed the river at Camp Izard, I marched up to the cove and crossed over a swamp the morning after our arrival; there was a well-beaten track, with the appearance that many persons had been in the habit of travelling

over it. I being among the number who crossed over first, had an opportunity of observing small tracks, which I took to be children's tracks, and which gave me the opinion that the families of some of them had not long since crossed that place. In our pursuit of the Indians during that day, we followed a well-beaten Indian trail, leading up the river, that had been recently very much used.

6. *Question by General Gaines.* Was the search made by that wing into the cove of the Withlacoochee for the Indians sufficient to determine whether the Indians or their families were or were not in the cove?

Answer. I should say it was not.

7. *Question by General Gaines.* How long was the army in the neighborhood of the cove in March and April; and was its march conducted through the cove or in the adjacent open country; and were any detachments made or other means resorted to in order to ascertain whether the Indians or their families had dispersed from the cove?

Answer. We arrived at the cove on the 30th; crossed the swamp I have referred to on the 31st; pursued the Indians three or four miles, as well as I could judge, and returned to our encampment, and proceeded thence to Tampa Bay. There were no other detachments made or other means resorted to, to my knowledge, on that march, to ascertain whether the Indians or their families had dispersed from the cove.

8. *Question by General Gaines.* The witness is desired to state whether any, and if any, how much, subsistence was left at Fort Drane on the 25th of March, 1836; and what quantity, or how many days' rations were received by the troops of the right wing on that day, or prior to their leaving Fort Drane?

Answer. I don't know how much subsistence was left at Fort Drane. As well as I can recollect, we started with ten days' provisions.

Captain G. S. DRANE, of the 2d regiment of artillery, a witness on the part of Major General Gaines, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by General Gaines.* It having been stated officially to the War Department, and more recently urged before this court, by General Scott, that the Indians had removed their families from the cove, so called, on the Withlacoochee river, and had also themselves dispersed from that place in March and April last, and thereby eluded the pursuit of the army, and having attributed these alleged facts to the movement of General Gaines, I therefore call the attention of the witness to the following points, and desire his answers, viz: Were you with the right wing of General Scott's army in Florida on its march from Fort Drane to Tampa Bay, and thence returning back to Fort Drane? Did you find any Indians south of the Withlacoochee at or near the cove? Were they pursued? How far and with what effect? State the extent of the cove, and how far it was penetrated by the army; and whether, from the search then or subsequently made by the right wing, any opinion could be formed as to whether the Indians were or were not in force in the cove; and what is the opinion of the witness as to whether the families of the Indians were in the cove or not, and on what the opinion is founded, and whether the opinion was general, so far as the witness knows. Was there a post established near the cove on going down to Tampa Bay? When was the post relieved, and were the Indians and their families, in the opinion of the witness, still in the cove, and was the cove then penetrated by the army? Was the cove, especially south of the Withlacoochee, penetrated by either of the other divisions of General Scott's army, to wit: the left wing or centre in the campaign? And what is the opinion of the witness as to the force of the Indians on the Withlacoochee about the month of March, and upon what does the witness found his opinion? And what, in the opinion of the witness, is the strength of the Seminole nation, including the Mickasuky Indians?

Answer. I was with the army under General Scott on its march from Fort Drane to Tampa Bay, and thence back. We met with Indians at what is called the lower point of the cove—probably a force of about two hundred and fifty. They were pursued by the army into the cove about, I think, not more than two and a half miles. I am not able to say with what effect. From the best information I have been able to collect, the cove is about fifteen or twenty miles from its commencement to its termination near the Wahoo swamp. The army penetrated this cove no more than about two miles and a half in pursuit of the Indians. At that particular time, I think, no opinion could be formed as to whether the Indians were or were not in force in the cove. It is my opinion that the families were there. I do not believe that the opinion was general. I formed my opinion on the fact that after Major Cooper had established his stockade, southwest of the cove a short distance, the army had left him but a few hours when he was attacked by the Indians from the cove, or coming from that direction, and believing that the operations of the army on the Withlacoochee were not such as to disturb their families, as we were some distance from their stronghold. The post of Fort Cooper was relieved on the return of the right wing of the army. The Indians and their families were still in the cove at that time, in my opinion. The army at that time marched through a very small portion of the cove, on the south side, in the march to the crossing of the Big Withlacoochee, on the Tampa road. I do not know whether the cove was penetrated by either of the other divisions of the army. I am not able to say what was the force of the Indians on the Withlacoochee in March. Judging of the numbers that usually resort on that river from what I saw on the 31st of December, 1835, I should think they would be able to bring into the field about 1,000 warriors, including negroes. I have always estimated the strength of the Seminoles, including the Mickasuky Indians, from the best information I could collect and from my own personal knowledge, to amount to eighteen hundred or two thousand warriors, including negroes. The whole of this force did not serve on the Withlacoochee, nor do I believe the whole force has ever been there at one time. The Mickasuky tribe, to which I refer, inhabit the country north of the Withlacoochee, in the direction of Fort King. Their range of country extends also in a southwesterly direction from Fort King, better understood as the Wetumpka country.

2. *Question by General Gaines.* The witness is desired to state whether any, and if any, what, number of cannon were fired by the troops at and near the Withlacoochee in the latter end of March, 1836, and by whose order; and whether the Indians in and about the cove were not near enough to hear those cannon; and whether it is not his opinion that they were thereby apprised of the movement of the troops against them under General Scott?

Answer. There were cannon fired; the number I do not recollect. They were fired, as I understood, by order of General Scott. I think the Indians were near enough to hear the cannon, and undoubtedly they must have been apprised of the movement of the troops by the firing of those cannon. I do not think, however, that the reports of the cannon affected them much, or that they were much alarmed at the reports.

3. *Question by General Gaines.* Did the witness see any of the Indians near the Withlacoochee, as General Scott's right wing marched towards Tampa Bay, holding up their hands, and thereby intimating a desire to have a parley? The witness is desired to state all he knows in reference to the matter here referred to.

Answer. I saw some Indians on the Withlacoochee, while we were crossing. I saw them after we had crossed, and previously to the attack at the foot of the cove. I did not see them holding up their hands, nor do I know myself that they did so. It was the impression of the army generally, and I saw some officers who informed me of the fact that they had seen some few of them come out and hold up their hands and make the sign of peace. The interpreter and guide were sent out to meet them, and, while talking with them, they saw evidently a disposition made among the Indians to capture the individuals, instead of holding a peaceable talk. They were evidently desirous of getting possession of Billy Omathla, the interpreter, and the guide, Nero. I conversed with Nero on the subject afterwards. Both Nero and Billy Omathla were decidedly of opinion that the Indians meant to prove treacherous, and not to hold a talk. The next morning after the Indians had made the signs, the 4th regiment of infantry, on approaching the spot, was fired upon by the Indians. Both Billy Omathla and Nero informed me that while talking with the Indians they saw, both on the right and left, several Indians creeping through the palmetto and grass, with a design to get in their rear. My knowledge of the character of Billy Omathla and Nero is such that I do not believe that fear had any influence over them at all, and I believe they were very sincere in the opinion they gave.

4. *Question by General Gaines.* The witness is desired to state whether the St. John's river at Picolata has at any time within his knowledge been impassable during a whole day, so as to prevent the common ferry-boats from crossing, and whether the steamboat "Essayons" could or could not cross in any state of the winds.

Answer. I have known the river to be so rough that the common ferry-boat could not cross for two or three days; but this is not usual. I have never known the river to be so rough as to prevent the steamboat Essayons, or a boat of her class, with the assistance of scows, crossing the river and landing on the opposite bank. The width of the river St. John's at Picolata is about one and three-quarters of a mile. I have crossed it there a number of times myself, and two or three times with my company and baggage, and never was detained.

The court adjourned to meet to-morrow morning at 11 o'clock.

JANUARY 28, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

The court was occupied until the 30th with the case of General Scott, when it adjourned to meet on the 31st, at 11 o'clock.

JANUARY 31, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present but the judge advocate, who was prevented by indisposition from attending the court: whereupon the court adjourned to meet to-morrow morning at 11 o'clock.

FEBRUARY 1, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

Colonel D. E. TWIGGS, of the 2d regiment of dragoons, a witness on the part of Major General Gaines, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by General Gaines.* What was your opinion of the sincerity of the Indians in their proposition for peace at Camp Izard the 6th of March last; and please state what motive, if any, the Indians could have had for treachery; and, finally, have you heard any observations on the subject from Indian countrymen, or other persons acquainted with the Indian character, calculated to strengthen or destroy your opinion?

Answer. The first night, (the night of the 5th,) when the Indians came and hailed the camp, I did not believe them sincere, or that they had any intention of coming in at all. The next morning I went to General Gaines and told him, "whenever you show me men coming from the moon, I will believe the Indians are coming in." Before we separated, some person standing near spoke and said, "here the Indians come." In a short time, having halted some distance from the breastwork, one or two of them came forward with a white flag. One of the volunteer officers (I think Adjutant Barrow) went out and met them. When I saw them conversing with Mr. Barrow, I then changed my opinion, and believed they were in earnest. I have thought a good deal on the subject, and I could think of no motive for their being otherwise than sincere. I judge they were sincere from what I had seen of the upper part of the Creek nation on previous occasions. It was at the Hickory Ground, with General Jackson, I think in 1813—after the first Indian came in there, I never heard of another act of hostility on the part of the nation towards the whites. The next occasion was in the Seminole campaign with General Jackson. I know after the first Indian came in there was no act of hostility. I know this, for I was left in the country. I had a conversation with Colonel Dill at Jacksonville, who has been a long time in that country. After detailing the circumstances to him as they happened at Fort Izard, he said he had not a doubt but that they were sincere in their wish for peace—so much so that he advised the people to go back again on their plantations on the road from Micanopy to Fort Drane.

2. *Question by General Gaines.* Please state what conversation you had, if any, with General Clinch on the subject of the effect of the movement of General Gaines upon the operations of General Scott's army in East Florida.

Answer. I had some conversation with General Clinch on the subject, and he stated to me pretty much what he has stated to the court: that General Gaines's movement had no influence on the movements of General Scott. He stated to me a few days ago that he regretted he had not been a little more explicit, and informed the court that the wagon train at Fort Drane had time to go to Picolata or Black creek (I don't recollect which) for provisions, and return time enough for that part of the army to get in position, agreeably to the plan of operations.

3. *Question by General Gaines.* Colonel Twigg is requested to state whether he met a wagon train,

about the middle of March last, between Fort Drane and Black creek; and if so, whether the wagons were or were not accompanied with a guard.

Answer. I left Micanopy, ten miles on this side of Fort Drane, on the 19th of March last. On that day I met the wagon train, with the provisions, about twenty miles from Black creek. I inquired of the person having charge of the wagon train, (called the wagon-master,) where the escort was. He said he had none; and I did not see any guard with it at all.

4. *Question by General Gaines.* Be pleased to state whether the Louisiana volunteers were or were not ready or willing to march at any time after the middle of March, 1836, and what are your reasons for the opinion which you entertain in this case?

Answer. I have no doubt but the Louisiana volunteers, had they been ordered, would have marched the next day after their arrival from the Withlacoochee near to Fort Drane. I had a conversation with General Smith on this subject, and his opinion and mine coincided, that both our commands, the regulars and volunteers, were ready to march, and that we should not ask to detain the army on their account.

5. *Question by General Gaines.* Colonel Twiggs is requested to state what he knows on the subject of making a sortie at or from Camp Izard in February and March, 1836.

Answer. I received an order on the 29th of February, after the Indians had retired from making an attack on us, to hold the command in readiness for a sortie. After the 29th, in a conversation with General Gaines, I think he stated to me he had written to the officer in command at Fort Drane, and he expected him down with some mounted troops; that, as soon as they made their appearance, the command was to leave the breastwork to attack the Indians. I think he stated to me that he had so written, that he would not make the sortie until the troops should come down. I had frequent conversations with the general on the subject, and he stated to me his views: that we could do no good by going out; that the Indians would fly before us, and that as soon as any troops made their appearance we should go out and attack the Indians. It was expected that troops would arrive, from the direction of Tampa Bay, on the opposite side of the river. This was before the 5th of March.

6. *Question by General Gaines.* Be pleased to state whether any, and if any, what officers of the light brigade, expressed a doubt as to the sincerity of the Indians in their desire to fight no more and make peace, after they came in with a white flag on the 6th of March, 1836.

Answer. I never heard one express a doubt while I stayed there—not one.

1. *Question by the court.* What is your opinion of the number of the enemy that invested Camp Izard; and were the forces under General Gaines sufficient to have driven or dispersed the enemy, had a sortie been made?

Answer. I estimated the Indians on the 29th, that were firing on Camp Izard, at about 1,000. I believe the force was quite sufficient to have driven them at any time.

2. *Question by the court.* Do you believe that the Indians were aware of the destitute situation of the troops as respects provisions before they made overtures for peace?

Answer. It is impossible, in my opinion, that they could have had any knowledge of it.

3. *Question by the court.* What is your opinion as to the propriety of making a sortie from Camp Izard, whilst invested by the enemy?

The witness here requested the court to excuse him from answering the question. It would be merely an expression of opinion, and *might* place him in a situation towards General Gaines which it was his wish to avoid.

General Gaines observed that the answer of the witness could make no difference in his feelings towards him; but that he was then preparing a question similar in import to the one just proposed by the court, which would relieve the witness from any delicacy which he might feel on the subject.

The court excused the witness from answering the question, when General Gaines proposed the following:

7. *Question by General Gaines.* Colonel Twiggs is desired to state whether or not it was his opinion, at any time between the 27th of February and 6th of March, that the enemy could have been subdued by making a sortie, or whether it would not have contributed only to disperse the Indians; and state whether the Indians could not have concealed themselves in a thick hammock at any moment in three or four minutes' time; and state whatever opinion he entertained on the subject at the time, and whether he communicated to General Gaines such opinion.

Answer. To the first part of the question, from the 27th to the 28th, and including the 28th, the Indians were on the opposite side of the river, and we had not boats to cross the river. From the 29th of February to the 5th of March we could, at any time the Indians made their appearance, have driven them; but we had not the means to follow them. I cannot say whether we should have dispersed them or not; as our camp fronted the river, there was an extensive hammock and scrub on the left. There was a hammock also on the right; both of them two or three hundred yards of the camp, or probably a shorter distance, and the Indians could have taken shelter in either of those hammocks in a few minutes. I never gave General Gaines, while at Camp Izard, any opinion as to the propriety of a sortie.

8. *Question by General Gaines.* Colonel Twiggs is requested to state whether any officers, and if any, who, of the light brigade, at Camp Izard, in February and March, 1836, expressed the opinion that a sortie ought to have been made.

Answer. Not one, while I was there, expressed such an opinion. I had, and as far as I could learn from the opinion of the command generally they had, entire confidence in General Gaines, and we were willing to submit to his judgment.

Captain Drane, a witness, again called.

5. *Question by General Gaines.* Please state what reasons you had, if any, after returning with the right wing of the Florida army to Fort Drane, for believing the families of the Indians were still in the cove, and whether any doubt remained on your mind as to their being there in March and April last.

Answer. The night before the right wing of the army crossed the Big Withlacoochee, returning, I was called at 12 o'clock that night by Major Cooper, who was the officer of the day, to listen to the talk of both Indians and negroes on the north bank of the Big Withlacoochee. The next morning the army had marched but about half a mile, when we crossed a trail of Indians coming out of a swamp, passing to the south. A little further on, about two or three hundred yards, we discovered a trail leading into the swamp. The trails were evidently fresh and made that morning. The second day after crossing the Little Withlacoochee, on our route to Fort King, the army crossed several small trails, some leading

to the east and to the west; those west, leading into Wahoo swamp, or in that direction. The day following (the day we reached Fort King) our left flankers were attacked by a small party of Indians that soon fled, also in the direction of the Wahoo swamp, or Withlacoochee. On our arrival at Fort King we were there informed that Billy Omathla's wife and one other squaw—I believe her sister—had been captured during the absence of the army from Fort Drane, and taken off by the hostile Indians. Some days after the army arrived at Fort Drane, Billy Omathla's wife made her escape and returned to the right wing of the army, to her husband. I had several conversations with her, through the interpreter. She informed me that the Indians had not moved from the Wahoo swamp and the coves on the Wathlacoochee; that their women and children were still there; that they had planted their grounds; that the crops were very fine, and described the corn and rice as being about a foot high. She stated that, in her opinion, they would have a better crop than they had ever had. I inquired of her if the Indians had moved their families from there at any time during the war. She informed me that they had not. She there had had a conversation with Powell, who advised her to quit her husband and join the Mickasukies, and not return back to the white people; that his men had whipped all the white men and driven them out of the country, and that they had gone home; that he meant to assemble his warriors and drive the pale faces from Fort King, and then he would go to Fort Drane and drive them away from there, where they would get a large supply of ammunition; they would then drive all the Alachewa's (meaning volunteers) out of the country as far as the Suwanee, when they would have all the country from the Suwanee south to themselves. She informed me that she had heard Powell repeatedly say, during the time she was in captivity, that he never would make peace with the white man. These are the reasons why I have never had a doubt that the Indians had never quitted the cove or their strongholds on the Withlacoochee. After the army had returned from the Withlacoochee, with General Gaines, I was sent to Oakland, five or six miles northeast from Fort Drane, where I remained until General Scott arrived. During the time I occupied that post with my command, and a few days after I returned from the Withlacoochee, very frequent signs of Indians were discovered on the plantation of Colonel John McIntosh, and crossing the main road leading to Micanopy. I had frequently seen fires on the opposite side of Orange lake during this period, and I felt satisfied they were Indian fires. The Indian women spoken of in this answer were captured during the time the army was absent on its march from Fort Drane to Tampa Bay. They returned from captivity after the army arrived at Fort Drane from Tampa Bay.

6. *Question by General Gaines.* Please state, as far as you know, the disposition of the troops at and near Fort Drane from the 11th to the 26th of March; whether individuals or small parties were exposed to the enemy during that time; whether any attack was made by the enemy; and whether, from your knowledge of the scouting habits of the Indians, they could have been ignorant of the exposed situation of individuals, parties, or detachments during the time specified.

Answer. After the army returned from the Withlacoochee they were encamped in a range of country extending, I think, eleven or twelve miles, Fort Drane being the centre. The only troops on the left of the centre were my own command at Oakland. Those encamped in a southwestèrly direction from Fort Drane, or on its right, were the Louisiana volunteers and the regulars that had been at Camp Izard. There were small parties and individuals passing to and from the encampments, and were exposed to the enemy. I never heard of their being attacked or any attempt to attack them. The Indians were not ignorant that these parties were passing back and forth, as frequently, in going between Oakland and Fort Drane, I saw small Indian trails crossing the road in both directions, passing to the north and south. I also saw Indian tracks in many other directions, as far north as within seventeen miles of the ferry at Picolata.

7. *Question by General Gaines.* Is the witness of opinion that it was known or believed at Fort Drane that the general commanding in Florida had required five hundred Creek warriors as an auxiliary force against the Seminoles; and does the witness know or believe that information of that requisition was communicated to the Seminoles by means of a negro named Primus?

Answer. Not to my knowledge. I had understood that Primus was sent into the nation, but I was not at that post at the time, nor do I know for what purpose he was sent.

8. *Question by General Gaines.* Does the witness suppose that, from the information likely to be communicated by Primus to the Seminoles, they could have anticipated any other than a spirit of exterminating hostility from the troops on the movement of the right wing?

Answer. I am not able to say.

The court here adjourned, to meet to-morrow morning at 11 o'clock.

FEBRUARY 2, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

Lieutenant Mitchell, a witness, again called.

9. *Question by General Gaines.* Lieutenant Mitchell is requested to state what was said in his presence or hearing, by the Indian women who had been with the hostile party, as to the location and views of the party in the spring or summer of 1836.

Answer. On the 12th of October we arrived within about four miles of the Withlacoochee. The advance guard surprised and took some Indian women and children prisoners. These women were interrogated by Governor Call as to the then location of the Indians, and they reported that the Mickasuky tribe was still on the Withlacoochee, in the cove. The Indian families, they said, were on the opposite side of the river from where we were at that time, and the negroes and their families were on the side with us, between the river and a lake that emptied into the river. They said that Micanopy with his party was located in the Wahoo swamp.

10. *Question by General Gaines.* Lieutenant Mitchell is desired to state whether any guards were ordered to accompany the baggage train or other wagons, or other parties that passed to and from Black creek and round about Fort Drane, to and from the several encampments, from four to six miles from Fort Drane, in March, 1836.

Answer. I am unable to say whether a guard accompanied the baggage from Black creek; but there never was a guard, that I know of, that accompanied the train from Fort Drane to the encampment occupied by the 4th infantry and the Louisiana volunteers, about four miles from Fort Drane. Individuals and small parties were frequently passing between Fort Drane and the several encampments; individuals were also in the habit of hunting in the vicinity of our encampment.

11. *Question by General Gaines.* Does the witness believe that wagons, or small parties, or single individuals, would have been allowed to pass and re-pass between the camp of the Louisiana volunteers and Fort Drane, if no effort had been made by the enemy to sue for peace?

Answer. I know it was the opinion of the Louisiana volunteers and the 4th infantry that there was no danger in passing and re-passing in the vicinity of the encampments, and that it was their opinion that the Indians were sincere in their proposition for peace at Camp Izard. As to whether this impression prevailed throughout General Scott's camp at Fort Drane, I am unable to say.

12. *Question by General Gaines.* Is the witness of opinion that it was known or believed at Fort Drane that the general commanding in Florida had required 500 Creek warriors as an auxiliary force against the Seminoles; and does the witness know or believe that information of that requisition was communicated to the Seminoles by means of a negro named Primus?

Answer. I heard it spoken of at Fort Drane by a gentleman named Watson, who said he could go and bring these Indians down, if permitted by General Scott; but it is my impression it was not believed that he would ever bring them. He, however, went off with that intention, but returned without the Indians. The reason why he did not bring them I am unable to say. I don't know of any such information having ever been communicated to the Indians. The reports about camp were, that Watson had gone after these 500 Indians. I think Primus was sent to the enemy after these reports were in circulation, and that he did not return.

Mr. CUMMINGS, of the United States navy, a witness on the part of Major General Gaines, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

Question by General Gaines. Were you on an expedition from Tampa Bay to Pease creek, or its neighborhood, about April, 1836; and if so, state what evidences were discovered of Indians being or having been in force in that neighborhood?

Answer. I was with General Smith at that time, (the last part of April.) I was at Charlotte harbor when he arrived there; joined him and remained with him until he re-embarked for Tampa Bay. While with General Smith I saw no Indians at all; an old trail, probably of some ten or twelve men, was the only sign of Indians that we met. While I was in the neighborhood there were some signs of Indians in the vicinity of the residence of the collector; these Indians had been there before General Smith arrived. We went up Pease creek in canoes about forty miles, returned to the old encampment, and then went through the country about fifty or sixty miles, and saw no signs of Indians but the old trail I have mentioned.

General Gaines here presented to the court the paper numbered 38, (see documents,) being a copy of the "New York Courier and Enquirer" of April 2, 1836.

At the request of General Gaines, certain passages in that paper (editorial) were read to the court by the judge advocate; after which, at the instance of General Gaines—

Colonel WILLIAM DE PEYSER, of Florida, was duly sworn as a witness, and interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by General Gaines.* The witness is desired to state whether he has or has not reason to believe that the article from the "Courier and Enquirer," of April 2, 1836, was not written by or at the suggestion of Major General Scott; if so, he is desired to state the grounds of his belief.

Answer. I do not believe that it was written by General Scott, or with his knowledge; further, I do not believe that General Scott ever published or caused to be published an article of the kind, or that there was ever one published with his knowledge. I have been associated a good deal with General Scott, and have known him to disapprove of any publication of the kind; and have heard him say, himself, that he never did authorize or request any public or private publication, and that he did not believe that any of his staff had published anything. As to this individual publication, I never saw or heard of it until this moment; and it appears to be an editorial article, written by the editor.

2. *Question by General Gaines.* The witness is desired to state whether he has or has not heard Major General Scott express in conversation sentiments similar to those expressed in the article alluded to in the last interrogatory; if so, state when and where.

The witness here asked whether General Gaines expected him to relate a private conversation with a friend. He had no objection on his own account to answer the question.

After some remarks made by General Gaines and the witness, the court was cleared, and decided that the question was not a proper question to be put.

After the court was resumed, General Gaines asked that his case might be laid over until the 9th instant, to give time for an important witness to present himself for examination, and to afford him time also to prepare his final address; whereupon the court adjourned to meet on the 9th of February, at 11 o'clock a. m.

THURSDAY, February 9, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present but General Atkinson, in consequence of whose absence the court adjourned to meet to-morrow morning at 11 o'clock.

FEBRUARY 10, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

General P. F. SMITH, adjutant general of the State of Louisiana, and witness on the part of Major General Gaines, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by General Gaines.* General Smith is desired to state what command he had in the campaign in Florida under General Gaines, and by whose request the corps of Louisiana volunteers were raised and called into the service of the United States.

Answer. I served as third in command in the army under General Gaines, having waived my rank as colonel in favor of Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs. I had been a long time acquainted with Colonel Twiggs, and highly respected him as an officer, and thought it would be hardly fair that I should derive the advantages of his experience and receive the honors that might possibly accrue by having him with me. The corps of Louisiana volunteers was raised on the requisition of General Gaines.

2. *Question by General Gaines.* General Smith is requested to state his opinion as to the best mode of fighting the Indians at Camp Izard, between the 28th of February and the 5th of March, 1836, inclu-

sively, taking into consideration all the circumstances attending the service there, and particularly whether, in his opinion, a sortie would have been attended with advantages.

Answer. I believe that the only mode of fighting Indians is to wound or kill Indian warriors, but that simply to attempt to disperse them would produce no great benefit; therefore, if the Indians occupy a position which we desire to occupy ourselves, we must certainly attack and drive them; but, under other circumstances, whatever method offers the greatest facilities of wounding or killing them is the best method of fighting them. The position which General Gaines occupied at Camp Izard, at the period mentioned, was one that he was desirous of maintaining, and I therefore think that he was likely to do more injury to the Indians in repulsing their advance on his position than he would do in quitting it to follow them through the woods. It is impossible for a soldier on foot in that country to overtake an Indian. The Indian could, at the first attack, withdraw himself from the fire, and the facilities of the hammocks in the neighborhood afford them a retreat in which they could hide themselves immediately. I believe that, as in attacks on positions fortified or not, the loss is always greater on the attacking party than in any other kind of combat, where the object is to destroy the life of the enemy, that species of combat affords more advantages than any other. The battle of New Orleans, the attack on Sandusky, and, in fact, all the attacks which were repelled during the last war, are evidences of this. On the 29th of February, when, I think, the largest body of Indians appeared, I think it likely that fewer of our men would have suffered if we had made a sortie, but far fewer of the enemy would have fallen. The defences that were afterwards made of the camp were hardly then begun, and especially the whole interior of the camp was entirely exposed. General Gaines himself, who was sitting near the centre of the camp, received a wound in his mouth. I therefore think that, under all the circumstances, there was a greater injury inflicted on the enemy, as they approached the camp through the open ground around it, than if the troops had gone out and followed them through the woods. I would remark, however, that the whole of the troops were not in camp; two companies of the Louisiana regiment were posted down on the river, and a part of them were drawn in afterwards to cover a part of the line.

3. *Question by General Gaines.* What is the opinion of General Smith upon the motives of the Indians in seeking an interview and expressing a desire for peace at the Withlacoochee? and state how far the Indians manifested a desire for peace by their conduct previous to the hostile movement of the troops from Fort Drane, the 26th of March, under the orders of General Scott.

Answer. I think, indeed I feel assured, that the Indians were perfectly sincere in seeking a peace. I don't know on what terms they may have wished it, but I believe they desired a peace. A great many reasons operated on my mind to produce this conviction. The first was, that on the night of the 29th, after the Indians had retired across the river, I heard some one, in a peculiar voice, by the tones of which I judged it to be Powell's, making an address to his followers, apparently. The friendly Indians and their interpreter lay close by me. I called to them through the interpreter, and desired them to listen and try if they could catch any of the expressions. When the speech was finished, the Indians said to me, through the interpreter, that it was an address of the chief, intended to encourage them; that he told them that no matter if they had suffered on our side of the river, that when we attempted to cross they would then have the advantage; and he suggested to me that it was apparent from this that a portion of the Indians were dissatisfied. The Indians did not appear again the next day, nor until the evening of the second day, when a few shots were fired out of one of the hammocks on the river; nor did there ever seem to be one-fourth of the number of Indians on our side of the river that appeared on the 29th. On the evening when the first offer to treat was made, a voice of a negro hailed the camp in English. He called out that the Indians were tired of fighting, and desired to come in and make friends. He was answered, by direction of General Gaines, that if the chiefs sent in a flag the next day it would be respected. They held a talk next day with the officers sent by General Gaines, precisely as they were directed to do. From all these circumstances, it suggested itself to me that there was a large portion of the Indians who were averse to continue the war, so large that the hostile party was obliged to conform to their desires; that they had nothing to gain, under any view of the subject, by delay; that they were then as well prepared to carry on the war, and better than they would be at any subsequent period; whereas they must have expected that the whites would increase in force and strength every day; that if their object was to gain time in order to escape, that they could always have done that, as they could always outmarch us, and that in fact they did not make use of it for that purpose, for Primus, who was sent to them afterwards, must have found them in the upper part of the cove or in the Wahoo swamp. From the time the Indians held the talk with General Gaines there was not the slightest hostile movement on their part. Our men were fishing and bathing in the river every day by hundreds while we stayed there; and as there was a thick swamp on the other side, in the vicinity where they were bathing, the Indians might at any moment have shot down two hundred men, with perfect security to themselves. We encamped about four or five miles southwest from Fort Drane, between Fort Drane and the Withlacoochee, and small parties, and often single individuals, were often passing between the different encampments and Fort Drane, and were scattered over the whole woods for ten miles around, and I never heard of the sign of an Indian. The first that was heard of or met with after this period was on the evening of the day General Scott commenced his march to the Withlacoochee, when a wagoner, belonging to the Georgia horse, and who was left behind on the road, was shot by the Indians.

4. *Question by General Gaines.* Does the witness know of General Scott's having authorized the employment of 500 Creek Indians against the Seminoles, and does he believe that fact could have been communicated to the Seminoles by a negro named Primus?

Answer. The fact was known generally in camp and at Fort Drane; but I don't know whether Primus had been sent then or not. I was in camp four or five miles from Fort Drane, and was but twice at Fort Drane.

5. *Question by General Gaines.* When the right wing marched, the 26th of March, from Fort Drane, was all the transportation made use of by General Scott? and the witness is requested to state what reason Captain Shannon, assistant quartermaster, gave for leaving some commissary stores at Fort Drane.

Answer. I asked Captain Shannon, the quartermaster, some questions in relation to the transportation for my own regiment. In his answer he remarked to me that the means of transportation for the army were not sufficient to convey all the provisions that were at Fort Drane; and I understood him that some portion was left for want of transportation. I understood that the great want was the means of transportation rather than provisions. I know that General Scott had used every means in his power to obtain means of transportation.

6. *Question by General Gaines.* To what extent was the cove swamp penetrated by General Scott in

March or April, 1836, and was the search for the Indians by him sufficient to enable him to pronounce upon the position of the Indians or their families?

Answer. On the 30th of March General Scott left all the baggage under the charge of Major Wilson and a detachment at what, I presume, may be called the entrance of the cove. We marched without the baggage that afternoon probably about four and a half miles. The next morning we crossed the foot over a deep and difficult bog which was in front of our encampment. The right column, which was under my command, attacked a small party of Indians that was in front, and pursued them three or four miles, to utmost extent of the pursuit. Part of the column had arrived by taking one direction on the banks of the river; the other part, with which I was myself, was pursuing the trail down through the woods to the right, when one of General Clinch's staff brought an order for us to return. We then retraced our steps to where the baggage was, and the next morning took up our march round the outside of the cove; and after leaving Major Cooper with his battalion towards the southern extremity of it, we went to Tampa Bay. The furthest extent to which the cove was penetrated was by the party which I commanded. Both the columns that entered the cove met altogether in the cove about 120 or 130 Indians. We had lost all trace of the Indians in the cove before we were recalled. We were on an old path, but we had lost all trace of the particular party we were pursuing.

7. *Question by General Gaines.* What is the opinion of the witness as to the location of the Indian families in March and April, and does the witness know whether they had or had not gone down to Pease creek?

Answer. I had no idea of where they were at that time. They could not have been on Pease creek, unless, possibly, at the very head of it, a point beyond which I went. I do not think there was any large body of Indians on Pease creek, as I ascended it with only about 140 men, and the Indians would have known of our approach. We crossed two considerable trails leading to the south, but they must have been two or three months old.

8. *Question by General Gaines.* General Smith is requested to state in what manner the movement of General Gaines affected the movements of General Scott in Florida.

Answer. My impression has always been that every effort that General Scott could make to advance his movement was made by him; but such were the difficulties in obtaining the means of transportation that I do not think he could have been able to commence his movements earlier than he did; that therefore no operation of General Gaines delayed General Scott's movements, and that General Scott would not have been ready sooner or later, whether General Gaines was there or not. General Gaines brought from New Orleans with him some means of transportation; he added to General Scott's forces at Fort Drane about 1,000 effective men; he had acquired some knowledge of the country around the Withlacoochee; his position on the Withlacoochee had restrained the Indians during the period General Scott was occupied in transporting provisions to Fort Drane, and that, therefore, in these respects General Gaines's movements were of great advantage to the movements of General Scott. I might add that, after all, the means of transportation were not sufficient to allow General Scott to operate a long time on the Withlacoochee, and that therefore he was not able to derive those advantages which he otherwise would have derived.

9. *Question by General Gaines.* The witness is requested to state what purpose was expressed to him in maintaining the position at Camp Izard, and what importance was attached to that position by General Gaines.

Answer. After we had encamped at Camp Izard, and, I think, on the night of the 29th, General Gaines, a little after dark, came to me and stated that, as it was then evident that the Indians were in our immediate neighborhood, and that, as all the operations, if any, must be in that neighborhood, and that as that appeared to be the most convenient crossing place, whether the operations of the Alabama troops expected from Tampa Bay or from General Scott's coming from the north, that he had made up his mind to maintain that position, provided the troops under his command were disposed to submit to all the privations they might be subjected to in case the convoy of provisions expected from Fort Drane did not arrive. He argued that the position then kept the whole body of Indians in check; that it was evident we must be in the neighborhood of their establishments, and they would not dare to quit them to undertake any predatory expedition as long as the force under General Gaines was so near the position where their families were. But he stated that something might prevent our receiving any supply of provisions for some days; that then we would be obliged to have recourse to killing the horses; that if I thought that my regiment would not willingly submit to these privations, it would be easy to retire to Fort Drane where there were provisions; but that he considered it of the highest importance that he should maintain the position we then occupied on the banks of the Withlacoochee. I told General Gaines that whatever measure he should decide on would be heartily seconded by the whole of the regiment; that they were prepared to do or suffer anything that was necessary for the object of the campaign. He then expressed his determination to remain there and keep the Indians in check until the forces that were expected would be prepared to assemble around that country. General Gaines was principally desirous to maintain that particular position, as it was the best crossing place, and indeed it was afterwards selected by General Scott in crossing his army. It was also General Gaines's belief that if we were to retreat from that point, or to push across to Tampa Bay, the Indians would then be let loose over the whole country; and that then, besides the forces that would be necessary to protect the convoys of provisions coming from the north, it would require a great many men scattered through the settlements to protect them from the ravages of the Indians.

Captain P. MORRISON, of the 4th regiment of infantry, a witness on the part of Major General Gaines, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by General Gaines.* General Scott having endeavored to show that a report of the war being ended caused a detention in New Orleans of supplies called for by requisitions for Florida, the witness is desired to state whether he was commissary in New Orleans from January to April, 1836, inclusive; whether any such detention took place with regard to commissary supplies; whether he had opportunities of judging whether quartermaster's stores were detained, and whether they were so detained; and is requested to state whether he understood from the quartermaster whether he would or would not feel authorized to detain supplies under the supposed circumstances of there being a report like that in question. And the witness will also please state what rations returned to New Orleans with the Louisiana volunteers from Tampa Bay; whether a part was in bulk, and by him issued to the volunteers; and whether

he made any remarks to Captain Thistle on the subject of the bacon so returned, and what remarks he made.

Answer. I was assistant commissary at New Orleans from January to April, and have been for ten years past. No detention took place in the furnishing of supplies. Every exertion was used to procure hard bread and bacon, as required by General Scott. The bread and bacon could not be procured in sufficient quantities; the other parts of the ration, consisting of pork and flour, were delivered to the quartermaster to make up the deficiency. A duty which I owe to Major Clark, as he is not present, compels me to state that every exertion was made use of on his part to furnish supplies and transportation. We both felt a deep interest that nothing should be wanted, and that no complaint should be made. From the 7th to the 16th of May, when the regiment of Louisiana volunteers returned to New Orleans from Florida, there were 720 pounds of bacon and 2,160 pounds of bread, surplus rations, which were sent to the commissary's store at New Orleans, besides other rations in proportion. Captain Thistle came to me somewhere between the 10th and 16th of May with a return for back rations. In offering Captain Thistle his choice of pork, bacon, flour or hard bread, I observed that I regretted that the hard bread and bacon had ever come back, after the difficulty I had in sending it to Florida. As to Captain Thistle's asking me why I did not send the bacon, I have no recollection of his having made such an observation to me, neither do I believe he did. No observation was made by me to Captain Thistle that the Florida war was closed. [The witness here presented to the court papers Nos. 39 and 40, (see documents,) as evidence that he had discharged his duties promptly and to the satisfaction of his department.]

2. *Question by General Gaines.* What conversation had the witness with General Gaines in New Orleans in April on the subject of sending supplies to Florida, and what did General Gaines urge?

Answer. About the beginning of April I had understood that General Gaines had arrived in New Orleans, and was on my way to pay my respects to him, when I met Major Clark, who requested me to get a requisition from General Gaines, which he had left with the general the evening previous or the same morning. I found General Gaines at his quarters. He was unwell; and, after a little conversation, I asked him for the requisition left by Major Clark. He handed it to me, and observed, very impressively, "furnish everything that you are ordered to furnish." Commodore Dallas, of the navy, came in, and I withdrew. I did not ask General Gaines about furnishing the supplies. His remarks were applied both to Major Clark and myself. [The witness here produced paper No. 41, (see documents,) showing the quantity of certain supplies at Tampa Bay on the 31st of March, 1836.]

Lieutenant GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, of the 4th infantry, a witness on the part of Major General Gaines, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by General Gaines.* General Scott having charged that General Gaines took the public transportation from Tampa Bay, to the disadvantage of the movement of Colonel Lindsay, the witness is desired to state what amount of transportation was taken by General Gaines; also whether it was or was not more than replaced by Lieutenant Casey; when Lieutenant Casey arrived at Tampa; what amount of transportation he brought; whether Colonel Lindsay had the benefit of that transportation; and by whose order, when, and where, so far as witness knows or believes, Lieutenant Casey was sent for said transportation.

Answer. There were only four or five indifferent horses taken by General Gaines that belonged to the post, besides the number that was directed to be sent by him from New Orleans. It is proper to state that there were sixty horses sent at first; but from disease and rough weather at sea five or six died, and some of the others were in a poor condition for service. Lieutenant Casey, the acting quartermaster at Tampa Bay, had been sent, I suppose by the orders of the commanding officer, to Middle Florida, (Tallahassee,) to procure means of transportation for General Gaines's army, which was expected to arrive soon. The transportation (six or eight teams complete) arrived a short time after General Gaines's departure with his forces from Tampa Bay. This transportation was put in requisition by Colonel Lindsay, after he arrived there, and formed the principal transportation of his column. To the best of my recollection there were forty-two or forty-eight horses or mules which formed the teams for the wagons which arrived from St. Mark's.

2. *Question by General Gaines.* Was it known at Tampa Bay, at the time Lieutenant Casey was sent for transportation, that any other troops were expected at Tampa Bay than those taken there by General Gaines?

Answer. I knew of no other, and I believe it was not known then that Colonel Lindsay's or any other troops were expected to arrive at that time.

The court adjourned till to-morrow at 11 o'clock a. m.

FEBRUARY 11, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

Mr. POTTER, a witness on the part of Major General Gaines, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

1. *Question by General Gaines.* Were you at Fort Drane in March, after the council on the Withlacoochee, and previous to the movement of the right wing on the 26th of that month; and what exposure of individuals or small parties to the hostility of the Seminoles occurred, and was any hostility exhibited by the Indians?

Answer. I arrived at Fort Drane with General Gaines on the 11th of March. I remained at Fort Drane until about the 10th of April. Previous to the movement of the right wing, on the 26th of March, small parties of from two to five individuals frequently passed between the various camps and Fort Drane. I, myself, mounted the horse of Major Lytle to go in search of Camp Twiggs on some business for Major Mountfort. I took the wrong road, and proceeded a distance of about six miles, as I was afterwards informed, when I met three of the Georgia volunteers. I asked them how far it was to Camp Twiggs; they answered, "eight miles in a contrary direction." They told me they had been nineteen miles that day, and were then returning; they had seen Indian tracks, and had heard of Indians being in the neighborhood where they had been. In short, to the best of my knowledge, there was no hostility exhibited by the Indians before the march of General Scott from Fort Drane. I had never been from Fort Drane to any of the encampments, which accounts for my taking the wrong road.

2. *Question by General Gaines.* Please to state, as far as you know, whether the information likely to

be communicated by Primus, who was sent among the Indians, was calculated to encourage their hopes of being heard in council according to the arrangement of General Gaines, or otherwise; and on what do you found your opinion?

Answer. At Fort Drane, on the 14th or 15th of March, I was standing near a squad of friendly Indians and an interpreter. I heard General Scott say to the interpreter, "tell them that I am determined to carry on a war of extermination among them—I will shoot down every man." I will take occasion to remark to the court that I know not what preceded this conversation, but think it more than probable he told them that they must lay down their arms. Not having had sufficient intercourse with the troops generally, my intercourse was principally with the officers at Fort Drane, and they were generally very guarded in expressing any opinion. I am therefore unable to say what impressions were produced on their minds. I merely know that the Creek Indians had been sent for, and I subsequently heard that the order had been countermanded.

3. *Question by General Gaines.* The witness is desired to describe the country in the vicinity of Camp Izard.

Answer. The country in the vicinity of Camp Izard is very hammocky. Here is a drawing made by myself; the hammocks laid down in this drawing were about 150 or 200 yards from Camp Izard. I am aware that the map is imperfect as respects the scale. I suppose the encampment was about 200 yards square, and I suppose it to be about 450 yards, or rather more, from the camp to the river on the west side of the camp. I suppose the river to be about 100 to 120 yards from the front of the encampment. There was an opening to the river in front of the camp; but the river could not be seen from the camp.

Colonel J. WATSON WEBB, editor of the "New York Courier and Enquirer," a witness, being duly sworn, was interrogated as follows:

Question by the court. You are requested to state whether you know, or have reason to believe, that Major General Scott is the author of the article in the "Courier and Enquirer" of the 2d of April, 1836, or whether it was written or published with his knowledge.

Answer. I will state to the court that I saw General Scott a short time previous to his being ordered to Florida; that I did not see him again until after his recall from that country. The article in question was written by myself, and contained my views of what had transpired in Florida up to that period. During the ten months which have since elapsed, I have seen no cause to change, in any respects, those views. I do not know that General Scott has ever seen, read, or heard of the article in question.

Question by General Gaines. Had the editor of the Courier and Enquirer a correspondent in Florida during the early part of the campaigns of 1836? Did that correspondent write from St. Augustine in a tone very highly complimentary to General Gaines of the movement of that general in Florida, quoting, in reference to that movement, that it was calling forth golden opinions from all sorts of people, and did not the tone of the letters of said correspondent entirely change after joining General Scott and going to Picolata?

And further, the witness is requested to state whether the article in the Courier and Enquirer, besides the basis it confessedly has upon the official correspondence of General Scott, as published in the Globe, and upon the article from the Richmond Enquirer, published at the residence of General Scott's immediate friends, was or was not founded upon the communications of the correspondent in Florida; and if not, upon what was the said article fabricated?

Answer. I had a correspondent in Florida at that time. That correspondent did write from St. Augustine. I have not the slightest recollection of the tone of his correspondence in relation to General Gaines; but I know, from my own feelings at that time, that if he did write anything complimentary to the general, it was very cheerfully published by me. I do not know precisely when the tone of those letters changed, but I am very certain that if they had contained anything favorable to General Gaines's conduct after the affair of the Withlacoochee and the facts in relation to the army's being intrenched there being known to me, I would have considered it unjust to the public to have given currency to such opinions. The article had, as its base, an order issued by General Gaines, and published in the "Savannah Georgian," which order met my eye on the evening of the 1st of April. The article alluded to, and based upon that order, was written after ten o'clock at night, without consulting any person or persons whatsoever. I never wrote any article, either of praise or censure, of either General Scott or General Gaines, founded upon the opinions or judgment of my correspondent, or of any other person or persons whatsoever. I have never exchanged any opinions in writing with General Scott in relation to that campaign, and, to the best of my recollection, have only seen him once for the period of about five minutes, in Broadway, in the city of New York, at which time he refused to express any opinions in relation to General Gaines, General Jesup, or others; but said "that, as regarded himself, he would compel the whole country, by the mere force of truth, to do him justice." The article alluded to is not a fabrication, but contains my views, founded upon the news which I had received from the seat of war, and such opinions in relation to military matters and military conduct as I have acquired during more than eight years' service in the army, and the greater part of it under the immediate command of the officers composing this court. I believed them to be correct then; I believe them to be correct now, as I also do the deductions drawn from the premises assumed in the article.

General Gaines having requested that his case might be laid over till Thursday, the 16th instant, to enable him to prepare his final address, his case was laid over to that day accordingly; and the court adjourned to meet on Monday, the 13th instant, at 11 o'clock a. m.

FEBRUARY 16, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

Major General Gaines presented to the court paper No. 43, (see documents,) on the subject of the publication of his letter of the 4th of July, 1836, in the New Orleans Bulletin, September 27, 1836; and, in reference to that publication, made the following remarks:

In submitting the foregoing letter for the consideration of the court, I have to state in writing what I have already intimated in reference to the publication of my letter to the adjutant general, under date the 4th of July, 1836.

That letter was published as an act of *self-defence* and *self-preservation*, in obedience to the first law of nature. This law *authorizes me and my household, my staff, and every other member of my family,*

civil and military, when assailed by *assassins* or pirates with deadly weapons in their hands, to *repel force by force*, until the assailants are subdued or disarmed; and upon the same principle, when attacked by *assassins* of reputation, *armed with the weapons of falsehood*, that law authorizes me and my family to *employ the weapons of truth* to disarm the *assassins of reputation*. I availed myself of this sacred right, in giving publicity to my letter of the 4th of July, 1836, to repel the attacks made on me, and my faithful companions in arms by the *author and publishers* of the atrocious calumnies contained in the official letters and orders upon your table, signed by Major General Winfield Scott, or by his authority, and published by certain editors of newspapers, and by the authority of certain persons, not in the power of this court, more especially the letters and reports of Major General Scott of the 1st, 4th, 9th, and 14th of March, which have been laid before this court, and the falsehoods which they contain, detected and exposed by the testimony of General Smith, Colonel Twiggs, Captain Hitchcock, Captain Drane, Captain McCall, Lieutenant Morris, Lieutenant Mitchell, and Mr. W. Potter, to all which the court is referred. In repelling these attacks, however, I have in no case violated any known law, regulation, or order. But even if it were otherwise; if, indeed, I had, in *self-defence*, and in the essential work of *self-preservation*, deviated from a *law*, a *regulation*, or an *order*, I could not but avail myself of the plea that "all human authority ceases at the point where *obedience* becomes criminal." I could not have remained silent under such calumnies as those to which I have referred, without committing a crime of omission, equal to the crime of sitting still in silence whilst *assassins* or pirates were engaged near me in the act of firing at my house, my children, or myself. My silence under such attacks would have been, in a moral point of view, highly criminal.

The old Army Regulations contain the provision which follows:

"650. *Private letters or reports, relative to military marches and operations, are frequently mischievous in design, and always disgraceful to the army; they are, therefore, strictly forbidden.* And any officer found guilty of making such report for publication, without special permission, or of placing the writing beyond his control, so that it finds its way to the press, *within one month after the termination of the campaign to which it relates, shall be dismissed from the service.*"

I have underscored the parts to which I desire the particular attention of the court.

In referring to the first member of this paragraph it may be remarked, that although "*private letters or reports relative to military marches and operations* are frequently mischievous in design," they are not always so, nor "*always disgraceful to the army.*" This is too obvious to require illustration or argument. All must admit that there may be and often have been "*private letters or reports relative to military marches and operations*" not "*always disgraceful to the army.*" for example, the meritorious soldier, regular or volunteer, who, seeing in a published report, probably from the pen of a secret enemy, assertions that he had deserted the service in the moment of battle, and had at a stated time and place gone over to the enemy, he would naturally feel inclined to contradict the report, if possible, before it should have time to reach his parents, his wife, children, or friends. In doing this, he might deem it proper himself to write or to desire some brother soldier to state that he had discharged his duty faithfully in battle at the time and place referred to in the report, and had afterwards continued to discharge his duty from place to place (naming the places visited by the army) up to the time and place at which his letter is dated. Surely no man in his proper senses would venture to say that such a *private letter* or such a *report* was "*always disgraceful to the army;*" notwithstanding it may have been written "*relative to military marches and operations,*" and in the apparent contemplation of the order or regulation in question. What "*private letters or reports,*" then, are obviously allowed or not allowed to be published? In answer, I have to remark that I have deemed it to be right to inquire what description of "*private letters or reports*" are manifestly "*mischievous in design and always disgraceful to the army?*" and to come to the conclusion that the publication of such as these only were forbidden: for example, the letter written by Captain Hitchcock, my acting inspector general, to my friend Mr. Lyon, of the House of Representatives, dated at Fort Drane, March 13, 1836, and the letter written by Captain McCall, my aide-de-camp, to the editor of the New Orleans Commercial Bulletin, dated Camp Sabine, May 18, 1836, letters voluntarily written with the most scrupulous regard to truth, and without anything like acrimonious animadversion or censure towards any officer, soldier, or citizen, I deemed to be liable to no objection. I was not apprised of the contents of these letters until after they were written and voluntarily submitted to me by the writers respectively. I expressly gave my sanction to their publication, convinced, as I was in giving publicity to mine of July 4, 1836, that they contained nothing that could tend to violate the regulation No. 650, or any other description of military law or orders.

On the other hand, I have considered such letters and *reports* as those upon your table, written by Major General Scott, dated the 1st, 4th, 9th, and 14th of March, to be "*mischievous in design, and always disgraceful to the army.*"

The testimony upon your table, and to which I have expressly referred, will enable the court, in the opinion which they are required to give, to say whether any, and if any, which of the *letters* and *reports* to which I have referred are such as were written and published in violation of the spirit, the true intent and meaning of the regulation in question.

All which is respectfully submitted.

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General by Brevet, U. S. A.*

After the foregoing remarks, Major General Gaines commenced his final address, (which accompanies these proceedings,) and continued its reading for some length of time, when, at his request, the court adjourned to meet to-morrow at 10 o'clock.

FEBRUARY 17, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

Major General Gaines took up and finished his address, after which the court adjourned to meet to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock.

FEBRUARY 18, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

The court was occupied on this day and on Monday, the 20th, in revising its proceedings in reference to the Greek campaign.

FEBRUARY 21, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

The court took up the testimony in reference to the campaign in Florida, under Major General Gaines, and, after a careful examination, finds that Major General Gaines, on receiving, at Mobile, about the 17th of January, 1836, information of the massacre of Major Dade and his command by the Seminole Indians, in Florida, repaired with promptness to the city of New Orleans, where he, with great zeal, organized a force of regular and volunteer troops, amounting to about eleven hundred men, and proceeded without delay to Tampa Bay, where he arrived about the 10th of February, and after making preparations for the field, moved on the Fort King road on the 13th, and reached Dade's battle ground on the 20th, where he buried the meritorious dead with the honors of war. He then proceeded for Fort King, where he arrived on the 22d. After drawing nine or ten days' supply of subsistence from Fort Drane, and receiving a small supply of ammunition, he moved on the Withlacoochee, where he arrived on the 27th, and encountered the same day the enemy across the river in a sharp conflict of half an hour, when the troops withdrew for the night, after a loss of one killed and six wounded. On the morning of the 28th, the troops marched down the river to a point two and a half miles below, where it was understood the crossing was practicable. Here the advance of the army was fired upon from across the river, and an action ensued, which continued until 12 or 1 o'clock, in which Lieutenant Izard was mortally wounded. The army here encamped that afternoon, and an express was despatched by Major General Gaines to General Clinch, or the officer commanding at Fort Drane; the troops in the meantime throwing up a slight breastwork of logs. On the morning of the 29th, at 9 or 10 o'clock, the enemy, in force, estimated at about one thousand or fifteen hundred men, made an attack on three sides of the fortified camp, which was continued for two hours, when he withdrew, leaving one of his dead on the field. On this day another despatch was sent by Major General Gaines to Fort Drane. From the 2d to the 5th of March the enemy made more or less spirited attacks upon the camp, in which several conflicts the loss on the part of our troops amounted to some three killed and about forty wounded. On the night of the 5th of March a proposition was made from the woods, by the enemy, for peace. On the next day a strong party of Indians appeared within five or six hundred yards of the camp, a few of whom advanced with a flag to within one hundred and fifty to two hundred yards, and Adjutant Barrow, of the volunteers, was sent out to confer with them, when they informed him they did not wish to fight any more, but wanted General Gaines to go away; upon which information General Gaines sent out Captain Hitchcock, who was accompanied by two or three officers, to hold a further conference with them. The Indians repeated to him their proposition for peace, and stated they had lost a great many of their men. Before the conference was finally closed, the advance of the troops under General Clinch came up, and commenced a fire upon the Indians standing in the rear, when they and the chiefs in council fled and covered themselves in the hammocks, and were no more heard of up to the 10th of March, when the army (the command of which had been turned over by Major General Gaines to General Clinch the day preceding) fell back upon Fort Drane, where it arrived on the 11th.

The court, after carefully reviewing and collating the testimony of Captains Hitchcock and McCall, Colonel Twiggs, General Smith and others, in reference to the operations and peculiar situation of the army at Camp Izard, finds it difficult to come to a conclusion as to the real causes of the failure of the campaign. It appears, although the army was surrounded and repeatedly assailed by the enemy in its fortified position from the 29th of February to the 5th of March, and straitened in its means of subsistence, that, however important to the chivalry and reputation of the troops, no sally was made to test the result of such a movement, which it is possible might have issued in the defeat and subjection of the enemy, and have brought the war to a close. But the court, however, judging from subsequent events in prosecuting the war under other commanders, and the indomitable spirit of hostility evinced by the enemy, is of opinion that, had a sortie been made by Major General Gaines, though he might have been able to beat and drive the enemy into the surrounding hammocks and swamps, they would have eluded pursuit and retired to their more remote fastnesses. But, if such had been the result of a sortie, Major General Gaines had not the means of subsistence to have enabled him to remain long enough in or about the cove of the Withlacoochee to seek out the enemy and press the war to a successful conclusion. Still, the court, without impugning the motives that influenced Major General Gaines, is of opinion that a sortie, under all the circumstances of the case, should have been made.

The court, therefore, in taking a full and impartial view of all the circumstances appertaining to the operations of Major General Gaines at Camp Izard, is of opinion that the failure of the campaign should rather be attributed to the want of the means of subsistence to prosecute the war than to the contingent result of a sortie.

The attention of the court was next called to a consideration of the publication of Major General Gaines's official report of the 4th of July, 1836, to the adjutant general, in the public prints. The fact of its publication in the "New Orleans Bulletin" of the 27th of September is admitted by Major General Gaines (as will appear in the proceedings of the court) as authorized by him, and without any authority but his own action. The court is not aware that its publication in the public journals as late as the 29th of September is in violation of any rule or regulation of the service; but is of opinion that all publications in the public prints tending to excite public opinion, or to produce recriminations between officers, are prejudicial to the interests of the public service and injurious to the discipline of the army. The publication of the official report of Major General Gaines, of the 4th of July, to the adjutant general, is considered by the court as falling under publications of this description, by its personal allusions.

The court cannot close its proceedings without adverting to the strain of invectives and vituperation used by Major General Gaines, in the language generally of his summary of the evidence touching the operations of his Seminole campaign; particularly the part of it couched in the following terms: "*the atrocious machinations of the second United States general officer who has ever dared to aid and assist the open enemy of the republic in their operations against United States forces employed in the protection of the frontier people. The first great offender was Major General Benedict Arnold; the second, as your finding must show, is Major General Winfield Scott.*" Assertions without facts or circumstances to sustain them, and unbecoming his, Major General Gaines's, high rank and station—remarks and assertions which the court condemn in the most decided terms of reprehension.

The court, in continuation, feels itself compelled to notice the censure in the official letters of Major General Scott (spread upon the record of these proceedings) cast upon Major General Gaines, in reference to his operations in Florida; and in a tone of language that could not be otherwise than offensive to

the latter general, and in terms, the court is of opinion, not called for under the circumstances of the case, and ought not to have been indulged in.

ALEX. MACOMB, *Major General, President of the Court of Inquiry.*
S. COOPER, *Judge Advocate, Recorder of the Court.*

Defence of Major General E. P. Gaines, before the court of inquiry of which Major General Macomb is president. Frederick, Maryland, February, 1837.

MR. PRESIDENT: My first object is to show that the order given me to command the western department, made it my duty, on hearing of the outbreak of savage war upon the troops and frontier inhabitants of East Florida, within the known limits of my department, to collect together whatever disposable force I could obtain near me, and fly to the theatre of the war to "*repel the invasion,*" and beat the enemy, or hold them in check, and stand between them and the bleeding frontier, until the President of the United States should be advised of the state of the war, and of my movements and measures, and thereupon make whatever arrangements he might see fit for affording *protection* to the frontier and terminating the war.

I stand before this court as one of the *accused*. Major General Scott, though placed, as I am placed, in the attitude which the law recognizes as one of the "*accused,*" (see the 91st article of the Rules and Articles of War,) has been erroneously, as I have endeavored to show, suffered by the court to *act as my accuser—and thus to act in my absence*. Protesting again, as I have protested, against this proceeding, I can but avail myself of the restricted means which the court has seen fit to impose in the vindication of my conduct; and since the court has denied me the privilege of meeting my accuser and his witnesses face to face, and thus scrutinizing the accusations against me, and "*cross-examining and interrogating the witnesses,*" as authorized by the 91st article of war, I find myself compelled to proceed under all the disadvantages of repelling accusations that have not only been so far sanctioned by the Secretary of War as to be published by his authority, and then acted on by the court in my absence, and ultimately forwarded to the Department of War, as I have been given to understand, with the final decision of this court.

Notwithstanding all these disadvantages, Mr. President, I do not despair. The strength of my cause, the strict military propriety of my measures, with the patient hearing which the court has given to the testimony before you, assure me that whatever may have been the force of *appearances* against me, I cannot but feel satisfied that the testimony upon your table will convince you of the correctness of my conduct, as set forth in my letter of the 4th of July to the adjutant general, to every part of which, and to my correspondence and orders to which it refers, I desire the particular attention of the court, as a part of this, my final vindication.

Mr. President: When last before this court you notified me, whether with or without the concurrence of the court I did not understand, that Major General Scott was *not considered my accuser*. I then endeavored to convince the court, from a hasty reference to the official letters and reports of that officer, that he was, in fact, my accuser. I have since seen, in an article purporting to be the defence of General Scott before this court, a declaration that he is not my accuser. If this is true, sir, the letters bearing the signature of that officer, dated at Picolata, the 1st and 4th of March, with his letters dated the 9th and 14th of March, which I have seen before the court, must be considered as forgeries; otherwise, the *receiver* of those letters, who authorized their publication, must be my accuser, for I can truly affirm that during the long period of my service I have never known an officer to be more palpably charged with crimes than the writer of those letters has seen fit to charge me. I therefore deem it to be due to the public service, and to my own reputation, aspersed by these accusations, to establish their authorship, whilst I prove them to be false and calumnious. The question between the *writer* and the *receiver* I leave to be settled between them. The *writer* is in the power of the court, the *receiver* is not.

In my letter of July 4, 1836, addressed to the adjutant general, I made the statement which follows:

"The Order No. 7 of the present year, requiring General Scott to repair to the left wing of my department, was never seen by me until my arrival at Fort King, the 22d of February. I state this fact simply because it is a *fact* hitherto, I apprehend, unknown at your office, but it is a fact to which I attach little or no importance. Had I received this order at Pensacola, I should have viewed it as a measure of the *Secretary of War*, taken without a full knowledge of the progress of the war upon that frontier, and of the circumstances which had rendered my movement to Florida proper; and that therefore my movement thither ought to continue until I should feel assured that the President was apprised of all the material facts bearing upon the subject, and more especially until the officer authorized to enter upon that part of my command assigned to him, and which formed the principal theatre of the war, should make his appearance in person upon that theatre of the war, unless, indeed, my attention had been called to other and apparently more important military operations, also *in actual war*, than those which called me to East Florida.

"This view of the subject is based upon an essential principle of military law, derived from the laws of nature, and incorporated in our institutions—a principle sustained by the ablest writers of all enlightened nations to whose works I have had access—a principle without the strict observance of which no nation whose geographical limits exceed twenty miles square could be successfully defended—a principle deeply interwoven with the highest attributes of *sovereignty* and of *self-government*, namely, *self-defence* and *self-preservation* as a nation or a state, or, in other words, *protection, immediate, instantaneous protection to the exposed feeble members of the community from savage war*. Yes, sir, *immediate, instantaneous protection* by the military officer intrusted with the command of the particular section of country threatened with savage attack, until relieved *before the enemy* by the new commander.

"Let us look into a few of the principal features of the case in question and see what would probably have been the effect of a contrary rule of conduct on my part. In command of the western department, I had met, at New Orleans, intelligence of a great and unlooked-for disaster having occurred upon the left wing of my department, far distant from the seat of the federal government, from whence alone could I hope to receive new orders, or special instructions, more applicable to the case in all its bearings than the orders of the President embraced in my commission to serve the United States diligently as a general officer, with the orders which he had given me to *COMMAND THE WESTERN DEPARTMENT*. An important white settlement within my department was reported to be *OVERRUN, SACKED, AND BURNED*—a United States agent of Indian affairs, and eight valuable officers, and ninety-eight faithful soldiers, with many worthy frontier citizens, killed, and their property stolen or destroyed; and I was aware that most of the neigh-

boring military posts—namely, Forts Brooke, King, Drane, and Key West, all within my military department—were without any other works of defence than such as an efficient force of five hundred men might have taken and destroyed in a few hours with little loss or risk on their part—the garrisons of two of those posts (Fort King and Key West) being insufficient for their defence. I was, moreover, apprised that there were but about six hundred troops of the regular army at that time in Florida, and that these were separated by a wilderness, supposed to be occupied by the enemy, comprehending near twenty thousand square miles, extending near two hundred and fifty miles from north to south, and from one hundred and twenty to forty miles from east to west—with our six hundred regulars stationed at the opposite angles and sides of this extensive wilderness, without disposable force sufficient to insure a concentration at any one important vulnerable point from one side of the wilderness in question to the other, without the most imminent danger of having such force destroyed in its movements to the point of concentration. The destruction of the brave but unfortunate Major Dade, with his heroic officers and men, affords an impressive lesson upon this view of the subject which no prudent American soldier or citizen should ever lose sight of. Under these circumstances, what was the duty of the commander of the western department? What, I ask, was the proper course for me to pursue? These questions may be most readily answered by asking another: What had I promised upon my oath to do? I had promised upon my oath, prescribed by law, 'to bear true faith and allegiance to the United States of America, and to serve them honestly and faithfully against their enemies or opposers whomsoever, and to observe and obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to the rules and articles of war.'

"I had with me my sword and my commission, with the orders of the President of the United States to 'command' this department. Now, it is well known that for me to command a military department, or any particular section of country upon the frontier, great or small, is, in a plain military sense, *so to order and employ the men and means confided to my direction as to protect our own people of the United States upon that section of frontier 'against their enemies or opposers whomsoever,'* as set forth in the aforementioned oath; and if it be in time of war, to continue so to command until duly relieved by the new commander, IN HIS OWN PROPER PERSON, and on the theatre of war.

"In failing to comply with this sacred injunction, I well knew that I might thereby have suffered the enemy to kill great numbers of the citizens and troops, in addition to those already slain, within the limits of my command, and burn their houses, and take their property. It was my bounden duty, therefore, without waiting for *new orders* or special instructions, to collect together my disposable force found within my department, which I might deem sufficient to enable me promptly to strike at the enemy, and, if possible, subdue them, or check their devastations, until the President should have notice of them, and of my efforts to arrest them, and then give such new orders as he might think fit.

"But it is contended—principally, indeed, by those who have proven themselves to be better qualified for the quiet vocation of a writing-desk than the turbulent scenes of an Indian war—that I ought to have abandoned the expedition at Pensacola, because I received, on my arrival at that city, your letter notifying me, not that General Scott had actually arrived at the theatre of the war in Florida, but that he had been ordered thither by the Secretary of War! But little reflection is necessary to see the fallacy of this closest-view of the subject. I had embarked, pursuant to my letter of the 2d of February, addressed 'to General Clinch, or the officer commanding the forces assembling on the northeast border of East Florida,' with a view to co-operate with that officer in subduing the enemy; I had, moreover, given a pledge to the principal force then with me, the Louisiana volunteers, that I would not require them to go further than I would myself go, and that I would stand by them as long as they would stand by me in bringing the war to an honorable close. I had thus promised, on the 2d of February, with a force of seven hundred men, so to co-operate; this force had been fortunately increased before the embarkation was effected to near one thousand one hundred men. With this very respectable force embarked, and in its movement for Tampa Bay, and within two days' march (by steam) of that place, I received at Pensacola the notification from you that General Scott had been ordered by the Secretary of War to that part of my command to which I was, under the above-mentioned circumstances, destined. But what assurance could I have had that he was there? Did you notify me that he was at the post of honor assigned to him by the Secretary of War, or that such arrangements had been made as afforded reasonable ground to hope that General Scott would be prepared soon to breast the storm of savage desolation, and protect from the scalping-knife and fire-brand the helpless citizens of both sexes and of all ages in that region, who had looked to me as their protector? Did you tell me that Ocoola and his war chiefs had given to the President satisfactory assurance that they would suspend their massacres and conflagrations until General Scott should complete his plan of operations, and be quite ready to subdue them? No such thing is found in your letter. Nor had I any reason, from the previous northern or western wilderness movements of that officer, to anticipate anything like a prompt movement on his part into the wilds of Florida longer than he should find himself and his forces and supplies propelled by steam-power."

I repeat, sir, I had been notified, not that General Scott was there, but that he had been ordered thither; I was assured, not that Ocoola and his ferocious chieftains and braves had promised to suspend their wonted havoc until General Scott should have full leisure to mature his plan of operations, and be quite ready to surround and annihilate the enemy; but was simply notified that this officer was ordered to extend his operations into my department, without regard to imaginary lines. It is here proper, and essential to my complete vindication, to advert to the well-known fact that, on a previous occasion, when General Scott was ordered into my department against the Black Hawk and his red warriors, that officer did not arrive at the theatre of the war until the enemy had been met and beaten by the gallant troops headed by the commander of the right wing of my department, now a member of this court, seconded and sustained by another member of this court, with Taylor, of the United States army, and Dodge, of the volunteers. Major General Scott with his troops did certainly move with very considerable rapidity from Albany, New York, to Chicago, at the southern extremity of Lake Michigan, as long as he was propelled by steam-power; but, when this mighty power could no longer be rendered subservient to his movement, the general, with a large portion of his army, fell prostrate upon the threshold of the then theatre of the war, afflicted with disease, and mortified that they were thus deprived of the professional gratification of leading in the vigorous chase, and winning the honors of the victory which ensued. He arrived at the theatre of that war not until after the enemy had been subdued, and in time only to perform the diplomatic duties assigned to him by the Secretary of War.

I was warranted, therefore, by his northwestern tardy movements and misfortunes, in the apprehension that the same officer might possibly be tardy and unfortunate while in quest of southern laurels; but

it was enough for me to know, as I did full well know, that, even had each one of us, with our troops, been blessed with the unerring means of flying rapidly as an eagle to the protection of the suffering frontier, it were better to "make assurance doubly sure," and for each of us thus to hasten our movement thither, than that any possible chance of a failure to afford timely protection should be hazarded, and hazarded, too, by uncalled-for haste in my complying with a notification or suggestion like that which met me at Pensacola from Adjutant General Jones requiring no immediate action on my part—a notification which was obviously written without any knowledge of the *extraordinary circumstances and irrevocable arrangements* which made it my duty to proceed to Florida, and to act with all possible effect in protecting the frontier inhabitants and subduing the enemy; until these circumstances and arrangements should be known to the Department of War, and other measures be taken there; or until I should meet with the officer authorized to relieve me; or, finally, until I should beat the enemy and force them to sue for peace, as I ultimately had the satisfaction to do between the 27th of February and 6th of March, 1836, as the evidence upon your table abundantly proves—a fact to which I shall again advert somewhat more in detail.

General Scott left Washington for East Florida on the 22d of January. On the 2d of February he writes officially to Colonel Lindsay, and communicates his expectation of being in readiness to act decisively in East Florida by the 25th of that month. When I heard of his having been ordered to East Florida, I made a similar calculation, and confidently expected to meet him about or before that time upon the theatre of the war. I have shown to this court my readiness and willingness to yield my command to him, or to co-operate with him—leaving the election entirely to himself; my sole purpose being to afford *protection* to the frontier by acting immediately upon the enemy. If General Scott, in the full knowledge of his own resources, and with as ample authority as was ever furnished to any general in the field, was induced thus to anticipate the contemplated time of action in the enemy's country, my own expectations in respect to him can be regarded only as an evidence of my confidence in him, which his subsequent movements most lamentably disappointed, with no fault of mine. Had he fulfilled my expectations, our two forces might have united in a most solemn duty upon the battle ground of the gallant and lamented Dade; for it was upon the 20th of February I performed the deeply affecting duty of giving honorable interment to the bodies of our military brethren sacrificed fifty-two days before by an overwhelming band of savages; and, having thus united our forces at that melancholy scene, we might at once have directed our march upon the enemy and crushed him at a blow.

But to return to the actual movements of General Scott. He arrived at Picolata on the 21st of February, in advance of his troops and in advance of his transportation for his army. On the 26th of February he hears of my arrival at Fort King, and immediately writes to the War Department a denunciatory letter against me, formally reporting that my movement had thwarted his plan of campaign, and stating distinctly that his plan was to have marched upon the enemy on the 8th of March.

I will pause here to call the attention of the court to this formal announcement of his *plan*, and the defeat of it by my movement, in order to connect with it, in the view of the court, the several passages which I have caused to be spread upon the record, all taken from the original letters of General Scott, wherein that general over and over again reports officially to the War Department that, of his means of transportation, "not a horse or a mule has arrived"—"not a wagon, &c., has arrived"—"the steamboat Essayons, like everything else left behind, has not arrived"—"the South Carolina troops have not arrived;" sometimes he writes "they have not been heard of." Captain Wharton and his dragoons had not arrived. Certain troops that had arrived had refused to be mustered into service, and thus crippled him to such an extent that, finally, the strong necessity of the case compelled him to lean upon the brave Louisianians and regulars under my command; for, on the 6th of March, we find him still at Picolata writing that, if the Louisiana troops or those of General Gaines shall not be at Fort Drane, it will be indispensable for him to suspend his movement until the arrival of Captain Wharton. In his strong agony, General Scott, who had been directed to prosecute the war, and had authority to command into service men and means, was obliged formally to report that, unless the troops of General Gaine were at Fort Drane, it would become indispensable for him to await the arrival of Captain Wharton. I have caused to be placed upon your record the official report showing that Captain Wharton did not reach Fort Drane until the 23d of March. Of course, by General Scott's own showing, he could not have marched upon the enemy until that date; and it is upon your record that he did actually move within three days after it. So that under no possible statement of facts can it be made to appear that my movement delayed him over three days' time.

But, Mr. President, since I am upon this topic, I will proceed to show that he was not delayed, by my movement, even those three days. I refer you to General Scott's own letters written from Fort Drane—they are upon your record—reporting officially his reasons for assigning the 25th of March for the movement of his divisions upon the Withlacoochee.

Among those reasons, General Scott dwells upon the necessity of fixing a day that late, in order to be certain that General Eustis and Colonel Lindsay would be in *position*. It is here to be remarked that General Scott's plan contemplated a simultaneous movement from Fort Drane from the north, Volusia from the east, and Tampa Bay from the south. Hence, on a philosophical principle in determining the strength of a beam in architecture, that the weakest point in the beam is the measure of its strength—on the like principle, the slowest, most tardy, or most obstructed division of the three divisions of the army advancing upon the Withlacoochee must necessarily have determined the whole movement. That division was not the right wing, at Fort Drane, into which my force had been merged, and which, of course, was the only one that could in any manner be delayed by my movement; but it was the left wing at Volusia, under General Eustis: for I refer you to your record again, where you will find an official letter from General Eustis to General Scott, reporting his fear that, with all his efforts, he might not be able to reach Pelaklikaha before the 27th or 28th of March. In fact, Mr. President, he did not arrive in *position*, (I use a favorite term of General Scott,) he did not arrive in position at Pelaklikaha until the 31st of March, where he should have been by the 27th of that month, in order to make a simultaneous movement upon the stronghold of the enemy with the other divisions of General Scott's army. Thus I have shown that, while my troops made an essential portion of the right wing of General Scott's grand army, without which that wing would have been the weakest of his three divisions, and altogether below the original design of General Scott, (owing to the disgust or defection of a certain portion of the Georgia volunteers, who refused to be mustered into service,) yet that wing could not have been delayed more than three days; but what still more strikingly illustrates the perverse and untiring efforts of General Scott to throw the responsibility of his delay upon my movement, I have shown that his left wing, that of General Eustis, at Volusia, (and the zeal and energy of General Eustis have often been eulogized by General Scott himself—see his report from Tampa

Bay,) the left wing, I repeat, was not able to get into position until the 31st of March; whereas the right wing, embracing my command, was actually on the Withlacoochee, under General Scott's orders, on the 28th of that month. It is worthy of remark here that General Scott, although he arrived as late as the 28th of March on the Withlacoochee, had appointed the 25th for leaving Fort Drane. But it seems it rained on the 25th, and the movement was deferred that day, possibly because the little steamboat *Essayons* was not there, with her comfortable cabin. It can hardly be urged that I caused it to rain on the day appointed for the march. The 25th being the day appointed for the movement, it may seem strange that the "right wing" did not reach the Withlacoochee until the evening of the 28th, a period of four days, the distance being less than thirty-five miles. Every previous movement between Fort Drane and the Withlacoochee had been accomplished in a day and a half; but, as soon as General Scott presented himself in person, it required four days (including the rainy 25th) to accomplish the same march; and this fact presents a tangible, palpable, undeniable instance of delay, that can in no manner be attributed to me or to my movement. With what pretence, or with what shadow of reason, then, can it be asserted that my movements delayed those of General Scott?

I refer the court to the testimony of General Clinch upon this point, and I will return again to General Scott at Picolata; apologizing to the court for having left him there so long, hastening myself into the enemy's country in advance of him—I can only plead the force of *habit*.

General Scott, as I have said, heard of my arrival at Fort King on the 26th of February, but made no movement from Picolata until the 9th day of March, although he had reported, from Augustine, his expectation of moving by the 20th of February, and although he had also reported that his plan of moving on the 8th of March had been thwarted by my march upon Fort King. Had he thus been ready, why did he not move? I had the men; he should have had the means. Had he been thus ready, it would have been a very simple matter to have left "in position" at Picolata a portion of his force, to be substituted by the troops of my immediate command, at Fort King or at the Withlacoochee, and, taking up his *means*, have rushed to the theatre of the war, there to co-operate with me, or take command of the troops, which I was always, from my first arrival in Florida, ready and willing to turn over to him, on finding him authorized and willing to employ them for the protection of the frontier and in subduing the enemy. Had he been thus ready for absence, his duty was plain; if not, what can justify the perseverance in wrong exhibited by the entire absence from your record of all explanation on his part? In all that voluminous pile of papers upon your table he nowhere has shown the magnanimity to correct the false impression to which he vainly gave currency with the sanction of his official signature. But, Mr. President, I will return to Picolata. I really find it as difficult to remain there as General Scott did to get away from there. It was on the 1st of March that General Scott, still at Picolata, received my despatch from the Withlacoochee of the 29th of February, in which I suggest a co-operation from Fort Drane, in order to occupy both sides of the river at the same time—the enemy having shown so great facility in crossing that river, and requesting, as I did, a supply of 6,000 rations.

It is important for the court to bear in mind that my despatch of the 29th of February was received by General Scott on the 2d of March; and also important to bear in mind that my despatch of the 28th of February, making precisely the same call for supplies as that of the 29th, was received by General Scott on the 1st of March. I now pass to the 9th of March, and I request the judge advocate to read the official letter of General Scott of that date, written between Picolata and Garey's Ferry.

In the letter just now read General Scott declares he had not received any information of the operations on the Withlacoochee of a date later than the 29th of February, (referring to my despatch,) either *official* or *otherwise*. He goes on to state that, on the morning of the 9th, he heard of a certain rumor by a steamboat—a rumor by a steamboat!—which rumor he states was confirmed by letters received by him six hours later, and he refers to the letters. In order to ascertain the character of that *rumor*, I desire the judge advocate to read the two letters referred to by General Scott. They are from Major Lytle, paymaster of the army, a most gallant and distinguished volunteer aide-de-camp to General Clinch in the memorable fight of the 31st of December, 1835.

Mr. President, in neither of these letters is there any allusion to any rumor whatever. Major Lytle, with all possible business-like brevity, simply communicates to General Scott the fact that General Clinch, with the troops at Fort Drane, had gone down to the Withlacoochee to *escort* supplies of provisions and ammunition to General Gaines. The court will not fail to remark that in both letters the same phraseology is used in allusion to General Clinch's movement. *He had gone down to escort supplies*. There is not one word about any matter foreign to that object, in confirmation of any rumor whatever; and in neither of these letters from Major Lytle, expressly referred to by General Scott, is there the remotest hint of necessity for a *rescue* on the Withlacoochee. Yet General Scott officially reported to the War Department that he is moving to the *rescue of General Gaines*; and, to convey an idea of the imminent danger of General Gaines, he reports that of some 240 men ordered on from Picolata, "even that small force may arrive in time to render essential service."

I must stop here to remark that this letter from General Scott, together with others from the same source, was published, as I have recently understood, in all the principal newspapers in the country, and was calculated, if not expressly designed, to misrepresent my efforts to put an end to the war, and to heap calumny and disgrace upon me and the force under my command, as far as the reckless author and publisher had weight of character to give effect to their official calumnies.

This remarkable *rescue-letter*, I go on to observe, was written upon the receipt of two letters from Major Lytle, in which that officer reports, in the simplest manner, without hurry, without urgency, a movement of General Clinch in escort of supplies to General Gaines. But this is not all of Major Lytle's communications. He proceeds to inform General Scott that General Clinch expected to return by the 9th day of the month. In so simple and unsophisticated a light was that movement regarded by Major Lytle, and by General Clinch himself, that without calling upon General Scott for aid of any sort, either of men or supplies, he communicates the expectation of General Clinch, that he would return to Fort Drane by the 9th of March—the very day of the writing by General Scott of the *rescue-letter*. At the very moment of writing that letter, so studiously worded to convey the idea of my being in danger, and of his (General Scott's) hastening, in defiance of all his plans of campaign, to my *rescue*, had he honestly read the letters of Major Lytle, he would have seen that General Clinch was probably back again at Fort Drane with his escort, as he had expected to be on the 9th, and as, in point of fact, he was on the 11th of March. But this is not all—worse, much worse, remains to be told; for, on referring again to the letters of Major Lytle, it will be seen that in a postscript, in a mere memorandum, so little importance did he attach to it, he refers to a third express having been received from General Gaines, but describes

it as a mere copy of the previous despatch of the 28th of February. The court will now see why I desired its attention to the fact that the despatch in question had been received by General Scott on the 1st of March. The very identical information upon which the rescue-letter was written, so far as it called upon General Scott for aid, had been received as early as the 1st of March. But how was it acted upon at that time? This court and my country shall see. I request the judge advocate to read the letters from General Scott to General Clinch of the 1st and 4th of March, 1836.

In these letters the court will not perceive anything like *hastening to the rescue*. Very far from it. The truth is, General Scott, at this stage of the business, imagined he had it in his power, not indeed to starve me and my command *in my position* on the Withlacoochee, but to starve me *out of it*—calling me an *interloper*, and using, in connexion with my name, an expression of his indignation. *His indignation!*

"When Haman saw Mordecai in the king's gate, that he stood not up, nor moved for him, he was full of *indignation* against Mordecai."

My accuser, Major General Winfield Scott, *commanded General Clinch to afford me no supplies, and prohibited his making any detachment to me*. There are the evidences upon your table, in the handwriting of General Scott. Let him escape from the consequences if he can. For the honor of my country I could wish it were possible; but, with every allowance that can be made, there must inevitably be in reserve a blank leaf in the annals of war to be foully blotted with the story of that transaction.

I proceed. After attempting to starve me out of my position, and force me back upon Fort Drane—a movement that must have been fatal to the security of the then recently bleeding frontier of Florida—my accuser quietly waited, in security himself, at Picolata, from the 1st till the 9th of March, beyond all doubt hoping daily to hear of my disgrace, and not of the defeat of the Indians. On the 9th of the month, instead of hearing the long and anxiously looked for intelligence of my retreat, he received two letters from Major Lytle, reporting identically the information that had been received by him (General Scott) as early as the 1st of the month, without inducing the smallest effort at a rescue, with the addition that Clinch, in defiance of his orders, and, beyond all doubt, in contempt of them, had gone down, not with a force to the *rescue*, but in command of an *escort* with supplies; and if need be, to fight his way to the position which he knew, and General Scott knew, from my despatch of the 29th of February, I had deemed it proper to maintain, where I could hold the enemy in check, and where I ultimately subdued them and forced them to sue for peace. What could General Scott see in the movement of the noble-hearted Clinch, taken in contrast to his own heartless inactivity, but disgrace for himself? And how clearly does it prove the truth of my remarks to the officers of my command upon the Withlacoochee, which you have in evidence, that in failing to move, upon the receipt of my despatch, *he could not but committ suicide upon his reputation!*

I have not introduced these letters and remarks for the purpose of throwing blame upon General Scott. That a deep and abiding odium must, indeed, attach to him, upon this showing of the case, is a necessary consequence, but not the object of this exposition.

General Scott, by the letters here exhibited, had, and intended to have had, a powerful effect, not only upon my movement, but upon my reputation; and down to this day his reports and his showing have had almost exclusive possession of the public attention, excepting, indeed, upon the southern and southwestern frontier, where my conduct has been witnessed and approved.

But there is still another letter which must pass under my examination; and well would it have been for General Scott had he never written it.

I remained on the Withlacoochee until the 10th of March, and moved to Fort Drane on the 11th, where I remained until near 10 o'clock on the 14th. General Scott arrived at that place on the 13th with a mounted escort, having been four days in travelling 65 miles, moving, be it remembered, "*to the rescue of General Gaines.*"

I will here take occasion to contrast with his *rescue*-march of about 15 miles a day the movement of an efficient officer in a recent case. During the past summer Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Pierce, then a major, being at Garey's Ferry, on Black creek, a point at a distance from Fort Drane the same as that of Picolata, (about 65 miles, as shown by one of the letters of Major Lytle,) received by express, at 10 o'clock at night, intelligence of a movement of troops upon Fort Drane, and calling on him for supplies. This call was promptly met by Colonel Pierce. He mounted his horse, packed his supplies, paraded his small body of troops as an escort, and, at 2 o'clock in the morning, but four hours after the receipt of the express, he was on his way to Fort Drane, and, pushing on with all his ability, arrived there the following evening, having in two days accomplished the march, 65 miles, escorting at the time a baggage train with supplies for the troops commanded by Governor Call. Will it be said that General Scott was without the means of transportation? Although much of that which he had ordered from Savannah had not arrived, yet the baggage train of General Clinch from Fort Drane had reached Picolata on the 2d of March, the very day on which my despatch of the 29th February was received by General Scott at Picolata. The baggage train was, however, there detained until the 6th of the month, when it was allowed to move slowly to Fort Drane, where it arrived on the 10th or 11th of March. Besides, some of his own wagons had arrived from Savannah, and there was a mounted corps of about 360 men then at Garey's Ferry, every horse of which, in case of need, was available as a pack or draught animal. There must also have been in Picolata and the neighborhood some horses, mules, wagons and carts within reach, and the town of St. Augustine was but eighteen miles distant.

The river St. John's, which is supposed to be near 3,000 yards wide at Picolata, may have been a little boisterous, but there was a steamboat at Picolata, and it is apparent, from the testimony of Captain Drane, that this small steamboat, (the *Essayons*.) aided by a common ferry-boat, would cross with supplies in any state of the winds or weather. But it seems, from General Scott's statements in his letters before referred to, that he was satisfied with the plea that the river was rough and difficult to cross from the 2d to the 6th of March; and hence it was that instead of my supplies being promptly forwarded by the baggage train of General Clinch, its movement was suspended for four days' time, to enable General Scott to accomplish his *starving-scheme* of the 1st and 4th of March, and then to get up his *rescue-scheme*.

I come now to a new exhibition of the evil genius of General Scott, which I will take leave to designate his *sortie-scheme*. For this purpose I request the judge advocate to read the official letter of General Scott to the adjutant general, dated at Fort Drane the 14th March, 1836.

The court must perceive in this letter the obvious spirit of the rescue-letter, exaggerated to an amazing enormity. In this letter General Scott, believing that he had access to the public through the habit of publishing official correspondence at Washington, availing himself of this advantage, misrepresenting the facts connected with my movement, and defaming, or attempting to defame, my public and military

character—he deliberately states, and certifies that he has it upon good authority, that I had opened a communication with the Indians on the Withlacoochee; that the Indians were stipulating that the Withlacoochee should either be the temporary or permanent boundary between the red and white men; and he falsely records that, but for the timely arrival of General Clinch, he has no doubt General Gaines would have concluded a treaty upon one basis or the other, stating, moreover, that the Indians had taken a position in my rear to intercept my retreat upon Fort Drane.

General Scott wrote this *sortie*-letter at Fort Drane the 14th of March, where he had arrived on the 13th. From the time of his arrival until near 10 o'clock on the morning of the 14th, (the date of his letter,) all the officers who were at the council with the Indians upon the Withlacoochee were present at Fort Drane, and entirely accessible to General Scott. He did not send for nor consult any one of those officers, but made the statement contained in his letter upon some carefully-concealed *anonymous* authority, which, however, he indorses. Of those officers who were at the council, you have, upon your record, the testimony of Captain Hitchcock, my acting inspector general, who had my immediate instructions in conducting the council on my part. You have also two letters from two of the other officers, in all material respects coincident with the testimony of Captain Hitchcock. The fourth officer, you have it in evidence, was not applied to for a statement, because his place of residence was not known; but Captain Thistle has sworn to the belief of that officer in the sincerity of the Indians.

The court will pardon my dwelling a moment upon the extraordinary fact that General Scott, at Fort Drane, should have carefully avoided every known and acknowledged source of correct information upon the subject, and officially have given the sanction of his name to a statement utterly at variance with truth, and that statement not merely calculated or intended to degrade me individually, but to fix a stain upon the American arms. That General Scott could, by any force of prejudice, passion, envy, or disappointment, be induced to place on record in the archives of the War Department a statement calculated or designed to disgrace his profession and country in my person, without making the least exertion to obtain the truth from those only who were acquainted with it—I mean the officers at the council—is a most astonishing instance of folly and malice.

General Scott states that I opened the negotiation with the Indians. You have it on record, gentlemen of the court, that the Indians, and not myself, opened the council. It was the Indians who sought the interview with me at Camp Izard, and the very first declaration they made was, that they did not wish to fight any more—that they had had fighting enough, and wanted to make peace. General Scott states that the Indians stipulated the possession of the country, on their part, with the Withlacoochee as a boundary. The evidence on your record is in positive contradiction to that statement. Not only did they not make such a stipulation, but you have it in evidence that they were told over and over again that they would be compelled to submit to the whites. Well knowing, as General Scott must have known, that the Indians in the rear of my camp were under the protection of a white flag, he makes no hesitation in asserting that those Indians had assumed a position there for the purpose of intercepting my retreat.

I will now pass from Fort Drane to this place, to show the perseverance by which General Scott, not satisfied with writing the letter of the 14th of March, comes before this court and voluntarily condescends to act over again that deliberate scheme of detraction.

General Scott has called before this court, as a witness, a volunteer officer of my command on the Withlacoochee, who was not at the council, and could not, by any possibility, have been informed of the history of it in any other manner than by unauthenticated camp stories. This ignorant man, whose detail of unimportant particulars, carrying on their very face the evidence of their hearsay character, now encumbers your document, was permitted, I must think by some inadvertence of the court, to place on the record his hearsay impressions of what passed at the council; and upon this slender foundation—this *shade of a shadow* of evidence, General Scott has been willing to build the fabric of an argument, when he had himself called before this court Captain Hitchcock, my acting inspector general, who conducted the council, and whose knowledge of what occurred must have been at least equal to that of the volunteer officer, but who was not questioned by General Scott on that very important matter. It did not suit his purpose to place on the record the truth. Captain Hitchcock was here before the court, and a sworn witness; a letter attributed to him, giving an account of what occurred at the council, was laid before the court, and Captain Hitchcock, on being questioned on the points, answered that he wrote the letter, and that he was the staff officer alluded to in it, who conducted the council. With all this before General Scott, and knowing, as he did, that not a single fact stated in the letter (such is the rule of evidence) could legally be used as testimony unless sworn to, he failed to put a single question to the witness on the subject of the council.

If, in speaking of the letters of the 9th and 14th of March, I use language of a strong, indignant tone, I have no other apology to offer than the deep provocation arising out of the character of the letters themselves. The *starving-letters* of the 1st and 4th of March, addressed to General Clinch, though disgraceful in the highest degree, have not the peculiar atrocity which attaches to the rescue-letter of the 9th of March, and its *postscriptum* of the 14th of March. The starving-letters could only operate a temporary inconvenience, and, in fact, as they fell into the hands of a man like General Clinch, who despised them, they were powerless in their object, and the disgrace of their depravity must, of necessity, be visited upon their author. But the other letters, designed to work a disgrace upon the American arms, in my person, must, by the ordinary course of things, if not checked and marked as I shall mark them, work evil in one of two ways: either they would be published by the War Department, as the official despatches from a commander in the field usually are, and thus abuse and poison the public mind, certified to as they are by the official signature of the commander, and receiving additional strength from the channel through which they are given to the public; or they must be deposited in the archives of the Department of War, there to be covered up and concealed in their loathsome enormity, for a time, until death shall remove the innocent victim of their falsehood, when some curious searcher after materials for a history brings them to light, spreads them far and wide, and transmits them to posterity beyond the reach of contradiction or question.

In truth, one of the letters, that of the 9th of March, was published, as I understand, by the War Department, and down to this day has been instrumental in spreading the poison of its falsehood. The other, possibly from its very enormity, was not published, and was in a fair way to take the other channel to posterity, and but for the investigations of this court, might have reached, uncontradicted, its destination.

Having shown, as I doubt not, to the satisfaction of the court, that it was my right and my duty, under the deeply-afflictive circumstances of the case, (as the commander of the western department,) to

collect together at New Orleans the force at my disposal, and make to General Clinch the solemn and irrevocable pledge contained in my letter of the 2d of February, 1836, to co-operate with him in subduing the enemy, and for that purpose to march to Fort Brooke, and thence to Fort King; and in pursuance of my plan of operations announced to that meritorious officer in my letter of the 22d of February, "to search for the enemy until I should find them, and then bear them or be myself beaten," and to continue my operations against them whithersoever they might go until I should subdue them, or until I should find General Scott at the theatre of the war, the only proper place for him to relieve me, or if he preferred it, to co-operate with me; and that it was my right and my duty to avail myself of whatever supplies and force I could find within the limits of my department; it remains for me to show that, when so reinforced and replenished, it was my right and my duty to continue my movement to the Withlacoochee; and on meeting at that place the enemy's principal force, to fight them precisely as I did, according to my own plan and my own judgment, in the best possible way to subdue them effectually, and at the least possible risk of dispersing them, until the arrival of supplies and mounted force from Fort Drane, and to subdue them without the useless sacrifice of my troops, who were always more than willing to encounter every privation of food and rest and every danger.

Mr. President, I affirm that there was no law, order, or regulation, tending to restrict me in the full and perfect right of meeting the enemy in the manner I met them at the Withlacoochee. The evidence of Colonel Twiggs, the efficient commander of the "light brigade;" General (acting colonel) Smith, who would do honor to the command of any corps in the regular service; Captain Hitchcock, my excellent acting inspector general, and Captain McCall, my long-tried and faithful aide-de-camp, officers who have proven themselves to possess a high grade of moral courage, and talents, and efficiency, (whose statements are in every material point in accordance with the recollections of every other intelligent officer with me on the campaign, whose impressions were known to me,) concur in the facts that in every conflict I had with the Indians I effected the object in view.

In the first affair (on the 27th of February) I had ordered my rear guard and baggage-train to halt at the nearest open plain adjacent to the river hammock, and within 400 or 500 yards of the river, at General Clinch's crossing place. My object was to examine the place, and then encamp for the night upon the open plain where I had left my rear guard and baggage. The river was examined and found unfordable, when the action commenced. The action continued across the river, where it was but 25 to 30 yards wide, for some 30 to 40 minutes, and until the enemy's slackened fire proved that they had principally retired from the conflict. This fight was without a breastwork. The next day's conflict took place about 2½ miles lower down the river, at a more convenient point for crossing. This fight also took place without a breastwork. Here I deemed it proper to prepare canoes and other means for crossing. These preparations could not be completed until the 29th of February, when I found undoubted evidence of the fact, which I had reason, on the 28th, to suspect, that I had before me the principal force of the enemy, consisting, as I then believed, and as I do still believe, of near fifteen hundred Indian and black warriors. It has been vaguely surmised by my accuser, who, at the time of the several conflicts, was then at Picolata, that the principal force of the enemy was not before me at or near Camp Izard. The principal and most intelligent officers of my command concurred with me in opinion, (see the testimony of Colonel Twiggs, General Smith, Captain Hitchcock, and Captain McCall;) and upon this point permit me to ask, if the principal force of the enemy was not before me on the 29th of February, where is a shadow of proof to be found that any considerable portion of the enemy was on that day, or for weeks after that time, at any other place than the cove or Withlacoochee swamps, near Camp Izard?

I then deemed it proper, as stated in my communication to General Clinch, to await the arrival of that officer or General Scott, with mounted force and supplies, as I felt convinced that these officers would gladly hasten to the theatre of action, having a few days previously seen a letter in the hands of General Clinch, written by General Scott, expressing a wish to know where the principal force of the enemy could be found. I could not doubt that, as he had arrived safely at Picolata, the termination of steam navigation, and but two days' ride distant, he would come promptly to the place, where I was convinced that, with the aid of a small corps of mounted men, either of us could have put an end to the war before the 20th of March. My "Order No. 7," of the 9th of March, gives a concise outline of the result of my operations. Compare that "Order" with the testimony to which I have referred, and you cannot fail to find the facts which I have in that order stated fully and completely established; that, with the chivalric Louisianians under General Smith, the brave infantry and artillery under Colonel Foster and Major Belton, the whole forming the "light brigade" under Colonel, acting brigadier, Twiggs, I did "*subdue the enemy, and did force them to sue for peace.*"

But this honorable court is told, as the War Department and the people of this nation have been told through a thousand channels, (as corrupt as the spirit of party could render them,) that the enemy could not be sincere in their admission that they were tired of fighting, and that they wished to make peace; and for why? Because, forsooth, the alleged beating and suing for peace was accomplished without my having made a sortie!—and that Major General Winfield Scott said so!

The word *sortie* appears to have had in it for General Scott a singular charm. He had seen my letter of the 29th of February, stating that *I had abstained and should abstain from a sortie* until I heard from him or General Clinch. He appears thus to have taken up the idea of a sortie; and instead of reasoning as I did, and as every man of sound principles and military mind would, he endeavors to torture it into an accusation against me. Who authorized General Scott to animadvert upon my measures in the command of my department? Mr. President, do you, does the court know of any law or authority by which that officer could properly interfere with me, or himself sit in judgment upon my conduct? No such authority ever existed. He was never authorized to command me. He was authorized to extend his operations into my department; and it is in proof before this court that I was ready and willing to place under his command the forces near me, whenever he appeared in person, ready and willing to command those forces; but I knew too well what was due to them, the frontier, the service, and my own reputation, to abandon them before the enemy, merely upon the receipt of a report that he was *ordered on* to take charge of the war, when I had also learned that he had halted for some ten or twelve days sixty miles from my department. This court is in possession of the first and only authority ever given to any officer or tribunal to call in question or animadvert upon my conduct in relation to the Seminole war. This court possesses the precise power comprehended in the orders given by the President, to inquire into the causes of the failure of the campaigns against the Seminole Indians.

Mr. President: Your powers in reference to my movements in East Florida hath this extent—no more. If you find that, by any *omission* or by any *act* of mine, a *failure* ensued in any one of the campaigns

against the Seminole Indians in the year 1836, it is your duty to mark and to animadvert on such act or omission. But even this court has no right to animadvert on or object to any such omission as that which General Scott has thus condemned, namely, the omission to make a *sortie*, unless, indeed, this court can upon its oath say, in the spirit of the order, that such omission to make a *sortie tended in some way to occasion a failure*. But when it is obvious from the testimony upon your table a *sortie* would have been attended with no possible benefit to the service, and that it might, on the contrary, have contributed to disperse the enemy, whilst the denounced act of omission was followed by irrefragable evidence that the enemy were subdued and sued for peace, I cannot but anticipate the expression of an opinion by this court approving my conduct, and awarding to my accuser the marked rebuke which his numerous vindictive accusations in his several letters and orders upon the subject so loudly call for. It is obvious, from the labored and long-continued efforts of General Scott to distort the facts connected with my measures on the Withlacoochee, that he must have felt convinced that nothing short of my conviction of some great error or misconduct could save him from inevitable disgrace. Hence it was that, after making use of the most glaring and clumsy pretexts to get up the starving-scheme of the 1st and 4th of March, and then his rescue-scheme of the 9th of March—after exhausting his powers in vain to prevent General Clinch from furnishing me with supplies, the *sortie-scheme* was devised and put forth with a *zeal* and a *perseverance* which, if properly applied to preparatory measures and movements against the enemy during the month of February and first five days of March, would probably have contributed to enable that officer to relieve me, and appropriate to himself the honors of subduing the enemy, and forcing them, as I did, to sue for peace.

Had General Scott arrived at Camp Izard at 9 o'clock on the night of the 5th of March, attended only by his staff or a corporal's guard, and an hour after his arrival the *black herald* of the enemy had announced to him, as in point of fact he did to me, that the *Indians did not want to fight any more, and desired to come in on the next morning and shake hands and make peace*; and had their chiefs the next morning approached the camp with a white flag and stated to General Scott, as they did to me, that they were tired of fighting, and having had many of their warriors killed and others disabled by wounds, and therefore wished to make peace and fight no more—can this honorable court doubt but that General Scott's *modesty* would have yielded to such an appeal? Can it be doubted that General Scott would, in so trying an emergency, have argued himself into the conclusion that *his* arrival in camp had electrified the savage foe and induced them to sue to *him* for peace? Extravagant as such a conclusion would certainly have been under all the circumstances of the case, it would have been viewed by me as a very trivial fault compared with the atrocious fraud and perfidy practiced by that officer upon his government and country, the army and myself, and, though last not least in point of atrocity, upon the deceived and miserable Indians: first, by a false and malicious statement in his letter to the adjutant general of the 14th of March, [see page 405;] and, secondly, disregarding my arrangements with the Indians, and vainly attempting to get up an exterminating war against them.

THE STARVING-LETTER OF MARCH 1, 1836.

General Scott to General Clinch, (Doc. No. 60), dated

"PICOLATA, March-1, 1836.

"By the arrival, at daylight this morning, of the express from Fort Drane, I have your note of yesterday's date, accompanied by a letter to you from Major General Gaines, dated the day before.

"I regret, in every point of view, the premature and unauthorized movement from Tampa Bay, made by that general, and the very awkward and responsible position he has placed himself in by his subsequent march from Fort King. I presume that, as instructed, you sent him my Order No. 4, dated the 26th ultimo. By that he saw that if the troops he brought with him from Tampa Bay could not be subsisted at Fort King by means of supplies derived from this place through the Ocklawaha, it was expressly commanded that the column should march to Volusia without delay, where subsistence in abundance would be immediately provided. But he had, before that order reached him, taken from Fort Drane a large part of the subsistence relied upon for a more systematic course of operations, and *decamped*. The order, however, I take it for granted, was sent after him, and in time to reach him within twenty miles of Fort King. In any event, the responsibility of his movements and actual position is his own, for he must have known, as early as the 10th ultimo, if not before, that I had been charged with the general direction of the war in Florida, and that, by interfering, he constituted himself an *interloper*.

"Even if you had sufficient stores on hand and means of transportation, I should, under the circumstances, command you to send no subsistence to him, unless to prevent starvation; but you have neither. Let him, therefore, in time, extricate himself from the embarrassment he has placed himself in by marching upon Volusia,* where I have no reason to doubt that 20,000 rations, sent hence on the 27th ultimo, have safely arrived. As he appears to have a retreat open to him, or is in no peril to prevent his taking that step, you, of course, will make no detachment or movement to join him.†

"The train you have ordered hither is expected to-night; as yet, we have here but few wagons to add to your numbers. The whole train shall be immediately loaded with subsistence and sent back to Fort Drane. I have only time to say that should the troops under Major General Gaines be compelled to march back to Fort King or to Fort Drane, instead of proceeding to Volusia, as heretofore commanded, and as I still wish that they should do, on account of the extreme difficulty of sending subsistence to your neighborhood, you will only issue rations to them for their current subsistence, and not for further false expeditions.

"As the first consequence of the arrival of the troops from Tampa Bay to Fort King, and the demand made upon Fort Drane for subsistence, I was obliged to order back a battalion of Georgia volunteers that had then been nearly two days in route to join you.

"The company of mounted men from the same State, now on the opposite side of the river, refuse to

* This move would give the Indians the uninterrupted control of the frontier of Middle Florida.

† Supplies could not be sent to me without the detachment or movement here forbidden.

be mustered into service, and refuse* to come under the rules and articles of war. The other companies of the same battalion may follow their example; if they do, I shall lose no time in ordering the whole back to their homes.†

"Major Gates, with his three companies, has not arrived, and I have no intelligence respecting the United States dragoons of a recent date. Finally, the horses for some days expected for Savannah have not arrived. These embarrassments may detain me here I know not how long.

"The left wing is moving upon Volusia with system and success. The South Carolina foot constitutes the advance, and I suppose the mounted regiment from the same State is now crossing the St. John's at Jacksonville.

"Send another copy of my Order No. 4 to Major General Gaines, and a copy of Order No. 1, which is enclosed for the purpose. The former is reiterated so far as respects the march to Volusia, if this be practicable; and enclose him a certified copy of this letter for his government and your justification.

"I remain, in haste, your obedient servant,

"WINFIELD SCOTT.

"P. S.—I am instructed by Major General Scott to say that the quartermaster's return did not accompany your letter of the 27th ultimo. No return has been received of your ordnance or ordnance stores, particularly the fixed ammunition for muskets. Please to send one.

"Respectfully,

"A. VAN BUREN, *Aide-de-camp*."

THE STARVING-LETTER OF MARCH 4, 1836.

General Scott to General Clinch, (Doc. No. 69,) dated

"PICOLATA, *March 4, 1836.*

"I still presume that Major General Gaines will be obliged to fall back to Fort Drane, which increases my anxiety to send the wagons (with some additions) loaded. I would prefer much that the force brought with him was back at Tampa Bay, or rather that it had not marched from that place; *provided* that the movement fails to crush the enemy or to terminate the war. *The worst result, next to the loss of that fine body of men, or a third of it, would be mere success in driving the enemy into the lower country, where I suppose it would be almost impossible for us to follow—I mean below the waters of Charlotte harbor. Hence my indignation* that an isolated attack should have been made from your vicinity well calculated to produce that result, and at a time when you knew, and Major General Gaines must have known, through you, (and before,) that my plan, with ample means, was to move simultaneously upon the Withlacoochee in three columns from Tampa Bay, the upper crossing on the Ocklawaha and Fort Drane, so as to make it impossible for the enemy to escape to the lower country.

"I have not yet supposed that Major General Gaines has not his retreat upon Fort Drane or King perfectly in his power. On account of subsistence, if he can cut his way through the enemy to Tampa Bay, I should much prefer that his force should be there; and when I wished him to march or send that force to Volusia, it was because it could be infinitely more easily subsisted there than at Fort Drane. Should he, however, be in any difficulty in operating a retreat from the Withlacoochee, I certainly wish you to afford any succors that the slender means within your reach may allow; and this, doubtless, you would render without any special permission to that effect. If the force return to Fort Drane or King, it must be sustained for at least five or six days from the means derived from this place; and hence I *now* prefer that it should become a part of the right wing rather than take that quantity of subsistence from you, and march back to Tampa Bay."

General Scott to the Adjutant General, (Doc. No. 68,) dated

"PICOLATA, *March 6, 1836.*

"I at length know that the South Carolina mounted regiment reached Jacksonville yesterday. It is destined to make part of the left wing.

"Besides, Brigadier General Eustis has necessarily been compelled to wait for the South Carolina mounted regiment, which cannot reach St. Augustine before the day after to-morrow, and Volusia before the 12th.

"If the column under Major General Gaines had fallen back upon Fort Drane or King, the right wing would have wanted nothing but subsistence, and the forces now in this vicinity, and known to be coming up, to act with vigor and effect.

"To add to my numerous vexations, the wagons reported to have been shipped at Baltimore in the Arctic have been left behind.

"I send no more troops for the present to Fort Drane, on account of the difficulty of subsisting them there. *If Major General Gaines shall not fall back on that point, it will be indispensable to wait for Captain Wharton.*"

Aide-de-camp Van Buren to the Adjutant General, (Doc. No. 97,) dated

"FORT DRANE, *March 25, 1836.*

"Captain Wharton, with his detachment of dragoons, reached this the day before yesterday."

◦ And yet, whilst the troops near him are refusing to serve, he is giving orders for the troops in the field to be starved!
E. P. G.

† This is protecting the frontier with a vengeance!
E. P. G.

GENERAL SCOTT'S RESCUE-LETTER, MARCH 9, 1836

General Scott to the Adjutant General, (Doc. No. 71,) dated

"BETWEEN PICOLATA AND GAREY'S FERRY, *March 9, 1836.*

I have just set out for Fort Drane, *via* Garey's Ferry, on Black creek, with two companies of regulars, and intending to take with me from the latter place the small battalion of mounted Georgians (heretofore mentioned) under the command of Major Douglass. Lieutenant Colonel Bankhead is at the head of the first detachment, and the two together may make a total of about 240; but even this small force may be important to rescue Major General Gaines.

"I had not received the slightest information of the operations on the Withlacoochee (official or otherwise) of a later date than the 29th ultimo, up to this morning, and had concluded that he had effected his march, with more or less success against the enemy, upon Tampa Bay, when, at daylight, the steamer that I am now in arrived and brought the rumor, which is confirmed by the two accompanying notes from Paymaster Lytle, received about six hours afterwards. On the reception of the rumor, I immediately commenced preparations for this movement; but being delayed by the necessity of unlading and relading the boat, I am now at anchor at the mouth of Black creek. I hope to put the troops in march from Garey's Ferry early in the day to-morrow, and to reach Fort Drane with a small escort the day following. It is possible that even these little detachments of horse and foot may reach the Withlacoochee in time to render a valuable service.

"I am aware that the movement I am making may be condemned, if regarded in any other light than a *rescue*, as premature. Colonel Goodwyn's mounted regiment only arrived at St. Augustine last night and this morning, and consequently the left wing cannot be in force on or up the Ocklawaha, in the direction of Pelaklikaha, earlier than the 17th, or with the enemy before the 20th instant. Colonel Lindsay, who may have already arrived at *Tampa Bay*, cannot operate more than two days' march from that place, from the want of the means of transportation,* Major General Gaines having taken away the horses which were there, and the basis of the right wing is merged in the force brought by that general into the field, and must participate in his success or failure. If it falls back with him upon Fort Drane it must suffer great loss, and if it follow him to Tampa Bay it will be wholly out of position.

"In this, and even a greater state of uncertainty I have been held since the 26th ultimo. The day after I ordered back Major Cooper's battalion of Georgia foot, to prevent starvation at Fort Drane; and though daily, from that time, in the expectation of receiving from Savannah horses and serviceable wagons, not one has arrived. The quantity of subsistence that will be at Fort Drane (say) to-morrow, will only be that sent from Picolata on the 6th instant, viz: 17,497 rations of bread and flour, 11,000 rations of pork, (with beef and cattle in the neighborhood,) 80,000 rations of beans, some coffee, vinegar, &c. And the troops now about to proceed, perhaps as far as the Withlacoochee, will not have the means of taking with them rations for more than six days.

"I beg leave to recapitulate the causes of my great deficiency in the means of transportation:

"1. The wagons and horses, which I knew Brigadier General Clinch to possess early in February, have been more broken down by hard service and bad roads than I had expected to find them.

"2. I had, upon what was considered in Georgia, and even in Picolata, the best information, confidently relied upon the use of the Ocklawaha as late as the 2d instant.

"3. No bacon has arrived, and the difference between it and pork, including wood and brine, is fifty per centum against the latter.†

"4. The wagons purchased at Charleston, and Augusta, by Assistant Quartermasters L'Engle and Peyton, are generally poor, and many of them unserviceable.

"5. The six or ten wagons actually reported to have been shipped at Baltimore in, I think, the Arctic, with Major Gates, were all left behind.

"6. Of the 19,000‡ rations known to be at Fort Drane about the 25th ultimo, nearly the whole have been drawn by a force not expected by the government or myself to appear in that quarter.

"And 7. Not a horse for the baggage train left by me at Savannah, or which I have since ordered to be purchased by Assistant Quartermaster Dimmock, has arrived in Florida.

"On the 21st ultimo, when I was but twenty hours from Savannah, I sent back by a steamer that was met an order to Lieutenant Dimmock to ship about 40 horses for the baggage train to Picolata. This order was strongly reiterated by a return steamer five days afterwards; and again, on the 2d instant, by another boat, he was instructed to send immediately, and by the speediest conveyance, 70 horses for the train, and 6 four-horse wagons. I had this morning a report from him, saying, after he had received my first and second orders, that he had sent all the horses wanted for draughts and packs by land, except a few which were to come as packs with Captain Wharton. Now, as the latter was about twenty-four days in New York, after receiving orders for Florida, and expected to remain ten in Savannah, he cannot be looked for in this neighborhood before the 18th or 20th instant. The other parts of the lot were, it seems, given as packs to the tenth company of South Carolina mounted men, and sent forward in a drove. They must, it is feared, arrive in a state unfit for the baggage train (say) about the 6th instant. Such has been the failure of human agents. The weather has been equally adverse.

"If the force on the Withlacoochee should fall back on Fort Drane, it will be seen from the foregoing that a part, at least, must probably march upon Volusia or Garey's Ferry, to be within reach of subsistence. Instructions have been left behind me to send forward rations, should the means of transportation arrive in time, and the troops already in the neighborhood of Picolata—Major Cooper's and the remaining company of Major Gates's battalion. I have also desired Brigadier General Eustis, in the same event, to order to Fort Drane two companies of mounted men of Colonel Goodwyn's regiment, and a fourth order will go back in this boat to Lieutenant Dimmock on the subject of horses and wagons.

* See the testimony of Lieutenant Morris, by which it will be found that Colonel Lindsay found near *ten times* as much transportation at Tampa Bay as that which General Gaines found there.

E. P. G.

† This statement is untrue. Pork and flour is a safer and more portable subsistence for a march in the wilderness than bacon and hard bread.

E. P. G.

‡ I took less than 12,000 complete rations.

E. P. G.

"Some rifles and the tents arrived this morning at Picolata; but Colonel Goodwyn had marched through six or eight storms without cover, and now all companies in march are to be reduced to three tents each."

"P. S.—Please to remark that, in his letter to Brigadier General Clinch, dated at New Orleans, the 2d ultimo, Major General Gaines speaks of '*an efficient co-operation*;' promises to be 'in readiness at Tampa Bay by the 8th* of the present month, to form a junction at or near that place with the force under your command, whenever, *and as soon as*, in your judgment, *your force shall be sufficient to justify the movement*;' and concludes by saying, 'a sufficient quantity of ammunition and provisions have been transported to Fort Brooke to divide with you until further supplies are received;' yet he did not wait until the brigadier gave notice that he was 'in force;' came to Fort King, and swept nearly the whole of the subsistence† collected at Fort Drane. A copy of that letter is in your office, and I now enclose one from Governor Eaton, from which it will appear that Major General Gaines knew, at Tampa Bay, about the 14th ultimo, that I had been charged with the direction of this war. He first heard this at Pensacola, and received Governor Eaton's despatch at Tampa, as I can establish. Hence his haste, and neglect of the assurance given to Brigadier General Clinch;‡ his isolated attack," &c.

PAYMASTER LYTTLE'S LETTERS OF THE 5TH AND 8TH MARCH, 1836.

Paymaster Lytle to General Scott, (Doc. No. 72,) dated

"FORT DRANE, March 5, 1836.

"I have been directed by General Clinch to inform you that your communications of yesterday's date reached him at this post after he had mounted his horse, and was on the move, with the forces under his command, to escort supplies to General Gaines. He directed me likewise to say to you that the distance from this post to Garey's (or Black creek) is about the same as the distance from here to Picolata. As you wish, however, to obtain all the information possible on the subject, I will take the liberty of adding, from my own knowledge, that the road from Garey's to this place is *sandy*, consequently, almost invariably dry; while the road from Picolata here is muddy after heavy rains, particularly such as we have just experienced.

"Colonel Gadsden arrived here from Tallahassee on the 4th, (yesterday,) and accompanied General Clinch this morning to the Withlacoochee."

From the same to the same, (Doc. No. 72,) dated

"FORT DRANE, March 8, 1836.

"By direction of General Clinch I opened your communication of the 6th instant, which arrived late last night, in advance of the wagons. You will perceive, by my letter of the 5th, that General Clinch, with all the forces at this post, and 100 mounted men from the vicinity, had left for Withlacoochee, to escort a small supply of cattle, ammunition, &c., to General Gaines, having received, the night before, a third address from that officer. No word has been received from either of these generals since the 5th. When General Clinch left here, he expected to be back on the 9th.

"The probability is, that the wagons will return without an escort, there being at present no troops here; and, should General Clinch get back before the wagons depart, his men may be too much fatigued to march again immediately; but this, of course, is merely conjecture. I am satisfied, however, that General Clinch would advise that an escort accompany the wagons back to this place when reloaded. Captain Graham being directed by General Clinch to send back the wagons for supplies after their arrival here, will send them to Garey's, it being the best road.

"N. B.—The amount of General Gaines's last express to General Clinch, dated 3d instant, was merely copies of his previous letters, with a note stating that the Indians were still around them; but little or no fighting had taken place since his last communication."

GENERAL SCOTT'S SORTIE-LETTER OF MARCH 14, 1836.

General Scott to the Adjutant General, (Doc. No. 77,) dated

"FORT DRANE, March 14, 1836.

"On my arrival here, I found that the force which had been upon the Withlacoochee had fallen back on this vicinity.

"Brigadier General Clinch with some means of subsistence, and about 600 men, (of whom 150 were mounted Floridians,) joined Major General Gaines on the 6th instant. The force under the latter had already been reduced to the necessity of commencing on horses and dogs for their subsistence. After receiving that timely and important succor, the army remained in position until the 10th.

"It may be remarked that, from the time of entrance into the intrenched camp, up to the retreat in this direction, not a sortie was attempted; and that, to save the pride of the higher officer, the command was relinquished to the next in rank, in order that he might give the order to retreat.§

* I entered Tampa Bay on the 9th of February, 1836.

E. P. G.

† The subsistence belonged to my own department.

E. P. G.

‡ To co-operate efficiently is to search for the enemy, and also to search for the force with whom we propose a co-operation. I did both. General Scott ought to have done the same.

E. P. G.

§ See the testimony of Captain Hitchcock, General Smith, Colonel Twiggs, and Captain McCall, proving this to be false.

E. P. G.

"A copy of Major General Gaines's order, yielding the immediate command of their joint forces to Brigadier General Clinch, is enclosed. This extraordinary paper I have but little time to comment upon. The poor sneer against me, as the *diplomatic agent of the War Department*, is in character with all his recent acts, for, at the moment of the succor on the 6th, he had already opened a negotiation with the enemy,* in which, it is said, on good authority, that he was willing to leave them in the quiet possession of the country below the Withlacoochee until the arrival of the 'diplomatic agent;' but in which Powell insisted that that river should be the perpetual boundary between us and the Seminoles. But for Brigadier General Clinch, I have no doubt that some treaty on the one or the other basis would have been formed between the parties;* he alleged the positive instructions of the War Department against all negotiations, and he enabled Major General Gaines to save the original force with him. Not a sortie was made from the intrenched camp from the time of its formation up to the retreat; and on the approach of the succor a large detachment of the enemy had taken a position to intercept the retreat in this direction.* How, under such circumstances, it can be alleged that the enemy has been beaten, it would be difficult to reconcile with facts.

"I have reason to hope that the enemy remain nearly in the same position as before the isolated and therefore false movement of Major General Gaines. This is fortunate.

"I have instructed Brigadier General Eustis, after scouring the country through which he will have to pass to some extent, to place his column in position somewhere in the neighborhood of Pelaklikaha about the 25th instant. Colonel Lindsay by the same day is to be with his force at Chickuchatty, (about two marches from Tampa,) and means are suggested to each in order to multiply the chances of communicating with each other.

"The right wing will move hence, say on the 24th instant, to attack in front. This column will pass the Withlacoochee about half a mile below the late intrenched camp, where there is a good ford, and of which Major General Gaines might have availed himself if he had had the strength or inclination."†

Mr. President, let us look into the subject of *sorties* or *sallies*, and see what objects are usually attained or sought for in making them. The first is to force the enemy to abandon the siege, or otherwise to beat them; secondly, to retard and embarrass their approaches by driving their guards and working parties from their trenches, in order, if practicable, to prevent or otherwise to delay the completion of their trenches, and thus to prevent or put off as long as possible the apprehended evil hour of a breach or an assault. I was particularly desirous to abstain from forcing the enemy to abandon their supposed siege, as will appear from my letter of the 29th of February, lest I should disperse the enemy; and I am sure nothing could have been more gratifying to me, and to every officer and soldier with me, volunteer and regular, than for the enemy to have opened trenches and attempted a breach or an assault. Whilst I abstained from a sortie, every Indian that approached in view of my breastwork did it at his peril; whereas by making a sortie the Indians could escape to their ambuscades in the thick hammock in two or three minutes' time. Under these circumstances, nothing short of the extreme of folly or a disposition to trifle with the most important duties of the service could have prompted me to make a general sortie without an object—such as the arrival of troops or expresses, as Colonel Lindsay's brigade from Tampa Bay, or that of General Scott or General Clinch, or other troops from Fort Drane or King—until I should have it in my power, by the aid of mounted men with supplies, to continue the sortie or sally for some days in succession, until I should have had it in my power to scour the Withlacoochee swamps, and give a good account of the place called *The Cove*. To speak seriously of any other description of *sorties* or *sallies* in an Indian war is to me something worse than absurd. It will be seen by the testimony of several officers with me, including my staff, that orders were given for the troops to be held in readiness for a sortie on the happening of any contingency, such as those just now alluded to, to justify the measure. Small parties of from 50 to 120 woodsmen and sharpshooters were often permitted to look after the enemy for a short distance up and down the river. It is in proof before this court that a party of this description, composed of the companies of Captain Burt and Captain Thistle, consisting of volunteers and regulars, was out some 200 to 400 yards from camp during the action of the 29th of February, and were engaged in action with a large party of Indians (from 350 to 400, as Captain Thistle believes,) on the opposite of the river. The conflict continued across the river, with some short intervals, for about two hours. Captain Kerr, Lieutenant Grayson, and other officers of volunteers and regulars, were frequently out and employed in firing at the enemy across the river.

But, since the court has been pleased so far to tolerate General Scott's accusations in reference to a sortie as to make it the subject of special interrogatories to several of the witnesses, I have been disposed so far from attempting to throw any impediment in the way of a full and free inquiry into all the bearings and probable tendencies of sorties or sallies, to extend the inquiry still further than my position at Camp Izard, as will be seen by my interrogatories to General Smith, the accomplished commander of the Louisiana volunteers, to Captain Drane, a most efficient and experienced officer, and Lieutenant Mitchell, a young officer of great promise, with their answers. By the testimony of these very respectable witnesses, called before this court by my accuser, it will be seen how far General Scott himself carried out, in *honest matter-of-fact practice*, the theories with which he had been attempting to edify the War Department and the newspaper press of our country upon the subject of sorties.

Mr. President, the testimony of the witnesses last mentioned proves clearly that General Scott's practice was not in accordance with his theories. Sir, that officer, with over 2,000 men, as gallant troops as either of us ever commanded, and an outfit sufficient for at least fifteen days' good service, hurried across the Withlacoochee and thence to Tampa Bay without devoting more than one day to what any officer acquainted with his duty would have deemed the great and leading object of the campaign, namely, an examination of the *Big Cove swamp*. Captain Drane testifies that that swamp, from 15 to 20 miles in width, was penetrated by a part of the force under General Scott but two and a half miles! General Smith estimates the distance at four and a half miles. My accuser, who had written so eloquently to nullify every measure of mine at the Withlacoochee, and to prove that the Indians could not have been beaten without a sortie, and that they could not be sincere in suing for peace without a sortie—this same general devoted but one day to the great duty of "searching for the Indians" where he could have had any reasonable ground to calculate on "finding them." He could not find them because he would not take time to search for them in the Cove swamp, where, it is in proof upon your record, they have been residing,

* See the testimony of Captain Hitchcock, General Smith, Colonel Twiggs, and Captain McCall, proving this to be false.

E. P. G.

† The "good ford" was not fordable when found in March, 1836.

E. P. G.

with their families, for the most part of the time since the 6th of March, the day on which they sued for peace. The Big Cove swamp, 15 to 20 miles in width, and near 60 miles in circumference, was penetrated along a large path (exhibiting evidence of recent footsteps of the Indians, adults and children) but four and a half miles. The dismal aspect of that swamp probably contributed to give to my accuser the first really impressive lesson he had ever received upon the intrinsic difficulties attending an Indian war in Florida. The testimony is silent upon the subject of what he wrote or what he said or thought at that swamp in reference to the propriety of making sorties. It is probable, however, that he said nothing upon the subject, as it is proven by Lieutenant Mitchell that arrangements were made to establish a post near the swamp, which was left under the command of Major Cooper, with a battalion of volunteers, whereupon the general, with the residue of the right wing of his grand army, marched forthwith to Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay, as the witness believes, in order to obtain a supply of subsistence. "Hard bread and bacon," it would seem, and not sorties or Indian warriors, then occupied the thoughts of the new commander. My accuser, on his arrival at the Big Cove swamp, found himself in a dilemma. My simple plan of operations, communicated to General Clinch, and by him to my accuser, General Scott, was condemned by the last-mentioned general, who, on his arrival near the Big Cove swamp, found that he would be compelled to act in accordance with my plan, or to act not at all. My plan, the court will recollect, was "to search for the enemy until we should find them, and then beat them, or they would beat us."

The new general could not reconcile it to his views of propriety, after saying all manner of evil things against me, to condescend to search for the enemy, as my plan had suggested. The Big Swamp was accordingly left without being disturbed by "a sortie," "a sally," "a drive," or "a drag." This rough work could not have been accomplished without some considerable labor and difficulty; whereas but very little was necessary for General Scott to write a letter or two, asserting that the Indians were not in that swamp—that 500 warriors had not been within any space of ten miles square since the commencement of the war; and that they had been frightened off to the Everglades by the accounts which, after they had sued for peace, I authorized Captain Hitchcock, my acting inspector general, to give them of the great forces expected soon to be in the country against them. It was easier, while reclining in the shade of a Florida ever-green magnolia, to make these random assertions, (whether true or false is for the court to decide,) than to devote a few days' time, with the consequent labor and privation of food and rest that must have attended a vigorous search throughout the swamp, than by such a search to give a practical illustration of the theory of *sorties* or *sallies*, so adroitly discussed by my accuser in his sortie-letter of the 14th of March, and other productions of equal candor; but one of which remains to be noticed by me. I allude to the notorious *sortie* "Order No. —," of 1836, based upon a nefarious scheme got up by my accuser in order to enable him to divert public attention from himself, by striking at me over the shoulders of Major Gates, and thus to keep up the hue and cry of *sortie! sortie!* Upon the same principle that a *pickpocket*, when amidst the crowd he filches from an unguarded stranger his purse, immediately raises the cry of *stop thief! stop thief!* and thus diverts public attention from himself, the actual offender.

I am aware, Mr. President, how exceedingly improper this view of the subject would be, if it had not truth and reason to sustain it. The evidence is before you. It is for me to perform the disgusting duty of applying the testimony, furnished by my accuser himself, to enable you to do justice to him. It is for me to vindicate my own conduct, and in doing so to correct the vagrant and profligate pretensions of a great public offender.

In desiring your attention to the order in the case of Major Gates, I take leave to precede my remarks by a paper, which is a copy of the rough draught of a letter which I prepared on the 20th of July last, the morning after receiving the order in question. This paper contains my views at that time. My views remain unchanged. After writing the letter, however, I determined, on reflection, that I would not send it until time and opportunity should be given to enable the Secretary himself to correct, unsolicited by me, an irregularity which I was willing to attribute to the haste and hurry of business which I was aware had often, in the War Department, led honorable men into error and apparent irregularity, at or near the close of a long and arduous session of Congress. I therefore retained my letter to the President until the receipt of "Order No. 65" apprised me of the propriety of submitting it through this honorable court.—(See Document No. 45, page 445.)

I have said that *I could not, without the palpable violation of a fundamental principle of military law, abandon the expedition until I should meet with the officer authorized to relieve or succeed me, unless expressly required by the President of the United States so to do, or the receipt of his orders to that effect.*

Where, I may be asked by those who know no law but that which their own prejudices and passions enact, where is this great fundamental principle of military law to be found? I answer, that it is incorporated in the Constitution and laws of the United States, and in the constitution and laws of all the sovereign States of this great and growing confederacy. It will be found inscribed upon the heart, and seen in the mind's eye of every free white man of the American Union, who feels and who knows how to appreciate his equal share of that sovereignty which gives him the inestimable right of self-government, with the inseparable, the kindred right of self-defence.

We learn from our federal, as well as from our State constitutions, that the primary object of the people in the adoption of each was to provide for "the common defence" and "general welfare," to suppress insurrection and repel invasion, and thus to afford protection to the defenceless; to keep the peace. For this purpose the President of the United States is expressly authorized to command the national forces, land and naval; and the governors of States are in like manner authorized to command the forces of their States respectively. The President has a full and perfect right not only to command throughout every part of the United States and their Territories, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, but also upon the high seas throughout the world, wherever any part of the land or naval forces may be, on duty or otherwise.

My command extended to every section of the western department wherever any part of the forces assigned to me happened to be, and more especially to the whole of the southern and western frontier. Authority is given to Congress to declare war, and support an army, to serve under the authority of the President; and being myself honored with a high commission in that army, and ordered by the President to command the western department, my right to employ the forces placed under me against a known savage foe at war with the frontier citizens and troops of my department, to "repel invasion," was as full and perfect a right as the President and the Congress of the United States could give me. He had ordered me to command the western department. This was sufficient to authorize me, on the sudden approach of war, to go whithersoever I deemed necessary to protect the people of that department "against their enemies and opposers whomsoever," as my official oath required me to do; and to see where

and how I could do the enemy the greatest harm, and my country the greatest good, with the means at my disposal, keeping myself always within the pale of our institutions and of the laws of war.

From my letter to the adjutant general, dated at New Orleans, January 15, 1836, it will be seen that I there suggest the propriety of immediate measures for the arrest or destruction of the enemy before the dry weather of winter should pass away and the rains of spring and summer cover the swamps and flats with water; and for this purpose I suggest the propriety of ordering the 6th, with parts of the 1st and 7th regiments of infantry, and urged the employment of an army of not less than *four thousand men*, to be aided by a strong naval force.

By a letter from General Scott to the adjutant general, dated at Augusta, Georgia, January 31, 1836, it will be seen that that officer urges the propriety of an army of five thousand men, aided by a naval force, being employed against the enemy.

In my letter to General Clinch, dated at New Orleans, the 2d February, 1836, a copy of which was forwarded to the adjutant general, I announce my intention to embark on the following day on board certain steamboats with a regiment of Louisiana volunteers, and some companies of the 4th United States infantry, for Tampa Bay, making an *irrevocable pledge* to co-operate with General Clinch in bringing the war to a speedy close. In a letter from General Scott to the adjutant general, written on the — of February, that officer expresses a hope that the 4th infantry will be ordered from New Orleans to Tampa Bay. And in a letter written on the 2d of February, also to the adjutant general, General Scott mentions the receipt of a report that Colonel Twiggs had embarked with a volunteer and regular force at New Orleans for Tampa Bay, and expresses a hope that this force will enable Colonel Lindsay to act *independently* in a direction from Tampa Bay towards Fort King, on precisely the same route upon which my movement was made between the 13th and the 22d of February.

Mr. President, it will be seen, by an inspection of these four letters, that they were written by myself and General Scott, without either of us having any knowledge of the views of the other, and that our views and wishes accorded in our letters, written near about the same time, whilst six or eight hundred miles apart, were, for the most part, in strict accordance, so far at least as regarded the forces from New Orleans and the movement from Tampa Bay to Fort King, and variant only in this: that my estimate of the requisite force to terminate the war was four thousand men, whilst that of General Scott was five thousand men; and my plan was to co-operate with General Clinch, or the officer commanding in East Florida; to search for the enemy until I should find them, and then, if possible, subdue them, and thus protect the frontier inhabitants; whereas General Scott's plan was to surround and pen up the enemy near the frontier; a plan which I could not approve, because it was wholly impracticable without an army of ten thousand men, principally mounted; and, even with that force, the Indians could not be hemmed in upon the frontier of Florida, without endangering the lives of most of the remaining inhabitants, for whose protection our troops were employed as a primary duty. It was not my purpose, however, to interfere with General Scott's plan of operations. I intended simply to command, as appeared to me proper, until I should meet with that officer, and then co-operate with him, or, if he preferred it, turn over the troops with me, according to the notification received by me at Pensacola from the adjutant general of the army. Nothing, therefore, appeared to disturb the harmony in which that officer was approaching the theatre of active operations, until he learned that I was at the head of the forces from the west. The patriot spirit of harmonious co-operation seems then all at once to have abandoned that general, leaving him a prey to the furies of anarchy and discord. He immediately reports his plans thwarted by my movement, notwithstanding he had so recently expressed his satisfaction at the prospect of a similar movement on the part of another officer. He immediately set about a scheme to arrest the movement of the supplies ordered for my department, *before he had anything to do with the affairs of the war in East Florida*.

Lest I should be deemed unjust to the general, I will, in due time, employ his own words to explain his object in arresting and withholding from me the subsistence destined for my command.

Mr. President, I have passed in review a point in my vindication fraught with intense interest not merely to myself and my faithful officers and men, but to you and to every member of the army confided to your command, and more especially to every citizen soldier throughout America, whose duty it is, and in all future time will be, to enjoy the inestimable right of participating in the national defence; a point upon which you are solemnly bound to state facts as you find them established by evidence, and to give an opinion which cannot but contribute, as far as you have power, to relieve the army and the republic of a high military offender, who, in the hope of inflicting a wound on the reputation of his senior, and supposed rival, had the childish audacity to withhold, not only from that senior but from the patriotic troops who accompanied and nobly sustained him in action at the Withlacoochee, *public supplies* essential to their existence, supplies ordered to be conveyed to the troops of my department before that officer was ordered thither; and he had the hardihood, also, to direct General Clinch not to afford me any of the supplies which I had required from him at Fort Drane, a post within the limits of my department, and which General Scott had not seen fit to approach nearer than Picolata, a distance of sixty miles within the settlement near St. Augustine, and from ninety to a hundred miles from the theatre of the war, intending thereby not to sustain me himself, and, as far as he possibly could, to prevent the troops of my own department from sustaining me in the position which I had taken against the enemy at the Withlacoochee, but by cutting off my necessary supplies, *to starve my troops out of that position!* a position which I could not abandon without suffering the principal force of the enemy (which I there held in check) to fall upon hundreds of helpless families—evils which must have followed, had not the chivalry of my troops triumphed over the enemy and forced him to sue for peace. In doing so, they achieved at once a triple victory—a victory over their wants of regular supplies, a victory over the savage foe, and a victory over the atrocious machinations of the second United States general officer who has ever dared to aid and assist the open enemy of the republic in their operations against United States forces employed in the protection of the frontier people. The first great offender was Major General Benedict Arnold; the second, as your finding must show, is Major General Winfield Scott.

Question by General Gaines to Colonel Twiggs. Colonel Twiggs is requested to state what he knows on the subject of making a sortie at or from Camp Izard, in February and March, 1836?

Answer. I received an order on the 29th of February, after the Indians had retired from making an attack on us, to hold the command in readiness for a sortie. After the 29th, in a conversation with General Gaines, I think he stated to me he had written to the officer in command at Fort Drane, and he expected him down with some mounted troops; that, as soon as they made their appearance, the command was to leave the breastwork to attack the Indians. I think he stated to me that he had so written, that

he would not make the sortie until the troops should come down. I had frequent conversations with the general on this subject: and he stated to me his views, that we could do no good by going out; that the Indians would fly before us, and that as soon as any troops made their appearance we should go out and attack the Indians. It was expected that troops would arrive from Tampa Bay on the opposite side of the river. This was before the 5th of March.

“Question by the court. What is your own opinion as to the propriety of making a sortie from Camp Izard whilst invested by the enemy?”

The witness begged leave to decline answering the question, and was excused by the court.

“Question by General Gaines. Colonel Twiggs is desired to state whether or not it was his opinion, at any time between the 27th of February and 6th of March, that the enemy could have been subdued by making a sortie, or whether it would not have contributed only to disperse the Indians. And state whether the Indians could not have concealed themselves in a thick hammock at any moment, in three or four minutes time; and state whatever opinion he entertained on the subject at the time, and whether he communicated to General Gaines such opinion.”

“Answer to the first part of the question. From the 27th to the 28th, and including the 28th, the Indians were on the opposite side of the river, and we had not boats to cross the river. From the 29th of February to the 5th of March, we could, at any time the Indians made their appearance, have driven them, but we had not the means to follow them. I cannot say whether we should have dispersed them or not. As our camp fronted the river, there was an extensive hammock and scrub on the left. There was a hammock, also, on the right, both of them two or three hundred yards of the camp, or probably a shorter distance, and the Indians could have taken shelter in either of those hammocks in a few minutes. I never gave General Gaines, while at Camp Izard, any opinion as to the propriety of a sortie.”

“Question by General Gaines. Colonel Twiggs is requested to state whether any officers, and if any, who, of the light brigade, at Camp Izard, in February and March, 1836, expressed the opinion that a sortie ought to have been made.”

“Answer. Not one, while I was there, expressed such an opinion. I had, and, as far as I could learn from the opinion of the command generally, they also had entire confidence in General Gaines, and we were willing to submit to his judgment.”

“Question by General Gaines to General Smith. General Smith is requested to state his opinion as to the mode of fighting the Indians at Camp Izard, between the 28th of February and the 5th of March, 1836, inclusively, taking into consideration all the circumstances attending the service there, and particularly whether, in his opinion, a sortie would have been attended with advantages.”

“Answer. I believe that the only mode of fighting Indians is to wound or kill individual warriors, but that simply to attempt to disperse them would produce no great benefit. Therefore, if the Indians occupy a position which we desire to occupy ourselves, we must certainly attack and drive them; but, under other circumstances, whatever method offers the greatest facilities of wounding or killing them is the best method of fighting them. The position General Gaines occupied at Camp Izard, at the period mentioned, was one that he was desirous of maintaining, and I therefore think that he was likely to do more injury to the Indians in repulsing their advance on his position than he would do in quitting it to follow them through the woods. It is impossible for a soldier on foot, in that country, to overtake an Indian. The Indian could, at the first attack, withdraw himself from the fire, and the position of the hammocks in the neighborhood offered them a retreat, in which they could hide themselves immediately. I believe that, as in attacks on positions, fortified or not, the loss is always greater on the attacking party than in any other kind of combat; where the object is to destroy the life of the enemy, that species of combat offers more advantages than any other. The battle of New Orleans, the attack on Sandusky, and, in fact, all the attacks which were repelled during the last war, are evidences of this. On the 29th of February, when, I think, the largest body of the Indians appeared, I think it likely that fewer of our men would have suffered if we had made a sortie, but far fewer of the enemy would have fallen. The defences that were afterwards made of the camp were hardly then begun, and especially the whole interior of the camp was entirely exposed. General Gaines himself, who was sitting near the centre of the camp, received a wound in his mouth. I therefore think that, under all the circumstances, there was a greater injury inflicted on the enemy, as they approached the camp through the open ground around it, than if the troops had gone out and followed them through the woods. I would remark, however, that the whole of the troops were not in the camp—two companies of the Louisiana regiment were posted down on the river, and a part of them were drawn in afterwards to cover a part of the line.”

“Question by General Gaines to Colonel Twiggs. What was your opinion of the sincerity of the Indians in their proposition for peace, at Camp Izard, the 6th of March last; and please state what motive, if any, the Indians could have had for treachery; and, finally, have you heard any observations on the subject from Indian countrymen or other persons acquainted with the Indian character calculated to strengthen or destroy your opinion?”

“Answer. The first night (the night of the 5th) when the Indians came and hailed the camp, I did not believe them sincere, or that they had any intention of coming in at all. The next morning I went to General Gaines and told him, ‘Whenever you show me men coming from the moon, I will believe the Indians are coming in.’ Before we separated, some person standing near spoke and said, ‘Here the Indians come.’ In a short time, having halted some distance from the breastwork, one or two of them came forward with a white flag. One of the volunteer officers—I think, Adjutant Barrow—went out and met them. When I saw them conversing with Mr. Barrow I then changed my opinion, and believed they were in earnest. I have thought a good deal on the subject, and I could think of no motive for their being otherwise than sincere. I judged they were sincere from what I had seen of the upper part of the Creek nation on previous occasions. It was at the Hickory Ground, with General Jackson, I think in 1814, after the first Indian came in there I never heard of another act of hostility on the part of the nation towards the whites. The next occasion was on the Seminole campaign with General Jackson. I know that after the first Indian came in there was no act of hostility. I know this, for I was left in the country. I had a conversation with Colonel Dill, at Jacksonville, who has been a long time in that country. After detailing the circumstances to him as they happened at Fort Izard, he said he had not a doubt but that they were sincere in their wish for peace, so much so that he advised the people to go back again on the plantations on the road from Micanopy to Fort Drane.”

“Question by General Gaines to General Smith. What is the opinion of General Smith upon the motives of the Indians in seeking an interview and expressing a desire for peace at the Withlacoochee? And

state how far the Indians manifested a desire for peace by their conduct previous to the hostile movement of the troops from Fort Drane the 26th of March, under the orders of General Scott.

"*Answer.* I think I feel assured that the Indians were perfectly sincere in seeking a peace. I do not know on what terms they may have wished it, but I believe they desired a peace. A great many reasons operate on my mind to produce this conviction. The first was, that on the night of the 29th, after the Indians had retired across the river, I heard some one—a peculiar voice, the tone of which I judged to be Powell's—making an address to his followers, apparently. The friendly Indians and their interpreter lay close by me. I called to them, through the interpreter, and desired the Indians to listen and try if they could catch any of the expressions. When the speech was done, the Indians said to me, through the interpreter, that it was an address of the chief, intended to encourage them; that he told them that no matter if they suffered on our side of the river, that when we attempted to cross they would have the advantage; and he suggested to me that it was apparent from that that a portion of the Indians were dissatisfied; that the Indians did not appear the next day, nor until the evening of the second day, when a few shots were fired out of one of the hammocks on the river, nor did there ever seem to be one-fourth of the number of Indians on our side of the river that appeared on the 29th. On the evening when the first offer to treat was made, a voice of a negro hailed the camp in English; he called out that the Indians were tired of fighting, and desired to come in and make friends. He was answered (by direction of General Gaines) that if the chiefs sent in a flag the next day it would be respected. They held a talk the next day with the officer sent by General Gaines, precisely as they were directed to do. From all these circumstances, it suggested itself to me that there was a large portion of the Indians who were averse to continuing the war, so large that the hostile party was obliged to conform to their desires; that they had nothing to gain under any view of the subject by delay; that they were then as well prepared to carry on the war, and better, than they would be at any subsequent period, whereas they must have expected that the whites would increase in force every day; that if the object was to gain time in order to escape, that they could always have done that, as they could always out-march us, and that, in fact, they did not make use of it for that purpose, for Primus, who was sent to them afterwards, must have found them in the upper part of the cove, or in the Wahoo swamp. From the time the Indians held a talk with General Gaines there was not the slightest hostile movement on their part, and our men were fishing and bathing in the river every day by hundreds while we stayed there; and as there was a thick swamp on the other side, in the vicinity where they were bathing, the Indians might at any moment have shot down two hundred men, with perfect security to themselves. We encamped about four or five miles from Fort Drane, between Fort Drane and the Withlacoochee, and small parties were constantly passing, and often single individuals, between the different encampments and Fort Drane, and were scattered over the whole woods for ten miles round, and I never heard of a sign of an Indian. The first that were heard of or met with after this period was on the evening of the day General Scott commenced his march to the Withlacoochee, when a wagoner belonging to the general's train, and who was left behind in the road, was shot by the Indians.*

"*Question by the court to Captain Hitchcock.* Do you believe the Indians were sincere in proposing a truce?

"*Answer.* I believe they were perfectly sincere. I will remark, in reference to this question, that there was nothing in the manner or matter of the interview which I had with the Indians on the Withlacoochee to give me the smallest suspicion of their sincerity. There seemed to be a peculiar sadness over them, as if thoughtful of the misfortunes of their tribe, indicating that further hostility on their part was hopeless. I thought them sincere, and in that opinion all who were present entirely concurred with me, and I am the more inclined to continue in that belief from several considerations. Although wars among Indian tribes are sometimes of very long duration, it is seldom that active warlike movements among them continue for any great length of time. With tribes at war, there may be years of cessation of the war; and when a war-party, as it is called, is got up, with considerable formality, with a feast and wardance, and the party will make what they call a strike at the enemy—return from the expedition and celebrate their success, if successful, with the scalp-dance; but this kind of war cannot be carried on against the whites. To carry on war against the whites the Indians are compelled to embody themselves in large numbers, making it difficult for them to obtain supplies of ammunition, provisions, or clothing. In Florida the enemy had, I believe, been so embodied for some length of time; they had had, I believe, some special causes for the war which had in part been removed, especially by the conduct of Ocoala, near Fort King, and I believe his language to me in council, that 'he was satisfied,' had reference to that conduct. I have heard of other similar instances. The Indians had been successful in the destruction of Major Dade's command, and they had killed many more than they had lost. General Gaines having taken a position in their neighborhood which they had found it impossible to move, they must have seen that they could not in future have procured from above the supply of provisions, consisting of cattle, which they had before drawn from thence. The opinion among them that this position was likely to be permanently held was calculated to break down their spirits. I have never doubted that the Indians were informed of the movement of General Clinch from Fort Drane on the 5th of March. I believe that the Indians, in the knowledge of this, saw additional reason to suppose that they could not maintain themselves in the country, and that, taking council on the evening of the 5th, they had concluded to make overtures of peace; and I have always believed they would have accepted terms such as would have been worthy of this great nation to dictate to them, had there been authority there to conclude a peace. There was not, in the council I held with the Indians, anything said about the terms of peace; they made no proposition to settle limits; they asked for nothing; stipulated for nothing beyond what I have stated in my testimony. They were told by me that they should be sent for to council, but that in the meantime they must abstain from war, and promise to attend the council when sent for. They engaged to all that freely, and with apparent alacrity. During the time that the troops remained at Fort Drane after that, to wit, from the 11th to the 26th of March, as I have understood and believe, there was no sign of any hostility of the Indians in that part of the country; they had abundant opportunities to annoy the troops at that post, which were scattered over an extent of country of several miles in diameter, accommodating themselves with wood and water. Even before I left there, and as I have heard afterwards, the officers

* NOTE BY MAJOR GENERAL GAINES.—It seems evident from the testimony of General Smith that General Scott confided in the sincerity of the Indians in suing for peace, inasmuch as he suffered these small parties to pass and repass round about Fort Drane for several miles without a guard.

and men were passing at pleasure between the several corps of the army thus dispersed, and provisions were sent to these several corps without once being disturbed. General Gaines and his staff, a party of four, during that time travelled from Fort Drane to Tallahassee, through a country that had been before and was afterwards in possession of the Indians, without molestation and without suspicion of danger, so far as I know. I have always believed that the Indians had a right to suppose that no further hostile demonstrations would be made against them until they should have been sent for and heard in council. When the hostile movements took place from Fort Drane, about the 26th of March, the rear was fired upon by the Indians, and I have understood a baggage wagon, or perhaps two, cut off. I have regarded this as an evidence that the Indians were fully informed of the exposed condition of the several corps around Fort Drane, but that so long as they could hope to be sent for to council, they abstained from annoying those troops, in compliance with their engagement on the Withlacoochee river."

Some days after giving the above testimony, Captain Hitchcock presented himself before the court and asked permission to add to his testimony the following, as continuation of his answer to the 15th question by the court. (The 15th question is that to which the above is an answer.)

"*Captain Hitchcock in reference to the 15th question by the court.* I will state to the court that yesterday, on referring to some official documents from Tampa Bay, I saw it stated that General Gaines had an escort from Fort Drane to Tallahassee; that statement is not correct, but I presume it was founded upon this: that Major McLemore was about to proceed from Fort Drane in the direction of Tallahassee, with a mounted troop; that he tendered to General Gaines, unsolicited, as I believe, on the part of General Gaines, a small detachment of his troop as an escort. This detachment remained a day, or perhaps a day and a half, and commenced its march as an escort to General Gaines, but General Gaines, after the first day's ride, dismissed the escort; halting himself, permitting the escort to leave him, and moved on afterwards without it. I did not refer to this in my testimony, because the escort was entirely unsolicited, I believe not even desired. Major McLemore's troop was returning to their homes at the time; they were not detached as an escort.*

"*Question by General Gaines to Colonel Twiggs.* Colonel Twiggs is requested to state whether he met a wagon train about the middle of March last, between Fort Drane and Black creek; and if so, whether the wagons were or were not accompanied with a guard?

"*Answer.* I left Micanopy, ten miles on this side of Fort Drane, on the 19th of March last. On that day I met the wagon train with provisions, about twenty miles from Black creek. I inquired of the person having charge of the wagon-train (called the wagon-master) where the escort was? he said he had none, and I did not see any guard with it at all.†

"*Question by General Gaines to Colonel Twiggs.* Be pleased to state whether the Louisiana volunteers were or were not ready or willing to march at any time after the middle of March, 1836. And what were your reasons for the opinion which you entertain in this case?

"*Answer.* I have no doubt but the Louisiana volunteers, had they been ordered, would have marched the next day after their arrival from the Withlacoochee near to Fort Drane. I had a conversation with General Smith on this subject, and his opinion and mine coincided, that both our commands, the regulars and volunteers, were ready to march, and that we should not ask to detain the army on that account."‡

"*Question by General Gaines to General Smith.* General Smith is requested to state in what manner the movement of General Gaines affected the movements of General Scott in Florida.

"*Answer.* My impression has always been, that every effort that General Scott could make to advance his movement was made by him; but such were the difficulties in obtaining the means of transportation, that I do not think he could have been able to commence his movement earlier than he did; that therefore no operation of General Gaines delayed General Scott's movements, and that General Scott would not have been ready sooner or later, whether General Gaines was there or not. General Gaines brought from New Orleans with him some means of transportation. He added to General Scott's forces at Fort Drane about 1,000 effective men. He had acquired some knowledge of the country around the Withlacoochee. His position on the Withlacoochee had restrained the Indians during the time General Scott was occupied in transporting provisions to Fort Drane; and that, therefore, in these respects, General Gaines's movement was of great advantage to the movements of General Scott. I might add that, after all, the means of transportation were not sufficient to allow General S. to operate along the north Withlacoochee, and that therefore he was not able to derive all those advantages which he otherwise would have derived.

"*Question by the court to Captain Hitchcock.* Were there any sorties made from the fort upon the enemy on any one of the attacks made by him whilst the army lay there; and what was the strength of the army at the time?

"*Answer.* The army was about 1,000 strong—a few over, perhaps—and no sortie was made. It may be proper to add to this answer, that one wing of each of the several bodies occupying the faces of the square had been ordered by General Gaines to be held in readiness for a sortie, should he think proper to order one. This order was given on the afternoon of the 29th February.

"*Question by the court.* Was the army on the Withlacoochee under General Gaines strong enough, and well enough appointed, to have attacked the enemy with a prospect of success?

"*Answer.* In my opinion the army could have beaten the enemy at that place, and driven him at any time; but there were not means for pursuing him with any effect.

"*Question by the court.* Do you think that Major General Gaines had it in his power at any time, with the means in his hands, and the appointment of his forces, to have marched upon the enemy and subdued him, had the enemy availed himself of the fastnesses of the country well known to him?

* NOTE BY MAJOR GENERAL GAINES.—I desired no escort. The discharged men, or those permitted to go to Middle Florida, here referred to, travelled with me the principal part of the first day's journey, the 14th of March, and until breakfast time, about 9 a. m., on the morning of the 15th of March, when I halted and desired them to go on without me. They never travelled with me another mile.

E. P. GAINES.

† NOTE BY E. P. GAINES.—By this testimony it is obvious that General Scott confided in the sincerity of the enemy in their having been subdued, and in their having sued for peace. Otherwise he certainly would not have suffered the baggage train to have passed and repassed so near the enemy without a guard.

E. P. GAINES.

‡ NOTE BY MAJOR GENERAL GAINES.—And yet, notwithstanding this fact must have been known to Major General Scott, he persisted in saying that his delay was necessary to enable these troops to rest and refresh themselves.

E. P. GAINES.

"*Answer.* I believe they would have escaped any pursuit he might have made with his force. With regard to the effect of a sortie, it is a problem which, perhaps, any one may form an opinion from a consideration of the facts which I will state. The Indians appeared to have a great facility in crossing the river; the banks of the river, above and below our camp, were lined with a dense swamp. Had a sortie been made, the Indians would have rushed into this swamp on one side or the other, and, by their knowledge of the best passages through it, and their facility in crossing the river, would, in all probability, have eluded any pursuit that could have been made from our camp. In the event of a sortie, there would, in all probability, have been a loss on both sides; but, it is my impression, without producing any beneficial results. The Indians were expending their ammunition, while our fire was reserved, and we were daily in the expectation of force from Fort Drane, especially of mounted men, a species of force of which we had none.

"*Question by the court.* While you were in the fortified camp on the Withlacoochee, was there any preparation made for a sortie by order of General Gaines? if so, state the force or corps, and the officer appointed to the command of the troops ordered for that purpose.

"*Answer.* The troops in the camp were disposed in the form of a square; the order was for one wing of each face of the square to be held in readiness for a sortie, directions being given for the other wing to extend. Colonel Foster would have been one of the officers on the right; I believe General Smith himself would have commanded the sortie on the left. I am not able at this time to give the names of the other officers. The order was given on the 29th February, in the afternoon, communicated by myself to Colonel Twiggs, commanding the light brigade. A previous order on the subject had, I believe, been communicated by some other officer. It is my opinion that, had the attack been renewed in character like that of the morning of the 29th, a sortie would have been made; but, after that attack, there was no serious attack made while we were on the Withlacoochee. There were but small parties engaged, from time to time, in endeavors to annoy us. This circumstance was itself a source of alarm, lest the Indians had abandoned that part of the country to the disappointment of the hopes of General Scott, expressed in a letter to General Clinch, and which had been seen at Fort King. The first order for the preparations for a sortie was, I believe, given, not through myself, but through some other officer. Colonel Foster came to me and made a suggestion as to mere detail, desiring me to communicate it to General Gaines. I did so, and received his orders thereon, which were communicated as above stated. General Gaines, on several occasions, spoke of the probability of an arrival of troops other than those expected from Fort Drane, especially speaking of Colonel Lindsay, who was supposed to have arrived at Tampa Bay, and declared it to be his purpose instantly to move in any direction from which reports of firing might be heard. Log canoes were constructed, and were then in the camp, with rived boards to be used for purposes of making platforms on the canoes to cross the river, the general saying that he would cross the river instantly on hearing a gun from the other side.

"*Question by General Gaines.* The witness is requested to describe the hammocks near my encampment on the Withlacoochee, and state the time at which that encampment was fortified.

"*Answer.* The hammocks bordering the river very nearly united immediately in front of the camp. From this point, both above and below, they gained very rapidly in width, and were extremely dense, especially to the east or above the camp, where the hammock extends considerably back from the stream, but at a distance of several hundred yards from the camp. The river itself has not the bend as represented in the map I hold, (marked,) the curve being much larger. A light breastwork was made around the camp on the afternoon of the 28th of February, according to custom.

"*Question by the court to Captain McCall.* No sortie was made on the enemy at the several attacks made on the camp. What were the reasons which withheld or prevented such a movement on the part of General Gaines?

"*Answer.* He did not explain to me particularly his reasons, but my impression was that it would not have resulted in any important advantage.

"*Question by the court.* Did no officer during the siege urge the propriety of making a sortie?

"*Answer.* I did not myself hear any officer, and my impression at the time was that there was no officer there who differed with the general on that point.

"*Question by the court to Captain McCall.* What is your opinion of the ability of the forces under General Gaines to drive and beat the enemy if a sortie had been made?

"*Answer.* I have not the smallest doubt that they would have been able to do it, but from the nature of the ground. The hammocks which bordered the river being thick and extremely difficult of access to the troops, would have enabled the Indians lying concealed to deliver their fire, and then, owing to their superior celerity and knowledge of the ground, to have passed through the hammock and crossed the river before the troops could have come up with them, their facilities for crossing the river being great, and the troops without the means of following them.

"*Question by General Gaines.* What part of the force was out of the limits of my breastwork during the action of the 29th of February; and state whether one or two companies were not often engaged in firing at the enemy across the river prior to the 6th March?

"*Answer.* There was one company out of the limits of the breastwork on the 29th February. Several companies were engaged in firing at the enemy across the river prior to the 6th March.

"*Question by General Gaines.* Was it General Gaines's intention to make a sortie, in the event of his hearing General Clinch's or Colonel Lindsay's guns?

"*Answer.* General Gaines remarked several times while lying at Camp Izard that he should not be surprised at hearing Colonel Lindsay's guns on the other side, and in that event he would cross immediately and march to his aid; or should the Indians engage Clinch on his advance, he would immediately march out and support him."

Mr. President and gentlemen of the court: In desiring your attention to the evidence which I have adduced to disprove the accusations against me, it becomes my duty expressly to protest against that mass of papers which have been referred to as *documentary evidence*, consisting of the *official reports, letters, and orders* of Major General Scott. This monstrous mass of *words*, recklessly jumbled together, *no matter by whom they have been indorsed*, embraces not a word of *legal evidence* which the court can, upon their oath, bring to bear *against me*, or against any man in existence save and except the fabricator of those *reports, orders, and letters*. That it is your duty to bring them to bear *against him* is obvious; but against me they can have no legal bearing whatever; not merely because they are palpably *untrue*, but also because they constitute nothing of the character of *legal evidence* as against any other than the writer of such *reports, letters, or orders*.

"*Truth is the basis of all excellence*," and I have shown—I have demonstrated by the testimony of officers of the first character and standing in the army and Louisiana volunteers, that General Scott's statements in reference to me and my movements are in many respects *false* and *malicious*. Look, for example, at what he has said in his letter of the 14th March, in which he endeavors to show the necessity of my having made a *sortie*, and to disprove the facts stated in my "Order No. 7," of the 9th of March, that I had beaten the enemy and forced them to sue for peace. Sir, what is there in this letter that can possibly be found to embrace any of the elements of legal testimony against me? Let us suppose, for the sake of illustration, (what the testimony of General Smith, Colonel Twiggs, Captain Hitchcock, Captain McCall, Lieutenant Mitchell, Mr. Potter, and other witnesses will go far to disprove,) that General Scott was truly and sincerely of the opinion that his statements contained in that *sortie-letter* were correct; then, sir, by what authority can the court *employ against me the mere opinion* of Major General Scott?

Even if he had ever won a battle at the head of a division, or in the command of an army, or any other force, beyond the immediate authority of his senior and superior officer—an honor which he never enjoyed—he would not, in the event of his having achieved such an honor, have been able to give to his reports, letters, or orders any of the essential properties of *evidence* against any man but himself; but he never achieved anything in battle at the head of a division or other independent force.

The opinions of experienced men are often very properly received by courts, both civil and military, in order to elucidate facts based upon legal evidence; but the opinions of *interested witnesses* are of no validity otherwise than as against themselves. Need I tell the court, what General Scott has so fully demonstrated, that he is so much altogether an *interested witness* in the case before you—the case of the *United States regarding the causes of the failure of certain campaigns against the Seminole Indians in 1836*—that nothing but my arrest, trial, and condemnation can possibly save that officer from being found guilty of high military offences.

The testimony of the officers last above named, that, notwithstanding General Scott's extraordinary letter of the 14th of March, in which he endeavors to prove that the Indians *were not subdued* and that *they did not sue for peace*, or that if they did sue for peace *they were not sincere*, most clearly proves that General Scott himself, at the moment of writing that letter, and for twelve days after that time, did in fact confide in the truth and sincerity of the Indians, as the testimony will demonstrate, inasmuch as he suffered wagons, small parties, and individuals to pass and repass to and from the several encampments, from five to six miles round about Fort Drane, without a guard; although that section of the Florida frontier was within twelve hours' march of the Withlacoochee, where the principal force of the Seminole Indians was known to be encamped.

Besides the general evil inherent in all statements made in opposition to truth, there are peculiar evils in the representations of General Scott, arising out of the official sanction given to them by his signature, as the general specially authorized to command in the field, and also out of opinions founded upon them by the executive head of these United States.

It has been suggested to me that the President of the United States, forming his opinions upon the official representations of General Scott, has expressed sentiments unfavorable to my conduct on the Withlacoochee. The fact of my going to Florida, in the execution of my duty, could not easily be misrepresented; and though arguments have been sought and pressed into the question to impugn my motives, they have failed to produce the effect intended, and my movement to Florida, under the extraordinary and peculiar circumstances of the case, has not in any manner been censured by that high public functionary; but my conduct while in the country of the enemy was less visible, comprised a large mass of facts, was pursued at a distance from all direct communication with Washington; and while I was in the heart of the country occupied by the enemy, in hearing of their war-whoop and rife on the Withlacoochee, General Scott was snugly posted at the little quiet place called Picolata, within eighteen miles of the city of St. Augustine, making free use of his facilities for communicating with the government, and writing the letters which I have deemed it proper to designate his *starving-letters* of the 1st and 4th of March; and then from the *little steamer, the Essayons*, on his way from Picolata, his *rescue-letter* of the 9th of March; and afterwards from Fort Drane, his *sortie-letter* of the 14th of March—all which were received with unsuspecting confidence at Washington, and upon which, false and slanderous as they were, my conduct was viewed by the Chief Magistrate with disapprobation. I look with confidence to the developments made before this court for enabling the President to do me justice, and relieve me before the army and my country from the odium which the publication by the War Department of these official slanders, and the suppression of all my correspondence upon the subject, reported for the information of that department, was calculated to produce.

General Scott has said he is not my *prosecutor* nor my *accuser*; and yet, without the slightest pretension of self-defence, he has deliberately fabricated or indorsed the most calumnious accusations, which he only has not prosecuted, because an investigation, as he knew full well, would inevitably throw back upon himself the shafts poisoned by his own venom.

Among the duties assigned to this court it is required to investigate all subjects connected with the campaigns in Florida, and I now therefore solemnly call upon the court to take that notice of the remarkable letters of General Scott of the 1st, 4th, 9th, and 14th of March, which their extraordinary contents deserve.

Thanks to the Almighty, I have lived to enjoy the privilege guaranteed to every citizen and soldier of the republic, to vindicate my conduct, and to expose and demolish the weak and nefarious schemes contrived by my accuser, while in the use and abuse of a little brief authority, for my destruction; and thanks to the high public functionaries of our beloved country for affording this privilege while I am yet in the land of the living; and in time to save my children and my military and volunteer friends the deep affliction, and the abiding mortification, of finding, when I shall be no more, the uncorrected accusations which you have received from the Department of War, and which now lie before you.

That it was the duty of the head of that department, as an act of natural equity and justice prescribed by law, (see the 77th and 79th articles of war,) to have acted upon and notified me of these accusations the moment they were received by him, and to have assembled as soon thereafter as the state of the service would permit the proper tribunal for their investigation, there can be no ground to doubt. The omission of this obvious duty, and the placing me upon a most "delicate and important command," wherein I was honored with the Secretary's notification that the President of the United States had been pleased to approve my views and measures, ought, perhaps, to be considered as the strongest assurance that could be given me of unshaken confidence in my fidelity and honor, and, on the other hand, of the little reliance placed in my accuser. Perhaps, too, the honorable the Secretary of War was apprised, as

I have been long apprised, of the fact that my accuser, never having learned how to govern himself, would, in due time, if allowed much latitude, *defeat himself*, in his overheated zeal to destroy me; for there is no principle in moral philosophy, natural law, or military science, better established, than that the officer who has not learned how to *command himself* is wholly unqualified to *command freemen*, or American soldiers, volunteers or regulars, and will sooner or later, in his unbridled efforts to destroy his imagined rivals, destroy himself.

My accuser charges me with the crime of having contributed to prevent or retard the forwarding of subsistence and other supplies required in East Florida. This charge is disproved by the testimony of Captain Morrison, the late assistant commissary for the post of New Orleans recently examined by this court. That officer testifies that on my return from Florida to New Orleans I directed him to forward promptly all the supplies that had been or might be required in Florida. The captain's testimony upon this point is in the following words:

Question by General Gaines to Captain Morrison. General Scott having endeavored to show that a report of the war being ended caused a detention in New Orleans of supplies called for by requisitions for Florida, the witness is desired to state whether he was commissary in New Orleans from January to April, 1836, inclusive; whether any such detention took place with regard to commissary supplies; whether he had an opportunity of judging whether quartermasters' stores were detained, and whether they were so detained; and is requested to state whether he understood from the quartermaster whether he would or would not feel authorized to detain supplies under the supposed circumstances of there being a report like that in question? And the witness will also please state what rations returned to New Orleans with the Louisiana volunteers from Tampa Bay; whether a part was in bulk and by him issued to the volunteers; and whether he made any remarks to Captain Thistle on the subject of the bacon so returned, and what remarks he made.

Answer. I was assistant commissary at New Orleans from January to April, and had been for ten years as such. No detention took place in the furnishing of supplies; every exertion was used to procure hard bread and bacon, as required by General Scott. The bread and bacon could not be procured in sufficient quantities; the other part of the ration, consisting of pork and flour, was delivered to the quartermaster to make up deficiencies. A duty which I owe to Major Clark, as he is not present, compels me to state that every exertion was made on his part to furnish supplies and transportation; we both felt a deep interest that nothing should be wanted. From the 7th to the 16th May, when the regiment of Louisiana volunteers returned to New Orleans from Florida, there were 720 pounds of bacon, 2,160 pounds of bread, surplus rations, which were sent to the commissary store at New Orleans, besides other rations in proportion. Captain Thistle came to me somewhere between 10th and 16th May, with a return for back rations. In offering Captain Thistle his choice of pork, bacon, flour, or hard bread, I observed that I regretted that the hard bread and bacon had come back after the difficulty I had in sending it to Florida. As to Captain Thistle's asking me why I did not send the bacon and hard bread, I have no recollection of his having made such an observation to me, nor do I believe he did. No observation was made by me to Captain Thistle that the Florida war was closed. [The witness here presented to the court papers Nos. 39, 40, (see documents,) as evidence that he had discharged his duties promptly and to the satisfaction of his department.]

Question by General Gaines. What conversation had the witness with General Gaines in New Orleans, in April, on the subject of sending supplies to Florida, and what did General Gaines urge?

Answer. About the beginning of April I had understood that General Gaines had arrived in New Orleans, and was on my way to pay my respects to him when I met Major Clark, who requested me to get a requisition from General Gaines, which he had left with the general the previous evening or the same morning. I found General Gaines at his quarters; he was unwell; and, after a little conversation, I asked him for the requisition left by Major Clark; he handed it to me and observed, very impressively, 'furnish everything which you are ordered to furnish.' Commodore Dallas, of the navy, came in and I withdrew. I did not ask General Gaines about the furnishing the supplies. His remarks were applied both to Major Clark and myself." [The witness produced paper No. 41, to show the quantity of certain supplies at Tampa Bay on the 31st March, 1836.]

Upon this point Major Clark, assistant quartermaster at New Orleans, with a promptness which does his heart and his sense of justice great honor, distinctly asserts, in an official letter to the Quartermaster General's office, written long before this court was ordered, and without my solicitation or knowledge, that I directed him, on my return to New Orleans in the latter end of March, to forward promptly to Florida all the supplies that had been or might be required from this department. The court is particularly desired to examine the testimony of these two officers, Major Clark and Captain Morrison; compare their statements with the vague allegations upon which my accuser relies, and mark how completely the plain simple statements of these most exemplary officers of the general staff disproves the hearsay stories upon which the charge of my accuser is based. By the testimony of these officers it will be seen that their efforts were unremitting to obtain and forward promptly every supply required. They were well aware of the probability that the war in Florida would be renewed. But even had it been otherwise—had they received official notice that a treaty of peace had been concluded, they understood their duty too well to relax in their efforts to forward supplies, as they well knew that troops must have their rations, and public horses their forage, in *peace* as well as in war; besides, they knew that a treaty of peace would create an additional call for subsistence, inasmuch as it would impose on the United States the task of feeding some thousands of half-starved Indians of both sexes and all ages.

Major Clark had been on duty in East Florida for several years subsequent to the year 1820; had superintended the construction of the military road from Fort Brooke to Fort King; had made himself well acquainted with the Indians, and with the topography of a considerable portion of the country they then occupied. My letter to the adjutant general, under date the 15th of January, 1836, now before the court, contains Major Clark's estimate of the number of the Indians and blacks, which he deemed to be over 2,000 warriors. His statement in reference to the accusation in question is as follows:

"ASSISTANT QUARTERMASTER'S OFFICE, *New Orleans, August 16, 1836.*

"Sir: I have this day seen a publication in the National Intelligencer of the 27th July, taken from the New York Star, on the subject of the campaign in East Florida. The writer, in speaking of the arrival of the army at Tampa Bay, says: 'We there learned that the quartermaster at New Orleans, influenced by the representations made or caused (as it was said) to be made by General Gaines that the

war was closed, had abstained from sending on provisions he had been ordered to forward from that place.' The whole of this part of his statement is incorrect. When or how he obtained this information I know not. General Gaines, on his return to New Orleans, told me to continue to send supplies, which was done promptly. Every exertion was made, both by myself and the assistant commissary, to obtain and forward the subsistence and forage required. There was great difficulty in obtaining hard bread, and every barrel that could be had was immediately shipped.

"On the 31st of March the assistant commissary at Fort Brooke forwarded a statement to the assistant commissary at New Orleans of the supplies on hand: 216,750 rations of meat, 304,423 rations of bread and flour, and the small rations in proportion; at this time there were two vessels on the way laden with subsistence and forage, and the bills of lading show that they were received on the 6th of April in good condition. Now, it appears the army arrived at Tampa Bay the 3d, 4th, and 5th April, and remained but a few days before they took their departure, and I cannot conceive where was the scarcity of provisions, unless it was in the hard bread; this was unavoidable, for it could not be obtained; that is, the quantity required.

"My object in making this statement is to correct the error that General Gaines had in any way contributed to the withholding supplies from the army in Florida; also to show that there was no cessation on the part of the commissary or myself in procuring and forwarding the supplies at the earliest period possible. The proofs of this are contained in my list of shipments now at Washington.

"I have the honor to be, sir, with high respect, your obedient servant,

"J. CLARK, *Assistant Quartermaster.*

"Major T. Cross, *Acting Quartermaster General, Washington.*"

General Scott has urged, as among the causes of the failure of his campaign, the necessity of replacing the subsistence drawn from Fort Drane by General Gaines, and of providing for a larger force than was expected there; and has desired the court to remember *who* took from Tampa Bay the means of transportation which were there early in February, and *what* prevented the arrival of new means from New Orleans.

I remark that the subsistence drawn by me from Fort Drane, previous to the arrival of General Scott, was something less than 12,000 rations. By General Scott's letter of the 9th of March to the adjutant general it will be seen that the ordinary baggage-train of General Clinch conveyed in one single trip from Picolata to Fort Drane 17,497 rations of bread and flour, and 11,000 rations of pork, besides a quantity of beans, coffee, &c. The court will perceive that, with the beef-cattle at Fort Drane, (of which the principal part of the meat ration was composed,) this supply of 17,000 rations and upwards of bread and flour, nearly twice replaced the whole amount of supplies drawn by my troops, and that this was done not by the transportation ordered into the country or provided by General Scott, but by a single expedition of the wagon train of General Clinch, which had been despatched from Fort Drane, and had arrived at Picolata on the 2d of March, the day on which my express of the 29th of February was received by General Scott. This wagon train was detained unnecessarily until the 6th of March, and was then four days in removing to Fort Drane, although a movement of the same extent in the summer, the rainy season of the year, was effected some weeks afterwards by Colonel, then Major, Pierce in two days' time. As to the necessity of providing for more force than was expected, this can in no manner be alleged by General Scott as an evil; for, by his letter of the 6th of March, he admits the necessity of a part of that force to complete the right wing, (owing to the defection of the Georgia troops,) and if the force was larger than was desired on account of supplies, he had it entirely in his power to relieve the commissariat by detaching as much to Picolata as he pleased, or dismissing the whole of it if he thought necessary. But he retained the whole of it, merging it into the right wing, and taking it with him on his march to Tampa. There is a disingenuity in the allusion of my having taken the transportation from Tampa in the argument of General Scott; for he would have the court infer that it operated to the disadvantage of the movements of the right wing, whereas, whatever that transportation was, it was at his own disposal after it reached Fort Drane, and necessarily became a part of the transportation of the right wing; so that, while the general had it entirely in his power to diminish the force *ad libitum* at Fort Drane by discharging the surplus, he was actually in the use of all the transportation taken by me, not only from Tampa, but from New Orleans. From Tampa Bay I did indeed take, but one single horse-cart, and I believe one horse and one mule of public property, not placed there by General Scott, and perhaps 8 or 10 Indian ponies. The principal part of my transportation was procured by myself at New Orleans, and General Scott not only had as much or as little of my force as suited his own pleasure, but he had all my transportation at Fort Drane. General Scott admonishes the court to remember what prevented the arrival at Tampa of new means of transportation from New Orleans, alluding to the testimony of Lieutenant Morris; and here is the same disingenuity; for, had the city of New Orleans itself been at Tampa Bay at the time of the movement of the right wing, it could not have aided the operations of that wing in its attempts upon the cove in its downward march to Tampa. That this movement was necessarily and absolutely independent of Tampa is too plain to require proof. But even if it had depended upon Tampa, all of the quartermaster's and commissary's stores, as seen by the letter of Major Clark, were there; and these were all that the government had any control over, all that could have been or were ordered there, all that were at all necessary for the campaign. The only stores not there, even admitting the testimony of Lieutenant Morris, were some sutler's stores, mere articles of convenience or comfort in a permanent garrison—such as tobacco and herring, and sometimes cheese and bacon and crackers; articles that could not have been carried on the campaign, if for no other reason than the want of transportation. It would have been strange, indeed, to have thrown out of the wagons the substantial and necessary articles of pork and flour, and supplied their places with herring and tobacco. On this head, however, I have another remark, that Mr. Morris, the writer of the letter to Lieutenant Morris, in which was enclosed the scrap of a newspaper containing a report that the war was ended, and assigning this as a reason for not sending the herring and tobacco, was not a sutler, and was not in any manner bound to furnish those little comforts. He was a New Orleans merchant, and in the business of turning a penny by sutling, was an intruder, or, to use the more forcible language of General Scott, he was an "interloper." [Upon the subject of means of transportation at Tampa, see the testimony of Lieutenant Morris, by which it is obvious there was near ten times more public means of transportation brought to that place by me, and by order of Major Belton, for my use, than was there upon my arrival.]

Question by General Gaines to Lieutenant Morris. General Scott having charged that General Gaines took the public transportation from Tampa Bay, to the disadvantage of the movement of Colonel Lindsay,

the witness is desired to state what amount of transportation was taken by General Gaines; also, whether it was or was not replaced by Lieutenant Casey; when Lieutenant Casey arrived at Tampa; what amount of transportation he brought; whether Colonel Lindsay had the benefit of that transportation, and by whose order; when and where, so far as witness knows or believes, Lieutenant Casey was sent for said transportation.

"*Answer.* There were only four or five indifferent horses taken by General Gaines that belonged to the post, besides the number that was directed to be sent by him from New Orleans. It is proper to state that there were 60 horses sent at first; but, from disease and rough weather at sea, five or six died, and some of the others were in a poor condition for service. Lieutenant Casey, the acting quartermaster at Tampa Bay, had been sent, I suppose by order of the commanding officer, to Middle Florida, (Tallahassee,) to procure means of transportation for General Gaines's army, which was expected to arrive soon. The transportation, 6 or 8 teams complete, arrived a short time after General Gaines's departure with his force from Tampa Bay. This transportation was put in requisition by Colonel Lindsay, after he arrived there, and found the principal transportation of his column. To the best of my recollection there were 42 or 48 horses or mules, which formed the teams for the wagons arrived from St. Mark's.

"*Question by General Gaines.* Was it known at Tampa Bay, at the time Lieutenant Casey was sent for transportation, that any other troops were expected at Tampa Bay than those taken there by General Gaines?

"*Answer.* I knew of no other, and I believe it was not known there that Colonel Lindsay's or any other troops were expected to arrive at that time.

"*Question by General Gaines to Captain Drane.* Please state what reason you had, if any, after returning with the right wing of the Florida army to Fort Drane, for believing that the families of the Indians were still in the cove, and whether any doubt remained on your mind as to their being there in March and April last?

"*Answer.* The night before the right wing of the army crossed the Big Withlacoochee, returning, I was called, at 12 o'clock at night, by Major Cooper, who was the officer of the day, to listen to the talk of both Indians and negroes, on the north bank of the Big Withlacoochee. The next morning the army had marched but about one half mile, when we crossed a trail of Indians coming out of a swamp; passing to the south, a little further on, about 200 or 300 yards, we discovered a trail leading into the swamp; the trails were evidently fresh, and made that morning. The second day after crossing the Little Withlacoochee on the route to Fort King, the army crossed several small trails, some leading to the cove and some to the west; those west leading into Wahoo swamp, or that direction. The day following the day we marched to Fort King, our left flank was attacked by a small party of Indians that soon fled also in the direction of the Wahoo swamp or Withlacoochee. On our arrival at Fort King, we were there informed that Billy Emathla's wife and one other squaw, I believe her sister, had been captured during the absence of the army from Fort Drane, and taken off by the hostile Indians. Some days after the army arrived at Fort Drane, Billy Emathla's wife made her escape and returned to the right of the army to her husband. I had several conversations with her through the interpreter. She informed me that the Indians had not moved from the Wahoo swamp and the cove on the Withlacoochee—that their women and children were still there; there they had planted their grounds; that the crops were very fine. She described the corn and rice as being about a foot high. She stated that, in her opinion, they would have a better crop than they ever had. I inquired of her if the Indians had moved their families from there at any time during the war. She informed me that they had not. She there had a conversation with Powell, who advised her to quit her husband and join the Mickasukies, and not return back to the white people; that his men had whipped all the white men, and driven them out of the country, and then they had gone home; that he then meant to assemble his warriors and drive the pale faces from Fort King; and then he would go to Fort Drane and drive them away from there, where they would get a large supply of ammunition, and they then would drive all the Alachuas (meaning volunteers) out of the country, as far as the Suwanee; and then that they would have all the country from the Suwanee, south, to themselves. She informed me that she had heard Powell repeatedly say, during the time she was in captivity, that he never would make peace with the white man. The above are the reasons why I have never had a doubt that the Indians had never quitted the cove or the strongholds on the Withlacoochee. After the army had returned to the Withlacoochee with General Gaines, I was sent to Oaklands, five or six miles northeast from Fort Drane, where I remained until General Scott arrived. During the time I occupied that post with my command, and a few days after I returned from the Withlacoochee, very frequent signs of Indians were discovered on the plantation of Colonel John McIntosh, and crossing the main road leading to Micanopy. I had frequently seen fires on the opposite side of Orange lake during this period, and I felt satisfied they were Indian fires.

"The Indian women spoken of in this account were captured during the time the army was absent on its march from Fort Drane to Fort Brooke. They returned from captivity after the army arrived at Fort Drane from Fort Brooke.

"*Question by General Gaines to General Smith.* To what extent was the cove swamp penetrated by General Scott in March or April, 1836, and was the search for the Indians by him sufficient to enable him to pronounce upon the position of the Indians or their families?

"*Answer.* On the 30th March General Scott left all the baggage under the charge of Major Wilson, and a detachment at, what I presume, may be called the entrance of the cove. We marched without the baggage that afternoon probably about four and a half miles. Next morning we crossed the foot over a very deep and difficult bog which was in front of our encampment. The right column, which was under my command, attacked a small party of Indians that were in front, and pursued them three or four miles, to the utmost extent of the pursuit. Part of the column had arrived, by taking a direction on the banks of the river; the other part, with which I was myself, was pursuing the trail down through the woods to the right, when one of General Clinch's staff brought an order for us to return. We then retraced our steps to where the baggage was, and the next morning took up our march round the outside of the cove, and, after leaving Major Cooper with his battalion towards the southern extremity of it, we went to Tampa Bay. The furthest extent to which the cove was penetrated was by the party which I commanded. Both the columns that entered the cove met in the cove altogether about 120 or 130 Indians. We had lost all trace of the Indians in the cove before we were recalled. We were on an old path, but we had lost all trace of the particular party we were pursuing.

"*Question by the same to the same.* What is the opinion of the witness as to the location of the Indian

families in March and April; and does the witness know whether they had or had not gone down to Pease creek?

"Answer. I have no idea of where they were at that time. They could not have been on Pease creek, unless, possibly, at the very head of it—a point beyond which I went. I do not think there was any large body of Indians on Pease creek, as I ascended it with only 140 men, and the Indians would have known of our approach. We crossed two considerable trails leading to the south, but they must have been two or three months old."³

I have stated that the proper time and place for Major General Scott to enter upon the command of the forces under me, in that part of my department which formed the theatre of the war, was the precise time and place of his arrival in person at the position occupied by the force actively engaged under me at that position; because, until the moment of his arrival at my position, every duty and every responsibility necessarily rested with me, and therefore it was proper that I should be governed in my movements and measures by the movements of the enemy, with a view to the immediate protection of the frontier and to subdue the enemy, or to hold them in check until the arrival of additional force and supplies. This view of the subject is based upon a principle which has from time immemorial governed the interior and exterior police of the armies of the most enlightened nations of the world during a state of war—a principle, therefore, strictly applicable to a state of war. Take, for example, a picket-guard or a small outpost near the enemy: who ever heard of the commander of either being relieved otherwise than upon the personal appearance of the officer authorized to take command? At a post or in a department where there are several officers on duty, the commander may be relieved in time of war by a special order directing him, on the receipt of such order, to turn over his command to a particular officer near him, or to his next in rank; but, without some such special authority, the officer to be relieved would remain in command, if near the enemy, until the new commander arrives in person at the position occupied by the principal force employed near the enemy.

I have sought in vain for a case tending to justify or excuse the pretension of a right on the part of General Scott to assume the command of any part of the forces of my department upon the theatre of the war, whether with me in the field or otherwise, previous to his arrival *within the limits of my department and at the spot where the troops were employed in an active campaign against the enemy*. I have, on the contrary, found many cases tending to establish the principle for which I contend, and upon which I acted, to one of the strongest of which I have desired and again desire the attention of the court. I allude to the case connected with the battle of Vimera, in Portugal, fought in August, 1808, between the British army, under Sir Arthur Wellesley, and the French, under General Junot.

After Sir Arthur embarked at Cork, in Ireland, with an army of ten thousand men, for the Peninsula, General Sir Harry Burrard Neale, senior in rank to Sir Arthur, was ordered to take command of the forces proceeding to Spain, of which Sir Arthur's division formed a part. About the same time General Sir Hugh Dalrymple, then at Gibraltar, received orders to take command of whatever British forces he should find in Portugal. Sir Arthur, on arriving near the coast of Portugal, learned that General Junot with a French army of 14,000 men was in the vicinity of Vimera; whereupon the British army under Sir Arthur landed and was soon after attacked by the French. A severe conflict ensued. It so happened that during the battle General Neale arrived at Vimera; he immediately sent an officer of his staff to the field of battle in sight of Vimera to announce his arrival to Sir Arthur, notifying him, however, that he was expected to continue his operations against the enemy according to his own plan. The battle continued for some hours. Previous to its termination, General Sir Hugh Dalrymple arrived at Vimera. He also announced his arrival to Sir Arthur, who was again notified by a superior that he, Sir Arthur, would continue his operations according to his own original plan until the battle should be over. The French army was ultimately beaten, and was seen by General Dalrymple retiring rapidly in a

³ NOTE BY MAJOR GENERAL GAINES.—General Scott has labored very diligently to show that the Indians removed their families and dispersed themselves from the cove of the Withlacoochee in March, and has attributed the supposed movement to me. He formally reported his opinions to the War Department on the 30th of April, and has urged the same considerations before the court of inquiry, but without introducing any evidence upon the subject. He has quoted his own letters containing his opinions, and asks, very significantly, how he is to account for not finding, three weeks after General Gaines left the Withlacoochee, any considerable body of the enemy, on any other supposition than that of their dispersion.

The difficulty is very easily solved: and, since General Scott has suggested it in connexion with the effects of my movement, I have thought proper to place on your record the testimony necessary for the purposes of explanation; and the answer to the general's inquiry may be embraced in a single sentence: he did not find the enemy because he did not go where the enemy was to be found. The testimony of Captain Drane and Lieutenant Mitchell has shown that Major General Scott penetrated the cove but two and a half miles, about four miles from the crossing of the river, although Captain Drane, who has been many years in that country and is well acquainted with it, has told you that the cove is fifteen or twenty miles in extent. It has a circumference of not less than forty, perhaps fifty, miles. And this celebrated spot—the known and acknowledged stronghold of the enemy, the object of all General Scott's plans, the theme of his public letters and reports—was penetrated but the short distance of two and a half miles, when the pursuit was strangely abandoned while a portion of the enemy was in view; and the remainder of the march was conducted in the open country, for many miles adjacent to this celebrated hammock, to Fort Cooper, where a useless post was established and supplied with seventeen or eighteen days' provisions for three or four hundred men, instead of penetrating the hammock with that supply of provision and searching for the enemy. In connexion with this subject, I will observe that, if General Scott thought the force was too large in the right wing, he should have left a portion of it at Fort Drane, more especially if he was not able to supply it with provisions. Again, General Scott took with him all the transportation he had at Fort Drane, leaving still some supplies in depot at Fort Drane. Now, this transportation was more than all he had ordered into the country, not only by the addition of that possessed by General Clinch, but by that taken to Fort Drane by myself; so that, if his force was out of proportion large, he could have left a portion of it, and then have moved on the Withlacoochee better provided, in every respect, than it was possible for him to be independent of my movement; yet, with all these advantages of men and means, he only penetrated the swamp two and a half miles, proceeded to Tampa Bay, and there reported to the War Department that he had penetrated the cove to its head, as he thought; and now insists upon it, as a matter clearly ascertained, that the Indians had dispersed. I repeat, in answer to his question why he did not find the enemy, it was because he did not go where they were. They were in the cove. A body of some 250 was actually found at the edge of it by General Scott; and after he left Fort Cooper, that post was assailed by Indians from the cove for some seventeen days in succession.

On the return march from Tampa to Fort Drane, Fort Cooper was absorbed, and the march was thence conducted into the Tampa and Fort King road; in passing to which Captain Drane testifies that the southern edge of the hammock was traversed for a short distance, but the great cove itself was not penetrated.

In this march from Tampa, it might be readily supposed one select corps could have been organized of the three divisions at Tampa, leaving the remainder at Fort Brooke, and, with the whole of the transportation, this corps of choice troops might have been amply provided for an examination of at least a week or ten days in the cove; but no, the divisions returned as they went, and the great cove, as if avoided with special care, was passed on the west in going down and on the east in returning, and, without examination, the Indians were officially reported to have dispersed.

E. P. GAINES.

direction towards *Torres de Vidras*. On making this discovery, General Dalrymple sent his aide to desire Sir Arthur to give up the pursuit and return with his army to Vimera. Sir Arthur remonstrated, and insisted upon the propriety of pursuing and capturing the remnants of the French army as an essential part of his original plan. General Dalrymple persisted in recalling the victorious army, and sent a peremptory order to Sir Arthur requiring him to retrace his steps to Vimera. He complied. But the great error of this retrograde movement was soon demonstrated by the arrival of a flag of truce, with a proposition from the French commander to capitulate on condition that his army should be conveyed by British transports to France as prisoners of war on parole.

This capitulation was arranged at Cintra, and it was termed "The Convention of Cintra." From the proceedings of a board of inquiry, consisting of several general officers, into the operations at Vimera which led to the convention of Cintra, there is no evidence of any effort by either of the general officers ordered to command the forces under Sir Arthur Wellesley to assume or exercise any command whatever until their arrival at Vimera; and even then they both successively deemed it to be their duty to abstain from taking command until the pending battle should be terminated. And General Dalrymple was censured for his interference before the pursuit and capture of the enemy were completed.

Had either of those general officers halted from sixty to ninety miles from the theatre of the war in which Sir Arthur was engaged, it is not to be believed that any respect would have been paid to their orders, nor is it probable that the British government would have tolerated so irregular and inefficient a measure. Suppose, sir, that either of those senior commanders had sat still at the very secure post of Gibraltar and had taken measures to withhold from Sir Arthur Wellesley's army their proper supplies of subsistence, and had thus attempted to starve that gallant army out of its position at Vimera, would it not have brought the author of so atrocious an outrage to a volley of ball cartridges? Yes, sir; even in the monarchical and aristocratic government of England, where favoritism has its all-powerful sway, I venture to affirm that such an outrage on the part of any officer in the British army or navy would have cost him his life; and the ministry that would have sanctioned or connived at such an outrage would have been promptly hurled from power.

I thank the court for the patient hearing which they have given me.

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General U. S. Army by brevet.*

DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE OF GENERAL GAINES.

No. 1.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *New Orleans, January 15, 1836.*

GENERAL: I do myself the honor to report, for the information of the proper authorities, that having met, on my arrival at this city yesterday, the bad news of the defeat and massacre of Major Dade, with a detachment of United States troops, consisting of eight officers and nearly one hundred non-commissioned officers and soldiers, by the Seminole Indians, near Tampa Bay, East Florida; and having reason to apprehend that the troops at Fort Brooke, with those which this sad disaster must speedily draw towards that post, will need more arms, ammunition, and subsistence, with axes and other tools, than the supply now there will afford, I have considered it to be my duty to order, and have therefore ordered, the articles specified in the requisitions of which I enclose herewith copies, (marked A, B, and C,) to be obtained and forwarded thither forthwith.

Convinced, as I am, that no time should be lost in applying to these red and black savages the last and obvious means of correction, and not doubting but that the 6th and part of the 1st and 7th regiments of infantry will very soon be ordered, by the way of this city, to East Florida, to co-operate with the disposable companies of United States artillery and territorial volunteers in the arrest or destruction of those Indians and brigands, before the dry weather of winter shall pass away and the rains of spring and summer cover the swamps and flats that surround them with water; and believing that the forces to which I have alluded will not be able to arrest or punish a people so nearly amphibious as these savages are, without the aid of some naval force, with gunboats, to co-operate with the troops along the sea-coast of Florida, I shall, by the first conveyance, request the commander of the naval station at Pensacola to furnish such force and boats as he may feel authorized to order on that service.

Some experience and much reflection have convinced me that the only sure means of terminating speedily and effectually all difficulties with these savages will be to march an army of at least four thousand men along the sea-coast, to which they usually take refuge, to be flanked and supported by the proposed naval force, whose aid will be necessary in crossing inlets, creeks, bays, lakes, and ponds, with which the whole of that sea-coast abounds, and in scouring the tangled thicket-woods and deep swamps into which the enemy would escape and be secure against any force that we would employ on *land*, unaided by naval force; whereas, by the proposed co-operation of land and naval force, we should not fail to take or destroy most of them, and certainly take or destroy their boats and the boats of their allies, the fishermen and other stragglers and idlers from the Island of Cuba, from whom, there is reason to believe, these Indians obtain supplies of ammunition and subsistence. We should thus cut off this source of supply and of escape, and we should thus force them to sue for peace.

Their number of fighting men cannot, I am convinced, be less than two thousand four hundred. Our excellent quartermaster, Major Clark, who spent several years near them and often surrounded by them, deems their force to be between two thousand and two thousand five hundred; recent accounts state their number at near three thousand; but, if they have not more than two thousand, it would be imprudent to send in pursuit of them, in a country so perfectly known to them and so little known to our troops, and, moreover, a country affording them peculiar natural advantages, which might often enable them, with inferior numbers and inferior prowess, to overcome and destroy our troops. Indeed, Colonel Twiggs, who has had the means of appreciating the character of the country, as well as that of the enemy, concurs with me in the opinion that a *land force* of ten thousand men would find it extremely difficult to take or destroy this enemy, contemptible as it is deemed to be, without the co-operation of naval force.

All which is most respectfully submitted for the information of the proper authorities.

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General, Commanding.*

The ADJUTANT of the *United States Army, Washington, D. C.*

No. 2.

A.

Requisition for ordnance and ordnance stores for the year 1836.

Musket-ball cartridges	250,000
Musket flints	3,000
Cartridges, canister shot, fixed, for 6-pounders	2,000
Sticks portfire	50
Pounds slowmatch	100
Cartridges, grape shot, fixed, for 6-pounders	200
Rifles, complete	200

This requisition is rendered necessary in consequence of the Seminole Indians and blacks having commenced war in the Territory of Florida, and having recently cut off a considerable force under Major Dade, 4th infantry. Immediate concentration of force at Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay, is necessary, and for which force these supplies will be required.

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *New Orleans, January 15, 1836.*

The acting ordnance officer at Baton Rouge arsenal will issue and deliver to Lieutenant Myers the ordnance stores embraced in the above requisition.

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General, Commanding.*

No. 3.

B.

40,000 rations pork, equal 150 barrels; 40,000 rations flour, equal 235 barrels; 40,000 rations beans, equal 26 barrels; 40,000 rations candles, equal 2 barrels; 40,000 rations soap, equal 9 barrels; 40,000 rations salt, equal 7 barrels; 40,000 rations vinegar, equal 13 barrels; 40,000 rations sugar, equal 16 barrels; 40,000 rations coffee, equal 10 barrels: total, 468 barrels.

NEW ORLEANS, *January 16, 1836.*

The above articles of subsistence stores will be required to complete the loading of the transport destined for Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay.

P. MORRISON, *First Lieutenant 4th Infantry, A. C. S.*

No. 4.

C.

Special requisition on the quartermaster's department.

For 200 pounds 10d nails; 200 pounds double 10d nails; 200 pounds 8d nails; 200 pounds 4d nails; 6 broadaxes; 200 felling axes; 100 picks or grubbing hoes, with an axe one side; 25 augers, assorted; 12 crosscut saws; 200 pounds oakum; 2 dozen gimlets, assorted; 4 grindstones, common size; 50 hatchets; 400 pounds spikes, wrought, for building boats; 200 spades; 12 handsaws; 20 coils (inch diameter) rope; 2 dozen whipsaws; 2 dozen whipsaw files; 6 dozen handsaw files; 3 dozen crosscut files; 2 dozen iron wedges; 2 dozen iron froes; 6 adzes; 6 hammers; 1 set blacksmith's tools, screw-plate, &c.; 4 sets calking irons; 300 pounds iron, bar; 200 pounds rods for bolts, $\frac{3}{4}$ inch thick.

I certify that the above requisition is correct, and that the articles specified are absolutely requisite for the public service, rendered so by the following circumstances: The Seminole Indians and blacks having commenced war in the Territory of Florida, and having recently cut off a considerable force under Major Dade, 4th infantry. Immediate concentration of force at Tampa Bay, Fort Brooke, is necessary, and for which these supplies will be required.

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General, Commanding.*

The quartermaster will issue the articles specified in the above requisition.

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General, Commanding.*

Received, New Orleans, January, 1836, of Major J. Clarke, assistant quartermaster United States army, two hundred pounds 10d nails; two hundred pounds double 10d nails; two hundred pounds 8d nails; two hundred pounds 4d nails; six broadaxes; two hundred felling axes; two hundred spades; one hundred picks or grubbing hoes; twenty-five augers, assorted; two dozen gimlets, assorted; twelve crosscut saws; twelve handsaws; twenty coils of inch rope; two dozen whipsaws; six dozen whipsaw files; six dozen handsaw files; three dozen crosscut files; two dozen iron wedges; two dozen iron froes; four grindstones; fifty hatchets; four hundred pounds spikes; two hundred pounds of oakum; six adzes; six hammers; one set blacksmith's tools; four sets calking irons; three hundred pounds of iron, bar; two hundred pounds rod $\frac{3}{4}$ inch thick.

In full of the above requisitions.

No. 5.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *New Orleans, January 15, 1836.*

SIR: Being convinced, from the published reports of the late sanguinary conflicts in East Florida between the United States troops and the Seminole Indians, that an immediate concentration in that quarter of additional force is necessary for the prompt punishment which the habitual faithlessness and inveterate hostility of those brigand tribes merit, I am sure I shall but anticipate the wishes of the President of the United States by soliciting the services of a few corps of the high-minded and chivalric volunteers of Louisiana. I have, therefore, respectfully to request your excellency to give orders authorizing a regiment of eight companies of riflemen and infantry, or of either of these arms, to hold themselves in readiness to assemble, at a moment's warning, at this city, for embarkation from hence to Fort Brooke, near Tampa Bay.

The United States quartermaster and assistant commissary of subsistence will be ordered to have in readiness at this city arms, ammunition, and subsistence, and camp equipage, hospital and medical stores, and medical attendance for the volunteers, who will be expected to provide themselves with a supply of clothing.

Very respectfully, &c.,

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General, Commanding.*His Excellency E. D. WHITE, *Governor of Louisiana.*

No. 6.

SPECIAL ORDER.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *New Orleans, January 16, 1836.*

The assistant commissary of subsistence at New Orleans will obtain and deliver to Lieutenant Myers, of the 4th regiment of infantry, forty thousand complete rations of provisions, to be forwarded to Fort Brooke, East Florida, forthwith.

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General, Commanding.*

No. 7.

SPECIAL ORDER.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *New Orleans, January 16, 1836.*

1. Lieutenant A. C. Myers, of the 4th infantry, will repair to Baton Rouge, and receive from the ordnance officer at that post the arms and ordnance stores specified in my requisition of yesterday's date, which supplies he will have shipped to this city and placed on board the transports to be furnished by the United States quartermaster, with the subsistence and tools required for Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay; which supplies will be receipted for, and be in charge of Lieutenant Myers, and be delivered by him to the commandant of Fort Brooke.

2. To guard against accidents, Lieutenant Colonel Foster will furnish Lieutenant Myers with a non-commissioned officer and twenty sober men to accompany him for the protection of the vessel and military stores ordered to Fort Brooke.

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General, Commanding.*

No. 8.

ORDER No. 4.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *Mobile, Alabama, January 18, 1836.*

Captain Ethan A. Hitchcock is hereby appointed to act as assistant adjutant general. He will accompany the general to Pensacola, and thence on his intended visit of inspection in Florida and Louisiana.

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General, Commanding.*

No. 9.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 5.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *Mobile, Alabama, January 18, 1836.*

1. Lieutenant Colonel D. E. Twiggs will receive and cause to be mustered into the service of the United States the corps of Louisiana volunteers requested of his excellency the governor on the 15th instant, and have them supplied with arms, ammunition, and camp equipage, with a supply of subsistence sufficient for two months' issue.

2. To the Louisiana volunteers, or to such four companies of them as may be first ready for service,

Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs will add such regular force as may have arrived at New Orleans previous to the time the volunteers shall receive their supplies, together with such of the 4th regiment of infantry at Baton Rouge and New Orleans as in his judgment can be considered disposable; with which force he will embark on board the most serviceable vessel he can select for the contemplated voyage and peculiar service in view, and repair to Tampa Bay, where he will report to and co-operate with Brigadier General Clinch or the officer commanding the present expedition against the Seminole Indians.

3. Should an immediate communication with the main force now in Florida prove to be impracticable, Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs will in that case take command of such other force as he may find disposable at Tampa Bay, and arrange with the commander of such naval force as he shall find in that quarter a plan of co-operation for the immediate arrest or destruction (in case of resistance) of all the Indian warriors and colored fishermen found in East Florida, with such as may be seen hovering upon the Florida coast without permission.

4. The Louisiana volunteers will be mustered by Lieutenant Buchanan.

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *Pensacola, January 25, 1836.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to report, for the information of the proper authorities, that, in pursuance of my intention suggested in my letter to you under date of the 15th of this month from New Orleans, I proceeded, by the way of Mobile, to this place, where I had the satisfaction to learn that Commodore Dallas, at Key West, and Commodore Bolton, at the navy yard here, had, with the promptitude, zeal, and judgment for which they have been long and justly distinguished, ordered to Tampa Bay all the force which they deemed it practicable to dispose of, for the desired co-operation with the troops in that quarter, of which I doubt not the Navy Department has been duly advised. These timely aids, added to the force which Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs is now collecting together for that service, with the 6th regiment of infantry, which I trust will have been ordered by the general-in-chief in time to reach New Orleans between the 1st and 5th of February, (next month,) will, I am convinced, be sufficient, with the force which General Clinch has a right to calculate on from the Atlantic posts south of New York, inclusively, to take or destroy the enemy in the course of a few days after the concentration of the forces above referred to; possibly a month may be required for the accomplishment of this service.

Having reason to believe that some volunteer companies of Louisiana were disposed to tender their services in the expedition to East Florida, I, on the 15th instant, requested his excellency Governor White to give orders authorizing a regiment, to consist of eight companies of riflemen and infantry, or of either of those arms, to hold themselves in readiness to assemble at a moment's warning at New Orleans, for embarkation to Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay. On my way to this place, on meeting the news of the sudden abandonment and *homeward rush* of the Floridian militia from Brigadier General Clinch, just when he had most need of them to rush upon the enemy, I, on the 18th instant, issued my Special Orders No. 5, of which I send herewith a copy, directing Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs to receive in service the regiment of Louisiana volunteers, and to proceed with that and all other disposable force at and near New Orleans to Fort Brooke; to report to and co-operate with Brigadier General Clinch; and, with the aid of the naval force sent thither, to take or *destroy* (in case of resistance) the hostile Indian warriors, with all other colored men in East Florida, or found hovering on that coast without authority.

I very much regret to learn from Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs, under date of the 22d instant, that he has reason to apprehend there will be but few volunteers, and that his whole force of regulars will amount to not more than 140 fit for duty. Small as this force is, I shall direct it to proceed to Tampa, with as many of the companies of volunteers required as may be in readiness in the present week; not doubting but that the 6th infantry will follow as soon as practicable after it receives the anticipated orders to march. Should the ice have obstructed the navigation of the Mississippi even as far down as New Madrid, the regiment could march thither without heavy baggage in five or six days, where it would embark on board steamboats, there being always of late years some two or three (more or less) at or near the lower point of the obstructed section of the river. With such an obstruction, the regiment would arrive at New Orleans twelve days from the time it received marching orders; without the supposed probable obstruction, the movement would be accomplished in six or seven days after the receipt of marching orders at Jefferson Barracks. By suitable steamboats for the movement from New Orleans, the regiment, or any part of it deemed requisite to send to Tampa Bay, would be landed there in two and a half to three days.

I shall repair immediately to New Orleans, and avail myself of every proper occasion in my power to meet faithfully all exigencies as they may occur, and to carry into effect whatever plans of operation the constituted authorities may see fit to direct for the defence of the country and for the interests and honor of the service, pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the land, and more especially in accordance with the *oath* under which I have often rendered our beloved country some service against *enemies* and *opposers* without and within her limits, as you and a few other honorable brethren in arms (who, thanks to our Heavenly Father, are yet spared from an untimely grave) can and will testify. Let me have men and means, with the authority hitherto allowed to officers of my grade and station in times of war or threatened war, and my life upon it I will not only soon inflict exemplary punishment on our too-much-despised red foe and his allies, but I will very soon put in a state of defence, for giving our old friends the French a warm reception, our excellent forts on this frontier—forts that are now without the means of defence—whilst every infantry company in my department may be, and shall be, if placed at my disposal, rendered equal in a few weeks time to our artillery companies.

All which is most earnestly and most respectfully submitted.

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brig. Gen. ROGER JONES, *Adjutant General.*

No. 11.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *New Orleans, February 2, 1836.*

SIR: With a view to an efficient co-operation of the forces now assembling in the northeast quarter of East Florida, under your command, with those ordered from this city by water to Tampa Bay, against the Seminole Indians and their colored vassals and allies, I take much pleasure in advising you that a fine battalion of the chivalric volunteers of Louisiana, consisting of eight companies, headed by Adjutant General Smith, are engaged to embark to-morrow with the regular troops at this post, under the command of Colonel Twiggs, on board the steamboats the Merchant, Captain Smyler, and the Watchman, Captain Vincent. These forces, amounting to near seven hundred men, added to two hundred and fifty artillerymen and marines now at Tampa, to be sustained by an efficient naval force promptly furnished by Commodores Dallas and Bolton, for cutting off the enemy's boats and other means of escape to the islands on the coast, are intended to be in readiness at Fort Brooke, Tampa, by the 8th of the present month, to form a junction at or near that place with the force under your command, whenever and as soon as in your judgment your force shall be sufficient to justify the movement.

In the interim I shall be governed by such information as I may receive at Tampa, or in my voyage thither, to effect the desired junction, and as soon as possible to operate against and take or destroy the enemy.

I advise you to move with great caution, fortifying your camp at night, and marching in open order during the day, so as to be always ready for action at a moment's warning. A sufficient quantity of ammunition and provisions have been transported to Fort Brooke to divide with you until further supplies are received.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General D. L. CLINCH, *or officer commanding Fort King, Florida.*

No. 12.

SPECIAL ORDER No. 7.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *New Orleans, February 3, 1836.*

I. On the arrival at this city of the sixth United States infantry, or such part of that regiment as shall arrive within the present month, the commanding officer will detach therefrom a guard, to consist of an officer and twenty-four non-commissioned officers and men, to each of the following posts, viz: Forts Jackson, Wood, and Pike, and to Baton Rouge; and post one company at the barracks in this city, for the defence and protection of the said forts and posts, and to co-operate with the civil authorities in the maintenance of order.

II. In the interim, and until these arrangements can be made, Major Clark, the quartermaster, will take measures for the preservation of the public property at the above-named posts, by the employment of suitable officers or citizens to be stationed there for that purpose.

By order of Major General Gaines.

GEORGE A. McCALL, *Aide-de-camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant.*

No. 13.

HEADQUARTERS, ON BOARD THE STEAMBOAT WATCHMAN,
Lake Pontchartrain, 8 o'clock a. m., February 4, 1836.

SIR: I have the satisfaction to find that, in addition to the handsome battalion of Louisiana volunteers under Adjutant General Smith which you have had the goodness to raise, and, with the aid of the city authorities, supply with an outfit for the United States service, some other companies had yesterday offered their services.

In the absence of authentic information from the theatre of the border war in East Florida, and being satisfied, under existing circumstances, it is obviously more prudent and proper to have in the field a few companies, or even a *battalion more*, than to risk a *single soldier less* than may be deemed sufficient to take or destroy the brigand enemy in that quarter, and thus terminate the war speedily and effectually, I can have no doubt of the propriety of requesting and accepting of two or three additional companies that have so gallantly offered their services.

In addition to the supplies mentioned in my letter of the 15th ultimo, I have directed the quartermaster to furnish these additional companies with knapsacks and blankets.

I have the honor to be, with perfect respect, your obedient servant,

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General, Commanding.*

His Excellency E. D. WHITE, *Governor of Louisiana.*

No. 14.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *January 22, 1836.*

SIR: Your communication of the 5th instant is this day received and submitted to the general-in-chief; and I have the pleasure to inform you that your proposed tour to the southern and eastern portion of your command is approved.

I am instructed to inform you, however, that the state of affairs *west* of the Mississippi may soon require your attention, if not presence, in that quarter; accordingly, you will be pleased to await orders and instructions in New Orleans.

I herewith respectfully enclose "Order No. 7," by which you will see that Major General Scott has been ordered to Florida. The turn which Indian affairs have recently taken in that quarter has required considerable drafts on the neighboring States for a volunteer and militia force, as well as an increase of the regular force drawn from the seaboard.

As the operations against the Seminoles will oblige Major General Scott to cross the line of his command, authority is given to him to that effect by instructions from the Secretary of War. As soon as the state of things will permit, General Scott will order the troops back to their respective stations.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

R. JONES.

Major General GAINES.

Extract from a letter from the Secretary of War to General Scott, dated January 21, 1836.

"The line dividing your own department from that of General Gaines is at present an imaginary one, and probably would, if run, actually pass through the scene of hostilities. You will pursue your operations, therefore, without regard to any such divisionary line."

No. 15.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *on board steamboat Watchman, Pensacola Bay, Feb. 6, 1836.*

GENERAL: I have to acknowledge the honor of your letter of the 22d of last month, written, as I must infer, *by order of the Secretary of War*, (but upon this point you are not explicit,) which letter I met here this day, this vessel having been aground, and come in here to obtain fuel.

In your letter you refer to "Order No. 7;" no such order of the present year has been received by me.

Referring you, for the information of the proper authorities, to my letter written to you for their information, under date the 15th and 25th of last month, and more especially to the copy of my letter of the 2d instant to General Clinch, (reported also for the information of the Secretary of War and general-in-chief,) I have to state that I cannot consistently with my plan of co-operation with General Clinch, or with General Scott—if, indeed, he be the immediate commanding officer of the troops in the northeast border of East Florida—I cannot with propriety abandon the proposed expedition or co-operation until its results are known, or until I am authorized so to do at a time subsequent to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case being known at Washington; for, in addition to the binding effect of my proposition to *co-operate* with the forces from that quarter, I have made a pledge to the governor and volunteers of Louisiana—a voluntary pledge—that I would not require this fine corps to go further than I myself would go, and that I would stand by them as long as they would stand by me in our contemplated efforts to take or destroy our red and black enemy in East Florida. I cannot but hope that this may be accomplished before the state of affairs west of the Mississippi "*may soon*," as you intimate, "*require my attention, if not my presence*," in that quarter, judging from the style of your letter upon this point, and that I shall arrive at New Orleans in time to receive any orders and execute any duties that may be assigned to me.

In respect to the contents of the extract subjoined to your letter touching the "imaginary line" between the western and eastern departments, about which the honorable Secretary of War has again and again given himself so much trouble, that is a matter which I perfectly understand. The Rules and Articles of War, in accordance with which every *responsible* personage honored with the President's commission is presumed to act under the sanction of an oath and upon honor, make this matter quite plain, the long-continued intrigues of all who have written to mystify the subject to the contrary notwithstanding.

All which is submitted with profound respect.

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General, Commanding.*

Adjutant General JONES, *Washington City.*

No. 16.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, February 22, 1836.*

SIR: Your communication dated "Pensacola Bay, on board steamboat Watchman, February 6, 1836," has this day been received and submitted to the Secretary of War and general-in-chief; and, in answer, I am directed to say it is expected that the Secretary of War's instructions to you, dated the 23d of January, have ere this been received, and that you will have proceeded, accordingly, to the western frontier of the State of Louisiana, there to assume the personal command of all the troops which are or may be employed in any part of the region adjoining the Mexican boundary. Lest the instructions herein referred to may not have reached you, the Secretary of War directs that a triplicate copy be now forwarded, and that on receiving this communication you will not delay your departure, but that you will be pleased to proceed immediately to the western frontier as herein required.

I send copies of this communication to you at Fort King and Pensacola.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

Major General GAINES, *Fort Brooke, Florida.*

No. 17.

ORDER No. 4.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *Fort Brooke, Florida, February 10, 1836.*

I. Captain E. A. Hitchcock, of the 1st regiment of United States infantry, is hereby appointed to act as assistant inspector general of the department.

II. The troops at this post, consisting of A, B, G, and H companies of the 2d regiment of artillery, and A, B, E, G, H, I, and K companies of the 4th infantry, with the Louisiana volunteers, under Adjutant General Smith, will constitute a brigade, to be designated the "light brigade," and will be commanded by Lieutenant Colonel D. E. Twiggs, of the 4th regiment of infantry.

III. Lieutenant J. Izard, of the dragoons, will perform the duties of brigade major, and will report to Colonel Twiggs accordingly.

By order of Major General Gaines.

GEORGE A. McCALL, *Aide-de-camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 18.

ORDER No. 6.

HEADQUARTERS, *Fort Brooke, February 12, 1836.*

Brevet Majors H. Wilson and W. W. Lear, of the 4th infantry, senior captains on duty with their regiment, will do duty as field officers, during the absence of the colonel and lieutenant colonel on other service, or until otherwise directed; to take effect from the 10th instant.

By order of Major General Gaines.

GEORGE A. McCALL, *Aide-de-camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 19.

SPECIAL ORDER No. 11.

HEADQUARTERS, *Fort Brooke, February 12, 1836.*

First Lieutenant S. McKenzie, of the 2d regiment of artillery, ordnance officer at this post, will issue, for the use of the friendly Indians who have volunteered their services, seventy-three rifles, seventeen wipers and drivers, and ten bullet-moulds, to be returned when their services on the campaign shall be dispensed with.

By order of Major General Gaines.

GEORGE A. McCALL, *Aide-de-camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 20.

SPECIAL ORDER No. 12.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *Fort Brooke, February 13, 1836.*

Lieutenant McKenzie, ordnance officer, will issue to Captain Benjamin Hallett, of the Indian department, fifty muskets and one keg of powder, taking the proper receipts for the same.

By order of Major General Gaines.

GEORGE A. McCALL, *Aide-de-camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 21.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *Fort King, East Florida, February 22, 1836.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to report, for the information of the President of the United States, my arrival at this post this afternoon, with the regular and volunteer force referred to in my plan of operations, enclosed to you from New Orleans, under date the 2d of the present month, all in good health, save two or three cases of chills and bad colds, which I have reason to believe two days of rest and medical attendance will remove—having sought at every point deemed most likely to present to me the principal force of our savage enemy, without being able to find him, or any visible evidence of the direction of his late movements. I shall continue to search for and endeavor to send a satisfactory account of these faithless barbarians.

I shall take an occasion to write to you as soon as I shall have time to collect the information which this place and its vicinity may afford. In the meantime I enclose to you the report of my acting inspector general, giving an account of my visit to the battle ground of Major Dade, and the burial of the gallant band of which he was the unfortunate leader.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDMUND P. GAINES.

Adjutant General JONES.

No. 22.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *Fort King, East Florida, February 22, 1836.*

GENERAL: I do myself the honor to announce to you my arrival at this place this afternoon, pursuant to my plan of operations communicated to you under date the 2d of the present month, my force, consisting of near eleven hundred regulars and volunteers, all in good health, save and except some few cases of chills and colds, which I doubt not but two days' rest will remove. My march to this place was by way of Warren's Landing, on the Alafia river, and thence to "the military road," near the burnt bridge on the Hillsborough river, thence along the road to this post; having found, nearly forty miles south of this post, the deeply afflictive exhibition of the slain and mutilated bodies of the gallant band who fell in battle under Major Dade, on the 28th of December, without being able to discover the savage foe by whom this and other numerous acts of barbarism had been perpetrated upon this ill-fated frontier.

Hoping soon to see you or hear from you the results of your late movement upon the northern and eastern border of the theatre of war, with the information obtained by you as to the enemy's late movements and present probable position, that we may concert measures for his speedy overthrow, in which I shall take much pleasure in a cordial co-operation with you, I offer you my best wishes that our joint efforts may tend to a speedy and honorable termination of the war.

My present object is to march from this place by way of the lower battle ground on the Withlacoochee, and thence whithersoever any trail or trace of the enemy may be found; and finally to return to Fort Brooke, obtain additional supplies, and then move in a direction to Charlotte harbor, not doubting that, after securing the frontier north and east of this place, you will obtain such information of the movements of the enemy as to lead you from this place by the way of Toloc-chopko, on Pease creek, and thence toward Charlotte harbor, where you will find a supply of subsistence and ammunition, under the protection of a United States naval force. At Fort Brooke you will also find similar supplies, sufficient for your return to this place, or, if necessary, to enable you to remain in that quarter with 1,000 or 1,200 men until you can obtain supplies from New Orleans.

These suggestions are necessarily imperfect; but this must always be the case, more or less, in a war with a people who take no prisoners, who have no fortifications, no intercourse with any other part of the human family; no newspapers, nor any post office or intelligence department. I therefore leave you to act according to the best of your judgment and the information you may from time to time obtain, proceeding, as I shall proceed, upon the principle that to find the enemy we must search for him; and when we find him we must take or destroy him, or he will assuredly destroy us.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General D. L. CLINCH,

Or the officer commanding on the northeast border of East Florida, Fort Drane.

No. 23.

WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *Fort King, Florida, February 22, 1836.*

GENERAL: Agreeably to your directions, I observed the battle ground six or seven miles north of the Withlacoochee river, where Major Dade and his command were destroyed by the Seminole Indians on the 28th of December last, and have the honor to submit the following report:

The force under your command, which arrived at this post to-day from Tampa Bay, encamped on the night of the 19th instant on the ground occupied by Major Dade on the night of the 27th of December. He and his party were destroyed on the morning of the 28th of December, about four miles in advance of that position. He was advancing towards this post, and was attacked from the north, so that on the 20th instant we came upon the rear of his battle ground about nine o'clock in the morning. Our advanced guard had passed the ground without halting, when the general and his staff came upon one of the most appalling scenes that can be imagined. We first saw some broken and scattered boxes, then a cart, the two oxen of which were lying dead, as if they had fallen asleep, their yokes still on them; a little to the right one or two horses were seen. We then came to a small enclosure made by felling trees in such a manner as to form a triangular breastwork for defence. Within the triangle, along the north and west faces of it, were about thirty bodies, mostly mere skeletons, although much of the clothing was left upon them. These were lying, almost every one of them, in precisely the position they must have occupied during the fight, their heads next to the logs over which they had delivered their fire, and their bodies stretched, with striking regularity, parallel to each other. They had evidently been shot dead at their posts, and the Indians had not disturbed them except by taking the scalps of most of them. Passing this little breastwork, we found other bodies along the road and by the side of the road, generally behind trees, which had been resorted to for covers from the enemy's fire. Advancing about 200 yards further, we found a cluster of bodies in the middle of the road; these were evidently the advanced guard, in the rear of which was the body of Major Dade, and to the right that of Captain Frazer. These were all doubtless shot down on the first fire of the Indians, except, perhaps, Captain Frazer, who must, however, have fallen very early in the fight. Those in the road and by the trees fell during the first attack. It was during a cessation of the fire that the little band still remaining, about thirty in number, threw up the triangular breastwork, which, from the haste with which it was constructed, was necessarily defective, and could not protect the men in the second attack.

We had with us many of the personal friends of the officers of Major Dade's command, and it is gratifying to be able to state that every officer was identified by undoubted evidence. They were buried, and the cannon, a six-pounder, that the Indians had thrown into a swamp, was recovered and placed vertically at the head of the grave, where it is to be hoped it will long remain. The bodies of the non-commissioned officers and privates were buried in two graves, and it was found that every man was accounted for. The command was composed of eight officers and 102 non-commissioned officers and privates. The bodies of eight officers and 98 men were interred, four men having escaped, three of whom reached Tampa Bay; the fourth was killed the day after the battle.

It may be proper to observe that the attack was not made from a hammock, but in a thinly-wooded country, the Indians being concealed by palmetto and grass, which has been since burned.

The two companies were Captain Fraser's, of the third artillery, and Captain Gardiner's, of the second artillery. The officers were Major Dade, of the fourth infantry; Captains Fraser and Gardiner, Second Lieutenant Basinger, Brevet Second Lieutenants J. E. Henderson, Mudge, and Keais, of the artillery, and Doctor J. S. Gatlin.

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

E. A. HITCHCOCK, *Captain First Infantry, Acting Inspector General.*

Major General EDMUND P. GAINES, *Commanding Western Department, Fort King, Florida.*

No. 24.

SPECIAL ORDER No. 13.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *Fort King, Florida, February 22, 1836.*

1. Lieutenant Colonel William S. Foster, of the fourth regiment of infantry, with the effective force of his regiment present, will proceed to Fort Drane, Auld Lang Syne, and procure from the officer in command thereof fourteen thousand rations of salted pork, and fourteen thousand rations of hard bread or flour, with a proportional quantity of salt, with which he will return to this post with as little delay as practicable. Colonel Foster will take with him all the public horses and carts at this post. Should these, together with the horses and light carts, or wagons, he may be able to procure at Fort Drane, be insufficient to transport the number of rations above specified, he will return with such number as the means of transportation afforded him will allow.

2. Captain Shannon, assistant quartermaster, will accompany Colonel Foster, and will procure from the quartermaster at Fort Drane, or otherwise, if practicable, twenty-five horses for this command. He will then take such measures as he may deem most expedient to forward provisions and quartermaster stores to the different points designated in his instructions from the quartermaster general.

3. Lieutenant John H. Allen, of the third artillery, will at the same time proceed to join his company at Fort Drane.

By order of Major General Gaines.

GEO. A. McCALL, *Aide-de-camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 25.

SPECIAL ORDER No. 15.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *Fort King, Florida, February 26, 1836.*

Lieutenant G. H. Talcott, acting quartermaster, will purchase three horses, to be used in drawing the field-pieces in possession of the battalion of artillery under the command of Captain F. S. Belton, second artillery.

By order of Major General Gaines.

GEO. A. McCALL, *Aide-de-camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 26.

SPECIAL ORDER No. 16.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *Fort King, Florida, February 26, 1836.*

Lieutenant G. H. Talcott will furnish, on the requisition of Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs, commanding the light brigade, such articles as may be necessary for the troops under his command.

By order of Major General Gaines.

GEO. A. McCALL, *Aide-de-camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 27.

SPECIAL ORDER No. 17.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *Camp Izard, February 28, 1836.*

Lieutenant and Adjutant Buchanan, of the fourth infantry, will perform the duties of brigade major of the light brigade until the recovery of Lieutenant and Brigade Major Izard from the wound received this morning.

By order of Major General Gaines.

GEO. A. McCALL, *Aide-de-camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 28.

HEADQUARTERS CAMP IZARD, *on the right bank of the Withlacoochee, Two miles west of General Clinch's battle ground, February 28, 1836.*

GENERAL: I take much pleasure in stating to you that I have reason to believe I have now near me the principal force of the Seminole Indians with their black vassals and allies. I yesterday afternoon, after halting my reserve and rear guard, with my baggage train, in the upper pine woods, near the encampment north of the battle ground, proceeded with the remaining part of my force to the Withlacoochee with a view to inspect and reconnoitre in person the adjacent section of the river preparatory to my intended crossing, which I had designed to attempt this morning. I had been at the river only long enough to examine 250 or 300 yards about and above the usual crossing place, when the enemy commenced a spirited firing upon my party, and kept it up with the war-whoop for half an hour. The fire was, of course, returned.

Having determined this morning, in consequence of the thick woods on the opposite side of the river, to extend my examinations to this point, at which I learned there were open pine woods on both sides of the river, I accordingly marched with my whole force to this place, where I was promptly met by the enemy, whose force appears to have increased very considerably in the course of an hour or two. The river at this place is deemed to be about as wide, but much deeper and less rapid than at the first-mentioned place, with open pine woods on both sides. Neither of the places are fordable. My reconnoissances, in consequence of the narrowness of the river, and the impossibility of finding materials for promptly bridging or rafting the stream, have resulted in the loss of two of the Louisiana volunteers killed and ten volunteers and regulars wounded. Among the latter, I deeply lament to find the gallant Lieutenant Izard, of the dragoons, dangerously.

Being convinced that the principal force of the enemy is now assembled before me, and not doubting that their women and children are placed in a large cypress swamp within a few miles of this place, and that an immediate movement of a force equal or nearly equal to that now with me, consisting in part of mounted men, would enable us to put an end to the war in the next ten days, by a combined and simultaneous movement against them, I have deemed it my duty to propose to you such a movement, should the forces expected at Fort Drane have arrived; otherwise, the force there on the 22d would, I think, be sufficient, but this is doubtful, and the case is one of too much importance to leave the question of force at all in doubt. In the expectation of this co-operation, I shall endeavor to amuse the enemy in completing my boats and preparing to cross; but I shall not cross until I hear from you.

In any event, I request of you six thousand rations of pork, and flour, and sugar, with the quartermaster's stores which follow: 2 whip saws, 2 cross cut saws, 2 hand saws, 6 adzes, 6 froes, augers, assorted, 4 broadaxes, 2 iron wedges, 200 iron spikes, and, if possible, two field-pieces, with 150 rounds canister and 50 round shot, 10,000 musket cartridges.

Killed—Zeno Bouillie, Valentine Beck.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

EDMUND P. GAINES.

Brig. Gen. CLINCH, *or officer commanding the U. S. troops assembling at Fort Drane, East Florida.*

P. S.—The forces from Fort Drane should cross the Withlacoochee at the ford eight or ten miles above the battle ground, or at the point, and move down on the left bank of the river to this place.

No. 29.

HEADQUARTERS CAMP IZARD, *two miles west of General Clinch's battle ground, February 29, 1836.*

GENERAL: I last night stated to you, by express, the occurrence of my meeting the Indians on my arrival at this place, suggesting the expediency of an immediate co-operation on the part of the disposable force under your command, under the strong conviction that, by such co-operation, we should be able, in a few days, to bring the war to a close, having been convinced that the principal force of the enemy is assembled near me on this river. The occurrences of the day confirmed me in the opinion I then expressed to you.

Having occupied myself in preparing a small work to command the crossing place of the river, and making canoes for the purpose of constructing a bridge, I had not deemed it necessary to strengthen my breastworks, not having apprehended that the enemy would have the temerity to attack me in my position. In this conclusion, however, I have been disappointed. At ten o'clock this morning a spirited and vigorous attack was made by the enemy on three sides of my encampment, which continued two hours, with little or no intermission; in the course of which they frequently approached so near to my left flank, commanded by Adjutant General Smith, of the Louisiana volunteers, as to wound several men on the opposite flank, a distance of 200 yards. They were, however, repulsed, I have reason to believe, with considerable loss.

The loss sustained by the force of command was, one sergeant killed, and one officer (Lieutenant Duncan) and 10 men wounded of the regulars, and one officer and 20 men wounded of the volunteers. The troops having been particularly instructed not to throw away their fire, or to fire without correct aim at a short distance, I was happy to find that the order was strictly attended to, and, consequently, but little ammunition was expended. It is impossible to say, with any precision, what was the enemy's force; but the officers best acquainted with the service concur with me in opinion it was not less than 1,500. From the foregoing facts I have no doubt the principal force of the enemy is now in this vicinity; that they are sensible of the desperate situation in which they have placed themselves, and that their temerity will prompt them to make a resistance commensurate with the circumstances in which they find themselves.

I have abstained and shall abstain from a sortie until I hear from you, in the expectation that this course will contribute to keep them together, whilst a sortie might tend to disperse them. I am now satisfied a movement directly to this place will be more advisable than to attempt to cross the Withlacoochee higher up, as suggested in my letter of yesterday. I am, moreover, of the opinion that, if mounted men can be procured in the course of a few days, your force should not move from Fort Drane without this description of troops. I repeat my request that I may be furnished 6,000 rations of flour, pork, and

sugar, five bushels of salt, some corn, with tools to build block-houses, two field-pieces, 150 rounds of canister and 50 of round shot, 10,000 musket-ball cartridges, with as many light wagons as can be spared, as my wounded are increasing daily, and my horses decreasing.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

EDMUND P. GAINES.

General D. L. CLINCH, *or officer commanding troops assembled at Fort Drane, Auld Lang Syne.*

No. 30.

SPECIAL ORDER No. 18.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *Camp Izard, on the Withlacoochee, March 9, 1836.*

Lieutenant Colonel D. E. Twiggs, of the 4th infantry, will repair to New Orleans and resume command of the post. Until otherwise directed, he will make occasional visits of inspection to the military posts in his immediate vicinity.

By order of Major General Gaines.

GEO. A. McCALL, *Aide-de-camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 31.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, March 10, 1836.*

SIR: Your communication, dated Fort King, February 22, reporting your arrival at that post with the regular and volunteer force under your command, (number not stated,) has been submitted to the general-in-chief, the Secretary of War, and by him to the President. Without determining, at this time, on the circumstances which induced you to repair with a considerable volunteer force from Louisiana to Florida, and subsequently to Fort King, the President directs that you will be pleased to report, for the information of the Executive, the circumstances and reasons which have prompted your recent movements in Florida, especially as regards the plan of operations detailed in your despatch to General Clinch from Fort King, under date of February 22, 1836, as seen by the *copy* this day received through Major General Scott, and to him forwarded by General Clinch—the said despatch to General Clinch being considered by the President as interfering with the previous plan of operations in Florida, and the command of the troops in that quarter, which, by the orders of the President, had, in January, been assigned to Major General Scott, as you have already been apprised.

I am further directed respectfully to request that you will be pleased to state why you did not report your arrival at Tampa Bay, the force there assembled under your command, the condition of the service in general at that post, as well as any intelligence respecting Indian affairs, &c, as circumstances at the time would have enabled the commanding officer to communicate, and as required by the regulations.

I respectfully enclose herewith, for your information, a copy of my letter to General Arbuckle of this date, by which you will see that, in your absence, he has been ordered to the western frontier of Louisiana.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

Major General GAINES, *U. S. Army, Tampa Bay, via Fort King, Florida.*

No. 32.

ORDER No. 7.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *Fort Izard, on the Withlacoochee, Florida, March 9, 1836.*

1. Called to East Florida by the savage massacres and conflagrations of the 28th of December and the following month, the commanding general hastily collected in Louisiana the forces which accompanied him from that patriotic State. These troops, in the short space of thirty-six days, have marched by land and water nearly eight hundred miles, one hundred and forty of which was through the country occupied by the enemy, whose principal force they have met, beaten, and forced to sue for peace.

2. These important objects of the campaign having been accomplished with the hearty and cordial co-operation of Brigadier General Clinch, (to whose sound judgment the defence of this frontier had been wisely confided, and by whose gallantry the enemy had been chastised on the 31st of December, and since held in check as far as his limited means would allow,) the troops from Louisiana are placed under his command, in order to guard against the known faithlessness of the enemy, until the arrival of the forces under the officer charged with the diplomatic arrangements of the War Department. Whenever and as soon as that officer shall mature his plan of operations, and accomplish the duties assigned him, the forces from Louisiana will return to New Orleans.

3. The commanding general cannot, consistently with his views of propriety, take leave of the troops by whom he has been so manfully sustained without tendering them his grateful acknowledgments for the constancy and courage with which they have performed every duty, and borne privations, the recital of which would not fail to command the admiration of the virtuous and wise of every section of the republic. The officers and soldiers of the whole of these forces, (including the artillery from Tampa Bay,) acting as a light brigade, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs, of the 4th infantry, have per-

formed their duty so much to the satisfaction of the general that he cannot discriminate between the relative claims of corps, of officers, or other individuals, without the risk of invidious distinctions; all did their duty cheerfully and gallantly; and when it became necessary to meet the question whether to eat the meat of their own horses or to abandon an important position, all cheerfully preferred this unpleasant subsistence to any movement that would endanger the frontier; the horse-meat was accordingly eaten by officers and men, until the enemy was beaten and sued for peace. A timely supply of provisions arrived, escorted by the brave Georgians, Floridians, and regulars, under General Clinch, at the moment the pacific propositions of the enemy were in the act of being answered. The Indians were fired on by the general's light troops before he could be notified of the object of their being near the camp. They have since disappeared.

4. The general deeply regrets the fall of First Lieutenant J. F. Izard, of the dragoons, acting brigade major, and in command of the advance guard. He fell at the head of his corps, and though mortally wounded, had the heroic presence of mind to order, "Keep your positions, men, and lie close." Second Lieutenant Duncan, of the second artillery, was slightly wounded; Captain Sanders, commanding the friendly Indians, was severely wounded; Captain Armstrong, of the United States transport schooner *Motto*, was slightly wounded. The two last-named officers were in the advance, where their services had been highly useful during the march. Lieutenant Ephraim P. Smith, of Captain Williams's company of Louisiana volunteers, received three wounds. This officer and twenty-nine non-commissioned officers and soldiers of other companies of the regiment evinced their gallantry by their good conduct as well as by their honorable wounds. The general is convinced that he never commanded a finer corps; its chief would do honor to any service.

The officers of the medical department merit the approbation of the general for the attentive and skilful manner in which their duties were discharged.

List of killed and wounded.

Killed.—First Lieutenant J. F. Izard, dragoons; Sergeant F. Dunn, of the second artillery; Private Z. Bolie, of the Louisiana volunteers; Privates Val. Beck and Henry Butler: total, 5.

Wounded, of officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates.—Second artillery, 8; fourth infantry, 8; Louisiana volunteers, 30: total, 46.

By order of Major General Gaines.

GEO. A. McCALL, *Aide-de-camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 33.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *Camp Sabine, July 4, 1836.*

SIR: I received on the 25th, at Pensacola, on my way to this place, your letter of the 10th of March.

I have delayed replying until now, from a firm conviction that my letters of the 15th and 25th of January and 6th of February to you, with those of the 2d, 22d, 28th, and 29th of February and 2d of March, to General Clinch, with my orders and special orders of the 18th of January to the 9th of March, 1836, inclusively, reported to you by my acting assistant adjutant general for the information of the proper authorities, would fully exculpate me from the imputations of General Scott, that I had "*interfered with his command*" or "*disturbed his plan of operations,*" &c.; more especially as the complainant's accusations were not deemed to be of sufficient importance for me to be furnished with a copy. But having recently seen the attacks made on me through the newspaper called the "*Globe,*" and some other papers of equal respectability and of *all political parties*, since the 1st of April last, purporting to be from the pen of that officer, or from his dictation or sanction, aided by the quartermaster general, a franking bureau officer of the War Department, these insidious publications assure me that I am again wantonly assailed. These combined attacks suggest to me the propriety of making, for the information of the proper authorities, the remarks and explanations which follow, and which I deem necessary and proper, in vindication of my conduct, my movements, and measures, in connexion with the war in East Florida, between the 15th of January and 9th of March last—a task which I was more than willing to abstain from, or leave to others, as I could not, consistently with my own self-respect and justice to my command, repel the calumnious accusations without calling in question the opinions of high public functionaries whose judgment and patriotism I had long sincerely respected; nor, indeed, without seeming disposed to join in an acrimonious controversy, which nothing short of an order from the President or the absolute necessity of *self-defence* could prompt me to do.

The Order No. 7 of the present year, requiring General Scott to repair to the left wing of my department, was never seen by me until my arrival at Fort King, on the 22d of February. I state this fact simply because it is a *fact* hitherto, I apprehend, unknown at your office, but it is a fact to which I attach little or no importance. Had I received this order at Pensacola, I should have viewed it as a measure of the *Secretary of War*, taken without a full knowledge of the progress of the war upon that frontier and of the circumstances which had rendered my movement to Florida proper, and that therefore my movement thither ought to continue until I should feel assured that the President was apprised of all the material facts bearing upon the subject, and more especially until the officer authorized to enter upon that part of my command assigned to him, and which formed the principal theatre of the war, should make his appearance in person upon that theatre of the war, unless, indeed, my attention had been called to other and apparently more important military operations, also in actual war, than those which called me to East Florida.

This view of the subject is based upon an essential principle of military law, derived from the laws of nature, and incorporated in our institutions; a principle sustained by the ablest writers of all enlightened nations to whose works I have had access; a principle without the strict observance of which no nation whose geographical limits exceed twenty miles square could be successfully defended; a principle deeply interwoven with the highest attributes of *sovereignty* and of *self-government*, namely, *self-defence* and *self-preservation*, as a nation or a state; or, in other words, *PROTECTION—IMMEDIATE, INSTANTANEOUS PROTECTION, to the exposed feeble members of the community from savage war.* Yes, sir, *immediate, instantaneous protection* by the military officer intrusted with the command of the particular section of country threatened with *savage attack*, until relieved *before the enemy* by the new commander.

Let us look into a few of the principal features of the case in question, and see what would probably have been the effect of a contrary rule of conduct on my part. In command of the western department, I had met at New Orleans intelligence of a great and unlooked-for disaster having occurred upon the left wing of my department, far distant from the seat of the federal government, from whence alone could I hope to receive new orders, or special instructions more applicable to the case in all its bearings, than the orders of the President, embraced in my commission, to serve the United States diligently as a general officer—with the orders which he had given me *to command the western department*. An important white settlement within my department was reported to be *overrun, sacked, and burnt*—a United States agent of Indian affairs, and eight valuable officers, and ninety-eight faithful soldiers, with many worthy frontier citizens killed, and their property stolen or destroyed. And I was aware that most of the neighboring military posts, namely, Forts Brooke, King, Drane, and Key West, all within my military department, were without any other works of defence than such as an efficient force of 500 men might have taken and destroyed in a few hours, with little loss or risk on their part—the garrisons of two of those posts (Fort King and Key West) being insufficient for their defence. I was, moreover, apprised that there were but about 600 troops of the regular army at that time in Florida, and these were separated by a wilderness, supposed to be occupied by the enemy, comprehending near 20,000 square miles, extending nearly 250 miles from north to south, and from 120 to 40 miles from east to west, with our 600 regulars stationed at the opposite angles and sides of this extensive wilderness, *without disposable force sufficient to insure a concentration at any one important vulnerable point* from one side of the wilderness in question to the other, without the most imminent danger of having such force destroyed in its movement to the point of concentration. The destruction of the brave but unfortunate Major Dade, with his heroic officers and men, affords an impressive lesson upon this view of the subject which no prudent American soldier or citizen should ever lose sight of. Under these circumstances, what was the duty of the commander of the western department? What, I ask, was the proper course for me to pursue? These questions may be most readily answered by asking another: What had I promised upon my oath to do? I had promised, upon my oath prescribed by law, “to bear true faith and allegiance to the *United States of America*, and to serve them *honestly and faithfully* against their enemies or opposers whomsoever, and to observe and obey the orders of the *President of the United States*, and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to the rules and articles of war.”

I had with me my sword and my commission, with the orders of the President of the United States to “command” this department. Now, it is well known *that for me to command* a military department, or any particular section of country upon the frontier, great or small, is, in a plain military sense, *so to order and employ the men and means confided to my direction* as to protect our own people of the United States upon that section of frontier “against their enemies or opposers whomsoever,” as set forth in the aforementioned oath; and, *if it be in time of war, to continue so to command until duly relieved by the new commander, in his own proper person, and on the theatre of the war.*

In failing to comply with this sacred injunction, I well knew that I might thereby have suffered the enemy to kill great numbers of the citizens and troops, in addition to those already slain within the limits of my command, and burn their houses, and take their property. It was my bounden duty, therefore, without waiting for *new orders*, or special instructions, to collect together any disposable force found within my department which I might deem sufficient to enable me promptly to strike at the enemy, and, if possible, subdue them, or check their devastations, until the President should have notice of them, and of my efforts to arrest them, and then give such new orders as he might think fit.

But it is contended, principally indeed by those who have proven themselves to be better qualified for the quiet vocation of a writing-desk than the turbulent scenes of an Indian war, that I ought to have abandoned the expedition at Pensacola, because I received on my arrival at that city your letter notifying me, not that General Scott had actually arrived at the theatre of the war in Florida, *but that he had been ordered thither by the Secretary of War!* But little reflection is necessary to see the fallacy of this *closet view* of the subject. I had embarked, pursuant to my letter of the 2d of February, addressed “to General Clinch, or the officer commanding the forces assembling on the northeast border of east Florida,” with a view to *co-operate* with that officer in subduing the enemy. I had, moreover, given a pledge to the principal force then with me (the Louisiana volunteers) that I would *not require them to go further than I would myself go, and that I would stand by them as long as they would stand by me, in bringing the war to an honorable close.* I had thus promised, on the 2d of February, with a force of 700 men, so to co-operate; this force had been fortunately increased, before the embarkation was effected, to near 1,100 men. With this very respectable force embarked, and in its movement for Tampa Bay, and within two days’ march (by steam) of that place, I received at Pensacola the *notification* from you that General Scott *had been ordered by the Secretary of War* to that part of my command to which I was, under the above-mentioned circumstances, destined. But what assurance could I have had that he was there? Did you notify me that he was at the post of honor assigned to him by the Secretary of War? or that such arrangements had been made as afforded reasonable ground to hope that General Scott *would be prepared soon* to breast the storm of savage desolation, and *protect* from the scalping-knife and firebrand the helpless citizens of both sexes, and of all ages, in that region, who had looked to me as their protector? Did you tell me that Ocoela and his war-chiefs had given to the President satisfactory assurance that they would suspend their massacres and conflagrations until General Scott should *complete his plan of operations*, and be quite ready to subdue them? No such thing is found in your letter. Nor had I any reason, from the previous northern or western wilderness movements of that officer, to anticipate anything like a prompt movement on his part into the wilds of Florida, longer than he should find himself and his forces and supplies *propelled by steam-power.*

The now well-ascertained fact that General Scott confined his personal operations to the little interior and *unmenaced* places called *Picolata, Volusia, Black creek, and Fort Drane*, and the intervening country within the white settlements, occasionally on board the “little steamboat the *Essayons*” for near six weeks, viz: from about the middle of February until the 25th of March last, without any attempt on his part to search for the enemy, proves clearly, not that I should have abandoned my expedition at Pensacola, at Tampa Bay, at Fort King, or at the Withlacoochee, without subduing the enemy, but that I should, if possible, have redoubled my efforts to accomplish this all-important object sooner than I did; and, in place of leaving them under a pledge that hostilities on our part should cease, if, as they proposed, they would peaceably await the arrival of General Scott, and would attend to the terms he should be authorized by the President of the United States to offer them, [a pledge which appears to have been wholly disregarded by that officer,] I had taken them to Tampa Bay, completed with them a treaty in accordance with my

own understanding of what was due to them and to the United States—a measure which I am convinced I could have accomplished had I not indulged in the fruitless expectation that General Scott would arrive soon after hearing I had found the enemy and employ himself in the performance of the diplomatic and other duties assigned to him by the Secretary of War—I have no doubt that I should by such a movement have relieved the Florida frontier *forever* from all further disturbance on the part of these Indians, and should have placed them in a position calculated in time to change their inveterate hostility, desperation, and distress, to peace and comfort, if not to a sense of respect and gratitude to our government and country for the humanity, care, and kindness extended to them on their having sued for peace. I am well assured that every officer, and every intelligent soldier of the Louisiana volunteers and United States troops then with me upon the Withlacoochee, will concur in the opinion just now expressed.

From the foregoing views it may possibly be inferred that I may have been disposed to attach blame to General Scott for his readiness again and again to solicit or accept a command which he might imagine was calculated to awaken in my mind sentiments of personal ill-will towards *him*, such as he had some years past labored through many acrimonious pages to produce; but which *time*, with that sort of reflection which naturally results from a *rational use of time*, has so mitigated as to induce me on the receipt of your letter notifying me that he was ordered into my department, so far from feeling *dissatisfied with him*, to resolve upon availing myself of the occasion to co-operate with him [though junior to me] in a manner which I felt convinced, if he did his duty correctly, would be the means of enabling us at the proper theatre of action to settle our disputes forever by *our joint efforts in battle to show which of us could do the enemy the most harm and our country the most good*; and thus, in the best possible way of terminating personal enmities, restore between us that harmony which a proper sense of public duty should prompt every high-minded public functionary to extend to each other, so that the public service should suffer no detriment from their intemperate controversies. I knew General Scott too well to imagine *he had ever solicited such a command in the swamps of a wilderness, and against an enemy such as he had long held in contempt*; and I had long since ceased to cherish towards that officer any feeling of hostility. I had triumphed in the controversy which he had forced upon me I was gratified at my triumph, not so much that *General Scott was vanquished*, as that *the law of the land was maintained and preserved inviolate by the part which I had taken in that controversy*. I shall again triumph, not that I have any claim to that peculiar talent of which some of my reckless enemies may boast—the talent of “*making the worse appear the better cause*”—but that I have the law of the land to sustain me. It is my present purpose to show that the facts of the case were such as to prove that I was constantly within the pale of military law; I cannot, therefore, but prove myself to have been *in the right*, and that all who are opposed to me *are in the wrong*.

It will be seen, by referring to my letter of February 23, that I expressed my purpose *cordially to co-operate with General Clinch or the officer commanding the forces then assembling in the northeast border of East Florida or at Fort Drane*. (I have no copy of my letter near me, and write now from my recollection of its contents, in which I am sure that I am substantially correct.) I also expressed in that letter *my hope that our joint efforts might tend speedily to terminate the war*. This sentiment had been often expressed by me to my staff and to the field officers of my command. True it is that my letters of the 22d, 28th, and 29th of February, and 3d of March, were all addressed to General Clinch or the officer commanding at Fort Drane. They were, however, properly so addressed, and they were obviously intended for the information and government of any officer at Fort Drane in command of the force assembling at or near that post for the defence of that section of the national frontier. Soon after the date of my letter of February 22 I had seen at Fort King a letter from General Scott, in which he expressed a desire to know where the principal force of the enemy could be found; that letter was addressed to General Clinch, and dated at Picolata about the 17th or 18th of February. Not doubting the sincerity of General Scott's *wish to learn where to find the enemy*, I was truly gratified to have it in my power to say that I would search for and endeavor to find their principal force, and would report accordingly. My superior knowledge of the country and of the enemy justified me in the hope and expectation that I should be able soon to relieve General Scott's supposed anxiety upon this point; for my movement by the way of the Alafia and the battle ground of the lamented Major Dade, where there was most reason to believe the enemy would make their boldest stand, (that having been deemed to be the place of their “*greatest good luck*,” as the interpreters had termed it,) having proven that their principal force was not in that quarter, I could not doubt but that I should find them lower down on the Withlacoochee, and I therefore determined to continue my search in that direction, that being in the direction to Fort Brooke, the only certain point from which I could replenish my supplies of subsistence and ammunition; the *great supply* which should have been at Fort King having been withheld from that place, whether *intentionally* to embarrass my operations, or from *ignorance* of the country with its wasted resources, or ignorance of their duty on the part of General Scott and his quartermaster general, I am yet to learn.

It is sufficient for me at present to affirm that large supplies *ought to have been*, and might have been, deposited at Fort King and at Fort Drane before the 22d of February, and that I was unable to obtain at those posts more than eight days' rations of subsistence, with scarce one hour's supply of powder and shot or cartridges. Nor could I take this slender supply without leaving those posts with a short allowance that could not have been justified, but upon the expectation of other supplies being on the road near them, and that my movement would contribute to divert from them the attention of the enemy. My plan of operations, embraced in my letter of the 22d of February, was, under all the circumstances of the case, necessary and proper; and it was also proper for me to address my letters intended for General Scott, who, I am aware, was not in my department, to *General Clinch*, an officer known to be on duty within my department, or *the officer commanding the troops assembled at Fort Drane*, where General Scott was expected to arrive in the course of a few days—where, indeed, he ought to have been before the middle of February. General Clinch, who perfectly understood his duty, lost no time in forwarding my letters or copies of them to General Scott, at Picolata, who, in place of a prompt response, meeting in the spirit in which it was offered my proposition cordially to co-operate with him in bringing the war to a speedy termination, indulged himself in unwarranted animadversions—imputing to me the worst of motives for my movements, and wasting in unavailing murmurs that precious moment for *action, by co-operation with me as I had proposed*, or, if he preferred it, by *taking the field and there relieving me*; he appears to have chosen rather to occupy himself in writing accusations against me, and endeavoring to convince the President of the United States that, in my letter of the 22d of February, above referred to, I had been guilty of some criminal interference with his (General Scott's) authority, as stated in your letter of the 10th of March, and more fully stated in the publications dated at Picolata, Black creek, Fort Drane, and more recently at other places, purporting to be from General Scott and other officers of the

army, all referring to "the plan of operations" and opinions of General Scott, but so artfully mixed up with plausible *fiction* and *reckless calumny*, slightly tempered with a few grains of truth, as to render it impossible to determine the source whence the mass of matter originated, or to discriminate between *the official*, *the semi-official*, and *mere hireling slanders* contained in this mass of matter. I would not willingly, in an official communication to your office, to be submitted to the President of the United States, take any notice of anything contained in those publications that is not strictly official. If I err in my attempt to discriminate in this particular, I will thank you to enable me to rectify myself, by favoring me *with all the official statements* referring to my conduct in relation to the war in Florida, as I may deem it to be essential to my vindication to show to all who may have entertained a doubt, as I trust I have already shown to the satisfaction of every man of military mind who has heard me or seen my vindication upon the following points:

1. That the proper *time* and *place* for me to have suspended my movement, and for General Scott to have entered upon the command assigned to him in my department, was *when he should appear in person near me* at the known theatre of the war, and nowhere else, while the war continued.

2. That, until he thus made his personal appearance near me at the theatre of the war, he had no right whatever to assume the control of a soldier, a public horse, or a public ration, within the limits of my department.

3. That it was my bounden duty to retain the control of every soldier, every horse, every ration, and every other species of public property necessary to the success of my operations against the enemy, connected with the command of the western department; and, above all, to retain and exercise *the command honestly and faithfully*, on the part of the United States, "*against their enemies or opposers whomsoever*;" and (in the language of the 62d article of war) give "orders for what is needful to the service, unless otherwise specially directed by the President of the United States, according to the nature of the case," and *the President had never specially directed it to be otherwise*. The adjutant general's notification of orders given through him by the *Secretary of War* was sufficient. This was, to say the least, a loose way of carrying into effect a solemn provision of law, embracing a subject of great delicacy and importance to the service.—(See the 62d article of war.) When the law expressly forbids a change of command, as in this article of war, *without the special direction of the President*, it is obvious that the spirit of the law cannot be fulfilled without the direction is given *by the President, or in his name*, by a person known to be authorized to communicate the orders or directions of *the President*. The adjutant general wrote *by order of the Secretary of War*. Nevertheless, if the President himself had given the order that General Scott should enter upon the duties of the command against the Indians in the western department whilst I was in the field, I contend that neither myself nor any other officer *engaged as I was in the immediate protection of the frontier, in the pursuit of the enemy, or in action, holding the enemy in check, could, with any propriety, or without a crime, abandon the command merely on receipt of the order*, and before the arrival at the place of pursuit or of action of the new commander, *unless specially directed by the President so to abandon the command!* A direction such as, I venture to affirm, has never been given in any civilized nation whose military history is known to this country. The theatre of the war was the place, the only proper place, for General Scott to enter upon, and for me to abandon the command assigned to him at any time before the enemy was subdued; but that officer did not choose to make his personal appearance at the Withlacoochee, though cordially and repeatedly invited by me, and challenged by the reiterated reports of my cannon, and by the war-whoop and rifle of the Indians, (as announced to him by General Clinch,) *to partake of the professional banquet*, which was regularly spread before me every day, from the 27th of February to the 5th of March, inclusively. I did not choose *to urge or entreat* him to come, because I have never desired to see an officer or soldier near me in action who did not come cheerfully and promptly, or who has been habitually vexing himself in fastidious scruples about *his rank*; and because I had reason to apprehend from the tardiness of his movement that a disease, which General Scott contracted towards me in August, 1814, had not been completely cured.

It was probably that sickness of the spleen which the best of doctors say "*finds ease only in the misery of others*," a sickness which a rapid march to the Withlacoochee, with the animating scenes, the martial music, pure air, and simple food of that region of the wilderness has never, to my knowledge, failed to improve the health of troops afflicted with disease of any kind, including cholera. That General Scott was retarded in his movement to the Withlacoochee by some *secret griefs* I could not doubt. What they were I know not. They will doubtless be disclosed in due time. He appears to have been content, for a time, with the notion that I had most improperly and prematurely interfered with his command and disturbed his plan of operations before it had been brought to maturity!—that it was my duty to consider him as entitled to the command, and the entire control of my troops and supplies, before he arrived in person within the limits of my department!—that my subduing the Indians ought to pass for nothing, because *he was especially authorized*, and *I was not especially authorized, to subdue them!* Childish conclusions these; too trifling to merit any notice, nor should I have noticed them but for the call made on me to explain and vindicate my conduct; and from the hope that my vindication may be read by the well-meaning officers and men of the volunteers and the army—who doubt, if, indeed, any doubt the propriety of my conduct—who, I am convinced, will readily yield their hasty opinions to the conviction which mature reflection on the subject cannot but produce. They will agree with me that my path of public duty was plain—too plain to be mistaken by any honest soldier or citizen not blinded by the spirit of party or some other diabolic prejudice or passion. It was, without waiting for *new orders*, to fly as rapidly as possible, with whatever disposable force and supplies might appear to me necessary and proper to arrest the progress of the apparent growing evil of the late disasters; strengthen the feeble military posts, and, if possible, put an end to the war by a vigorous co-operation with any forces found in that quarter, or otherwise, as circumstances should dictate, according to my own plan of operations, contained in my letters of the 2d, 22d, 28th, and 29th of February, above referred to. The sum and substance of my design was to afford prompt and complete *protection*—that sort of protection which is guaranteed by the *Constitution of the United States to the people of the United States*, including the pioneer, the widow, the orphan, inhabitants of the frontier camp or cabin, as well as the polished and wealthy citizen of the great emporium of party politics, of commerce, and fashion; that complete *protection*, the work of which should, if possible, commence before *the work of destruction upon the frontier is finished or even begun*—*protection to the living citizen rather than to the ashes of the slain!* My plan of operations was expressed as concisely as I could express it in my letter of the 22d of February; it was "*to search for the enemy until I should find them, and then beat them, as otherwise he would beat me*"

4. In carrying into effect this plan of operations, I could suffer no officer to interfere with my troops

military posts, or supplies of any kind, within the limits of my department, until he should appear in person within those limits, duly authorized, and apparently ready and willing to meet the enemy and protect the people of the United States within my department "against their enemies or opposers, whomsoever," or until I had met and beaten the enemy and compelled them to sue for peace.

5. I did meet the enemy, and did several times beat them, and finally compelled them to sue for peace. How this was accomplished I need not now undertake to describe. Grave doubts have been expressed in some of the publications to which I have referred, as to the sincerity of the Indian chiefs in suing for peace, upon which is supposed to rest the fact of their having been subdued. I am willing to leave the issue of these questions to the testimony of the officers and the intelligent volunteer and regular soldiers who served with me, pledging my honor to abide by their concurrent testimony. But I am not willing to be tried and condemned without a hearing, and by persons who were not only not near me, but who have given me good reason to believe they would have been better pleased at my downfall than at the triumph obtained by me over the enemy; persons who know full well that the final decree at which every enlightened citizen and soldier who investigates the subject must sooner or later arrive, establishing the correctness of my conduct, must virtually fix the seal of condemnation upon theirs. Hence it was that many hours and days of precious time which should have been devoted to active operations against the Indians, were sacrificed at Picolata and Fort Drane, and other places, to the fabrication of slanderous essays to forestall and mislead public opinion, to condemn my movements, and cover me with the vilest detraction. The editors of newspapers hitherto professing friendliness towards me have been employed as the leading vehicles of this atrocious scheme of slander. Why is this so? I answer, that it is because I disdain to be the man of a political party! I owe allegiance to the *United States of America*, and not to a party. It may be that I did not require my officers and men at the Withlacoochee to take from the enemy as many lives as they had by their savage conduct forfeited; but where was the bond, or the principle of the laws of war or of nations, binding them to give or me to take the life of any one of them after they had raised the white flag and sued for peace? Their first proposition was made on the evening of the 5th of March. They were then told that if their chiefs would come in the next day they would be heard. They accordingly came with a white flag on the morning of the 6th of March, when they said, in the most subdued tone and manner, "We do not wish to fight any more; we have lost many of our warriors killed, and others disabled by wounds; we do not wish to lose any more in this way, or otherwise than by sickness or by the falling of trees; and we desire to make peace." They were told, in reply, that I was not authorized to treat with them, but that I had learned that an officer was on his way and would soon be there with authority to treat with them; that if they wished for peace they must lay down their arms or cease to make any further use of them, and stay beyond the Withlacoochee until the officer authorized to treat with them should arrive, and that they must then go wherever he should require them; but that if they should commit any more hostilities, our troops, of which we had many, would kill all of them found with arms in their hands. They then counselled among themselves and their warriors until four or five o'clock in the evening. The chiefs then returned and freely assented to my answer to their propositions, the last sentence of which my acting inspector general was for the second time explaining to them when General Clinch arrived in sight with the troops of his immediate command from Fort Drane, some of whom fired in the direction of the Indians, but at too great a distance to hurt them. They then hastily retreated to the adjoining hammock. They, however, manifested no disposition to violate their engagement, nor do I believe there was an officer or soldier with me, who had witnessed their conduct, who entertained a doubt but that they were subdued, and perfectly sincere in the desire they expressed to abstain from further hostilities, and meet General Scott in council whenever and wherever he might direct.

I remained in command, in order to satisfy myself of their sincerity, until the 9th of March, during which time some hundreds of my men were allowed to amuse themselves fishing, for a mile or two up and down the river, without discovering any indication of further hostility on the part of the Indians, some of whom were seen on the opposite side of the river. I, on the 9th of March, turned over the command of the troops then with me to General Clinch, as will be seen by my orders of that date, with a view to repair to this frontier. It is proper here to remark that, in order to obtain accurate information as to the position of the chiefs and warriors, and whether their pacific views remained unchanged, after being fired on by the volunteers with General Clinch, I approved the suggestion of General Clinch to send a black interpreter across the river to their camp. He set out on the 8th and returned on the evening of the 10th of March. He reported that the chiefs and warriors had gone up the Withlacoochee, near thirty miles above Camp Izard, to where their families were stationed; and that the chiefs told him they were waiting agreeably to my directions, and that they would be ready in five days to hold a council with the officer expected on for that purpose. General Scott was that officer, who, in place of meeting them in council, and directing them what to do to enable them to obtain peace, and conform to the wishes of the President of the United States—General Scott openly avowed (as I have been informed, and his official letters imply) a determination to pay no regard to my arrangement with the Indians, but to obtain an overwhelming force and then annihilate them. His blustering threats to this effect were probably known to every person, white and black, in and about the house of General Clinch at Fort Drane; and, as some of the black domestics were in the habits of intimacy with the black interpreters, it was more than probable that in this way the threats of the gallant general reached the ears of the Seminole chiefs. Nothing, therefore, could be more natural than that they should prepare for self-defence, and self-preservation, against a commander regardless of the pledge made to them by me, his immediate predecessor in command, and his senior; a pledge which could not be disregarded without a gross violation of the laws of nature and of war, which no nation can tolerate without a positive disregard of the most sacred of her obligations of good faith towards her neighbors. The sequel has proven the fallacy of such threats, and the truth of the proverb that "the battle is not always to the strong, nor the race to the swift."

6. It may be that I did not expose my officers and soldiers, volunteers and regulars, to as much risk and loss as some of my accusers deem necessary to give eclat to a triumph! Heaven preserve me, I pray, from that eclat which is won by the useless or wanton sacrifice of those placed under my command! If my accusers have reason to believe, from the testimony of those who ventured to accompany and co-operate with me in battle, that I neglected any important duty to save my own life, or the life of any of my officers or men, it would be strictly correct in them to establish, if possible, such a charge. But upon this point, as upon all the imputations of General Scott and his franking and writing friends, I hold towards them the attitude of honest defiance. Had the Constitution or any other law of the land required it, or had I ordered it, I have not a doubt that every officer and soldier with me at the Withlacoochee

would cheerfully have agreed, "if the enemy would stand," to desire them to take the first shot; and would, moreover, have declined the comfort and security of sleeping or fighting behind a breastwork, had not this method of occasional *action* and *rest* been consecrated by the example of our own beloved WASHINGTON, and all other great and good men who have signalized themselves in the defence of our country. I think it more than probable that my brave little army would have subdued the enemy a few days sooner than we did, had I directed them to make a few rapid *sorties*; but I had promised General Clinch to make no *sorties* until I should hear from him, from an apprehension that a *sortie* would have dispersed and driven off the Indians before the arrival of *mounted force*—the only description of force with which a *sortie* could have been made with full effect at the place which I occupied. With the aid of the anticipated mounted force, I had calculated on taking or destroying most of the Indians and terminating the war in the course of a few days. They were, however, subdued, and sued for peace near twenty hours before I heard from General Clinch.—(See my letter to that officer under date of the 29th of February, in which I promised to abstain from making a *sortie* until I should hear from him.) On the subject of a *sortie*, however, I was convinced that I should not have succeeded in rendering it effective without the loss of from 50 to 100 of my officers and soldiers; and I have no hesitation in saying that I would not have had twenty of my excellent Louisiana volunteers or regulars recklessly sacrificed, whilst momentarily expecting the arrival of mounted force, to have had laid at my feet in chains all the Indians in Florida. The troops were for several days held in readiness for a *sortie*, and it would have been made on hearing from General Clinch, or in co-operation with his command, had not the Indians sued for peace before he was heard from.

7. Among the numerous calumnies, official and unofficial, I have seen none more absurd than that I was actuated in my movement to Florida by no higher motive than that of a desire to obtain "*laurels*" to which General Scott had superior claims! I feel convinced that those who know me best know, and will testify, that I have ever been incapable, even while a young subaltern, of that over-weening vanity and officiousness which sometimes prompt the weak or the vicious to attempt to rob their brother soldiers of what may be justly their due. Laurels, indeed! The idea of obtaining laurels in an *Indian war*, I have long deemed to be as a vision never to be realized by any known system of operations embraced in the art of war in its supposed improved state, nor otherwise than by watching the movements of the enemy, and profiting by his example of *vigilance*, *rapidity of movement*, and *privation of food and rest*. No man acquainted with the sufferings of the frontier people of Florida, possessed of a spark of patriotism or humanity, could for a moment be ignorant of the great and only inducement which ought or could have prompted me to make the movement in question. It was obvious to me that protection must be afforded, and quickly afforded, to the bleeding frontier of that neglected Territory, or that her late flourishing settlements would be destroyed, and that delightful region of our national frontier rendered a scene of devastation disgraceful to the military character of our country, and doubly disgraceful to the officer intrusted with its defence.

I have shown, as I doubt not, to the satisfaction of every man of military mind who will take the trouble to read this letter, that it was my bounden duty, under the circumstances of the case, to collect together the forces embarked at New Orleans on the night of the 3d and the morning of the 4th of February, and with them to repair promptly, as I did, to East Florida, and there to employ my best efforts in subduing or holding in check the enemy until the arrival of General Scott *at the theatre of the war*. This being admitted, my right to the entire control of the *subsistence*, and *horses and other means of transportation*, found within the limits of my department, or such as were on their passage thither, is established beyond the shadow of doubt. Upon what ground, then, could General Scott assert that I interfered with and retarded his operations by taking rations and horses belonging to his command? I affirm that his excuse is baseless and his assertion untrue. I affirm, moreover, that if the horses and rations, which he falsely accuses me of having wrongfully taken, had been forcibly seized by me from one of the posts within the eastern department, and to which I could have no claim—the *number of rations and number of horses in question was too small to delay the movement of General Scott's grand army for more than three days' time*. The whole number of rations taken by me from the day of my arrival at Fort King, the 22d of February, to the day I turned over the command to General Clinch, the 9th March, 1836, inclusive, amounted to less than twelve thousand complete rations, and the number of horses, I am assured, was not more than eight or ten taken from *Forts King and Drane*, (posts of my department,) and less than this number of miserable ponies from *Fort Brooke*, not one of which had been placed at either of those posts by General Scott, as I have been informed and believe.

His assertion, therefore, that his operations were greatly embarrassed or retarded by my having taken the *rations and horses* provided for his command, is not only not true, but is marked with a *reckless malignity, disgraceful to an officer and dishonorable to a man—not to say a gentleman*.

All which is submitted for the information of the President of the United States.

With profound respect,

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General U. S. Army, Washington City.*

No. 34.

JACKSON, Louisiana, October 29, 1836.

DEAR SIR: I have the honor of informing you that I received your letter containing a wish that I would make a statement of facts concerning the treaty at the Withlacoochee, in Florida, during our campaign under Major General Gaines.

I will now give you what I understood at that talk.

We, General Gaines's troops, were to cease hostilities, and they, the Seminoles, were to observe a like course of conduct; that we had no right to make a treaty with them, nor they with us, (as their *chief* was not present,) but that they were tired of the war and did not wish to continue it; and *they* would meet any authorized agent of our government at the Withlacoochee at any time they were notified to do so, and hold themselves and warriors in readiness to take into effect any treaty then and so made; *hey* were to recross the river and await any message sent them, and not to fire a gun until they heard

from General Scott or his agent; and, so far as I know, they kept their part of the agreement. There never was (in my presence) a word said about any line or boundary, and they were informed that the whole country must be left, and that if not peaceably they would be exterminated; and it was the opinion of every officer with whom I had any conversation that the war was over and the Indians willing to remove.

My own opinion is, if General Scott had not moved down on them with his force, they would now have been over to the Mississippi.

Believe me, sir, yours,

F. MARKS, *Captain of the Bayou Sara Blues, from Louisiana.*

E. A. НИГНСОК, *Esq., U. S. Army.*

No. 35.

NEW ORLEANS, *October 9, 1836.*

DEAR SIR; I received your letter in due course of mail, in which you direct my attention to a communication published in the New York Evening Star of the 2d ultimo, addressed to M. M. Cohen, esq., author of a book called "Notices of Florida and the Campaigns." I have not seen the work alluded to, but previous to receipt of your favor I had perused the article referred to cursorily; since then it has claimed my particular notice. It gives me great pleasure, sir, to have it in my power, from a fresh recollection of all that passed at the council whereat I was present with yourself and another officer, to state with confidence that in every particular in the said communication you have observed a studied accuracy, especially with regard to some leading facts at issue, to wit: that the Indians stipulated to maintain the country with the Withlacoochee river as a boundary line. So far from this being the case, I recollect distinctly that when it was proposed by the Indian chiefs on our first meeting them, that we should "go home where we came from," that you directly remarked that we intended to maintain our position at all hazards, and continue to fight them if necessary. This, sir, must certainly look like anything else but yielding to them "the maintenance of the country."

For fear, however, of prolixity, I will briefly state what took place at the council held by these chiefs in our presence, and leave it for others to draw conclusions. On the occasion of the meeting in council, our camp was hailed the evening previous, in a very audible and clear manner, by one of the enemy, which awakened the attention of all. After being answered by Colonel Twiggs, who desired to know what he wanted, the person replied: "We want to make peace with the white men." The colonel directed him to come in the morning, and bear a white flag, if the red men wanted to hold a talk; that he would then hear what they had to say. He consented, departed, and bade us good night.

The morning following the Indians were seen collecting in groups in the rear of our breastwork, and soon after a deputation from them was discovered advancing slowly and cautiously, displaying a white flag. Adjutant Barrow was ordered to exhibit a white flag from the breastwork in answer, as a token of our promise made the night before, and as an assurance of their safe advance towards the camp. You then, sir, received instructions from General Gaines to go out to meet them, accompanied by the adjutant and myself, and learn what they had to say. About one hundred and fifty yards distant we received seven chiefs, and seated ourselves on a dry log with them. Jumper, called also the Lawyer, opened and conducted the talk, through Abraham, a black chief and interpreter, in a grave and respectful manner, while Ocoola and the others were listening with the greatest attention. They said they had lost many warriors, and did not wish to fight any more—they wanted peace. They wished time to consult together, and agreed to meet us again in the afternoon. Preparatory to that meeting you had reduced to writing certain stipulations, which, section by section, Abraham, the interpreter, explained to the others in an earnest and impressive manner, the amount of which was that they should agree to meet commissioners from the United States, and abide their decision; in the meantime there should be a cessation of hostilities. All present agreed to the terms proposed in a manner which satisfied us of their sincerity, but asked time to see their governor, who was some miles distant, which they would do that night, and meet us with him the next day. They then inquired if we had not more men coming; if so, they wished them to be informed of what had taken place, as they had also many warriors on their way to join them. It was then proposed that a certain number of white and red men should go out together, to prevent a hostile meeting between the advancing parties. About this time the Indians who were seated on the ground at a distance rose up and began to fly, informing their chiefs, who were then in council with us, that the white men were coming. We directed them to take their men into a hammock on our right; but before they had all entered General Clinch came up with his command and fired a few shots upon them, before he could be informed what had been done in council. The next morning they did not appear; but so much confidence had you and I, sir, in their sincerity the day before that we left the camp together for a walk of observation on the bank of the river. Our men, after that, amused themselves fishing and bathing in the river, without the least apprehension; and while we remained there, and during the two weeks in camp near Fort Drane, not a rifle was fired. In truth, sir, there was nothing like treachery on their part; and I believe every officer and private considered them sincere, and looked for a speedy termination of the war.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE E. HARRAL, *late Surgeon Louisiana Volunteers.*

Captain E. A. НИГНСОК.

P. S.—I have given you a hasty sketch, from memory, of what took place at the meeting we had with the chiefs. You are at liberty to do with it as you please, either in part or as it now stands. I did hope, before this, to have had the pleasure of paying my respects to General Gaines, as it has been reported that he was coming to our city. I look back with much pleasure on some portion of our campaign together, and shall always entertain the highest respect for the general and his staff, as well as many others. I hope that my communication contains all you require; if not, write me again, and I may supply any omissions now made.

H.

No. 38.

[From the New York Courier and Inquirer of April 2, 1836.]

Affairs in Florida.—The Savannah Georgian contains an order issued by General Gaines, giving a history of his campaign in Florida, from which we make the following extracts:

“These troops, in the short space of thirty-six days, have marched by land and water nearly eight hundred miles—one hundred and forty through the country occupied by the enemy, whose principal force they have met, beaten, and forced to sue for peace.

“All did their duty cheerfully and gallantly; and when it became necessary to meet the question whether to eat their own horses or to abandon an important position, all cheerfully preferred this unpleasant subsistence to any movement that would endanger the frontier. The horse-meat was accordingly eaten by officers and men, until the enemy was beaten and sued for peace.”

He further says:

“The object for which I set out from Louisiana being accomplished, I resign the command of the Louisiana troops to General Clinch, until the arrival of the forces under the officer charged with the diplomatic arrangements by the War Department. Whenever and so soon as that officer shall mature his plan of operations, and accomplish the duties assigned to him, the forces from Louisiana will return to New Orleans.”

The manner in which the war with the Seminole Indians has been conducted, and the injury which the country has sustained in consequence of the jealousy which General Gaines has exhibited towards General Scott, are subjects of general conversation; and although we have ever entertained a high respect for General Gaines, and justly appreciated his services, we should be wanting in our duty as public journalists if we did not pointedly condemn his conduct while at the head of the troops which have been so disgracefully kept at bay on the banks of the Withlacoochee by an enemy inferior in numbers and without any pretension to discipline.

We will not stop to inquire into the motives which induced General Gaines to proceed into the Indian country after he had received official information at Pensacola that General Scott had been selected to conduct the war against the Seminoles, and that his services were required on the Mexican frontier. Any person who will read the extract from his general orders, must at once perceive, that while patriotism may have been one of the causes for such conduct, yet the moving principle of action with him was a desire to deprive General Scott of any laurels which a successful issue to the campaign might secure to him. We do not say, nor do we believe that he intended to render the campaign unsuccessful; but we have not a doubt that he was determined to make an effort to put an end to the struggle by a forced march of his own, even at the hazard of thereby frustrating for a time the plans of his superior officer. In this it is now certain he might have succeeded if he had acted with vigor; and if so, he probably would have been held excused by the public, who always look more to the results of military movements than to the objects with which they are undertaken and the foresight and talent displayed in their execution.

That General Gaines proceeded into the heart of the Indian country with nearly five hundred volunteers and upwards of six hundred regular troops, well disciplined, and commanded by as brave and intelligent officers as can be found in any army, is already matter of history; and it is equally matter of history, that although the Indian enemy did not in fact muster so large a body of warriors, yet at no time did the general himself estimate them at more than fifteen hundred! Admitting for a moment that they were fifteen hundred strong: has it ever happened in the history of our Indian wars, has it ever entered the mind of the most ignorant, to believe it possible that with this force eleven hundred regulars and volunteers should have been held in check, beaten day after day, and finally compelled to act upon the defensive and starve within a breastwork which they had reared for defensive instead of offensive warfare? The very conception of such a contingency being within the scope of possibility, would, but a few weeks since, have been considered evidence of gross ignorance if not partial derangement; and yet such an event has occurred, and the people in astonishment look at each other and ask in vain for an explanation! They look too, in vain, for any explanation in the letters from the seat of war, or in the orders of the commanding general; unless indeed they are to find such explanation in his boast that his command had “met, beaten, and forced the enemy to sue for peace!”

We would respectfully ask, Are such the facts of the case? Do not the official reports of Generals Scott and Clinch, corroborated by all the letters written from the theatre of events, distinctly proclaim that the enemy has not been beaten or forced to sue for peace, but that he is now in force on the Withlacoochee, flushed with victory, and ready to make another desperate effort, in consequence of the encouragement he has received in his contests with General Gaines's command? It is notorious that day after day General Gaines was met and held in check by an inferior force of Indians; and that instead of sweeping them from the face of the earth and putting an end to the war at once, as he could have done by a gallant attack upon them, he intrenched himself in a hastily-constructed breastwork, and there resolved to starve in presence of his enemy unless relieved by General Clinch. If his men were too short of provisions to fight, how happens it that they succeeded in sustaining themselves for several days in succession within their breastwork? It is not contended that when they entered their breastwork they were in a starving state and too much enfeebled by hunger to meet the enemy; and we cannot but believe that the labor and energies expended in fortifying themselves against the very enemy they sought for the purpose of chastising, would have been far better applied in a brisk pursuit of that enemy and his annihilation. Why, we venture to assert that there was not a solitary officer of the army with the general at the time who did not condemn his proceeding as most extraordinary and calculated to cover their detachment with dishonor; and we are very sure that there cannot be found in service an officer of any rank or standing who will have the hardihood to defend this proceeding. We do not doubt the courage of General Gaines—that is as unquestionable as are his former services to the country; but never has it fallen to our lot since the days of Hull to record such disreputable prudence at the very moment when an opportunity offered to accomplish the great object of the expedition—the total destruction of his foe. There is not, there cannot be a doubt that if Gaines had continued to operate on the offensive instead of ingloriously retiring into a breastwork, Ocoola and his warriors would now have been effectually put down, if not exterminated; and that, too, without his troops suffering as much from hunger as they did in their intrenchments. Had he beaten the enemy, as he says he did, and as he most assuredly could and should

have done, he would have been able to supply his command from *their* stores, for they had an abundance of stolen *beeves* with them, two of which *Oceola* offered him when he treated with and *dictated* terms to his conqueror!

But enough of this disgraceful affair. General Gaines was fortunately rescued from his perilous situation by the timely arrival of General Clinch; and even then, instead of forcing his enemy to yield, he fled from him with precipitation, and published the account of his *glorious campaign*, which has caused his brother officers to blush for the conduct of the third in rank in the army, and at the same time greatly perplexed the people at large, who cannot exactly understand why an enemy which has been "beaten and compelled to sue for peace," should still bid defiance to the army under General Scott.

But, extraordinary as has been the conduct of General Gaines in the field, the detail of that conduct as given by himself is equally open to censure. At Pensacola General Gaines was officially apprised that General Scott had been selected to conduct this war; he subsequently met that officer and saw his arrangements to accomplish what *he* had failed in; and yet he published to the world not only that the enemy had been "beaten and forced to sue for peace," but speaks of his commanding general as "the officer charged with the *diplomatic* arrangements by the War Department." Now, if this means anything, it means that General Scott was only sent to Florida in a civil capacity—as a negotiator, a minister extraordinary or plenipotentiary, for the purpose of treating with King *Oceola*, while he (General Gaines) was selected to do the fighting; had accomplished the object of his visit, paved the way for a gracious reception of Mr. Scott the diplomatist, and bravely borne away the honors of a gallant and chivalrous achievement! Alas, "how are the mighty fallen!" how unfortunate is it that poor human nature cannot resist the ravages of time, and that the noblest of our species, if permitted to remain too long on earth, necessarily relapse into a second *childhood*.

The following is the intelligence from the seat of war received yesterday:

[From the Globe of March 31.]

"Despatches were received on Tuesday evening at the Adjutant General's office, dated Fort Drane, March 14, which state that General Clinch, with some means of subsistence, and about six hundred men, of whom one hundred and fifty were mounted Floridians, joined General Gaines on the 6th instant. The force under the latter had already been reduced to the necessity of commencing on horses and dogs for their subsistence. The troops remained in their position until the 10th. General Gaines relinquished the command to General Clinch on the 9th, and departed for Louisiana. The troops under General Clinch fell back to the vicinity of Fort Drane.

"It appears that at the moment of the junction of the troops under General Clinch with General Gaines some communication had been opened with the Indians. The Indians, however, were fired upon by the advancing troops, and afterwards disappeared.

"General Scott reports that he has reason to believe the Indians in the same position they have occupied for some time. General Scott continues, 'I have instructed Brigadier General Eustis, after scouring the country through which he would have to pass to some extent, to place his column in position somewhere in the neighborhood of Pelaklikaha about the 25th instant. Colonel Lindsay, by the same day, is to be with his force at Chickuchatty, about two marches from Tampa, and means are suggested to each in order to multiply the chances of communication with each other. The right wing will move hence, say, on the 24th instant, to attack in front. This column will pass through Withlacoochee about half a mile below the late intrenched camp, where there is a good ford, &c.

"The 25th instant is appointed in order that I may be certain of giving Brigadier General Eustis and Colonel Lindsay time to put themselves in position respectively, and further to give time to the harassed troops lately under the command of Major General Gaines to recruit themselves for effective operations. The same interval is equally important to enable Brigadier General Clinch to receive from Picolata, or Garey's Ferry, a quantity of subsistence indispensable to give confidence to the movements of the right wing.'

Extract of a letter from General Clinch to General Scott, dated

"FORT DRANE, March 12.

"I returned last night from the Withlacoochee with the troops composing the right wing, Florida army. The troops turned over to me by Major General Gaines are stationed four miles in advance of this post, and with a little rest and recruiting, will be a very efficient force, and will add much to the strength of the army of Florida.

"The principal force of the Indians is still on the Withlacoochee, and it is my opinion they will remain there until driven from their stronghold by force."

The following is an extract from a letter received from Dr. Nourse, dated

"FORT BROOKE, Tampa Bay, March 16, 1836.

"We march in a few days for Fort King, for the purpose of joining General Scott. Colonel Lindsay, of the army, arrived since my last with eight hundred Alabama volunteers, making the force at this post at present about one thousand two hundred."

[From the Richmond Enquirer, March 16.]

"There is every reason to believe that Powell (*Oceola*) remains with his people in the same neighborhood. This is most fortunate for Scott's operations. On the 25th, Eustis, with 1,700 men, would be at Pelaklikaha, on the road from Tampa to Fort King, and Colonel Lindsay had been expected to be at Chickuchatty, nearer to Tampa, with about 800 men. There is too much reason to fear that the dispersion of the 700 troops from Alabama would embarrass this part of the arrangement. General Scott could not, by the 16th, have heard of this unfortunate *contretemps*. Clinch, on the same day, (the 25th,) would be back on the Withlacoochee, with about 1,800 men. About 400 of Clinch's wing had been left by General Scott on the St. John's, but they would be up in time. Whilst Scott attacks them in front on the one side, Eustis and Lindsay were to close in the rear—not only to aid in the engagement, but to prevent the escape to the southeast. If the Indians remain in their present position, and everybody believed that they would, the great stroke was expected to be given about the 28th, (yesterday,) and some smaller

bodies would then remain to be picked up. The delay till the 28th was to make it certain that Eustis and Lindsay were in position, and to enable Clinch to receive from Picolata and Garey's Ferry the necessary subsistence. All the wagons have gone to those places. The army was in fine spirits, and Gaines's troops recovering fast from their recent sufferings. If General Scott should succeed in his operations, he expected to be at Tampa Bay by the 7th of April.

"How far the disappointment in receiving the Alabama volunteers will embarrass the operations of the campaign it is impossible for us to determine. We have every confidence, however, in the genius and resources of General Scott."

No. 39.

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSARY GENERAL OF SUBSISTENCE, *Washington, July 1, 1836.*

SIR: Yours of the 11th ultimo is received. I feel confident that no exertions on your part have been spared to meet the wishes of this department; and I have to express my entire approbation of all you have done in the performance of your important and arduous duties.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. GIBSON, *Commissary General of Subsistence.*

Lieutenant P. MORRISON, *Assistant Commissary of Subsistence, New Orleans.*

No. 40.

[Extract.]

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSARY GENERAL OF SUBSISTENCE, *Washington, September 23, 1836.*

I cannot close this communication without expressing to you my thanks for the prompt, correct, and very efficient manner in which you have conducted the arduous duties confided to you by this department for the last eleven years.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. GIBSON, *Commissary General of Subsistence.*

Lieutenant P. MORRISON, *Assistant Commissary of Subsistence, New Orleans.*

No. 41.

Statement of subsistence stores in the harbor of Tampa Bay on the 31st March, 1836.

Rations of pork.....	216, 750
Rations of flour and hard bread.....	304, 423
Rations of coffee.....	340, 250
Rations of sugar.....	212, 875

The amount of small rations on hand, viz: beans, soap, candles, salt, and vinegar, exceeds this statement, and no additional supplies of those articles will be required.

The commanding general no doubt will give you a statement of the number of troops in the field, and the quantity of rations which will be required at this post. Should, however, an estimate be made for additional complete rations, it will only be necessary for you to furnish pork and flour, or bread.

GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, *First Lieutenant and A. C. of S.*

First Lieutenant P. MORRISON, *A. C. S., New Orleans, La.*

No. 42.

[From the New Orleans Bulletin of September 26, 1836.]

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *Camp Sabine, July 4, 1836.*

SIR: I received, on the 25th, at Pensacola, on my way to this place, your letter of the 10th of March.

I have delayed replying until now, from a firm conviction that my letters of the 15th and 25th of January and 6th of February to you, with those of the 2d, 22d, 28th, and 29th of February and 2d of March, to General Clinch, with my orders and special orders of the 18th of January to the 9th of March, 1836, inclusively, reported to you by my acting assistant adjutant general, for the information of the proper authorities, would fully exculpate me from the imputations of General Scott, that I had "interfered with his command," or "disturbed his plan of operations," &c.; more especially as the complainant's accusations were not deemed to be of sufficient importance for me to be furnished with a copy. But, having recently seen the attacks made on me, through the newspaper called the "Globe," and some other papers of equal respectability, and of all political parties, since the first of April last, purporting to be from the pen of that officer, or from his dictation or sanction, aided by the quartermaster general, a franking bureau officer of the War Department—these insidious publications assure me that I am again wantonly assailed. These combined attacks suggest to me the propriety of making, for the information of the proper authorities, the remarks and explanations which follow, and which I deem necessary and proper, in vindication of my

conduct, my movements, and measures, in connexion with the war in East Florida, between the 5th of January and 9th of March last—a task which I was more than willing to abstain from, or leave to others, as I could not, consistently with my own self-respect, and justice to my command, repel the calumnious accusations without calling in question the opinions of high public functionaries whose judgment and patriotism I had long sincerely respected; nor, indeed, without seeming disposed to join in an acrimonious controversy, which nothing short of an order from the President, or the absolute necessity of *self-defence*, could prompt me to do.

The Order No. 7 of the present year, requiring General Scott to repair to the left wing of my department, was never seen by me until my arrival at Fort King, the 22d of February. I state this fact simply because it is a *fact* hitherto, I apprehend, unknown at your office—but it is a fact to which I attach little or no importance. Had I received this order at Pensacola, I should have viewed it as a measure of the *Secretary of War*, taken without a full knowledge of the progress of the war upon that frontier, and of the circumstances which had rendered my movement to Florida proper; and that, therefore, my movement thither ought to continue until I should feel assured that the President was apprised of all the material facts bearing upon the subject; and more especially *until the officer authorized to enter upon that part of my command assigned to him, and which formed the principal theatre of the war, should make his appearance in person upon that theatre of the war*, unless, indeed, my attention had been called to other and apparently more important military operations, also *in actual war*, than those which called me to East Florida.

This view of the subject is based upon an essential principle of military law, derived from the laws of nature, and incorporated in our institutions—a principle sustained by the ablest writers of all enlightened nations to whose works I have had access—a principle without the strict observance of which no nation whose geographical limits exceed twenty miles square could be successfully defended—a principle deeply interwoven with the highest attributes of *sovereignty* and of *self-government*, namely, *self-defence* and *self-preservation*, as a nation or state; or, in other words, PROTECTION—IMMEDIATE, INSTANTANEOUS PROTECTION—to the *exposed feeble members of the community from savage war*. Yes, sir, *immediate, instantaneous protection* by the military officer intrusted with the command of the particular section of country threatened with savage attack, until relieved *before the enemy* by the new commander.

Let us look into a few of the principal features of the case in question, and see what would probably have been the effect of a contrary rule of conduct on my part. In command of the western department, I had met at New Orleans intelligence of a great and unlooked-for disaster having occurred upon the left wing of my department, far distant from the seat of the federal government, from whence alone could I hope to receive new orders, or special instructions more applicable to the case, in all its bearings, than the orders of the President embraced in my commission to serve the United States diligently as a general officer—with the orders which he had given me *to command the western department*. An important white settlement within my department was reported to be *overrun, sacked, and burnt*—a United States agent of Indian affairs, and eight valuable officers, and ninety-eight faithful soldiers, with many worthy frontier citizens killed, and their property stolen or destroyed. And I was aware that most of the neighboring military posts, namely, Forts Brooke, King, Drane, and Key West, all within my military department, were without any other works of defence than such as an efficient force of 500 men might have taken and destroyed in a few hours, with little loss or risk on their part—the garrisons of two of those posts (Fort King and Key West) being insufficient for their defence. I was, moreover, apprised that there were but about 600 troops of the regular army at that time in Florida, and these were separated by a wilderness, supposed to be occupied by the enemy, comprehending near 20,000 square-miles, extending nearly 250 miles from north to south, and from 120 to 40 miles from east to west, with our 600 regulars stationed at the opposite angles and sides of this extensive wilderness, *without disposable force sufficient to insure a concentration at any one important vulnerable point*, from one side of the wilderness in question to the other, without the most imminent danger of having such force destroyed in its movement to the point of concentration. The destruction of the brave but unfortunate Major Dade, with his heroic officers and men, affords an impressive lesson upon this view of the subject which no prudent American, soldier or citizen, should ever lose sight of. Under these circumstances, what was the duty of the commander of the western department? What, I ask, was the proper course for me to pursue? These questions may be most readily answered by asking another: What had I promised upon my oath to do? I had promised, upon my oath prescribed by law, “to bear true faith and allegiance to the *United States of America*, and to *serve them honestly and faithfully* against their enemies or opposers whomsoever, and to observe and obey the orders of the *President of the United States*, and the orders of the officers appointed over me according to the rules and articles of war.”

I had with me my sword and my commission, with the orders of the President of the United States to “command” this department. Now, it is well known that *for me to command* a military department, or any particular section of country upon the frontier, great or small, is, in a plain military sense, *so to order and employ the men and means confided to my direction as to protect our own people* of the United States upon that section of frontier “against their enemies or opposers whomsoever,” as set forth in the aforementioned oath; and, *if it be in time of war, to continue so to command until duly relieved by the new commander, in his own proper person, and on the theatre of the war*.

In failing to comply with this sacred injunction, I well knew that I might thereby have suffered the enemy to kill great numbers of the citizens and troops, in addition to those already slain within the limits of my command, and burn their houses, and take their property. It was my bounden duty, therefore, without waiting for *new orders* or special instructions, to collect together any disposable force found within my department which I might deem sufficient to enable me promptly to strike at the enemy, and, if possible, subdue them, or check their devastations, until the President should have notice of them, and of my efforts to arrest them, and then give such new orders as he might think fit.

But it is contended, principally indeed by those who have proven themselves to be better qualified for the quiet vocation of a writing-desk than the turbulent scenes of an Indian war, that I ought to have abandoned the expedition at Pensacola, because I received, on my arrival at that city, your letter notifying me, not that General Scott had actually arrived at the theatre of the war in Florida, *but that he had been ordered thither by the Secretary of War!* But little reflection is necessary to see the fallacy of this *closest view* of the subject. I had embarked, pursuant to my letter of the 2d of February, addressed “to General Clinch, or the officer commanding the forces assembling on the northeast border of East Florida,” with a view to *co-operate* with that officer in subduing the enemy. I had, moreover, given a pledge to the principal force then with me (the Louisiana volunteers) that I would *not require them to go further than I would myself go, and that I would stand by them as long as they would stand by me, in bringing the war*

to an honorable close. I had thus promised, on the 2d of February, with a force of 700 men, so to co-operate; this force had been fortunately increased, before the embarkation was effected, to near 1,100 men. With this very respectable force embarked, and in its movement for Tampa Bay, and within two days' march (*by steam*) of that place, I received at Pensacola the *notification* from you that General Scott had been ordered by the Secretary of War to that part of my command to which I was, under the above-mentioned circumstances, destined. But what assurance could I have had that he was there? Did you notify me that he was at the post of honor assigned to him by the Secretary of War, or that such arrangements had been made as afforded reasonable ground to hope that General Scott *would be prepared soon* to breast the storm of savage desolation, and *protect* from the scalping-knife and firebrand the helpless citizens of both sexes, and of all ages, in that region, who had looked to me as their protector? Did you tell me that Ocoela and his war-chiefs had given to the President satisfactory assurance that they would suspend their massacres and conflagrations until General Scott should *complete his plan of operations*, and be quite ready to subdue them? No such thing is found in your letter. Nor had I any reason, from the previous northern or western wilderness movements of that officer, to anticipate anything like a prompt movement on his part into the wilds of Florida, longer than he should find himself and his forces and supplies *propelled by steam-power*.

The now well-ascertained fact that General Scott confined his personal operations to the little interior and *unmenaced* places called *Picolata*, *Volusia*, *Black creek*, and *Fort Drane*, and the intervening country within the white settlements, occasionally on board the "little steamboat the *Essayons*," for near six weeks, viz: from about the middle of February until the 25th of March last, without any attempt on his part to search for the enemy, proves clearly—not that I should have abandoned my expedition at Pensacola, at Tampa Bay, at Fort King, or at the Withlacoochee, without subduing the enemy, but that I should, if possible, have redoubled my efforts to accomplish this all-important object sooner than I did; and, in place of leaving them under a pledge that hostilities on our part should cease, if, as they proposed, they would peaceably await the arrival of General Scott, and would attend to the terms he should be authorized by the President of the United States to offer them, (a pledge which appears to have been wholly disregarded by that officer,) I had taken them to Tampa Bay, completed with them a treaty, in accordance with my own understanding of what was due to them and to the United States—a measure which, I am convinced, I could have accomplished had I not indulged in the fruitless expectation that General Scott would arrive soon after hearing I had found the enemy, and employ himself in the performance of the diplomatic and other duties assigned to him by the Secretary of War—I have no doubt that I should by such a movement have relieved the Florida frontier *forever* from all further disturbance on the part of these Indians, and should have placed them in a position calculated in time to change their inveterate hostility, desperation, and distress, to peace and comfort, if not to a sense of respect and gratitude to our government and country for the humanity, care, and kindness extended to them on their having sued for peace. I am well assured that every officer, and every intelligent soldier of the Louisiana volunteers and United States troops then with me upon the Withlacoochee, will concur in the opinion just now expressed.

From the foregoing views it may possibly be inferred that I may have been disposed to attach blame to General Scott for his readiness again and again to solicit or accept a command which he might imagine was calculated to awaken in my mind sentiments of personal ill-will towards *him*, such as he had some years past labored, through many acrimonious pages, to produce; but which *time*, with that sort of reflection, which naturally results from a *rational use of time*, had so mitigated as to induce me, on the receipt of your letter notifying me that he was ordered into my department, so far from feeling *dissatisfied with him*, to resolve upon availing myself of the occasion to co-operate with him (though junior to me) in a manner which I felt convinced, if he did his duty correctly, would be the means of enabling us at the proper theatre of action to settle our disputes forever, *by our joint efforts in battle, to show which of us could do the enemy the most harm and our country the most good*; and thus, in the best possible way of terminating personal enmities, restore between us that harmony which a proper sense of public duty should prompt every high-minded public functionary to extend to each other, so that the public service should suffer no detriment from their intemperate controversies. I knew General Scott too well to imagine *he had ever solicited such a command, in the swamps of a wilderness, and against an enemy such as he had long held in contempt*; and I had long since ceased to cherish towards that officer any feeling of hostility. I had triumphed in the controversy which he had forced upon me. I was gratified at my triumph, not so much that *General Scott was vanquished*, as that *the law of the land was maintained and preserved inviolate by the part which I had taken in that controversy*. I shall again triumph—not that I have any claim to that peculiar talent of which some of my reckless enemies may boast—the talent of "*making the worse appear the better cause*"—but that I have the law of the land to sustain me. It is my present purpose to show that the facts of the case were such as to prove that I was constantly within the pale of military law; I cannot, therefore, but prove myself to have been *in the right*, and that all who are opposed to me are *in the wrong*.

It will be seen, by referring to my letter of the 22d of February, that I expressed my purpose *cordially to co-operate with General Clinch, or the officer commanding the forces then assembling in the northeast border of East Florida, or at Fort Drane* (I have no copy of my letter near me, and write now from my recollection of its contents, in which I am sure that I am substantially correct.) I also expressed in that letter *my hope that our joint efforts might tend speedily to terminate the war*. This sentiment had been often expressed by me to my staff and to the field officers of my command. True it is that my letters of the 22d, 28th, and 29th of February, and 3d of March, were all addressed to General Clinch, or the officer commanding at Fort Drane. They were, however, properly so addressed, and they were obviously intended for the information and government of any officer at Fort Drane in command of the force assembling at or near that post for the defence of that section of the national frontier. Soon after the date of my letter of the 22d of February, I had seen, at Fort King, a letter from General Scott, in which he expressed a desire to know where the principal force of the enemy could be found; that letter was addressed to General Clinch, and dated at Picolata, about the 17th or 18th of February. Not doubting the sincerity of General Scott's *wish to learn where to find the enemy*, I was truly gratified to have it in my power to say that I would search for and endeavor to find their principal force, and would report accordingly. My superior knowledge of the country and of the enemy justified me in the hope and expectation that I should be able soon to relieve General Scott's supposed anxiety upon this point; for my movement by the way of the Alafia, and the battle ground of the lamented Major Dade, where there was most reason to believe the enemy would make their boldest stand, (that having been deemed to be the place of their

"greatest good luck," as the interpreters had termed it,) having proven that their principal force was not in that quarter, I could not doubt but that I should find them lower down on the Withlacoochee; and I therefore determined to continue my search in that direction—that being in the direction to Fort Brooke, the only certain point from which I could replenish my supplies of subsistence and ammunition, the *great supply* which should have been at Fort King having been withheld from that place—whether *intentionally* to embarrass my operations, or from *ignorance* of the country, with its wasted resources, or ignorance of their duty on the part of General Scott and his quartermaster general, I am yet to learn. It is sufficient for me at present to affirm that large supplies *ought to have been*, and might have been, deposited at Fort King and at Fort Drane before the 22d of February, and that I was unable to obtain at those posts more than eight days' rations of subsistence, with scarce one hour's supply of powder and shot or cartridges. Nor could I take this slender supply without leaving those posts with a short allowance, that could not have been justified but upon the expectation of other supplies being on the road near them, and that my movement would contribute to divert from them the attention of the enemy. My plan of operations, embraced in my letter of the 22d of February, was, under all the circumstances of the case, necessary and proper; and it was also proper for me to address my letters intended for General Scott, who, I was aware, was not in my department, to *General Clinch*, an officer known to be on duty within my department, or *the officer commanding the troops assembling at Fort Drane*, where General Scott was expected to arrive in the course of a few days—where, indeed, he ought to have been before the middle of February. General Clinch, who perfectly understood his duty, lost no time in forwarding my letters, or copies of them, to General Scott, at Picolata, who, in place of a prompt response, meeting in the spirit in which it was offered my proposition cordially to co-operate with him in bringing the war to a speedy termination, indulged himself in unwarranted animadversions—imputing to me the worst of motives for my movements, and wasting, in unavailing murmurs, that precious moment for *action, by co-operation with me, as I had proposed*, or, if he preferred it, by *taking the field, and there relieving me*; he appears to have chosen rather to occupy himself in writing accusations against me, and endeavoring to convince the President of the United States that, in my letter of the 22d of February, above referred to, I had been guilty of some criminal interference with his (General Scott's) authority, as stated in your letter of the 10th of March, and more fully stated in the publications dated at Picolata, Black creek, Fort Drane, and more recently at other places, purporting to be from General Scott and other officers of the army, all referring to "the plan of operations" and opinions of General Scott, but so artfully mixed up with plausible *fiction* and *reckless calumny*, slightly tempered with a few grains of truth, as to render it impossible to determine the source whence the mass of matter originated, or to discriminate between the *official, the semi-official, and mere hireling slanders* contained in this mass of matter. I would not willingly, in an official communication to your office, to be submitted to the President of the United States, take any notice of anything contained in those publications that is not strictly official. If I err in my attempt to discriminate in this particular, I will thank you to enable me to rectify myself, by favoring me *with all the official statements* referring to my conduct in relation to the war in Florida, as I may deem it to be essential to my vindication to show to all who may have entertained a doubt, as I trust I have already shown to the satisfaction of every man of military mind who has heard me, or seen my vindication, upon the following points:

1. That the proper *time* and *place* for me to have suspended my movement, and for General Scott to have entered upon the command assigned to him in my department, was *when he should appear in person near me*, at the known theatre of the war, and nowhere else, while the war continued.

2. That until he thus made his personal appearance near me, at the theatre of the war, he had no right whatever to assume the control of a soldier, a public horse, or a public ration, within the limits of my department.

3. That it was my bounden duty to retain the control of every soldier, every horse, every ration, and every other species of public property, necessary to the success of my operations against the enemy, connected with the command of the western department; and, above all, to retain and exercise the *command, honestly and faithfully* on the part of the United States, "*against their enemies or opposers whomsoever*;" and (in the language of the 62d article of war) give "orders for what is needful to the service, unless otherwise specially directed by the President of the United States, according to the nature of the case," and *the President had never specially directed it to be otherwise*. The adjutant general's notification of orders given through him by the *Secretary of War* was insufficient. This was, to say the least, a loose way of carrying into effect a solemn provision of law, embracing a subject of great delicacy and importance to the service.—(See the 62d article of war.) When the law expressly forbids a change of command, as in this article of war, *without the special direction of the President*, it is obvious that the spirit of the law cannot be fulfilled without the direction is given *by the President, or in his name*, by a person known to be authorized to communicate the orders or directions of the *President*. The adjutant general wrote *by order of the Secretary of War*. Nevertheless, if the President himself had given the order that General Scott should enter upon the duties of the command against the Indians in the western department whilst I was in the field, I contend that neither myself nor any other officer *engaged as I was in the immediate protection of the frontier, in the pursuit of the enemy, or in action, holding the enemy in check, could, with any propriety, or without a crime, abandon the command merely on receipt of the order, and before the arrival at the place of pursuit, or of action, of the new commander, unless specially directed by the President so to abandon the command!* A direction such as I venture to affirm has never been given in any civilized nation whose military history is known in this country. The theatre of the war was the place, the only proper place, for General Scott to enter upon and for me to abandon the command assigned to him at any time before the enemy was subdued; but that officer did not choose to make his personal appearance at the Withlacoochee, though cordially and repeatedly invited by me, and challenged by the reiterated reports of my cannon, and by the war-whoop and rifle of the Indians, (as announced to him by General Clinch,) *to partake of the professional banquet* which was regularly spread before me every day, from the 27th of February to the 5th of March, inclusively. I did not choose to *urge or entreat* him to come, because I have never desired to see an officer or soldier near me in action who did not come cheerfully and promptly, or who has been habitually vexing himself in fastidious scruples about *his rank*; and because I had reason to apprehend, from the tardiness of his movement, that a disease which General Scott contracted towards me in August, 1814, had not been completely cured. It was, probably, that sickness of the spleen, which the best of doctors say "*finds ease only in the misery of others*;" a sickness which a rapid march to the Withlacoochee, with the animating scenes, the martial music, pure air, and simple food of that region of the wilderness has never, to my knowledge, failed to improve the health of troops afflicted with disease of any kind, including cholera. That General Scott was retarded in his movement to the Withlacoochee by

some *secret griefs* I could not doubt. What they were I know not. They will doubtless be disclosed in due time. He appears to have been content, for a time, with the notion that I had most improperly and prematurely interfered with his command, and disturbed his plan of operations before it had been brought to maturity! that it was my duty to consider him as entitled to the command, and the entire control of my troops and supplies, before he arrived in person within the limits of my department! that my subduing the Indians ought to pass for nothing, because *he was especially authorized*, and *I was not especially authorized, to subdue them!* Childish conclusions these; too trifling to merit any notice, nor should I have noticed them but for the call made on me to explain and vindicate my conduct, and from the hope that my vindication may be read by the well-meaning officers and men of the volunteers and the army, who doubt, if indeed any doubt the propriety of my conduct—who, I am convinced, will readily yield their hasty opinions to the conviction which mature reflection on the subject cannot but produce. They will agree with me that my path of public duty was plain—too plain to be mistaken by any honest soldier or citizen not blinded by the spirit of party, or some other diabolic prejudice or passion: it was, without waiting for *new orders*, to fly as rapidly as possible, with whatever disposable force and supplies might appear to me necessary and proper to arrest the progress of the apparent growing evil of the late disasters; strengthen the feeble military posts, and, if possible, put an end to the war by a vigorous co-operation with any forces found in that quarter, or otherwise, as circumstances should dictate, according to my own plan of operations, contained in my letters of the 2d, 22d, 28th, and 29th of February, above referred to. The sum and substance of my design was to afford prompt and complete *protection*, that sort of protection which is guaranteed by the *Constitution of the United States to the people of the United States*—including the pioneer, the widow, the orphan, inhabitants of the frontier camp or cabin, as well as the polished and wealthy citizen of the great emporium of party politics, of commerce, and fashion; that complete *protection*, the work of which should, if possible, commence before the *work of destruction upon the frontier is finished, or even begun—protection to the living citizen rather than to the ashes of the slain!* My plan of operations was expressed as concisely as I could express it in my letter of the 22d of February—it was “to search for the enemy until I should find them, and then beat them, as otherwise he would beat me.”

4. In carrying into effect this plan of operations, I could suffer no officer to interfere with my troops, military posts, or supplies of any kind, within the limits of my department, until he should appear *in person* within those limits, duly authorized, and apparently *ready and willing* to meet the enemy and protect the people of the United States within my department “*against their enemies or opposers whomsoever;*” or until I had met and beaten the enemy, and compelled them to sue for peace.

5. I did meet the enemy, and did several times beat them, and finally compelled them to sue for peace. How this was accomplished I need not now undertake to describe. Grave doubts have been expressed, in some of the publications to which I have referred, as to the *sincerity* of the Indian chiefs in suing for peace, upon which is supposed to rest the fact of their having been subdued. I am willing to leave the issue of these questions to the testimony of the officers and the intelligent volunteer and regular soldiers who served with me, pledging my honor to abide by their concurrent testimony. But I am not willing to be tried and condemned without a hearing, and by persons who were not only not near me, but who have given me good reason to believe they would have been better pleased at my downfall than at the triumph obtained by me over the enemy; persons who know full well that the final decree at which every enlightened citizen and soldier who investigates the subject must sooner or later arrive, establishing the correctness of my conduct, must virtually fix the seal of condemnation upon theirs. Hence it was that many hours and days of precious time, which should have been devoted to active operations against the Indians, were sacrificed at Picolata and Fort Drane, and other places, to the fabrication of slanderous essays, to forestall and mislead public opinion, to condemn my movements, and cover me with the vilest detraction. The editors of newspapers, hitherto professing friendliness towards me, have been employed as the leading vehicles of this atrocious scheme of slander. Why is this so? I answer, that it is because I disdain to be the man of a political party! I owe allegiance to the *United States of America*, and not to a party. It may be that I did not require my officers and men at the Withlacoochee to take from the enemy as *many lives* as they had, by their savage conduct, forfeited—but where was the bond, or the principle of the laws of war, or of nations, binding them to give or me to take the life of any one of them after they had raised the white flag and sued for peace? Their first proposition was made on the evening of the 5th of March. They were then told that if their chiefs would come in the next day they would be heard. They accordingly came with a white flag, on the morning of the 6th of March, when they said, in the most subdued tone and manner, “We do not wish to fight any more; we have lost many of our warriors killed, and others disabled by wounds—we do not wish to lose any more in this way, or otherwise than by sickness, or by the falling of trees; and we desire to make peace.” They were told, in reply, that I was not authorized to treat with them, but that I had learned that an officer was on his way, and would soon be there, with authority to treat with them; that, if they wished for peace, they must lay down their arms, or cease to make any further use of them, and stay beyond the Withlacoochee until the officer authorized to treat with them should arrive, and that they must then go wherever he should require them; but that if they should commit any more hostilities, our troops, of which we had many, would kill all of them found with arms in their hands. They then counselled among themselves and their warriors until four or five o'clock in the evening. The chiefs then returned, and freely assented to my answer to their propositions, the last sentence of which my acting inspector general was, for the second time, explaining to them when General Clinch arrived in sight with the troops of his immediate command from Fort Drane, some of whom fired in the direction of the Indians, but at too great a distance to hurt them. They then hastily retreated to the adjoining hammock. They, however, manifested no disposition to violate their engagement; nor do I believe there was an officer or soldier with me, who had witnessed their conduct, who entertained a doubt but that they were subdued, and perfectly sincere in the desire they expressed to abstain from further hostilities and meet General Scott in council *whenever and wherever* he might direct. I remained in command, in order to satisfy myself of their sincerity, until the 9th of March, during which time some hundreds of my men were allowed to amuse themselves fishing, for a mile or two up and down the river, without discovering any indication of further hostility on the part of the Indians, some of whom were seen on the opposite side of the river. I, on the 9th of March, turned over the command of the troops then with me to General Clinch, as will be seen by my orders of that date, with a view to repair to this frontier. It is proper here to remark that, in order to obtain accurate information as to the *position* of the chiefs and warriors, and whether their pacific views remained unchanged after being fired on by the volunteers with General Clinch, I approved the suggestion of General Clinch to send a black interpreter across the river to their camp. He set out on the 8th

and returned on the evening of the 10th of March. He reported that the chiefs and warriors had gone up the Withlacoochee, near thirty miles above Camp Izard, to where their families were stationed; and that the chiefs told him they were waiting agreeably to my directions, and that they would be ready in five days to hold a council with the officer expected on for that purpose. General Scott was that officer; who, in place of meeting them in council, and directing them what to do to enable them to obtain peace and conform to the wishes of the President of the United States—General Scott openly avowed (as I have been informed, and his official letters imply) a determination to pay no regard to my arrangement with the Indians, but to obtain an overwhelming force, and then *annihilate them*. His blustering threats to this effect were probably known to every person, white and black, in and about the house of General Clinch at Fort Drane; and as some of the black domestics were in the habits of intimacy with the black interpreters, it was more than probable that in this way the threats of the *gallant* general reached the ears of the Seminole chiefs. Nothing, therefore, could be more natural than that they should prepare for self-defence and self-preservation against a commander regardless of the pledge made to them by me, his immediate predecessor in command, and his senior—a pledge which could not be disregarded without a gross violation of the laws of nature and of war, which no nation can tolerate without a positive disregard of the most sacred of her obligations of good faith towards her neighbors. The sequel has proven the fallacy of such threats, and the truth of the proverb that “the battle is not always to the strong, nor the race to the swift.”

6. It may be that I did not expose my officers and soldiers—volunteers and regulars—to as much *risk* and *loss* as some of my accusers deem necessary to give *eclat* to a *triumph*! Heaven preserve me, I pray, from that eclat which is won by the useless or wanton sacrifice of those placed under my command! If my accusers have reason to believe, from the testimony of those who ventured to accompany and co-operate with me in battle, that I neglected any important duty to save my own life or the life of any of my officers or men, it would be strictly correct in them to establish, if possible, such a charge. But upon this point, as upon all the imputations of General Scott and his franking and writing friends, I hold towards them the attitude of honest defiance. Had the Constitution or any other law of the land required it, or had I ordered it, I have not a doubt that every officer and soldier with me at the Withlacoochee would cheerfully have agreed, “if the enemy would stand,” to desire them to take the first shot; and would, moreover, have declined the comfort and security of sleeping or fighting behind a breastwork, had not this method of occasional *action* and *rest* been consecrated by the example of our own beloved Washington, and all other great and good men who have signalized themselves in the defence of our country. I think it more than probable that my brave little army would have subdued the enemy a few days sooner than we did, had I directed them to make a few rapid *sorties*; but I had promised General Clinch to make no *sorties* until I should hear from him, from an apprehension that a *sortie* would have dispersed and driven off the Indians before the arrival of *mounted force*—the only description of force with which a *sortie* could have been made with full effect at the place which I occupied. With the aid of the anticipated mounted force, I had calculated on taking or destroying most of the Indians, and terminating the war in the course of a few days. They were, however, subdued, and sued for peace near twenty hours before I heard from General Clinch.—(See my letter to that officer under date the 29th of February, in which I promised to abstain from making a *sortie* until I should hear from him.) On the subject of a *sortie*, however, I was convinced that I should not have succeeded in rendering it effective without the loss of from fifty to one hundred of my officers and soldiers; and I have no hesitation in saying that I would not have had twenty of my excellent Louisiana volunteers or regulars recklessly sacrificed, whilst momentarily expecting the arrival of mounted force, to have had laid at my feet in chains all the Indians in Florida. The troops were for several days held in readiness for a *sortie*, and it would have been made on hearing from General Clinch, or in co-operation with his command, had not the Indians sued for peace before he was heard from.

7. Among the numerous calumnies, official and unofficial, I have seen none more absurd than that I was actuated in my movement to Florida by no higher motive than that of a desire to obtain “*laurels*” to which General Scott had superior claims! I feel convinced that those who know me best know, and will testify, that I have ever been incapable, even while a young subaltern, of that overweening vanity and officiousness which sometimes prompt the weak or the vicious to attempt to rob their brother soldiers of what may be justly their due. Laurels, indeed! The idea of obtaining laurels in an *Indian war* I have long deemed to be as a *vision* never to be realized by any known system of operations embraced in the art of war in its supposed improved state, nor otherwise than by watching the movements of the enemy and profiting by his example of *vigilance*, *rapidity of movement*, and *privation of food and rest*. No man acquainted with the sufferings of the frontier people of Florida, possessed of a spark of patriotism or humanity, could for a moment be ignorant of the great and only inducement which ought or could have prompted me to make the movement in question. It was obvious to me that protection must be afforded, and quickly afforded, to the bleeding frontier of that neglected Territory, or that her late flourishing settlements would be destroyed, and that delightful region of our national frontier rendered a scene of devastation disgraceful to the military character of our country, and doubly disgraceful to the officer intrusted with its defence.

I have shown, as I doubt not, to the satisfaction of every man of military mind who will take the trouble to read this letter, that it was my bounden duty, under the circumstances of the case, to collect together the forces embarked at New Orleans on the night of the 3d and the morning of the 4th of February, and, with them, to repair promptly, as I did, to East Florida, and there to employ my best efforts in subduing or holding in check the enemy until the arrival of General Scott *at the theatre of the war*. This being admitted, my right to the entire control of the *subsistence*, and *horses*, and *other means of transportation*, found within the limits of my department, or such as was on their passage thither, is established beyond the shadow of doubt. Upon what ground, then, could General Scott assert that I interfered with and retarded his operations by taking rations and horses belonging to his command? I affirm that his excuse is baseless, and his assertion untrue. I affirm, moreover, that if the horses and rations which he falsely accuses me of having wrongfully taken had been forcibly seized by me from one of the posts within the eastern department, and to which I could have no claim, *the number of rations and number of horses in question was too small to delay the movement of General Scott's grand army for more than three days' time*. The whole number of rations taken by me from the day of my arrival at Fort King, the 22d of February, to the day I turned over the command to General Clinch, the 9th March, 1836, inclusively, amounted to less than twelve thousand complete rations, and the number of horses, I am assured, was not more than eight or ten, taken from Forts King and Drane, (posts of my department,) and less than this number of

miserable ponies from Fort Brooke, not one of which had been placed at either of those posts by General Scott, as I have been informed and believe.

His assertion, therefore, that his operations were greatly embarrassed or retarded by my having taken the *rations* and *horses* provided for his command is not only not true, but is marked with a *reckless malignity disgraceful to an officer and dishonorable to a man—not to say a gentleman.*

All which is submitted for the information of the President of the United States.

With profound respect,

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General U. S. Army, Washington City.*

No. 43.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *Camp Sabine, September 18, 1836.*

GENTLEMEN: The occurrences in East Florida during the last winter and spring, and more especially the acrimonious and calumnious publications from the pen of General Scott, or from his sanction or dictation, taken in connexion with the *silence* of the War Department, or, in other words, the *suppression* of my orders and communications in reference to the operations in that quarter under my direction, have combined to place me at that point of *moral responsibility* or moral action at which longer silence on my part would be criminal.

I am therefore compelled, in self-defence, publicly to vindicate my conduct—not to *seek a paper war*, or any other description of war; but never to shun a war of any kind when necessary in defence of the legacy of *honor* and of *principle* bequeathed to me by our fathers of the revolutionary war, in the midst of which I was born, (March 20, 1777.) But I think I have seen and done too much good service in battle against the enemies of our country to war with the tools or understrappers of my principal foe. I will do that honor only to the *head* of the cabal arrayed against me, and he only, whoever he is, if he desires it, and will step out of his place of shelter and concealment.

For the purpose of my vindication I desire to have access to the columns of an independent paper, with an editor who has the moral courage to speak and write what truth and justice demand. That you can find such an editor near you I have no doubt—to whom, I pray you, hand the accompanying copy of the first part of my vindication. The residue will be sent to you as soon as it can be copied.

I am, with affectionate respect, your friend,

EDMUND PENDLETON GAINES.

Messrs. General P. F. SMITH and Colonel WILLIAM CHRISTY, *City of New Orleans.*

No. 44.

Questions by General Gaines to Surgeon General Thomas Lawson.

Question 1. Did you serve with the Louisiana volunteers in the army under command of Major General Gaines in Florida, in February and March, 1836; and if so, in what capacity?

Answer. I served with the Louisiana volunteers in the army under command of Major General Gaines, in Florida, in February and March, 1836, and in the capacity of lieutenant colonel.

Question 2. Did you have a conversation with Captain McCall (then aide-de-camp to Major General Gaines) at Pensacola, on the 6th of February, 1836, on the subject of the pledge General Gaines had given to the Louisiana volunteers, and his continuing in command of the troops then on their march (by steam) to Tampa Bay; and if so, did you state to him that the Louisiana volunteers would be dissatisfied if General Gaines relinquished the command?

Answer. I had a conversation with Captain McCall, with Captain Hitchcock, and with General Gaines himself, at Pensacola, on the 6th of February, 1836, in relation to a communication just then received by General Gaines from the Adjutant General's office, notifying him (General Gaines) that General Scott had been ordered to conduct the military operations against the hostile Seminole Indians, and that his (General Gaines's) services might soon be required on the Mexican frontier, and directing him to await further orders in New Orleans. Being the senior officer present with General Gaines, and in the immediate command of the troops with him, I felt myself authorized to give my views touching the obligations incurred by General Gaines's promise of co-operation with General Clinch, and his pledge to accompany the Louisiana volunteers to the scene of action. And I did so to Captain McCall, as well as to General Gaines, in language to the following import: I said that the communication from the Adjutant General's office did not make it imperative on General Gaines immediately to withdraw from the command of the troops; that the order for General Scott to conduct the war in Florida no doubt had been given without any knowledge of the arrangements that had been made or were making by General Gaines to take the field; and that, inasmuch as he had, on his own responsibility, raised a respectable military force for the purpose of relieving the threatened military posts and frontier settlements, he ought to press forward to the theatre of the war. In the course of this conversation I said that General Gaines could lead on his men until he accomplished the object for which he set out, or at least until he met the officer commanding the troops advancing from the eastern side of the peninsula. I moreover stated that, inasmuch as he had pledged himself to the Louisiana volunteers to lead them on to the theatre of the war, they would expect him to accompany them, and would be dissatisfied if he withdrew from the command of the expedition.

Question 3. Did General Gaines, on his passage from Pensacola to Tampa Bay, communicate to you his purpose to co-operate with General Scott, in the event of that officer being found in the field?

Answer. On more than one occasion, I believe, General Gaines observed that his personal feelings towards General Scott should not interfere with his public duties. He stated that he would meet General

Scott, if he found him in the field, in a spirit of conciliation, and would cordially co-operate with him in bringing the war to a close.

Question 4. Would, in your opinion, any advantage have been gained by a sortie upon the Indians, had one been made from Camp Izard, at any time between the 29th of February and the 5th of March, 1836?

Answer. The concentration of three or four hundred men on any point of the enemy's line would have driven them from their position, and dispersed them, without any material advantage resulting to our cause.

Question 5. What is your opinion as to the sincerity of the Indians in suing for peace on the 6th of March, 1836, at Camp Izard, on the Withlacoochee?

Answer. It is my opinion, and I believe it was the opinion of the army generally, that the Indians were sincere in their proposition for peace.

Question 6. Please to state on what grounds your opinion is founded?

Answer. I judge that they were sincere from the manner in which they made the overture, and their conduct during the progress of the negotiation; from the fact that they permitted, for two or three days afterwards, the officers and men to fish and bathe in the river, and to cross to the opposite bank and wander for some distance into the woods; from the message sent by Primus to General Gaines, reiterating their desire to make peace, and their willingness, in five days, to meet him on the Withlacoochee; from the fact that the troops remained in three or four separate encampments for two or three weeks, the men individually passing between the several commands day and night without molestation; and again, from the appearances of Camp Izard and the grounds around, on the return of the troops under General Scott, when we found everything in pretty much the same state in which it was left, viz: the canoes that had been made by General Gaines's command uninjured; the slabs gotten out for the bridge or other purposes untouched, and the bodies of the dead undisturbed, which was very uncommon with the Indians.

THOMAS LAWSON.

Sworn to before—

S. COOPER, *Judge Advocate, Recorder of the Court.*

No. 45.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *Camp Sabine, July 20, 1836.*

SIR: I did not receive, until last night, the Order No. 37, of which I think myself in duty bound to send you a copy enclosed herewith, marked A, being convinced that you have not been apprised of the fact that this order, issued, as it appears, by your direction, was suffered, by the person to whom you confided the trust of preparing the order for the office of distribution, to contain the extrajudicial opinion of General Scott in reference to the command of Camp Izard, on the Withlacoochee.

That General Scott should employ lawless means to palliate his own unofficer-like conduct, to condemn me without even the color of authority, and attempt thus indirectly to foist into an order issued under the supreme sanction of the executive department of the United States the malignant fictions of his own fancy, was to be expected, and was calculated to excite in my mind neither surprise nor concern, as all the evil of such an intrigue on his part would recoil upon himself, and the ill-designed attempt would redound to my honor rather than to my injury. I cannot suppose it to be possible that you have given your sanction to that part of the order in question referring to the command of Camp Izard, and therefore I am convinced I need only to solicit your attention to the subject to insure its correction, and my relief before the army and my countrymen from the odium which the order, in its present shape, under your sanction, would imply.

Had I been charged with a crime and put in arrest pursuant to the 77th article of war, and tried according to law, and found guilty of having committed a crime in connexion with my command at Camp Izard, or if my official report had been disproved, General Scott and any other officer might very properly refer to the record of the settled case, embracing such crime, and hold it up to the army *in terrorem*, or in palliation of some other established case of crime. But to prejudice me without my having had any intimation from the proper authorities that my conduct at Camp Izard had been called in question, and to obtrude the extrajudicial judgment into orders for the information and government of the army, and thus to forestall the opinion of the army and the nation against me, and in a manner calculated to pollute the streams of public justice, and not only disqualify General Scott himself from sitting in judgment in any such case against me, but tending to bias, mislead, and disqualify such officers of the army as may be disposed to yield to the opinion of General Scott—an opinion, however, as I have before intimated, from which I should feel no concern where that opinion is disconnected, as I trust it will be disconnected, from the apparent support given it by the sanction of the President of the United States, as the order in question, in its present form, implies.

My letter of the 4th of this month to the adjutant general, to be submitted to you in reply to his letter of the 10th of March, written by your direction, and written long before I had any knowledge of the existence of the order in question, or of the inquiry in the case of Major Gates, will show that it was an essential part of my plan to hold the Indians in check and to prevent their dispersion, preparatory to their entire defeat, on the arrival of the mounted men from Fort Drake, that I should abstain from a sortie until their arrival, or until I should hear from them. In my letter of the 28th of February to General Clinch I say, "I shall prepare means for crossing the river, but shall not attempt to cross until I hear from you;" and in my letter of the 29th of February to General Clinch I say, "I have abstained and shall continue to abstain from a sortie until I hear from you." These letters were intended for General Clinch, and for General Scott whenever he should arrive within the limits of my department. He was furnished by General Clinch, as he informed me, with copies. It is evident, therefore, that he made the allusion to my command at Camp Izard with a full knowledge of the fact that I was under a pledge to General Clinch not to make a sortie until I heard from him. My having, however, beaten the enemy and forced them to sue for peace twenty hours before I heard from General Clinch, happily superseded the necessity of making a sortie, which could not have been made without great loss on my part, with but little loss on the part of the enemy.

I have the honor to be, with profound respect, your obedient servant,

EDMUND P. GAINES, *Major General by brevet, United States Army.*

ANDREW JACKSON, *President of the United States.*

A.

GENERAL ORDER No. 37.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Adjutant General's Office, Washington, June 11, 1836.*

I. The proceedings of the court of inquiry held at St. Augustine, East Florida, on the 6th day of May, 1836, and continued until the 7th, assembled by order of Major General Scott, at the request of Major William Gates, and of which court Lieutenant Colonel Crane, of the United States army, was president, have been laid before the President of the United States.

The court, at the request of Major Gates, was directed to investigate the conduct of that officer during and subsequent to the attack on the military post at Volusia, on the St. John's river, in Florida, embracing the 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th of April, of this year.

The court of inquiry, having been directed to give its opinion on the whole case, came to the following conclusion:

OPINION.

II. "The court, after mature deliberation on the testimony before them, are of opinion, from the evidence of Adjutant Patterson, Dr. Graham, and Lieutenant Pettes, that the effective force under the command of Major Gates was much greater than the estimated force of the Indians who attacked him on the morning of the 14th of April, 1836; and that, therefore, he was capable of meeting the enemy in the field, if necessary; also, that the bodies of two volunteers, killed, were improperly left exposed, and ought to have been brought in on the morning when they were killed—such exposure necessarily operating injuriously on the garrison."

On which proceedings and opinion, Major General Scott, commanding the troops in Florida, made the following remarks:

"It is clear from the evidence that the garrison of Fort Barnwell was, at the time it was attacked, at least twice as numerous as the assailing party; a vigorous sortie, with two-thirds of the garrison should, therefore, have been promptly made. The moral effect of such movement would have been great on both sides. Many of the enemy would, probably, have been killed or captured, and the garrison thereby inspired with a just confidence in the superior prowess of the white man.

"If for no other object, a strong detachment ought instantly to have been sent out to bring in the bodies of the sergeant and private who were seen to fall near the wood at the beginning of the attack. This imperative duty was neglected for more than forty-eight hours—a delay that is curiously slurred over in the major's official report.

"It is most painful to remark the fatal charm that seems to have hung over every commander in this war who has been attacked behind breastworks or pickets. From the leading case, at Camp Izard, to the last that has been reported, not a sortie—certainly not one of vigor—has been made by any garrison, however inferior the assailing force. Several mortifying cases of this sort have duly followed; and Major Cooper alone, with his Georgia battalion, has ventured for a moment beyond a line of defences to receive or to repel an attack. The series of examples alluded to have inspired the enemy with hardihood, repressed the zeal of our troops, and may slightly excuse the conduct of Major Gates. Certainly a gallant effort is yet to be made by some future commander of a post to break the charm and to check Indian audacity."

III. The President of the United States, on a full consideration of the conduct of Major William Gates, of the 1st regiment of artillery, as disclosed by the evidence before the court of inquiry, has directed that the name of that officer be stricken from the rolls. Major William Gates, therefore, ceases to be an officer of the army.

By order of Alexander Macomb, major general commanding-in-chief.

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

General Gaines to the Secretary of War, enclosing letter from Major Graham.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, *Frederick, Maryland, February 28, 1837.*

SIR: I have to request your attention to the enclosed letter from Major Graham, in connexion with the proceedings of the court of inquiry of which Major General Macomb is president. It was received too late to lay before the court. Upon reflection, however, I find it constitutes the only evidence known to me as likely to repel one of the many foul slanders alleged against me, namely, that I spoke of the order assigning General Scott to the Florida frontier in terms of disrespect towards the President of the United States. It is on this account I desire you to lay before the President Major Graham's letter.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDMUND P. GAINES.

The SECRETARY OF WAR.

PENSACOLA, Florida, February 15, 1837.

GENERAL: I have recently heard, with much surprise and regret, that there was a rumor (which I have reason to apprehend may have reached you) that I had stated or intimated, in speaking of an interview I had with you at this place on or about the 6th of February last, that I knew of your having received an order from the War Department, assigning the command of the army in Florida to another general officer, and that you had treated the order in a manner disrespectful to the authority from whence it emanated. It is a duty I owe to myself to state to you that if any such rumors have been abroad

they are entirely incorrect, and not warranted by anything I have ever expressed or intimated to any one; nor have I ever made a single statement or intimation, in allusion to that interview, tending to your disparagement. On the contrary, whenever inquired of by those who knew I was in Pensacola, when you touched here, in reference to your movement with the troops, I always stated, fairly and emphatically, the high sense of duty by which you appeared to me actuated in going to the relief of a portion of your countrymen who you believed would fall victims to savage butchery, if not relieved in a shorter time than could reasonably be counted on by any other force than that which you had organized and brought thus far on the route to the scene of hostilities.

On the day above alluded to I called on board the steamboat in which you had come with the troops, in order to pay my respects to you, as a superior officer. I had that morning observed a paragraph in a newspaper, (I think the National Intelligencer,) stating that "it was rumored" that General Scott had been ordered to the command of the Florida army, and yourself to hold yourself in readiness to repair to the Mexican frontier, or something to that effect. As the subject appeared to be of universal interest here, I ventured to ask you the question, if you intended to proceed on with the army? To this question you replied that you had, since your arrival at this place, received from the post office a letter from the adjutant general, informing you that an order had been issued by the direction of the War Department, placing Major General Scott in command of the Florida army, and directing that you should remain in New Orleans (as well as I remember) until further orders were sent you. You remarked that you had no intention whatever of interfering with the officer mentioned in the letter of the adjutant general, but added that you found yourself surrounded by circumstances, which the great distance of the seat of government from the scene of Indian hostilities rendered it impossible for the War Department to appreciate fully; that situated as you were, you believed it was a duty you owed your country to continue on with your army at least as far as might be necessary to arrest the depredations which it was understood the Indians were still committing upon our defenceless citizens, and that you conceived you had a right to rely upon the approbation of the War Department when all the circumstances should be known. You then took a rapid view of the probable period that must elapse before General Scott could, even with the greatest possible activity, have his army in the field, and the mischief which the Indians would be enabled to commit in the meantime, if not arrested by the force you had already organized and marched thus far towards the seat of war—mentioned the instructions you had sent to General Clinch, at Fort King, to make a movement in order to co-operate with you in your contemplated march from Tampa Bay; that it was now too late to countermand this order with any certainty of its reaching General Clinch, for the newspapers contained rumors that the Indians were collected in force around Fort King, (where General Clinch was then supposed to be,) either with a view of storming the picket or of preventing any supplies reaching it; that if these rumors were true, General Clinch, with his small force, something like 130 or 140 regulars fit for duty, and nearly one-half that number of wounded to take care of, ought to be relieved without any loss of time; that if the rumors alluded to were not true, then General Clinch would probably make a movement in accordance with the instructions which had been forwarded to him, and counting upon your co-operation, which, if not rendered according to the understanding, might expose him to attack from the united force of the Indians, which was known to be far superior to his in number; that when the Louisiana volunteers (or some of them, for I do not remember whether the remark applied to all or to a part) came to be mustered into the service of the United States, a question arose among them as to what commander they were to serve under; that in order to give confidence and produce unanimity of feeling among them, you had declared to them that you would not require them to march further into the enemy's country than you should go yourself, having, at the time, no reason to apprehend you would receive any orders adverse to this assurance; and that if you were then to quit them, before they had proceeded halfway to the post where their useful services were to commence, it would probably create dissatisfaction among them; in which event, constituting as they did a large majority of your force, the whole object of the expedition would probably be thwarted. These, I think you remarked, were all circumstances of so imperious a nature, and which it was impossible the War Department could have been acquainted with when the letter from the adjutant general was written, that you considered it your duty to your country to yield to them, and, in doing so, felt you had a right to calculate upon the approbation of the Executive or the War Department.

I have given you, general, in the foregoing statement, the true import of all I have ever said in reference to this subject, and I leave it to yourself to judge whether or not I have misrepresented you. I will only add that, on my return to the north a year ago, I had occasion to allude to this subject, in answer to inquiries which were made of me by several distinguished individuals in Washington, in New York, and in Boston, in which (as I can appeal to them to testify if necessary) I uniformly gave the view which I have here presented.

I am, general, with much respect, your obedient servant,

J. D. GRAHAM, *Major United States Topographical Engineers.*

Major General GAINES, *United States Army.*

No. 4.

Proceedings of a court of inquiry in reference to publications of officers of the army.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS.

- No. 1. The Globe of April 2, 1836.
2. The Globe of April 8, 1836.
3. The Globe of June 4, 1836.
4. Army and Navy Chronicle of August 11, 1836.
5. Army and Navy Chronicle of September 29, 1836.

Proceedings of a court of inquiry held at the city of Frederick, Maryland, by virtue of the following orders, viz:

GENERAL ORDER No. 65.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Adjutant General's Office, Washington, October 3, 1836.*

The following order is published for the information of all concerned :

By direction of the President of the United States, a court of inquiry, to consist of Major General Macomb, president, and Brevet Brigadier Generals Atkinson and Brady, members, is hereby ordered to assemble at the city of Frederick, in Maryland, as soon as the state of the military operations against the Indians will permit the witnesses to attend, (of which the President of the court is to judge and determine, and to give notice to all concerned,) to inquire and examine into the causes of the failure of the campaigns in Florida, against the Seminole Indians, under the command of Major General Gaines and of Major General Scott, in 1836; and the causes of the delay in opening and prosecuting the campaign in Georgia and Alabama against the hostile Creek Indians in the year 1836; and into every subject connected with the military operations in the campaigns aforesaid; and after fully investigating the same, the court will report the facts, together with its opinion on the whole subject, for the information of the President of the United States.

Captain Samuel Cooper, of the 4th regiment of artillery, is hereby appointed to act as judge advocate and recorder of the court.

LEWIS CASS.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 3, 1836.*

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

GENERAL ORDER No. 69.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, October 14, 1836.*

The following order has been received from the War Department, and is published for the information of all concerned:

WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 13, 1836.*

1. It appearing by the public prints that the official report of Brevet Major General Gaines, dated "Headquarters Western Department, Camp Sabine, July 4, 1836," made to the adjutant general of the army, has been published, and the said publication being without the sanction of the War Department, or other proper authority, the court of inquiry of which Major General Macomb is president will, in addition to the duties already assigned to it, inquire into the facts as to the manner, and by whose authority, the said official report was made public.

2. The court will also report its opinion as to the violation of the rules of the service by such publication, and as to the character of said report, in reference to all its bearings and consequences, as it concerns general military propriety and the discipline of the army.

3. And, further, the court will examine and inquire into any other reports and publications made by Brevet Major General Gaines, or by any other officer of the army, having reference to military affairs, and published without the sanction of the War Department, or other proper authority, and give its opinion on the tendency of such reports and publications in the same manner as it is herein required to do in the case referred to in the foregoing paragraph of this order.

C. A. HARRIS, *Acting Secretary of War.*

By order of Major General Macomb.

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

FREDERICK, *February 13, 1837.*

The court met pursuant to adjournment of Saturday. Present: Major General Macomb, president; Brigadier General Atkinson and Brigadier General Brady, members; Captain Cooper, judge advocate and recorder.

The court was sworn in presence of the parties interested in the present investigation, who had stated that they had no objections to offer to any member of the court.

The judge advocate then proceeded to open the investigation having reference to the unauthorized publications of officers of the army on the subject of military affairs, and the tendency of such publications. He presented to the court a letter from Captain Hitchcock, of the 1st infantry, addressed to the honorable F. S. Lyon, dated Fort Drane, March 11, 1836, and published in the *Globe* of the 2d of April, 1836; also, a communication from Major General Jesup to the editors of the *Globe*, and published in that paper of the 8th of April; and further, a letter from Captain Hitchcock to the editors of the same paper, dated Washington, June 2, 1836, and published in the *Globe* of the 4th of June.—(See documents Nos. 1, 2, 3.)

After the reading of these letters, Captain Hitchcock asked leave, and addressed the court to the following effect:

"MR. PRESIDENT AND GENTLEMEN OF THE COURT: As among the duties assigned to this court, that of passing an opinion upon the tendency of publications by officers of the army is one; and there being before the court two letters over my signature—one addressed to the honorable F. S. Lyon, dated at Fort Drane, in March last, and the other addressed to the editors of 'The Globe,' dated in June last, both of which I acknowledge to have written—I request that the facts and views which I am about to state may receive the attention of this court.

"The letter addressed to Mr. Lyon was written under the following circumstances:

"While marching from the Withlacoochee to Fort Drane, the 11th of March, I observed to my friend and associate, Captain McCall, that 'all manner of stories would be put in circulation about the movements of the army, and that unless some one acquainted with the facts would undertake to state them, the newspapers would be all at fault; that much interest must be excited in the country on the subject; and,' said I, 'I am disposed to prepare a statement and send it to some editor.' Accordingly, on arriving at Fort Drane I wrote the letter in question. After completing it, and being desirous of publishing nothing but the truth, I requested General Gaines to permit me to read it to him. He at first declined, but on my urging it he gave me his attention while I read the letter, and at the conclusion he expressed a wish that his nephew, Mr. Lyon, might have a copy of it. Not being disposed to prepare a copy, I determined to send the original to Mr. Lyon, and did so, telling him in a note that I had not written the letter for the purpose of placing my name before the public, but that if he thought it worth while to authenticate the facts with my name, he was at liberty to do it.

"It is my wish, of course, that before passing any opinion that may touch the letter, even indirectly, the court will hear it read, and consider whether the following observations are not perfectly just, and sustained by the letter. It purports in its first paragraph to be a statement of facts. There is nothing in it at variance with that declared object. There are no discussions in it designed or calculated to aid or direct public opinion upon the rights or duties or responsibilities of individuals connected with the movement of General Gaines, or of individuals affected by that movement. There is nothing personal in the letter; nothing directly or remotely designed or intended to *awaken* or *control* any controversy of any sort. There is not a single remark in the whole letter in compliment to General Gaines, except where I record the confidence of the officers in his judgment, &c., and that itself was the mere statement of a fact, attested by the signature of every officer but one in the camp, in a letter to the general after the command was turned over to General Clinch. The principles governing the general in going to Florida are not discussed, nor are there in the letter any discussions upon the expediency of any of the numerous specific determinations resolved upon or executed by him while in Florida; but the letter is what it purports to be—a statement of facts; and had it been my pleasure to have put it forth anonymously, it would have been as silently passed by as hundreds, if not thousands, of similar statements have been since the commencement of the Florida difficulties.

"I need not call the attention of the court to the fact that the public is principally informed of the movements of the army by paragraphs in newspapers, headed by the editors with this announcement: 'We have been politely favored with information from the army by a letter from an officer,' &c. There is scarcely a paper of the present day that does not contain some such announcement, and no one sees anything improper in this, considered in itself. Every newspaper copies these statements, even without a responsible name, and they are thankfully received all over the country, and often furnish materials for history.

"In a recent publication of official correspondence called for by Congress relating to a change of commanders in Florida, the Acting Secretary of War, in one of his letters, refers especially to an article in the *Florida Herald*, prepared, as he had understood, by an aide-de-camp of Governor Call, and expressly states that the facts disclosed in the article relative to the operations of Governor Call, formed the *principal* ground of action by the department. The article was not even signed; and if the present Acting Secretary of War—a man of great legal ability, of scrupulous integrity, and of irreproachable delicacy of character—so far from condemning the article, adopted it as among the sources of information upon which to base an important order; and if the court should think otherwise in reference to a publication of my own, in all respects similar, except that I made myself responsible for the facts I stated by my signature, I shall be compelled to *feel* the truth of a striking observation of Tacitus—that, in early ages, men suffered from the vices of the times; they afterwards suffered from the *snares* of the law—for in writing the article I did not imagine I was violating any law or rule, or that any law or rule was necessary in the case.

"I deem it not improper here to allude to the fact of there being a weekly paper published in the city of Washington, immediately under the observation of the government, and apparently encouraged and supported by officers of all grades in both the army and navy, and that the pages of this journal are principally employed in inviting, distributing, and preserving for future instruction all manner of communications touching matters of high interest to the service and to the country. Among these communications will be found discussions upon military principles, suggestions for improvements in all imaginable ways, and very numerous letters from officers in foreign countries and at distant posts, giving accounts of military and naval movements beyond the reach of the Post Office Department. In all this no one is for a moment at a loss in drawing a line between the *fact of communicating* and the *matter communicated*.

"It would appear, therefore, that there is no necessary evil in the fact of publishing information.

"It might be well to consider that, in time of war, the country must and will have accounts, more or less accurate, of military movements; that editors will get at these accounts by mingling even with the privates of an army returned from the field; that officers and privates cannot be expected to be silent, but will *talk* in the hearing of those who will write of where they have been and what they have done; that many will write to their friends and relatives, who have been, perhaps, weeks or months in suspense and anxiety on account of the war. The court cannot, I apprehend, entertain the question whether it be desirable to prevent the publication of facts so communicated in relation to a campaign. All who are not wilfully blind must see that this is utterly impracticable—absolutely impossible. There is no power on earth that can control this in a country like our own, where the liberty of speech is secured, the public mail is sacred, and the freedom of the press unshackled. In monarchies or despotic governments, some control may be exerted; but in this country, yet new in its discovery, and still more new in its institutions, it every day becomes necessary to modify and often to reverse the usages of foreign nations. It is our boast to improve upon the institutions of other countries, and, without intending any disrespect to the old regulations of the army, annulled by General Order, December 31, 1836, I cannot but think that a rule of Mr. Jefferson's, on a topic of far deeper interest, is strictly applicable in the matter I am considering—that error is not dangerous when truth is left free to combat it. Prohibit publications in the abstract, and the consequence will be that anonymous and false statements will flood the country, and oftentimes become so widely circulated and so universally received as to enter into the regularly-compiled histories of the times, when it will be next to impossible to separate the false from the true. These statements, however, may, in a great measure, be deprived of their mischief, when those over a respon-

sible name are subjected only to that supervision which has regard not to the fact of publication, but to the matter published.

"If my harmless, and I must say unambitious, letter, in which my name only appears in the signature to authenticate the statements I made, be supervised with reference to the views here expressed, I shall have no reason to apprehend that many years of hitherto irreproachable public life are now in danger from my having given my name voluntarily to facts I thought the public would receive with thanks. I will observe that not a single individual in the country has been misled by my letter. The court cannot but see that, although it was written in haste, and is utterly destitute of affectation of fine writing, still it bears the impress of 'studied accuracy' as to facts, which no subsequent events have in any manner invalidated. I stated facts merely, and expressly cautioned readers to *wait events*, as the last paragraph of the letter will show.

"I am reluctant to allude to the circumstance of my having made no mention of General Scott in the letter; but as remarks have been made, as if I had some sinister design in that omission, it is my duty to explain that the first paragraph promises only a statement in relation to the movement of General Gaines. Down to the date of the letter I had no personal knowledge of the operations of General Scott. I had only seen certain letters, and heard certain rumors and reports in relation to him, not likely to be commented upon with much satisfaction; and the court, on bearing in mind the testimony showing my knowledge of those letters and reports, cannot fail to see a virtue in my silence. It made no part of my object to call the attention of the public to a source of conflicting feelings about to become conspicuous between two distinguished commanders. I have never fostered, aided, or assisted in any manner in angry controversies in the army, either among officers of high rank or those of more humble claims to the notice of their government or country. It accords neither with my disposition or principles to lose sight of the paramount claims of the army to the individual exertions of its every member to sustain its reputation as a whole, which must be sacrificed by espousing personal altercations or quarrels.

"I may be excused doing justice to myself at this time by stating that, so far was I from entertaining a disposition to do injustice to General Scott, or to enliven the causes of irritation between himself and General Gaines, that I sought three of his staff officers, Lieutenants Chambers and Temple and Captain Van Buren, and conversed with them at Fort Drane, with the express view of healing the difficulties between the two generals, and sought the same object through Colonel Gadsden, desiring him to aid me in that object. I will also state that, on the Withlacoochee river, I urged upon General Clinch the propriety of withholding from General Gaines the letter from General Scott of the 1st of March, observing to General Clinch that its exhibition could have no other effect than to widen the breach between the generals; and acting consistently with my conduct at that time, I made no allusion to that letter in all my intercourse with General Gaines from that day until the order for the court of inquiry made silence on the subject both unnecessary and impossible. I doubt not it will be in the recollection of the court that General Gaines himself, on hearing the letter read in court, declared in the most emphatic manner his previous ignorance of its existence. In the same spirit on my part I did not even mention the existence of the letter to Captain McCall, although associated with him for weeks and months on the most intimate terms, and through scenes when, if ever, the heart is warmed to the disclosure of whatever a man of honor may communicate to his friend.

"For the truth of these facts and principles I appeal to my past life and to the testimony of all who know me; but will add that, apart from public considerations, I had private reasons, all-important with myself, that influenced me in abstaining, not only in my letter to Mr. Lyon, but on all occasions, from bringing the measures of General Scott into question in relation to Florida affairs.

"If these remarks seem too much extended, and out of proportion to the importance of the letter to which they refer, I beg the court will consider that the principles involved in the matter are the same, my letter to Mr. Lyon occupying but a couple of columns, as if it had filled a whole newspaper—that I am not advised of the precise scope of the inquiry touching the letter; but above all, I trust that mere kindness will make great allowance for an endeavor to avoid a censure from this honorable court, composed of three distinguished officers, an unfavorable opinion from either of whom would be regarded with the most extreme mortification.

"In reference to the letter of the 2d of June, published in 'The Globe' of the 4th of that month, I would observe that the facts stated in it are strictly in accordance with the testimony before the court in the case of both General Gaines and General Scott, and that the manner of my making the statement was necessary, and is not liable to exception. I desire the court to consider that the letter purporting to come from General Jesup, to which mine was a reply, was not called for by my letter to the honorable Mr. Lyon. I appeal to my letter, and to the natural and unprejudiced impressions upon reading it, to sustain me in declaring that nothing contained in the letter was the legitimate cause of the letter having the name of General Jesup to it, and, therefore, I must presume the court will not hold me accountable for that letter, and I trust will find no objection to the explanation it called for of the 2d of June. I have no complaint to make of General Jesup, supposing him to have written the letter to which mine is a reply, and I am ignorant of the existence of any evil as resulting from either of the letters."

The court here adjourned to meet to-morrow at 11 o'clock a. m.

FEBRUARY 14, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

The judge advocate presented to the court a letter from Captain McCall, of the 4th infantry, dated "Camp Sabine, May 18, 1836," addressed to the "Editor of the New Orleans Bulletin," and published in the Army and Navy Chronicle of the 11th of August, 1836; also a postscript to said letter, addressed to the Editor of the Army and Navy Chronicle, and published in that paper of the 29th of September, 1836.—(Docs. 4, 5.)

After the reading of these letters, Captain McCall asked leave, and addressed the court to the following effect:

"*Mr. President and gentlemen of the court:*

"As the attention of the court has been directed to the publication by officers of the army of certain letters relating to the campaigns forming the subject of its investigation, with a view to obtaining its opinion as to the tendency of those letters; and as a letter under my signature has been laid before the

court, I have to request that the following remarks, in connexion therewith, may be taken into consideration.

"At the time my letter was written the public prints were teeming with misrepresentations of the operations in Florida as injurious to the character of the army as gross and indecorous in themselves. Paper after paper was filled with either a strange perversion of facts or a tissue of harsh reflections upon the officers and troops who had been engaged in arduous service in Florida.

"In this state of things I was desirous, by a faithful representation of the principal events of the campaign in which I had served, to remove the stigma which I conceived had been wantonly cast upon the arms of the country

"I addressed a letter on the subject of the campaign to a gentleman who had always manifested a deep interest in the honor and welfare of the army. Before sending this letter I read it to General Gaines, and expressed a hope that my statement might tend to remove the injurious impressions likely to be made by the various reports then in circulation. With his permission I afterwards sent a copy of the letter to the editor of the 'New Orleans Bulletin,' likewise with a view (as appears from my note to the editor) to correct the errors which had already found their way to the press.

"My letter purports to be a sketch of the principal features of the campaign in Florida, under Major General Gaines, which terminated on the 9th of March, 1836. The letter was written on the 18th of May, 1836, and did not appear in the Bulletin until the 21st of June following. No army regulation, therefore, was violated by its publication.

"The 650th paragraph of the 'General Regulations for the Army' (1825) prohibits the publication of letters or reports relative to military marches and operations, without special permission, *within one month* after the termination of the campaign to which such letters or reports relate. My letter relates only to the campaign under Major General Gaines, and was not published until *more than three months* after the termination of that campaign.

"In writing the letter I studiously avoided expressions that might reflect upon any officer, in any way connected with the campaign to which my narrative was confined, or any other campaign.

"Had I published the letter anonymously, I should have avoided the responsibility of authorship, as has been the case with great numbers who have written to editors and others since the commencement of hostilities in the south; but conscious of the integrity of my motives, and confirmed in the correctness of my narrative; and, moreover, satisfied that I should violate no known regulation of the army, nor any principle of right or propriety, I did not hesitate to give my name to the contradiction of foul and calumnious statements, which were greedily swallowed by the public, and some of which have even been admitted into a work purporting to be a *history* of the war.

"In the United States, where the liberty of the press is enjoyed in the fullest sense of the word, the rapid dissemination of every description of accounts of military marches and operations, even while the army is in the field, may be expected. Where the militia constitutes the principal numerical force of an army, the novelty of the life and the interest of the scenes through which the young soldier passes, together with a desire to gratify the curiosity or relieve the anxiety of distant friends, offer temptations too great to admit a doubt that the accounts sent from the seat of war to every part of the Union will be as numerous and perhaps as various as the individuals composing the forces in the field. These accounts are circulated in a thousand ways, and tend to impress improperly the public mind. This fact has been fully illustrated during the last twelve months.

"The court needs no argument to satisfy it of the impossibility of *preventing* this evil. It was with a view of applying, as far as in my power lay, a remedy to this evil, that my plain narrative of the campaign was written, and *my name attached to it*; for the country was flooded with anonymous accounts of the operations in Florida, sometimes as intemperate and abusive in their expressions as imperfect and fallacious in their details. Amongst the most violent of these productions was the article that has been laid before the court by General Gaines. And when I state that this article was received at Camp Sabine a few days before my letter was written, I feel confident the court, so far from seeing an impropriety in the honest desire I manifested to place the events of the campaign in their true light, will rather be surprised at the calmness and moderation which marked the tone and language of my letter.

"As Major General Scott, in his defence before this court, has quoted a passage from my letter, and has deduced an argument therefrom which may tend as much to prejudice others as to benefit himself, I must, with all respect to General Scott, remark that the interpretation given this passage (which has been singled out of a long letter, and in itself comparatively of minor importance) is a more liberal interpretation than was contemplated by the writer.

"It was never my intention to convey an idea that 'the Louisiana volunteers were a body of vassals, who owed allegiance to a particular chief,' (see General Scott's defence,) nor can I think it would be inferred from my letter. Nor do I think it would be inferred from my letter that they evinced a determination to violate their engagement with the United States; or that they would have been guilty of mutiny had General Gaines relinquished the command.

"It is well known that these troops had been regularly mustered into service for three months; had received a bounty of thirty dollars, and were to receive the pay of ten dollars per month: they were, therefore, *bound* to obey all officers properly placed over them.

"I stated in my letter, and on the authority of General Gaines, myself, that '*he had pledged himself to accompany the Louisiana volunteers whithersoever they went, &c.*' In alluding to this fact as the *least important* of several reasons General Gaines expressed for continuing his movement from Pensacola, I said the volunteers were (owing to this pledge) unwilling to proceed *without him*. Had I said they were unwilling to *part with him*, I should have expressed my meaning more clearly; and that fact is fully established on your record. Even grammatically criticising the sentence, the freest construction to be put upon it is, that the volunteers would have *proceeded unwillingly* without General Gaines, who had pledged himself to accompany them. Although no one doubts that this fine regiment was bound to proceed, and would have proceeded without General Gaines had he so directed, yet they were unwilling to part with him; and this is the only proper construction that can be put upon the passage. For, if the other interpretation is given it, I must appear to cast upon the Louisiana volunteers a *reflection* altogether inconsistent with the terms of encomium used towards them in other parts of the narrative.

"The slight verbal difference I have noticed I cannot believe has misled the public, for my meaning is clearly conveyed in the spirit and context of the letter.

"As I am not advised of any particular point in my letter to which the attention of the court is directed; and as I am not aware of having violated any known law or order in the production of that

letter, I have confined myself, in the first place, to laying open to the court the *motives* which induced the writing and the publication of the letter, and which I cannot doubt will be found good and sufficient; and, in the second place, to explaining to the court a passage in my letter which has received an interpretation different from that which was contemplated in penning it. This explanation, I trust, is satisfactory, for a thought that a different opinion was entertained by any member of this high and honorable court would be to me a source of the most painful humiliation."

The court adjourned to meet to-morrow at 11 o'clock a. m.

FEBRUARY 15, 1837.

The court met pursuant to adjournment. All present.

The court proceeded to pronounce its opinion on the foregoing cases, as follows:

The court took into consideration a communication from Captain Hitchcock, of March 11, 1836, to the honorable Mr. Lyon, of Alabama, published in the "Globe" of April 2, 1836, detailing the operations of Major General Gaines in his campaign against the Seminole Indians in Florida in 1836, and find that its publication was made with the approbation of Major General Gaines, and does not violate any regulation or rule of service; that it appears to be a narrative of facts assumed by the writer, without any comments or reflections injurious to the public service; and the court cannot, therefore, see that there is any necessity for further investigation into the subject.

The judge advocate laid before the court a number of the "Globe" of April 8, 1836, containing a publication purporting to be from the pen of Major General Jesup, commenting on the letter of Captain Hitchcock of the 11th of March; also a letter of the 2d of June, addressed by Captain Hitchcock to the editors of the "Globe," and published in that paper of the 4th of June, in reply to the publication having the signature of Major General Jesup. In viewing the contents of the letter of Captain Hitchcock of the 2d of June, it purports to be a justification of the premises assumed in his letter to Mr. Lyon of the 11th of March, and contains nothing contrary to the regulations of the army.

The court was called to consider a publication made by Captain McCall, addressed to the editor of the New Orleans "Bulletin," under date of May 18, 1836, and published in the "Army and Navy Chronicle" of August 11, 1836; also a postscript or notes to said letter, published in the "Army and Navy Chronicle" of September 29, 1836. The purport of the letter and postscript is a detail or narrative of the campaign of Major General Gaines against the Seminole Indians in Florida in 1836. But as the publications were made more than a month after the campaign was closed the army regulations were not violated thereby.

ALEX. MACOMB, *Major General, President of the Court.*
S. COOPER, *Judge Advocate, Recorder of the Court.*

PUBLICATIONS OF OFFICERS OF THE ARMY.

No. 1.

[From the Globe of April 2, 1836]

FORT DRANE, *Florida, March 11, 1836.*

SIR: The following statement of facts in relation to the recent movement of troops from Louisiana, under the immediate command of Major General Gaines, you may rely upon, and, if you think proper, may use for the information of the public.

General Gaines left his permanent headquarters at Memphis, Tennessee, on a tour of inspection, and arrived at New Orleans about the 15th of January, where he heard, for the first time, of serious disturbances in Florida, and particularly of the melancholy massacre of Major Dade and his command, which occurred on the 28th of December. He immediately communicated with the governor of Louisiana, and requested him to call upon and hold in readiness a body of volunteers for service in subduing the Seminole Indians, and proceeded to Pensacola to solicit the co-operation of the naval force on that station. At Pensacola he found his wishes had been anticipated, Commodores Dallas and Bolton and Captain Webb having already directed their attention towards Tampa Bay, and other inlets of Florida, whither they had ordered marines and munitions of war.

The general, on his way to Pensacola, feeling called upon to take the most prompt and decisive measures to sustain the military post within his command, and secure the peace of the frontier, issued his orders to Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs to receive into service eight companies of the volunteers requested of the governor of Louisiana, and, together with the regular force at Baton Rouge, New Orleans, and other stations in the immediate vicinity of New Orleans, to hold himself in readiness for a movement to Tampa Bay. The whole force amounted to about eleven hundred men, including about seven hundred volunteers. This order was dated at Mobile the 18th of January.

The general visited Pensacola, as stated, and then proceeded to New Orleans, where he arrived about the 26th. He organized and equipped his force, and moved, on the 4th of February, in three steamboats. He reached Tampa Bay on the 9th, and on the 13th took the field in the enemy's country. It was first designed to search for and defeat a body of Indians reported to have been recently in the neighborhood of Fort Brooke, said to have been in battle only a day or two before the arrival of the general with the friendly Indians. Accordingly, the general marched in an easterly direction upon the Alafia river, but at the end of two days, having found two or three fields of turnips and other vegetables, as also fodder-stacks, not destroyed by the enemy, it was readily concluded he could not have been in that vicinity in any considerable force, and the general directed his march towards Fort King. He had taken ten days' rations only, but had reason to suppose that a large supply of stores was at Fort King, the quartermaster having shown him an official letter from the quartermaster general, advising him that one hundred and twenty thousand rations had been ordered to that post. The letter was dated the 21st of January.

The march was continued to Fort King, passing, on the 20th of February, the battle ground of the gallant band cut off under Major Dade on the 28th of December, where we interred the bodies of 106 heroes.

No language can do justice to the scene. The remains of our mutilated brothers in arms were found where they had fallen, at their posts; the very position of the advanced guard being clearly indicated. Our troops marched to solemn music around the little breastwork, which had been hastily thrown up, and where the last of the party were destroyed—each individual lying at the breastworks, where, beyond a doubt, he fell in the execution of his duty. We continued our march a short distance that day, and on the 22d, as if to celebrate the birth of him who was "first in war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen," we arrived at Fort King, and gave an agreeable surprise to one company of artillery, the garrison of that post, which, from its isolated and exposed situation, had been reported in the presses of the country as having been assaulted and destroyed by the Indians. The garrison had indeed been exposed, but was well prepared to give the enemy a warm reception. The guard, on the approach of General Gaines, was paraded, and the customary honor paid in due form. But where were the hearts of all at that moment? The writer of this confesses "he turned aside to wipe away a tear."

The general, contrary to his reasonable expectations, found no sufficient supply of stores of any kind. The next morning, the 23d, all the horses were sent to Fort Drane, (22 miles northwest,) with a suitable convoy, for a supply of provisions. The 24th brought us all that could be procured, and it was ascertained to be but seven days' rations, which, with two days' supply found at Fort King, made up all that could be looked for in that quarter. The general had then to decide upon his next movement. To remain at Fort King without supplies was out of the question; to proceed further north might embarrass the operations of another officer then ascertained to be employed at Picolata in preparing force and supplies to penetrate the enemy's country. After much and mature deliberation, the general decided to move south again, by the battle ground of General Clinch. If the enemy should not be found, the general would, at all events, reach supplies at Tampa Bay. His movements would occupy, and perhaps concentrate the enemy, and tend greatly to give security to the frontier, and enable families to return to their deserted plantations, and in safety recommence their peaceful avocations, which was considered of very great importance, the season having arrived for the commencement of planting operations. Lastly, but not the least of the considerations, we might find and beat the enemy.

The general moved from Fort King on the 26th of February, and on the 27th, at two o'clock, we were on the right bank of the Withlacoochee, at the place where General Clinch crossed the river the 31st of December preceding. The troops had advanced from Tampa Bay, and to this time the same order of march had been preserved, in three columns, a right, centre, and left, respectively, about 100 yards distance from each other, with a strong advance and rear guard; the baggage being in the rear of the centre column. In this order it followed that we struck the river at three points; the advance guard, as the centre, being at the usual crossing place. The baggage and the rear had been ordered to halt, as the general only designed examining the crossing place. Up to this time no attack or annoyance had been offered us since we left Tampa Bay, and but few of us expected it at the Withlacoochee; we were, therefore, many of us, fully exposed while sounding and examining the river, and our exposure was matter of jocular remark, when, for the first time, opposite our left flank, a spirited fire was heard, accompanied by the enlivening war-yell of the savage. The fight was continued about half an hour, the enemy being on the left bank of the river, when the general ordered the troops to encamp near the river. We lost one killed and eight wounded. On the 28th we moved down the river about two miles, where the banks were less covered with thicket, and the advance guard was here fired upon, and Lieutenant Izard, of the United States dragoons, mortally wounded. He fell, but partially recovering himself, commanded his men, with the utmost composure, to "keep their positions, and lie close;" a command scarcely less remarkable than that of the lamented Lawrence: "Don't give up the ship." Lieutenant Izard, after five days of suffering, died on the 5th of March, and was buried on the banks of the Withlacoochee—himself a loss too great for the savage foe ever to compensate.

The fight was continued on the 28th, with little or no intermission, from about 9 o'clock until 1 o'clock p. m., when we encamped again. During this period the Indians kept up a continuous yell, except during an interval, when they retreated for a short time. We lost this day, besides Lieutenant Izard, one killed, and Captain Sanders, commanding the friendly Indians, and Captain Armstrong, of the United States schooner *Motto*, both volunteers, wounded, the latter slightly. In the evening of this day an express was sent to Fort Drane to report to the officer commanding in that quarter that the enemy had been found in force, and to recommend an immediate movement, crossing the Withlacoochee some distance above, and thence to fall down upon the enemy's rear, which it was hoped would terminate the war.

On the 29th, in the morning, the enemy was silent; but the experience of the general looked upon it as ominous, and he ordered one-third of the command to remain at the breastworks, the remainder of the force being employed in preparing timber and canoes for crossing the river. At about 9 o'clock our working parties were fired upon, and simultaneously a vigorous fire poured into camp from three sides—that nearest the river being the only one not assailed. The firing continued a little over two hours, during which we lost one man killed, and three officers and thirty non-commission and privates wounded. The force of the enemy was estimated at twelve hundred or fifteen hundred. General Gaines was wounded by a small rifle ball, which passed through his lower lip, making a very slight wound, but knocking out one lower tooth and slightly fracturing two upper-teeth. This was a most startling incident to all as soon as known, but affected everybody more than the gallant hero himself, who, with the most heart-cheering good humor, observed that it was extremely unkind for the enemy to take a tooth from him which he valued so highly. Lieutenant Duncan, of the artillery, was slightly wounded, and Lieutenant E. Smith, of the Louisiana volunteers, was wounded no less than three times. The enemy at length retired in some haste; for, contrary to their custom, they left one of their dead, after dragging the body some distance. They took his rifle, but we found him well supplied with powder and about sixty bullets.

The enemy, contrary to expectation, having crossed the river, it was evidently unnecessary for the troops from Fort Drane to go higher up; and accordingly General Gaines sent another express that evening, suggesting the expediency of a movement directly to Camp Izard, (the name he had given his own camp,) requesting, as he had done by the previous express, a supply of six thousand rations of pork, flour, and sugar. On the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th days of March, the enemy fired at intervals, both day and night, upon our camp, which we secured by breastworks of pine logs, within which most of the command enjoyed themselves in conversation, and speculating upon probabilities as to whether supplies would reach us, while our sharpshooters were amusing themselves in picking off the Indians from behind the trees.

As our provisions diminished we began to inquire into the virtues of roots and the comparative excellence of horse meat. At a meeting of officers, all the corn was thrown into the public crib, and an

issue of a pint made to those men whose bread had been exhausted. At length bread, corn, and meat disappeared, and some of the men were two days without food. What were then the feelings in camp? Let it be recorded to the honor of every man, and let no one from false modesty hesitate to yield his feelings to the gratification of noble pride, when he recollects that not a murmur was heard, and not a whisper of retreat circulated from any quarter. Far from it. Some horses were killed, and a very delicate piece was brought to the general at his tent, who found it remarkably tender and well flavored. We felt very well able to maintain ourselves at least three weeks, if necessary; and by that time, at least, the force from above must certainly come down, and the Indians would assuredly be taken. These were our reflections on the night of the 5th, when, at about 10 o'clock, we heard some one calling from the woods, and wishing to speak with us. The officer of the guard answered the man, and demanded his designs. He distinctly stated that the Indians were tired of fighting, and wanted to make peace. The general ordered the officer of the guard to answer that, if he wanted to say anything, to come in the morning with a white flag, and he should not be fired upon. He replied, "very well," repeating his desire to come in and have a friendly talk, and to shake hands. This was soon circulated throughout the camp; but, from the well-known treachery of the Indians, we were ordered to be particularly on our guard, and continued so all night.

During the day of the 5th we lost one man killed, and had two wounded—the only casualties which had occurred since the 29th. On the morning of the 6th, at about 10 o'clock, about 300 of the Indians fled out from the river and took up a position in our rear, about five hundred yards distant. They were armed, and we were fully in the belief that this was a mere feint—supposing the residue of their force in a neighboring hammock—and were confident of a desperate assault from some other quarter. We were at a stand, waiting their movements, some minutes. At length one or two advanced a short distance, and, after considerable hesitation on their part—the result of their fears lest we should entrap them—they approached near enough to be heard, and, after being joined by three or four others, came within about two hundred yards, and repeated what had been declared the night before. The general then directed a staff officer to go out to them and hear what they had to say. It was soon reported to the general that the Indians did not wish to fight any more, but they wanted him to retire from the Withlacoochee. The staff officer was then ordered to return to them, and, in the plainest language, to tell them the exact truth as to the force ordered into the country to subdue them; that additional force was expected every day; that the time was near when every Indian found with a rifle in his hand would be shot down. This was communicated, with such explanations as were deemed necessary to give it force, and they then said they would go and hold a council, and would assemble again in the afternoon to give an answer. In the afternoon they came as before, including, as in the morning, the celebrated Powell and scarce less celebrated Jumper, with several others, and with the interpreter Abram. The general's staff officer had with him two or three others from our camp to the talk. The Indians repeated much of what they had said in the morning—that they had lost many men by death and wounds, and were tired of the war, and wanted peace; but as their governor, as they called him, Micanopy, was not with them, they wanted time to consult him. They therefore asked a cessation of the war. The staff officer, having been previously instructed by the general, told them that if they would engage to cease from all acts of hostility, retire south of the Withlacoochee, and promise to attend a council when called upon by the United States commissioners, they should not for the present be molested. They answered that, for themselves, they would, and did promise all that was required. At that moment a noise was heard from that portion of the Indians at a distance, and they were seen running towards the river. It was easy to conjecture the cause. Immediately afterwards General Clinch, with 500 men and supplies, came gallantly on; and his advance guard of mounted men seeing Indians, and not knowing the purpose of their being where they were, formed a line promptly to the left, and fired. But the fleetness of the Indians saved them; they were beyond the reach of gunshot, and were soon out of sight and over the river.

Then followed one of the most delightful greetings imaginable. General Clinch's force moved onward, and was soon within hail of friends; and were we not all friends indeed? The new comers were soon divested of their surplus bread, &c., until their haversacks were emptied and our command feasted. General Clinch brought two days' supply of pork and bread, with sugar, besides about forty head of cattle, many of which did not live out that night.

On the 8th a negro man was sent over the river, who had a wife among the hostiles, with orders to account for his appearance among them in any way he might choose; to see and talk with them; to ascertain their location and wishes. The 9th he did not return, and much doubt prevailed as to the position and disposition of the enemy. On this day, the 9th, General Gaines thought proper to deliver the command over to General Clinch. We all regretted, and yet were pleased with the change; regretted to lose the presence of a tried, experienced, and gallant general, whose deportment commanded respect, whose judgment insured confidence, and whose mild and amiable manners won the affectionate regard of every one; but if a change was deemed a public duty, to whom could the command be assigned with so much satisfaction to his troops as to General Clinch, who came nobly to their aid, with all the despatch and all the assistance in his power, and whose manners were an index of his generous and heart-ennobling qualities.

General Clinch, for reasons assigned in orders, directed a movement to this place, to commence on the 10th instant, at 10 o'clock. In the midst of a heavy rain the march commenced, and the troops moved about seven miles and encamped. In the evening the negro man who had been sent among the foe came in, and, to our great satisfaction, confirmed in the most precise manner the truth and sincerity of all the Indians had professed. He went among them, and found they had moved some fifteen or twenty miles up the river, and had dispersed over a space of some two miles or more, in several encampments. They gave the negro every assurance of a pacific disposition on their part, stating that they had ordered their young men to abstain from war, and that they had seen our men fishing in the river, and had abstained from firing upon them. They stated that thirty had been killed in the several battles on the Withlacoochee within the 27th of February and the 5th of March. It must be observed that no terms have been offered the Indians; and, although there can be no doubt of their having been broken in spirit, it is yet to be seen whether they will suffer the dictation of terms which it is understood are to be imposed on them. It is certainly known through the negro man that they do not wish to go west, and they may refuse to comply with a requirement to do so.

General Gaines arrived at this place to-day in good health.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

E. A. HITCHCOCK, *Captain United States Army.*

HON. FRANCIS S. LYON, *M. C., Washington City.*

No. 2.

[From the Globe of April 8, 1836.]

GENTLEMEN: I have read the letter of Captain Hitchcock, late acting inspector general in Florida, published in your paper of Saturday, and regret to observe that, in the warmth of his zeal for his chief, he attempts to throw the responsibility of the movement on Fort King, with inadequate supplies, upon the officers of the quartermaster's department. Now, most men have as much as they can do to bear the burden of their own errors; I find it so at least, and I confess my shoulders are not quite broad enough to bear the additional weight which the gallant inspector seems kindly disposed to transfer to them. But let him speak for himself. He says, "*the general directed his march towards Fort King; he had ten days' rations only, but had reason to suppose that a large supply of stores was at Fort King, the quartermaster having shown him an official letter from the quartermaster general, advising him that one hundred and twenty thousand rations had been ordered to that post;*" and in a subsequent paragraph he says: "*the general, contrary to his reasonable expectations, found no sufficient supply of stores of any kind*" It is a maxim in war, as old as the science itself, that a general should never separate himself from his supplies without taking care to secure his communications; but it is the high attribute of genius to be able to dispense with those rules which are necessary for the government of ordinary mortals; the commander, however, who disregards them, assumes a responsibility which nothing short of complete success can justify. Reasonable grounds for supposing that supplies would be found at Fort King may palliate but cannot justify a movement contrary to rule, which resulted in failure as this did.

But let us examine the grounds for the supposition of the general. Captain Shannon, the senior quartermaster in Florida, had been advised in a letter of the 19th January, from the Quartermaster General's office, that a large supply of provisions had been ordered from *New York to Fort King*. The following is an extract from that letter of all that relates to the subject: "*Large supplies of provisions have been ordered from New York to Fort King.*" By comparing this extract with Captain Hitchcock's letter it will be seen that he has omitted the material fact, that the supplies were ordered from *New York*. Now, he must pardon me, if, not satisfied with the precise quantum of truth which he has chosen to tell, I claim for the department the benefit of the *whole truth*.

General Gaines, we are told, moved from Tampa Bay on the 13th of February, just twenty-four days subsequent to the date of the letter to Captain Shannon—a time not sufficient to have placed the supplies in depot at Fort King, even in the most favorable season of the year, and with the land communication entirely free from the interruptions of the enemy. Besides, General Gaines must have known that all the settlements in Florida, from near St. Augustine to Fort King, had been broken up, or were kept in constant alarm by the enemy, and that the whole line of the Ocklawaha, as well as the roads from Pilatka and Picolata, were liable to be seized and held by him. It must also have been known that General Scott was in the field, and the least reflection must have led any one to perceive that he would hardly allow his supplies to go without protection, in advance of his force. The date of the letter, the place whence the supplies were necessarily drawn, the state of the roads in Florida, the condition of that country, and the position of General Scott, should all have been considered. Viewing these circumstances together, what grounds were there to justify the supposition that supplies would be found at Fort King? What *reasonable* expectation of the general could have been disappointed, unless, indeed, he supposed General Clinch had obtained supplies before General Scott arrived in the country? But if he, at the head of a thousand men, was obliged to intrench himself on the Withlacoochee, and was neither able to open the communication with his own depot at Tampa Bay nor to keep open that with Fort King, how could he expect General Clinch, with less than half that force, even if the supplies had arrived at Picolata, to keep open the communication, and furnish protection for them on the route, when every brigade of wagon or pack-horses required a military escort?

The fact is, there was no just grounds for the supposition, if it was ever entertained, that supplies would be found at Fort King more than sufficient for its garrison. Tampa Bay was the proper depot for General Gaines's division. When he left that post for Fort King the supplies were abundant; if he chose to leave them there, and allow the enemy to cut him off from them, he no doubt had reason sufficient, in his own opinion, to justify the measure; but the responsibility, as well as the honor, is all his own. I must be excused from sharing either.

THOMAS S. JESUP.

MESSRS. BLAIR & RIVES.

No. 3.

[From the Globe of June 4, 1836.]

WASHINGTON CITY, D. C., June 2, 1836.

GENTLEMEN: I avail myself of the first opportunity to notice the errors contained in a letter from General Jesup of the 8th April, referring to my letter to the honorable Mr. Lyon, previously published in the Globe.

General Jesup says that General Gaines had no reasonable expectation of finding supplies at Fort King, after seeing a letter from the Quartermaster General's office to the assistant quartermaster in Florida, dated the 19th of January, informing him that large supplies had been ordered from New York to Fort King; and the general charges me with omitting, in my letter to Mr. Lyon, the "material fact," as he calls it, that the supplies were ordered from *New York*, and claims "the benefit of the whole truth."

Notwithstanding the self-complacent formality of the general's principle, as "old as the science itself," I shall set him right very abruptly. He urges three points: 1st, the want of time to send supplies from New York to Fort King; 2d, that the roads in Florida were liable to be seized and held by the enemy, and that every wagon train, therefore, required an escort, 3d, that "the least reflection" would have told any one that General Scott would hardly allow his supplies to go in advance of his force without protection.

1. As to time. The general having claimed the benefit of the whole truth should not have withheld it himself, particularly in the delicate situation of being interested; and, therefore, to the "twenty-four days" from the date of the letter of advice from his office to Captain Shannon, the 19th of January, to the departure of General Gaines from Tampa Bay, the 13th of February (all the time General Jesup "chooses" to consider,) he should have added the *ten days* for which General Gaines took rations on his march to Fort King, more especially as he quoted the fact itself from my letter, and thus passed it manually before his eyes; and he should also have considered that every post, as a matter of course, has some days' supply always on hand; in the present case, *nine* which General Gaines took from, and several that he left at Forts King and Drane. So that, in fact, instead of "just twenty-four days," the quartermaster general had forty-three, and perhaps fifty days allowed him; and yet *the supplies were not placed in depot*. No one can deny but that here was time enough to forward the supplies, even from New York, and therefore my omitting to state the place whence they were drawn was not "material."

2. As to roads and escorts, the only road required was that from Picolata to Fort Drane. This road was entirely under the control of the army, and almost daily passed by expresses; and General Scott's main force was at Picolata ready to furnish all necessary escorts.

3. As to sending the supplies in advance. General Scott's plan made it a most important object to send supplies in *advance* to Fort Drane. For this he labored weeks in succession, embarrassed constantly for the want of transportation due from the quartermaster's department; and in order to insure this very desirable object he even detained his force at Picolata to avoid consuming the supplies at the depot *in advance*.

Thus, it appears, there was *time*; the road was *protected*, and the supplies were required in *advance*. Why, then, were they not forwarded?

It is not true, as General Jesup partly states and partly implies, that General Gaines was *driven* to his breastworks, there besieged, and unable to move. General Gaines had the example, if example were necessary, of the present Chief Magistrate and other distinguished commanders, and habitually intrenched his camp at night in Florida. He was in one of these breastworks when the Indians presented themselves on the 29th of February. He had the *day before* declared, in a letter to Fort Drane, that he would not leave his position until he should hear from Fort Drane, hoping for the means of striking a blow that would terminate the war in "ten days," without the hazard of dispersing the Indians, or driving them to the Everglades. He was not besieged, for after about 12 m. of the 29th of February, not an Indian was seen or heard of about camp until the afternoon of the 2d of March, when a small party threw in a volley and ran away; and on the subsequent days, for hours in succession, the country was equally open, and could have been cleared at any time.

General Clinch went down with five hundred men; General Gaines had a thousand to move with, had he been disposed to move at all; but dispersing, or merely driving the Indians further off, would have been "worse than suffering a defeat," and to retire never once occupied his thoughts.

I will conclude by expressing a hope that when General Jesup wishes again to vent his spleen against General Gaines he will not attempt it over my "shoulders."

E. A. HITCHCOCK.

MESSRS. BLAIR & RIVES.

No. 4.

[From the Army and Navy Chronicle of August 11, 1836.]

CAMP SABINE, near the Sabine river, May 18, 1836.

DEAR SIR: I take the liberty to enclose herewith a copy of a letter to a friend, on the subject of the late movements in Florida under General Gaines.

I had written nothing relative to that campaign with a view for publication, nor should I now send the enclosed had I not lately seen in some of the papers strange misrepresentations of facts which should not be permitted to pass unnoticed.

I have had time only roughly to sketch the principal features of the campaign; but the letter is at the service of the public, and I shall be obliged by your giving it an insertion in your paper.

I am, with great respect, &c.,

GEORGE A. McCALL.

EDITOR of the N. O. Bulletin.

MY DEAR SIR: A rapid change of position and almost constant occupation during the last four months have prevented until now my making *the Florida war* the subject of a letter. The first intelligence of "actual hostilities" in that section of his military department was received by General Gaines at New Orleans, whilst on a tour of inspection to the Gulf posts. The news of the massacre of Dade's detachment had burst like a thunder-clap upon the inhabitants of the great southern emporium. On receiving the official report of this sad disaster, General Gaines immediately addressed to the adjutant general at Washington a letter, in which he urged that no time should be lost in applying to the savages on that frontier the last and obvious means of correction, at the same time declaring, from his knowledge of the Seminole Indians and the country they inhabited, his conviction that the only sure means of speedily and effectually terminating the difficulties in that quarter would be to bring into the field an army of at least 4,000 men, aided and supported by a strong naval force. Under this impression he recommended that the 6th and part of the 1st and 7th regiments of infantry be ordered to Florida, to reinforce the United States troops on the Gulf, and such volunteers from the adjoining States as the emergency might call forth. On the same day he made a requisition on the governor of Louisiana for a regiment of riflemen or infantry; and soon after requested of Commodore Bolton, at Pensacola, the co-operation of such naval force as he might feel authorized to order on that service. Some days subsequent to this, the receipt of

intelligence that Fort Brooke (Tampa Bay) was invested by the Indians and negroes, and the garrison in danger of being cut off, determined General Gaines to proceed at once to their relief with what force he might be able to collect at New Orleans. He accordingly wrote by express to General Clinch, who commanded in Florida, and was at that time at Fort King, one hundred miles north of Fort Brooke, that he (General Gaines) would be at the latter post on the 8th of February, with seven hundred men. General Clinch, it was understood, would have, by that time, a respectable force (volunteers) from Georgia and the upper counties of Florida. He was accordingly ordered, if strong enough to take the field, to march to the southward in time to effect a junction with General Gaines at or near Fort Brooke. Under these circumstances, General Gaines embarked at New Orleans on the night of the 3d of February, with a brigade of about eleven hundred men, (to which number his force had fortunately increased,) consisting of six companies of the 4th infantry, under Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs, and a regiment of Louisiana volunteers, under the command of General P. F. Smith, adjutant general of the State. The transports, being steamboats, were obliged to touch at Pensacola for wood; and here it was that General Gaines met the adjutant general's letter of the 22d of January, which purported to cover the "Order No. 7," directing *General Scott to repair to Florida "and take command of the troops operating against the Indians in that quarter."* This Order No. 7 was not enclosed, nor did General Gaines see it until his arrival at Fort King, sixteen days afterwards. This fact may be a matter of no great import; but as the continuance of the movement from Pensacola to Tampa, after his being notified that such an order had been issued, is one of the two prominent features of the campaign that has been very unhesitatingly criticised and condemned in some of the popular prints, it may be well to examine what might have been the consequences had he abandoned the expedition at that advanced stage of its progress.

In command of a military department, he had received at a point far distant from the seat of federal government, whence alone special or new instructions could be sent him, the intelligence of a great and unlooked-for disaster having occurred on the extreme southern frontier of the country occupied by the left wing of his division; he learned the melancholy news that a large white settlement had been *overrun, sacked, and burnt*, and many of the inhabitants killed; the United States agent of Indian affairs murdered; eight valuable officers and ninety-eight brave soldiers of his division cut to pieces by an overwhelming savage foe and he was aware that the military posts on the borders of the Indian country, viz: Forts Brooke, King, and Drane, with the station at Key West, all within his military department, were without any other work of defence than such as a daring leader with 500 men might, at the risk of a little loss, take and destroy in a few hours, the garrisons of three of those posts being insufficient for their defence. What, then, was the duty of the commander of the department? Had he hesitated one single moment he would indeed have merited the stern opprobrium of his fellow-citizens. He did not hesitate. He collected what force he could and marched immediately for the theatre of war. On the route, and within two days' march (by steam) of the Indian borders, he received a notification that General Scott had been ordered to repair from the city of Washington to Florida, "and take command of the troops operating against the Indians in that quarter." At the same time he was informed that "the state of affairs west of the Mississippi might soon require his attention, if not his presence, in that quarter;" and he was directed to await further orders in the city of New Orleans. Had hostilities actually existed on the Louisiana frontier, and General Gaines received an order to repair thither immediately, it is difficult to say whether the historian would have approved or condemned his conduct at that stage of the game had he obeyed the order, and, by so doing, left General Clinch in expectation of a promised co-operation, to extricate himself as he could from any difficulty into which the failure on the part of General Gaines in preconcerted movements might peradventure throw him. *And without General Gaines, the volunteers, his principal force, were unwilling to proceed*; for, before they left New Orleans, he had pledged himself to accompany them whithersoever they went, and to stand by them as long as they would stand by him, in repressing the rising spirit of savage devastation. Moreover, he was firmly persuaded that the instructions from the War Department requiring him to wait further orders in the city of New Orleans, were forwarded before that department could possibly have received a detail of the circumstances which rendered the *immediate* movement to Florida not only proper but imperative.

A little reflection determined him to continue the movement until the President should be apprised of all the particular circumstances attending it, or until the officer authorized to operate in his department should make his appearance in person in that part of the country which constituted the principal theatre of the war, or the Indians be subdued and the security of the frontier re-established. This view of the subject is based upon a sound principle of military law, and is supported by the ablest writers of all enlightened nations whose arms have been crowned with success. Had General Gaines failed to comply with this wise precept—had he disregarded this sacred injunction, he well knew that he might suffer the enemy to defeat a body of troops expecting his co-operation, and consequently leave the citizens dwelling within the limits of his command quivering beneath the upraised tomahawk and the blood-stained scalping-knife.

Was it his duty, under such circumstances, to abandon an expedition, on the prosecution of which the safety of the border people possibly hung; or was it his duty to strike promptly at the enemy, if possible subdue him, or at all events endeavor to check his devastations until the President should have notice of his strength and the determined spirit with which he seemed prepared to carry on the war?

General Gaines proceeded to Tampa Bay. On his arrival at Fort Brooke he learned that the day previous a party of about 100 of the friendly Indians had been attacked near the fort, and driven in by a superior force. The country occupied by the hostile tribes lying between Forts Brooke and King, no communication had been kept up between those posts since the massacre of Major Dade's command, and consequently, General Gaines, on arriving at the first-named station, was unable to gather any information from which he could form even a tolerable conjecture of General Clinch's strength or movements. But relying on the co-operation of that officer, he determined, as soon as his horses could be landed, to place a sufficient garrison in the pickets, and with the remainder of his force march out to meet him.

Owing to the expense and difficulties attending the transportation of horses from New Orleans by sea, the baggage train brought with the brigade was necessarily small, and the expectation that the requisite number to complete the train might be procured at Tampa was not realized; the horses and cattle in that vicinity having been stolen or lost during the alarm, which broke up the settlement and drove the families for protection to the fort. Some half dozen Indian ponies were, I believe, all that the quartermaster could procure to add to the number brought from New Orleans. The question, then, among both officers and soldiers was, not "what they might get along with," but "what they could do without on their march?" Ten days' rations were issued to the troops, (five of which were to be carried

in the haversacks,) and on the morning of the 13th the brigade took the field. The order of march was three columns, with an advance and a strong rearguard. The right was four companies of the second artillery, acting as infantry, commanded by Major Belton; the centre seven companies of the fourth infantry, under Lieutenant Colonel Foster; the left and rear being composed of the Louisiana volunteers, under Colonel Smith and Lieutenant Colonel Lawson, Lieutenant Colonel Twiggs acting as brigadier.

The friendly Indians, who to the number of seventy-seven accompanied the brigade, having reported their belief that the war party which attacked them a few days before was not only formidable but was probably still encamped on the Alafia river at a point some fifteen miles from Fort Brooke and seven from the main road to Fort King, General Gaines made a detour to the right for the purpose of breaking it up and driving before him this band of marauders. On the second day's march, however, it was ascertained that the enemy had not been at Alafia in any strength; and the troops, having received two additional rations which had been directed to meet them by water at Warren's, proceeded on their route. On approaching the Withlacoochee, on Dade's line of march and some thirty miles above Clinch's battle ground, the friendly Indians expressed their firm belief that a vigorous attack would be made the following day, and urged strenuously that they might be permitted to return home, *i. e.*, to Fort Brooke. This faltering on the approach of battle created some surprise, not unmingled with distrust of their fidelity. A half-hour's talk, however, reassured them, and they moved on without evincing any further timidity.

The expected attack, however, was not made; and the brigade arrived without annoyance at Dade's battle ground, where funeral honors were paid to the gallant band who had left on the trees around abundant proof of a field nobly contested against an overwhelming foe. The sad scene can never be erased from the memory of those who witnessed it, but its images, still vivid in the mind, recall feelings too painful to permit me to dwell longer upon a scene which has already been described by many.

Up to this time, the eighth day since he marched from Fort Brooke, General Gaines had been in hourly expectation of meeting Clinch; and the fall of a towering pine, which in those extensive wilds produces a sound it is difficult to distinguish from the report of distant artillery, and was on two occasions the cause of long and animated discussion among all ranks, whilst at the end of every mile some further indication of Clinch's approach was looked for. Knowing the promptness of that officer, General Gaines could not now but apprehend that some serious obstacle had arisen to prevent the desired junction. Being only about forty miles from Fort King, the general felt bound to proceed thither to ascertain the situation of Clinch's command and if possible gain some information with regard to the movements of the enemy. His only doubt with regard to the expediency of proceeding thither was on the score of provisions. This he mentioned to me on Dade's battle ground while a party detailed for the purpose was collecting the bodies of the slain for burial. He concluded by saying that the men had with them enough to carry them back to Tampa if he returned immediately, and that there were abundant supplies; but that if he proceeded to Fort King he might not find a sufficient provision to make that position the basis of his operations without embarrassing General Clinch, with whom he desired to co-operate, or General Scott, should he have arrived. I then remarked that an officer had just mentioned to me that the quartermaster had received, before he left Fort Brooke, a letter from the quartermaster general, notifying him that 120,000 rations had been ordered to Fort King in January preceding. This letter was immediately called for. It was from the Quartermaster General's office, and dated the 19th (nineteenth) of January. The passage that had been referred to was as follows:

"Large supplies of provisions have been ordered from New York for Fort King, and 30,000 rations to St. Augustine, from the same place."

This was the first time General Gaines saw the letter in question, or knew that a large additional supply had been ordered from New York to Fort King. He had brought a large supply of subsistence and forage to Tampa Bay, and had written to General Clinch to that effect from New Orleans, intending to make Tampa the basis of his operations. But now, unable to gain the least information of General Clinch's strength or movements, or those of the enemy, in any other way than by proceeding to Fort King, the acquisition of the information above detailed removed the only doubt he had entertained with regard to the expediency of the measure. He decided to push on without delay, and the order to march was given the moment the simple but solemn funeral rites of the band of heroes was concluded. I have been thus precise in this part of my narrative, because a want of knowledge of the circumstances attending this measure has caused the whole movement to be so misconstrued as to lay General Gaines liable to the charge of dashing heedlessly into the wilderness without any plan of operations; suffering himself to be separated by a wide district of the enemy's country from the depot of his supplies, and thus exposing his men to hardships and privations as unnecessary as profitless.

But this is the second principal feature of the campaign that has been most unhesitatingly criticised, of which more anon. To return to the thread of my narrative:

The troops reached Fort King on the 22d of February without meeting with any accident worthy of remark. A single company of the 3d artillery constituted the garrison of this station. General Clinch with his principal force was at Fort Drane, twenty-two miles to the northwest. With great regret General Gaines now learned that Clinch had not received the expected reinforcements from the northern borders of the Territory, but two volunteer companies having joined him from that quarter. His force was four companies of artillery and one of infantry, and the two companies of volunteers I have mentioned. General Gaines was not less disappointed when he was told that the supply of provisions at these two posts (King and Drane) was little more than sufficient for their support. Whether this disappointment was consequent to a reasonable expectation or not, I shall not pretend to determine. The simple facts from which must be determined the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the conclusion drawn from the information received by General Gaines, on the battle ground, are these: the troops had marched from Fort Brooke on the 13th with ten days' rations. At the Alafia they received two days' rations, brought thither by water, making in all twelve. That is, they were provisioned to include the 24th of February. On the 20th of February General Gaines saw the letter of the 19th January already alluded to. From the date of the letter to the day he saw it, inclusive, is 32 days, and to the 24th February, the day to which his troops had been provisioned, is 36 days. The supplies had been ordered on the 19th; how long before that he knew not. The facilities of water transportation from New York to the mouth of the St. John's river, and up that river by steam to Picolata, whence it is about 70 miles to Fort Drane and 92 to Fort King, led to the conclusion that in 36 days the supply would have reached its destination. The roads the troops had travelled were in fine order, the season having been remarkably dry. We were told no rain had fallen from some time in September till the day before we reached Dade's battle ground, when there was a slight rain.

At Fort King it was learned that preparations were making for the campaign at Picolata, under direction of General Scott. It was thought, however, that he would not be enabled to take the field with any considerable force for some time.

Finding he could expect no immediate co-operation from a quarter where he had expected to meet a considerable force—Clinch's command being barely sufficient to supply the necessary escorts to the provision wagons between Picolata and Fort Drane—and unwilling to draw upon the nucleus of supplies here collecting, General Gaines decided on returning immediately to Tampa Bay, and making that the basis of his operations. He informed General Clinch of this, and requested barely a sufficient supply to last him on the march. He had marched from Fort Brooke to Fort King by the main route—the common wagon road. This road is longer by a day's march than the route by Chocochater. He therefore determined to return by the latter. It was, indeed, the opinion at Fort King that the Indians had established themselves near the point at which this trace crosses the Withlacoochee, viz: Clinch's battle ground. If so, so much the better—he might beat them by the way. At any rate the movement of one thousand men through the country occupied by the Indians would have the effect of keeping them concentrated, and therefore relieve the frontier from petty depredations. Of the seventy-seven friendly Indians who accompanied the brigade from Fort Brooke ten returned with it, the balance remaining with General Clinch. These men, who acted as guides, promised to find a ford somewhere near the point at which General Clinch had crossed.

On the 27th General Gaines reached the Withlacoochee at this point, and a half hour or more had been passed in searching for the ford, when the enemy opened a fire from the opposite bank. The stream is about forty yards wide, but deep and rapid. A few companies were immediately brought into action, and very soon the fire became general from the left to the centre. This skirmish (the first bush-fighting the men had seen) lasted half an hour. The loss of the troops was one killed and seven wounded. The troops encamped near the river, and the guides declared the ford must be about three miles below, where a trail leading to the right struck the river. The next morning by sunrise the three columns marched for the point indicated, on reaching which a spirited fire was immediately opened from the opposite bank; it was quickly returned, and continued, with occasional intermissions, till 1 o'clock. In the early part of this action Lieutenant Izard, a gallant soldier, was mortally wounded. The loss this day was one killed and three wounded. The stream at this point also proved too deep to be forded, and the guides, who had been accustomed to hunt in the lower country and had not been in this section for many years, were totally at fault. The banks of the stream, however, at this point were less thickly clad with the customary undergrowth, and the general determined to cross. A detail was accordingly made to prepare canoes and the flooring of a pontoon bridge, and the cheerful sound of the axe was soon mingled with the crack of the rifle and the animating war-cry. At 4 o'clock p. m. a distant but very loud whooping was heard, which indicated the approach of a large reinforcement to the enemy from the opposite side. The friendly Indians immediately declared it to be Micanopy, whose force they estimated at eight hundred warriors.

General Gaines, then satisfied that the whole force of the enemy was in the field, considered the opportunity of bringing the war to a close too favorable to be lost. Under this impression he sent an express to General Clinch, recommending an immediate movement of the force under his command, with an additional supply of ammunition and provisions. Clinch was desired to cross the river some ten miles above, and move down on the left bank. General Gaines added that he would in the meantime endeavor to amuse the enemy, prepare his boats, &c., for crossing, but would not cross until he heard from Fort Drane, where General Clinch expected by this time some accession to his force.

By this movement it was believed the two brigades would be enabled to attack the enemy in front and rear at the same time, and probably terminate the war in a few days. The customary log breastwork was thrown up about three feet high, and the troops slept undisturbed that night. The following morning an attack was thought not improbable from some quarter, and one-third of the men were kept on duty at the breastwork. At 10 o'clock a. m. the working parties were fired upon, and immediately afterwards a dashing attack was made on three sides of the camp. The Indians advanced boldly and fired with great rapidity, but not with precision. At one time they set fire to the high grass and palmetto on the windward side of the camp, and made a bold dash under cover of the smoke, which, mingled with flame, came rolling towards the breastwork like a heavy sea. The fire was coolly extinguished, and the audacity of the assailants punished by Louisiana riflemen. The fight lasted till a few minutes past 12 o'clock m., when the enemy withdrew. Their numbers were estimated by those considered the best judges at fifteen hundred. The troops having the advantage of the slight breastwork before mentioned, lost this day only one sergeant killed and thirty-four officers and men wounded. Among the latter was General Gaines himself. The loss of the enemy was considerable, the troops firing with a coolness and precision that would do honor to veterans. Nor should the 29th of February be passed without bestowing a word of praise on the marked gallantry of these red assailants, who fought (many an old Indian fighter present said) "as Indians never fought before."

As the Indians had crossed the river, a runner was sent that night to General Clinch, informing him of the occurrences of the morning. In concluding this letter General Gaines said: "I have abstained, and shall abstain from a sortie, till I hear from you, in expectation that this course will tend to keep them together, whilst a sortie might contribute to disperse them. I am now satisfied that a direct movement to this place is more desirable than to cross the river higher up, as I suggested in my letter of yesterday. I am moreover of opinion that, if mounted men can be obtained in a few days, your force should not move from Fort Drane without that description of troops." The Indians move with too much celerity to be pursued in that country, with any chance of success, by any other than mounted men. The following day (March 1) there was light skirmishing, and occasional shots were fired at those who passed out of camp.

On the morning of the second of March an attack was made nearly as vigorous as that of the 29th, and was kept up for one hour; but the troops, having raised the breastwork, sustained little loss. It was possible that General Clinch might arrive this afternoon, and many of the men, who were getting hungry, began to look eagerly for his appearance; though, when they were told that if he should be detained by the non-arrival of the mounted men it might yet be some days before they received a supply of provisions, in which case they must be content to dine on horse meat until they could do better, I do not think there was a man but declared his willingness to do so as long as there was a prospect of bringing the war to a successful termination by so doing. All the corn in camp was turned in as common stock, and afforded about a pint per man; and afterwards some horses were killed and the meat regularly issued. The 3d, 4th, and 5th of March did not produce any incidents greatly differing from those of the preceding days,

The Indians were frequently firing into the camp by night as well as by day, generally selecting the hour of guard-mounting or parade, when the men were most exposed. Our sharpshooters, however, kept them at long shots, and their bullets whistled through the camp without doing much execution. On these occasions, as usual, the woods rung with the animating war-cry. During this time the troops lost but one man killed and two wounded.

At 10 o'clock p. m. on the 5th, some one was heard hailing the camp. It was at first supposed to be a return express from Fort Drane, who was thus giving notice of his approach lest he should be fired on by the sentinels. He was told to advance. In a few moments a negro called out at the top of his voice, "the Indians are tired of fighting and wish to come in to-morrow to shake hands." He was told that if they had anything to say they might come in the morning with a white flag, and they would be heard; whereupon he retired, bidding us a hearty "good night." At 10 o'clock a. m. on the 6th, 300 warriors, or thereabouts, drew up in line facing the rear of the camp at the distance of 450 or 500 yards. After some delay and apparent hesitation on their part, two or three advanced about half way with a white flag. Here they were met by Adjutant Barrow, to whom they communicated their desire to have a talk with General Gaines. Captain Hitchcock, acting inspector general, was then sent to hear what they had to say. He returned and reported that the Indians did not wish to fight any more, but that they were desirous that the troops should withdraw from the Withlacoochee. They said they had lost a great many warriors, and were unwilling to lose any more except in the course of nature, or perchance by the fall of a forest tree. The celebrated Ocoela was much dejected, and apparently subdued in spirit. Captain Hitchcock was directed to return and tell them that a large force would soon be in the field, and the inevitable consequence of their refusing to come to terms would be the destruction of a great portion of the nation. They expressed a desire to treat with General Gaines, and said they would hold a council on the subject and give their answer in the afternoon. They returned at the appointed time, and again expressed their desire to make peace with General Gaines, but said their act could not be binding without the sanction of Micanopy, the principal chief, who had gone to his town. They said they would send for him and then sign a treaty. Captain Hitchcock then communicated to them what he had been instructed to say, viz: that General Gaines had no authority to treat with them; but that if they would return to the south side of the Withlacoochee, and remain there without molesting the inhabitants of the country, until the United States commissioners should appoint a time and place to meet them, they should not for the present be disturbed. The chiefs present gave their promise to do so. At this moment General Clinch's advance came in sight of the party that had accompanied the chiefs, and not knowing what was passing at the camp, wheeled into line and poured a volley upon the Indians, who immediately fled and crossed the river, as did the chiefs who were with Captain H., fearing no doubt they would be shot down. This broke up the conference.

The brigade with Clinch were met with heartfelt greetings. He brought the greater part of the garrison from Fort Drane, and a squadron of mounted men, raised in the counties immediately north of Fort Drane, and with them all the supplies his slender means of transportation would allow, together with forty head of beef cattle. From this time up to the 9th of March the Indians remained true to their promise to abstain from hostilities, our men having frequently during these days fished and bathed in the river without molestation. Micanopy, however, did not arrive, and General Gaines decided this day (see Order No. 7) to place the troops under the command of General Clinch, whose gallantry and decision had proved him so worthy of the trust, and prepared to return immediately to New Orleans in pursuance of the instructions he had received at Pensacola.

On the 10th General Clinch took up the line of march for Fort Drane; that night a negro, who had a wife among the hostile Indians, and among whom he had been sent on the 8th, returned and reported that they assured him of their intention to adhere to their promises, and told him they would meet the whites on the Withlacoochee in five days, and bring with them all the principal chiefs. They said they had seen our men fishing, but desiring to be at peace did not fire on them.

The troops encamped about three miles south of Fort Drane; thither General Gaines proceeded, and soon after set out on his return to New Orleans, by the way of Tallahassee and Pensacola. At New Orleans he received the instructions from the War Department relative to this frontier, and immediately proceeded to Fort Jesup.

This is a rough sketch, but you may rely on the facts, and you are at liberty to make use of the letter, if you think proper, for the information of the public.

With constant regard, I am your most obedient servant,
GEO. A. McCALL, *Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*

No. 5.

[From the Army and Navy Chronicle of September 29, 1836.]

General Gaines and the Seminole campaign.

We have received a letter from Captain G. A. McCall, aide-de-camp to General Gaines, requesting us to insert in the Chronicle the letter from him to a friend, which appeared in the New Orleans Bulletin, and furnishing a few additional paragraphs by way of a postscript.

By reference to the Chronicle of the 11th ultimo, it will be seen that the first part of this request had been anticipated. We have, therefore, only to comply with the other portion by publishing the following

POSTSCRIPT.

Although the promptness with which General Gaines repaired to Florida has been very generally commended, and his determination to strike boldly at the enemy whilst the season was favorable for rapid movements has been approved, the very pertinent question has lately often been asked, "Why did he remain idle for several days on the Withlacoochee while the Indians were within striking distance; why did he not make a *sortie*?" To this question the answer is plain. He did not wish, by a premature

move, (the effect of which would have been comparatively unimportant,) to frustrate the ulterior object of the campaign—the complete subjection and removal of the Indians.

There were numbers at Fort Izard on the 29th of February who would have sprung like the young war horse to head a sortie or lead a charge against the Mickasukee and the Seminole, but the general was convinced that a sortie at that time would be productive of consequences that would retard the successful termination of the campaign by dispersing the Indians, and possibly driving them into a part of the country inaccessible to the troops, namely, the Everglades.

One decisive victory over the Mickasukee and Seminole tribes would perhaps have resulted in their complete overthrow. But any one acquainted with the country, and the Indian mode of fighting, knows that this would have been the work of several days. In an engagement between well-disciplined troops, who *will* stand to it, and take hard knocks upon hard knocks until one or other of the parties is fairly beat down, a splendid and decisive victory may be achieved in a few hours; but an engagement with these Indians, to result in permanent advantages, it was well known, must be a succession of running fights from hammock to swamp, and must be kept up for days. The troops at Fort Izard had neither ammunition nor provisions for perhaps a ten days' pursuit, and a sortie would have been worse than useless, had it not been rigorously and uninterruptedly prosecuted to a successful termination.

As has already been stated, General Gaines received at Fort King a supply barely sufficient to carry him to Tampa. But as soon as it was ascertained that the united Mickasukee and Seminole tribes were in full force in the vicinity, he informed General Clinch of the fact, and requested a further supply, stating his belief that, by a combined movement of the two forces, the war might be terminated in ten days.

Having despatched this letter, General Gaines resolved to do nothing that would tend to disperse the Indians, but quietly to await Clinch's arrival, and then make a *sortie* that would carry him several days' march into the fastnesses of the enemy's country, where it was believed the women and children were secreted; for he was satisfied that the complete subjugation of the savages could be accomplished only by a decisive victory, followed by the capture of the women and children. In the meantime, the Indians were wasting their ammunition without doing material injury. They were almost constantly at it, and fired at least one hundred shots to our one, the men at the breastworks having positive orders not to fire a single shot without good aim at a distant object within fair striking distance.

These are the reasons a sortie was not made during the time the brigade remained on the bank of the Withlacoochee waiting Clinch's arrival. But before General Clinch arrived the Indians *sued for peace*, and promised to remain quiet until the United States commissioners should appoint a time and place to treat with them; and General Gaines, having promised that they should not be disturbed if they remained quiet on the south side of the river until they heard from the commissioners, felt bound to observe towards them the same strict regard to his word that he would have observed to the most powerful people on earth. The Indians complied strictly with their promises; for although the troops were afterwards encamped at different points within five or six miles of Fort Drane, the Indians never fired a rifle until they found accumulated forces in hostile array advancing on the Withlacoochee in different directions.

In conclusion I will merely remark that the idea of the brigade at Fort Izard having been beleaguered and unable either to advance or fall back is ridiculous and without foundation. General Gaines would hardly have ordered General Clinch to move down with five hundred men had he considered himself unable to drive the Indians before him with one thousand.

G. A. M.

GENERAL ORDER No. 13.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Adjutant General's Office, Washington, March 21, 1837.*

The following order has been received from the War Department, and is published for the information of all concerned.

By order of Major General Macomb.

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *March 21, 1837.*

A court of inquiry, of which Major General Macomb is president, convened at the city of Frederick, Maryland, on the 28th of November, 1836, pursuant to General Orders Nos. 65 and 68 of that year, for the purpose of inquiring and examining into the causes of the failure of the campaigns in Florida against the Seminole Indians, under the command of Major General Gaines and of Major General Scott, in 1836; and the causes of the delay in opening and prosecuting the campaign in Georgia and Alabama against the hostile Creek Indians in 1836, and into every subject connected with the military operations of those campaigns; also, to inquire and examine into the unauthorized reports and publications of officers of the army.

The court, after duly examining all the testimony offered in the several cases, pronounced the following *opinions* thereon:

1. *Opinion of the court in reference to the failure of the campaign in Florida, conducted by Major General Scott, in 1836.*

“The court finds from a review of the testimony that Major General Scott was ordered, on the 21st of January, to take the direction of the Florida war, with full authority to organize a regular and volunteer force sufficient in his judgment, with a view to bring the war to a speedy termination; that under this order he proceeded to Augusta, Georgia, where he arrived near the last of January, and commenced organizing the service; that he proceeded thence to Milledgeville for the purpose of consulting with the governor of Georgia on the subject of the Creek difficulties and in hastening the preparations for operations in Florida; that he returned to Augusta on the 6th of February, and arrived at Savannah on the 9th, where he was occupied in regulating the supplies and movements of the troops for Florida until the 20th; that he arrived at Picolata on the 22d, and was detained there until the 9th of March,

awaiting the arrival of troops, both regular and volunteers, also, transportation and supplies, and in forwarding the same to Fort Drane and Volusia; his plan of campaign being to move in three divisions simultaneously from Fort Drane, Volusia, and Tampa, upon the Withlacoochee, the stronghold of the enemy; that on the 9th of March General Scott proceeded to Fort Drane with a small escort with supplies for the relief of General Gaines's forces on the Withlacoochee, and arrived at Fort Drane about the 14th, where he was detained until the 25th, to give time for the left wing and the centre of his army to put themselves in position, and also in awaiting the arrival of supplies to enable him to commence operations. These supplies were delayed for the want of additional means of transportation momentarily expected from Savannah, the few teams already in use being nearly exhausted by the bad state of the roads and the constant and heavy labor imposed on them. On the 26th of March General Scott commenced his movement from Fort Drane for the Withlacoochee with the right wing of his command, consisting of about 1,968 regular and volunteer troops, and with eighteen days' rations; that he reached Camp Izard, on the Withlacoochee, on the morning of the 28th, where the Indians from the opposite bank of the river fired into the camp. Preparations being made, the troops commenced crossing the river the next morning at 4 o'clock; during the crossing the rear division was attacked, but the enemy was driven. On the morning of the 30th the army, having crossed, proceeded up the river in search of the enemy, whom they discovered about 10 o'clock in small parties on an island in a chain of lakes; the troops advanced to the attack, when the Indians retired and were pursued about four miles, but not overtaken. The next morning the Indians were again discovered on another island surrounded by broad and wet savannas, and so boggy that it was with difficulty the troops could struggle through them. The Indians were attacked, dislodged, and pursued three or four miles, when they eluded the pursuit by crossing the river. In this pursuit the troops became several times engaged, but the enemy was always dislodged and driven from the hammocks. Finding it impossible to pursue the enemy across the river, and being twenty-four hours without provisions, the troops returned to their baggage train and encamped. On the 1st of April the troops proceeded on the march, and established a post of observation, called Fort Cooper, at the southeastern extremity of a chain of lakes, leaving there a part of the force with seventeen days' provisions and reserving only enough subsistence to carry the remainder to Tampa Bay, where they arrived on the 5th of April, after a fatiguing and difficult march, making the road the whole distance. The loss of the troops in the several rencontres was four killed and nine wounded.

"The left wing, under General Eustis, after scouring the country between St. Augustine and Volusia, *via* Tomoca, commenced crossing the St. John's at Volusia on the 22d of March, when it was attacked by the enemy, who was repelled at all points, and retreated to his fastnesses after a loss on the part of the troops of three killed and nine wounded. One Indian was found dead and evidences of four others being thrown into the river. On the 24th a subaltern's command of mounted men fell in with a party of twelve or fifteen Indians and killed two. On the 25th the left wing, consisting of four companies of United States artillery, Colonel Goodwyn's mounted regiment, Colonel Brisbane's regiment of foot, and Elmore's volunteers, concentrated, and on the 26th commenced the march for Pelaklikaha by the upper crossing of the Ocklawaha, with 1,400 men and thirteen days' rations, leaving at Volusia two of Brisbane's companies. The route being difficult the troops made only seven miles by the evening of the 27th, and were obliged to build bridges over the Ocklawaha, the Withlacoochee, and one intermediate stream. On the 29th, after crossing the Ocklawaha, an Indian of note, Ayah Hajah, was killed by Colonel Shelton, who was wounded. On the 30th the advance was attacked at Oakahumpy swamp and three men killed; the hammocks were scoured and the Indians discovered and driven into a swamp inaccessible to the troops, one of whom was wounded. The enemy retreated whenever the troops approached to within 200 yards. On reaching Pelaklikaha the villages were found to have been abandoned, perhaps for several weeks; cattle and ponies were abundant in the neighborhood; the houses and fences were burned by the troops. It being impossible to obtain provisions from Fort King, and the horses being too much exhausted to draw provisions from Volusia, and General Scott having crossed the Withlacoochee south on the 28th with the right wing, the left wing moved on the main road from Fort King to Tampa, where the horse of that wing arrived on the 5th of April, leaving the foot at a position fifteen miles from that place.

"The centre under Colonel Lindsay, consisting of from 1,000 to 1,200 men, organized at Tampa about the 13th of March. Large fires being discovered in the direction of the Alafia, the battalion of Florida volunteers was sent in that direction, where they surprised a party of Indians, killing three and capturing six ponies. On the 15th, the centre moved upon the Hillsborough, on the main road to Fort King, and on the 20th established a post called Fort Alabama, with a view of bringing supplies near to the scene of hostilities in the direction of the Withlacoochee, leaving there the Florida battalion under Major Reed, the remainder of the troops marching back to Fort Brooke, (Tampa,) where a despatch was received from General Scott, giving the plan of the campaign, and requiring the centre to be at Chickuchatty by the 25th to co-operate. On the 22d the march was commenced, the battalion at Fort Alabama was taken up, leaving at that post one company and thirty sick. The route lay through a hilly country abounding in hammocks. After passing Elochuto, the Indians, taking advantage of their coverts, began to annoy the rear and flanks of the column: a flanker was killed and another wounded, whilst passing a dense hammock. The hammock was scoured, and the Indians driven out. During the night, at the encampment, parties of the troops were fired on by the Indians from a hammock contiguous to a pond which furnished water for the troops. The Indians were dispersed by a round of canister. On the 27th, the Indians still continuing their annoying attacks, always firing from ambush, one of our men was killed and two wounded. The column halted at noon, when an attack was made upon the rear, but, upon a brisk return of the fire, the Indians disappeared. On the 28th, when encamped at Fort Brodnax, near the Chickuchatty, the Indians commenced a fire on the horses, and the party guarding them. A detachment was sent out, which drove the enemy without loss to the troops. On the 30th, provisions being scarce, two parties of mounted men were sent in pursuit of cattle, covered by a force of two hundred and fifty men; they brought in a supply sufficient for four days. During that day the friendly Indians attached to the command killed a chief called Charley Fixico, a leader of about eighty-five men. That night the sentinels were fired upon occasionally, and also on the 31st, but without injury. On the same day an attempt was made to procure more beef. Being sixty miles from the depot, with barely enough provisions to reach it, without any prospect of being able to keep the field, for the purpose of co-operation, and having obtained no response to the signals made for eight days in succession, Colonel Lindsay deemed it advisable to return to Tampa, where he arrived on the night of the 4th of April. In the interval between the departure from and return to Fort Alabama, that post was attacked by a force of between three and four hundred Indians, which resulted in a loss on the part of the troops, after an action of two hours and

twenty minutes, of one killed and two wounded; the supposed loss of the enemy was fifteen killed. The enemy continued to lie around the work in considerable force, both day and night, until the return of the centre column.

"The several columns which arrived at Tampa about the 5th of April, remained at that place until the 14th, for the purpose of recruiting the men and horses, which had become much exhausted from the heat of the weather, and the fatiguing and difficult marches. The army was here divided into five detachments. Colonel Smith, with the Louisiana volunteers was detached to Charlotte harbor and up Pease creek, accompanied by a naval force, when, after operating some days up the country, and discovering no Indians, he returned to Tampa, and thence to New Orleans, where the volunteers were discharged.

"The Florida volunteers, under Major Read, were sent to the mouth of the Withlacoochee, to operate up that river. The object of this expedition was not effected, and the troops were conveyed to St. Mark's and Tallahassee, where they were discharged.

"The right wing, under General Clinch, consisting of 278 artillery, 43 dismounted dragoons, 202 infantry, 139 Augusta volunteers, and 140 mounted men, marched for Fort Drane, *via* Fort Cooper, on the Withlacoochee, making short marches in consequence of the heat of the weather and the debilitated condition of the horses. On the 18th (three miles from Fort Cooper) General Clinch despatched two companies with light wagons, with instructions to Major Cooper to join him. The detachment was fired upon from a hammock, and one lieutenant and a private severely wounded. The enemy fled. Fort Cooper had been invested from the 5th to the 17th of April, with a loss of one killed and five wounded: the force of the enemy estimated at 250. On the 22d one of the flankers was fired on from a hammock; when prompt pursuit was made, but without effect, the Indians retiring through a thick undergrowth. The troops reached Fort Drane on the 25th, the men and horses much exhausted by sickness and the heat of the weather. Another day's march would have occasioned the abandoning of the train. Fifteen horses and mules died on the road, and eight were turned out that could not be got along by leading. The term of service of the volunteers having expired they returned to their homes. On the 20th the enemy made an attack on Fort Drane, but were repulsed by the garrison; they carried off some negroes and horses.

"The left wing, accompanied by General Scott, moved, *via* Pelaklikaha and the upper crossing of the Ocklawaha, for Volusia. On the night of the 22d of April, the camp was fired upon by a party of six or eight Indians. They were pursued at daylight without any result. On the 24th a party of the enemy was met, but with no other result than the capture of their horses and packs, the enemy escaping into the hammocks. A body of the left wing reached Volusia on the 25th. All the volunteers of the left wing marched under Colonel Goodwyn for St. Augustine on the 28th, *via* Tomoca. The regulars were left to garrison Volusia and superintend the evacuation of the post, which had become very sickly.

"The centre column, under Colonel Lindsay, moved for the forks of the Withlacoochee. Passing over the Hillsborough, a wagoner was killed by the Indians, and on that night the Alabama regiment was fired on and a sentinel wounded. The remainder of the march was effected without annoyance from the enemy. No signs of Indians were discovered on the Withlacoochee. Being encumbered with the sick, the troops returned to Fort Alabama. The wagon train was insufficient for the removal of the sick alone to Tampa, and the absorption of the post of Fort Alabama was necessarily deferred until the army could return with its transportation from Tampa, relieved from the encumbrance of the sick. The march to Tampa was uninterrupted by the enemy, and, after resting a day and a half, Colonel Chisholm, with the Alabama regiment and four companies of infantry and twenty artillery, returned to remove all the public property and stores from Fort Alabama. The troops reached Fort Alabama, and on their return march were attacked, about three o'clock in the afternoon of the 27th, as the advance guard was preparing to cross Thlonotosassa creek, the Indians firing from a dense covert on the front and both flanks of the column. The fire was vigorously returned by the troops, and after twelve or thirteen rounds from a field-piece, Colonel Foster, at the head of the infantry, charged into the hammock, attacked and drove the Indians, estimated at three hundred, and thus put an end to the conflict, which had been kept up for an hour, resulting in a loss on the part of the troops of five killed and twenty-four wounded. The troops reached Tampa the next day, and the volunteers returned to their homes, the rainy season having set in and the weather so hot as to render it impossible to keep the field without a great sacrifice of life.

"The strength of the enemy during the campaign is estimated by General Scott not to exceed 1,200 fighting men; and he is of opinion that not more than 500 had at any time, since the commencement of hostilities, been brought within the same ten miles square, and that in all his operations for thirty days, no party larger than 130 had been found, but that parties from 10 to 30 had been encountered almost everywhere.

"After the return of the troops from Tampa to their several positions, General Scott deemed it necessary, in consequence of the extreme heat of the weather and the sickness of the troops, to put them into summer quarters, which was approved by the Secretary of War, in a letter of the 5th of May from the adjutant general, and thus closed the campaign.

"The court, after a full consideration of the foregoing facts and the testimony from which they are drawn, comes to the following opinion:

"The court, after a careful review of the great mass of testimony taken in the foregoing investigation, finds that Major General Scott was amply clothed with authority to create the means of prosecuting the Seminole war to a successful issue, but is of opinion that at the time he was invested with the command the season was too far advanced for him to collect, appoint, and put in motion his forces until a day too late to compass the object. It appears that after using great diligence and energy, he was not in a condition to take the field and enter the enemy's strongholds before the 28th of March, and then without sufficient means for transporting the necessary supplies to enable him to remain there long enough to seek out the scattered forces of the enemy.

"The court, therefore, ascribe the failure of the campaign to the want of time to operate, the insalubrity of the climate after the middle of April, the impervious swamps and hammocks that abound in the country occupied by the enemy, affording him cover and retreat at every step, an absence of all knowledge by the general or any part of his forces of the topography of the country, together with the difficulty of obtaining in time the means of transporting supplies for the army.

"The court is further of opinion, from the testimony of many officers of rank and intelligence who served in the campaign, that Major General Scott was zealous and indefatigable in the discharge of his duties, and that his plan of campaign was well devised, and prosecuted with energy, steadiness, and ability."

2. *Opinion of the court in reference to the delay in opening and prosecuting the campaign in Georgia and Alabama, against the hostile Creek Indians, in 1836.*

"The court finds, from a careful review of the testimony, the following facts: That under instructions from the War Department of the 16th May, General Scott arrived at Augusta, from Florida, on the 25th May, on his way to take the direction of the Creek campaign, having, previously to leaving Florida, ordered essential stores from Picolata, St. Augustine, Charleston, and Savannah to Hawkinsville, on the Ockmulgee, within seventy-five miles of Fort Mitchell; and had also ordered 250,000 complete rations from New Orleans to the highest navigable point on the Chattahoochee; that he despatched ten wagons with subsistence from Augusta, on the 23th May, for Columbus, and appointed an agent and sent him to Hawkinsville to hasten on supplies and purchase subsistence; that he proceeded himself to Columbus, where he arrived on the 30th May, and directed the Georgia volunteers already assembled there, about 1,500, to be mustered into service and distributed over a line of forty miles on the river above and below Columbus to prevent the escape of the Indians towards Florida, and also the employment of two armed steamers cruising up and down the river for the same purpose; that on the 1st of June he ordered General Jesup to Montgomery to take command of the Alabama troops and to operate up the country from a point below Irwinton; that he was engaged in organizing the Georgia militia and collecting supplies and arms up to the 23d June; that on the 12th June there had arrived at Columbus 3,300 Georgia volunteers, but not more than one-third were armed; that General Moore arrived at Irwinton about the 14th June, with 750 mounted Alabamians, with a view of commencing operations forthwith, but that he was instructed by General Scott to await his arrival in that quarter; that General Jesup, unexpectedly to General Scott, arrived about the 17th June in the neighborhood of Fort Mitchell, with the Alabama forces from Tuskegee, calling on General Scott for supplies, which had not then arrived from New Orleans; that on the night of the 20th of June 1,000 muskets arrived, and were distributed to the Georgia volunteers on the 21st June, who were immediately ordered to the mouth of Cowagee creek, on the Chattahoochee, below the enemy; that companies of the regular troops commenced arriving on the 14th and to the 20th, when two battalions were marched down the river. The first detachment of marines arrived on the 23d, and marched immediately below; the last detachment of marines arrived some days after.

"That General Scott left Columbus on the 23d to commence operations below, and was actively engaged from that time until the 6th of July, when he was recalled from his command by the instructions of the President of the 28th of June, and that he turned over the command to General Jesup on the 8th of July.

"The court, after a full consideration of the foregoing facts, and of the testimony from which they are drawn, comes to the following opinion :

"Upon a careful examination of the abundant testimony taken in the foregoing case, the court is of opinion that no delay which it was practicable to have avoided was made by Major General Scott in opening the campaign against the Creek Indians. On the contrary, it appears that he took the earliest measures to provide arms, munitions, and provisions for his forces, who were found almost wholly destitute; and as soon as arms could be put into the hands of the volunteers, they were, in succession, detached and placed in positions to prevent the enemy from retiring upon Florida, and whence they could move against the main body of the enemy, as soon as equipped for offensive operations.

"From the testimony of the governor of Georgia, of Major General Sanford, commander of the Georgia volunteers, and many other witnesses of high rank and standing, who were acquainted with the topography of the country, and the position and strength of the enemy, the court is of opinion that the plan of campaign adopted by Major General Scott was well calculated to lead to successful results, and that it was prosecuted by him, as far as practicable, with zeal and ability, until recalled from the command."

3. *Opinion of the court in reference to the failure of the campaign in Florida, conducted by Major General Gaines, in 1836.*

"The court took up the testimony in reference to the campaign in Florida under Major General Gaines, and, after a careful examination, finds that Major General Gaines, on receiving at Mobile, about January 17, 1836, information of the massacre of Major Dade and his command by the Seminole Indians in Florida, repaired with promptness to the city of New Orleans, where he, with great zeal, organized a force of regular and volunteer troops, amounting to about 1,100 men, and proceeded without delay to Tampa Bay, where he arrived about the 10th of February, and after making preparations for the field marched on the Fort King road on the 13th, and reached Dade's battle ground on the 20th, where he buried the meritorious dead with the honors of war. He then proceeded for Fort King, where he arrived on the 22d. After drawing nine or ten days' supply of subsistence from Fort Drane, and receiving a small supply of ammunition, he marched on the Withlacoochee, where he arrived on the 27th, and encountered the same day the enemy across the river, in a sharp conflict of half an hour, when the troops withdrew for the night, after a loss of one killed and six wounded. On the morning of the 28th the troops marched down the river to a point two and a half miles below, where it was understood the crossing was practicable. Here the advance of the army was fired upon from across the river, and an action ensued which continued until twelve or one o'clock, in which Lieutenant Izard was mortally wounded. The army here encamped that afternoon, and an express was despatched by Major General Gaines to General Clinch, or the officer commanding at Fort Drane, the troops in the meantime throwing up a slight breastwork of logs. On the morning of the 29th, at 9 or 10 o'clock, the enemy, in force estimated at about 1,000 or 1,500 men, made an attack on three sides of the fortified camp, which was continued for two hours, when he withdrew, leaving one of his dead on the field. On this day another despatch was sent by Major General Gaines to Fort Drane. From the 2d to the 5th of March the enemy made more or less spirited attacks upon the camp, in which several conflicts the loss on the part of our troops amounted to some three killed and about 40 wounded.

"On the night of the 5th of March a proposition was made from the woods, by the enemy, for peace. On next day a strong party of Indians appeared within five or six hundred yards of the camp; a few of whom advanced with a flag to within one hundred and fifty to two hundred yards, and Adjutant Barrow, of the volunteers, was sent out to confer with them, when they informed him they did not wish to fight any more, but wanted General Gaines to go away; upon which information General Gaines sent out Captain Hitchcock, who was accompanied by two or three officers, to hold a further conference with them. The Indians repeated to him their proposition for peace, and stated they had lost a great many of their men. Before the conference was finally closed, the advance of the troops under General Clinch came up, and com-

menced a fire upon the Indians standing in the rear, when they and the chiefs in council fled, and covered themselves in the hammocks, and were no more heard of up to the 10th of March, when the army (the command of which had been turned over by Major General Gaines to General Clinch the day preceding) fell back upon Fort Drane, where it arrived on the 11th.

"The court, after carefully reviewing and collating the testimony of Captains Hitchcock and McCall, Colonel Twiggs, General Smith, and others, in reference to the operations and peculiar situation of the army at Camp Izard, finds it difficult to come to a conclusion as to the real causes of the failure of the campaign. It appears, although the army was surrounded and repeatedly assailed by the enemy in its fortified position from the 29th of February to the 5th of March, and straitened in the means of subsistence, that, however important to the chivalry and reputation of the troops, no sally was made to test the result of such a movement, which it is possible might have issued in the defeat and subjection of the enemy, and have brought the war to a close. But the court, however, judging from subsequent events in prosecuting the war under other commanders, and the indomitable spirit of hostility evinced by the enemy, is of opinion that had a sortie been made by Major General Gaines, though he might have been able to beat and drive the enemy into the surrounding hammocks and swamps, they would have eluded pursuit and retired to their more remote fastnesses. But, if such had been the result of a sortie, Major General Gaines had not the means of subsistence to have enabled him to remain long enough in or about the cove of the Withlacoochee to seek out the enemy and press the war to a successful conclusion. Still, the court, without impugning the motives that influenced Major General Gaines, is of opinion that a sortie, under all the circumstances of the case, should have been made.

"The court, therefore, in taking a full and impartial view of all the circumstances appertaining to the operations of Major General Gaines at Camp Izard, is of opinion that the failure of the campaign should rather be attributed to the want of the means of subsistence to prosecute the war, than to the contingent result of a sortie.

"The attention of the court was next called to a consideration of the publication of Major General Gaines's official report of the 4th of July, 1836, to the adjutant general, in the public prints. The fact of its publication in the 'New Orleans Bulletin' of the 27th of September is admitted by Major General Gaines (as will appear in the proceedings of the court) as authorized by him, and without any authority but his own action. The court is not aware that its publication in the public journals as late as the 29th of September is in violation of any rule or regulation of the service; but is of opinion that all publications in the public prints tending to excite public opinion, or to produce recriminations between officers, are prejudicial to the interests of the public service and injurious to the discipline of the army. The publication of the official report of Major General Gaines, of the 4th of July, to the adjutant general, is considered by the court as falling under publications of this description, by its personal allusions.

"The court cannot close its proceedings without adverting to the strain of invective and vituperation used by Major General Gaines, in the language generally of his summary of the evidence touching the operations of the Seminole campaign; particularly the part of it couched in the following terms: '*the atrocious machinations of the second United States general officer who has ever dared to aid and assist the open enemy of the republic in their operations against United States forces employed in the protection of the frontier people. The first great offender was Major General Benedict Arnold; the second, as your finding will show, is Major General Winfield Scott.*' Assertions without facts or circumstances to sustain them, and unbecoming his (Major General Gaines's) high rank and station—remarks and assertions which the court condemns in the most decided terms of reprehension.

"The court, in continuation, feels itself compelled to notice the censure in the official letters of Major General Scott (spread upon the record of these proceedings) cast upon Major General Gaines, in reference to his operations in Florida; and in a tone of language that could not be otherwise than offensive to the latter general; and in terms, the court is of opinion, not called for under the circumstances of the case, and ought not to have been indulged in."

4. *Opinion of the court in reference to unauthorized reports and publications of officers of the army.*

"The court took into consideration a communication from Captain Hitchcock, of the 11th of March, 1836, to the honorable Mr. Lyon, of Alabama, published in 'The Globe' of the 2d of April, 1836, detailing the operations of Major General Gaines in his campaign against the Seminole Indians in Florida, in 1836, and finds that its publicity was made with the approbation of Major General Gaines, and does not violate any regulation or rule of service; that it appears to be a narrative of facts assumed by the writer, without any comments or reflections injurious to the public service; and the court cannot, therefore, see that there is any necessity for further investigation into the subject.

"The judge advocate laid before the court a number of 'The Globe' of the 8th of April, 1836, containing a publication purporting to be from the pen of Major General Jesup, commenting on the letter of Captain Hitchcock of the 11th of March; also, a letter of the 2d of June, addressed by Captain Hitchcock to the editors of 'The Globe,' and published in that paper of the 4th of June, in reply to the publication having the signature of Major General Jesup. In viewing the contents of the letter of Captain Hitchcock of the 2d of June, it purports to be a justification of the premises assumed in his letter to Mr. Lyon of the 11th of March, and contains nothing contrary to the regulations of the army.

"The court was called to consider a publication made by Captain McCall, addressed to the editor of the New Orleans 'Bulletin,' under date of the 18th of May, 1836, and published in the 'Army and Navy Chronicle' of the 11th of August, 1836; also, a postscript or notes to said letter published in the 'Army and Navy Chronicle' of the 29th of September, 1836. The purport of the letter and postscript is a detail or narrative of the campaign of Major General Gaines against the Seminole Indians in Florida, in 1836. But as the publications were made more than a month after the campaign was closed, the army regulations were not violated thereby."

The proceedings and opinions in the foregoing cases have been submitted to the President, and are approved.

The court of inquiry is dissolved.

J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 739.

[1ST SESSION.]

ESTIMATES OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR SUPPRESSING HOSTILITIES OF THE SEMINOLE INDIANS IN FLORIDA, AND FOR THE REMOVAL OF THE RAFT IN RED RIVER.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SEPTEMBER 18, 1837.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *September 15, 1837.*

SIR: The Seminole Indians having a second time failed to comply with their engagements, this department has been compelled to make extensive preparations for a vigorous prosecution of the war in Florida. The success of the measures adopted by the government, in pursuance of a humane policy towards the Indians, and our duty to protect the persons and property of the citizens of that territory from outrage and violence, leave us no alternative other than the enforcement of the treaty; and an effort is being made to enable the officers charged with its execution effectually to accomplish this object. The nature of the country and of the climate has enabled the enemy to prolong this contest to an unexpected length; but the experience of the officers who, with so much constancy and courage, have hitherto conducted the military operations there, the knowledge of the country they have acquired, and the means which will be placed at their disposal, all give reasonable hopes of bringing the war to a speedy and successful close.

The disastrous consequences of an unsuccessful summer campaign involved the country in great expenses, that were much increased during the protracted negotiations which terminated so unfortunately, by the Indians again violating their treaty obligations. During this period vessels were kept in readiness at great cost, and other means provided to facilitate the emigration of the Indians, while the ordinary expenses of the war establishment were necessarily continued. These unavoidable expenses, with those incurred by the preparations now making to collect a sufficient force and ample supplies for the ensuing campaign, have exhausted the means placed at the disposition of this department for the suppression of Indian hostilities, and will render further legislative provision necessary.

There will be required for the suppression of Indian hostilities, under the following heads, the sum of \$1,588,848 22, to wit:

For forage, means of transportation, and various other objects of supply, to be procured by the Quartermaster's department, and to meet the contingent expenses of the service...	\$800,000 00
For pay of volunteer force that will be employed in Florida.....	600,000 00
For clothing and equipage to be provided by the Purchasing department.....	153,848 22
For supplies to be furnished by the Ordnance department.....	25,000 00
For medical supplies	10,000 00
	1,588,848 22

With a view to an economical prosecution of the important work now in progress on the Red river, the removal of the raft, it is respectfully suggested that the sum of \$25,000 be appropriated at the present time. This amount, it is confidently believed, if applied now, will enable the department to complete that object: whereas if the works be suspended for want of funds until the usual period of making the annual appropriations, much precious time will be lost, and great additional expense incurred.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

HON. C. C. CAMBRELENG, *Chairman of Committee of Ways and Means, &c.*

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 740.

[1ST SESSION.]

REPORT OF A BOARD OF OFFICERS ON IMPROVEMENTS IN FIRE-ARMS BY HALL, COLT, COCHRAN, HACKETT, FISHER, AND LEAVITT, AS COMPARED WITH THE UNITED STATES MUSKET AND RIFLE, AND THEIR RELATIVE QUALITIES AND EFFICIENCY, AND THE COST OF MANUFACTURING EACH ARM.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE SEPTEMBER 19, 1837.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *September 19, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit the report of a board of officers appointed in conformity with a resolution of the Senate of the 21st of January, 1837, requiring "an examination to be made by a board of officers into the improvements in fire-arms made by Hall, Cochran, Colt, and the Baron Hackett," &c.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

HON. R. M. JOHNSON, *President of the Senate.*

Report of the board of officers appointed to examine the improvements in fire-arms made by Hall and others.

The board of officers appointed by the following "orders," in conformity with a resolution of the Senate, to inquire into and report upon the improvements in fire-arms made by Hall, Cochran, Colt, and the Baron Hackett, and to show the advantages of each in all important military points of view, have the honor to report that the results of the various experiments to which the board have subjected the arms named in the resolution, and which have not failed to establish a decided opinion with regard to their merits and demerits as weapons to be applied to the armament of troops for service in the field, are herewith presented in tabular form, as required by the aforesaid resolution.

From these tables the following results have been obtained, being the most favorable view in either case.

In preparing this report the board has felt constrained to follow the order prescribed in the resolution, which has, of necessity, involved some repetitions.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 2.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, February 3, 1837.*

I. The Secretary of War *ad interim* has received the following resolution from the Senate of the United States:

Resolved, That the Secretary of War be requested to cause an examination to be made by a board of officers into the improvements in fire-arms made by Hall, Cochran, Colt, and the Baron Hackett; and that the general results be presented to the Senate in tabular statements, showing the advantages of each in all military points of view, and especially as to—

1. The celerity of fire.
2. The extent of the recoil.
3. The efficiency of the fire.
4. The inconvenience of heated barrel in rapid firing.
5. The capacity of being used as a rifle.
6. The simplicity and cheapness of construction.
7. Durability.
8. Saving of ammunition and appendages.
9. The number of charges which may be carried by an infantry soldier.
10. The advantages when used against a charge of cavalry.
11. The advantages when used by cavalry.

II. In conformity with the provisions of the foregoing resolution, the Secretary directs that a board, to be composed of the following officers: Brevet Brigadier General J. R. Fenwick, colonel 4th artillery; Brevet Brigadier General N. Towson, paymaster general; Colonel G. Croghan, inspector general; Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Worth, ordnance; Lieutenant Colonel Wainwright, marines; Lieutenant Colonel Talcott, ordnance; and Captain B. Huger, ordnance, be assembled at the Washington arsenal on Monday the 20th February instant, at 11 o'clock, for the purpose of making a thorough examination of the improvements in fire-arms made by Hall, Colt, Cochran, and the Baron Hackett, in the manner and mode specified in the resolution.

III. The board will report the general results, for the information of the Secretary of War, in tabular form, showing the utility of each fire-arm in all important military points of view, as required by the resolution; and will also report such further information on the subject as they may be able to communicate, with their opinion on the relative advantages of the several improvements submitted to their examination.

First Lieutenant J. N. Macomb, of the artillery, and aide-de-camp, will record the proceedings of the board.

By order.

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

SPECIAL ORDER No. 10.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, February 20, 1837.*

The Secretary of War directs that First Lieutenant R. Anderson, instructor of artillery at the Military Academy, be detailed to serve as a member of the board ordered to convene at Washington arsenal for the purpose of testing the value of the improvements of certain fire-arms, in conformity with General Order No. 2, of February 3. It is not intended that this assignment shall interfere with his duties at the academy whenever his services may be required there.

By order.

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

SPECIAL ORDER No. 35.

[Extract.]

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, May 15, 1837.*

II. Lieutenant Colonel Talcott, of the ordnance, is relieved from serving as a member of the board of which Brigadier General Fenwick is president, and directed to convene, by General Order No. 2, for the examination of certain fire-arms; and Brevet Major Baker is detailed as a member of said board, and will accordingly repair to West Point on the 15th of June next, and report to the president.

By order.

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

I. THE CELERITY OF FIRE.

The tables give the following results in loading and firing:

1. *With the musket.*

No. 1. Hackett's	5 times a minute.
2. Hall's	5 "
3. Colt's	3.1 "
4. Cochran's	3 "
5. United States standard	3 "

2. *With rifles.*

No. 1. Colt's	4 times a minute.
2. Hall's	3.4 "
3. Colt's (musket calibre)	3.3 "
4. Cochran's	3.2 "
5. Leavitt	1.22 "

Hackett's and Hall's muskets load at the breech, with single charges, but are constructed upon different principles.

The United States standard musket loads at the muzzle.

Colt's and Cochran's load at the breech, with many-chambered shifting receivers.

The fire with Hackett's, Hall's, and the United States standard was continuous, and at equal intervals.

Colt's and Cochran's require from 2' to 2' 10" to load one receiver, (with the advantage, too, of convenient ground,) and from 25" to 30" to discharge it.

In the experiment to determine comparative celerity, the parties having been placed upon the ground, with each a target, were required to deliver the greatest practicable number of fires in a given time, combining celerity and accuracy; Hackett's, Hall's, and the United States musket being supplied with cartridges, Colt's and Cochran's with loose ammunition, all unloaded, and were required to commence loading at the word "fire."

The board adopted this mode in order to place the respective weapons upon an equality, and in such circumstances as would ordinarily occur, in regard to fire, in actual service.

II. THE EXTENT OF RECOIL.

As the arms of Hall, Hackett, Colt, and Cochran are all loaded at the breech, they allow the use of a ball of greater diameter than the chase of the barrel, which causes it to slug or fit perfectly tight, thus destroying all windage or escape of the explosive force, and consequently requiring a diminished charge of powder to produce results equal to those acquired with increased charges in the gun of the ordinary kind; consequently, the recoil is less than that of a gun of the same calibre loaded at the muzzle, in which an allowance of windage is indispensable to the introduction of its charge. The recoil is not sufficient in any of them to produce any great inconvenience in service, and may be assumed as being about equal in either kind of arms that load at the breech.

III. THE EFFICIENCY OF FIRE.

From the experiments made, it appears that, for guns of the large calibre, the penetration (in the same target) of those arms loading at the breech, provided they have the correct charge of powder, is greater than those loading at the muzzle. This effect results from the fact stated in the preceding number, viz: the ball fitting exactly, there remains no windage; consequently the whole force of the charge acts on the ball, and produces a greater penetration.

The following statement shows these results:

Experiments made at West Point on the 19th of June, 1837.—Target of well seasoned white oak.

Musket.	Charge of powder.	Distance from target.	Penetration.	Penetration into a package of 1,000 sheets of cartridge paper.
	<i>Grains.</i>	<i>Feet.</i>	<i>Inches.</i>	
United States.....	134	10	2.3	770 sheets No. 2, and 653 sheets No. 1.
Hall's.....	110	10	2.175	386 sheets No. 2, 80 grains charge.
Colt's.....	134	10	2.640	481 No. 2, 80 grains; 717 No. 1, 100 grains.
Colt's.....	110	10	2.750	
Colt's.....	100	10	3	
Cochran's.....	80	10	1.650	

The chambers of Cochran's musket were not capable of containing over 80 grains of powder each.

Note.—It will be observed, in the case of Colt's weapon, that a charge of 134 grains gave 2.64 inches penetration; 110 grains gave 2.75 inches penetration; 100 grains gave 3 inches penetration; which is accounted for by the admitted fact that *over* charges give *diminished* velocities.

IV. INCONVENIENCE FROM HEATED BARRELS.

Guns that receive their charges at the breech have been found to acquire a less degree of heat from a continuous course of discharges than the common arm, from the circumstance of their admitting, during the loading process, a free circulation of air through the barrels.

The temperature of the interior of the several barrels was determined by the introduction of a thermometer, that indicated a very uniform degree immediately after firing for a given period. In the experiment alluded to the time was 10'.

V. CAPACITY OF BEING USED AS A RIFLE.

In constrained positions, such as are not uncommon to light troops, the experiments with Hall's rifles, at Fort Monroe, in 1826, when in the hands of troops, fully prove that this arm is admirably adapted to this service and that of mounted corps, in consequence of the convenience in loading and facility of discharging when on horseback.

The many-chambered arms, on the contrary, requiring a variety of appendages to aid in charging them, and the application of considerable manual force in placing the charge in the cylinders, cannot be loaded either in constrained positions or on horseback without inconvenience; and it is consequently believed that Hall's rifle and Hackett's gun are the only descriptions of arms loading at the breech that can be considered as suitable for the service of light troops, either on foot or mounted. These remarks might not be applicable to the many-chambered guns, could it be supposed that they would at all times be supplied with a number of loaded cylinders, [receivers,] but this is not to be admitted as being practicable at all times and in all situations.

VI. THE SIMPLICITY AND CHEAPNESS OF CONSTRUCTION.

The attainment of simplicity in the construction of fire-arms is unquestionably of the first importance, in order that those who are to use them may readily comprehend their principles and utility. In the examination of Hall's guns nothing appears complicated; on the contrary, one of their greatest merits consists in the simplicity of their component parts and the absence of the various appendages [equipments] which are attendant upon, and indispensable to, the use and service of the arms of Colt and Cochran.

The same may be said of the gun of Baron Hackett, which, in general, possesses many of the features of utility which characterize the arms of Hall, and which is one of the most important conditions that has governed the construction and decided the character of this description of arms. In this character its utility for military purposes mainly and essentially consists. An arm which is complicated in its mechanism and arrangement deranges and perplexes the soldier in its management, requires more than common attention to its care and preservation, and if, perchance, it fail in its operation, which its complexity of construction would necessarily occasion, he loses all confidence in its powers of execution.

The guns of Hall, and apparently of Hackett, presenting in their construction this desired simplicity, are more easily managed, present less accountability to the soldier, are less liable to get out of order, and when they are so are more easily repaired.

The reports of the master armorers, who have been instructed to prepare careful estimates of the cost of each description of arms, are appended to this general report.—(See report of Mr. Hall, marked A.)

VII. DURABILITY.

The means of testing the durability of the several descriptions of arms is not within the control of the board. It can only be determined by requiring the inventors to undertake a fatiguing course of firings, greater than some of them could endure, or by placing the arms in the hands of troops and having them exposed to all the incidents and trials of active service.

The experiments with Hall's gun in 1826 gave results satisfactory with regard to its character for resisting the effects of long firings, and there can be no doubt that the durability of all descriptions of arms will depend greatly upon simplicity and consequent strength of construction.

VIII. SAVING OF AMMUNITION AND APPENDAGES.

A reference to the tabular statements will show that all guns that load at the breech require less powder to produce the same results than guns loading in the ordinary manner.

This peculiarity is accounted for under No. 2, "efficiency of fire," and need not be repeated here.

In the common musket 144 grains of powder constitute the charge for service, inclusive of about ten grains used as priming.

Colt's musket, fired with a charge of 100 grains, (being primed with a percussion cap,) gave proof of equal, and even superior, power of penetration; whence it was determined that that quantity of powder was fully sufficient for the charge of his muskets for service.

The construction of Cochran's musket limited its charge to 80 grains of powder, which was insufficient to impart to his arm a power equal to that possessed by the United States musket with its service charge, or by Colt's musket with a charge of 100 grains; but the reduction of the charge of the latter down to the maximum of Cochran's gave evidence of the possession of equal power by either arm.

These experiments being directed to the attainment of facts in regard to the proper charges to be used in the new description of arms, and likewise with a view to test their relative powers, were conclusive in their results, and prove that in muskets of the same calibre the saving of powder would be, in favor of those that load at the breech, as 100 is to 144; in the one case percussion caps are used, and in the other flints—the expense being probably in favor of the use of the latter; and, secondly, that (the same principle operating in the different arms of Hall, Hackett, Colt, and Cochran) the same charge would produce the same degree of velocity or penetration.

The inventors of Colt's and Cochran's muskets propose that each soldier should at all times have about his person *five* receivers. Supposing one of these receivers constantly attached to, forming part of, and entering into the weight of the gun, there remain four, weighing—

Colt's, each, 3 pounds, or the four.....	12 lbs.
To which add their charges.....	1 lb. 14 oz.
Total.....	13 lbs. 14 oz.

Cochran's, (when increased to hold 100 grains,) each 3 pounds 12 ounces, or the four.....	15 lbs.
Charges as above	1 lb. 14 oz.
Total.....	16 lbs. 14 oz.

to supply 35 rounds of ammunition. The same number of rounds of ammunition as five receivers would contain, carried in the ordinary manner, weigh 2 pounds 12 ounces—the increase in the one case being 11 pounds 2 ounces, and in the other 14 pounds 2 ounces, of a substance inconvenient in form and disposition, to the burden of the soldier, ever of necessity too great.

To load the many-chambered guns several implements of a novel and inconvenient form are required, the use and accountability of which would be extremely difficult and oppressive, besides adding still more to the great weight of the appendages already noticed.

In the common musket, and in Hall's and Hackett's, these equipments are not required.

IX. THE NUMBER OF CHARGES WHICH MAY BE CARRIED BY AN INFANTRY SOLDIER.

A reference to the remarks under No. 8 will exhibit the relative weight of 35 rounds of ammunition for the standard musket and Colt's and Cochran's muskets, by which it will be seen that it would be utterly impracticable for a soldier to carry the very great weight of metal required to contain only a limited number of cartridges.

This is one of the important objections which render the many-chambered arms, in the opinion of the board, altogether unsuited to the wants and exigencies of the service.

The arms of Hall and Hackett, on the contrary, can carry a number of charges always equal to, and rather exceeding, that carried by infantry soldiers in the established cartridge-boxes.

X. THE ADVANTAGES WHEN USED AGAINST A CHARGE OF CAVALRY.

In sustaining an attack from cavalry, arms have an advantage in proportion to their capability of keeping up a continuous fire, preserving at the same time their position of defence with the bayonet; the muskets of Hall and Hackett possess this advantage in an eminent degree, being, even during the process of loading, in readiness for personal defence.

This is not the case with the many-chambered guns, in consequence of the necessity that exists for disconnecting their parts for the purpose of charging them.

XI. THE ADVANTAGES WHEN USED BY CAVALRY.

The advantage is believed to be altogether in favor of arms that load at the breech and with receivers that contain only one charge; such arms being conveniently handled and loaded on horseback, are peculiarly adapted to the cavalry service; and the ball being larger than the diameter of the barrel, it is not changed from its position in the receiver by the movement of the horse.

The many-chambered arms, for reasons stated under the fifth head of this report, are deemed inapplicable to the service of cavalry.

GENERAL REMARKS.

The various arms under consideration, which have been submitted to the examination and experiments of the board, constitute two classes, viz:

The first class comprises the guns of Hall and Hackett, being arms that load at the breech with single charges.

The second class are "many-chambered," or repeating guns of Colt and Cochran, the breech of which is formed of cylindrical receivers that revolve upon a pivot, and in which are chambers to contain a number of charges which are brought successively in a line with the same barrel.

The first class may be divided into two varieties:

First. Hackett's gun, the breech of which, opening, uncovers the bottom of the bore, into which the charge is inserted in the form of a cartridge—the powder remaining in its paper envelope.

Second. Hall's gun, the receiver of which being raised by means of a spring, receives its charge in its upper end, and may be loaded either by means of a flask or with a prepared cartridge.

The second class also embraces two varieties: the receiver, which contains the chambers for the charges in Cochran's, revolves horizontally on an *arbre* perpendicular to the axis of the bore; while Colt's receiver, having its chambers in the opposite direction to Cochran's, revolves upon an *arbre* parallel to this axis.

As all these arms load at the breech, the advantages of this method are, of course, common to all, viz: that the ball used may be of a diameter so great as to destroy all windage, and thus cause a greater range, more exactness of fire, and, in consequence of less powder being required by the absence of windage, diminished recoil.

In the first class we may add, to the advantages common to all, that they can be loaded with great facility; and that, for the use of light troops or skirmishers, this property might be frequently useful and important.

In the first variety (Hackett's) the charge is inserted in a cartridge, the powder remaining in its envelope, the remains of which, with the residue of the burnt powder, adhere after several fires to the chamber, rendering it difficult to insert the cartridges, and highly probable that the retention of fire by this mass of the burnt envelopes, might cause explosions on the introduction of a new charge.

In the second variety (Hall's) this inconvenience does not exist, as the powder may be first inserted and surmounted by the ball.

Another inconvenience common to guns loading at the breech is, that the deposit of burnt matter which escapes through the joints renders them stiff and difficult to manage.

The guns of the second class have the same disadvantages as to wear and escape of gas, greatly increased by their complication and the danger of explosion of more than one charge at a time.

Of all the arms submitted to the board, that of Cochran is deemed the most unsafe for military purposes, when subjected to rapid discharges with cylinders [receivers] fully loaded.

The slightest defect in the metal of the receiver would render it highly dangerous both to the bearer and to others in contiguous positions; and that such defects would frequently exist will not be doubted by mechanics whose experience every day convinces them of the many circumstances that serve to prevent a perfect union of parts in similar constructions; and even admitting original perfection in this important limb, it is nevertheless liable, from the effects of constant and severe service, to receive fractures or other injuries sufficient to destroy its character for safety, and render it more dangerous to the ranks it is intended to support and defend than to those of the enemy.

One accident of the kind that occurred in our practice of the 19th of June (*vide* tabular statements) would alone not only impair the confidence of the troops in the ability and power of their arms, but, what might be fatal to the reputation of those armed with them, would infuse into their minds such a degree of dread and apprehension of their dangerous qualities as to render them an unpopular, and consequently almost powerless, weapon of war.

This objection, founded upon an occurrence which our experimenter elicited, is deemed conclusive as regards the inaptitude of this arm to the public service; and it is believed that the possession of one quality that detracts from the general merits of an arm, so as to impair the confidence of the soldier in its safety and power, would be fatal to its reputation and consequent utility.

However ingenious in design, therefore, and creditable to the mechanical skill of the inventor, this arm may be, the board is of opinion that it is an unsafe weapon, and unsuited to the use of bodies of men acting in line or in masses.

It is the opinion of the board that the arm of Colt, involving all the merits, and free from some of the objections to the former, may be very usefully applied in *special* cases; as, in fixed positions in defence of a breach; to cover boarders; in tops of ships; or for personal attack or defence; in a word, under any circumstances where the operation is of a special and brief character, and it be desirable to throw a mass of fire upon a particular point for a limited time. In such or similar situations the entire strength of this arm might be so controlled and managed as to render it fully available and highly efficient, while its cumbersome and yet necessary appendages and the massive burden of its parts would condemn it as wholly unsuited to the wants and exigencies of the service *in the field*.

The board is of the unanimous opinion that, from its complicated character, its liability to accidents (one having occurred in practice on the 21st of June) in the hands of soldiers, and other reasons which may be found in this report, that this arm is entirely unsuited to the general purposes of the service.

That the arm of Hackett is one of great merit, possessing in general the qualities of the standard musket, over which it has the advantage of simplicity in construction and manœuvre, and rapidity and certainty of fire, is fully admitted by the board; but it is exposed to the serious objection of a dangerous and doubtful arrangement of its ammunition in respect to packing and transportation, and in not admitting of being loaded with loose powder and ball, the necessity of which often results from the casualties of service; and in using only a charge of a peculiar make, to which is attached a percussion primer, dangerous when in connexion with large quantities of ammunition.

As it is highly probable that the objections to this arm may be overcome, and as the weapon has attracted the serious attention and consideration of other and highly military nations, with a view to possess ourselves of the knowledge and use of a weapon which it may hereafter be necessary to oppose to those who shall adopt it, the board is unanimously of opinion that a number, say 100 stands, should be procured of the inventor and proprietor, and placed in the hands of a selected company or corps, by the direction of the Secretary of War, in order to a thorough course of experiments, to embrace all the incidents of campaign service, both in respect to the weapon and its ammunition.

From the report of the master armorers it appears that the standard musket is not susceptible of alteration so as to apply to it the principles of Hackett's gun; and such is the opinion of the board.

The arms now in use in the United States service, it is assumed, possess the power of being used in skilful hands with all *requisite* celerity and effect.

The experiments just finished teach conclusively that up to 40 rounds of fire, in reference to the usual characters and incidents of service, they have the advantage in several respects and equality in others to those with many chambers.

It is seriously doubted by experienced soldiers whether the celerity attainable with our own arms, or with a weapon, which in being loaded requires to be removed from its firing position, is not carried as far as is consistent with steadiness, coolness, and that self-possession so very necessary and so difficult of inculcation. It is the opinion of the board that a larger proportion of fire from rapidly repeating guns would be thrown away than from those that receive but one charge at a time.

In the instances of the arms under consideration, it is believed that even if there be anything gained by their peculiarities over the common musket and Hall's guns in point of celerity of discharging, such advantage has been acquired at too great a sacrifice of important and indispensable principles; that in the desire to reach perfection in the construction of the arms, the convenience, physical power, and safety of those who are to use them, have been wholly overlooked; and that their liability to be found out of a *state of preparation* for defence would detract greatly from their character for efficiency.

The board is confirmed in the opinion that the arm of Hall is entitled to all the favorable consideration which has heretofore been bestowed upon it by previously constituted boards and commissions.

That the arm requires some modification in its construction, and especially in its equipments, the board is fully convinced; and, with such improvements as are doubtless attainable, the board is of opinion that as an arm for military purposes, it possesses a decided superiority over every other constructed upon the principle of loading at the breech.

The gun of Hackett, with many admirable qualities, is as yet a comparatively untried improvement; but Hall's gun, having successfully undergone the trials of service and the examination and thorough inspection of several competent commissioners, has again exhibited to this board powers and excellencies (capable, doubtless, of augmentation) far superior, in the opinion of the board, to those possessed by any other arm which has been subjected to its examination.

The application of the percussion primer to arms for the use of troops has not yet been made with success. They may, with improved means of attaching them to the nipple or cone, be used by light troops in extended order; but the difficulty of placing an object so small as the cap, during the excitement of action, in excessively cold weather, and in dark nights, has prevented this improvement in fire-arms (for sporting purposes) from being generally adopted in any service.

Hall's musket, (percussion lock.)

Date.	Charge.			Extent of recoil.	Distance in yards.	Number of fires.	Celerity of fire.			Efficiency of fire.				Casualties.		Remarks.
	Powder, grains of.	Ball.	Back shot.				Time of firing.	Rate of firing a minute.	Average rate of firing.	Mean penetration.			Number of hits.	Snaps.	Flashes.	
										In seasoned white oak.	No. 1, in musket cartridge paper, sheets of.	No. 2, in musket cartridge paper, sheets of.				
1837.																
Feb. 27	86	1	50	10	0.83
Mar. 1	85	1	100	10	0.34
2	82	1	150	10	0.07
	82	1	200	10	0.00	3	One ball imbedded.
6	82	1	9	2	0.85
June 19	110	1	3½	4	1.80	Fired without patches.
	110	1	3½	2	2.17	Fired with patches.
	80	1	13½	3	386

Hall's musket, (flint.)

June 19	100	1	3½	10	1.07	6
	100	1	100	20	10' 0"	2.0	3.5	17
22	100	1	10	2 0	5.0

Hall's rifle.

Feb. 27	70	1	50	8	0.63
Mar. 1	70	1	100	10	0.93
2	70	1	150	10	0.40	7
	70	1	200	10	0.00	3	Two balls imbedded.
6	70	1	9	2	1.70
	70	1	300	10	3.56	1	Slight indentation.
8	70	1	9° 17'	8	4' 30"	The recruit did not understand the use of flask.
9	70	1	100	50	21 5	2.37	43	6	West Point.
June 19	70	1	3½	10	1.12	Temperature 152° Fahrenheit.
21	70	1	180	34	10' 0"	3.40	7

Cochran's small rifle.

Feb. 27	35	1	50	10	0.55
Mar. 1	35	1	100	10	0.51
2	35	1	150	8	0.20	5
	35	1	200	10	3.02	0.14
6	35	1	9	2	1.13
8	35	1	2° 50'	8	2' 30"	3.20
9	35	1	100	50	17 35	2.85	37	Cylinder empty at the commencement of the time.

Cochran's carbine.

Feb. 27	38	1	50	10	0.61
Mar. 1	38	1	100	10	0.27
2	45	1	150	10	0.19	6
	45	1	200	10	0.02	4
6	45	1	9	2	2.66	0.90
7	45	1	100	100	30' 6"	3.3	95
14	45	1	400	9	3 50	2.03	50' to fire; 3' to load cylinder.

Cochran's musket.

Date.	Charge.			Extent of recoil.	Distance in yards.	Number of fires.	Celerity of fire.			Efficiency of fire.			Casualties.		Remarks.	
	Powder, grains of.	Ball.	Buck shot.				Time of firing.	Rate of firing a minute.	Average rate of firing.	Mean penetration.			Number of hits.	Snaps.		Flashes.
										In seasoned white oak.	No. 1, in musket cartridge paper, sheets of.	No. 2, in musket cartridge paper, sheets of.				
1837. June 19	72	1	3½	4	1.76	Thirteen fragments of caps and lead in the blindages.
	72	1	100	16	10' 0"	1.6	10	One lateral discharge.
	80	1	13½	3	2.30	Without patches.
	80	1	13½	3	454	With patches.
	80	1	3½	4	1.65
21	80	1	180	30	10' 0"	3.0	7	2	122° Fahrenheit, temperature of barrel after firing.

Colt's small rifle.

Mar. 1	30	1	50	8	0.60	Rifle powder.
	30	1	100	10	0.36
2	36	1	150	7	0.3	5
	36	1	200	7	0.0	One ball imbedded.
6	36	1	9	2	0.97
7	36	1	56	109	39' 0"	2.79	3.29	104	4	Commenced with cylinders empty to count the time.
8	36	1	5° 30'	8	3 20	2.4	3
9	36	1	100	50	12 30	4.0	2
14	36	1	8	2 0	4.0	30' to fire eight times, 1' 30' to load,

Colt's musket.

June 19	134	1	3½	6	2.64
	110	1	3½	4	2.75
	80	1	13½	3	481
21	100	1	100	31	10' 0"	3.1	2.85	22	1
	100	1	13½	1	717
	80	1	180	26	10' 0"	2.6	9	Temp. 120° Fahrenheit.
	100	1	3½	2	3.0

Colt's rifle, (musket calibre.)

June 21	100	1	180	28	10' 0"	2.8	8	2	Two discharges at a time in each volley.
	100	1	3½	1	2.8	1.6

Colt's carbine, (musket calibre.)

June 21	100	1	100	33	10' 0"	3.3	30
	80	1	13½	1	3.3	672
	72	1	3½	1	1.57

Baron Hackett's gun, (musket calibre.)

Feb. 27	73	1	50	8	0.81
Mar. 1	73	1	100	10	0.45
2	73	1	150	10	0.32
	73	1	200	10	0.10
6	73	1	9	2	0.82
	73	1	300	10	1	An indentation of 0.300 inches.

Baron Hackett's gun, (musket calibre.)—Continued.

Date.	Charge.			Extent of recoil.	Distance in yards.	Number of fires.	Celerity of fire.			Efficiency of fire.			Casualties.		Remarks.	
	Powder, grains of.	Ball.	Buck shot.				Time of firing.	Rate of firing a minute.	Average rate of firing.	Mean penetration.			Number of hits.	Snaps.		Flashes.
										In seasoned white oak.	No. 1. in musket cartridge paper, sheets of.	No. 2. in musket cartridge paper, sheets of.				
1837. Mar. 7	73	1	56	99	39' 30"	2.5	83	11	59 discharges were made in 15'. Cartridge inserted too far 13 times during the firing.	
8	73	1	9° 15'	8	1 50	4.37	Fired in a rain.	
9	73	1	100	50	14 50	3.5	24	3	Buck shot; mean penetration, 0.709.	
10	144	1	3	9	1	3.96	1.35	Ball rebounded.	
	85	1	200	5	1	Indentation, 0.200.	
	73	1	300	5	1	
	144	1	400	1	0.30	1	
	73	1	3	80	8	2' 15"	3.60	6	2	Ten buck shot of eighteen struck the target.	
14	73	1	400	10	2 0	5.0	
	73	1	300	10	2 5	4.8	2	

Leavitt's carbine.

Mar. 1	50	1	50	5	0.35	5
	50	1	100	5	0.49
2	50	1	150	5	0.30	3
	50	1	200	5	0.112	4

Fisher's gun.

Mar. 8	50	1	8	6' 30"	1.22	1.22	In the rain.
--------	----	---	-------	-------	-------	---	--------	------	------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	--------------

A.

WEST POINT, June 24, 1837.

SIR: Having attended as carefully as is practicable to the duties enjoined, upon me in the order of the board over which you preside, dated 19th of the present month, I, with due deference, submit the following statements.

Very respectfully, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN H. HALL.

General J. R. FENWICK.

In estimating the cost of construction of the different arms presented to us, it is necessary to consider the number to be made *annually*, and the *extent* of the works for manufacturing them in, because the expense of fabrication will be much affected by each of these circumstances. It would be less when many arms are made in the same period of time than when but few; a workman can do more, in the same time, when continuing upon the same kind of job, than when obliged to change often from one kind of work to another, as would be the case when making but few arms in a year.

There is a class of expenses incurred in a manufactory the amount of which is greatly influenced by the *extent* of manufacturing to which it is adapted; which expenses will be nearly similar, and to the same amount, whether much work is performed and many arms are made in each year or but few. Such are the expenses arising from the decay of the buildings; of the forebays and the water-wheels, &c.; the expenses of direction or superintendence; clerks' duties; watchmen; laborers to keep the shops in good order; to supply the stoves with fuel in cold weather, &c. My estimates have been made on the supposition of manufacturing three thousand arms of the same kind in each year.

The effect on the cost of the different kinds of the arms, which would be produced by making a smaller number of them in such an establishment, is exhibited in the paper numbered 4, by adding to the direct expenses on different parcels of them, viz: 1,000, 2,000, and 3,000 per year, the amount of the incidental ones annually incurred. From which it appears that Mr. Colt's muskets, without a bayonet, might be made in any quantities at the rate of 3,000 per year, at \$19 03 each; the fusil Robert, with a bayonet, at the rate of \$14 36 each; Mr. Cochran's musket, at \$19 10 each, without a bayonet.

Exhibit of incidental expenditures, such as would be incurred in an establishment for making three thousand arms per year, and their effect on the cost of the arms when made in different parcels annually, viz: 1,000 per year, 2,000 per year, and 3,000 per year.

Superintendence or direction.....	\$1,500 00
Inspection.....	1,400 00
Clerk's services.....	800 00
Assistant.....	400 00
Stationery.....	50 00
Watchman.....	600 00
Laborers.....	600 00
Fuel.....	600 00
Oil and tallow for lubricating water-wheel journals, and those of machines.....	100 00
Repairs of buildings, and forebays, and water-wheels, including deterioration of property..	950 00
	<u>7,000 00</u>
Estimated cost of direct expenses in making 1,000 of Mr. Colt's muskets in one year.....	16,520 00
Incidental expenses of one year.....	7,000 00
Total cost of 1,000 of Mr. Colt's muskets.....	<u>23,520 00</u>
Which is equal to \$23 52 for each.	
Cost of 2,000 of them, direct expenses.....	33,040 00
Incidental expenses.....	7,000 00
Total cost of 2,000.....	<u>40,040 00</u>
Which is for 1,000, \$20,020; equal to \$20 02 for each.	
Estimated cost of direct expenses for 3,000 of Mr. Colt's muskets.....	49,560 00
Incidental expenses.....	7,000 00
Total for making 3,000 in one year.....	<u>56,560 00</u>
Which is for 1,000, \$18,853; or \$18 85 3-10ths each.	
Direct expenses for fusil Robert for 1,000 in one year.....	12,030 00
Incidental expenses.....	7,000 00
Total for making 1,000 in one year.....	<u>19,030 00</u>
Or \$19 03 for each.	
Direct expenses for fusil Robert, made at the rate of 2,000 in one year.....	24,060 00
Incidental expenses.....	7,000 00
Total for 2,000 of the arms.....	<u>31,060 00</u>
Which is for 1,000 of them \$15,530, or \$15 53 for each.	
Direct expenses for fusil Robert, made at the rate of 3,000 per year.....	36,090 00
Incidental expenses.....	7,000 00
Total for 3,000.....	<u>43,090 00</u>
Which for 1,000 is \$14,303, or \$14 36½ for each.	
Direct expenses for 1,000 of Mr. Cochran's muskets in one year.....	16,770 00
Incidental expenses.....	7,000 00
Total expenses for 1,000 in one year.....	<u>23,770 00</u>
Or \$23 77 for each.	
Estimated cost of direct expenses for 2,000 of Mr. Cochran's muskets, made at that rate per year.....	33,540 00
Incidental expenses.....	7,000 00
Total for 2,000.....	<u>40,540 00</u>
Which is for 1,000 \$20,270; or \$20 27 for each.	
Direct expenses for 3,000 of Mr. Cochran's muskets made in one year.....	50,310 00
Incidental expenses.....	7,000 00
Total for 3,000 of the arms.....	<u>57,310 00</u>
Which for 1,000 is \$19,103½, or \$19 10½ each.	

WEST POINT, June 24, 1837.

Sir: Subjoined is a list of the appendages of Mr. Cochran's musket, and an estimate of the cost of making each of their component parts.

Also, a list of the appendages to Mr. Colt's musket, and an estimate of expense of making each of their component parts, so far as I could examine them separately. Those of the ammunition flask could not be separated; they have therefore neither been separately mentioned nor separately estimated.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN H. HALL.

General J. R. FENWICK.

Appendages to Mr. Cochran's musket.

1 powder-flask	\$1 50
1 leather pouch	1 10
1 leather belt	40
2 leather straps	25
2 small mallets	25
1 bullet-mould	40
	<u>3 90</u>

Appendages to Mr. Colt's musket.

1 belt	\$0 75
5 hooks	50
2 supports	50
5 rivet plates	50
1 buckle	10
Uniting the whole	50
	<u>2 85</u>

1 cartridge-box	2 00
1 ammunition flask	3 00
	<u>5 00</u>

Lever, consisting of the following parts:

1 fulcrum	\$0 6
1 screw-driver	8
1 screw-driver for cones	12
1 pick	8
1 cap, (brass)	8
	<u>0 52</u>

Primer, consisting of the following parts:

1 box	\$0 50
2 covers	20
2 springs	12
2 spring-screws	3
2 circular plates or buttons	20
2 cap-pushers	14
2 coiled springs	20
1 main-axis screw	3
2 axis or hinge rivets	4
2 palls or spring-catches	12
2 pall-screws	3
2 pivot-lid catches	6
	<u>1 67</u>

Uniting all the parts

30

Total

1 97*Recapitulation of appendages to Mr. Colt's musket.*

Belt	\$2 85
Cartridge-box	2 00
Flask	3 00
Lever	42
Primer	1 97
	<u>10 24</u>

WEST POINT, June 24, 1837.

Sir: Subjoined I present a list of the appendages to the Hall's musket, and the cost of each.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN H. HALL.

General J. R. FENWICK.

Appendages to Mr. Hall's musket.

1 cartridge-box, for containing either ball or buck-shot cartridges, or both	\$1 50
1 screw-driver and picker	9
1 primer	2 25
1 wiper	20
	<u>4 04</u>

ESTIMATE OF THE COST OF THE DIFFERENT SMALL ARMS SUBMITTED TO THE BOARD FOR THEIR EXAMINATION.

Estimate of the cost, &c., of the fusil Robert, or Baron Hackett's gun.

No. of parts.	Component parts.	Amount.
5	Barrel, with the bayonet, rear, and igniting stud and screws.....	\$3 77 6.5
2	Trunnion plates.....	65 6.2
2	Trunnion plate screws.....	2 7.5
2	Trunnion screws.....	5 6.8
2	Washers for trunnion screws, (copper).....	1 2.6
1	Stock bar for friction roller.....	16 0.8
2	Friction roller, and axis pin for stock.....	1 3.7
2	Lever with copper plug.....	49 1.6
1	Guide or rear sight for lever.....	12 7.6
2	Screws for guide.....	3 8.1
2	Catch for lever with stock pin.....	31 1.6
1	Catch spring.....	7 5.7
1	Screw for catch or axis.....	1 9
1	Hammer or spring for igniting.....	25 5.9
1	Screw for hammer.....	1 8.8
1	Guard plate.....	63 4.3
1	Guard bow, (brass).....	44 4.1
1	Screw for guard bow and trigger.....	2 8.6
3	Guard screws for screwing to the barrel.....	6 7.2
1	Guard screw, (wood).....	1 6.8
1	Trigger, (acts also as sear and spring).....	25 2
1	Breech plate.....	24 7
2	Breech plate screws.....	4 2.5
1	Top band, (brass).....	16 2.5
1	Sight for top band, with screws.....	1 9.2
1	Screw-driver for top band.....	8 8.5
1	Screw for screw-driver.....	2 7.3
1	Middle band, (brass).....	13 2.7
1	Lower band, (brass).....	8 9.7
4	Swivels, (2,) and rivetting wires (2).....	12 9.9
2	Side plate, (brass).....	3 8.1
1	Side screw.....	2 2.6
3	Band springs, (steel).....	13 9.4
1	Safety plate, (brass).....	39 1.3
11	Screws for safety plate, (for wood).....	9 7.3
1	Bayonet.....	1 18 1.4
1	Stock.....	1 22 8.4
<u>68</u>		<u>11 52 3.2</u>
	Case-hardening, polishing, and finishing.....	66 4.2
	Pay of officers, clerks, inspectors, machinist, jobbers, &c.....	1 50 6
		<u>13 69 3.4</u>
	Cost of one gun if 5,000 are manufactured.....	13 69 3.4
	Cost of one gun if 10,000 are manufactured.....	12 88 5.5
	Cost of one gun if 20,000 are manufactured.....	12 47 6.8
	Cost of one gun if 40,000 are manufactured.....	12 27 2.4
	Cost of one gun if 50,000 are manufactured.....	12 23 1.5
	DIMENSIONS AND WEIGHT.	
	Length of musket without bayonet.....	Feet. Inches. 4 10 $\frac{1}{8}$
	Length of musket from breech to point of bayonet.....	5 6 $\frac{5}{8}$
	Length of stock.....	4 7 $\frac{1}{8}$
	Length of barrel.....	42 $\frac{27}{100}$
	Diameter of calibre at muzzle.....	$\frac{95}{100}$ to $\frac{95}{100}$
	Diameter of chamber at breech.....	$\frac{72}{100}$ to $\frac{73}{100}$
	Length of the chamber about.....	2 $\frac{2}{8}$
	Whole length of the bayonet.....	19 $\frac{1}{4}$
	Weight of musket with bayonet.....	Founds. Ounces. 10 12
	Weight of barrel with stud.....	4 11
	Weight of bayonet with half-socket.....	10 $\frac{1}{4}$

REMARKS.

In Baron Hackett's gun there is no rod. It is thought that though the rod is unnecessary in loading, it is indispensable in washing or cleaning the barrel. No estimate has been made for it. If it should be thought necessary to add the rod, its cost is about that of the common musket; also, if the rod should be added, there would be some additional expense in stocking, and some in altering the top band.

The whole number of parts will be found in the column of parts.

Estimate of the cost, &c., of Samuel Colt's musket, without bayonet or rod.

No. of parts.	Component parts.	Amount.
3	Barrels, with base, guide, and front sight.....	\$5 50 1.2
1	Belt hook	1 9.8
1	Stud for lever axis	1 9.2
1	Receiver with six chambers	3 50 3.1
6	Cones with vents for receiver.....	50 7.6
1	Axis with shield head.....	2 09 5.7
1	Index or ratchet	31 9.7
1	Index stay	6 0.1
1	Index stay screw	2 0.9
1	Hammer for index	9 3.6
1	Key for connecting barrel with axis.....	6 7.9
1	Key screw or stop for key	1 2
1	Tang	27 5
3	Tang-screw for iron	5 1.4
1	Tang-screw for wood	2 0.1
1	Lock plate	2 36 3.1
2	Lock plate screws	3 7.1
1	Bolt for stop to receiver.....	7 8.2
1	Bolt spring.....	5 0.2
1	Bolt spring screw.....	1 7.6
1	Lever for cocking	25 0.9
1	Screw for lever	1 2.3
1	Spring for lever	8 7.2
1	Screw for lever spring	1 4.7
1	Hand spring	5 2.9
1	Hand spring screw.....	1 6.2
1	Hammer.....	35 6.3
1	Hammer screw axis	2 1.4
1	Hammer link	5 1.9
1	Hammer link screw.....	1 9.4
1	Hammer spring.....	18 6
1	Hammer spring screw	1 9.6
1	Trigger	8 8.5
1	Trigger screw axis.....	2 1.4
1	Trigger spring.....	4 2.4
1	Trigger spring screw	1 3
1	Guard for trigger	32 0
2	Guard screws for iron.....	2 7
2	Rivets	1.2
1	Breech plate	24 8
2	Breech plate screws.....	4 3.1
1	Stock	92 5.7
55		17 93 2.6
	Case-hardening, polishing, and finishing.....	79 5.3
	Pay of officers, clerks, inspectors, machinist, jobbers, &c.....	1 50 6
		20 23 3.9
	Cost of one gun if 5,000 are manufactured.....	20 23 3.9
	Cost of one gun if 10,000 are manufactured	19 13 2.1
	Cost of one gun if 20,000 are manufactured	18 66 1.7
	Cost of one gun if 40,000 are manufactured	18 42 6.5
	Cost of one gun if 50,000 are manufactured.....	18 37 9.5

Estimate of the cost, &c., of Samuel Colt's musket, &c.—Continued.

DIMENSIONS AND WEIGHT.		Feet. Inches.
Length of the musket		5 $\frac{5}{8}$
Length of the stock		14 $\frac{7}{8}$
Length of the barrel		42.
Diameter of calibre at muzzle and breech		$\frac{33}{100}$ to $\frac{34}{100}$
Length of receiver with seven chambers		$\frac{3}{4}$
Diameter of chambers		$\frac{31}{100}$
Depth of chambers		3
Greatest exterior diameter of receiver		3 $\frac{1}{8}$
		Pounds. Ounces.
Weight of musket		15 5
Weight of barrel		5 11
Weight of receiver with seven chambers		4 0

REMARKS.

As it appeared to be the opinion of the board that a receiver with six chambers would be preferable to one with seven, in order to reduce the weight of the musket; and preferable, also, to reduce the length of the chambers so as to contain a charge of 100 grains of powder, with ball, &c.; and to reduce the length of the barrel so as to make its length correspond with the length of the present musket barrel, viz., 42 inches; the foregoing estimate has been predicated on these modifications, all of which would reduce the weight of the musket from 15 pounds 5 ounces to 13 pounds 9 ounces.

These modifications would also tend to reduce the cost of the musket, if the receiver were made of iron. But as it appeared to be the general opinion (which opinion is concurred in) that a receiver made of cast-steel would be preferable to one made of iron, in consequence of iron being more liable to have flaws and seams than cast-steel, and these flaws and seams having a tendency to render the charges liable to ignite each other from the interior of the calibre, (an instance of which is thought to have occurred in the examination at West Point,) it is proper to remark that the cost of the cast-steel will probably rather more than counterbalance the reduction of cost by the above-named modifications, though it will not materially add to the cost of the gun.

In the foregoing estimate, wrought iron has been substituted for malleable iron in all the components made of malleable iron in Colt's musket, which will make an additional item in the cost of the manufacture.

Colt's gun has neither bayonet nor rod. It is thought that though the rod is unnecessary in loading, it is indispensable in washing or cleaning the barrel. No estimate has been made for these parts. If it should be thought necessary to add them, their cost will be about the same as that of the bayonet and rod of the musket.

In consequence of Mr. Colt's statement, that, although the guide or rear sight on the gun presented for examination was made of three parts, it was not intended so for the ordinary manufacture of the musket, as it would be more expensive than that of the ordinary kind; in this estimate the guide has been called but one part, and corresponds with the one which was on the rifle and carbine he had with him.

The lock-plate, also, was called but one part, although the plate on the gun presented for examination consisted of two parts, there being a sort of scroll on the tang. This was mere fancy, and not intended as a model for ordinary manufacture of the musket.

The form of the present musket breech-plate was substituted for the one presented for examination on account of its being less expensive in the manufacture; and consequently two screws were estimated instead of three.

As it seemed to be the opinion that a receiver with six chambers would be preferable to one with seven, as noticed above, only six cones were estimated for.

If wrought iron were substituted for malleable iron, it would be found economical to make the guard of two pieces. In this estimate it has been considered as one part; but two rivets have been added to the number of pieces.

The number of parts in the gun presented for examination was fifty-eight; the number of parts intended to be examined, fifty-five; the number of parts actually estimated, by dispensing with one cone and one breech-plate screw, and by adding two rivets, amounted to fifty-five.

Although the guide has been estimated, it is considered to be of no more use to Colt's gun than it would be to the common musket, but rather an inconvenience in the manual exercise.

Estimate of the cost, &c., of Mr. Cochran's musket, without bayonet or rod.

No. of parts.	Component parts.	Amount.
2	Barrel, with front sight.....	\$2 96 7.5
1	Receiver.....	2 26 4.6
7	Cones.....	59 4.6
1	Axis for receiver.....	5 9.6
1	Lock or guard-plate.....	1 79 8.3
1	Lock or guard-plate screw.....	2 4.1
1	Strap for capping over receiver and axis.....	35 9.1
1	Strap-axis, or pin.....	1 6.7
1	Stop-bolt.....	7 2.3
1	Stop-bolt axis, or pin.....	1.0
1	Stop-bolt spring.....	3 6.0
1	Stop-bolt spring-screw.....	1 9.6
	Thumpiece. (This was made of <i>lectrum</i> , but is estimated as if made of iron, and in one piece with the bolt.)	
1	Hammer.....	24 4.6
1	Hammer-screw.....	2 0.7
1	Hammer-spring.....	13 9.2
1	Hammer-spring screw.....	1 9.7
1	Hammer-lifting spring.....	4 0.7
1	Hammer-lifting spring-screw.....	1 8.1
1	Sear, (acts as a trigger).....	18 0.2
1	Sear-axis pin.....	1 2.1
1	Sear-spring.....	2 3.4
1	Sear-spring screw.....	1 4.4
1	Tang-screw.....	1 9.7
1	Socket for tang-screw.....	3 3.5
1	Socket-pin.....	2.9
1	Separator, (brass).....	17 0.5
2	Separator-screws.....	3 1.2
1	Separator-washer, (copper).....	4 2.9
2	Separator-washer pins, (wires).....	7.5
1	Fence.....	15 0.7
2	Fence-screws, (for wood).....	3 3.6
1	Supporter, (brass).....	24 2.1
1	Supporter-screw—catch for strap.....	3 4.4
1	Supporter-screw, (for wood).....	1 9.3
1	Breech-plate.....	24 8.0
2	Breech-plate screws.....	4 3.1
1	Stock.....	87 1.9
48		10 87 7.8
	Case-hardening, polishing, and finishing.....	67 7.0
	Pay of officers, inspectors, clerks, machinist, jobbers, &c.....	1 50 6.0
		13 06 0.8
	Cost of one gun if 5,000 are manufactured.....	\$13 06 0.8
	Cost of one gun if 10,000 are manufactured.....	12 26 2.5
	Cost of one gun if 20,000 are manufactured.....	11 86 3.7
	Cost of one gun if 40,000 are manufactured.....	11 66 4.3
	Cost of one gun if 50,000 are manufactured.....	11 62 4.5
	DIMENSIONS AND WEIGHT.	
		Feet. Inches.
	Length of the musket.....	4 7 $\frac{1}{2}$
	Length of the stock.....	15 $\frac{3}{4}$
	Length of the barrel.....	36 $\frac{1}{2}$
	Diameter of calibre at muzzle.....	$\frac{67}{100}$ to $\frac{68}{100}$
	Exterior diameter of the receiver, with seven chambers.....	4 $\frac{1}{2}$
	Thickness of receiver, about.....	$\frac{1}{16}$
	Diameter of receiver about edge.....	$\frac{68}{100}$
	Diameter of receiver at bottom.....	$\frac{1}{2}$
		Pounds. Ounces.
	Weight of musket.....	11 14
	Weight of barrel.....	3 3
	Weight of receiver.....	3 1

REMARKS.

In this estimate, wrought iron has been substituted for malleable iron in all of those components made of malleable iron in Cochran's musket, which will tend rather to increase the cost of the gun.

The form of the common musket breech-plate was substituted for the one presented for examination, on account of its being less expensive to manufacture; and consequently two screws were estimated instead of three.

The stop-bolt consisted of two parts, in consequence of the thumbpiece being made of lectrum; but as this might be more economically made of iron, in one piece with the bolt, they have been estimated as one part.

Cochran's musket, also, has neither bayonet nor rod. It is thought that though the rod is unnecessary in loading, it is indispensable in washing or cleaning the barrel. No estimate has been made for these parts. If it is thought necessary to add them, their cost will be about the same as that of the bayonet and rod of the common musket.

The number of parts in Cochran's musket was.....	50
The number of parts estimated, by dispensing with the thumbpiece and breech-plate screw, amounts to.....	48

GENERAL REMARKS.

As there might, at first sight, appear too great a discrepancy in the cost of some of the screws of nearly the same size, it is thought proper to remark that, when the same tools would answer for various classes of screws, the cost of these tools has been thrown wholly or in part upon the first of these classes of screws estimated.

If arms were manufactured of the foregoing pattern, there might be an improvement made in the uniformity of the screws, which would tend to cheapen, as well as equalize, the cost of fabrication.

BENJAMIN MOOR.

HARPER'S FERRY, July 22, 1837.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 741.

[1ST SESSION.]

REGULATIONS AND EXPERIMENTS SHOWING THE MEANS AND MANNER OF TESTING, PROVING, AND BURSTING CANNON, UNDER THE DIRECTIONS OF THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE SEPTEMBER 19, 1837.

WAR DEPARTMENT, September 19, 1837.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a report of the colonel of ordnance, in answer to a resolution of the Senate of February 17, 1837, on the subject of the bursting of cannon at Major Clarke's foundery in July, 1833, and August, 1834.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Hon. R. M. JOHNSON, President of the Senate.

ORDNANCE OFFICE, Washington, July 13, 1837.

SIR: In obedience to your orders, and in conformity to the resolution of the Senate of February 17, 1837, directing that the facts concerning the bursting of 16 cannon at Major Clarke's foundery in July, 1833, and August, 1834, be reported, I have the honor to report:

First. The facts concerning the bursting of the 7 guns on the 18th of July, 1833, as follows:

Agreeably to orders from the Ordnance department, the inspectors of cannon (Lieut. Colonel. W. J. Worth and his assistant, Lieut. John Childe) being at the Bellona foundery on the 18th of July, 1833, in presence of Major Clarke, fully explained to him the regulations for proving cannon, informing him at the same time that if he had any objections to them, or to the manner of administering them, the inspectors would delay operations until further orders from the department could be received. The inspectors were permitted to proceed, and Major Clarke was requested to be present, and was present, at the proving of the powder, the weighing of the charges, and at the loading and discharging of the guns.

It should here be premised that, previous to this inspection of July 18, 1833, Colonel Worth and his assistant had made two inspections at the West Point foundery, two at the Pittsburg foundery, and one at the Columbian foundery in Georgetown, in which they had examined 118 guns, 9 of which burst in proving at the Pittsburg foundery. The metal of these bursted guns was afterwards admitted by the founders to be objectionable. Though they evidently were not aware of it until after the proof.—(For the remarks of the founders on this subject see letter of Messrs. McClurg, Wade & Co.)

The guns (32-pounders) of the inspection of July, 1833, were charged with powder and ball according to the following tabular statement, the details of which are in conformity with the regulations of November 29, 1832, which governed at that time.

Number of gun.	Proof range of powder for first charges.		First charges, (powder.)		Proof range of powder for second charges.		Second charges, (powder.)		No. burst.		Number of gun.	Proof range of powder for first charges.		First charges, (powder.)		Proof range of powder for second charges.		Second charges, (powder.)		No. burst.	
	yards.	lbs. oz.	yards.	lbs. oz.	yards.	lbs. oz.	yards.	lbs. oz.	First fire.	Second fire.		yards.	lbs. oz.	yards.	lbs. oz.	yards.	lbs. oz.	yards.	lbs. oz.	First fire.	Second fire.
257	268	18 3	269	13 10	293	237	20 7	294	236	20 8	264	14 3	
258	268	18 3	269	13 10	294	236	20 8	295	265	18 8	260	14 3	
259	267	18 5	269	13 10	295	265	18 8	296	248	20 1	259	14 4	
260	266	18 6	249	14 11	296	248	20 1	297	265	18 8	260	14 3	
261	238	20 6	255	14 6	297	265	18 8	298	265	18 8	262	14 1	
262	268	18 3	269	13 10	298	265	18 8	299	237	20 7	262	14 1	
263	238	20 6	249	14 11	299	237	20 7	300	260	18 15	259	14 4	
264	266	18 6	249	14 11	300	260	18 15	301	236	20 8	262	14 1	
265	252	19 14	269	13 10	301	236	20 8	302	236	20 8	
266	266	18 6	249	14 11	302	236	20 8	303	236	20 8	
267	266	18 6	249	14 11	303	236	20 8	304	264	18 9	247	14 13	
268	238	20 6	261	14 2	304	264	18 9	305	237	20 7	259	14 4	
269	268	18 3	249	14 11	305	237	20 7	306	264	18 9	260	14 3	
270	233	20 6	269	13 10	306	264	18 9	307	237	20 7	259	14 4	
271	266	18 6	268	13 10	307	237	20 7	308	247	19 12	
272	248	19 11	257	14 5	308	247	19 12	309	240	20 3	285	12 15	
273	268	18 3	269	13 10	309	240	20 3	310	245	19 13	259	14 4	
274	248	19 11	269	13 10	310	245	19 13	311	246	19 13	259	14 4	
275	268	18 3	269	13 10	311	246	19 13	312	245	19 13	
276	234	19 1	257	14 5	312	245	19 13	313	271	17 15	258	14 5	
277	268	18 3	269	13 10	313	271	17 15	314	247	19 12	285	12 15	
278	261	18 15	257	14 5	314	247	19 12	315	245	19 13	252	14 9	
279	268	18 3	257	14 5	315	245	19 13	316	247	19 12	285	12 15	
280	268	18 3	269	13 10	316	247	19 12	317	271	17 15	259	14 4	
281	268	18 3	269	13 10	317	271	17 15	318	240	20 3	285	12 15	
282	265	18 3	257	14 5	318	240	20 3	319	258	19 1	252	14 9	
283	265	18 8	319	258	19 1	320	240	20 3	285	12 15	
284	248	19 11	257	14 5	320	240	20 3	321	258	19 1	271	13 18	
285	264	18 9	321	258	19 1	322	271	17 15	285	12 15	
286	258	19 4	262	14 1	322	271	17 15	323	258	19 1	258	14 5	
287	261	18 13	262	14 1	323	258	19 1	324	258	19 1	247	14 13	
288	261	18 13	262	14 1	324	258	19 1	325	240	20 3	258	14 5	
289	248	19 11	262	14 1	325	240	20 3	326	271	17 15	252	14 9	
290	264	18 9	263	14 1	326	271	17 15	327	245	19 13	252	14 9	
291	237	20 7	260	14 3	327	245	19 13	328	252	19 7	252	14 9	
292	264	18 9	269	13 10	328	252	19 7	

Extract from the report of the inspectors of July, 1833, marked "B."

These guns were proved with Dupont powder; the charges regulated in strict conformity with tables furnished by the Ordnance department. Twenty barrels of proving powder were recently forwarded to Bellona from Frankford arsenal, where it had been carefully proved by the standard eprouvette. The remainder, about seven barrels, was drawn from the magazine at Bellona and carefully reprovved immediately before use. It will be perceived that, generally, the guns conform in measurement very closely to the established patterns. Seven guns burst in proof—six at the first, and one at the second discharge. In several instances the evidence was very conclusive that the breaking had been caused or accelerated by the breaking and wedging of the shot. Two shot and two wads were used at both discharges, agreeably to regulations.

W. J. WORTH, *Brevet Lieut. Col., Major of Ordnance and Inspector.*
JNO. CHILDE, *Lieutenant and Assistant Inspector.*

Second. The facts concerning the bursting of the nine guns on the 7th of August, 1834, as follows: The two inspecting officers (Lieut. Col. Worth and Lieut. Maynadier) being at Major Clarke's foundry on the above date, in obedience to orders from the Ordnance office, fifty-eight 32-pounder guns were presented for inspection. Forty-two, however, were only proved, the proof being discontinued at the instance of the founder. The powder used in proving these guns was most carefully proved on the ground by the inspectors, and the charges weighed by them in presence of the founder. The powder was of Dupont's manufacture, except that used in eight charges for the second fire, and was selected from the lowest range on hand at the Frankford arsenal.

As stated in the facts concerning the former bursting, (of July, 1833,) the regulations were fully explained to the founder; he was also informed that if he had any objections to the regulations, or to the manner of administering them, the inspectors would await the further orders of the department. The founder was also requested by the inspectors to be present, and was actually present, and assisted in proving the powder, weighing the charges, and in loading and discharging the guns. Of the 42 guns proved, 9 burst—eight at the first and one at the second fire.

As Major Clarke had been unfortunate in the inspection of July, 1833, and as he was prejudiced

against the method of ascertaining the strength of the powder, (by the use of the established eprouvette,) no means were left untried to arrive at the greatest practicable accuracy. Major Clarke formerly made great objections to the use of two round shot in proving his guns, to the breaking and wedging of which he attributed the bursting of his guns. *On this occasion*, at his request, cylindrical shot were used, except (at his suggestion) in the last three guns tried, two of which broke in like manner with the preceding. The eprouvette used in proving the powder was perfectly new, and from less use doubtless gave greater ranges (and consequently greater reductions in quantity by the tables) than that of the same series in use at the Frankford arsenal.

The guns (32-pounders) of the inspection of August, 1834, were charged with powder and ball according to the following tabular statement, the details of which are in conformity with the regulations of November 29, 1832, which governed at that time.

No. of gun.	First proof.			Second proof.			Burst.	
	Proof range of powder.	Weight of charge.	Weight of shot.	Proof range of powder.	Weight of charge.	Weight of shot.	First fire.	Second fire.
329	yards. 273	lbs. oz. 17 13½	lbs. oz. 66 3	yards. 276	lbs. oz. 13 5	lbs. oz. 65 12
330	225	21 5	66 7	276	13 5	66 2
331	273	17 13½	66 4	276	13 5	65 9
332	275	17 13½	66 00	276	13 5	66 7
333	273	17 13½	66 7	276	13 5	65 14
334	225	21 5	66 6	273	13 6½	66 4
335	276	17 11	66 2	269	13 10	66 2
336	273	17 13½	66 3	1
337	225	21 5	66 6	276	13 5	65 6
338	225	21 5	66 5	269	13 10	66 00
339	255	19 4	65 14	269	13 10	65 10
340	255	19 4	66 4	269	13 10	66 4
341	242	20 1	66 10	276	13 5	66 00
342	242	20 1	65 1	259	13 10	66 1
343	255	19 4	66 4	269	13 10	66 00
344	255	19 4	65 1	226	15 15	66 4
345	226	21 4	65 1	276	13 5	66 1
346	226	21 4	66 13	269	13 10	66 12
347	255	19 4	66 00	279	13 3½	66 00
348	276	17 11	66 00	276	13 5	66 4
349	242	20 1	66 00	279	13 3½	66 7
350	242	20 1	66 00	276	13 5	65 12
351	276	17 11	66 11	279	13 3½	66 4
352	226	21 4	66 00	276	13 5	66 6
353	226	21 4	66 6	279	13 3½	66 4
354	279	17 9	66 00	1
355	284	17 5	65 14	261	14 2	66 00
356	281	17 7	66 2	245	14 14	66 00
357	284	17 5	66 00	1
358	281	17 7	66 9	1
359	284	17 5	66 00	261	14 2	66 00
360	281	17 7	66 6	1
361	281	17 7	66 00	261	14 2	66 00
362	281	17 7	66 00	261	14 2	66 00
363	281	17 7	65 10	261	14 2	66 4
364	279	17 9	65 12	245	14 14	66 00
365	226	21 4	66 4	1
366	284	17 5	66 12	261	14 2	66 00
367	284	17 5	66 10	245	14 14	66 4	1
368	277	17 10	67 6	277	13 4	67 6
369	277	17 10	67 6	1
370	277	17 10	67 6	1

Extract from the report of the inspectors of August 7, 1834.

The founder ascribes the failure of his guns to excessive proof-charges. The inspectors entertain a different opinion, and ascribe the result to defect, either in the metal or in the manner of working it, in which they were sustained by the nature of the fractures. Specimens were preserved, and have been since submitted to experienced founders, who, without knowing anything of the circumstances, or whence they came, at once decided that the metal was good, but had been injured and rendered unfit for gun-metal in melting and casting; that the result arises from this cause cannot be doubted, when it is remembered that the cannon at other founderies are subjected to the like proof, and for the past year without failure. The three last guns were charged with two round shot, and the others with one cylindrical shot, for the weight of which see face of the report.

W. J. WORTH, *Brevet Lieut. Col., Major Ordnance, Inspector.*
WM. MAYNADIER, *Lieut., Assistant Inspector of Ordnance.*

The following is a letter from Messrs. McClurg, Wade & Co. on this subject:

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1836.

Sir: In compliance with the request contained in your letter of yesterday, we have to state that Colonel Worth inspected cannon at our works first in December, 1833, also in June and October, 1834, making six inspections in all.

In our opinion these inspections were always conducted with the greatest care, attention, and accuracy by the inspecting officer. He always invited our personal attention to all the proceedings, and desired us to point out anything which we might consider objectionable, or as not being in accordance with the regulations. We have not, however, on any occasion, made any objection to the proceedings of the inspectors, nor to any part of them, being always fully satisfied that they were in strict conformity with the established regulations.

At the inspection made in 1832, the first conducted by Colonel Worth, several of our cannon failed to stand the required proof, and nine burst. All the cannon cast since that inspection, amounting to one hundred and forty-seven in all, have stood the proof, not a single failure having occurred in guns since that time.

We have never attributed the failure of some of the guns cast in 1832, and the undeviating success of all cast since, to any difference in the mode or the accuracy of proving the several parcels, but to a difference in the quality of the material used. When the failure occurred we attributed it to the quality of the iron; and since that time we have taken very good care not to use any iron the strength of which was in the least degree doubtful. This difference in results we have always attributed to our own care and attention in selecting materials, and not to any want of either on the part of the inspecting officers.

Respectfully, your obedient servants,

McCLURG, WADE & CO.

Colonel G. BOMFORD, *Ordnance Office.*

The following are the answers of G. Kemble, esq., of the West Point foundery, in his letter of the 20th of June, 1836, to the queries propounded to him by this office:

1st query. Please state the number of inspections made by Colonel Worth at your establishment, and their periods.

2d query. Your opinion as to the care, accuracy, and attention with which those inspections were conducted?

In answer to the first query, Colonel Worth acted as inspector of ordnance in the years 1833 and 1834; during which time he made four inspections of guns and shot at the West Point foundery, viz: On the 13th of May, 1833; on the 1st of July, 1833; on the 24th of May, 1834, and on the 2d of July, 1834.

In answer to the second query, it becomes me to state that no officer could be more accurate in his examinations, or more attentive to every point relating to the proof, than was Colonel Worth throughout the whole of these inspections.

Such are the facts of these two cases of bursting. They have been collected with great care from original reports of inspectors, letters, &c., marked A, B, C, D, E, and K, accompanied herewith.

Before proceeding to examine the facts of these cases, it should be stated that the 16 guns which burst out of 114 examined must have failed either in consequence of a defective regulation proof, or of incapacity or culpability in the inspectors; in either of which suppositions Major Clarke would be fairly entitled to remuneration from the government—that is to say:

First. The regulation charges, under which they failed, may have been excessive, and, though accurately measured and determined in practice by the inspectors, they may have been so powerful as to destroy guns equal in strength to those which the United States were then receiving from other foundries. In this case the regulation would be objectionable, and Major Clarke fairly entitled to compensation.

Second. On the other hand, the regulation charges may have been good and unobjectionable, but by the neglect of the inspectors they may not have been used in practice; and in this case the fault would be with the inspectors, and Major Clarke be in consequence clearly entitled to compensation.

It is obvious that under no other than one of these two cases could Major Clarke be entitled to any remuneration.

Let us now proceed to examine the first of these suppositions, that we may determine if the regulation charges were really excessive.

To do this, it will be necessary to look into the composition and strength of the proof-charges, and the recorded statements of their effects or general results, at the various founderies where they have been used during the whole period of their adoption by the government.

Were the proof-charges excessive?

Proof-charges.—The first guns, under the new system of sea-coast artillery, were cast in 1826, and were proved, each, with two regulation proof-charges, as follows:

1st charge.—Two-thirds weight of shot in powder, two junk-wads, and two shot.

2d charge.—One-half weight of shot in powder, two junk-wads, and two shot; the proof of powder being never less than 200 yards by the eprouvette then in use.

This regulation continued in operation until that of the 29th of November, 1832, (accompanied herewith,) which was as follows: 1st and 2d charges, same as above. The proof of powder being not less than 190, nor more than 290 yards by the new eprouvette, the standard being 225 yards.

This latter regulation continued in force until rescinded by the regulations existing at the present time, adopted by the board of ordnance, and under date of the 1st of May, 1834. This last went into operation at the founderies on the 1st July, 1835, after the bursting of the sixteen guns, and was as follows:

1st and 2d charges, same as above; but the proof of powder increased so as not to exceed 300 yards, nor be less than 200 yards; the standard being 250 yards.

Powder, proof-charges.—The above regulation of the 29th November, 1832, under which the sixteen guns burst, was not intended to increase, nor did it increase the charges, but rather the contrary, as will be seen. It was intended—

First. To restate the proof ranges of the powder intended for the proving of cannon which had been changed by the then recent adjustment of the eprouvettes, that had been effected with great care. By this adjustment, the powder, which was 200 yards by the old eprouvette, became 225, without any increase of strength by the new eprouvette; and as none could be used in the proof of cannon less than 200 yards before the adjustment, so it would have appeared reasonable that none should have been used after it of

a strength less than 225 yards; yet so favorable was the regulation to the founders, that it admitted powder so low as 190 yards, and so high as 290; 225 yards being the standard proof. But as the new eprouvette gave proof ranges for the same powder $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent greater than those of the old, it is hence perceived that the above minimum proof range of 190 yards, (new eprouvette,) is equal to $166\frac{1}{2}$ yards of the old eprouvette; and thus it is seen that the minimum powder authorized under the new regulations was really about 35 yards less in strength than the minimum powder of the old regulations, which was 200 yards.

Second. It was intended to remedy some inconveniences which had arisen in practice since 1826. The inspectors could not always command powder of a proof exactly 200 yards, and were, in consequence, often obliged to use powder ranging between that proof and the proof of 250 yards and higher; and thus, for this increase of strength, a proportional reduction in quantity became necessary. It was the object of the regulations of 1832 to point out in a scientific way, and with great precision, the amount of this reduction, in every possible case of increased strength; and it was therefore a measure calculated to favor the founders, as well as to assure the government, since it would prevent the mistake of using too great a quantity of very strong powder, or too small a quantity of very weak powder, in the proof of cannon. The regulation was drawn up on scientific principles, with great care, and in conformity with the most exact experimental results. It accompanies this paper, marked M.

Thus, then, while the three regulations provide the same *weight of standard powder*, the same weight of metal, and the same wads, they exhibit the maximum, minimum, and standard powder as follows, by the new eprouvette now in use:

Date of regulation.	Maximum proof range.	Standard proof range.	Minimum proof range.
Regulation of 1826.....	300 yards	225 yards	225 yards
Regulation of 1832.....	300 yards	225 yards	190 yards
Regulation of 1834.....	300 yards	250 yards	200 yards

As, therefore, the maximum proof ranges are equal as well as all the other elements of the proof-charges, except the *standard* and *minimum* proof ranges, the force of the charges under the three regulations must vary as these latter. But the standard proof ranges of the regulations of 1826 and 1832 being equal, the force of the proof-charges, under those regulations, will be as the minimum proof ranges, which, in the regulation of 1832, being 35 yards less than those of 1826, the proof-charges of the former regulation should be less than those of the regulation of 1826, while those of the regulation of 1834, now in force, are probably the strongest of all. Hence, it is very clear that the proof-charges used under the regulation of 1832, with which the sixteen guns were burst, were really of powder weaker than those which either preceded or followed them.

So much for the powder-proof of proof-charges.

We next consider their *effects or general results at the founderies*. They divide themselves into three parts, viz:

Those under the regulation of 1826, those under the regulation of 1832, and those under the regulation of 1834; and are exhibited in the following tabular statement:

At what foundery.	By what officer inspected.	Number and description of cannon presented.			Number rejected.	Number burst.	Total No. received.
		24-pounders.	32-pounders.	42-pounders.			
<i>Under the regulation of 1826.</i>							
Georgetown, D. C.....	Colonel Bankhead.....	248	216	2	1 32-pounder.....	465
Bellona foundery.....do.....	145	256	1 32 and 2 24-pound'rs.	398
West Point foundery.....do.....	269	217	486
Pittsburg foundery.....do.....	13	13
<i>Under the regulation of 1832.</i>							
Georgetown, D. C.....	Colonel Worth.....	91	91
Bellona foundery.....do.....	114	16 32 pounders.....	98
West Point foundery.....do.....	90	90
Pittsburg foundery.....do.....	160	4 32-pounders.....	9 32-pounders.....	147
<i>Under the regulation of 1834.</i>							
Georgetown, D. C.....	Captain Ripley.....	37	5	22	64
Bellona foundery.....do.....	4	76	3 24-pounders.....	1 24-pounder.....	76
West Point foundery.....do.....	52	49do.....	100
Pittsburg foundery, Penn.....do.....	97	11	2 24-pounders.....	106

RECAPITULATION.

Under the regulation of—	Number of guns presented for inspection and proof.	Number burst.	Number rejected.	Number burst and rejected.	Number received.
1826.....	1,366	4	4	1,362
November 29, 1832.....	455	25	4	29	426
May 1, 1834.....	353	2	5	7	346
Total.....	2,174	31	9	40	2,134

In examining this table with a view to the proof-charges, several forcible views are presented:

First. It is seen above that the 16 guns were burst under the regulation of 1832, and that the powder used under the preceding or following regulations was clearly stronger than that used under the regulation of 1832. It is hence obvious that the 2,174 guns submitted for proof during the last eleven years were proved with charges either *equal to or greater* than those with which the 16 guns were burst. And it is remarkable that during this long period, out of so great a number presented for proof, only 31 should have burst; and that, out of these 31, nine should be admitted by the Pittsburg founders to be of defective metal; 2 should never be complained of by the West Point and Georgetown founders; 4 should never be complained of by Major Clarke; and that only 16 should have the proof contested by Major Clarke; total burst, 31.

Thus, out of the 2,174 guns submitted for proof, *sixteen* only have been contested—that is to say, one gun of every 136.

There can be no doubt as to the truth of this remarkable fact. Can it prove that the charges are excessive, and ought in consequence to be reduced?

Is it not much more reasonable to infer that the sixteen guns were too weak than that charges, which burst only one gun of one hundred and thirty-six, are too strong? Are we to say “the charges are too strong because the gun breaks?” or shall we not rather say the gun is too weak because the charges have been sanctioned and tested by an experience so uniform and ample? Are we to measure the gun by the charges, or the charges by the guns in a case like this? In reality, this fact can never be a reason for reducing the proof-charges, though it may be in favor of their increase.

Second. But let us compare the effects of the proof-charges at the several founderies one with another. They were made up from the same elements and fired by the same inspectors, under circumstances in all respects as exactly the same as it was possible. These effects ought, therefore, to be a correct measure of the force of the proof-charges, as well as of the relative skill of the founders; and perhaps this is the best view that could be taken of the subject.

The tables show that, since the adoption of the new sea-coast artillery, there have burst at the Bellona foundery, where the sixteen guns burst, 20 guns out of 595—that is, 1 out of every 29.

At the Pittsburg foundery, employed only during the last five years, 9 guns out of 281—that is, 1 out of every 31.

At the Georgetown foundery 1 gun out of 621—that is, 1 out of 621.

At the West Point foundery 1 gun out of 677—that is, 1 out of 677.

Thus, with the same proof-charges and the same inspectors, the guns at Bellona foundery (one of the oldest employed) have suffered greater failures than at any one of the other three founderies; and very much greater than either of the other old founderies of West Point or Georgetown. What can be the reason of this evident difference in the strength of the guns made at the different founderies? Does it not prove the existence, in the manufacture or in the material, of causes of weakness at the Bellona foundery which do not exist at the others? The guns made at that foundery, which sustain the proof, are no doubt good and sufficient for all the purposes of war; but these facts certainly show them to be inferior in strength to those made at the other founderies. If the proof-charges be excessive at the Bellona foundery, why are they not so at the others? Why, indeed, do the other founders make no complaint? Why are they perfectly satisfied with the charges? Is this great difference in the resistance of the guns, attributable to the fault of the founder or to excessive proof-charges? If it be to the latter, why have not the same failures appeared at the other founderies where the same charges have been used?

Notwithstanding these striking facts, the subject of reducing the proof-charges is agitated by the founder contesting the proof of the sixteen guns. Let us see what would be the ultimate effects or consequences of such a reduction.

The manufacture of cannon, in consequence of the great difficulties of the operation, is become, in Europe as well as in this country, a profession to which men devote their lives; and which requires extensive aids from chemistry, natural philosophy, and the mathematics. These difficulties arise from the great stress which, by means of gunpowder, is necessarily applied to iron, and to which the strength of the iron must be constantly proportional. But the prodigious increase in the strength of gunpowder during the last twenty years has increased proportionally this stress upon the iron used in cannon; and has thus rendered the strength required in that material proportionally greater, and the profession of a founder much more difficult than formerly. These difficulties are considered so great in the United States, and the procuring good guns for the national defences has been deemed a subject of so much importance, that the government has found it advisable to employ only four founders out of the great number now in the United States; this being done in order that these founders might employ all their time and talents upon a subject of so much difficulty.

So soon, therefore, as we reduce the proof-charges for cannon, the founders will not have the same difficulties to surmount with the new as with the old proof-charges; and, as a matter of course, will reduce their expenditures proportionally. For assuredly they will curtail the expenditures corresponding to the difficulties to be surmounted in the heavier proof-charges, and make only the lighter expenditures corresponding to the lesser difficulties of the lighter proof-charges. Thus the guns will be inevitably weakened, while the government yet pay the same prices for their cannon.

This is a consequence of reduction which can in no way be avoided. Does the government want weaker cannon at the same prices? Would it not be preferable to pay higher prices, if a change be at all necessary, and continue the guns of the same unexceptionable strength as at present? In this manner the unskilful founder might devote greater expenditures, to overcome, without loss, the difficulties of the manufacture.

Finally, seeing that a change in the proof-charges would necessarily produce a change in the manufactures at the founderies; that it would unsettle the existing state of their operations, which are admitted to be accompanied by the most successful results in the manufacture of cannon; seeing that, by the use of these proof-charges for a long series of years, they have given us a system of sea-coast artillery of unexampled strength and beauty of construction; that under this system of proof we have received upwards of 2,000 cannon, and expended nearly a million of dollars: shall we, at this late date, abandon what has proved to be good and unexceptionable, and commit ourselves to uncertainty and the hazards of new rules, which, whether they be those of France or England, (different the one from the other,) will, as they are different from our own, unavoidably produce a change in our manufactures? and which, while they cannot produce better guns, may, and most probably will, produce those which are worse; for it must not be forgotten that the English and French proofs agree only in the use of one shot. They differ

in the important points of *quantity of powder*, and in the *number of discharges*, while those of England and the United States differ in the *quantity of metal* and in the *quantity of powder*, but agree in the number of discharges ; and it is as difficult to compare those of France and Great Britain, and to say which is the greater, as it is to compare those of Great Britain and the United States. It is known, too, that, corresponding to these different proof-charges, there is a marked difference in the metal of the three nations ; the Swedish metal used in France being better than the English, and the English metal manifestly different from our own. Long experience of these several states in their different proof-charges show them to be good, and severally applicable to their different metal, and they therefore have made no changes. Why, then, shall we displace our own, and take the English or French proof? They have, indeed, been found good for metal different from our own ; but, upon our metal, they must necessarily produce different results, which we cannot predict to be good or evil, as we only know that by this change we lay aside that which is certainly good, to take up with that which is not only uncertain, but from which there would be high probability of error and consequent disaster to the country. Besides, if we adopt the English or French proof-charges, why may we not also go on and adopt the entire system of the French or English sea-coast artillery, with all its different dimensions and different apparatus? They are equally applicable to our system of fortifications ; and if their proof-charges be good for our artillery, (so different in size from theirs,) they would be still better for their artillery adopted by us.

But it is urged with great earnestness that the American proof-charges are much more powerful than those of Great Britain ; and it is hence pretended to be inferred that they are unfit to be used in the proof of cannon. Now, although it has been clearly shown by unquestionable recorded results, extending through a series of years, obtained at various founderies, while controlled by different superintendents, and without complaint from the latter, that these charges have been adequate to all the purposes of government, and are in no way objectionable, yet, for your satisfaction, it may be proper to exhibit them by the side of those of Great Britain. They are so exhibited below :

British proof-charges for heavy cannon.

Calibres.	Weight.	Average weight.	First charge.		Second charge.	
			Powder in lbs. and ounces.	Powder in parts of the weight of the balls.	Powder in lbs. and ounces.	Powder in parts of the weight of the balls.
42-pounder	<i>Pounds.</i> 7,308	<i>Pounds.</i> 7,308	25 0	.595	25 0	.595
32-pounder	6,240	5,792	21 8	.671	21 8	.671
Do	5,344		21 8	.671	21 8	.671
24-pounder	5,616	5,076	18 0	.750	18 0	.750
Do	5,328		18 0	.750	18 0	.750
Do	4,872		18 0	.750	18 0	.750
Do	4,488		18 0	.750	18 0	.750
18-pounder	4,716	4,464	15 0	.833	15 0	.833
Do	4,212		15 0	.833	15 0	.833

REMARKS.—For each charge of each gun, one shot and two high junk-wads.

American proof-charges for heavy cannon, used in the proof of Major Clarke's guns.

Calibres.	Weight.	Average weight.	First charge.		Second charge.	
			Powder in lbs. and ounces.	Powder in parts of the weight of the balls.	Powder in lbs. and ounces.	Powder in parts of the weight of the balls.
42-pounder	<i>Pounds.</i> 8,704	28 0	.666	21 0	.500
32-pounder	7,584	21 4	.666	16 0	.500
24-pounder	5,595	16 0	.666	12 0	.500

REMARKS.—For each charge of each gun, two shot and two junk-wads.

In examining these tables, we at once see a remarkable difference, in the great weapon of the two nations, to consist in the weights of the different calibres.

42-pounders.—That of the American 42-pounder is 1,396 pounds heavier than that of the English, or heavier by about one-fifth of the English gun.

32-pounders.—In the 32-pounders the differences are still greater. The American 32-pounder is heavier than the heaviest English 32-pounder by 1,344 pounds—that is, heavier by one-fourth or one-fifth of the heaviest English 32-pounder. And the same American gun is heavier than the lightest English 32-pounder by the enormous difference of 2,240 pounds; thus making the American 32-pounder about one-half or one-third heavier than the lightest English 32-pounder, (and this, it may be remarked, is the calibre that burst at Major Clarke's foundery.)

24-pounders.—The English have as many as four different calibres of 24-pounders; the heaviest being about equal in weight to that of the United States, and the lightest 1,147 pounds lighter than the Ameri-

can gun, which is thus about one-fourth of the English gun heavier, and about 500 pounds heavier than the average weight of the four English 24-pounders. A further view of calibres in English sea-coast artillery is not taken, as we have not as yet cast any 18-pounders.

Thus, while the average weight of the three English calibres is but 5,392 pounds, that of the same three American calibres is 7,294 pounds. And as the principal of these calibres have near about the same length with the American guns, they must consequently have a thickness of metal considerably less; and hence (supposing the material and workmanship equal) the American gun, having a greater thickness of metal, would require and should sustain proof-charges proportionally greater than those for the English guns.

The government of the United States, therefore, having, upon principle, and after due consideration, adopted a system of sea-coast artillery of a weight and thickness of metal considerably greater than those in use in Great Britain for the same calibres, there would hence appear very powerful reasons why the American proof-charges should be greater than those in use for like calibres in the British empire. Yet, on examination, it is a matter of doubt which proof-charges are upon the whole the greater—those of Great Britain or of the United States.

It is perceived, on examining these tables, that the English use two charges to each gun, with one shot and two high junk wads to each charge; that the Americans, in like manner, use two charges and two junk wads to each gun, differing from the English, however, in using two shot in each charge.

42-pounders.—As regards the English 42-pounder, it has the first charge of powder three pounds less than that of the United States for this calibre, and the second charge four pounds greater; but it should be remembered that that is 1,400 lighter than the American 42-pounder.

32-pounders.—The first charges of the American and English 32-pounders are about the same; but the second charge for this calibre of the English piece is 21 pounds 8 ounces, while that for the American piece is only 16 pounds; the latter gun being, notwithstanding, 2,240 pounds heavier than the lightest English 32-pounder, and heavier than the heaviest by 1,344 pounds.

24-pounders.—The English 24-pounder has 18 pounds for the first charge, while that of the American gun of the same calibre has only 16 pounds for this charge; and in the second charge of this calibre the difference is still greater, the English charge being 6 pounds greater than the American, while it must not be forgotten that the American gun is 1,147 pounds heavier than the lightest English gun of this calibre, and 500 pounds heavier than the average weight of the English guns of this calibre.

18-pounders.—With regard to the 18-pounder, the Americans have not yet finally fixed on the dimensions of this piece; but its proof-charges have been established to be in the same proportion as for the sea-coast artillery. The English first charge for this piece being 15 pounds, is 3 pounds heavier than the American second charge, which would make it two-thirds greater than the American second charge—the English being 15 pounds and the American 9 pounds.

It thus appears that in Great Britain the proof-charges of powder are variant, being comparatively high with single shot; while in the United States the proof-charges of powder are uniform, but comparatively low with double shot, our artillery being much heavier, having greater thickness of metal.

From all which we would conclude, with regard to the proof-charges, that they are far from being excessive, and ought not to be reduced; and this conclusion is confirmed by the able report, (marked L,) on the same subject, of Major General Macomb and Brigadier General Wool, who state: "We believe there must have been some defect in the guns which did not stand the proof. The fact that so many guns have stood the prescribed proof at Bellona arsenal, as well as at every other foundry, is a strong presumption that the proof to which the guns have been subjected is not too great."

If it be shown by these investigations that *the proof-charges were not excessive*, we have next the further question (under the second division of the subject) to examine, viz:

Were the proof-charges accurately measured and correctly used by the inspectors?

To make this examination, we must inquire, from the facts in the case—

First, if the inspectors had the necessary ability, experience, and carefulness for the transaction of such business; and, *secondly*, if they were culpable, either from public or private motives.

The inspectors were both selected for their general ability and experience. Those of the senior inspector were undoubted, and generally acknowledged. He had been selected to command in some of the most important stations in the army, the cadets at West Point, in the artillery school of practice at Fortress Monroe, and, lastly, for the command of one of the largest arsenals of munitions of war in the country, viz: that at Frankford, Pennsylvania. In the latter situations his information in the affairs of the ordnance, which was before more general, became now necessarily more particular, exact, and in detail; and he was in consequence selected to superintend the operations in inspection of cannon at the foundries. His rank, besides, to which the government, impressed with his abilities and services, had recently advanced him in the ordnance department, gave him a claim to this position in the inspections.

In addition to these views of general ability and experience, the senior inspector had acquired much detailed experience in the proof of cannon immediately before proceeding with the July inspection of Major Clarke, in which seven guns were burst. The facts show that he had, before that inspection, inspected the other three foundries, and proved 118 cannon; and *that* without the slightest objection on the part of the founders, although one of them had nine cannon burst and four rejected.

It must be remarked here, with regard to the bursting of these last-mentioned cannon, that the transaction shows, in a striking manner, the ability and experience manifested by the senior inspector, and their remarkable advantages to the government in the detection of defective cannon, and in the improvement in the manufacture which followed.

The report shows two inspections at the Pittsburg foundry by the senior inspector, preceding the July inspection of Major Clarke. In the first, seven guns were burst, and in the second, two. But though the founders seem to have been satisfied, by the result, that the guns were of defective metal, yet they thought it well to be better assured of the fact, and accordingly presented, with thirty-one other cannon of superior metal, two of the metal of the burst guns. The inspectors knew nothing of any difference in the metal. The thirty-one cannon stood the proof, but the two, of different metal, burst; which perfectly assured the founders of their defective metal.—(See their letter on this subject, page 485.)

It is not, perhaps, possible to exhibit a stronger case going to establish ability, carefulness, experience, and knowledge of his business, in an inspection of cannon. Here, without previously knowing

anything of the metal, he detected the existence of defective metal in two several instances, to the great advantage of the government, and the entire satisfaction of the founders. As a consequence, not a gun has burst at the foundery since, although the proof-charges have been since increased.—(On this subject, of the fitness of the inspector, see also the answers of G. Kemble, esq., page 485.)

The senior inspector did not, therefore, appear at the Bellona arsenal without much experience of a detailed and specific character in the proof of cannon. Having arrived at the foundery, how did he conduct himself? He requested Major Clarke to be present at the proof, as well as at all the operations preceding it. The regulations, all the preparatory operations, were proposed to be explained to him, to any extent he might desire. He had the power to stop the proof or other operations at any moment, and to refer any point of objection to the proper department. Yet Major Clarke, having full power to stop the inspectors, either in the proof or in the initiatory operations, and to correct them in all points, did not do so, until they had proceeded to the extent noted in the facts. The conduct of the inspectors was in accordance with the regulations; it was formal, regular, and uniform. They proceeded, step by step, in the most detailed manner, especially in the second inspection. The proof of each barrel of powder is given in their tables, made upon the spot, and the exact amount, in pounds and ounces, of each of the proof-charges for each gun, according to the strength of each barrel from which it was drawn. All this detailed information is given in the facts, which exhibit a laborious attention to particulars which would seem to leave no room to doubt of the exactness of the inspectors; and yet, in the July inspection, seven guns were burst out of the seventy-two proved.

But if, in the first inspection in which the seven guns were burst, there was no reason to believe that the inspectors had committed errors in the proof, it was still less probable in the second inspection; in which (in consequence of the complaints made by Major Clarke about the result of the first inspection) unusual and extraordinary efforts were made by the inspectors to attain the greatest possible correctness in everything, and yet *nine* guns burst in the second inspection, out of the forty-two proved.

We see in this second (or August) inspection at Major Clarke's foundery the same laborious attention to minute details in the correspondence of the weight of all the charges with the proof of each barrel of powder, and with the tables of proof-charges furnished from this office. We see, also, that to please Major Clarke, and at his suggestion, cylinder instead of round shot were used; that the powder was proved and all the other operations performed in his presence; and that he was invited to see and to object freely to any and everything not clearly correct. Under such circumstances it does not seem possible that the inspectors could have committed an error in a matter so plain, and especially after so much conversation and complaint, on the part of the founder, because of the previous bursting.

But why should we not consider the bursting to proceed not from a mistake, but from defective metal? Only a short time before we see that seven guns out of twenty burst at Pittsburg by the same inspectors and the same charges, the founders inferring, *from the bursting*, that it was in consequence of defective metal; and that they were right in this inference is proved by the fact that from that proving they proceeded to improve their metal, and although two hundred and fifteen guns have been proved since with higher-charges, not one has burst. Is there any difference between the case of Pittsburg, in which seven out of twenty burst, and that of Major Clarke, in which sixteen out of one hundred and fourteen burst? The Pittsburg founders did not, prior to the proof, certainly know of the existence of defective metal any more than did Major Clarke, but they (as the result showed) rightly *inferred that* from the proof; and why should we not make the same inference in the case of Major Clarke, who has also had eighty cannon proved since with higher charges, and without bursting? The cases are precisely alike; only in the former the proof-charges are admitted by the founders to be the tests of the goodness of the metal, which the subsequent proofs of two hundred and fifteen guns have confirmed; and in the latter they are denied by Major Clarke to be so upon vague, indefinite, and general grounds.

But if it be shown that the inspectors had the necessary ability, experience, and carefulness for the transaction of such business, it becomes necessary next to inquire if they were *culpable* either from public or private motives. And here it should be remarked, that no accusation of the kind has been even distantly alluded to against them. Universally acknowledged by all who know them to be correct and honorable in all things, wholly unconnected in their pecuniary relations with the other three founders and with the other departments of the ordnance, it is impossible even to suppose that they could be influenced by unworthy motives.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

G. BOMFORD, *Colonel of Ordnance.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

P. S.—All the papers not named in the above report, and having reference to the subject, are also herewith transmitted, marked as follows: Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24.

A.—INSPECTION OF CANNON, BELLONA FOUNDRY, AUGUST 7, 1834.

Dimensions and proof of forty-two 32-pounder iron cannon, manufactured by Major John Clarke, Bellona foundry, for the United States.

Variation allowed.	Diameters not turned, $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{More, } .20. \\ \text{Less, } .10. \end{array} \right.$									
	a a. Diameter of the cascablo.	b b. Diameter of the neck of the cascablo.	c c. Diameter of the fillet of the cascablo.	e e. Diameter of the beginning of reinforce.	f f. Diameter behind the trunnions, (measured on rimbasces.)	h h. Diameter before the trunnions, (measured on rimbasces.)	i i. Diameter before the rimbasces.	k k. Diameter at the end of the reinforce.	l l. Diameter at the beginning of the chase.	m m. Diameter of the end of the chase.
	6.41	5.20	6.41	21.70	20.70	20.70	19.50	18.90	13.00
329.....	6.33	5.09	6.40	21.82	20.67	20.67	19.60	19.07	13.02
330.....	6.41	5.18	6.40	21.86	20.67	20.67	19.70	19.16	13.10
331.....	6.35	5.14	6.42	21.83	20.69	20.69	19.61	19.20	13.17
332.....	6.37	5.12	6.43	21.80	20.68	20.68	19.60	19.13	13.15
333.....	6.38	5.22	6.43	21.88	20.70	20.70	16.70	19.21	13.12
334.....	6.35	5.02	6.40	21.85	20.70	20.70	19.64	19.19	13.15
335.....	6.35	5.11	6.41	21.83	20.68	20.68	19.60	19.09	13.12
333*.....	6.33	5.06	6.41	21.76	20.64	20.64	19.61	19.10	13.15
337.....	6.36	5.07	6.41	21.83	20.64	20.64	19.60	19.11	13.17
333.....	6.36	5.13	6.40	21.86	20.65	20.65	19.62	19.11	13.15
339.....	6.36	5.09	6.40	21.83	20.67	20.67	19.62	19.13	13.17
340.....	6.32	5.11	6.41	21.83	20.62	20.62	19.61	19.10	13.13
341.....	6.35	5.06	6.41	21.80	20.63	20.63	19.58	19.14	13.16
342.....	6.37	5.06	6.42	21.84	20.67	20.67	19.67	19.14	13.17
343.....	6.37	5.12	6.41	21.81	20.70	20.70	19.69	19.10	13.20
344.....	6.39	5.08	6.41	21.85	20.63	20.63	19.67	19.11	13.17
345.....	6.41	5.00	6.41	21.90	20.65	20.65	19.71	19.12	13.20
346.....	6.39	5.00	6.41	21.80	20.66	20.66	19.71	19.10	13.20
347.....	6.39	5.09	6.40	21.81	20.68	20.68	19.71	19.13	13.11
348.....	6.36	5.15	6.42	21.80	20.69	20.69	19.72	19.19	13.11
349.....	6.40	5.04	6.41	21.81	20.62	20.62	19.62	19.09	13.26
350.....	6.39	5.04	6.40	21.82	20.63	20.63	19.70	19.12	13.15
351.....	6.33	5.03	6.42	21.84	20.70	20.70	19.69	19.12	13.12
352.....	6.38	5.00	6.39	21.80	20.68	20.68	19.72	19.17	13.20
353.....	6.37	5.06	6.40	21.81	20.71	20.71	19.71	19.15	13.20
354*.....	6.32	5.11	6.41	21.81	20.71	20.71	19.67	19.18	13.25
355.....	6.39	5.04	6.40	21.77	20.69	20.69	19.70	19.20	13.18
356.....	6.38	5.06	6.41	21.81	20.70	20.70	19.70	19.16	13.17
357*.....	6.40	5.04	6.40	21.80	20.67	20.67	19.71	19.16	13.10
358*.....	6.31	5.04	6.40	21.74	20.70	20.70	19.70	19.18	13.20
359.....	6.49	5.19	6.42	21.86	20.69	20.69	19.70	19.24	13.25
360*.....	6.38	5.09	6.44	21.80	20.70	20.69	19.66	19.25	13.26
361.....	6.38	5.06	6.44	21.80	20.72	20.72	19.63	19.10	13.18
362.....	6.40	5.05	6.42	21.72	20.70	20.70	19.70	19.15	13.25
363.....	6.41	5.20	6.46	21.80	20.72	20.72	19.68	19.14	13.25
364.....	6.23	5.08	6.46	21.84	20.68	20.68	19.65	19.12	13.25
365*.....	6.38	5.09	6.44	21.80	20.72	20.72	19.15	19.05	13.22
366.....	6.39	5.10	6.42	21.78	20.72	20.72	19.68	19.15	13.20
367†.....	6.42	5.11	6.43	21.81	20.70	20.70	19.70	19.13	13.14
368.....	6.33	5.04	6.41	21.80	20.70	20.70	19.67	19.11	13.30
369*.....	6.38	5.03	6.40	21.80	21.71	20.71	19.56	19.11	13.25
370*.....	6.37	5.07	6.40	21.77	20.69	20.69	19.68	19.14	13.21

* Burst first fire.

† Burst second fire.

A.—*Inspection of cannon, Bellona foundry—Continued.*

Variation allowed.	Diameters turned, more or less .05.			More or less .20.	More or less .05.	More or less .20.	More or less .20.	More or less .25.	More or less .20.
	d d. Diameter of the breech plate band.	n n. Diameter of the swell of the muzzle.	o o. Diameter of the fillet of the muzzle.	A D. Length from the end of the case-cable to the breech-plate band.	D F. Width of the breech-plate band.	D G. From the rear of breech-plate band to the end of the trunnions.	D K. From the rear of the breech-plate band to the end of the reinforce.	D P. From the rear of the breech plate band to the muzzle.	F P. Whole length of the bore.
	22.30	15.00	13.50	11.20	2.	42.20	57.00	114.00	107.59
329.....	22.32	15.00	13.51	11.15	2.	42.20	57.18	114.05	107.69
330.....	22.32	15.00	13.50	11.25	2.	42.25	57.35	114.12	107.69
331.....	22.31	15.00	13.50	11.23	2.	42.30	57.11	114.16	107.80
332.....	22.30	15.00	13.50	11.25	2.	42.20	57.16	114.16	107.85
333.....	22.30	14.99	13.51	11.20	2.	42.30	57.17	114.22	107.90
334.....	22.32	15.00	13.51	11.20	2.	42.22	57.23	114.30	107.59
335.....	22.32	15.03	13.50	11.10	2.	42.18	57.15	114.25	107.85
336*.....	22.31	15.00	13.50	11.20	2.	42.25	57.25	114.27	107.78
337.....	22.32	14.98	13.50	11.20	2.	42.20	57.20	114.32	107.70
338.....	22.31	15.03	13.50	11.25	2.	42.18	57.17	114.25	107.78
339.....	22.33	15.00	13.50	11.25	2.	42.22	57.10	114.20	107.60
340.....	22.32	15.00	13.52	11.18	2.	42.22	57.20	114.20	107.68
341.....	22.31	15.01	13.51	11.24	2.	42.20	57.11	114.38	107.75
342.....	22.31	15.04	13.50	11.21	2.	42.24	57.34	114.18	107.62
343.....	22.33	15.00	13.51	11.21	2.	42.25	57.17	114.25	107.76
344.....	22.32	15.01	13.49	11.23	2.	42.30	57.22	114.33	107.68
345.....	22.32	15.02	13.51	11.23	2.	42.22	57.10	114.20	107.70
346.....	22.32	15.00	13.51	11.28	2.	42.20	57.20	114.22	107.70
347.....	22.30	15.02	13.50	11.20	2.	42.26	57.20	114.20	107.74
348.....	22.34	15.04	13.53	11.21	2.	42.33	57.16	114.30	107.62
349.....	22.30	15.00	13.50	11.22	2.	42.20	57.18	114.27	107.78
350.....	22.30	15.00	13.50	11.14	2.	42.24	57.15	114.28	107.73
351.....	22.31	15.00	13.52	11.15	2.	42.34	57.20	114.28	107.86
352.....	22.31	15.02	13.50	11.21	2.	42.32	57.15	114.28	107.67
353.....	22.32	15.02	13.49	11.18	2.	42.30	57.15	114.20	107.76
354*.....	22.33	15.01	13.51	11.12	2.	42.27	57.18	114.24	107.75
355.....	22.33	15.01	13.50	11.17	2.	42.26	57.14	114.36	107.63
356.....	22.32	15.00	13.48	11.20	2.	42.30	57.17	114.33	107.78
357*.....	22.33	15.00	13.50	11.19	2.	42.35	57.10	114.15	107.85
358*.....	22.30	15.02	13.49	11.17	2.	42.30	57.12	114.14	107.05
359.....	22.35	14.98	13.52	11.25	2.	42.25	57.10	114.30	107.92
360*.....	22.29	15.00	13.54	11.20	2.	42.20	57.12	114.35	107.93
361.....	22.33	15.03	13.54	11.25	2.	42.20	57.18	114.20	107.70
362.....	22.34	15.02	13.53	11.30	2.	42.20	57.18	114.25	107.85
363.....	22.35	15.05	13.52	11.30	2.	42.25	57.13	114.25	107.70
364.....	22.35	15.02	13.51	11.30	2.	42.35	57.13	114.34	107.87
365*.....	22.32	15.03	13.51	11.15	2.	42.25	57.13	114.25	107.75
366.....	22.35	15.00	13.51	11.25	2.	42.30	57.12	114.33	107.85
367†.....	22.32	15.00	13.50	11.25	2.	42.30	57.18	114.17	107.78
368.....	22.33	15.00	13.50	11.20	2.	42.25	57.05	114.20	107.76
369*.....	22.31	15.00	13.50	11.24	2.	42.35	57.10	114.18	107.76
370*.....	22.32	15.00	13.51	11.15	2.	42.25	57.04	114.20	107.85

* Burst first fire.

† Burst second fire.

A.—*Inspection of cannon, Bellona foundery—Continued.*

Variation allowed.	More or less .20.	Less, .04; more, .00.	More, .20; less, .10	Above, .00; below, .20.		More, .04; less, .00.	More, .05.	More or less, .20.	More or less, .20.
Number of gun.	K P. Length of the chase, including the muzzle.	G H. Diameter of the trunnions.	f s. Length of the trunnions.	Position of the trunnions above or below the axis of the bore.	Alignment of the trunnions.	P P. Diameter of the bore.	Diameter of the vent.	Position of the vent, exterior.	Position of the vent, interior.
	57.00	6.41	6.	On the axis.	6.41	.20	6.204	1.603
329.....	56.87	6.40	6.	.00	Correct....	6.44	.20	6.30	1.70
330.....	56.77	6.41	6.	.04	...do.....	6.44	.20	6.25	1.50
331.....	57.05	6.41	6.	.04	...do.....	6.44	.20	6.25	1.66
332.....	57.00	6.40	6.	.07	...do.....	6.44	.20	6.20	1.63
333.....	57.05	6.40	6.	.10	...do.....	6.44	.20	6.20	1.70
334.....	57.07	6.41	6.	.08	...do.....	6.45	.20	6.20	1.63
335.....	57.10	6.40	6.	.00	...do.....	6.44	.20	6.20	1.60
336*.....	57.02	6.40	6.	.00	...do.....	6.45	.20	6.20	1.65
337.....	57.12	6.40	6.	.16	...do.....	6.45	.20	6.22	1.60
338.....	57.08	6.41	6.	.05	...do.....	6.44	.20	6.25	1.65
339.....	57.10	6.41	6.	.05	...do.....	6.44	.20	6.20	1.60
340.....	57.00	6.40	6.	.05	...do.....	6.41	.20	6.21	1.68
341.....	57.20	6.40	6.	.05	...do.....	6.45	.20	6.20	1.60
342.....	56.84	6.40	6.	.00	...do.....	6.45	.20	6.20	1.65
343.....	57.08	6.40	6.	.20	...do.....	6.42	.20	6.25	1.60
344.....	57.11	6.41	6.	.05	...do.....	6.44	.20	6.20	1.60
345.....	57.10	6.40	6.	.05	...do.....	6.43	.20	6.20	1.58
346.....	57.02	6.41	6.	.00	...do.....	6.44	.20	6.20	1.70
347.....	57.00	6.40	6.	.00	...do.....	6.42	.20	6.20	1.65
348.....	57.14	6.40	6.	.06	...do.....	6.44	.20	6.20	1.65
349.....	57.09	6.40	6.	.05	...do.....	6.43	.20	6.20	1.60
350.....	57.13	6.40	6.	.10	...do.....	6.43	.20	6.20	1.50
351.....	57.08	6.40	6.	.11	...do.....	6.45	.20	6.20	1.60
352.....	57.13	6.40	6.	.17	...do.....	6.45	.20	6.20	1.50
353.....	57.05	6.40	6.	.11	...do.....	6.43	.20	6.20	1.60
354*.....	57.06	6.40	6.	.06	...do.....	6.45	.20	6.20	1.65
355.....	57.22	6.40	6.	.16	...do.....	6.42	.20	6.20	1.65
356.....	57.16	6.40	6.	.15	...do.....	6.43	.20	6.20	1.80
357*.....	57.05	6.40	6.	.05	...do.....	6.45	.20	6.20	1.75
358*.....	57.02	6.40	6.	.04	...do.....	6.42	.20	6.20	1.60
359.....	57.20	6.40	6.	.00	...do.....	6.45	.20	6.20	1.62
360*.....	57.23	6.40	6.	.05	...do.....	6.42	.20	6.20	1.60
361.....	57.02	6.40	6.	.03	...do.....	6.43	.20	6.20	1.60
362.....	57.07	6.40	6.	.03	...do.....	6.44	.20	6.20	1.65
363.....	57.12	6.40	6.	.08	...do.....	6.45	.20	6.20	1.60
364.....	57.21	6.39	6.	.11	...do.....	6.45	.20	6.20	1.60
365*.....	57.12	6.41	6.	.00	...do.....	6.44	.20	6.20	1.65
366.....	57.21	6.39	6.	.07	...do.....	6.44	.20	6.20	1.64
367†.....	56.99	6.40	6.	.17	...do.....	6.43	.20	6.20	1.64
368.....	57.15	6.40	6.	.00	...do.....	6.43	.20	6.20	1.70
369*.....	57.08	6.40	6.	.04	...do.....	6.44	.20	6.20	1.60
370*.....	57.16	6.40	6.	.04	...do.....	6.43	.20	6.20	1.58

* Burst first fire.

† Burst second fire.

A.—Inspection of cannon, Bellona foundry—Continued.

Number of gun.	Weight of the gun, 7,540.	Ring bores.	First proof.			Second proof.		
			Proof range of powder.	Weight of charge.	Weight of shot.	Proof range of powder.	Weight of charge.	Weight of shot.
			yards.	lbs. oz.	lbs. oz.	yards.	lbs. oz.	lbs. oz.
329.....	7,550	.07	273	17 13½	66 3	276	13 5	65 12
330.....	7,552	.05	225	21 5	66 7	276	13 5	66 2
331.....	7,548	.04	273	17 13½	66 4	276	13 5	65 9
332.....	7,530	.10	273	17 13½	66 00	276	13 5	66 7
333.....	7,554	.02	273	17 13½	66 7	276	13 5	65 14
334.....	7,548	.00	225	21 5	66 6	273	13 6½	66 4
335.....	7,550	.00	276	17 11	66 2	269	13 10	66 2
336*.....	7,552	.00	273	17 13½	66 3			
337.....	7,540	.10	225	21 5	66 6	276	13 5	65 6
338.....	7,552	.00	225	21 5	66 5	269	13 10	66 00
339.....	7,546	.07	255	19 4	65 14	269	13 10	65 10
340.....	7,542	.03	255	19 4	66 4	269	13 10	66 4
341.....	7,538	.00	242	20 1	66 10	276	13 5	66 00
342.....	7,567	.00	242	20 1	65 1	269	13 10	66 1
343.....	7,557	.04	255	19 4	66 4	269	13 10	66 00
344.....	7,557	.06	255	19 4	65 1	226	15 15	66 4
345.....	7,559	.02	226	21 4	65 1	276	13 5	66 1
346.....	7,555	.03	226	21 4	66 13	269	13 10	66 12
347.....	7,557	.03	255	19 4	66 00	279	13 3½	66 00
348.....	7,540	.02	276	17 11	66 00	276	13 5	66 4
349.....	7,553	.00	242	20 1	66 00	279	13 2½	66 7
350.....	7,530	.00	242	20 1	66 00	276	13 5	65 12
351.....	7,556	.07	276	17 11	66 11	279	13 2½	66 4
352.....	7,560	.03	226	21 4	66 00	276	13 5	66 6
353.....	7,548	.06	226	21 4	66 6	279	13 3½	66 4
354*.....	7,550	.04	279	17 9	66 00			
355.....	7,550	.01	284	17 5	65 14	261	14 2	66 00
356.....	7,548	.00	281	17 7	66 2	245	14 14	66 00
357*.....	7,556	.04	284	17 5	66 00			
358*.....	7,546	.00	281	17 7	66 9			
359.....	7,550	.00	284	17 5	66 00	261	14 2	66 00
360*.....	7,552	.00	281	17 7	66 6			
361.....	7,548	.00	281	17 7	66 00	261	14 2	66 00
362.....	7,552	.00	281	17 7	66 00	261	14 2	66 00
363.....	7,552	.00	281	17 7	65 10	261	14 2	66 4
364.....	7,538	.02	279	17 9	65 12	245	14 14	66 00
365*.....	7,530	.00	226	21 4	66 4			
366.....	7,534	.00	284	17 5	66 12	261	14 2	66 00
367†.....	7,550	.02	284	17 5	66 10	245	14 14	66 4
368.....	7,538	.02	277	17 10	67 6	277	13 4	67 6
369*.....	7,546	.00	277	17 10	67 6			
370*.....	7,540	.00	277	17 10	66 6			

* Burst first fire

† Burst second fire.

REMARKS.—Fifty-eight guns were presented and inspected, although only 43 appear on this report, the proof having at that number been discontinued at the notice of the founder. Nos. 336, 354, 357, 358, 360, 365, 369, and 370, broke on the first, and 337 on the second fire. The powder used, except eight charges for the second fire drawn from Bellona arsenal, was of Dupont's manufacture: for charges and ranges see face of the return, for proof of three successive periods see table below. The powder was most carefully proved on the ground by the inspectors, and the charges weighed by them in presence of the founder. 367, which broke on the second fire, was charged with 14 lbs. 14 oz. of Bellona powder, marked range 19½, and re-proof 245 yards.

The exterior finish and general appearance of these guns was not of that degree of excellence which might be attained by proper care and skill; *a a* and *b b* exceed the variation allowed below the prescribed dimension generally; *k k*, *D K*, *D P*, and *F P*, generally above. With the exception of *a a* and *b b*, the errors pointed out last year have been corrected.

The founder ascribes the failure of his guns to excessive proving charges; the inspectors entertain a different opinion, and ascribe the result to defect either in the metal or the manner of working it, in which they were sustained by the nature of the fractures; specimens were preserved, and have been since submitted to experienced founders, who, without knowing anything of the circumstances, or whence they came, at once decided that the metal was good, but had been injured, and rendered unfit for gun metal in melting and casting; that the result arises from this cause cannot be doubted, when it is remembered that the cannon at other foundries are subjected to the like proof, and, for the past year, without failure. The last three guns were charged with two round shot, and the others with one cylindrical shot; for the weight of which see face of the report.

The founder presented 637 32-pounder shot: of which were rejected 37 for being plugged, 65, cavities exceeding allowance, 2, too small, and 1, too large; 532 received, average weight of which was 33 lbs. 7 oz. The true point of sight was determined, and marked at the swell of the muzzle and lock-piece of the guns.

Respectfully submitted.

W. J. WORTH, *Brevet Lieut. Col., Maj. of Ordnance, Inspector.*
WM. MAYNAIDIER, *Lieut., Assistant Inspector of Ordnance.*

Table showing the proof-range of each barrel of powder used in the foregoing inspection, by the proofs in the years of 1829 and 1833, at Frankford arsenal and at Bellona foundry at the time of use.

Number of barrel.	Proof range of 1829.	Proof range of 1833.	Proof range of 1834.	Number of barrel.	Proof range of 1829.	Proof range of 1833.	Proof range of 1834.
98.....	281	225	273	107.....	288	226	276
99.....	310	235	269	108.....	280	226	242
100.....	272	226	281	109.....	300	235	279
101.....	291	229	255	110.....	307	227	284
103.....	287	230	276	112.....	269	225	284
104.....	267	227	226	114.....	267	230	225
105.....	300	231	273	556.....	194		*245
105.....	276	225	279	80.....	210		*261

* Drawn from Bellona foundry of necessity, and used for second charges.

B—INSPECTION OF CANNON, BELLONA FOUNDRY, JULY 18, 1833.

Dimensions and proof of 72 32-pounder iron cannon, manufactured for the United States by John Clarke, esq.

Variation allowed.	Diameter not turned—More, .20; less, .05.								
	a. Diameter of cascable, 6.41.	b. Diameter of the neck of cascable, 5.20.	c. Diameter of the beginning of reinforce, 21.70.	f. Diameter behind the trunnions, measured on ribs, 20.70.	h. Diameter before the trunnions, measured on ribs, 20.70.	i. Diameter before the ribs, 20.	k. Diameter at the end of reinforce, 19.50.	l. Diameter of the beginning of chase, 18.90.	m. Diameter of the end of the chase, 13.00.
257.....	6.30	5.00	21.92	20.60	20.60	19.33	19.05	13.50
258.....	6.31	5.04	21.87	20.60	20.60	19.32	18.97	13.20
259.....	6.33	5.04	21.90	20.68	20.68	19.39	19.00	13.15
260.....	6.35	5.04	21.90	20.60	20.60	19.40	19.00	13.10
261.....	6.30	5.04	21.92	20.60	20.60	19.36	19.00	13.25
262.....	6.31	5.04	21.92	20.60	20.60	19.34	18.96	13.20
263.....	6.35	5.05	21.92	20.60	20.60	19.40	19.00	13.18
264.....	6.35	5.05	21.93	20.62	20.62	19.35	19.00	13.20
265.....	6.30	5.00	21.93	20.55	20.55	19.25	18.96	13.20
266.....	6.34	5.08	21.89	20.59	20.59	19.38	19.00	13.21
267.....	6.39	5.02	21.84	20.54	20.54	19.56	19.04	13.25
268.....	6.38	5.05	21.88	20.64	20.64	19.45	18.90	13.08
269.....	6.37	4.99	21.87	20.60	20.60	19.52	19.00	13.20
270.....	6.30	5.00	21.85	20.60	20.60	19.60	19.00	13.26
271.....	6.37	5.00	21.86	20.64	20.64	19.60	19.05	13.26
272.....	6.34	5.00	21.83	20.58	20.58	19.35	18.98	13.21
273.....	6.40	5.08	21.85	20.60	20.60	19.30	18.99	13.20
274.....	6.35	5.00	21.82	20.60	20.60	19.40	19.10	13.20
275.....	6.40	5.10	21.85	20.65	20.65	19.36	18.93	13.20
276.....	6.41	5.00	21.78	20.59	20.59	19.65	19.00	13.20
277.....	6.48	5.08	21.88	20.57	20.57	19.38	18.90	12.21
278.....	6.40	5.10	21.80	20.61	20.61	19.60	19.15	13.15
279.....	6.30	5.02	21.76	20.66	20.66	19.30	18.90	13.03
280.....	6.35	5.05	21.80	20.61	20.61	19.37	19.00	13.20
281.....	6.35	5.48	21.80	20.55	20.55	19.58	19.00	13.20
282.....	6.31	5.03	21.86	20.60	20.60	19.57	19.02	13.20
283*.....	6.33	5.08	21.82	20.60	20.60	19.45	19.05	13.10
284.....	6.35	5.20	21.85	20.66	20.66	19.55	19.10	13.20
285*.....	6.30	5.00	21.75	20.55	20.55	19.50	19.00	13.16
286.....	6.30	5.07	21.78	20.56	20.56	19.45	19.09	13.05
287.....	6.32	5.10	21.80	20.56	20.56	19.50	19.00	13.17
288.....	6.31	5.12	21.85	20.60	20.60	19.50	19.00	13.10
289.....	6.31	5.10	21.82	20.59	20.59	19.50	19.00	13.19
290.....	6.31	5.14	21.78	20.52	20.52	19.47	19.00	13.20
291.....	6.36	5.15	21.82	20.60	20.60	19.50	19.11	13.14
292.....	6.35	5.20	21.82	20.55	20.55	19.42	19.08	13.10
293.....	6.28	5.20	21.75	20.55	20.55	19.50	19.10	13.15
294.....	6.30	5.18	21.80	20.55	20.55	19.50	19.05	12.96
295.....	6.33	5.15	21.83	20.53	20.53	19.45	19.08	13.14
296.....	6.41	5.15	21.75	20.56	20.56	19.50	19.00	13.12
297.....	6.38	5.20	21.82	20.58	20.58	19.47	19.06	13.05
298.....	6.30	5.20	21.82	20.58	20.58	19.52	19.09	13.25
299.....	6.31	5.20	21.84	20.60	20.60	19.50	19.12	13.15
300.....	6.36	5.11	21.83	20.67	20.67	19.48	19.10	13.11
301.....	6.35	5.18	21.82	20.54	20.54	19.52	19.02	13.18
302*.....	6.30	5.15	21.80	20.60	20.60	19.40	19.00	13.10
303*.....	6.35	5.15	21.77	20.50	20.50	19.50	19.00	13.10
304.....	6.30	5.20	21.80	20.60	20.60	19.41	19.00	13.15
305.....	6.30	5.05	21.70	20.55	20.55	19.45	19.00	13.15
306.....	6.30	5.20	21.75	20.60	20.60	19.45	19.05	13.20
307.....	6.29	5.15	21.70	20.50	20.50	19.50	19.00	13.15
308*.....	6.30	5.20	21.70	20.53	20.53	19.42	19.02	13.10
309.....	6.30	5.20	21.80	20.58	20.58	19.50	19.05	13.10
310.....	6.30	5.10	21.84	20.50	20.50	19.45	19.08	13.15
311.....	6.30	5.12	21.80	20.58	20.58	19.50	19.06	13.12
312*.....	6.38	5.20	21.76	20.60	20.60	19.56	19.08	13.18
313.....	6.35	5.18	21.80	20.60	20.60	19.51	19.06	13.10
314.....	6.32	5.15	21.75	20.60	20.60	19.50	19.00	13.10
315.....	6.40	5.10	21.90	20.60	20.60	19.50	19.06	13.12
316.....	6.35	5.15	21.80	20.63	20.63	19.50	19.00	13.12
317.....	6.30	5.15	21.75	20.60	20.60	19.50	19.00	13.16
318.....	6.30	5.12	21.82	20.58	20.58	19.44	19.00	13.20
319.....	6.35	5.12	21.75	20.60	20.60	19.50	19.00	13.20
320†.....	6.40	5.20	21.80	20.61	20.60	19.50	19.00	13.15
321.....	6.40	5.20	21.80	20.62	20.62	19.50	19.08	13.16
322.....	6.42	5.18	21.78	20.60	20.60	19.50	19.00	13.10
323.....	6.40	5.11	21.70	20.60	20.60	19.50	19.00	13.18
324.....	6.39	5.10	21.71	20.60	20.60	19.48	18.90	13.10
325.....	6.39	5.15	21.70	20.60	20.60	19.50	19.00	13.11
326.....	6.40	5.20	21.71	20.60	20.60	19.48	18.90	13.11
327.....	6.30	5.16	21.70	20.55	20.55	19.42	19.05	13.16
328.....	6.31	5.15	21.70	20.60	20.60	19.40	19.00	13.12

* Burst first fire.

† Burst second fire.

B.—*Inspection of cannon, Bellona foundry—Continued.*

Variation allowed.	Diameters turned, .05.				A D. Length from the end of the cascabe to the breech-plate band, 11.50.	D F. Width of the breech-plate band, 2.00.	D G. From the rear of breech-plate band to the rear of trunnions, 42.20	D K. From the rear of breech-plate band to end of reinforcement, 57.00.
	Number of gun.	c c. Diameter of the fillet of cascabe, 6.41.	d d. Diameter of the breech-plate band, 22.30.	n n. Diameter of the plane of the muzzle, 15.00.				
257	6.45	22.32	15.02	13.50	11.32	2 00	42.30	57.20
258	6.45	22.34	15.00	13.50	11.35	2.00	42.20	57.30
259	6.45	22 40	15.00	13.50	11.40	2.00	42.18	57.20
260	6.37	22.31	15.00	13.50	11.34	2.00	42.22	57.20
261	6.44	22.37	15.00	13.50	11.25	2.00	42.30	57.35
262	6.45	22.33	15.00	13.50	11.30	2.00	42.30	57.35
263	6.46	22.37	15.00	13.50	11.35	2.00	42.25	57.10
264	6.43	22.37	15.00	13.50	11.40	2.00	42.30	57.21
265	6.43	22.31	15.00	13.50	11.30	2.00	42.25	57.40
266	6.47	22.31	14.93	13.50	11.30	2.00	42.20	57.35
267	6.41	22.31	15.01	13 45	11.30	2.00	42.32	57.30
268	6.42	22.30	15.01	13.50	11.30	2.00	42.30	57.20
269	6.43	22.30	15.00	13.50	11 40	2.00	42.20	57.15
270	6.52	22.35	15.00	13.50	11.30	2.00	42.20	57.25
271	6.49	22.35	15.05	13.50	11.30	2.00	42.32	57.05
272	6.50	22.28	15.00	13.50	11.42	2.00	42.18	57.18
273	6.48	22.35	15.00	13.46	11.30	2.00	42.20	57.10
274	6.50	22.35	15.00	13.50	11.25	2.00	42.22	57.05
275	6.43	22.31	15.00	13.50	11.20	2.00	42.20	57.10
276	6.42	22.31	15.00	13.40	11.30	2.00	42.20	57.04
277	6.41	22.33	15.00	13.50	11.15	2.00	42 25	57.20
278	6.36	22.33	15.00	13.40	11.50	2.00	42.20	57.00
279	6.42	22.26	15.00	13.48	11.15	2.00	42.26	57.28
280	6.44	22.30	15.00	13.50	11.15	2.00	42.35	57.30
281	6.42	22.32	15.00	13.46	11.12	2.00	42.30	57.12
282	6.41	22.31	14.98	13.50	11.12	2.00	42.28	57.10
283*	6.42	22.30	15.00	13.42	11.20	2.00	42 20	57.15
284	6.40	22.40	15.00	13.50	11.25	2.00	42.20	57.20
285*	6.40	22.30	14.98	13.50	11.20	2.00	42.20	57.10
286	6.41	22.30	15.04	13.50	11.20	2.00	42.20	57.10
287	6.40	22.30	14.96	13.50	11.30	2.00	42.19	57.10
288	6.40	22.30	15.00	13.41	11.11	2.00	42.10	57.12
289	6.39	22.32	15.00	13.50	11.25	2.00	42.25	57.20
290	6.40	22.30	14.96	13.48	11.20	2.00	42.10	57.00
291	6.40	22.31	14.98	13.48	11.20	2.00	42.20	57.00
292	6.35	22.35	15.00	13.49	11.30	2.00	42.30	57.10
293	6.40	22.30	15.00	13.50	11.20	2.00	42.30	57.10
294	6.43	22.28	15.00	13.50	11.25	2.00	42.23	57.20
295	6.40	22.30	15.03	13.50	11.40	2.00	42.22	57.10
296	6.39	22.31	14.96	13.47	11.30	2.00	42.26	57.18
297	6.40	22.30	15.00	13 50	11.25	2.00	42.20	57.20
298	6.40	22.30	15.02	13.52	11.20	2.00	42.30	57.10
299	6.41	22.30	15.00	13.50	11.30	2.00	42.30	57.15
300	6.40	22.35	15.00	13.50	11.20	2.00	42.20	57.00
301	6.40	22.30	15.00	13.48	11.25	2.00	42.15	57.15
302*	6 40	22.32	15.00	13.50	11.40	2.00	42.35	57.05
303*	6.40	22.30	15.00	13.50	11.30	2.00	42.20	57.15
304	6.42	22.31	15.00	13.49	11.25	2.00	42.20	57.15
305	6.40	22.31	15.00	13.49	11.55	2.00	42.20	57.20
306	6.40	22.28	15.00	13.50	11.25	2.00	42.20	57.10
307	6.40	22.28	15.00	13.50	11.35	2.00	42.20	57.20
308*	6 38	22.28	15.00	13.50	11.45	2.00	42.10	57.10
309	6.40	22.32	15.00	13.50	11.35	2.00	42.20	57.00
310	6.40	22.32	15.00	13.50	11.32	2.00	42.12	57.05
311	6.40	22.21	15.00	13.50	11.40	2.00	42.15	57.00
312*	6.40	22.35	15.00	13.50	11.35	2.00	42.22	57.15
313	6.40	22.32	15.00	13.48	11.40	2.00	42.28	57.15
314	6.40	22.32	15.00	13.50	11.30	2.00	42.25	57.10
315	6.40	22.30	15.00	13.50	11.33	2.00	42.20	57 10
316	6.40	22.32	15.00	13.50	11.25	2.00	42.10	57.00
317	6.40	22.30	15.00	13.48	11.10	2.00	42.20	57.12
318	6.40	22.32	15.00	13.50	11.40	2.00	42.20	57.10
319	6.40	22 30	15.00	13.50	11.30	2.00	42.20	57.00
320†	6.35	22.31	15.02	13.48	11.30	2.00	42.18	57.20
321	6.50	22.32	15.00	13.50	11.45	2.00	42.10	57.10
322	6.41	22.30	15.00	13.50	11.25	2.00	42.25	57.20
323	6.40	22.31	15.00	13.50	11.45	2.00	42.10	57.18
324	6.42	22.30	15.00	13.48	11.40	2.00	42.18	57.15
325	6.40	22.30	14.49	13.49	11.30	2.00	42.09	57.90
326	6.42	22.29	15.00	13.50	11.10	2.00	42.10	57.10
327	6.40	22.35	14 98	13.50	11.30	2.00	42.13	57.10
328	6.45	22.30	14 98	13.50	11.35	2 00	42.10	57.10

* Burst first fire.

† Burst second fire.

B.—*Inspection of cannon, Bellona foundry—Continued.*

Variation allowed.	D. P. From the rear of breech-plate band to the muzzle, 114.00.	.30.		K P. Length of the chase, including the muzzle, 57.00.	Less, .04.		More, .10. Less, .05.		Above, .00. Below, .30.		Alignment of trunnions.	More, .04. Less, .00.	
		F P. Whole length of the bore, 107.50.			G H. Diameter of trunnions, 6.41.	f s. Length of the trunnions, 6.00.	Position of the trunnions above or below the axis of the bore, .00.	P P. Diameter of the bore, 6.41.					
257.....	114.30	107.70	57.10	6.39	6.00	.16	Correct.....	6.44					
258.....	114.25	107.70	56.95	6.39	6.00	.14	do.....	6.43					
259.....	114.25	107.69	57.05	6.40	6.00	.10	do.....	6.43					
260.....	114.35	107.60	57.15	6.39	6.00	.10	do.....	6.44					
261.....	114.15	107.64	56.80	6.40	6.00	.10	do.....	6.43					
262.....	114.20	107.60	56.85	6.40	6.00	.09	do.....	6.44					
263.....	114.30	107.65	57.10	6.40	6.00	.11	do.....	6.43					
264.....	114.20	107.60	57.00	6.40	6.00	.10	do.....	6.43					
265.....	114.30	107.68	56.90	6.39	6.00	.07	do.....	6.42					
266.....	114.20	107.60	56.85	6.39	6.00	.08	do.....	6.43					
267.....	114.20	107.62	56.90	6.37	6.00	.05	do.....	6.43					
268.....	114.25	107.70	57.05	6.41	6.00	.10	do.....	6.42					
269.....	114.05	107.65	56.90	6.40	6.00	.10	do.....	6.42					
270.....	114.25	107.64	57.00	6.39	6.00	.08	do.....	6.43					
271.....	114.30	107.65	57.25	6.39	6.00	.05	do.....	6.43					
272.....	114.32	107.60	57.14	6.39	6.00	.07	do.....	6.43					
273.....	114.40	107.70	57.30	6.49	6.00	.12	do.....	6.42					
274.....	114.30	107.70	57.25	6.40	6.00	.00	do.....	6.43					
275.....	114.20	107.80	57.10	6.40	6.00	.15	do.....	6.43					
276.....	114.20	107.80	57.16	6.39	6.00	.13	do.....	6.42					
277.....	114.28	107.65	57.08	6.39	6.00	.12	do.....	6.44					
278.....	114.30	107.60	57.30	6.39	6.00	.10	do.....	6.43					
279.....	114.30	107.80	57.02	6.39	6.00	.12	do.....	6.43					
280.....	114.34	107.70	57.04	6.40	6.00	.14	do.....	6.44					
281.....	114.25	107.70	57.13	6.39	6.00	.05	do.....	6.43					
282.....	114.30	107.68	57.20	6.40	6.00	.04	do.....	6.42					
283*.....	114.35	107.72	57.20	6.39	6.00	.04	do.....	6.44					
284.....	114.30	107.73	57.10	6.40	6.00	.05	do.....	6.43					
285*.....	114.35	107.70	57.25	6.40	6.00	.00	do.....	6.43					
286.....	114.20	107.73	57.10	6.40	6.00	.03	do.....	6.44					
287.....	114.25	107.75	57.15	6.40	6.00	.05	do.....	6.40					
288.....	114.20	107.66	57.05	6.40	6.00	.05	do.....	6.42					
289.....	114.30	107.75	57.10	6.40	6.00	.06	do.....	6.43					
290.....	114.25	107.80	57.25	6.40	6.00	.09	do.....	6.45					
291.....	114.20	107.75	57.21	6.40	6.00	.06	do.....	6.43					
292.....	114.30	107.80	57.20	6.39	6.00	.25	do.....	6.44					
293.....	114.30	107.70	57.20	6.39	6.00	.02	do.....	6.44					
294.....	114.20	107.80	57.00	6.40	6.00	.28	do.....	6.42					
295.....	114.25	107.75	57.15	6.40	6.00	.05	do.....	6.43					
296.....	114.25	107.80	57.07	6.39	6.00	.02	do.....	6.42					
297.....	114.35	107.75	57.15	6.39	6.00	.25	do.....	6.42					
298.....	114.20	107.75	57.10	6.40	6.00	.65	do.....	6.45					
299.....	114.30	107.80	57.15	6.39	6.00	.06	do.....	6.45					
300.....	114.20	107.75	57.20	6.39	6.00	.10	do.....	6.43					
301.....	114.25	107.70	57.10	6.40	6.00	.06	do.....	6.43					
302*.....	114.15	107.80	57.10	6.40	6.00	.08	do.....	6.43					
303*.....	114.25	107.80	57.10	6.39	6.00	.17	do.....	6.42					
304.....	114.25	107.85	57.10	6.39	6.00	.11	do.....	6.42					
305.....	114.20	107.80	57.00	6.39	6.00	.21	do.....	6.43					
306.....	114.25	107.80	57.15	6.39	6.00	.25	do.....	6.43					
307.....	114.30	107.80	57.10	6.39	6.00	.10	do.....	6.45					
308*.....	114.35	107.75	57.25	6.39	6.00	.14	do.....	6.45					
309.....	114.15	107.90	57.15	6.40	6.00	.15	do.....	6.44					
310.....	114.15	107.70	57.10	6.40	6.00	.00	do.....	6.44					
311.....	114.28	107.70	57.28	6.40	6.00	.03	do.....	6.45					
312*.....	114.15	107.70	57.00	6.40	6.00	.07	do.....	6.43					
313.....	114.15	107.75	57.00	6.39	6.00	.07	do.....	6.44					
314.....	114.25	107.70	57.15	6.39	6.00	.05	do.....	6.43					
315.....	114.22	107.70	57.12	6.40	6.00	.12	do.....	6.43					
316.....	114.25	107.80	57.25	6.40	6.00	.15	do.....	6.44					
317.....	114.28	107.65	57.16	6.40	6.00	.15	do.....	6.43					
318.....	114.15	107.70	57.05	6.40	6.00	.06	do.....	6.43					
319.....	114.10	107.75	57.10	6.40	6.00	.11	do.....	6.43					
320†.....	114.24	107.85	57.04	6.40	6.00	.00	do.....	6.42					
321.....	114.10	107.70	57.00	6.44	6.00	.09	do.....	6.43					
322.....	114.25	107.70	57.05	6.40	6.00	.03	do.....	6.44					
323.....	114.25	107.80	57.07	6.40	6.00	.04	do.....	6.44					
324.....	114.15	107.75	57.00	6.41	6.00	.00	do.....	6.44					
325.....	114.25	107.70	57.25	6.40	6.00	.09	do.....	6.42					
326.....	114.28	107.80	57.18	6.40	6.00	.10	do.....	6.45					
327.....	114.30	107.80	57.20	6.40	6.00	.06	do.....	6.44					
328.....	114.25	107.80	57.15	6.40	6.00	.16	do.....	6.44					

* Burst first fire.

† Burst second fire.

B.—*Inspection of cannon, Bellona foundry—Continued.*

Variation allowed.	More, .05.	Position of vent exterior, 6.41.	Position of vent interior, 1.60.	Weight of the gun.	Proof range of powder for 1st charges.	1st charges.	Proof range of powder for 2d charges.	2d charges.
Number of gun.	Diameter of vent, .2.				yards.	lbs. oz.	yards.	lbs. oz.
257.....	.2	6.43	1.60	7,537	268	18 3	269	13 10
258.....	.2	6.38	1.60	7,537	268	18 3	269	13 10
259.....	.2	6.30	1.60	7,501	267	18 5	269	13 10
260.....	.2	6.40	1.40	7,537	266	18 6	249	14 11
261.....	.2	6.40	1.50	7,519	238	20 6	255	14 6
262.....	.2	6.39	1.60	7,507	268	18 3	269	13 10
263.....	.2	6.30	1.75	7,517	238	20 6	249	14 11
264.....	.2	6.40	1.50	7,513	266	18 6	249	14 11
265.....	.2	6.33	1.60	7,523	252	19 14	269	13 10
266.....	.2	6.20	1.50	7,500	266	18 6	249	14 11
267.....	.2	6.50	1.50	7,537	266	18 6	249	14 11
268.....	.2	6.45	1.50	7,511	233	20 6	261	14 2
269.....	.2	6.35	1.50	7,543	268	18 3	249	14 11
270.....	.2	6.36	1.30	7,529	238	20 6	269	13 10
271.....	.2	6.40	1.60	7,520	266	18 6	268	13 10
272.....	.2	6.28	1.48	7,507	248	19 11	257	14 5
273.....	.2	6.30	1.45	7,537	268	18 3	269	13 10
274.....	.2	6.40	1.60	7,537	248	19 11	269	13 10
275.....	.2	6.26	1.45	7,541	268	18 3	269	13 10
276.....	.2	6.37	1.60	7,502	254	19 1	257	14 5
277.....	.2	6.40	1.55	7,520	268	18 3	269	13 10
278.....	.2	6.40	1.60	7,537	261	18 15	257	14 5
279.....	.2	6.42	1.56	7,507	268	18 3	257	14 5
280.....	.2	6.40	1.60	7,530	268	18 3	269	13 10
281.....	.2	6.40	1.58	7,534	268	18 3	269	13 10
282.....	.2	6.30	1.58	7,540	265	18 8	257	14 5
283*.....	.2	6.40	1.61	265	18 8
284.....	.2	6.40	1.62	7,530	248	19 11	257	14 5
285*.....	.2	6.36	1.56	264	18 9
286.....	.2	6.36	1.60	7,541	258	19 4	262	14 1
287.....	.2	6.30	1.60	7,546	261	18 13	262	14 1
288.....	.2	6.25	1.55	7,529	261	18 13	262	14 1
289.....	.2	6.35	1.52	7,547	248	19 11	262	14 1
290.....	.2	6.30	1.60	7,542	264	18 9	263	14 1
291.....	.2	6.38	1.60	7,550	237	20 7	260	14 3
292.....	.2	6.40	1.56	7,552	264	18 9	269	13 10
293.....	.2	6.30	1.60	7,520	237	20 7	260	14 3
294.....	.2	6.25	1.59	7,528	236	20 8	264	13 15
295.....	.2	6.30	1.59	7,542	265	18 8	260	14 3
296.....	.2	6.35	1.60	7,528	248	20 1	259	14 4
297.....	.2	6.40	1.59	7,512	265	18 8	260	14 3
298.....	.2	6.38	1.60	7,530	265	18 8	262	14 1
299.....	.2	6.40	1.60	7,544	237	20 7	262	14 1
300.....	.2	6.32	1.58	7,550	260	18 15	259	14 4
301*.....	.2	6.30	1.53	7,534	236	20 8	262	14 1
302*.....	.2	6.40	1.54	236	20 8
303.....	.2	6.42	1.60	236	20 8
304.....	.3	6.33	1.50	7,538	264	18 9	247	14 13
305.....	.2	6.32	1.60	7,544	237	20 7	259	14 4
306.....	.2	6.30	1.55	7,530	264	18 9	260	14 3
307.....	.2	6.45	1.55	7,517	237	20 7	259	14 4
308*.....	.2	6.38	1.60	247	19 12
309.....	.2	6.40	1.55	7,542	240	20 3	285	12 15
310.....	.2	6.30	1.60	7,518	245	19 13	259	14 4
311.....	.2	6.30	1.60	7,530	246	19 13	259	14 4
312*.....	.2	6.36	1.60	245	19 13
313.....	.2	6.37	1.60	7,526	271	17 15	258	14 5
314.....	.2	6.35	1.55	7,542	247	19 12	285	12 15
315.....	.2	6.25	1.60	7,502	245	19 13	252	14 9
316.....	.2	6.40	1.60	7,542	247	19 12	285	12 15
317.....	.2	6.20	1.60	7,526	271	17 15	259	14 4
318.....	.2	6.38	1.60	7,526	240	20 3	285	12 15
319.....	.2	6.35	1.60	7,528	258	19 1	252	14 9
320†.....	.2	6.30	1.55	240	20 3	285	12 15
321.....	.2	6.35	1.60	7,534	258	19 1	271	13 8
322.....	.2	6.33	1 60	7,522	271	17 15	285	12 15
323.....	.2	6.30	1 62	7,510	258	19 1	258	14 5
324.....	.2	6.38	1.62	7,528	258	19 1	247	14 13
325.....	.2	6.29	1.60	7,524	240	20 3	258	14 5
326.....	.2	6.28	1.60	7,548	271	17 15	252	14 9
327.....	.2	6.30	1.60	7,517	245	19 13	252	14 9
328.....	.2	6.25	1.58	7,537	252	19 7	251	14 9

* Burst first fire.

† Burst second fire.

Remarks.—These guns were proved with Dupont powder; the charges regulated in strict conformity with tables furnished by the Ordnance department. Twenty barrels of proving powder was recently forwarded to Bellona from Frankford arsenal, where it had been carefully proved by the standard eprouvette; the remainder, about seven barrels, was drawn from the magazine at Bellona, and carefully proved immediately before use. It will be perceived that, generally, the guns conform in measurement very closely to the established pattern; seven guns burst in proof—six at the first and one at the second discharge. In several instances the evidence was very conclusive that the breaking had been caused or accelerated by the breaking and wedging of the shot; two shot and two wads were used at both discharges, agreeably to regulations.

W. J. WORTH, *Bot. Lieut. Colonel, Major Ordnance, and Inspector.*
JNO. CHILDE, *Lieutenant and Assistant Inspector.*

Errata.

July 24, 1833—Examined this report and found the following errors, to wit:

1st. The dimensions under the columns of *f f* and *h h* vary from the deviations allowed by the regulations. The allowances under those two heads may be either $\frac{1}{16}$ of an inch more or $\frac{1}{16}$ less than the prescribed dimensions.

2d. The allowance shown over the heading of the "position of the trunnions above or below the axis of the bore," instead of " $\frac{1}{32}$ of an inch below the axis of the bore," it should be " $\frac{1}{16}$ of an inch."

The guns Nos. 292, 294, 297, and 306, exceed the allowance authorized under the last-mentioned head.

3d. The following differences have also been found in the charges, viz:

Second charge of gun No. 261 should be $14\frac{1}{4}$ pounds, instead of $14\frac{3}{4}$ pounds.

First charge of gun No. 276 should be $19\frac{1}{4}$ pounds, instead of $19\frac{3}{4}$ pounds.

First charge of gun No. 286 should be $19\frac{1}{4}$ pounds, instead of $19\frac{3}{4}$ pounds.

First charge of gun No. 296 should be $19\frac{1}{4}$ pounds, instead of $20\frac{3}{4}$ pounds.

(See letter to Colonel Worth of July 26, 1833, pointing out the above differences.)

C.

BELLONA FOUNDRY, *July 18, 1833.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit my detailed report of the inspection of seventy-two 32-pounder cannon, manufactured by John Clarke, esq., for the United States; of which number sixty-five have been found conformable to the established pattern, sustained the required proof, and been received on account of the United States. Seven burst in the proof—six on the first and one on the second discharge. I have also inspected, proved, and received eight hundred and thirty-four 32-pounder shot, independent of those used in proof.

With high respect, I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

W. J. WORTH, *Bvt. Lieut. Col., Maj. Ordnance, and Inspector.*

Colonel GEORGE BOMFORD, *Ordnance Corps.*

D.

PIKESVILLE ARSENAL, *Maryland, May 21, 1836.*

COLONEL: I send you herewith a letter from Mr. John Childe, late a lieutenant in the army, and assistant to Lieutenant Colonel Worth, the inspector of ordnance. This letter gives a statement of the facts connected with the proof of guns at Bellona foundry, at which Mr. Childe was present. It is sent to you under the impression that it may be useful when the claim advanced by Major Clarke for pay for the bursted guns is brought before the Secretary of War for his decision.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. MAYNADIER, *1st Lieutenant 1st Artillery.*

Colonel GEO. BOMFORD, *Chief of Ordnance Department, Washington, D. C.*

YORK, *Pennsylvania, May 10, 1836.*

MY DEAR FRIEND MAYNADIER: Yours of the 7th instant came to hand last night. I will, with pleasure, answer the questions you ask respecting the proof of *seven* guns which were bursted at Major Clarke's foundry in 1833.

1st. The powder was all proved by the regulation epreuve immediately before putting it into the proof-cartridges.

2d. The quantity of powder put into the cartridges was the same as is prescribed by the ordnance regulations, taking 225 yards as the proof range of standard powder. When stronger, the quantity was reduced; when weaker, increased; in accordance with tables furnished for that purpose by the colonel of ordnance. I would here remark that the *strength and quantity* of powder fired in each gun proved at Major Clarke's foundry in 1833 were entered on the margin of the inspection report sent to the Ordnance office, which, I presume, may now be found in that office on file.

3d. The guns were loaded and fired under my immediate inspection, and in strict accordance with the regulations.

4th. The proof and inspection at Bellona foundry was conducted, in every respect, in exact accordance with the ordnance regulations upon that subject, and in precisely the same manner as at all other founderies.

When I left the inspection service there was a manuscript book in Colonel Worth's possession in which had been entered a rough sketch of each inspection that I attended, embracing, with a general outline of procedure, all uncommon circumstances that occurred at the inspections worthy of recollection. This book probably contains some notes upon the inspection of 1833, at Bellona, and I think you will find something therein about the *seven* bursted guns. The circumstances, however, have passed my recollection.

With many wishes for your health and happiness, I am truly yours,

JNO. CHILDE.

Lieutenant WM. MAYNADIER, *United States Army.*

P. S.—I shall endeavor to call and see you before I leave this quarter of the country.

E.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *May 28, 1836.*

COLONEL: On the 29th of April last I addressed you a letter, giving a statement of facts in relation to the proof of cannon at Bellona foundry in August, 1834.

I have since seen a letter from Mr. Clarke, the proprietor of that foundry, addressed to the Secretary of War, in which he advances a claim for pay for the bursted guns, on the grounds that the inspecting officers being newly appointed, were not acquainted with, or experienced in, the inspection and proof of cannon, and that some error in the proof must have been made.

That the inspecting officers were newly appointed was true; but that any error or mistake was made by them in the proof of Mr. Clarke's guns, or any other, I utterly and unequivocally deny. I am positively certain that at every inspection made after I was appointed to that duty, the most scrupulous attention was paid to the performance of it in a correct manner; and the inspectors never lost sight of the idea that, whilst their duty bound them, for the interest of the government, to see to the faithful performance of the duties of contractors, the interest of the latter was not to be jeopardied by any want of attention on their part, or by the undue strictness of the inspection or proof. On the contrary, great solicitude was always felt for their interests and the reputation of their establishments.

That any mistake could have been made in the proof of Mr. Clarke's guns, in August, 1834, is, from the very strict attention paid by the inspectors to the proof of powder and filling of the cartridges, impossible; and he himself, who witnessed both operations, ought to know it. It is not probable that an error so sensibly affecting his interest would have escaped his notice, or have failed to have been corrected by him at the time. Besides, he was distinctly informed by Colonel Worth, (who had burst several guns on the previous inspection at that foundry,) that if he had any objection to urge against the manner of the proof, it should be done before he proceeded further in his operations.

Mr. Clarke seems to think that as Captain Ripley proved sixteen guns of the same manufacture the year following without bursting one, it is clear evidence that the first proof was excessive. Colonel Worth, at the inspection made by him, proved and received *thirty-three* guns, more than double the number received by Captain Ripley of that lot. I have not the least doubt that the sixteen guns proved by Captain Ripley would have been received by Colonel Worth or any other inspecting officer who might have been directed to prove them under the same regulations, unless, perhaps, Captain Ripley's experience (this being the first inspection he ever made) made him a more competent judge of the correct manner of proving cannon. Besides, a year had elapsed since the inspection by Colonel Worth; and it is believed by many that cast iron, especially that of an open, coarse-grained structure, improves in strength by exposure to the atmosphere. On this hypothesis the different results of the two inspections may be accounted for, without calling in question any officer's attention to the correct performance of his duty. In the proof of the guns newly cast, the elastic fluid generated by the ignition of the powder, and urged by its expansive force, penetrated between the particles, and exerted a separate force on each, tending to separate it from the next. After a year's exposure, the absorption of oxygen from the atmosphere had filled the interstices and more firmly united the particles, enabling them to resist a force greater than that to which they had previously yielded.

Finally, the guns bursted at Bellona foundry were proved as guns made by all other contractors are proved, and as all the contractors know that they will be proved, before they undertake to make or offer them to the government. Mr. Clarke, in my opinion, has no just claim on the government for pay for the bursted guns.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. MAYNADIER, *First Lieutenant First Artillery, Inspector of Ordnance.*

Colonel GEORGE BOMFORD, *Chief of Ordnance Department, Washington, D. C.*

K.

WASHINGTON, *May 28, 1836.*

SIR: On the subject of Major Clarke's claim to pay for sixteen broken guns, I have very little to state, other than to affirm that the inspection and proof were conducted in strict and rigid accordance with the established regulations; that those regulations were fully explained to him; that he was informed that if he had any objections to the regulations or the manner of administering them, the inspectors would await the further orders of the department; that he was required by the inspectors to be present at, and was actually present, and assisting in proving the powder and weighing the proving-charges, and loading the guns. The mistake which he supposes may have taken place had no foundation save in his imagination. There was no error except in the quality of his metal.

The major dwells, with apparent confidence, upon the inexperience of the inspector. The undersigned, with his assistants, had conducted *five* inspections at other founderies before his first visit to Bellona, and *fourteen* before his second. One hundred and fourteen guns were presented by Major Clarke on the occasion of the visits in July, 1833, and August, 1834, of which number ninety-eight guns were received, and sixteen broken. The major, however, does not find it convenient to his purpose to notice any want of experience in Colonel Worth's successor, who proved (and no doubt with care and accuracy) the remaining sixteen guns, although this was his first and unprepared effort. The question of fitness, however, was, it is presumed, well considered by those who had the appointing power.

In two several inspections at the Pennsylvania foundry, the result was as follows:

20 guns were presented, 11 broken, 9 received.

33 guns were presented, 2 broken, 31 received.

The two broken at the second inspection were of the same lot of metal whereof the first were made. The founders, instead of seeking payment for broken guns, assured of the inferior quality of the metal, took active and successful measures to remedy their own fault and protect their own interest for the future. Since that period not a gun has been broken at their works.

This case has been referred to as strikingly contrasting with and illustrative of the one in question. I request that all my reports and all correspondence with the office may be submitted to the officers to whom the Secretary has referred this matter. The letter accompanying my report of last inspection at Bellona is annexed to this communication and particularly referred to.

During the period that I performed the duties of inspector the correction of abuses and protection of the government's interest were regarded as a paramount duty; but I never ceased to feel a lively solicitude so to perform this duty as not to infringe on the rights and proper interests of the founders.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

Colonel GEORGE BOMFORD, *Ordnance Corps.*

W. J. WORTH, *Lieutenant Colonel.*

FRANKFORD ARSENAL, *August 15, 1834.*

SIR: I have the honor to forward a detailed report of the recent inspection at Bellona foundry: fifty-eight guns were presented and inspected, and forty-two proved; of which latter number nine were broken, *eight* on the first, and *one* on the second fire, and thirty-three accepted.

Having in view the misfortunes of this founder on the preceding inspection, and his prejudices against the method of ascertaining the strength of powder, (by use of the established eprouvette,) no means were left untried to arrive at the greatest practicable accuracy. Every circumstance will be found carefully noted on the detailed report. It will be recollected that heretofore Major Clarke raised great objections to the use of two round shot, to the breaking and wedging of which, in the passage through the gun, he mainly ascribed the bursting. On this occasion cylinder shot was used, except, at his suggestion, in the last three guns tried, two of which broke in like manner with the preceding. The powder used (with the exception of eight charges for the second fire) was sent from this arsenal the 29th of April last, selected from among the lowest range on hand by the proof of 1833. I have noted on the detailed report the proof of this same powder in July, 1829, November, 1833, and now at the time of its use. The season, added to partial deterioration, will account for the difference in the first two proofs. The last, the time of use, brings it up again nearly to the first, 1829, which is accounted for satisfactorily to the inspectors: first, by its deposit for the period of three months in one of the best magazines in the United States subject to the action of southern heat; second, its being necessarily exposed some hours, when verifying the proof, to an intemperate heat. Still it did not exceed the proof of 1829, and was within the prescribed limits. The eprouvette used was No. 11 of the seventeen new ones, which, from less use, doubtless gave higher ranges (and consequently greater reductions in quantity by the tables) than that of the same series in use at this arsenal. An opinion as to the true cause of the failure will be found on the detailed report.

The supply of Dupont's powder at this arsenal, whence, by existing orders, it is drawn for proving purposes, is exhausted. I now beg leave again to request authority, either by exchange or purchase, to contract for a sufficient quantity for the next year's proof; and especially for the completion of Major Clarke's proof in December of the precise range of 225 yards. I do not attach much importance to it, but the founder does. Such an arrangement, therefore, will take from him all cause of complaint and relieve the inspectors from painful and unsatisfactory discussions.

The proof was discontinued at the request of the founder. I have taken great pains to possess the department of all the facts in the case in view of a correspondence which I foresee will ensue. Sixteen inspected but unproved guns remain, and nine are to be made to complete his complement.

The practice of plugging shot was observed. All such were rejected, and notice given that in future any such practice would be deemed sufficient cause for abandonment of the inspection. The founder stated that special orders had been given to that effect.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. J. WORTH, *Brevet Lieutenant Colonel, Major of Ordnance, and Inspector.*

Colonel GEORGE BOMFORD, *Ordnance Corps.*

Statement of all the proofs and inspections of ordnance and projectiles made by Lieutenant Colonel Worth whilst inspector, showing the number of guns and shot of each calibre received and rejected.

Foundry.	Date.	No. of guns.	Received.	Rejected.*	No. of shot.	Received.	Rejected.
Columbia.....	Nov., 1832	Iron, 20.....	20
Pittsburg.....	Dec., 1832	..do..20.....	9	11
Pittsburg.....	April, 1833	..do..33.....	31	2
West Point.....	May, 1833	..do..34.....	34
West Point.....	July 1, 1833	..do..11.....	11
Bellona.....	July 18, 1833	..do..72.....	65	7
Pittsburg.....	Sept., 1833	..do..34.....	34
Pittsburg.....	Dec., 1833	..do..21.....	21
Columbia.....	January, 1834	..do..8.....	8
Pittsburg.....	April, 1834	..do..27.....	27	790	102
West Point.....	May, 1834	..do..20.....	20
Columbia.....	May, 1834	..do..14.....	14	1,847	1,230	617
Columbia.....	July 19, 1834	..do..12.....	12	2,400
West Point.....	July 26, 1834	..do..25.....	25	527	310	217
Bellona.....	August, 1834	..do..42.....	33	9	637	532	105
Pittsburg.....	October, 1834	..do..25.....	25
West Point.....	Dec., 1834	Brass, 6.....	6

* The reasons for the rejection of any gun, shot, or shell, are set forth in full on the detailed report made immediately after each inspection to the colonel of ordnance; which reports accompany this statement.

L.

WASHINGTON, June 18, 1836.

SIR: The commanding general and inspector general, to whom the case of Major Clarke was referred, would make the following report:

From the statements furnished, it appears that Major Clarke cast for the United States, between the 10th of June, 1829, and the 25th of June, 1832, two hundred and fifty-six 32-pounder cannon, of which only one burst, under the inspection and proof of Colonel Bankhead and Lieutenant Symington. It also appears that he cast for the United States seventy-two 32-pounder cannon, which were inspected and proved by Lieutenant Colonel Worth and Lieutenant Childe the 18th of July, 1833, of which seven burst; and also 42 on the 7th of August, 1834, which were inspected by Lieutenant Colonel Worth and Lieutenant Maynadier, of which nine burst. On the 9th of July, 1835, he furnished forty-five 32-pounders, 16 of which were of the same parcel inspected by Lieutenant Colonel Worth and Lieutenant Maynadier, of which none burst in the proof made by Captain Ripley and Lieutenant Maynadier. The whole number of 32-pounder cannon furnished by Major Clarke for inspection and proof, from the 10th of June, 1829, to the 9th of July, 1835, amounts to 415, of which 17 burst in the proving. Of this number, 16 burst under the inspection and proof of Lieutenant Colonel Worth.

Major Clarke states that the iron, casting, and the manufacture of his guns, throughout the whole number, were in all respects the same: therefore, and from the fact that of three hundred and one 32-pounders proved previous to any inspection made by Lieutenant Colonel Worth, only one burst, and from the further fact, that, of 45 subsequently proved by Captain Ripley, none burst, that Lieutenant Colonel Worth must have committed some error in the preparation of the proof-charges, and that they must have been much stronger than any charges previously used by Colonel Bankhead, or subsequently used by Captain Ripley. Hence he infers the bursting of his guns, for which he claims remuneration.

In answer to which it appears, from the inspection reports of Lieutenant Colonel Worth, Lieutenant Childe, and Lieutenant Maynadier, that the inspection and proof of the guns for which Major Clarke claims remuneration, and inspected by them, was in all respects conformable to the regulations prescribed by the Ordnance department, and precisely the same as used for the proof of cannon at all other founderies. Each and all assert, with the utmost confidence, there could have been no mistake or error committed in the preparation of the proof-charges for any part of the guns proved at the foundery of Major Clarke.

It, however, appears remarkable, and perhaps extraordinary, that so great a difference should appear in the result of the proof of his guns, and that, with the exception of one gun, all should have burst in the two inspections made by Lieutenant Colonel Worth; and yet we have nothing before us to call in question, or in any respect to doubt the accuracy of the inspections or the reports and statements of the inspectors, who, we conceive, could not have had any other motive than a rigid and faithful discharge of their duty.

After a careful investigation of the subject under consideration, we have arrived at the conclusion that the proving of the guns referred to, as having been burst by Lieutenant Colonel Worth, was done in conformity with the established regulations governing the Ordnance department, and we believe there must have been some defect in the guns which did not stand the proof. The fact that so many guns have stood the prescribed proof at Bellona arsenal, as well as at every other foundery, is a strong presumption that the proof to which the guns have been subjected is not too great. This is supported by the further evidence that no complaints of the proof being too great has ever been made to the Ordnance department by any person who contracted to furnish the government with cannon but Major Clarke. The circumstance to which he has alluded, and to which he appears strongly to rely in support of his claim for remuneration, that the British prove their iron guns with a less charge than the United States, will not, we think, add or give strength to his claim. The British prove their 32-pounders, weighing from 6,160 to 6,496 lbs., with 21 lbs. 8 oz. powder, one shot, and two wads. The United States prove the same guns, weighing 7,500 lbs., with 21 lbs. 4 oz. powder, two shot, and two wads. The British repeat the same proof, but the United States reduce the quantity of powder from 21 lbs. 4 oz. to 16 lbs., with two shot and two wads. It may, however, be a subject worthy of consideration whether the proof as established by the Ordnance department ought not to be changed, so far, at least, as to prove with one shot instead of two. This is suggested from the circumstance that it has been found by experience that two shot fired at the same time, under a heavy charge, are subject to be broken, and when thus broken are liable to cut grooves in the iron as they pass through the bore of the pieces, and it is possible that the fragments might be so wedged in as to burst the gun.

It is, however, worthy of particular notice, that the charges used in proving the guns in question was less than any proof, by 25 yards, since used for the same purpose; and since the proof-charge has been increased, not a single gun, as we are informed by the Ordnance department, has burst, under the increased proof-charge, which is now 250 yards.

We have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servants,

ALEX. MACOMB *Major General.*

JOHN E. WOOL, *Brig Gen. and Ins. Gen. U. S. Army.*

Hon. LEWIS CASS, *Secretary of War.*

M.

Letter to Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Worth, regulating the proof-charges for cannon, based on the standard proof range of 225 yards.

ORDNANCE OFFICE, Washington, November 29, 1832.

SIR: The proof-charges of powder, as established by the present regulations for the proof of the heavy ordnance, are two-thirds of the weight of the shot for the first charge, and one-half of the weight of the shot for the second charge. But since the strength of the serviceable powder now in the magazines varies so much (as indicated by the new eprouvette) as between 200 and 300 yards, the graduation of the charges to be used in the proof of cannon, according to this variety in the quality of the powder, becomes

a matter of importance; for it is obvious that whatever quality of powder is used in the charges, they should be so increased or diminished as to produce, in all cases, if possible, the same explosive force upon the gun. To effect this, it is necessary that some particular quality of powder should be adopted as a standard, so that, of that quality the full charges of two-thirds and one-half the weight of the shot may, in all cases, be used in the proof of heavy cannon. As it is not desired at present to deviate from the standard heretofore in use in this department, that of 200 yards by the old eprouvette will still be continued. But as all the powder now in the magazines is tested by the new eprouvette, which gives a range about $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. greater than the old one, the standard of 200 yards by this last will thus become 225 yards by the new eprouvette, and this, therefore, will be considered, until further orders, as the proof range of the standard powder; of which, the full charges of two-thirds and one-half the weight of the shot will, in all cases when it can be obtained, be used in the proof of heavy cannon.

But as standard powder cannot always be obtained, it hence becomes necessary to increase or diminish the quantity used in the standard charges according as the proof range of the powder to be used is less or greater than the standard proof range.

To be enabled to make this graduation of the charges according to the quality of powder, an experiment was directed by this department to be made with the eprouvette at the arsenal in this city in 1826, the result of which is satisfactory, and is as follows:

Reduced charges of the eleven different kinds of powder; each charge being equal in effect one with another, and also to the standard charge, (E).	Ounce charges of the eprouvette for eleven different kinds of powder, giving ranges as in fourth column.	Weight of the reduced charge of the eprouvette in grains of the same quality of powder.	Medium range.	32-pounder.		24-pounder.	
				Proof-charges, corresponding to two-thirds weight of shot, standard powder.	Proof-charges, corresponding to one-half weight of shot, standard powder.	Proof-charges, corresponding to two-thirds weight of shot, standard powder.	Proof-charges, corresponding to one-half weight of shot, standard powder.
Grains.	Oz. grs.	Oz. grs.	Yards.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Pounds.
335.0	1 = 437 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 437 $\frac{1}{2}$	305	16.33	12.25	12.25	9.18
(D) 351.0	(A) 1 =	(B) 20 417 $\frac{1}{2}$	(G) 288	(H) 17.11	12.84	12.84	9.63
358.7	1	40 397 $\frac{1}{2}$	271	17.97	13.48	13.48	10.11
388.3	1	60 377 $\frac{1}{2}$	260	18.93	14.20	14.20	10.65
410.1	1	80 357 $\frac{1}{2}$	243	19.98	14.99	14.99	11.23
434.3	1	100 337 $\frac{1}{2}$	227	21.17	15.88	15.88	11.91
(E*) 137.5	1	102.5 335	(C) 225	(F) 21.33	16.00	16.00	12.00
461.6	1	120 317 $\frac{1}{2}$	207	22.50	16.88	16.88	12.66
476.6	1	130 307	200	23.23	17.42	17.42	13.06
492.6	1	140 297	190	24.01	18.01	18.01	13.05
528.1	1	160 277 $\frac{1}{2}$	168	25.74	19.31	19.31	14.47

* Standard charge.

The third column shows the charges used, and the fourth column the result of the experiment. The ranges are perceived to be so regular as to be reduced generally by about seventeen yards for every reduction of twenty grains in the charge.

The second column shows the ounce charges of eleven different kinds of powder, the ranges corresponding being the same with those in the fourth column. The fifth and sixth and seventh and eighth columns show the reduced proof-charges for the thirty-two and twenty-four pounders, as obtained from the data in the other columns.

To explain the principle on which these reduced charges were obtained it is necessary to observe, first, with regard to the third column, that it indicates eleven different charges of the same kind of powder, producing eleven different ranges, as given in the fourth column; and that the same ranges are also produced by eleven ounce charges of eleven different kinds of powder, as in the second column; the effect of each of these last charges, formed from different qualities of powder being equal to that of its corresponding charge in the third column in producing the same change. If, for example, we wished to reduce the charge (B) in the third column to such a degree as, when fired from the eprouvette, it will produce the standard range (C) of 225 yards, we would diminish it by $(417.5 - 335 =) 82\frac{1}{2}$ grains. But the charge (B), though of a different kind of powder from that of the charge (A), is exactly equal to it in effect, as they both produce the same range of 288 yards. If, therefore, in reducing the charge (B) by $82\frac{1}{2}$ grains we give it the standard range of 225 yards, we shall in like manner, by reducing its equal in effect, the charge (A), by a proportional quantity, obtain a charge of powder (D) of the same quality with that of (A), which will also give the standard range of 225 yards.

To give an example of the method of obtaining the charges in the first column:

As the charge B, ($417\frac{1}{2}$ grains): $(417\frac{1}{2} - 335 =) 82\frac{1}{2}$ grains:: charge A, ($=437\frac{1}{2}$ grains): 86.4 grains, which is the quantity according to which the charge (A) ought to be reduced in order to make the reduction proportional, to that of (B); 86.4 grains being therefore deducted from charge (A), $=437\frac{1}{2}$ grains, leaves the charge (D) equal to 351 grains, as seen in the table.

In this manner all the ounce charges, (of the second column,) which are taken from eleven different qualities of powder, are reduced to the corresponding charges in the first column, which last are all of equal strength one with another, each producing the standard range of 225 yards; the standard charge (E) in this column being equal to one ounce, and all above it less, and all below it greater than one ounce.

We have, therefore, in the first column a series of eleven charges of different qualities of powder, (these qualities being indicated in the fourth column,) all giving the standard range, viz: 225 yards, and having, therefore, the same effect upon the eprouvette; and it is next necessary to find a series of proof-charges (for the thirty-two-pounder, for example) corresponding to these different qualities of powder, and all being equal in effect to the standard proof-charge (F,) 21.33 pounds, and exerting, therefore, the same effect upon the gun. Now, as all the reduced proof-charges of the eprouvette in the first column are equal in effect to that of the standard proof-charge (E,) and as all the reduced proof-charges for cannon (for example, in the fifth column) ought to be equal in effect to that of the standard proof-charge (F,)

21.33 pounds, it is hence evident that these last in column five ought to be directly proportional to the former in the first column; and this is the principle on which the charges in the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth columns have been determined. To give an example: in finding the charge in the fifth column which corresponds to the range (G) of 288 yards: as the charge E=(437.5 grains): D=(351 grains):: F=(21.33 pounds): H=(17.11 pounds): which, as seen in the fifth column, is the required reduction of powder giving 288 yards; and so for the other charges in this statement, and for all other cases of the reduction of charges for cannon of other calibres.

The general principle used in the above statement, in obtaining the charges for the proof of cannon by reference to corresponding reduced charges of the eprouvette, giving the same range, is esteemed to be the only correct one; and it is believed, if charges so large as these could be tested by the balastic pendulum, that the initial velocities would be found to be nearly equal.

I have to direct, in conclusion, that the several charges set forth in the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th columns for the proof of the 32 and 24-pounders, be used in the proof of those calibres until further orders, and that no powder be hereafter used in the proof of cannon giving a proof range greater than 290 yards, or less than 190 yards.

Your report that you consider the charges of powder used in the latter part of the late inspection as insufficient has led to the above investigation of the subject, and it is now hoped that these charges are established with suitable regard to the interest of the government, and to what, in justice, is due to the founder.

Respectfully, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

GEO. BOMFORD, *Colonel of Ordnance.*

Major W. J. WORTH, *Pittsburg, Pennsylvania.*

No. 1.

To the honorable the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled :

The petition of John Clarke, of Virginia, respectfully represents: That your petitioner is the proprietor of a cannon foundry and boring mills on James river, a few miles above the city of Richmond, called the Bellona Works. He was induced to erect them by the solicitation of the government during the administration of President Madison for the manufacture of ordnance for the service of the United States.—(See the letter of the late President Monroe, addressed to your petitioner, dated December 29, 1816, marked A, to which is annexed an extract from Colonel Bomford's (printed) report to the Secretary of War, dated November 29, 1825.)

Before that time your petitioner had been engaged by the government of Virginia to form the plan, construct the works, machinery, &c., and superintend the operations of the State manufactory of arms at Richmond—an extensive establishment, in which more than two hundred artificers were employed in the manufacture of small-arms and field artillery for the militia of Virginia; and which was continued until the general government took upon itself to supply arms to the militia of the States.

The iron used at his works is from the upper counties of Virginia, on and near James river; and he is thoroughly convinced, by the experience of thirty years, and by numerous comparative experiments of the best pig-iron of Great Britain, and of several of the States of this Union, that the James river iron used by him is superior in strength and toughness to any other that he has ever tried. It is chiefly of that iron, mixed and tempered by a uniform process, that his guns are made. And he challenges a comparison of them with any others manufactured either in America or Europe.—(See the accompanying letters of the late Colonel Decius Wadsworth, then at the head of the ordnance corps, to the Secretary of War, marked B and C; also letters and certificates (marked D, E, F, G, H) of the late Captain John Hills, of the ordnance corps—an officer highly qualified by many years of practical experience in the inspection and proof of ordnance.) The original letters may be seen by reference to the records of the War and Ordnance offices.

When 32-pounder cannon were required for the fortifications your petitioner made the first or pattern gun; and when the first parcel thereof, consisting of 58 guns, were proved, in June, 1829, one of them was burst, with too strong a charge, before there was any experience in respect to the strength of the proof-charges proper for those guns.

The whole number of 32-pounder cannon for fortifications manufactured by your petitioner previous to the end of the year 1836 is four hundred and forty-six. The greater part of those guns were proved at different periods between the years 1828 and 1833, under the regulations of the Ordnance department, and by skilful proving officers; and, save the single gun of the first parcel aforesaid, not a gun was burst. But after the formation of the new ordnance corps, the inspection and proof of ordnance for the service of the United States was committed to an officer newly initiated into that corps, and without the aid of experience in the proof of ordnance; he burst sixteen of those excellent 32-pounder cannon. Your petitioner, witnessing the unprecedented destruction of cannon of as good quality as he ever made, objected to the continuation of the proof by that officer; and he accordingly discontinued the proof, leaving sixteen of the same parcel of guns unproved, which 16 guns, together with 60 others, (making seventy-six 32-pounder cannon,) have since that time been proved by another proving officer, and not a gun of the whole number burst.

All those 446 guns were made, not only at the same works, but of the same pattern, in the same manner, of the same kind of iron, and by the same skilful artificers. And when it is considered that, save the single gun of the first parcel aforesaid, the whole 446 guns withstood proof, excepting the 16 guns which were burst by the said newly-appointed proving officer, and that it was only by him that any of those guns were burst, either before or after he acted as proving officer, the conclusion is irresistible that the guns proved by him were subjected to an unusual and excessive test, and that the destruction of the 16 bursted guns was occasioned by some error or defect in the proof, arising from mistake or the want of experience of the proving officer. This conclusion is rendered still more irresistible by the fact that the proofs made by him were attended with evidences of excessive violence, not only unusual, but, in the experience of your petitioner, wholly without example. The recoil of the guns, while undergoing proof, was nearly double what had ever been before or has been since. A fragment of one of the bursted

guns, weighing several hundred pounds, was thrown several hundred yards from the proving ground, through one of the principal buildings of the United States arsenal; and many other fragments were thrown to still greater distances.

Your petitioner does not desire to say anything derogatory of the character of the officer who burst the 16 guns. But, however well qualified for the performance of other duties, he certainly was not experienced in the proof of ordnance; and, in the opinion of your petitioner, there is no service in which the aid of experience is more necessary to counteract the dangerous errors to which the present mode of proving ordnance is liable.

When your petitioner was induced by the highest officers of the government to build the Bellona Works for the manufacture of ordnance for the United States, it was certainly intended that the pieces of artillery made at those works should undergo the usual proof of similar pieces at works where the greatest experience in the proving of cannon had been attained; and that the inspection and proof thereof should be conducted by men well qualified by practical experience in the performance of that important service. Whether that has been done in the case now submitted for your consideration you will decide. The Bellona works and machinery are constructed in the most permanent manner, and on the most improved plan; and the records of the War and Ordnance offices will show that, according to the opinions of the most experienced and able judges, the pieces of ordnance manufactured at those works are, for quality of metal, neatness and exactness of execution, and strength, equal, if not superior, to any pieces of artillery made in the United States.

Your petitioner has faithfully performed his part of the undertaking at great expense, and with profits inferior to the interest upon the original cost of his works. And, as his guns when made are inspected and proved under the sole management and control of an agent of the government, your petitioner conceives himself entitled to indemnity against loss or damage happening by reason of either the error or the want of experience of the proving officer.

In the month of April last your petitioner applied for compensation for the 16 burst guns to General Cass, Secretary of War; and as that application was founded upon the inexperience and unfitness of an officer who was appointed by the ordnance corps to prove the ordnance for the government, it was expected by your petitioner that the Secretary of War, after his making full investigation, would decide the case himself, not that he would refer it to the ordnance corps by whom the said proving officer was appointed, and who, it might be presumed, would be unwilling to admit the fallibility of a proving officer who was but recently appointed by that corps. But to the astonishment of your petitioner the Secretary of War (General Cass) did transmit the papers and refer the case of your petitioner to Colonel Bomford, the head of the ordnance corps, for his report thereon. That officer, however, declined making a report, under an apprehension, perhaps, that if he should make a report unfavorable to your petitioner he might be accused of injustice; and if he should make a report favorable to your petitioner it would be an acknowledgment of the incompetency of said proving officer, and would reflect an imputation upon that department itself for having appointed such an officer to perform duties so highly important to this nation. He therefore caused the said proving officer and his assistants, by whom the guns were burst, to attend in person at the Ordnance office; and after obtaining letters from them in behalf of themselves, those letters, with the two letters which your petitioner had addressed to the Secretary of War, were transmitted by Colonel Bomford (without any written report from himself) to the Secretary of War, who afterwards caused those papers to be sent to Generals Macomb and Wool for consideration and report; and near the termination of the last session of Congress those gentlemen made a report. But that report was founded upon the assertions made in the letter of Lieutenant Colonel Worth, the very officer and his assistants who destroyed the said 16 guns; and, so far as it respects your petitioner, the report of the two generals is, in effect, the report of the said Lieutenant Colonel Worth, who doubtless made every effort in his power to free himself from the imputation of being unqualified for the inspection and proof of ordnance.

But he not only thinks himself qualified for proving cannon, but that he is also qualified to judge of the qualities of the metals proper for their manufacture; for he says in his letter to Colonel Bomford, upon which letter Generals Macomb and Wool have founded their report, "*there was no error except in the quality of his metal,*" by which he endeavors to induce a belief that the guns were burst in consequence of the bad quality of the metal and not by any error or want of qualification in himself. His opinion, however, is in direct conflict with the opinions of numerous persons who, by their long actual use of iron, have become the best judges of its quality. The Bellona works have been in operation about twenty years, and numerous pieces of ordnance, of various descriptions, for the sea and the land service, have been made there and proved by many well-qualified officers; and they, as well as others who are considered to be the best judges, have declared *that iron* to be of the toughest and very best quality. Lieutenant Colonel Worth stands alone in his opinion, which I never knew until I saw it mentioned in his said letter to Colonel Bomford; and had it not been necessary to exonerate himself from the charge of incompetency, he perhaps never would have thought of advancing such a charge against the quality of the iron.

In the same letter he has also asserted that your petitioner "*assisted in weighing the proving-charges and loading the guns,*" which your petitioner positively denies, and solemnly declares that he did not assist in weighing the proof-charges, nor did he know the quantity of powder which Lieutenant Colonel Worth and his assistants put into his proof charges, nor did he assist in loading the guns, which duties belong exclusively to the proving officer, and with which your petitioner never did, on any occasion, meddle or interfere.

The eprouvette used in the United States for testing the strength of gunpowder is a small mortar with a calibre suited to fit a 24-pound cannon ball, at the bottom of which calibre there is a small chamber for containing one ounce avoirdupois of powder, which, when the axis of the calibre is placed at an angle of 45°, must propel the 24-pound ball 200 yards, (measured horizontally,) otherwise the powder would not be deemed to possess sufficient strength for standard powder. Such was the kind of proof to which powder was subjected in the year 1816, and the same kind of eprouvette is used at this time.

This mode of testing the strength of gunpowder when the eprouvette is in its best condition and without windage is subject to great variation and inaccuracy, in consequence of the density or the rarity of the air through which the ball is projected. But by frequent use the calibre of the eprouvette is soon worn larger by the friction of the ball, so that much windage is the consequence, and a considerable portion of the force of that small quantity of powder is lost in the windage between the ball and the calibre of the eprouvette. And as the distance to which the ball is propelled depends much upon the greater or less degree of the windage, and as the windage is always increased by the use and consequent

wear and enlargement of the calibre, the real strength of gunpowder cannot be ascertained by such eprouvettes.

The calibres of the eprouvettes are so much enlarged that a 25-pound ball instead of a 24-pound ball became necessary to fill the calibre, and as the weight of the ball has been increased, the weight of the powder which propels it should be increased in the same proportion. But that has not been done, and the one ounce of powder must be of such strength as to propel a 25-pound ball 200 yards, whereas it was formerly required to be of sufficient strength to propel a 24-pound ball 200 yards.

But within a few years the standard range by the eprouvette was increased, and the powder was required to be of such strength that one ounce thereof should propel the 25-pound ball 225 yards instead of 200, as formerly; and more recently the Ordnance department has again increased the standard range by the eprouvette, and the powder is required to be of such a degree of strength that one ounce thereof shall propel the 25-pound ball 250 yards instead of 225, to which, not long before, it had been increased from 200 yards.

A 42-pounder cannon (the largest class of our guns) requires for one proof-charge 28 pounds or 448 ounces of powder; and can it be imagined that, by a four hundred and forty-eighth part of such a charge, (only one ounce of powder,) fired from such eprouvettes, and under the circumstances above stated, the real strength of gunpowder can be ascertained.

The British nation, who have manufactured more cannon, and had more experience in the proof as well as the actual use of it than any other nation, *prove their cannon with only one cannon ball in each proof-charge*. For example, they prove a 42-pounder cannon by firing twice a proof-charge of 25 pounds of powder, one ball, and two wads. The Americans (less experienced) prove a 42-pounder cannon with 28 pounds of powder, two balls, and two wads in the first proof-charge, and in the second proof-charge 21 pounds of powder, two balls, and two wads. Thus there are three pounds of powder more and double the weight of shot used in our first-proof charge (which is the most straining charge) than there is in the first proof-charge for the British gun, which the books on gunnery will show, and they shall be seen if required.

The officers who prove ordnance for the United States have informed your petitioner that they were directed by the Ordnance department that, for any excess of strength in the powder beyond the standard range of the ball from the eprouvette, the quantity or weight thereof should be reduced in the proof-charge in proportion to the strength of the powder. Your petitioner, however, knows not by what rule the reductions are made.

But such a procedure, instead of affording a remedy, is attended with most destructive effects, which your petitioner will endeavor to explain: Suppose the strength of the powder used in the proof of cannon should be double as great as the strength of standard powder; then instead of the full weight and bulk of a proof-charge of standard powder, only one-half of that weight and bulk is taken of the extra strong powder, and made a proof-charge, instead of a proof-charge of standard powder. That proof-charge of extra strong powder having all the strength and occupying only half the space or number of superficial inches within the calibre which would have been occupied by a proof-charge of standard powder, every superficial inch, therefore, of the calibre occupied by the extra strong powder is subjected to double the degree of stress or straining force that it would have been subjected to if the gun had been proved with powder of standard strength. And it is not to be expected that cannon whose thickness of metal is proportioned to sustain the strength of standard powder should withstand the force of powder of double that strength.

In Great Britain, whenever the powder exceeds the standard strength, it is *mixed* with a weaker powder, so as to bring it to the standard degree of strength.—(See Beauchant's Naval Gunner, published in London in the year 1829.) And it is much to be regretted that the same method is not invariably practiced in this country. But the powder used in the proof of ordnance here is much stronger than even the very high degree of strength required for standard powder by the Ordnance department; and when this extra strong powder is sent to prove cannon no weaker powder is sent to be mixed with that which is excessively strong, so as to produce the standard degree of strength; and the proving officers proceed to prove the guns with the excessively strong powder alone, or unmixed with weaker powder, in the manner already mentioned, which is attended with most ruinous effects.

It is found that two shot in one charge fired from a cannon range to only half the distance of one shot with the same charge of powder and at the same elevation; therefore, in service, it is only for short distances that cannon are double-shotted, and then they are fired with less than one-third of the weight of their proof-charges in powder; otherwise the balls split within the guns, and the recoil is too violent.—(See Beauchant's, also Aday's, Gunnery, respecting the charges for cannon and the splitting or breaking of shot, which shall be seen if required.) It having been demonstrated that the shot split and break in pieces within the gun when double-shotted and fired with less than one-third of its proof-charge in powder, it is most evident that the gun, when double-shotted and fired with its full proof-charge of powder, will produce effects vastly more injurious; and why, therefore, should guns, when subjected to proof, be double-shotted? It is doubtless for the reasons above stated that the British gunners prove their cannon with only one shot in the proof-charge, which is demonstrated to be fully sufficient for testing the strength of guns without overstraining them, and, in the opinion of your petitioner, that injurious practice ought to be abandoned in our country.

Two cannon balls can touch each other only in a single point; and in the calibre of a gun, when subjected to proof with an excessively strong proof-charge, that small point, unable to withstand the immense and instantaneous impetus with which the hindmost shot is driven against the foremost while it is at rest, the shot inevitably break (as is well known and may be seen if required) into conical pieces or rounding wedges, which, being driven into the shot, split them, and, by enlarging their diameters, burst the guns; and when the guns thus proved do not happen to burst, the angular pieces of the broken shot are driven out with so great a degree of violence as to cut such deep grooves in their calibres as to render them unfit for service. Such was the case in relation to five 24-pounder cannon made at the Bellona works for our sloops of war, and although those excellent guns were ruined and useless, they were paid for by the Navy Department, as well as other guns which *did burst* with such excessive proof.

To prevent the evils resulting from the breaking of the *two shot* in the calibre of the gun while undergoing proof with excessive charges, recourse was had to proving with *one shot of cylindrical form, but of double the weight of one round shot*. Yet the guns thus proved were also burst, and will inevitably burst with the great excess of strength in the charges with which they are proved.

Some years past the Ordnance department caused 17 eprouvettes to be made for proving the gun-

powder manufactured for the United States; and the following table is a list of them, and their several respective *ranges*, furnished from that department, and is as follows:

Proof ranges of 17 eprouvettes.

No. 1, range 295 $\frac{3}{4}$ yards.	No. 7, range 284 yards.	No. 13, range 308 yards.
2, range *274 yards.	8, range 275 $\frac{1}{2}$ yards.	14, range 303 $\frac{1}{2}$ yards.
3, range *312 yards.	9, range 292 $\frac{1}{2}$ yards.	15, range 302 yards.
4, range 309 yards.	10, range 292 yards.	16, range 304 $\frac{1}{2}$ yards.
5, range 289 yards.	11, range 290 $\frac{1}{2}$ yards.	17, range 307 $\frac{1}{2}$ yards.
6, range 289 $\frac{1}{2}$ yards.	12, range 303 $\frac{1}{2}$ yards.	

Each of these 17 eprouvettes give a different range to the 25-pound ball; and between the highest range, *i. e.*, 312 yards, and the lowest range, 274 yards, there is a difference of 38 yards. Your petitioner was informed that when those eprouvettes were-made each of them was fired a considerable number of times with one ounce of powder of the same kind and strength; and there being a difference in the distance to which the ball was propelled at each of those fires, the medium of those distances was taken as the range of that particular eprouvette, and so on, respectively, throughout the whole of the 17 eprouvettes.

As the eprouvettes all differ in their respective ranges, how is the standard strength of powder to be ascertained by them? The proving officers were directed to reduce the quantity of powder in the proof-charge in proportion to the excess of the strength of the powder. But by which of the eprouvettes, and what number of yards of the range of that particular eprouvette, is to be taken as the standard range or distance on which they are to make the reduction?

Your petitioner has been informed that the 17 eprouvettes (on each of which is engraved its number, from one to 17, as per the above table) have been distributed—one to each of the United States arsenals, and one to each of the manufactories of cannon. Now, the range for standard powder last adopted by the Ordnance department (*i. e.*, 250 yards) being deducted from the respective ranges of the eprouvettes, (all of which differ,) and the excess or overplus number of yards being taken to determine how much the proof-charge of extra strong powder shall be reduced, there consequently is a considerable difference in the strength of the proof-charges used in proving cannon at the several cannon founderies at which they are made. At some of these founderies the largest class of guns may be subjected to proof with several pounds more of extra strong powder in the proof-charge than guns of the same description are proved with at other founderies.

The manufacture of gunpowder has been greatly improved within a few years, and the great importance of that material in the defence of our national rights requires that its best or most advantageous effects in the use of cannon and other fire-arms should be fully ascertained. That degree of strength in powder which will produce the longest ranges or greatest distances to which balls from cannon can be propelled may, by *experiments*, be ascertained; and when ascertained, that degree (your petitioner humbly conceives) should be established as the standard rate of strength for gunpowder.

By the skilful labors of scientific men, under the authority and patronage of the British government, the art of gunnery and the proof of ordnance have been brought to greater perfection in that country than in any other. Those skilful men, after numerous experiments, have demonstratively ascertained the different velocities, ranges, and effects of cannon balls, when propelled by great, by medium, and by small charges of powder, and that, in consequence of the immense resistance of the air in great velocities, the following effects are produced:

Maxim 4. "The ranges of pieces at a given elevation are no just measures of the velocity of the shot; for the same piece, fired successively at an invariable elevation, with the powder, bullet, and every other circumstance as nearly the same as possible, will range to very different distances."

Maxim 7. "That action of the air, by which it retards the motion of projectiles, is in many instances an immense force; and hence, the motion of these resisted bodies is totally different from what has been generally supposed."

Maxim 8. "This retarding force of the air acts with different degrees of violence, according as the projectile moves with a greater or less velocity; and the resistances observe this law: that to a velocity which is double another, the resistance (within certain limits) is four-fold, and to a treble velocity, nine-fold; and so on."

Maxim 13. "If the same piece of cannon be successively fired at an invariable elevation, but with various charges of powder, the greatest charge being the whole weight of the bullet in powder, and the least not less than one-fifth of that weight, then, if the elevation be not less than eight or ten degrees, it will be found that some of the ranges with the least charge will exceed some of those with the greatest."

Maxim 20. "No field-piece ought at any time to be loaded with more than one-sixth, or, at the utmost, one-fifth, of the weight of its bullet in powder; nor should the charge of any battering piece exceed one-third of the weight of its bullet."

In the American edition of the New Edinburgh Encyclopædia, under the head of "Gunnery," see the above-quoted practical maxims relative to the effects and management of artillery—the flight of shot and shells.

As the great and variable resistance of the air prevents the strength of powder from being ascertained by the distance to which balls are thrown, even by repeated discharges from the same piece of *long cannon*, loaded each time with the same weight and quality of powder, how can it be imagined that its strength can be ascertained by our eprouvette—a small mortar, with a calibre suited to a 25-pound shot, and by the ignition of only one ounce of powder in that mortar, whose calibre is only a few inches long, and in which the powder cannot exert its full force in consequence of its shortness?

In preference to so uncertain a method for proving powder as projecting a ball through the ever-varying and elastic atmosphere to a given distance, some experienced men in Great Britain have found that a more decisive experiment is to try the penetration of the bullet into some uniform substance placed a small distance before the muzzle of the piece. It would, however, be difficult to procure a perfectly uniform substance at every place where cannon are proved.

But the mode most eligible, in the humble opinion of your petitioner, would be to cause the force of a pound, or perhaps less, of powder to act against gravitation, (which never varies,) by throwing up vertically a heavy weight of iron from a piece of cannon or a tube of iron, whose length should be equal

to the length of the calibre of the cannon, which may be easily done, and would certainly be much more accurate than the method now practiced.

The standard rate of strength for British gunpowder is as follows:

The powder must be of such strength that *four ounces* thereof shall propel, from an eight-inch mortar at forty-five degrees elevation, a 68-pound iron ball 380 feet, or 126 yards and 2 feet.—(See Morton's British Gunner, published in London in the year 1828.)

The standard rate of strength adopted by the Ordnance department for gunpowder for the United States is as follows:

The powder must be of such strength that *one ounce* thereof shall propel, from a mortar of suitable calibre at forty-five degrees elevation, a 25-pound iron ball 750 feet, or 250 yards.

Thus it is seen that the strength of powder required by the Ordnance department is of considerable more than double the strength of British standard powder. Moreover, that department requires that the cannon shall be proved with double the weight of metal or shot in our proof-charges that is used in the British proof-charges.

And with such tremendous charges as are used in proving cannon for the service of the United States the guns are ruined, as those of them which do not burst while undergoing proof are so overstrained as to be liable to burst when in actual service.

A founder of cannon for the United States, after incurring the heavy expense of constructing his works and machinery, is annually under the necessity of selecting and procuring large supplies of the purest and toughest iron to the amount of many thousands of dollars; and, when made into pieces of ordnance, the amount is greatly increased by the price of the coal and other materials, and the labor of many skilful artificers employed in the manufacture. And if this great amount of the founder's property is to be at the mercy of a capricious or incompetent person, who may get himself appointed a proving officer, such person or officer has it in his power to ruin or make a bankrupt of the founder, who has no alternative but an appeal to Congress for justice and relief.

The two letters which your petitioner addressed to General Cass, the Secretary of War, also the report of Generals Macomb and Wool, and the letter of the proving officer, Lieutenant Colonel Worth, to Colonel Bomford, upon which letter that report was founded, accompany this petition, and are marked I, J, K, L.

Since the application was made to the Secretary of War last spring your petitioner has obtained certificates, on oath, of men of high respectability and of undoubted veracity, who have had great experience in the manufacture as well as the inspection and proof of ordnance. They have witnessed the inspection and proof of all the pieces of ordnance manufactured at the Bellona works for many years past, including the guns proved by Lieutenant Colonel Worth at those works, and their several affidavits, marked Nos. 1, 2, 3, accompany this petition.

As no relief has been given by the War Department, your petitioner now appeals to the justice of his country, and prays your honorable bodies to pass a law granting him indemnity for the injury which he has sustained.

JNO. CLARKE.

(I.)—No. 2.

WASHINGTON CITY, April 20, 1836.

STR: I am the proprietor of a cannon foundery and boring mills on James river, about ten miles above the city of Richmond, called the Bellona Works, which were built at the solicitation of the government during the administration of President Madison for the manufacture of ordnance for the service of the United States.—(See President Monroe's letter, marked A, addressed to the subscriber, and dated December 29, 1816.)

Previous to my engagements with the federal government I was engaged by the State government of Virginia to form the plan, erect the works, machinery, &c., and superintend the operations of the Virginia manufactory of arms, (an extensive establishment, in which upwards of two hundred artificers were employed in the manufacture of muskets, rifles, swords, pistols, field artillery, &c., for the militia of Virginia,) which was continued until the federal government determined to supply arms for the militia of the States at the expense of the nation.

The manufacture of good cannon requires the most strong and tenacious or tough metal, judiciously mixed and prepared for the purpose; and, from numerous experiments made by me for testing the strength and tenacity of the best pig-iron made in Great Britain, as well as the pig-iron made in many of the States of this Union, I found that the pig-iron made in some of the upper counties of Virginia, bordering on James river, possesses a greater degree of strength and toughness than any other iron I have yet tried, in the course of more than thirty years' experience in the manufacture of that material into all the varieties of ordnance for land and sea service. And it is of this James river iron chiefly that I manufacture cannon for the service of the United States.

Besides various other experiments for testing the strength of the guns I manufacture, I reduced the size of a field-piece, (a 6-pounder cannon,) after it had been completed and proved, by turning (as in a lathe) one inch in depth from its whole exterior surface, thus rendering it two inches less in its diameter than when it was proved, which made it a thinner and lighter gun of its calibre than I ever heard or read of. Thus reduced in substance or thickness of metal, I proved this gun with various charges of powder and ball, increasing the strength of each charge at every fire. Finding that it did not burst, I then fired this thin, light gun with the full proof-charge, which it withstood; and I repeatedly fired it with the full proof-charges for heavy 6-pounder cannon, all of which it withstood; but they caused this light gun to recoil about thirty-six feet at each fire. This little gun, which is now quite too light for actual service, had, before I reduced its substance, been inspected and proved by the proving officer of the Ordnance department, and would have been received by him for the service of the United States; but I determined to sacrifice the gun to enable me to test the strength of the metal I use in the fabrication of cannon. Colonel Decius Wadsworth, then at the head of the Ordnance department, on being informed of these facts by the proving officer of that department, (who had proved the gun before it was reduced in size and thick-

For short distances guns are sometimes double-shotted, but the two shot are not propelled by a force greater than that of the common service charge of powder, which is not more than half the force of the proof-charge; and, with that degree of force, the two shot will not overstrain the gun, nor will the shot be split in pieces by their contact within the gun.

England has long employed the acute ingenuity of her most scientific and skilful experimenters in the art of gunnery, to ascertain all the facts which relate to the fabrication and proof of cannon, as well as its usefulness in the service for which it is intended. And when we consider the effect of double-shotted guns, and the consequent splitting of the shot, even with the moderate charges of powder mentioned in books of recent date on British gunnery, we are inevitably brought to the conclusion that they have ascertained, by actual experiments, that guns tested by one shot in the proof-charge (as adopted by them) fully and effectually tests the strength of the gun, without its being weakened by it, and that the great superfluous force of the American proof-charge has the injurious effect of overstraining and destroying the strength of the gun.

The officers of our navy have sometimes burst good cannon by excessive proof-charges, which is well known to the officers by whom the guns were proved. I was, however, paid by the Navy Department for the burst cannon.

And if further proof be wanting of the excellent quality of the metal used by me in the fabrication of cannon, or that the proof-charges were excessive, it may be found in the examination of five 24-pounder cannon, made some years ago for sloops-of-war, and which are now lying at the Bellona works. These guns did not burst, although they were proved with charges of excessive strength; but such deep grooves were cut into the calibres of the guns, by the angular pieces of shot split or broken within the guns by the excessive force of the proof-charges, that those excellent pieces of cannon were deemed unfit for service by the officer who proved them. They were paid for by the Navy Department; because guns manufactured for the government are inspected and proved by the agents of the government; and if they are burst or destroyed in pursuance of improper instructions given by those agents, who dictate the mode of proof, the strength and composition of the proof-charges, &c.; or if they are burst by other agents, who, by improperly proving, burst the cannon, the loss is to be sustained by the government, whose agents have improperly caused the destruction of the guns.

In the autumn of 1833, soon after Major Worth had destroyed a parcel of my 32-pounder cannon, of as good quality as were ever made, I applied for payment for them at the Ordnance department, and was informed by Colonel Bomford that the Secretary of War was so much occupied that he could not at that time attend to my case, but imagined that he would find leisure to do so after a week or ten days. I then went to Philadelphia, and after about two weeks I returned to Washington, and again applied at the Ordnance office, and was informed by Colonel Bomford that the Secretary of War was then more busily occupied than on my first application, being engaged in making arrangements with the governor of Alabama relative to Indian affairs. I therefore returned to Virginia; and since that period I have had no convenient opportunity of making further application for payment. I now beg to request that payment may be made to me for the said sixteen pieces of cannon destroyed by excessive proof-charges. As I am now in Washington, if any further information or explanation shall be deemed necessary, I will endeavor to procure it, if required.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

JOHN CLARKE.

HON. SECRETARY OF WAR.

P. S.—The powder used by Captain Ripley, *who did not burst a single gun*, was part of the same parcel or lot of powder used by Major Worth, *who burst sixteen guns*.

(J.)—No. 3.

WASHINGTON CITY, May 9, 1836.

SIR: Colonel Bomford, within a few days past, handed me a paper, of which the following is a copy, marked with inverted commas; and stated that he intended to present it to you, without making any report himself on the subject to which it relates:

“ORDNANCE OFFICE, Washington, April 29, 1836.

“COLONEL: Having been present at the inspection and proof in August, 1834, as assistant to Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Worth, of forty-two 32-pounder iron cannon manufactured at Bellona foundry, Virginia, I am enabled to give the following statement of facts in relation thereto:

“The powder used in the proof of all these guns was of Dupont's manufacture, and was carefully proved in the presence and under the direction of the inspecting officers, immediately previous to filling the cartridges to be used in the proof-charges. The proof ranges given by the eprouvette were within limits prescribed by the regulations of the Ordnance department for the proof of cannon.

“The cartridge bags were filled in the presence and under the direction of the inspecting officers, with the exact quantity of powder, by weight, required by the ordnance regulations for the proof of cannon of this calibre.

“The guns were in every particular properly loaded.

“The inspection and proof throughout was made in exact conformity with the regulations of the Ordnance department on this subject, and in a manner exactly similar to that in which inspections and proofs had been made at other foundries.

“I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“WILLIAM MAYNADIER, *First Lieutenant 1st Artillery.*”

“At the inspection and proof of cannon, in July, 1835, at Bellona foundry, forty-five 32-pounder iron guns were presented by the founder, of which number sixteen had been inspected by Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Worth the year previous, but had been withdrawn by the founder before proof. All these guns were proved in exact accordance with the regulations of the Ordnance department, and withstood the

proof-charges. The powder used in the proof of these guns was principally of the same parcel as that used by Colonel Worth the year before. There not being, however, a sufficient quantity to prove all the guns, a mixture was made of this and other powder from the magazine of Bellona arsenal; all of which, from a proof of each barrel before the mixture, was found to be within the limits prescribed by the ordnance regulations for the strength of powder to be used in proof-charges. This mixture was carefully proved before the proof-cartridges were made, the quantity of powder in which was determined from the regulation range of standard powder—two hundred and fifty yards.

"This inspection and proof was in every particular similar to those at other founderies.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servants,

"JAMES RIPLEY, *Captain, &c.*

"WM. MAYNADIER, *First Lieutenant, &c.*"

Lieutenant Maynadier was the assistant of Colonel Worth when they burst the 32-pounder guns with excessive proof-charges. They were newly-appointed inspecting and proving officers, but neither of them acquainted with or experienced in the inspection and proof of cannon, which requires the most critical accuracy. I suppose they both *thought* that they proved the cannon correctly; but are such men competent to judge whether the guns were proved correctly or not?

When Lieutenant Maynadier assisted Colonel Worth in proving the guns which they burst, he thought they were proved in all respects as the other officers who did not burst the guns proved them; for he says in his statement (above) that "*the inspection and proof throughout was made in exact conformity with the regulations of the Ordnance department.*" Afterwards Lieutenant Maynadier assisted Captain Ripley, who proved a greater number of the same kind of guns with the same powder, and under the same regulations, *without bursting a single gun.* And Lieutenant Maynadier unites with Captain Ripley in stating (as above) that "*all these guns were proved in exact accordance with the regulations of the Ordnance department, and without the proof-charges.*"

When guns in all respects the same are proved with the same powder by two different persons, one of whom, in proving a given number, bursts many of the guns, and the other, in proving a greater number of them, under the same written regulations, *does not burst one gun*, the conclusion must be that the guns which were burst were not correctly proved; and that if Captain Ripley had used proof-charges of such enormous strength as those used by Colonel Worth he would have burst the guns; and if Colonel Worth had proved the guns correctly he would not have burst them; and it is most evident, when we consider that hundreds of these 32-pounder cannon, made of the material, by the same artificers, and at the same works, have been proved by officers who had many years of experience in the proof of cannon as well as the proof of powder, *and without bursting the guns*; and consider, also, that soon after Colonel Worth burst the said guns, Captain Ripley, (under the same regulations,) *without bursting a single gun*, proved forty-five of them, sixteen of which were of the same parcel that Colonel Worth began to prove, but left those sixteen guns unproved when I stopped him in his work of destruction.

The error or mistake which produced the bursting of so many excellent pieces of cannon (by those inexperienced provers of guns) may have been made in reducing the quantity of powder in the proof-charges in proportion to its excess of strength; or it might have been that, through mistake, more weights, or not the proper ones, were put into the scales when the powder for the proof-charges was weighed, either of which causes might have produced the same result. But such was the strength of those immensely powerful proof-charges, that the guns, on undergoing proof, recoiled nearly double the distance to which they had ever before recoiled on being proved, which was most obvious to all who were present and were accustomed to witness the proof of ordnance, which circumstance I repeatedly mentioned to Colonel Worth while the proof was carried on. By the tremendous force of these proof-charges, a fragment (weighing several hundred weight) of one of the guns burst by Colonel Worth was projected several hundred yards from the proving ground, and passed through one of the principal buildings of the United States arsenal; and numerous other large fragments were thrown to greater distances around the proving ground while the guns were bursting with those enormous proof-charges.

When I was induced by the highest officers of the government to build the Bellona works for the manufacture of ordnance for the United States, and promised their endeavors to encourage and support those works as long as the government would require cannon, it was doubtless intended and expected by the parties that the guns and other pieces of ordnance were to be of the best quality, and that they were to be fairly and properly inspected and proved by men well skilled by experience in that business. But that has not been done in the case now submitted for your consideration; and I ask of my country remuneration for the injury I have sustained in consequence thereof.

My works and machinery are constructed in the most permanent manner and on the most improved plan; and the records of the War office and those of the Ordnance office will show that, according to the best judges, the pieces of ordnance manufactured at those works are equal, if not superior, to any pieces of artillery made in the United States. It has been generally supposed that the manufacture of cannon for the government is a very profitable business; but I have manufactured ordnance for the government, for sea and land service, for the last nineteen or twenty years, with skilful artificers and with activity and economy, and the profit of the work executed does not amount to as much as the legal interest of the money that was necessarily expended in building the Bellona works; and I would now willingly sell the whole establishment for a reasonable price; although it has the advantages of being situated only a few miles above the city of Richmond, in the immediate vicinity of inexhaustible coal mines, and on the margin of the James river, by the navigation of which iron of superior quality is brought down to the works.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. CLARKE.

HON. SECRETARY OF WAR.

No. 4.

IN SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, *February 27, 1837.*

Resolved, That the Secretary of War be requested to ascertain the facts connected with the bursting of sixteen cannon at Major Clarke's foundry, in July, 1833, and August, 1834, especially such as may explain the mode of proof used upon that occasion, and the quality of the metal. Also the difference

between the strength of the charges used in proving those guns and the strength of the charges used in proving such guns in Great Britain; and report to the Senate, at its next session, his opinion of the remuneration to which the said Clarke should be entitled upon principles of equity.

MARCH 7, 1837.

NOTE.—It is my opinion that the Secretary of War, in causing to be carried into effect the order of the Senate in relation to the bursting of Mr. Clarke's cannon, would better accomplish the object of that order by construing it to include the additional inquiries mentioned above.

THOMAS H. BENTON, *Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs.*

No. 5.

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 17, 1836.

GENERAL: I give below a statement of the quantity of powder used in the proof of 32-pounder guns at Bellona foundery, at the proofs and inspections made by Colonel Worth in 1834, and by Captain Ripley in 1835; as also the strength of the powder in each case, as determined by the regulation eprouvette.

Proof range. 1834.	Proof range. 1835.	Weight of charge. 1834.	Weight of charge. 1835.
<i>Yards.</i> 273	<i>Yards.</i> 265	<i>Lbs. oz.</i> 17 13 $\frac{3}{4}$	<i>Lbs. oz.</i> 20 3
279	17 9	
284	17 5	
281	17 7	
281	17 7	
226	21 4	
277	17 10	
277	17 10	
245	14 14	Burst 2d fire.

The powder used in 1835 was a mixture of the powder left in 1834 with that in the magazine at the Bellona arsenal. This mixture gave a proof range of 265 yards, in accordance with which the weight of the cartridges was fixed at 20 pounds 3 ounces, taking the range of 250 yards as a standard. At the proof in 1834, the range of standard powder was 225 yards, which required the weight of proof-cartridges, made of powder ranging 265 yards, to be 18 pounds 8 ounces. Thus the powder used in 1834, though showing a greater proof range, was, both range and quantity considered, less than equivalent in effect to that used in 1835.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. MAYNADIER, *1st Lieutenant 1st Artillery.*

General Wool, *Inspector General United States Army, Washington City.*

No. 6.

WEST POINT FOUNDRY, June 2, 1836.

SIR: I am favored with your letter of the 26th of May, desiring me to answer certain interrogatories contained in Colonel Worth's letter to you of the same date, a copy of which you have done me the honor to enclose.

To the first interrogatory, requiring to know the number of inspections made by Colonel Worth at this place, I should answer, five inspections of guns and shot, viz: in May and July, 1833, in May and July, 1834, and in August, 1835.

To the second interrogatory, requiring "my opinion as to the care, attention, and accuracy with which those inspections were conducted," I would answer that no inspecting officer can be more careful, accurate, or attentive than Colonel Worth has always been in the performance of his duties.

To the third interrogatory, requiring me "to state such casualties in guns, shot, and shells as have occurred, together with an opinion on the quality of the metal and accuracy of proof" To this I would answer that but one gun ever gave way in the powder-proof, and this an experiment 12-pounder, at the inspection of experiment guns in August, 1835; that this gun possessed less relative strength to sustain the powder-proof than the brass 12-pounder; and that, although one of the same size and proportions stood the proof as well on repeated firings afterwards, and that the immediate cause of its failure was the accidental breaking of the shot in the gun, I should not deem it a safe model to be adopted for the service. No shells were ever inspected by Colonel Worth at this establishment. Shot have been occasionally condemned, both on account of cavities and general roughness of the surface; the proportion I cannot precisely state, but it would not be great, as no shot observed to be even doubtful is ever permitted to be presented to an inspecting officer.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

GOUV. KEMBLE.

Colonel GEORGE BOMFORD, *Colonel of Ordnance.*

No. 7.

ORDNANCE OFFICE, *Washington, April 29, 1836.*

COLONEL: Having been present at the inspection and proof in August, 1834, as assistant to Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Worth, of 42 32-pounder iron cannon, manufactured at Bellona foundery, Virginia, I am enabled to give the following statement of facts in relation thereto:

The powder used in the proof of all these guns was of Dupont's manufacture, and was carefully proved in the presence and under the direction of the inspecting officers, immediately previous to filling the cartridges to be used in the proof-charges. The proof ranges given by the eprouvette were within the limits prescribed by the regulations of the Ordnance department for the proof of cannon.

The cartridge bags were filled in the presence and under the direction of the inspecting officers, with the exact quantity of powder, by weight, required by the ordnance regulations for the proof of cannon of this calibre.

The guns were, in every particular, properly loaded and fired.

The inspection and proof throughout was made in exact conformity with the regulations of the Ordnance department on this subject, and in a manner exactly similar to that in which inspections and proofs had been made at other founderies.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM MAYNADIER, *1st Lieutenant 1st Artillery.*

At the inspection and proof of cannon, in July, 1835, at Bellona foundery, 45 32-pounder iron guns were presented by the founder, of which number sixteen had been inspected by Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Worth the year previous, but had been withdrawn by the founder before the proof. All these guns were proved in exact accordance with the regulations of the Ordnance department, and withstood the proof-charges. The powder used in the proof of these guns was principally of the same parcel as that used by Colonel Worth the year before. There not being, however, a sufficient quantity to prove all the guns, a mixture was made of this and other powder from the magazine of Bellona arsenal; all of which, from a proof of each barrel before the mixture, was found to be within the limits prescribed by the ordnance regulations for the strength of powder to be used in proof-charges. This mixture was carefully proved before the proof-cartridges were made; the quantity of powder in which was determined from the regulation range of standard powder—250 yards.

This inspection and proof was, in every particular, similar to those at other founderies.

Very respectfully, your obedient servants,

JAMES W. RIPLEY, *Captain, Inspector of Ordnance.*

WM. MAYNADIER, *1st Lieut. 1st Artillery, Assist. Ins. Ord.*

No. 8.

APRIL 7, 1836.

DEAR SIR: I have examined Major Clarke's papers relative to the bursting of sixteen cannon in proof-charges with double shot. I have no doubt but that cannon so charged, *with double shot*, are subjected to a trial beyond all use, and that the best of guns are so bursted. The globular form of the two balls have the effect upon one another of the hammer and wedge; one splits the other, drives in a section of it, bursts it, and bursts the gun. My opinion is, that Major Clarke's guns were too severely tested with these double shot, and that he has a claim for compensation for them. Being on the Military Committee, Major Clarke has made an exposition of his case to me, upon which this opinion is based.

Yours, truly,

THOMAS H. BENTON.

Hon. Mr. RIVES.

No. 9.

RICHMOND, *February 28, 1836.*

DEAR SIR: I beg leave to introduce to you Major John Clarke, of Virginia, who goes to Washington on some business connected with your department. I have known this gentleman from my youth, and for twenty years he has been an esteemed and intimate friend. I need not, then, say to you that he is one in whom entire confidence may be placed. He is among the first of our useful and best men. Any aid or facility that you may be able, consistently with the public interest, to give him, will be gratefully received by him, and acknowledged by,

Dear sir, your friend and obedient servant,

A. STEVENSON.

Hon. L. CASS, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

No. 10.

RICHMOND, *February 27, 1836.*

DEAR SIR: I do myself the pleasure of introducing to you Major John Clarke, of Virginia. He is engaged in the manufacture of ordnance, and has supplied the government of the United States frequently, on contract. He superintended the State manufactory of Virginia for many years, and is probably the

oldest manufacturer of cannon in the United States; and I have always considered him as one of the most accomplished. Such is his reputation with gentlemen of the highest standing in Virginia. He is a gentleman of the greatest respectability; and I would as soon take his statements for true as those of any other gentleman in my acquaintance. He desires particularly to be known to you, from the high respect he has formed for you, as well as from your peculiar relations to the defence of the nation. I trust, my dear sir, I shall not too much intrude upon your valuable time by asking you to converse with the major, not only upon the fortifications of the country, but upon the matter of a claim which he has upon the government for guns which were burst in consequence of their being improperly proved. Be so good as to examine his several, as well as his particular documents; for you may have it in your power to serve the country, as well as a man of worth.

I am, sir, very respectfully yours,

THOMAS RITCHIE.

Colonel THOMAS H. BENTON, *Senate of United States, Washington.*

(A.)—No. 11.

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1816.

DEAR SIR: I well recollect that when you suggested your intention to establish a foundery on James river, above Richmond, you inquired of me how far you might calculate on encouragement and support from the government: and that I informed you that you might fairly presume on such support, it being essentially the interest of the United States to promote three establishments of the kind, one of which should be on James river. I recollect, also, having communicated at the time with the Secretary of the Navy, if not with the Secretary of War; and being authorized by the former, and, as I think, by the latter, to give you an assurance to this effect, I did it with the greatest confidence. I have no doubt that you made the establishment in consequence of this assurance.

I am, dear sir, with great respect and esteem, your very obedient servant,

JAMES MONROE.

Major JOHN CLARKE.

Extract from one of Colonel Bomford's annual reports to the Secretary of War, dated November 29, 1825.

"All the existing cannon founderies, as well as the manufactories of small arms, had been established under assurances of continued support from the government, if their terms and the quality of their work should prove satisfactory. These founderies have, accordingly, continued to furnish all the ordnance required for the public service, both for the War and Navy Departments. The experience acquired in a practice of many years enables them to furnish ordnance of a more safe and durable description, and of a better quality generally than could be expected from new establishments. The cannon founderies now established are capable of furnishing more ordnance than is required in the public service. It was not, therefore, considered either advantageous to the public interest, or just to those who had relied upon the promised support of the government, to depart from the course long since established, and uniformly pursued for a number of years, by inviting proposals from persons unaccustomed to the business, and thereby encouraging the establishment of additional cannon founderies, which the wants of the public service did not require and could not sustain."

(B.)—No. 12.

ORDNANCE OFFICE, August 11, 1818.

SIR: My letter of yesterday, in relation to P. Townsend's contract, will evince that no further reliance is to be placed on him for the performance of his contracts for fabricating cannon.

Messrs. Wirt and Clarke having completed their contract for three hundred tons of cannon and cannon shot, and the work having been executed, not only promptly, but in a style of workmanship, as appears from my own personal inspection of a few of the pieces, as well as the report of the inspecting officer, superior, it is believed, to what has ever been seen before in this country, I feel solicitous they should receive all the encouragement to which they are entitled in consequence.

I would therefore respectfully propose entering into a further contract with them for three hundred tons of caannon, cannon shot, and shells, to be delivered as early as it may be convenient. This quantity will not be sufficient to make up the deficiency on P. Townsend's contract; besides, sufficient attention has not been given by the Ordnance department to obtain the due proportion of small guns for field service. We have already too many 18-pounders and 12-pounders, and too few mortars and howitzers. We want a supply of spherical case shot and canister shot.

Should the government decide to erect extensive batteries and fortifications for the defence of the Chesapeake, many 24-pounders and mortars will be required for that service; and should prefer to give that work to the Bellona foundery, on the James river, rather than to the foundery at Georgetown, because of its proximity to the place where the guns, &c., will be wanted, and because I think the proprietors have spared, and will spare, no pains to give satisfaction in what they may undertake.

They will require an advance of fifteen thousand dollars, which may be spared conveniently enough.

I have the honor to be, &c., &c.,

DECIUS WADSWORTH, *Colonel of Ordnance.*

HON. JOHN C. CALHOUN.

(C.)—No. 13.

ORDNANCE OFFICE, *July 10, 1820.*

Sir: Messrs. John Clarke & Co. have delivered, on their contract, cannon and other castings to the amount of about \$29,000. The amount of advances to them has been \$27,000. There will be, consequently, a small balance due them on their account, which will be paid, of course. In addition to which, they are desirous of having the original advance of \$15,000, from the fund for arming and equipping the militia, renewed to them. I am of opinion it will be expedient to grant them another advance of \$15,000 from the fund for arming and equipping the militia. Besides the cannon, &c., already proved, inspected, and delivered, they have on hand, nearly ready for delivery, cannon, &c., to the amount, when finished, of between \$7,000 and \$8,000, as appears by a statement which has been transmitted to me by Lieutenant Hills. It is known that a large amount of capital is required to enable persons to carry on a cannon foundry; and as the work executed by Messrs. Clarke & Co., for the United States, has been in quality equal, if not superior, to any other in the United States, I think they merit all the favor and encouragement from the government that can with propriety be given. I beg leave, therefore, to recommend that the sum of \$15,000 be paid them in advance, on account of their contract for field-pieces to arm and equip the militia.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your very obedient servant,

DECIUS WADSWORTH, *Colonel of Ordnance.*

Hon. JOHN C. CALHOUN.

(D.)—No. 14.

DEPOT NEAR RICHMOND, *August 28, 1817.*

Sir: Herewith enclosed I have the honor to transmit a certificate of the proof and inspection of a quantity of ordnance, cannon shot, and shells, fabricated at the Bellona foundry, in this State, by Major John Clarke and company, agreeably to their contract with the Ordnance department.

It is with much satisfaction and pleasure that I am enabled to add that the quality of the iron of which these castings are made, as also the execution of the work, is equal, if not superior, to that of any other foundry in the United States.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

JOHN HILLS, *Lieutenant of Ordnance.*

Colonel DECIUS WADSWORTH.

(E.)—No. 15.

DEPOT NEAR RICHMOND, *August 28, 1817.*

I hereby certify that I proved and inspected sixty pieces of cannon, and upwards of sixty tons of cannon shot and bomb-shells, fabricated at the Bellona foundry, belonging to Major John Clarke and company, in the county of Chesterfield, in the State of Virginia, for the Ordnance department of the United States; the whole of which cannon stood an unusually severe proof, as the gunpowder used in that process was of much greater strength than is customarily used in the proof of guns. And I further certify that the quality of the iron, and the execution of the work of said castings, is equal, if not superior, to any in the United States.

JOHN HILLS.

(F.)—No. 16.

ARSENAL NEAR RICHMOND, *June 27, 1820.*

Sir: Enclosed herewith I transmit a certificate of the proof and inspection, to which is subjoined the receipt of the military storekeeper of this station, for the cannon and howitzers, cannon shot and shells which have been fabricated for the United States at the Bellona foundry.

It affords me a high degree of satisfaction in being enabled to state that the castings above referred to are superior, in point of workmanship and quality of iron, to those produced from any other works in the United States.

I have the honor to be, sir, with much respect, your most obedient servant,

JOHN HILLS, *First Lieutenant of Ordnance.*

JOHN CLARKE, Esq.

(G.)—No. 17.

ARSENAL NEAR RICHMOND, *September 5, 1821.*

Sir: I transmit herewith a statement of proof and inspection, exhibiting the number of cannon, howitzers, cannon shot, and shells, received from the Bellona foundry in the present year.

It is with much satisfaction that I have to acquaint you that the castings are of a very superior quality, both in point of excellence of metal and good workmanship; and that castings of a better quality

are not to be found in any of our works of defence, or depots of the Ordnance department, than those which are fabricated for the general government at the Bellona foundery.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
JOHN HILLS, *First Lieutenant 3d Artillery, on Ordnance Duty.*

JOHN CLARKE, Esq.

(H.)—No. 18.

[Extract.]

“The cannon, shot, and shells, furnished agreeably to the present contract, are of excellent quality, both as respects excellence of workmanship and the superior quality of the iron used in their fabrication. No better castings are to be found in any of our works of defence, or depots of the Ordnance department, than those which have been received from the Bellona foundery.”

The above is an extract from a letter addressed to Lieutenant Colonel George Bomford, transmitting a statement of proof and inspection of castings received from the Bellona foundery, dated 12th of September, 1821.

JOHN HILLS.

Major JOHN CLARKE.

No. 19.

ORDNANCE OFFICE, *November 16, 1837.*

At the request of Major Clarke, I state that in the years 1828, 1829, and 1830, or during some of those years, I fired a 24-pounder, new pattern, manufactured by him, about eight hundred times with the service-charges for single and double shot, and powder stronger than ordinary. That during all the firings, examinations of metal, and transactions with that gun, (which is now mounted at Fortress Monroe,) I was satisfied that it was fabricated of exceedingly good metal.

The gun now in the batteries of Fortress Monroe has the history of its firings and trials it has sustained marked upon its carriage, and may be seen by any one. It has, as I understand, been fired many times without injury since my experiments.

WM. H. BELL, *Captain of Ordnance.*

No. 20.

WEDNESDAY, *March 15, 1837.*

I certify that I was the inspector of ordnance for the navy of the United States, and repeatedly inspected and proved cannon, shot, &c., manufactured by Major John Clarke, at his Bellona works in Virginia, as well as at other similar works in the employ of the government; and ever found that the metal used at the Bellona works was of very superior quality, the work neatly executed, and the inspection and proof thereof was performed according to the regulations of the commissioners of the navy.

S. GASSIN, *Captain United States Navy.*

No. 21.

WASHINGTON, *March 3, 1837.*

I certify that I was the inspector of ordnance for the government of the United States between six and seven years; that I inspected at the Bellona foundery, belonging to Major John Clarke, several hundred cannon of various calibres, including two hundred and fifty-six 32-pounder guns; that the iron of which the guns were made was of most excellent quality, having sustained the proof, which was made in strict accordance with the established regulations, except in one instance, when a 32-pounder gun, of the first parcel proved, burst; and that the dimensions of the guns and execution of the work were correct and faithful.

JAMES BANKHEAD, *Lieutenant Colonel Third Artillery,
and late Inspector of Ordnance for the Army.*

(1) No. 22.

I hereby certify that, for several years past, I have been employed as an artificer in the boring of cannon at Major John Clarke's Bellona cannon foundery, but for want of work from the government I left said foundery in the latter part of last year.

While I was employed at said works I attended and witnessed the inspection and proof of cannon by the government officers at those works; and was present and witnessed the inspection and proof of all the cannon proved at said foundery by Colonel Worth; and I am confident that the guns, when proved by Colonel Worth, recoiled or flew backward to double the distance that I had ever before seen 32-pounder

cannon recoil back when they were proved; which I think must have been owing to the guns being overloaded, or proved with charges much greater than usual.

Witness my hand this twelfth day of July, eighteen hundred and thirty-six.

SUBLETT McGRUDER.

I also certify that when Colonel Worth had bursted sixteen 32-pounder cannon at Major Clarke's foundery, the said Clarke stopped Colonel Worth from proving any more of his guns, at which time Colonel Worth left *sixteen of the guns unproved*; which sixteen guns, with twenty-nine other 32-pounder cannon, making forty-five guns, were afterwards proved by Captain Ripley, who did not burst any of the guns. I also witnessed this proof of guns by Captain Ripley, and am confident that the guns proved by Captain Ripley did not recoil (when proved) more than half the distance to which the guns proved by Colonel Worth recoiled when he proved them.

Witness my hand this twelfth day of July, eighteen hundred and thirty-six.

SUBLETT McGRUDER.

CHESTERFIELD COUNTY, *to wit*:

This day Sublett McGruder (whose name is above subscribed) personally appeared before me, in said county, and made oath to the truth of the foregoing certificate.

Given under my hand this 12th day of July, 1836.

H. HANCOCK, *a Justice of the Peace for the County of Chesterfield, State of Virginia.*

Since the date of the foregoing certificate, thirty-one 32-pounder cannon were proved by Captain Ripley at the Bellona works, without bursting a gun.

(2) No. 23.

BELLONA FOUNDERY, *December 13, 1836.*

I hereby certify that during the last nine years I have been employed in the manufacture of cannon at Major John Clarke's Bellona works, where, for the greater part of that time, I have acted, and do now act, as assistant foreman of those works, and have regularly attended the inspection and proof of the various pieces of ordnance manufactured at the said works.

In the year 1828 we commenced the manufacture of 32-pounder cannon for fortifications, and fifty-eight of them were proved in June, 1829. This was the first time that any of the 32-pounder cannon were proved, and it was before the strength of the proof-charges proper for those guns was ascertained; and in testing the strength of those fifty-eight guns one of them burst and fifty-seven stood proof. Previous to this 13th of December, 1836, we have manufactured at said works four hundred and forty-six 32-pounder cannon for fortifications, which have been proved at ten different periods and by different proving officers; and with the exception of the one gun, which was burst on the first trial of their strength, not one of the four hundred and forty-six guns was burst, excepting the sixteen of them which were burst when proved by Colonel Worth, who, in proving the guns, used proof-charges which, unquestionably, must have been vastly more powerful than usual, being so extremely strong as to cause the guns proved by him to recoil nearly double as far as I ever saw such guns recoil when proved by any other officer than him.

And as the whole of those four hundred and forty-six guns were made of the same kind of metal, (best James river iron,) and were manufactured at the same works, and by the same workmen, and with the exception of the one gun which burst at the first trial of their strength, *none of the guns* burst, excepting those that were burst by Colonel Worth, it is evident that the proof-charges used by him must have been much more powerful than the proof-charges used by the other officers, who proved portions of those guns at different periods, both before and after Colonel Worth proved guns at those works.

RANDOLPH AMONETT.

VIRGINIA, *Chesterfield County, to wit*:

This day Randolph Amonett, who has signed the foregoing certificate, personally appeared before me, Higginson Hancock, a justice of the peace for said county, and made oath that said certificate is true and correct.

H. HANCOCK, *J. P.*

(3) No. 24.

BELLONA FOUNDERY, *December 13, 1836.*

I hereby certify that for many years I have been occupied in the manufacture of cannon, &c., at Major John Clarke's Bellona works, where, for the last fourteen years, I have acted, and do now act, as foreman of the works, and have regularly attended the inspection and proof of the various pieces of ordnance made at said works for the land as well as for the naval service.

On or about the year 1828 the founders of cannon for the United States were required to make 32-pounder cannon for fortifications, and the first gun of that pattern, called the pattern gun, was made at the Bellona works. We proceeded to manufacture those guns, and as soon as fifty-eight of them were completed they were proved by the proving officers of the government, and one of the fifty-eight guns burst by the very great strength of the proof-charges. This happened at the first time of proving 32-pounder cannon, and before the strength of the proof-charges was proportioned to the strength of the gun. Between the years 1828 and the present time we have manufactured at said works four hundred and forty-six 32-pounder cannon for fortifications, some of which were proved every year, as soon as they

were made and ready for proof, and, with the exception of the *one gun* at the first proving, not a gun of them was burst until Colonel Worth (who seemed new to the business) burst sixteen of them. The whole four hundred and forty-six guns were made of James river iron, of excellent quality, and by the same experienced workmen, and were, I verily believe, of as great strength and good quality as any such guns ever yet were made, and I am confident that the sixteen guns which were burst by Colonel Worth were as good as any of the 32-pounder cannon which did not burst on being proved; and, although some of the guns proved by Colonel Worth did not burst, yet, in my opinion, the proof-charges used by him were so excessively strong as to overstrain the guns and render them liable to burst when used in war. Those proof-charges were made of powder greatly exceeding the standard strength of powder, and in proving the guns these proof-charges were made to discharge, from the calibre of the gun, double the weight of shot used in proving guns in Europe, and caused those guns to recoil to a much greater distance than any 32-pounder cannon ever did recoil when proved at these works by any other officer than Colonel Worth himself. Such, in fact, was the vast strength of his proof-charges, that, while the guns were bursting, a fragment weighing several hundred pounds was thrown several hundred yards, and in its progress passed through one of the principal buildings of the United States arsenal, and many other fragments of the bursted gun were thrown still further. The destruction of those excellent pieces of ordnance was so great that Major Clarke forbade Colonel Worth to proceed with the proof of them, at which time sixteen of the guns remained unproved; and the next year, viz., 1835, those sixteen guns left unproved by Colonel Worth, with twenty-nine others, (making forty-five 32-pounder cannon,) were proved by Captain Ripley without bursting a gun; and in October last (the present year, 1836) Captain Ripley proved an additional number of thirty-one 32-pounder cannon without bursting a gun; and, with the exception of the one gun which burst at the first proving of said guns, not one of the four hundred and forty six 32-pounder cannon was burst, excepting the sixteen guns proved by Colonel Worth.

JOSEPH YOUNG, Sr.

VIRGINIA, *Chesterfield County, to wit:*

This day Joseph Young, sr., the signer of the foregoing certificate, personally appeared before me, Higginson Hancock, a justice of the peace for said county, and made oath to the truth of the said certificate. Given under my hand this 14th day of December, 1836.

H. HANCOCK, J. P.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 742.

[1ST SESSION.]

ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS AUTHORIZING THE EMPLOYMENT OF INDIANS IN THE MILITARY SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES AGAINST THE SEMINOLE INDIANS IN FLORIDA, AND THE NUMBER SO EMPLOYED.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SEPTEMBER 21, 1837.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *September 21, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a report of the commanding general, in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 18th instant, relative to the number of Indians employed in the military service of the United States since the commencement of the present Seminole war, and copies of all orders and instructions under which said Indians have been employed, &c.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Hon. JAMES K. POLK, *Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, September 19, 1837.*

SIR: In answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives, dated September 18, 1837, requiring "a statement of the number of Indians employed in the military service of the United States since the commencement of the present Seminole war, and copies of all orders and instructions under which Indians have been employed," &c., I have respectfully to report that an examination of the files in the Adjutant General's office shows that a regiment of Creek Indians, composed of fifteen companies, and amounting in the aggregate to seven hundred and forty-nine, was received into the service of the United States on the 1st of September, 1836, by Major General Jesup's order, of which the following is an extract:

"ORDERS No. 50.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Mitchell, July 25, 1836.*

"1. A band of friendly Indian warriors will be immediately raised and organized for special service under instructions from the commanding general. They will be mustered into the service, mounted, equipped, supplied, and paid as mounted volunteers, for twelve months, unless sooner discharged. Captain J. F. Lane is appointed to raise, organize, and command them. He will be mustered in for the same period as colonel, subject to the approval of the President of the United States."

It is presumed that authority for the above was derived from the Secretary of War's letter dated July 11, 1836, of which the following is a copy:

“WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington, July 11, 1836.*

“Sir: It has been suggested that a few Creek warriors might be useful to Governor Call, and might be willing to be employed in the contemplated expedition against the Seminole Indians. You will please to correspond with Governor Call on this subject, and if he should desire it, I would thank you to raise a small corps of this description, not exceeding two or three hundred, and send them to Florida. They may be paid and organized as volunteers, but should be placed under the command of some white man, well acquainted with them, and who has their confidence. It is presumed that enough young men would be willing to go, without requiring their families to be retained in Alabama until their return. This measure of retaining Indian families ought to be avoided, as the immediate removal of the Indians seems to be indispensably necessary.

“Very respectfully, &c.,

“L. CASS.

“Major General T. S. JESUP, *Fort Mitchell, Alabama.*”

About the commencement of the Indian hostilities in Florida a band of ninety friendly Indians was received into the service by Captain Belton, the commanding officer at Tampa Bay, as seen by his letter of the 7th of January, 1836, but no rolls of them have been received, and it is not known for what time they were so employed; it is presumed not long, however.

On the recommendation of General Jesup, made on the 17th of June last, that a thousand northern Indian warriors should be engaged to take the place of the Creek regiment, which was about to be discharged, the present Secretary of War took measures, on the 25th of July, to call into the service of the United States that force, to be composed as follows:

Delawares.....	200
Shawnees.....	400
Sacs and Foxes.....	100
Kickapoos.....	100
Choctaws.....	200

It may be proper here to state that Major General Scott, in the month of March, 1836, called on Colonel Hogan, the agent for the Creeks, to obtain from that nation five hundred warriors, to serve against the Seminoles; but owing to delays and difficulties not within the general's control, they were not raised.

The orders, instructions, and correspondence having reference to this subject, are hereunto annexed, marked from 1 to 17, inclusive.

Respectfully submitted.

ALEX. MACOMB, *Major General, Commanding-in-chief.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

No. 1.

FORT MITCHELL, *Creek Agency, February 1, 1836.*

MY DEAR GENERAL: I have this day received a letter from the honorable the Secretary of War, of which the enclosed is a copy, from which I have learned that you are again in the field, and that the important duty of subduing the Seminoles has been assigned to you, and that I am ordered to report myself to you, and receive and carry into effect such instructions as you may give me. Now, this is all news to me, and is perfect Hebrew, unless the department meant in a modest way to say to me: Take a thousand of your Creek Indians and repair to Florida, and aid General Scott to subdue these rascally Seminoles. If this was their view, why not say so at once, and you should in a very short time have me again alongside of you tugging at the old oar. I have no doubt but that I could in ten days raise you one thousand warriors, and be on the march to join your army, and in as many more days be with you. All that is necessary is an order to that effect. But the Secretary seems to think the Creek Indians are hostile. This is not the fact, although some little skirmishing has taken place on the Georgia side of the river, and some few lives have been lost on both sides; but a peace has been effected here to-day between two militia general officers from Georgia and the chiefs, and an agreement has been signed by all the chiefs present. I was fifty miles below here night before last, and hearing of these murders, I came up yesterday, and to-day effected this peace, which I hope and trust will last at least until we can get them out of the country. I am using every exertion to effect this object, and have no doubt but I shall be successful, in a measure, in the course of this spring. A report is going the rounds of the public papers that a large body of the Creeks have joined the Seminoles. This you may rely on is incorrect. I have recently visited all the lower towns, and there is none of their people absent; and you may rely on it that, including all the stragglers that may have joined the Seminoles during the last summer, they cannot exceed one hundred in all; but I am told that they are reinforced by a number of runaway negroes, who are decidedly the most active, keen, and intelligent fellows among them. Whatever their strength was before this war, their reinforcements cannot exceed three or four hundred of every description.

In relation to the Creeks, there would be no difficulty in procuring their services, or in depending on them after they were procured. Whether, under existing circumstances, the government would be willing to employ them against the Seminoles is more than I can say; but if they should, there would be no difficulty in procuring as many as you might choose to muster into service.

I have the honor to remain your friend and humble servant,

JOHN B. HOGAN, *Superintendent of Creek Removal.*

Major General W. SCOTT, *Commanding in Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington, January 21, 1836.*

SIR: Major General Scott has been directed to assume the general direction of operations in Florida. Recent intelligence has led to the belief that the Creeks have actively joined, or intend to join, the Seminole Indians in their hostilities. Should such prove to be the case, General Scott has orders to reduce the Creek Indians, as well as the Seminoles, to unconditional submission. In this event, you will please to report yourself to him, and communicate to him all the instructions and information in your possession respecting the views of the government on the subject of the removal of the Creek Indians. You will also carry into effect such instructions on this matter as he may give you.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LEWIS CASS.

Colonel JOHN B. HOGAN, *Columbus, Georgia.*

No. 2.

TALLAHASSEE, *Florida, March 7, 1836.*

DEAR SIR: Major Flournoy and Mr. Watson, of Columbus, Georgia, who will hand you this letter, have applied to me to receive into the service two hundred Indians that they have conditionally engaged. It is a matter over which I have no authority, and, accordingly, have referred them to you. If, as I presume will be the case, the Indians shall betake themselves to the hammocks and swamps, and seek for safety there, those Indians may prove highly serviceable in discovering their retreat; besides, as in war times neighboring tribes are not disposed to be inactive, they may join the enemy if you refuse to take them into your service. I should think, therefore, it would be most advisable to authorize those gentlemen to bring them to Tampa. The Chattahoochee river being now in fine order, they could very soon be transported in a steamboat to Tampa Bay.

I have no news either from the army or elsewhere. Our difference with France is adjusted without war and without apology.

In this Territory horses nor supplies for them could be procured; accordingly, one-half, say three hundred, were sent to Tampa Bay, under Major Read. About two hundred are, or soon will be, on the frontier about the Suwanee, to guard against those marauding straying parties that may attempt any mischief there.

With great respect,

J. H. EATON.

General WINFIELD SCOTT.

No. 3.

ORDER No. 13.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF FLORIDA, *Fort Drane, March 14, 1836.*

General Thomas Woodward, of Macon county, Alabama, is authorized, aided by Majors J. H. Watson and W. B. Flournoy, to accept the services of any five hundred Creek warriors, to be employed as auxiliaries in the present war against the Seminole Indians. Should General Woodward decline taking the command of these friendly Indians, Major Watson, assisted by Major Flournoy, will take the command of them.

The United States agents in the Creek nation will give every facility in raising and despatching the auxiliary force mentioned above. The force will proceed, by water, from the Creek country to Tampa Bay, where, on its arrival, it will be reported to any general or colonel who may be in command in that quarter.

Commissions, of course, cannot be granted to the gentlemen who may be employed with this force; but the commander will be considered as having the rank of lieutenant colonel, the next officer the rank of major, and the third that of captain. Should more officers be requisite, one or two lieutenants will be recognized; but this will be a subject for future determination.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

No. 4.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *April 12, 1836.*

SIR: I enclose herewith an extract of a letter received from Colonel Hogan, together with a copy of one this day addressed to him.

As my views are fully expressed in the letter to Colonel Hogan, I need not trouble you with a repetition of them.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

LEWIS CASS.

Major General SCOTT, *Fort King, Florida.*

Extract of a letter from John B. Hogan to the Secretary of War, dated

TUSKEGEE, March 28, 1836.

SIR: At this council Mr. John H. Watson, the same young man who commenced all the late disturbances at Columbus by attacking a party of Creeks below Fort Mitchell, in which affair two white men were killed—this Mr. Watson came on the ground with a piece of paper purporting to be a copy of an order recently issued by Major General Scott, authorizing General Woodward, of this place, who is one of the new batch of emigrating contractors, to accept the services of any five hundred Creek Indians as volunteers. General W. declined making any efforts to raise volunteers, by stating that it was a well-known fact that he had no influence with the Indians, but if they were raised, and no better man could be found, he would go with them; but, as far as I could understand his open declarations, he appeared to disapprove altogether of the project, as it was his opinion that it would retard emigration. Mr. Watson, who appears to be a wild, rash, inconsiderate young man, insisted that I was bound to raise the warriors. I referred him to Captain Page, as a military officer, and who was acting as superintendent, but he seemed to think that a word or two from me would induce the chiefs to jump at the offer. In the meantime I consulted Captain Page, who was decidedly opposed to sending Indians under the orders of such a man, and, indeed, seemed to disapprove of it. I also consulted with Opothleholo, who said he did not want his people to engage in any such war at present; that he was anxious to get off for the west; but if the Secretary of War wanted his people to go, he did not wish them to go with men he did not know, and of course had no confidence in. Other chiefs told me the same thing. Mr. Watson continued to follow me about, and insisting that I must get him Indians to go; and at last he became rude and offensive. I then cut him short, by telling him if he had any communications to make me to do it in writing, and I would in the same-manner reply. I also consulted the emigrating contractors, who, I had reason to think, were pushing on Watson, and asked them, if the Indian warriors were raised, if they would give me, from under their hands, a relinquishment of any claim they might hereafter choose to prefer for damages on account of those Indians being carried to Florida. They said they would not give any relinquishment, but the Indians might go if the War Department required their services.

Whatever inclination I might have to obey General Scott's orders—and certainly there is no officer I have ever served under that I more highly love and respect, and whose orders at all times afforded me more pleasure to obey—yet, in the present instance, I have deemed it most prudent to refer the whole matter to you. I can easily perceive General Scott's situation when he gave that order to those young men, Watson and Flournoy, who visited him at Picolata, and no doubt made a display of their patriotism and popularity among the Creeks, and urged the general to give them an order to bring into the field five hundred Indians. The general, seeing but one side, and being pleased with their spirit, gave the order. You will see, too, that the order (a copy of which I herewith enclose) does not embrace an order on the commissariat or quartermaster general's department for subsistence and transportation, or on the ordnance department for arms, or their being mustered into the service of the United States; nor was it personally addressed to Captain Page or myself, nor would Mr. Watson vouch that it was a correct copy of General Scott's order, as he wrote it, he said, from memory. If it is desirable to have the five hundred Creek warriors engage in this war, I have but little doubt they can be obtained, if proper persons are sent to command them; but I do not think that either Mr. Watson or Mr. Flournoy is the right sort of person to be charged with such a command. I have no doubt of the bravery of either, but I should think they lack the other requisites of a commander, viz: prudence, temper, caution, and experience. If, however, you wish the order complied with, it shall be attempted and enforced as far as my influence will go. In my first communication to General Scott I made a tender of my services, should he require Indians in this campaign; not having heard from him, I presume the department would not sanction the employment of them, and thought no more on the subject. If, however, I am mistaken, I again tender my services to go as commander of such a body as the department may order. A matter of that sort is much more to my taste than the duties now assigned me.

I have the honor to remain your obedient servant,

JOHN B. HOGAN.

Hon. LEWIS CASS.

No. 5.

WAR DEPARTMENT, April 12, 1836.

SIR: I have received your letter of the 28th ultimo. With respect to the employment of the Creek Indians under the orders of General Scott I am unwilling to give you any definite instructions. I would rather that the campaign should be brought to a successful termination without the aid of the Creek Indians. Still, if from the nature of the operations this cannot be done without sacrificing our own troops to the unhealthfulness of the climate in the sickly season of the year, the department will consent to have a corps of these Indians raised, if they are willing to be so employed. But the time which has intervened since the authority given by General Scott on this subject, and the great changes which may have occurred in the state of things in Florida, render it inexpedient to give directions here to have any measures taken. I think it is best that you should explain to the Creeks the views of General Scott in relation to the employment of these young men, and request them to have in readiness the force which he required to be called out should General Scott again renew the requisition. In the meantime I shall communicate these views to General Scott, and refer to his own discretion the course which shall be taken.

I have to request your zealous co-operation in whatever measures General Scott may think necessary.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

LEWIS CASS.

Colonel J. B. HOGAN, Columbus, Georgia.

No. 6.

Extract from a letter of Major General Thomas S. Jesup to the Hon. B. F. Butler, (Secretary of War ad interim,) dated

“FORT DADE, *March 7, 1837.*”

“When the Indian regiment was raised in the Creek country, for service in Florida, it was distinctly understood by *them*, as well as by *me*, that they were to be allowed to return to Alabama in time to remove to the country assigned to them, west of the Mississippi, before the season for planting their corn. I have found it necessary to retain them in the service up to this time, and it is important that they remain until the Seminoles remove. Had they left me on the 1st of February, according to the assurances given to them, I must have called into service at least two regiments of militia or volunteers to have taken their places, at a heavy expense; besides, there would have been much loss of time in discharging the Indians and bringing into service the militia. From a careful consideration of all the circumstances in which I found myself, as well as from the situation of the enemy and the nature of the country in which we were operating, I was decidedly of opinion that sound policy, as well as considerations of economy, made it proper to retain the Indian force. To induce them to remain, I assured them that if they should be detained beyond the planting season the United States would not only subsist them for twelve months after their arrival west, but, in addition to that period, until the time of gathering their crops next year. By the arrangement which I have made with them a considerable sum will be saved to the treasury in the end, and I respectfully ask that it be approved by the department.”

No. 7.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *March 27, 1837.*

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 7th instant, respecting the further continuance of the regiment of Creek warriors in the service of the United States. The reasons given by you for adopting this measure are entirely satisfactory, and the department therefore approves it, and will carry into effect the assurances which you have given those Indians respecting their subsistence after their arrival at their homes in the west.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Fort Dade, Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

No. 8.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *July 22, 1837.*

SIR: It having been deemed advisable to employ a body of friendly Indians to aid in the operations against the Seminoles of Florida during the next campaign, you are required to endeavor to engage for this service four hundred Shawnees, two hundred Delawares, and one hundred Kickapoos, to be selected from the most intelligent of those best affected towards the United States. You will represent to them that they will be divided into bands of fifty each, including the individual who may have the command of each band, and who will be selected by those composing the bands out of their own number. The compensation of these Indians for six months' service will be as follows: To the chief of each band, four hundred and seventeen dollars, and to all others, each, two hundred and seventy dollars. Besides this pay, they will be subsisted at the expense of the government; and it may be proper to assure them that every effort will be made to give them, should they desire it, the same kind of ration which they now receive; and that, should any of the Indians thus engaged die or be killed while in the service of the government, the amount of pay which may be due them for the six months' service will be given to their families.

These Indians will be armed with their own rifles and implements, so far as they possess them, and those who may not have them of their own will be furnished by the United States, the cost of which to be deducted from their pay. Each band will select its own interpreter, who will be enrolled, and will compose one of the fifty. The compensation of each interpreter, for the six months' service, will be three hundred and fifty dollars.

It is of great importance that the enrolment and organization of this force should be completed sufficiently early to admit of its transportation to Tampa Bay, Florida, by the middle of October next at latest. In the duty of enrolling and organizing, you will be assisted by one or more officers of the army, who will join you at the proper time for the purpose, and who, when this duty shall have been completed, will take charge of the Indians, and conduct them in transports on their way to Florida.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Major R. W. CUMMINS, *Fort Leavenworth, Missouri.*

[Same to Captain William Armstrong, substituting for the names and numbers of the tribes two hundred Choctaws.

Same to General J. M. Street, substituting for the names and numbers of the tribes one hundred Sacs and Foxes.]

No. 9.

Extract from a letter to Major General Thomas S. Jesup, dated

“WAR DEPARTMENT, July 25, 1837.

“Measures have been taken to obtain the Indian force you have recommended, and it is hoped that one thousand warriors will be at Tampa in time to co-operate with the regulars at the commencement of the campaign: say two hundred Delawares, four hundred Shawnees, one hundred Sacs and Foxes, one hundred Kickapoos, and two hundred Choctaws, making in all one thousand warriors.”

No. 10.

WAR DEPARTMENT, August 1, 1837.

SIR: I enclose for your information copies of instructions that have been issued in reference to the employment of an Indian force during the next campaign in Florida.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

No. 11.

WAR DEPARTMENT, August 8, 1837.

SIR: Major Brant, quartermaster at St. Louis, has been instructed to turn over to you the sum of three thousand dollars, which is to defray the expenses incident to engaging the Shawnees, Delawares, Kickapoos, and Sac and Fox Indians, for service in Florida.

These expenses will comprise those necessarily incurred by the agent in assembling the Indians at some proper point, the cost of their subsistence while there, until they shall have been regularly enrolled and organized into companies and received into the service of the United States, and of such clothing as they may be in immediate want of. Payments for these objects will be made upon accounts certified by the agent whose duty it is to collect the Indians together. Of the sum mentioned, you will place two thousand five hundred dollars in the hands of Captain Bean, to defray the expenses of clothing the Shawnees, Delawares, and Kickapoos, and the remainder you will take charge of, and pay the expenses incident to the assembling of the Sacs and Foxes.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Lieutenant BENJ. POOLE, *St. Louis, Mo.*

No. 12.

WAR DEPARTMENT, August 8, 1837.

SIR: For the purpose of defraying the expenses incident to assembling the Choctaw Indians required for service in Florida, for subsisting them till they shall have been enrolled, organized, and regularly mustered into the service of the United States, and of providing them with such articles of clothing as they may be in immediate want of, the assistant quartermaster at Fort Gibson has been instructed to place in your hands the sum of five hundred dollars. You will make the payments for the above objects, and for such other expenses as the agent may necessarily incur, on accounts certified by the agent whose duty it is to assemble the Indians.

With respect to arms for such of these Indians as may not have them, these will be supplied from the arsenal at Baton Rouge, Louisiana; at which place, in transporting the Indians to New Orleans, you will stop, for the purpose of providing the Indians with them.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Captain BENJ. L. E. BONNEVILLE, *United States Army, Fort Gibson, Ark.*

No. 13.

WAR DEPARTMENT, August 9, 1837.

SIR: Captains Gordon and Bean have been selected to assist you in the performance of the duty of engaging the Shawnees, Delawares, and Kickapoos, for service in Florida, imposed upon you by my letter of the 22d ultimo, and to take charge of those Indians and conduct them to Florida, when they shall have been mustered into the service of the United States.

Measures have been taken for placing in the hands of Captains Gordon and Bean such an amount of funds as will, it is supposed, defray the expenses which it may be necessary to incur previous to the Indians being mustered. These expenses, it is presumed, will principally consist of those incident to the measures for collecting the Indians at one point, their subsistence, and the purchase of such articles of clothing as may be immediately required to render them comfortable and to create a favorable impression

on their part towards the United States. Accounts for these objects will be paid by Captains Gordon and Bean on your certificate; and I have to request that in your expenditures you will be prudent and as economical as circumstances will permit.

Should you not succeed in engaging the requisite number of either of the tribes named, you will use your discretion in making up the deficiency from one or both of the others; and should the number of each tribe which you may prevail upon to enter the service fall short of that required, you will endeavor to provide for the deficiency from other tribes, being careful to employ those who would serve with the Shawnees, Delawares, and Kickapoos, without danger of difficulty from dissensions between them.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Major R. W. CUMMINS, *Fort Leavenworth, Missouri.*

No. 14.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *August 9, 1837.*

SIR: Lieutenant Poole has been selected to assist you in the performance of the duty of engaging the Sacs and Foxes for service in Florida, imposed upon you by my letter of the 22d ultimo, and to take charge of those Indians and conduct them to Florida when they shall have been mustered into the service of the United States.

Measures have been taken for placing in the hands of Lieutenant Poole such an amount of funds as will, it is supposed, defray the expenses which it may be necessary to incur previous to the Indians being mustered. These expenses, it is presumed, will principally consist of those incident to the measures for collecting the Indians at one point, their subsistence, and the purchase of such articles of clothing as may be immediately required to render them comfortable, and to create a favorable impression on their part towards the United States. Accounts for these objects will be paid by Lieutenant Poole on your certificate; and I have to request that in your expenditures you will be prudent and as economical as circumstances will permit.

Should you not succeed in engaging the requisite number of Sacs and Foxes, you will endeavor to make up the deficiency from some other tribe, being careful, however, in engaging those who would harmonize in feeling with the Sacs and Foxes, and serve with them without danger of difficulty from dissensions between them.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

General J. M. STREET. (*To the care of General William Clark, St. Louis, Missouri.*)

No. 15.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *August 9, 1837.*

SIR: Captain Bonneville has been selected to assist you in the performance of the duty of engaging the Choctaws for service in Florida, imposed upon you by my letter of the 22d ultimo, and to take charge of those Indians and conduct them to Florida when they shall have been mustered into the service of the United States.

Measures have been taken for placing in the hands of Captain Bonneville such an amount of funds as will, it is supposed, defray the expenses which it may be necessary to incur previous to the Indians being mustered. These expenses, it is presumed, will principally consist of those incident to the measures for collecting the Indians at one point, their subsistence, and the purchase of such articles of clothing as may be immediately required to render them comfortable, and to create a favorable impression on their part towards the United States. Accounts for these objects will be paid by Captain Bonneville on your certificate; and I have to request that in your expenditures you will be prudent and as economical as circumstances will permit.

Should you not succeed in engaging the requisite number of Choctaws, you will endeavor to make up the deficiency from some other tribe, being careful, however, in engaging those who would harmonize in feeling with the Choctaws, and serve with them without danger of difficulty from dissensions between them.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Captain WILLIAM ARMSTRONG, *Choctaw Agency, Arkansas.*

No. 16.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *August 9, 1837.*

SIR: In the instructions to Major Cummins, whom you are to assist in engaging the Sacs and Foxes required for service in Florida, he is told that those Indians who may not have the necessary arms and accoutrements will be provided with them by the United States; and I have now to inform you that these will be supplied at St. Louis on your arrival there with the Indians on your way to Florida.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Lieutenant BENJAMIN L. E. POOLE, *St. Louis, Missouri.*

No. 17.

WAR DEPARTMENT, August 9, 1837.

GENTLEMEN: In the instructions to Major Cummins, whom you are to assist in engaging the Shawnees, Delawares, and Kickapoos, required for service in Florida, he is told that those Indians who may not have the necessary arms and accoutrements will be provided with them by the United States; and I have now to inform you that these will be supplied at St. Louis on your arrival there with the Indians on your way to Florida.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Captains WILLIAM GORDON and J. L. BEAN, *Fort Leavenworth, Missouri.*

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 743.

[1ST SESSION.

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF A BOARD OF OFFICERS ON IMPROVEMENTS IN FIRE-ARMS BY HALL, COLT, COCHRAN, LEAVITT, AND BARON HACKETT, AS COMPARED WITH THE UNITED STATES MUSKET, AND THEIR RELATIVE QUALITIES AND EFFICIENCY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE OCTOBER 3, 1837.

WAR DEPARTMENT, October 2, 1837.

SIR: The president of the board of officers appointed under a resolution of the Senate to examine certain arms, has, with the consent of the board, submitted to this department the accompanying report of their examination. This document appears to me not only to present the result of the investigation in a more condensed shape, but to contain some useful information omitted in the former. I beg leave therefore to withdraw that document and to substitute the report herewith submitted.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Hon. R. M. JOHNSON, *President of the Senate.*

INTRODUCTION.

The board of officers appointed by General Orders No. 2, February 3, in conformity with a resolution of the Senate of the 27th of January, 1837, "to inquire into and report upon the improvement in fire-arms made by Hall, Colt, Cochran, and the Baron Hackett, and to show the importance of each in all important military points of view," have the honor to report that the results of the various experiments to which the board has subjected the several arms named in the resolution, and which have not failed to establish a decided opinion as regards their advantages and faults as weapons proper for arming troops in field service, are herewith presented in tabular form, as required by the resolution.

The board, constrained to pursue the order prescribed in the resolution of the Senate, has involved some repetitions.

I. CELERITY OF FIRE.

The table gives the following results in loading and firing:

1. With the musket.		2. With rifles.	
No. 1. Hackett's	5	No. 1. Colt's	3.4
No. 2. Hall's	5	No. 2. Colt's, (musket calibre)	3.4
No. 3. Colt's	3.1	No. 3. Hall's	3.4
No. 4. Cochran's	3	No. 4. Cochran's	3.2
No. 5. United States standard	3	No. 5. Leavitt's	1.2

Muskets.—Hackett's and Hall's load at the breech with single charges, though constructed on different principles.

No. 5. The United States standard loads at the muzzle.

Nos. 3 and 4. Colt's and Cochran's load at the breech with many-chambered shifting receivers of their charges.

The firing with Hackett's, Hall's, and the United States muskets was in rapid succession.

Colt's and Cochran's required from 2' to 2' 10" to charge a receiver.*

To determine the comparative celerity, the parties were each furnished with a target, and were required each to load and fire the greatest number of rounds in a given time; Hackett, Hall, and the United States musket being supplied with cartridges, Cochran and Colt with loose ammunition; all commenced loading at the word "fire."

The board adopted this mode to place the respective weapons upon an equal footing, and under such circumstances as would ordinarily occur in actual service.

* To charge these receivers 2' to 3' were necessary. Colt, to press the ball down, used a lever; Cochran, a rammer and mallet; these were appendages apparently necessary. A rest was necessary to load the latter, Cochran's, receiver.

II. EXTENT OF THE RECOIL.

The arms of Hall, Hackett, Colt, and Cochran, being loaded at the breech, receive a ball of greater diameter than a gun which is loaded at the muzzle; the consequence is, a smaller quantity of powder being required to produce the same propelling power necessary for the musket, where, of course, there must be windage, the recoil must, even on that account, be considerably diminished; but, besides, the action of the powder upon the resisting point of these guns is much less than the effect produced by the elastic fluid upon the breech of other guns of the usual construction; the recoil does not appear sufficient in any of them to have occasioned any inconvenience to the persons using the arms.

III. THE EFFICIENCY OF FIRE.

From the experiments made, it appears that for guns of the same calibre, and in the same resisting medium, the penetration of the arms loading at the breech, and having their correct charge of powder, is greater than those which are loaded at the muzzle; this is supposed to proceed from the powder, in the former case, having its whole propelling force operating on the ball; in the latter case it cannot, owing to the windage.

The statement in the following table shows the results of experiments made at West Point on June 19, 1837.

Target of well-seasoned oak.

Arm	Charge.	Distance of target.		Penetration.
		Feet.	Inches.	
United States musket.....	134	10	2.3	
Hall's musket.....	110	10	2.1	
Colt's musket.....	134	10	2.6	
Colt's musket.....	110	10	2.7	
Colt's musket.....	100	10	3.0	
Cochran's musket.....	80	10	1.6	

NOTE.—The chamber of Cochran's gun was not capable of containing over 80 grains.

It is worthy of remark that in the case of Colt's gun has been illustrated and confirmed the experiments and theory of celebrated writers upon artillery and the effect of powder.

134 grains produced.....	2.64 inches.
110 grains produced.....	2.75 "
100 grains produced.....	3.00 "

Thus the declaration is here clearly demonstrated that overcharges produce diminished ranges !!

IV. INCONVENIENCE FROM HEATED BARRELS.

Guns which are loaded at the breech are supposed to acquire a less degree of heat, after a rapid and continued fire, than the common arm, in consequence of being cooled by a current of fresh air passing through the barrel during the period of loading; in the experiments here, such does not appear to have been materially the case. The temperature of the interior of the several barrels was ascertained by the introduction of a thermometer immediately after firing, in a given period, a certain number of rounds in quick succession, from 25 to 30 rounds. The result was as follows: Hall's, 150°; Hackett's, —; Colt's, 120°; Cochran's, 122°.

V. CAPACITY OF BEING USED AS A RIFLE.

In positions not uncommon to light troops, the experiments with Hall's rifle in 1826, at Fort Monroe, when in the hands of regular troops, fully proves this arm admirably adapted to that description of service; it will equally apply to the cavalry or mounted corps in all situations where fire-arms may be required.

The many-chambered guns, from causes before mentioned, connected with their complicated construction, are by no means suitable to the service of light troops, and particularly when mounted; Hall's rifle and Hackett's gun (reduced in length) may, it is considered, be very appropriate to the service required; the fulminating primer is, it must be stated, the only apparent objection to the adoption of Hackett's gun.

VI. SIMPLICITY AND CHEAPNESS OF CONSTRUCTION.

The attainment of simplicity in the construction of fire-arms is unquestionably of the first importance, in order that those who are to use them may readily comprehend their principles and utility.

In the examination of Hall's gun, nothing appears complicated; on the contrary, one is struck with the simplicity and solidity of the component parts, and the absence of the various appendages (equipments) which are attendant upon, and are indispensable to, the use and service of the arms both of Colt and Cochran. As regards simplicity and solidity of construction, what has been said of the arms of Hall may in general be applied to Hackett's gun. It possesses many of the features of utility which characterize the former, and which render them so valuable for military purposes. An arm complicated in its mechanism and arrangements deranges and perplexes the soldier in its management; it requires more than common

attention to its care and preservation; and should it perchance fail in its operation, which its complexity of construction would frequently occasion, he will lose all confidence in its powers of execution.

Hall's and Hackett's arms, possessing, apparently, the desired simplicity, are more easily managed, present less accountability to the soldier, are less liable to get out of order, and when they are they are more easily repaired.

The master armorers at the national manufactories have been instructed to prepare estimates of the cost of the manufacture of each description of arm. Their report, which, it is supposed, will approximate the reality, will accompany this report, C.

VII. DURABILITY.

The means of testing the durability of the several description of arms is not within the control of the board; it can only be determined by requiring the inventors to undertake a fatiguing course of firing greater than some of them could endure, or by placing the arms in the hands of troops, and having them exposed to all the incidents and trials of active field service.

The experiments with Hall's gun in 1826 gave results satisfactory as to its power of resisting the effect of long firing; and there can be no doubt that the durability of all description of guns will depend greatly upon simplicity, and consequent strength of construction.

VIII. SAVING OF AMMUNITION.

It has been stated that those arms which load at the breech require less powder to produce the same result than those of common construction.—(See No. 2, *efficiency of fire.*)

In the common musket 144 grains of powder constitute the charge for service, including ten grains for priming. Colt's musket, charged with 100 grains, (primed with a percussion cap,) gave proof of equal and even of superior power of penetration; which determined that quantity of powder was fully sufficient for that musket. Cochran's musket could not, from its construction, receive more than 80 grains, which was insufficient to accomplish the range and penetration of the United States musket, or that of Colt, with their respective charges; but the reduction of Colt's charge to that of Cochran's produced equal power.

These experiments being directed to facts in regard to the proper charges to be used in the new description of arms, and likewise with a view to test their relative powers, were conclusive in their results, and prove that in muskets of the same calibre the saving of powder would be in favor of those which load at the breech as 100 is to 144;* and secondly, the same principle operating in the different arms of Hall, Hackett, Colt, and Cochran, the same charge would produce the same effect.

Appendages.

The inventors, Colt and Cochran, propose that each soldier should, when armed, carry five receivers, (cylinders,) four exclusive of that affixed to the gun.

	lbs.	oz.
Colt's 4, each 3 pounds, would be.....	12	00
To which add their charges.....	1	14
	—	—
Would be for Colt—total.....	13	14
Cochran's, when increased to hold 100 grains, would weigh, with their charges as above, a total of.....	16	14

The same number of rounds (35) contained in these receivers or cylinders, weighing in one instance 16 lbs. 14 oz., would, in the common mode of transportation, only weigh 2 lbs. 12 oz. Thus the soldier would be encumbered with near 12 pounds additional weight of a substance inconvenient in form, and in its position oppressive in a high degree.†

To load the many-chambered guns several implements of novel and inconvenient form are required, the use and accountability of which would be equally difficult and oppressive to the soldier, besides adding still more to great weight and appendages already noticed. In the common musket, and with Hall's and Hackett's, these equipments are not required.

IX. THE NUMBER OF CHARGES WHICH MAY BE CARRIED BY AN INFANTRY SOLDIER.

The greatest number of cartridges which are carried by a soldier are 60, = 4 lbs. Colt's and Cochran's guns, to transport little more than half that number of charges, would, as has been presented, require the soldier to sustain an additional weight to that of his arms, his knapsack, &c., of from fourteen to seventeen pounds, which it is believed he could not support.

This is one of the serious objections to the arms of Colt and Cochran. The arms of Hall and Hackett are exempt from these objections; they may be provided with as many charges as are allowed for the musket in the usual cartridge-box or other modes of transportation.

X. THE ADVANTAGES WHEN USED AGAINST A CHARGE OF CAVALRY.

In sustaining an attack from cavalry, arms which can keep up a continuous fire, preserving at the same time a position of defence with the bayonet, have certainly an advantage greatly superior to those which are obliged to change their position "to load." Hall's and Hackett's muskets possess the above advantage in an eminent degree, being, even during the process of loading, at the charge, and ready for personal defence. This is not the case with Colt's and Cochran's arms, in consequence of the necessity of disconnecting their parts for the purpose of charging them.

* Percussion caps were used in the chambered guns, flint in the musket; the latter probably is the least expense. It is supposed the regulation charge for the musket is too great
 † With this weight of metallic substance, and fixed round the waist, how long would the soldier endure the heat and damp in the swamps of Florida?

XI. THE ADVANTAGES WHEN USED BY CAVALRY.

The advantage is very great in favor of guns which load at the breech; they are easily managed and conveniently loaded on horseback; they are therefore peculiarly adapted to cavalry service.

Another advantage they possess: the ball being larger than the diameter of the barrel, the ball is not deranged in its chamber by the movement of the horse.

For reasons stated in No. 5 of this report the many-chambered arms are deemed inapplicable to the service of cavalry.

General remarks.

The various arms under consideration, which have been submitted to the board, constitute two classes, viz:

The first comprises the guns of Hall and Hackett, which load at the breech with single chamber.

The second are the "many-chambered," or repeating guns of Colt and Cochran, the breech of which is formed of cylindrical receivers which revolve on a pivot, and in which are conical chambers to contain a number of charges, which are brought successively in line with the barrel. This first class differ in construction. Hackett's gun, opening at the breech, uncovers the bottom of the bore into which the charge is inserted in the form of a cartridge.

2. Hall's gun, the chamber of which being raised by means of a spring, receives its charge, either of cartridge or powder and ball, from a flask.

The second class also varies in construction. The receiver, which contains the chambers for the charges in Cochran's, revolves horizontally on an axis perpendicular to the bore; whereas Colt's receiver revolves on an axis parallel to the bore.

All these guns load at the breech. The advantages of this system are, therefore, common to all, viz: the ball being larger than the bore prevents windage; and, in consequence, obtains a greater range, more exactness of fire, and, less powder being required, the recoil is diminished. An additional advantage belongs to the first class, namely—Hall's and Hackett's; they can be loaded with great facility, and in any situation or position. This, for skirmishers and light troops, is very important.

Hackett's gun being loaded with cartridge, it often occurs that a part of the paper sticks to the side of the chamber, which, in some degree, chokes it; besides, this paper may at times retain fire, and expose the succeeding cartridge to explosion. This may be avoided in Hall's gun, it being loaded with loose powder.

The guns of Cochran and Colt are equally exposed with the others to the escape of gas through the joints and to a lodgment of burnt matter, rendering them stiff and difficult of movement, and, from the contiguity of the loaded chambers and primers, they are liable to explosion of more than one charge at the same time. This may well happen from defect in the metal or imperfection of workmanship. In that case, these arms become as dangerous and destructive to yourselves as the enemy. One accident of the kind occurred on the 19th of June. A similar occurrence in the field would not only impair the confidence of the troops in the power and safety of their arms, but might render doubtful, at least, the success of their operations. It is shown, also, from the experiments that risk of great injury might be apprehended by the bursting of the caps. However ingenious, therefore, may be the invention, however creditable the skill of the manufacturer, the board is of opinion that the arm of Cochran is an unsafe weapon, and unsuited to the use of bodies acting in line or in masses.

The arm of Colt, possessing all the merits and exempt from some of the objections attending the former, may be usefully applied in special cases, (such as in stationary defence, intrenchments, block-houses, perhaps, too, in the naval service, in the tops of ships, to cover or repel boarders, and in boat service.) Notwithstanding these objects favorable to it, the board is unanimous in opinion that, from the complicated construction of this arm, its liability to accidents (one having occurred on the 21st of June—see note) in firing, and for other reasons before noticed, that it is not adapted to the general purposes of the service.

The arm of Hackett the board considers of great merit, possessing in general the qualities of the musket, and over it, in several instances, advantages; but it is exposed to the serious objection of a dangerous arrangement of its ammunition as regards its packing and transportation, and from the impossibility of loading it with loose powder and ball, the necessity for which often occurs. The primer of fulminating powder, and attached to the cartridge, is considered dangerous when in connexion with large quantities of ammunition. These objections may be overcome by those in Europe who are devoting great attention and consideration to this arm; if so, we should place ourselves on a footing with those military nations who may adopt it, and to whom hereafter we may be opposed. The board is therefore of opinion we should be in possession of this arm, known in Europe as the *Fusil Robert*, and that the honorable Secretary of War be requested to have purchased ——— stand of these guns, and cause them to be placed in the hands of select men, in order to a thorough course of experiments embracing all the incidents of campaign service, both in respect to the weapon and its ammunition.

The arms now in use in the United States service possess the power, in skilful hands, of all the effect of celerity and efficiency.

The experiments just finished are conclusive that up to forty rounds of fire, in reference to the usual character and incidents of service, they have the advantage in several respects, and equality in others to those of many chambers.

In the instances of the arms under consideration, it is believed, if even there be anything gained by their peculiarities over the common musket and Hall's guns in point of celerity, such advantage has been acquired by too great a sacrifice of important and indisputable principles; that in the desire to reach perfection in the construction of these arms, the convenience, physical power, and safety of those who are to use them have been wholly overlooked, and their liability to be assailed when not in a state of preparation to continue their fire would detract greatly from their character for efficiency.

The board confirms the favorable reports and opinion of various commissions established to test the merits of Hall's guns, some modifications and changes in the arm, and the equipments. They are easily effected. Then the board must entertain the opinion that, as an arm for military purposes, it possesses a decided superiority over every other now known construction of the system of guns which are loaded at the breech.

The application of percussion primers to arms for the use of troops has not yet been successful. With improved means of attaching them to the nipple or cone, they may be introduced into the service of light troops acting as tirailleurs. The difficulty of placing and fixing so small an object as the cap during the excitement of action, in excessively cold weather, or in dark nights, is deemed almost impracticable, and has prevented this improvement in fire-arms being generally adopted in any service.*

Finally, it is the unanimous opinion of the board that the arms now in use in the service of the United States, viz: the musket, the rifle, and Hall's musket, rifle, and carbine, with such improvements in the construction as the latter are capable of, combine, in a higher degree, all the requisites of convenience, durability, simplicity, and efficiency than any that have been suggested for the general armament. All of which is respectfully submitted.

Signed on the part of the board.

JOHN R. FENWICK, *Brigadier General and President.*

C.

Cost of one gun from 5,000 to 50,000 of the new invented arms.

	5,000	10,000	20,000	40,000	50,000	Weight of musket.
Hackett's	\$13 69	\$12 83	\$12 57	\$12 27	\$12 23	<i>lbs. oz.</i> 10 12
Colt's	20 23	19 13	18 66	18 42	18 37	15 5
Cochran's	13 06	12 26	11 86	11 66	11 62	11 14

Tabular statement of experiments with Cochran's arms.

Arm.	Date.	Distance in yards.	Charge.			Celerity of fire.			Efficiency of fire, mean penetration.			Remarks.	
			F powder, grains.	Ball.	Buck shot.	Number of discharges.	Time of firing.	Average rate of firing per minute.	Oak target, inches.	No. 1, musket cartridge paper, sheets of.	No. 2, musket cartridge paper, sheets of.		
Small rifle, — balls to the pound.	1837, Feb. 27	50	36	1	10	0.56		
	March 1	100	36	1	10	0.51		
	2	150	35	1	8	0.20		
	2	200	35	1	10	0.14		
	6	9	35	1	2	1.13		
	8	35	1	8	2' 30"	2° 50' extent of recoil.	
	9	100	35	1	50	17' 35"	Cylinder empty at the commencement of the time.	
	Feb. 27	50	38	1	10	0.61		
	March 1	100	38	1	10	0.27	Fired with rifle powder.	
Carbine, small, — balls to the pound.	2	150	45	1	10	0.19	United States.	
	2	200	45	1	10	0.02		
	6	9	45	1	2	0.90		
	7	100	45	1	100	30' 6"		
	14	400	45	1	9	3' 50"	50" employed in firing; 3' employed in loading.	
	Musket.....	June 19	3½	1	4	1.76	13 fragments of caps and lead found in the blindages placed on each side of the soldier.
		19	100	72	1	16	10'	One lateral discharge.
19		13½	80	1	3	454	Fired without patches.	
19		13½	80	1	3	154	Fired with patches.	
19		3½	80	1	4	1.65		
21		180	80	1	30	10'	Temperature of barrel after firing 122° Fahrenheit.

* The liability of these caps to explode in pieces, and thereby annoy and maim the contiguous men, was fully illustrated by the experiments.

Tabular statement of experiments with Hall's rifle.

Date.	Distance in yards.	Charge.		Celerity of fire.			Efficiency of fire, mean penetration.			Remarks.
		Powder, grains.	Ball.	Number of discharges.	Time of firing.	Average rate of firing per minute.	Oak target, inches.	No. 1, musket cartridge paper, sheets of.	No. 2, musket cartridge paper, sheets of.	
1837. Feb'y 27	50	70	1	8	0.63	Two balls imbedded. One ball struck and made a slight indentation. 9° 17' extent of recoil. The recruit in whose hands the gun was did not understand the use of the flask.
March 1	100	70	1	10	0.93	
2	150	70	1	10	0.40	
2	200	70	1	10	0.00	
6	9	70	1	2	1.70	
6	300	70	1	10	0.00	
8	70	1	8	4' 30"	2.4	
9	100	70	1	50	21' 5"	
June 19	3½	70	1	10	1.12	
21	180	70	1	34	10'	

Tabular statement of experiments with Hall's musket.

Arm.	Date.	Distance in yards.	Charge.			Celerity of fire.			Efficiency of fire, mean penetration.			Remarks.
			Powder, grains.	Ball.	Buck shot.	Number of discharges.	Time of firing.	Average rate of firing per minute.	In oak target, inches.	No. 1, musket cartridge paper, sheets of.	No. 2, musket cartridge paper, sheets of.	
Percussion lock.....	1837. Feb'y 27	50	86	1	10	0.83	One ball imbedded. Fired without patches. Fired with patches.
	March 1	100	86	1	10	0.34	
	2	150	82	1	10	0.07	
	2	200	82	1	10	0.00	
	6	9	82	1	2	0.85	
	June 19	3½	110	1	4	1.80	
Flint lock	19	3½	110	1	2	2.17	
	19	13½	80	1	2	386	
	19	3½	100	1	10	1.07	
	19	100	100	1	20	10' }	3.5	
	22	100	100	1	10	2' }	

Tabular statement of experiments with Hackett's musket.

Date.	Distance in yards.	Charge.			Celerity of fire.			Efficiency of fire, mean penetration.			Remarks.
		Powder, grains.	Ball.	Buck shot.	Number of discharges.	Time of firing.	Average rate of firing per minute.	Oak target, inches.	No. 1, musket cartridge paper, sheets of.	No. 2, musket cartridge paper, sheets of.	
1837. Feb'y 27	50	73	1	8	0.81	An indentation of 0.300 inches. Fifty-nine discharges were made in 15'. The cartridge inserted too far thirteen times during the firing. Firing in a rain. Mean penetration of buck shot 0.7 inch. Ball rebounded. Indentation 0.20 inch. Ten buck shot out of eighteen struck the target. Recoil 9° 15'.
March 1	100	73	1	10	0.46	
2	150	73	1	10	0.32	
2	200	73	1	10	0.10	
6	9	73	1	2	0.82	
6	300	73	1	10	
7	56	73	1	99	39' 30"	
8	56	73	1	8	1' 50"	
9	100	73	1	50	14' 50"	
10	9	144	1	3	1	1.35	
10	200	85	1	0	5	
10	300	73	1	5	
10	400	144	1	1	0.30	
10	80	73	1	3	8	2' 15"	
14	400	73	1	0	10	2' 00"	
14	300	73	1	10	2' 5"	

Tabular statement of experiments with Colt's arms.

Arm.	Date.	Distance in yards.	Charge.			Celerity of fire.			Efficiency of fire, mean penetration.			Remarks.	
			Powder, grains.	Ball.	Ruck shot.	Number of discharges.	Time of firing.	Average rate of firing per minute.	Oak target, inches.	No. 1, musket cartridge paper, sheets of.	No. 2, musket cartridge paper, sheets of.		
Small rifle, — balls to the pound.	1837. Mar.	1	50	30	1	8			0.60			Fired with United States service. Rifle powder. One ball imbedded. Cylinder empty at the commencement of the time. 5° 30' extent of recoil. 30' employed in firing; 1' 30' employed in loading.	
		1	100	30	1	10			0.36				
		2	150	36	1	7			0.30				
		2	200	36	1	7			0.60				
		6	9	36	1	2			0.97				
		7	56	36	1	109	39'						
		8	56	36	1	8	3' 20"						
		9	100	36	1	50	12' 30"						
		14	100	36	1	8	2'						
	Musket.....	June	19	3½	134	1	6			2.64			
			19	3½	110	1	4			2.75			
			19	13½	80	1	3				481		
			21	100	100	1	31	10'					
			21	13½	100	1	1				717		
		21	180	80	1	26	10'				124° temperature.		
		21	3½	100	1	2			3.00				
		21	180	100	1	28	10'				Two simultaneous discharges in each volley.		
Rifle, musket calibre.	June	21	3½	100	1	1			1.60				
Carbine, musket calibre.	June	21	100	100	1	33	10'						
		21	13½	80	1	1				673			
		21	3½	72	1	1			1.57				

Mean penetrations in seasoned white oak.

Arm used.	Charges of powder, exclusive of priming.	Distances from target in yards.						
		Grains.	¾ yards.	9 yards.	50 yards.	100 yards.	150 yards.	200 yards.
United States musket	134	2.15	1.37	1.43	1.00	0.66	0.55	α 0.00
	125	1.60						
Harper's Ferry rifle	90	1.60						
	92	2.32	1 80	1.43	0.94	0.65	0.29	β 0.00
Hall's musket, percussion lock.....	110	1.804						
	110	c 2.175						
	86			0.83	0.34			
	82			0.85		0.07	δ 0.00	
Hall's musket, flint lock.....	80							
	100	1.07						
Hall's rifle	70	1.12	1.70	0.63	0.93	0.40	e 0.00	
	36			0.56	0.51			
Cochran's small rifle, — balls to the pound ...	35		1.13			0.20	0.14	
	45		0.90			0.19	0.02	
Cochran's carbine.....	38			0.61	0.27			
	80	1.65						
	72	1.76						
Colt's small rifle, — balls to the pound	36		0.97			0.30	f 0.00	
	30			0.60	0.36			
Colt's musket.....	134	2.64						
	110	2.75						
	100	3.00						
Colt's rifle, musket calibre.....	100	1.60						
Colt's carbine, musket calibre	72	1.57						
Hackett's musket	144		1.35					g 0.30
	73		0.82	0.81	0.46	0.32	0.10	
Leavitt's carbine, — balls to the pound.....	50			0.35	0.49	0.30	0.11	

α One ball imbedded.
 β Balls rebounded, mean indentation 0.2.
 c Patched.
 δ One ball imbedded.

e Two balls imbedded.
 f One ball imbedded.
 g At the distance of 400 yards.

Penetrations in cartridge paper at thirteen and one-third yards distance.

Arm used.	Charge in grains, priming exclu- ded.	No. of sheets penetrated— musket cartridge paper.	
		No. 1, sheets of.	No. 2, sheets of.
United States musket.....	134	653	770
Harper's Ferry rifle.....	92	500
Hall's musket, percussion.....	80	386
Cochran's musket.....	80	*454
	80	†154
Colt's carbine.....	100	717
	80	481
Colt's carbine.....	80	672

* Fired without a patch.

† Fired with a patch.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 744.

[1ST SESSION.]

PROCEEDINGS OF A COURT OF INQUIRY RELATING TO TRANSACTIONS OF BREVET
BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN E. WOOL, AND THOSE UNDER HIS COMMAND IN THE
CHEROKEE COUNTRY, IN ALABAMA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OCTOBER 9, 1837.

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

I have the honor, in compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 4th instant, to transmit the proceedings of the court of inquiry in the case of Brevet Brigadier General Wool.

M. VAN BUREN.

WASHINGTON, October, 1837.

WAR DEPARTMENT, October 9, 1837.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith the proceedings of the court of inquiry, whereof Major General Scott was president, to examine into the transactions of Brevet Brigadier General Wool, &c., in the Cherokee country, in compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 4th instant.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

The PRESIDENT of the United States.

Proceedings of a court of inquiry, held by virtue of the following orders:

GENERAL ORDERS No. 49.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Adjutant General's Office, Washington, July 26, 1837.*

The major general commanding in chief has received from the Secretary of War the directions of the President of the United States to appoint a court of inquiry to examine into the transactions of Brevet Brigadier General Wool, and others under his command, in reference to his and their conduct in the Cherokee country, so called, as set forth in a letter from his excellency the governor of Alabama, dated July 3, 1837, addressed to the Secretary of War, and in the joint resolutions of the Senate and House of Representatives of that State, approved the 30th of June, 1837, which accompanied the said letter, all of which will in due form be laid before the court by the judge advocate.

The court will hold its session at Athens, in the State of Tennessee, or at any other place which the court may deem more convenient; to open at 10 o'clock a. m. on the 25th day of August next, or as soon thereafter as practicable.

The court will consist of Brevet Major General W. Scott, Colonel W. Lindsay, and Major M. M. Payne, 2d artillery; and Lieutenant W. C. De Hart, 2d artillery, judge advocate, will act as recorder.

The court will report the facts in the case, for the information of the War Department.

By order of Alexander Macomb, major general commanding in chief.

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

SPECIAL ORDER No. 62.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, May 17, 1837.*

The court of inquiry instituted pursuant to "General Orders" No. 49, in the case of Brevet Brigadier General Wool, will report its opinion on the matter to be investigated, as well as the facts, for the information of the War Department.

By order.

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*KNOXVILLE, *Tennessee, September 4, 1837, 10 o'clock a. m.*

The court met pursuant to the above orders.

Present: Major General Winfield Scott, Colonel William Lindsay, Major M. M. Payne; Lieutenant W. C. De Hart, judge advocate.

The orders above written being read, General Wool was asked if he had any objection to any member named, to which he replied in the negative: whereupon the court and the judge advocate were duly sworn. The judge advocate stated to the court that he had been instructed to proceed to this place and prepare the case; that, on the 9th of August, he had addressed the governor of Alabama, advising him of the institution of the court of inquiry to investigate certain acts of Brigadier General Wool, and requesting that he might be furnished with the necessary testimony and the names of witnesses. On the 18th of August, while on the road, he was informed that Governor Clay had passed the day previous on his way to Washington city. He addressed a note to him, and received the following answer.—(See C.)

On the 19th of August the judge advocate stated that he had also addressed a letter to his excellency the acting governor of Alabama, notifying him of the institution of the court, and requesting to be furnished with the necessary evidence to support the allegations made against General Wool by the State of Alabama; to which letter the following answer was given.—(D.)

The judge advocate further informed the court that there was but one witness present, and the only one, as the judge advocate had been informed, who was cognizant of the facts referred to in the letter of complaint; it therefore remained with the court to determine whether they would proceed, or wait another period.

The court was cleared. The court decided that the judge advocate should bring forward any documentary evidence in his possession, and examine any witness on the part of the United States who may be present.

The court was opened. The judge advocate read the letter (A) from his excellency G. C. Clay, governor of the State of Alabama, and also the preamble and resolutions (B) enclosed therein, of the legislature of the State of Alabama.

The judge advocate then said that, in pursuance of a suggestion contained in the letter (C) from his excellency G. C. Clay, ex-governor of the State of Alabama, he had summoned Captain James Morrow, of the East Tennessee volunteers.

General Wool rose and addressed the court. He said that, although he felt certain that the accusation urged against him by the State of Alabama was unfounded, and although that State, as was shown by the letter (D) of the governor, had not a tittle of evidence to support such accusation, yet, with the permission of the court, he was willing and desirous to spread before it and explain every transaction of his while commanding in the Cherokee nation, and, with that view, was ready to indicate persons and exhibit papers. The judge advocate replied, that as the witness now present was the only person alluded to by the person complaining on the part of the State of Alabama from whom information might be derived, he would prefer to examine him.

Captain James Morrow was accordingly sworn.

Question by judge advocate. In what capacity were you serving in the Cherokee nation?

Answer. As captain of a volunteer company, under the command of General Wool.

Question. Will you state to the court your knowledge of the instructions given by General Wool in relation to, and of the acts of dispossessing one or any occupant of property in the Cherokee nation, within the State of Alabama, as set forth in the letter of complaint?

Answer. General Wool instructed me to investigate all complaints made by Cherokees against whites. The original orders I have.—(E, F.) In consequence of this last letter, I requested General Wool to decide the case himself. The parties agreed upon the manner of taking testimony before a magistrate. I conveyed the testimony to General Wool, and received these instructions.—(G.) The letter explains that Sheriff Riddle was the administrator of the estate of John Gunter, senior, deceased, who had acquired the rights of a Cherokee by having married a native.

Question. Did the witness receive any further instructions, written or oral, on the same subjects from General Wool?

Answer. I received no other instructions. In obedience to the letter of instructions I dispossessed Colonel Steele of the improvement, and put in possession the purchaser of the same.

Question. Who was the purchaser, and by whom was the sale made?

Answer. The sale was made by the administrator; the purchaser was Scrimpsher, son-in-law of J. Gunter, senior, deceased. This Mr. Scrimpsher was the husband of a half-breed.

Question. Were the improvements of this estate "Indian improvements?"

Answer. They were. These improvements were all in Marshall county, Alabama. Sheriff Riddle was the administrator appointed by authority of the laws of Alabama. All the parties resided in the Cherokee nation.

Question. Were all the parties interested in this question "Indians," or "Indian countrymen?"

Answer. They were, with the exception of the administrator. Mr. Riddle resided without the limits of the Cherokee nation; he was sheriff of Jackson county. I will also state that Mr. Scrimpsher had left before I had completed the removal of Steele's property from the house, and told me to give possession to Major Allen, and he would be satisfied with it.

Question by the court. Will the witness please state to the court the *manner* of executing the order for dispossessing the occupant, Colonel Steel, the *means* employed, and what resistance, if any, was opposed to the witness.

Answer. When I received the general's instructions I saw Major Riddle and Colonel Steel together, and told them I should be very glad if they could arrange it without any interference on my part. Colonel Steel agreed at that time that he would give possession to whoever might be the purchaser, else I was to dispossess him. The day of the sale Colonel Steel bid the property off himself, but refused to pay his bid, unless Riddle would make him such a transfer as he required. Major Riddle told Steel that he would sell the place the next day. I went down that day, however, and Major Riddle promised to make any transfer be required, if he would pay the money; Steel, nevertheless, refused. They wished to refer it to me; I told them I had nothing to do with it, and Major Riddle went on the next day to resell the place. Scrimpsner then bought it. Some time during that day Major Riddle sent word to me that Colonel Steel was collecting armed men to resist. I took some of my company and went down and found between fifteen and twenty men with guns. The colonel met me on the way, and told me that he had no intention of resisting me, but as he had understood that Riddle intended to take possession without applying to me, he would resist him. The armed men dispersed, and I returned to camp. Scrimpsner had agreed to leave Steel in the house until the next day. The next morning Riddle and Steel came up to the cantonment. Riddle agreed that Steel should retain possession of a dining-room until he could get a place for his family, and Colonel Steel agreed to give up to the purchaser every other part of the improvement. I was indisposed, and sent my lieutenant to see that Riddle or the purchaser received the improvement. Some time during the day my lieutenant informed me that Colonel Steel refused to give possession of any part of it, and used a threat that there were more men in the country than in my company. Upon hearing this I rode down with a few of my men. Colonel Steel had left the premises. I did not complete the removal of the goods until next day, when Colonel Steel returned and apologized for the expressions which he had used. After I had dispossessed him, he expressed himself satisfied with the manner in which it was done, and requested me to give a pledge that I was now done with it; which pledge I gave. I said to some that there was a chance of some difficulty, and that they had better take care of themselves. I will state, however, that neither I nor any of my men were present at an affray which followed. There was an application made to me by a citizen to assist in quelling the affray, which I refused, on the ground that I could not interfere unless summoned by the sheriff, it being an affair between whites, and which terminated in the death of two white men. My camp was three miles from the place where the affray occurred, and it was over before I was applied to. I told them that it was the duty of the sheriff; but if they procured a summons from the sheriff I would render every assistance. In connexion with this affair, I would offer to the court these letters, (H, I, K.) The letter marked I was from the persons arrested under a charge of murder, and the other, K, was from the leaders of the opposite party.

Question by the court. Are you acquainted with the character of the population within the limits of the Cherokee nation, in Alabama, and what is it?

Answer. I am. A portion of the population is very respectable; but a majority, as I believe, with whom I have come in contact, are very unworthy, who are there for the purpose of robbing and plundering the Indians, and have exercised every species of oppression towards them.

Question. When resident there, and not having acquired the rights of Cherokee countrymen, are they considered as intruders, living there by sufferance of the United States, or not?

Answer. Why, the State of Alabama does not consider them so, I believe. Her laws have encouraged emigration there, and protect those who make improvements. The laws of Alabama consider all as citizens.

Question by General Wool. Were you not with me at the time I called to see Colonel Steel on the subject of the improvement in question; if so, will you state the conversation which took place between him and myself in relation to it?

Answer. I was with him; they had a good deal of conversation, I do not recollect all the conversation; I was not in the house all the time; but I distinctly remember that Colonel Steel said he would as soon have you to decide as any body, and he had no doubt but what you would do him justice; and he appeared anxious that you should decide.

Question. Did he make any objection to the decision after it was made, or, in other words, did he not appear to be satisfied with it?

Answer. Why, I cannot say that he was satisfied with it; I do not recollect any particular expression upon the subject, either of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. He was satisfied that some of the houses were left to him. Colonel Steel declared that he had purchased of John Gunter, jr., his share, and that of others of the heirs. Samuel and Edward Gunter refused to make any compromise with him.

Question. Have you any doubt as to the rightful claim of the Cherokees to the improvement of which Colonel Steel was dispossessed, under my instructions of June 3, 1837?

Answer. I have no doubt of it at all. It was admitted by Colonel Steel himself, from the fact of having offered to purchase of two of the heirs.

Question. Will you state what instructions I gave you in regard to your intercourse with the citizens in the Cherokee nation, and whether or not you were instructed to avoid all collision with the white inhabitants, and that the laws of the State in which you might be called to act should in all cases be respected?

Answer. Such were the tenor of the instructions; to avoid all unnecessary collision with the State authorities. I never saw any disposition on the part of General Wool other than to enforce the treaty faithfully, and protect the rights guaranteed by the treaty. I recollect that he often instructed me, in case any depredations on whites or Indians should be committed by men under my command, to make instant and ample remuneration.

The court adjourned to meet to-morrow at 9 a. m.

TUESDAY, September 5, 10 o'clock a. m.

The court met.

Present: Major General Scott, Colonel Lindsay, Major Payne; Lieutenant De Hart, judge advocate.

The proceedings of yesterday having been read, Captain *Morrow* was recalled. He stated that he wished to explain a part of his testimony. The part on the third page of the third sheet and fifth line, which says, "I said to some," means to some of the parties I had put in possession.

Question by judge advocate. Did you, by the orders of General Wool, dispossess any others in the Cherokee nation within the State of Alabama?

Answer. I did; I dispossessed a great many.

Question. Were all such cases for Indian improvements, and claimed by Indians?

Answer. Yes; they were Indian improvements, and claimed by Indians. There was a Cherokee made a complaint against a white man, who he said was in possession of his improvement; upon examination, I found that the Cherokee had sold his claim to another white man; that white man had brought suit against the individual in possession, and the suit was then pending in the civil courts of the country. I refused to attend to it, on the ground that the Indian had sold his claim to a white man; I informed the Indian that if the suit was lost by the person to whom he had sold, and if the improvement price was recovered from him by a suit at law, then I would attend to his complaint, as I should consider the improvement as reverting to him. This contingency did not take place in this case.

Question. Where was General Wool at the time you dispossessed Colonel Steel of the property in Marshall county?

Answer. I supposed the General was at New Town, Georgia, or at Valley river, North Carolina.

Question. Where was General Wool when you received the instructions in that case?

Answer. He was at New Town. I was there myself.

Question by General Wool. You stated that the administrator, Riddle, had exposed this property to sale. Do you mean thereby the fee-simple, or occupant right?

Answer. I mean the possessory right, which he sold.

Question. Were not the Indians in the habit of selling their good-will, or possessory right?

Answer. Yes.

Question. You have said that Colonel Steel declared that he had purchased of John Gunter, jr., his share, and that of others of the heirs. Did you not investigate the case; and if so, were you not satisfied that he had no claim to any of the improvements as designated in my order of the 3d June, 1837, and directed to be put in possession of Sheriff Riddle, the administrator?

Answer. I did not make a regular investigation of the case. I examined the testimony sufficiently, however, to be satisfied that Colonel Steel had no right to the improvement at all.

Question. You have stated that Riddle was an officer acting under the laws of Alabama. Will you state to the court whether his application to me was not grounded upon the fact that the laws of Alabama did not afford adequate protection to the parties whom he represented?

Answer. I can't say upon what grounds he made the complaint. The improvement was valuable; and if he had, as administrator, had recourse to the laws of the State, it would have been in the power of the other party to have kept the suit in court until the expiration of the treaty, thereby depriving the heirs of any benefit of the improvement or of the sale of it. And in addition to this, there was important Indian testimony in this case, which would not have been admissible in the courts of Alabama. I have known one or two cases where whites took advantage of the fact that Indian testimony was not admissible; and the property of one Indian has been levied on for the debt of another, as this last one could not prove his right to it. In one of the cases to which I have alluded, there was a trial for the right of property before a jury and magistrate. After the verdict I examined the Indian testimony, and was satisfied that the property belonged to a different individual than the one for whose debt it was executed. I reported the case to General Wool, and he directed me not to interfere, as the case had been decided by the civil tribunals of the country.

Question by the court. Was it customary for Cherokees dispossessed of their improvements by whites to appeal to the State tribunals for redress, or did you ever know an instance of such appeal?

Answer. There have been instances, but they were rare, because the parties appealing were generally unsuccessful. The principal cause of non-success was, that the juries were composed of residents of the Cherokee county, who, many of them, had been guilty, probably, of taking violent possession of property themselves; and if not, were all under the influence of the prejudices of that country against the Cherokees. Another cause was, that Indian testimony is not admissible in the State courts of Alabama, and that in some, if not many of the cases, they had none but Indian evidence, and therefore they could prove nothing.

Question. Were not the delays of judicial process in the State courts, from the nature of the property in question, equivalent to a decision against the Cherokee claimant?

Answer. I think so, if the parties in possession wished delay.

Question. You have spoken of the constitution of the juries. Were not the magistrates, sheriffs, and all others concerned in the administration of justice the same sort of people?

Answer. The sheriff of Marshall county resides without the limits of the Cherokee country. In all the other counties of the Cherokee country within the State of Alabama, with the exception of Jackson county, the sheriffs, magistrates, and jurors are residents of the Cherokee country. I am not acquainted with all in the country. Most of the officers of the country, with whom I have come in contact, I have found under the full influence of the prejudice against the Cherokees.

General Wool here asked the court how far it would be relevant for him to consider, in his defence, the letter of the 17th of April last, as referred to in the letter of his excellency C. C. Clay, of the 3d of July, 1837, and the inference made by the writer thereof.

The court was cleared.

The court decided, in reply to this inquiry, "that, as the letter of the 17th of April had not been submitted to the court by the proper authority, but on the contrary, as it would seem, intentionally withheld, the court cannot go into an investigation of its supposed contents—the court being limited in its range of inquiry to the matters specially indicated and charged in the joint resolutions of the legislature of Alabama, and the letter of his excellency the governor of that State which communicated to the War Department those resolutions."

The court was opened and the decision or opinion of the court made known.

Question by General Wool. Are you acquainted with the course I have uniformly pursued as commander of the forces in the Cherokee country?

Answer. I believe I am.

Question. Do you know of any attempt on my part "to usurp the powers of the civil tribunals, disturb the peace of the community, and trample on the rights of the people" of the States, as charged in the letter of his excellency Governor Clay, of the 3d of July last, to the Secretary of War?

Answer. I do not know of any such attempt. General Wool always appeared very anxious to avoid any collision with the citizens, to avoid any violation of their rights, and to faithfully and honestly execute the treaty. He was always very industriously employed. I was with General Wool at all the posts except at Ross's Landing; his course at the different places was the same. The only objection I

had to him as an officer was, that I thought he did not carry the execution of his power, which I thought him possessed of, far enough in restraining the whites at New Town, Georgia, where the sale of spirits was tolerated on account of avoiding difficulties with Georgia, at least while the Tennessee troops were there; and I think the reason given by the general was, that there had been complaints made of the exercise of military authority as illegal by the Tennessee troops in Georgia. I have no doubt that all the officers, as well as myself, had the utmost confidence in the zeal and ability of General Wool, (I have had frequent conversations with them,) and that he had no object but a faithful discharge of his duties.

General Wool stated to the court that he would be ready to proceed with his evidence to-morrow; and, as there was no further evidence on the part of the complaint,

The court adjourned to meet to-morrow at 10 o'clock a. m.

WEDNESDAY, *September 6, 10 o'clock a. m.*

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Scott, Colonel Lindsay, Major Payne; Lieutenant De Hart, judge advocate.

General Wool presented to the court the following documents, to wit: Nos. 1 to 6, inclusive, which were read in the order enumerated.

THOMAS C. LYON was duly sworn on the part of the defence to explain a discrepancy between the date of the letter marked 5, and the date of the same as referred to in the letter marked 6. He says: "I was serving with General Wool as his aide-de-camp. The letter of the Secretary of War of the 1st of September (6) is, I believe, in answer to General Wool's letter dated the 15th of August, (5.) In the letter of General Wool of the 15th, I believe the instructions which General Wool sent to different officers were sent with this letter. These instructions were one to Captain Vernon, one to Colonel Byrd, one to Captain Morrow, and one certainly to General Dunlap. The mistake of the date might have occurred with myself in transcribing the letter. All these letters were sent to the Adjutant General's office. I perceive that the letters of the 4th and 12th of August to General Dunlap (4) are marked as having been sent to the Adjutant General's office."

The documents marked 7 to 26, inclusive, were read.

The court adjourned to meet to-morrow at 12 m.

THURSDAY, *September 7, 12 o'clock m.*

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Scott, Colonel Lindsay, Major Payne; Lieutenant De Hart, judge advocate.

The paper marked 28 was read—the protest.

Alexander Riddle was duly sworn for the defence.

Question by General Wool. Will you state to the court your knowledge of the facts attending the dispossessing of Colonel Steel of certain improvements in Marshall county, Alabama, by my order?

Answer. It is near two years since the orphans' court of Jackson county, Alabama, appointed me administrator of the estate of Mr. Gunter; my recollection does not serve me as to the exact time. I went on to take possession of the estate and papers; the former administrator gave me possession of everything, excepting the improvement; that he told me there would be, he presumed, some difficulty in getting possession of. He stated he did not know whether I could get possession without difficulty. I, after examining the case fully, and taking legal advice, determined I could not get possession of it, unless through General Wool, or some of his officers. I had frequent conversation with Mr. Steel, who went on the place without consent. When Mr. Potter, my predecessor, told me that Steel said he had a contract with young Gunter to buy the place, and asked him if he would be safe in buying from young Gunter, Mr. Potter said he pulled out the old man's will, and Steel read it. The contents of the will was that the improvements should be sold among the heirs. Steel, when he read this, said he would have nothing to do with it. After I got in possession of everything, except the improvement, he had frequent intercourse with me, and refused to give me possession, saying I must look to John for my rights. I told Colonel Steel I had nothing to do with John; but as administrator, I claimed the right of selling it; and told him he well knew John Gunter had no right to sell the place, or any other man but the administrator. I told him I wished possession that I might sell the place without difficulty, as he knew I ought to have the privilege of selling it. About this time John Gunter and Steel, who lived together, would ask me why I did not sell the place according to the provisions of the will. I told them the reason was that he would not give possession; but if he gave possession, I would sell it as soon as I could advertise it. About this time the heirs, with the exception of John Gunter, wrote to me not to sell the place until I could get possession, as it would not fetch a fair price encumbered as it was. Steel at that time asked me to assist him in trying to buy some of the heirs' interest; they refused to me to sell, and wanted me to sell according to the will, and would do nothing else. I thought now that I could not get possession, except through General Wool. When I came up to New Echota, General Wool was not there. I made my complaints known to Colonel Williams, and he thought it most likely that I could get possession that way. I determined to go back again some time in the month of February; when I went back I told Colonel Williams I did not know General Wool, and he made out a statement of the case and presented it to General Wool; General Wool seemed to think it was his duty to give possession, and gave me a letter to Captain Morrow to give me possession, unless he saw it was likely to produce too much excitement; he said he believed it his duty to give possession, but to what extent he could not say—he would see when he came down; Captain Morrow determined, when I saw him, not to have anything to do with it. At the time General Wool appointed to meet me at Gunter's we all went to Colonel Steel's house—the improvement I was contending for; there General Wool told Mr. Steel he conceived it was his duty to give possession to me of all the improvements old Mr. Gunter had made, and that he would give me possession; General Wool remarked to Mr. Steel that it seemed a very valuable improvement, and he was willing to call in and consult others about it, as he wished to do nothing but justice, and wished no hard thoughts about it. Colonel Steel replied, in substance, that it was useless for General Wool, for, said he, "I am perfectly willing that you should decide it as soon as any man in the world—I will submit to your decision cheerfully." General Wool then agreed, in all our presence, that Captain Morrow should take down all the proof on both sides, and bring it to New Town, and he would try, if

possible, to have the decision final against the day I had advertised to sell the property; Steel requested I would not have him dispossessed if it went against him; that he intended to purchase, and if he was not the purchaser he would give up the possession without any trouble; he stated that he had bought out some of the heirs, and if he did not purchase he would give possession on any day I should name; he stated that if I was afraid, he would give me a bond for \$20,000 that he would give possession two or three days after the sale; he tried me three or four times to get me to take a bond; he had a bond drawn out once, but I refused to take it; I said, you told me you would give possession; if you do not, I can only look to General Wool for these Cherokee people to give me possession.

The place was advertised to sell on the 5th of May, 1837, but I had promised General Wool to postpone from day to day until Captain Morrow should return with his decision; on Monday, the 5th, I called the sale and postponed it until the 6th at 12 o'clock, and on the 6th postponed to the 7th, when I sold; Captain Morrow arrived on Tuesday evening and sent for me to go up; I went up before the sale. Colonel Steel came to me, on the premises, in the presence of Captain Morrow; the decision was read in the presence of Colonel Steel and myself; he asked me how I liked it—he had seen it previously; I told him that, so far as General Wool had decided, I believed it was right, and he expressed himself fully satisfied with it; I then told Colonel Steel I should offer the place that day, and said, "Colonel Steel, if I confine this sale to the heirs, I shall require of you to produce a power of attorney to act as John Gunter's agent;" he seemed to be much pestered at that, and said I had no right to require such a thing as that, and that I knew he was John Gunter's agent; I then offered the place and the place, was bid off to Nathaniel Steel, by his brother Alexander Steel, for \$2,540 25, or thereabouts; Mr. Steel asked me to walk up to the house with him; I told him I would make him as good a right as the administrator could make, or as good as old Mr. Gunter could make if he was alive; I told him I was waiting for his own lawyer to write the conveyance to him from me; his own lawyer refused, and I then called on Judge Wycer, who wrote it, and I presented it to him, and made a demand of the money, and he refused to pay the money; I then told him if he did not pay me I should be compelled to go and offer the place again; I went back again to the company and made a demand of the money in presence of several gentlemen, and tendered the deed of conveyance; he took the deed and wrote on it "*protested*," and signed his name "Nathaniel Steel;" I then made known that the purchaser had not complied with the terms, and I offered it again; I could not get that evening a fair price, and I postponed the sale to next day at 11 o'clock, at which time I offered it again and sold it to Martin Scrimpsheer, who bid it off for six hundred and between seven and eight dollars; Mr. Scrimpsheer paid me the money, and I made him a right, though after I had sold it and received the money Captain Morrow and myself told Mr. Steel that if he paid the money he should not be dispossessed. Before the sale, from Monday to Friday, there appeared signs of hostilities, and there were a number of men assembled with guns; I was cautioned against this, and although Steel had never offered me any insult, I was told that Steel had threatened to kill me; I had reason to believe that my life had been threatened more than fifty times, and that those persons were gathered there for the purpose of deterring me; the signs of hostilities were so strong on Thursday evening that I sent for Captain Morrow to come down; he rode down in the evening with some of his men; Steel denied having any intention of interrupting me, and pledged himself that he would not; on Friday morning Steel and myself rode up to Captain Morrow's camp; I asked Captain Morrow to go down, or send down a part of his men, as I thought there would be difficulty; Captain Morrow then told Steel that he would not dispossess him if he would pay the money, \$2,500; Steel then said he might send as many men as he pleased, but it was unnecessary, as he would give possession; he wanted me to give him as long a time as I could, in order that he might get away a part of his plunder; Captain Morrow sent two of his men—Steel and myself rode down to the place where he lived, and Steel and Mr. Scrimpsheer and the two men commenced moving Steel's goods out of the house; I then thought the matter was finally settled, and got on my horse to go home between 11 and 12 o'clock; I got between two and three miles, when there came a runner after me; Mr. Scrimpsheer sent me word that Steel refused to give him possession, and if I did not come back and put him in possession he would sue me for the money he had paid me.

Question by judge advocate. Was there no remedy for the heirs under the laws of Alabama?

Answer. No; I do not think there was, not any that I could avail myself of; the part of the improvement which Steel holds yet I cannot get a lawyer who thinks that I can bring a suit successfully; and that if the general government does not protect the Indians, and does not give possession under the treaty, I cannot get it.

Question. Were you an officer of the courts of Alabama, or under her laws?

Answer. Yes. At that time I was sheriff of Jackson county, and by virtue of that office was appointed administrator. The sheriff, by the court, was compelled to take it.

Question by the court. Had the witness any interest other than that of administrator in the improvements occupied by Steel?

Answer. I had not.

Question. In calling upon General Wool to give you military assistance in getting possession of the improvement in question, did you consider yourself as acting in the usual and legal way, according to the understanding of the country, before and after that time?

Answer. I did not know of any other way. I thought that the only way of getting justice for the parties whom I represented. From my understanding of the treaty, I pursued the course I should pursue again. Such was the opinion of every body who had noticed the treaty, with whom I had consulted.

Question. The witness has stated many of the facts and circumstances, but, in general, what was the character of General Wool's temper and manner in the transaction in question; was it harsh and overbearing, or mild and considerate?

Answer. Mild and considerate; he acted with as much caution as I ever knew a man in any transaction whatever.

Question by General Wool. The governor of Alabama, in his letter to the Secretary of War of July 3, 1837, has charged me with usurping the powers of the civil tribunals of Alabama, disturbing the peace of the community, and trampling on the rights of the people. Will you state to the court how far my conduct, whilst commanding in the Cherokee country, was considered by yourself, or the people of Alabama generally, liable to such charges?

Answer. I have never known of any instance where he has usurped any authority which did not belong to him. I know of no person, who can be relied on, who has ever complained of him. There are some people, to be sure, who are his enemies, but they are such as have imposed upon the rights of the Cherokees. Except at one time, there was an excitement among the people when he stopped the sale of spirituous

liquors, which afterwards subsided. I have no doubt but that a great majority of the community in that section of the country would be glad if he would remain there.

Question. Will you state whether or not the people expressed regret at my recall?

Answer. They did. I believe a large majority of them would be in favor of his being stationed there.

Question. You have stated that part of the improvement of John Gunter, senior, deceased, is still in the possession of Mr. Steel, and that the most eminent lawyers have advised you not to bring suit under the laws of Alabama. Whilst giving you this advice, was not the justice of your claim to the possession always admitted?

Answer. Report says the transaction was made in fraud, but the deed shows, as recorded in our courts, that there was a valuable consideration; and I recollect that General Wool said because it was a litigated case he would not give possession.

Question. In all controversies between the whites and Indians, do you not consider that, from the situation of the country, the constitution of courts and juries, &c., that the Indians rarely obtain justice?

Answer. There have been very few trials. They can bring suits, but their evidence is not received in our courts, and they are cut off without any remedy whatever.

Question. Is there not now considerable excitement prevailing throughout the Cherokee portion of Alabama, in consequence of white men unjustly dispossessing the Cherokees of their property?

Answer. There are complaints, in several instances, to my knowledge. I have not been a great deal there latterly, but there are complaints.

Question by the court. Are you aware of any law passed at the last session of the legislature of Alabama, interdicting or limiting the exercise of authority on the part of the United States officers, and what are its provisions?

Answer. I do not know. I have not seen that act.

Question by General Wool. Was the justice of your claim, as administrator, to such parts of the improvement still held by Steel admitted to be just?

Answer. It is thought that if there was any law there I should be entitled to it. I know nothing to the contrary of its being a fair transaction, except what rumor says.

The court adjourned to meet to-morrow at 11 o'clock a. m.

FRIDAY, September 8, 11 o'clock a. m.

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Scott, Colonel Lindsay, Major Payne; Lieutenant De Hart, judge advocate.

The proceedings of yesterday were read.

The paper marked 27 was read.

Alexander Riddle was again called. He stated that he wished to make some correction of his evidence, and says: "I was mistaken in the time I was appointed administrator; upon examination of my memorandum-book, I was appointed something more than twelve months ago. When I carried Captain Morrow the letter of General Wool, he said he would take all the evidence and submit it to General Wool, but he would not decide on the case, as Steel had said that if he decided against him he would take an appeal against Captain Morrow."

Question by General Wool. Was the improvement of John Gunter, senior, valued as other Indian improvements, and returned to the commissioners for settlement; and if so, were the heirs paid for the same as guaranteed by the late Cherokee treaty?

Answer. Yes; the agents valued the improvements about which this contest arose. They valued it in the name of John Gunter, junior. They stated that the reason it was valued in his name was, their instructions from the commissioners was to value improvements in the name of whoever they found in possession of them. I objected to their valuing the improvement in John Gunter, junior's, name, and gave the agents a certified copy of the will and of the transfer of the improvement by John Gunter, junior. They then told me that they had no doubt but that I would be able to maintain it, but, according to their instructions, they must make it out in John Gunter, junior's, name. After they made a return, I filed a bill against John Gunter for the valuation of the improvement. The commissioners decided that the property was the property of the estate, and I, as administrator, was entitled to the valuation. I have never seen the decision of the commissioners on the books, but they told me they had awarded the valuation to me, excepting some works John Gunter had done after he had sold the improvement to his father.

Mr. Joseph Byrd was duly sworn.

Question by General Wool. In what capacity were you serving with me in the Cherokee nation?

Answer. As colonel of the second regiment of East Tennessee volunteers.

Question. The governor of Alabama, in his letter of complaint, has charged me with usurping the powers of the civil tribunals of Alabama, disturbing the peace of the community, and trampling on the rights of the people; you will please state to the court what my course of conduct was as military commander in the Cherokee nation, and whether it was considered by yourself, or the people of the Cherokee country, liable to such charges.

Answer. All the orders and communications I received from General Wool were mild and conciliatory, always directing me to take great care and caution not to have the rights of the citizens intruded upon; General Wool's course and conduct, so far as came to my knowledge, was not complained of by any person in the Cherokee country, either by the whites or natives. The volunteers, the citizens, and the Cherokees, unanimously regretted the recall of General Wool from the Cherokee nation.

Henry B. Shaw was duly sworn.

Question by General Wool. In what capacity were you serving with me in the Cherokee country?

Answer. As lieutenant of the Georgia volunteers since the 1st of December last. From the 2d of May until the 1st of July I was acting aide to General Wool.

Question. The governor of Alabama, in his letter of complaint, has charged me with usurping the powers of the civil tribunals of Alabama, disturbing the peace of the community, and trampling on the rights of the people; you will please state to the court what my course of conduct was as military commander in the Cherokee nation, and whether it was considered by yourself, or the people of the Cherokee country, liable to such charges.

Answer. I believe I am very well acquainted with the course of General Wool from the time I entered the service until he left it. I saw nothing, nor knew of anything to afford foundation for such charges, but everything to refute them. I have been on several occasions employed by General Wool's order in preserving the peace of the community, and sustaining the authority of the civil tribunals. I never knew of any act of General Wool, or of any other person by his order, in violation of the laws of the country. In every case where the State laws could operate, I know that General Wool not only preferred that they should operate, but assisted the officers of the country in executing them. There was no dissenting opinion in the country on this subject within my knowledge.

Question. You will please state whether the circumstances, as within your knowledge, and the state of feeling in the Indian country, were such as to warrant the statements in my letter of the 31st March, 1837, transmitted to the Hon. J. R. Poinsett, Secretary of War.

Answer. I have read that letter over; I was not in the staff of General Wool when it was written, but was consulted by him, having the honor of his confidence. In relation to that letter, which I copied for him, I would say, most unhesitatingly, that the circumstances referred to, and whose existence I knew, and the state of feeling in the country, did fully warrant it. I was charged with delivering over to the civil authorities the murderer referred to in that letter.—(See No. —.) I also examined the case fully, in order to lay it before the civil authorities. In that case, every proceeding was according to the laws of the State of Georgia; which laws were found, in that case, as in many others, to my knowledge, totally insufficient to answer the ends of justice towards that oppressed people. I believe, upon my knowledge of the country at that time, that the views of General Wool, in relation to that condition, are positively correct; that the Indians had been goaded almost to madness by the oppression of the whites, and, but for the justice afforded by General Wool, I believe there would have been serious difficulties in the country.

Question. Will you state whether or not, during your term of service in my staff, my time was not assiduously employed to promote the objects of the government, and execute the treaty faithfully, so far as its execution was intrusted to me.

Answer. I would state that during that time General Wool was constantly employed in executing the treaty as far as it was intrusted to him; he appeared to have no other objects than carrying out the purposes of the government as made known to him; he was generally employed from early in the morning to late at night in the duties of the command.

Question. Were there not almost daily complaints by the Indians from all sections of the country of having been dispossessed of their property by the whites; and were they not generally restored upon investigation by some officer of my command?

Answer. There were complaints almost every day of that kind, which General Wool always directed to be investigated by officers under his command, if he did not investigate them himself. Where they came under the provisions of the 16th article of the treaty they were always restored, which restorations I never knew controverted or resisted.

Thomas C. Lyon was recalled.

Question by General Wool. In what capacity were you serving with me in the Cherokee nation?

Answer. I served in the capacity of aide-de-camp from the 10th of July, 1836, I believe, until he left the country.

Question. The governor of Alabama, in his letter of complaint, has charged me with "usurping the powers of the civil tribunals of Alabama, disturbing the peace of the community, and trampling on the rights of the people;" you will please state to the court what my course of conduct was as military commander in the Cherokee nation, and whether it was liable to such charges.

Answer. I do not think it liable to such charges myself, nor do I think that the people of that country do. During General Wool's whole course as commander in the Cherokee nation he acted, I think, with great caution, as far as the rights of States or of individuals were involved. In all the instructions to his officers he particularly enjoined it upon them not to infringe the rights of individuals, or violate the laws of the States. If he committed any error in first coming to the country, I think it was an over-caution on these points.

Question. You will please state whether the circumstances, as within your knowledge, and the state of feeling in the Indian country, were such as to warrant the statements in my letter of the 31st March, 1837, transmitted to the Hon. J. R. Poinsett, Secretary of War?

Answer. Yes; I concur in the general tone and sentiments of that letter entirely.—(See —.) I think that the Indians were laboring under great excitement against the whites on account of the oppression they had suffered; and I think that nothing but fear of the consequences, and the influence of their leaders, would have prevented them from committing acts of hostilities. The case referred to of murder I was acquainted with, having examined the persons brought up to General Wool's headquarters. It was a very aggravated and unprovoked murder; and that case, taken in connexion with others, convinced me that the civil tribunals were inadequate for the protection of the Indians. General Wool's conduct in all cases towards the Indians had a tendency in restraining them and softening their animosities towards the whites and the government.

Question. Will you state whether or not, during your time of service in my staff, my time was not assiduously employed to promote the objects of the government and execute the treaty faithfully, so far as its execution was intrusted to me?

Answer. It was; I never served with a person whom I thought more devoted to business and the fulfilment of his duties. I believe the officers and soldiers of General Wool's command, and the citizens of the neighboring country, expressed a very general and decided regret at his recall.

Question. Were there not almost daily complaints by the Indians, from all sections of the country, of having been dispossessed of their property by the whites; and were they not generally restored upon investigation by some officer of my command?

Answer. Complaints of the kind referred to were very numerous; generally they were ordered to be investigated by some officer of the command, and possession restored when it was thought they were entitled to it.

Henry B. Shaw was recalled.

Question. Was not my recall from the command in the Cherokee nation generally regretted by the citizens of the country, as well as the officers and soldiers under my command?

Answer. It was; I know of many citizens writing to the War Department and remonstrating against it; I know that some of the Indian chiefs did so; and I know that I, in common with others of the Georgia volunteers, addressed a remonstrance to the Secretary of War and sent it; because we, officers, soldiers, citizens, and Indians and all, were fully satisfied with General Wool's course, and approbated it in every particular.

The letter marked — was read.

Mr. Thomas C. Lyon was again called.

Question by General Wool. Was the letter just read sent to the person to whom it is addressed?

Answer. I believe it was, though I did not put it in the office. I copied the letter. I have no reason to doubt its being duly despatched.

General Wool having stated that as it was not probable he would present any further testimony, and as the judge advocate had no other evidence on the part of the complaint, in order to give time for the copying of the documents, and for the defendant to prepare his papers,

The court adjourned to meet on Monday, the 11th instant, at 12 o'clock m.

MONDAY, September 11, 12 o'clock m.

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Scott, Colonel Lindsay, Major Payne; Lieutenant De Hart, judge advocate.

As General Wool was not prepared to present his defence the court adjourned to meet to-morrow at 10 o'clock a. m.

TUESDAY, September 12, 10 o'clock a. m.

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Scott, Colonel Lindsay; Lieutenant De Hart, judge advocate.

General Wool not being prepared with his defence, the court adjourned to meet to-morrow at 10 o'clock a. m.

WEDNESDAY, September 13, 10 o'clock a. m.

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Scott, Colonel Lindsay; Lieutenant De Hart, judge advocate.

The court adjourned to wait for General Wool to prepare his defence, to meet to-morrow at 9 o'clock, a. m.

THURSDAY, September 14, 9 o'clock, a. m.

The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present: Major General Scott, Colonel Lindsay, Major Payne; Lieutenant De Hart, judge advocate.

General Wool having appeared, and stated to the court that he was ready to proceed, presented the following defence. (No. 29.)

The court was cleared, and after mature deliberation on the testimony adduced, find this

OPINION.

The court, after fully weighing and considering the whole of the testimony submitted in the case, are of opinion that not one of the imputations on the conduct of General Wool, contained in the preamble to the joint resolutions of the legislature of Alabama, or the letter of his excellency Governor Clay to the War Department, which enclosed the said resolutions, is founded in justice or in fact. It will be seen that on the application of the judge advocate to the executive of Alabama for documents and the names of witnesses to support the accusation against General Wool, the late governor (the honorable C. C. Clay) replies: "The only official information I ever received in reference to the conduct of General Wool will be found in the executive archives. I am not informed of the names of the witnesses to prove the charges against General Wool, but presume the officers who served under him in that part of the Cherokee nation lying in Alabama would be competent to prove the orders which were the subject of complaint." And the acting governor (his excellency H. McVay) says: "Having caused an examination to be made, nothing can be found on file in this department which will enable me to furnish the information desired, nor am I able to comply with your request from other sources." Pursuing, however, the suggestion of the honorable Mr. Clay, that "the officers who served under him (General Wool) in that part of the Cherokee nation lying in Alabama would be competent to prove the orders which were the subject of complaint," the judge advocate, principally at the instance of General Wool, summoned many witnesses, and the latter has also freely submitted to the court every paper in his power which, as it would seem, belongs to the matter under investigation.

From this mass of evidence, parol and documentary, it appears that in his conduct towards Alabama, so far from "disturbing the peace of the community" and "trampling on the rights" of her people, General Wool's acts were so strikingly marked by caution, temper, and mildness, as to receive the almost universal approbation of the very people whom he is charged with having outraged.

Another, and the principal accusation contained in the letter of Governor Clay to the War Department (evidently founded on the preamble of the said joint resolutions) is, that *General Wool had usurped the powers of the civil tribunals of Alabama*; and the said preamble sets forth that "a company of volunteers in the service of the United States, under the command of (Brigadier) General Wool, have been stationed in the country lately owned by the Cherokee tribe of Indians in this State, for the pretended purpose of keeping peace between the said tribe of Indians and the citizens of the State, and have taken upon themselves the authority to adjudicate upon the claims of our citizens to their right to the possession of improvements; and in the enforcement of those adjudications have brought about a most ruinous and fatal conflict between our most worthy citizens, the consequences of which have already resulted in the taking of each other's lives."

The case here referred to has been most fully developed in the evidence; from which it appears that the Indian children of one John Gunter, deceased, through the sheriff (Riddle) of Jackson county, administrator *ex officio*, under the orphans' court, claimed the possession of certain *improvements* of which Nathaniel Steel, a white man, was in the actual occupancy; that on the application to that effect to General Wool by the sheriff-administrator, General Wool decided the case, with the previous approbation of the said Steel, giving the right of possession to a certain part of the improvements to the administrator, with which decision Steel expressed himself to be satisfied; that Captain Morrow, who commanded a volunteer company three or four miles off, received instructions from General Wool to put the administrator in possession of that part of the improvements adjudged to him; that Steel quietly, and without the application of military force, consented to give up the possession, and began accordingly to evacuate the premises, upon which Captain Morrow and the small detachment that was with him withdrew to his camp, distant as aforesaid; and that the conflict which afterwards occurred was neither in the presence nor, at the moment, within the knowledge of any officer or soldier in the service of the United States.

It is further in proof, and indeed fully admitted by General Wool, that he decided many other claims preferred by Indians to improvements wrongfully possessed by citizens of the States, and it would appear that in all these cases his decisions were acquiesced in, not only without conflict, but without complaint. The question now occurs: By what authority did General Wool take upon himself to give decisions on the class of cases just recited; and in doing so, did he, as is solemnly charged from a high quarter, usurp the powers of the civil tribunals of Alabama?

The sixteenth article of the treaty between the United States and the Cherokees, ratified May 23, 1836, allows those Indians to remain in the country therein ceded to the United States, up to May 23, 1838, and the United States stipulate "to protect and defend them (the said Indians) in their possessions and property and the free use and occupation of the same." This treaty is repeatedly referred to in the instructions from time to time addressed to General Wool by the War Department, and once emphatically by President Jackson himself, in a letter to the same commanding officer, and in each case as a rule of conduct for the latter.

In this letter from the then President, and also in that from the War Office, October 12, 1836, General Wool is directed to consider the sixth article of the said treaty, which confers even a higher power on the commanding officer than the sixteenth, as applicable to the Cherokees whilst yet residing within the geographical limits of North Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, and Alabama, and consequently that he (General Wool) was, by the sixteenth article, fully invested with the inferior power of repossessing an Indian claimant of improvements wrongfully withheld by a white intruder, not recognized by the Cherokees as one of their people. Again, the instrument agreed upon by the United States and the Cherokee nation, and ratified by the Senate of the United States May 23, 1836, being called, upon its face, a *treaty*, and repeatedly referred to as such by the President and Secretary of War, General Wool naturally considered it as such an instrument as is spoken of in the second clause, article six, of the Constitution of the United States; that is, as the supreme law of the land; and, consequently, believed himself, under it and his instructions, to possess the right as well as the power to do justice, in the Cherokee country, to Indian complainants, without usurping the power of the civil tribunals of Alabama or that of the tribunals of the other particular States mentioned. Without, however, pushing this view of the subject any further, which might be improper in a military tribunal, this court is of opinion that General Wool, in the acts recited and complained of, cannot be justly charged with having usurped powers belonging to the courts of Alabama.

In the letter of his excellency Governor Clay to the Secretary of War, dated July 3, 1837, before the court, there is an incidental mention of another letter from the same to the same, complaining of other acts of General Wool, perhaps of the same or a similar character to those already noticed; but this letter not having been submitted to this court by the proper authority, and its contents unknown, except by conjecture, no testimony has been taken, and no opinion is here given on its subject.

The attention of the court, in its order of appointment, has also been directed to "others under his (General Wool's) command, in reference to" the matters complained of; but the name of no other officer is given in that order, or mentioned by the legislature or executive of Alabama in the papers from them submitted to the court. It has, however, been incidentally disclosed by the evidence that Captain Morrow, commanding a company of Tennessee volunteers, in the temporary service of the United States, was the individual charged with the execution of General Wool's decision relative to the improvements of John Gunter, deceased, which were in the possession of Nathaniel Steel. In reference to this excellent officer, (Captain Morrow,) it is sufficient to say that he acted in strict conformity with the orders of his superior, and in such manner as to demand and receive the emphatic approbation of all the parties claiming those improvements, as may be seen in their respective letters to him, annexed to the proceedings of this court.

The court adjourned *sine die*.

WINFIELD SCOTT, *Major General and President of the Court.*
W. C. DE HART, *Judge Advocate, Recorder of the Court.*

Synopsis of the evidence and documents.

July 3, 1837.—Governor C. C. Clay, of Alabama, encloses resolutions of the legislature of Alabama to the Secretary of War, and accuses General Wool of having "usurped the powers of the civil tribunals, disturbed the peace of the community, and trampled upon the rights of the citizens."—(Doc. A.)

June 30, 1837.—Resolutions of the legislature of Alabama.—(Doc. B.)

August 19, 1837.—Hon. C. C. Clay to W. C. De Hart, judge advocate, referring him for evidence to the executive archives of the State of Alabama.—(Doc. C.)

August 28, 1837.—His excellency H. McVay, acting governor of Alabama, to W. C. De Hart, judge advocate, states that there is no evidence on file in the executive archives of Alabama against General Wool.—(Doc. D.)

January 23, 1837.—General Wool to Captain J. Morrow, instructing him to investigate all complaints, to restrain the Indians in disorders, both Creeks and others, and to prevent the whites from encroaching on their rights.—(Doc. E.)

March 21, 1837.—General Wool to Captain J. Morrow, instructing him to examine the case of N. Steel,

in possession of the estate of John Gunter, senior, deceased, and to give the administrator possession, if right.—(Doc. F.)

June 3, 1837.—General Wool to Captain J. Morrow, being his opinion and instructions to him relative to the estate of J. Gunter, senior, deceased; directs him to give possession to Sheriff Riddle, the administrator; excepts a part of the improvements.—(Doc. G.)

July 3, 1837.—N. Steel to Captain Morrow; thanks him for his conduct at the time of giving possession to the purchaser, and dispossessing him of the estate of John Gunter, senior, deceased.—(Doc. H.)

June 21, 1837.—N. Steel and others to Captain J. Morrow, thanking him for the manner in which he acted towards them.—(Doc. I.)

June 21, 1837.—A committee on the part of the citizens of Claysville, Alabama, to Captain Morrow, inviting him and his company to a public dinner.—(Doc. K.)

June 20, 1836.—Secretary of War to General Wool; directs him to proceed and take command in the Cherokee nation; general instructions for his government; encloses the treaty.—(Doc. No. 1.)

May 23, 1836.—Extract of a treaty with the Cherokees.—(Doc. No. 2.)

July 30, 1836.—Acting Secretary of War to General Wool; says no force or intimidation must be used to remove the Indians, who shall, until the expiration of the treaty, be protected in the peaceable possession of their country.—(Doc. No. 3.)

August 4, 1836.—General Wool to Brigadier General Dunlap; directs him to proceed to New Echota to give protection to the Cherokees; to be careful of coming into conflict with the Indians, and to prevent interference by the Georgians. If the Georgians are raised by authority of Georgia, they are to report to General Wool; to respect the sovereignty of the State.—(Doc. No. 4.)

August 12, 1836.—General Wool to Brigadier General Dunlap. Directs him to protect Ridge in the enjoyment of his property on the Coosa river.—(Doc. No. 4.)

August 15, 1836.—General Wool to the Acting Secretary of War. Reports his arrival at New Echota. The Indians dispersed at a council without coming to any conclusion; arrested several of the chiefs, and required the guns of the Indians to be given up; about one hundred were brought in; great opposition to the treaty; they will not receive anything from the United States; proposes four hundred regulars as necessary for the quiet of the country; wrote to General Jesup for troops, but was refused; will discharge a part of the forces at Fort Cass; has not yet heard of the commissioners; a force must be kept in the country while the commissioners are there; the paymaster inexperienced in his duties.—(Doc. No. 5.)

September 1, 1836.—Secretary of War to General Wool. Expresses gratification at the tenor of General Wool's orders; speaks of the different nature of his duties, as the Cherokees may be hostile or peaceable.—(Doc. No. 6.)

August 27, 1836.—General Wool to the Acting Secretary of War; says the Secretary has misapprehended his views, that few of the Indians are disposed to go; that they must be convinced that a treaty has been made, and will be executed, and recommends that a part of them go in the fall; that the whites should be restrained, and the Indians have all the rights secured by the treaty; the commanding officer ought to have discretionary powers, or not remain there.—(Doc. No. 7.)

September 13, 1836.—Acting Secretary of War to General Wool, in reply to him of the 27th of August, and approves of his views.—(Doc. No. 8.)

August 30, 1836.—General Wool to the President, in answer to him of the 7th of August; says that he has warned John Ross against holding a council, unless his views are to explain and carry out the treaty; asks instructions from the President how to act; encloses a circular from John Ross to Ridge and others; that Ross has sent runners through the country disseminating his views; that, by his instructions, he is very much restricted; the commissioners not yet arrived; the Indians very anxious for them.—(Doc. No. 9.)

September 7, 1836.—General Jackson to General Wool; says the treaty must be religiously fulfilled, and that intruders must be put out of the nation.—(Doc. No. 10.)

September 12, 1836.—General Wool to the Secretary of War; says it would be imprudent to discharge the troops until the treaty is executed. The force will depend upon the course of John Ross. If he is pacific, six or eight companies of United States infantry would be sufficient; if the contrary, eight hundred men will be required—winter quarters required. Governor Lumpkins says the commissioners will locate themselves at New Echota, and want two companies for their protection; selects Fort Cass as another station. Anxious to know if regular troops can be supplied. Objects to Governor Lumpkins's proposition to pay the committee out of the fund appropriated for that purpose, who have furnished rations. The opinion of the Secretary on these subjects asked for.—(Doc. No. 11.)

September 3, 1836.—Acting Secretary of War to General Wool. Informs him that the Indians may assemble in council if he thinks it may be conducive of good, otherwise he put a stop to. Expresses the confidence of the War Department in the judgment and energy of General Wool.—(Doc. No. 12.)

October 12, 1836.—The Acting Secretary of War to General Wool, authorizing him to call for militia forces, if necessary; that all citizens or others opposing the execution of the treaty shall be put out of the country; and that any officer of the army doing so shall be arrested, and a court instituted; and if the facts be duly established, the President will dismiss him from the service. He forbids, also, any council of the Indians, or a delegation to be sent to the Cherokees west of the Mississippi.—(Doc. No. 13.)

September 18, 1836.—General Wool to Secretary of War. That the Cherokees are fast coming in to the council. Endeavored to persuade John Ross against the course he is pursuing. Proposes that a distinction should be made in the case of the Creeks who have married in the Cherokee nation, and become naturalized. It is expected that the Valley River Indians will not give their names to the appraisers. Asks the Secretary for a decision of the questions embraced in the letter.—(Doc. No. 14.)

November 2, 1836.—General Wool to Acting Secretary of War. That he wishes the Secretary to assure the President of his willingness to obey all his commands; but as he seems not to possess his confidence, he desires to be recalled.—(Doc. No. 15.)

November 16, 1836.—The Secretary *ad interim* to General Wool, in answer to him of the 2d of November. Expresses the confidence of the President in General Wool, and that his measures taken in execution of the instructions of the 12th October are satisfactory.—(Doc. No. 16.)

November 6, 1836.—General Wool to the Secretary of War *ad interim*, being a detailed report of his proceedings under his instructions of the 30th June, 1836. Arrives at Knoxville, Tenn. On the 4th of July arrived at Athens. No preparations had been made to receive the volunteers. At the request of Governor Cannon, furnished the troops with forage and subsistence. At first objected to receive the volunteers, but upon the pledge of the governor received them, being one brigade of three regiments.

Reorganized it into two regiments of ten companies each, and ordered the remainder home. Established depots of provisions at Valley River, Ross's Landing, and New Echota. Requests to be recalled, if he has no discretion invested in him. Protests against the instructions which require obedience to the commissioners, as too humiliating to be submitted to.—(Doc. No. 17.)

November 23, 1836.—The Secretary of War *ad interim* to General Wool. Expresses the confidence of the War Department in General Wool.—(Doc. No. 18.)

November 28, 1836.—General Wool to Secretary of War *ad interim*. Encloses the "Athens Republican" of the 23d of November, and asks if the Secretary authorized the publication referred to. Expresses astonishment at the adoption of such a course towards an officer.—(Doc. No. 19.)

December 24, 1836.—The Secretary of War *ad interim* to General Wool, authorizing him to publish certain letters from the War Department.—(Doc. No. 20.)

March 31, 1837.—General Wool to the Secretary of War. Has discharged the volunteers, except one company of East Tennessee. That the Indians have been much abused by the residents among them. Refers to the case of the murder of an Indian by whites without provocation; had arrested them, and turned them over to the civil authority, but fears the prejudices of the country are too strong to allow justice to be done in the case. Renews the application for a regiment of United States troops. Lieutenant Deas, of the United States army, with agents for emigration, had arrived. The Creeks, about 1,000 in the nation, are adverse to removal and have fled to the mountains, and but few have been taken.—(Doc. No. 21.)

October 17, 1836.—Acting Secretary of War to General Wool; expresses the astonishment of the President that General Wool should have forwarded a communication from John Ross and others, (see 28,) and has determined that the treaty shall be executed without modification.—(Doc. No. 22.)

July 19, 1837.—General Wool to the Secretary of War. Requests a general investigation of his conduct while in the Cherokee nation.—(Doc. No. 23.)

July 27, 1837.—Secretary of War to General Wool, in reply to him of July 19. Refuses an investigation as asked for.—(Doc. No. 24.)

August 6, 1837.—General Wool to the Secretary of War. Renews his application for a general investigation of his conduct.—(Doc. No. 25.)

August 11, 1837.—The Secretary of War to General Wool. Refuses General Wool's application for a general inquiry, as asked for the 6th August.—(Doc. No. 26.)

October 13, 1836.—General Wool to General Maccomb. Says he proceeded to Red Clay, and there endeavored to persuade John Ross of the necessity of carrying out the treaty. Many complaints made by the Indians; and he has restored considerable property taken from them, and protected them in the possession of their lands, houses, and ferries.—(Doc. No. 27.)

September 30, 1836.—Protests against the treaty, and a request of General Wool to return the arms of the Indians, by John Ross and others.—(Doc. No. 28.)

Captain James Morrow says that he served with General Wool as captain of East Tennessee volunteers; that General Wool instructed him to investigate a question between Steel, who kept possession of the improvements of John Gunter, sr., deceased, and the administrator; that he refused to decide, but sent the evidence to General Wool; who directed Steel to be dispossessed, with the exception of some buildings; that Steel refused to give up the property after it was sold; and that after some delay and difficulty he did dispossess Steel. That neither he nor any of his men were present at any affray which took place afterwards between Steel and others; that the Indians cannot get redress under the laws of Alabama, as their testimony is not admissible. He also says that he never knew of General Wool's encroaching upon the laws of the State; that he was very cautious and prudent; and that all the officers and himself had full confidence in him.—(Record, p. 4.)

Alexander Riddle says that he was sheriff of Jackson county, Alabama, and appointed administrator of the estate of John Gunter, sr., deceased, by the orphans' court; that Steel kept possession of the property and refused to give it up. He took legal advice upon the subject, and finally was obliged to apply to General Wool for assistance, who gave an order to Captain Morrow to dispossess Steel of the property. He says that the parties whom he represented could not get a remedy, under the laws of Alabama, as their testimony is not admissible in their courts; and that under the treaty their only recourse was to General Wool; that General Wool acted with great prudence and discretion; that he has never known any instance in which General Wool has usurped any power; nor ever heard any person who can be relied on complain of him; that a great majority of the people would be glad if he would remain there.—(See Record, p. 10.)

Joseph Byrd says he served with General Wool as colonel of a regiment of East Tennessee volunteers; that General Wool was always mild and conciliating; and that he never knew any person in the Cherokee country complain of him, either whites or natives. The volunteers, citizens, and Cherokees, all regretted his recall.—(See Record, p. 15.)

Henry B. Shaw says he was a lieutenant of Georgia volunteers, and served with General Wool for two months as his aide; that he is acquainted with the course of General Wool in the Cherokee country, and saw nothing, nor knew of anything for the foundation of such charges as Governor Clay has preferred; that he was, by General Wool's order, on several occasions employed in sustaining the civil authorities and preserving the peace of the community. He never knew of any act of General Wool, or of others by his order, in violation of the laws of the country; that General Wool preferred the State laws should operate; that the laws of Georgia are insufficient to protect the Indians; that General Wool was constantly employed in the discharge of his duties; and that Indian property was restored after proper investigation; that a remonstrance was sent to the Secretary of War, on the recall of General Wool, because everybody approbated his course.—(See Record, p. 15.)

Thomas C. Lyon says he served as aide to General Wool in the Cherokee country; and that General Wool's conduct, he thinks, is not liable to the charges preferred by Governor Clay. That General Wool acted with great caution in respect to the rights of States and of individuals, and enjoined it upon all to be careful not to violate their rights. He thinks that General Wool's course tended much to allay the excitement of the Indians against the whites; that General Wool was very diligent in the discharge of the duties of his office; and that the citizens expressed regret at his recall; that many complaints were made by the Indians of the whites, and General Wool always caused them to be investigated, and their property to be restored when they were entitled to it.—(See Record, p. 17.)

GENERAL ORDERS No. 63.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Adjutant General's Office, Washington, October 2, 1837.*

I. The court of inquiry, instituted by direction of the President of the United States, whereof Brevet Major General Winfield Scott is president, and which convened September 4, 1837, at Knoxville, Tennessee, pursuant to "General Order No. 49," to examine into the transactions of Brevet Brigadier General Wool, and others under his command, in reference to his and their conduct in the Cherokee country, so called, as set forth in a letter from his excellency the governor of Alabama, dated July 3, 1837, addressed to the Secretary of War, and in the joint resolutions of the senate and house of representatives of that State, has reported the following

OPINION.

"The court, after fully weighing and considering the whole of the testimony submitted in the case, are of opinion that not one of the imputations on the conduct of General Wool, contained in the preamble to the joint resolutions of the legislature of Alabama, or the letter of his excellency Governor Clay to the War Department, which enclosed the said resolutions, is founded in justice or in fact. It will be seen that on the application of the judge advocate to the executive of Alabama for documents, and the names of witnesses to support the accusation against General Wool, the late governor (the honorable C. C. Clay) replies: 'The only official information I ever received in reference to the conduct of General Wool will be found in the executive archives. I am not informed of the names of the witnesses to prove the charges against General Wool; but presume the officers who served under him in that part of the Cherokee nation lying in Alabama would be competent to prove the orders which were the subject of complaint.' And the acting governor (his excellency H. McVay) says: 'Having caused an examination to be made, nothing can be found on file in this department which will enable me to furnish the information desired, nor am I able to comply with your request from other sources.' Pursuing, however, the suggestions of the honorable Mr. Clay, that 'the officers who served under him (General Wool) in that part of the Cherokee nation lying in Alabama would be competent to prove the orders which were the subject of complaint,' the judge advocate, principally at the instance of General Wool, summoned many witnesses, and the latter has also freely submitted to the court every paper in his power which, as it would seem, belongs to the matter under investigation.

"From the mass of this evidence, parol and documentary, it appears that in his conduct towards Alabama, so far from 'disturbing the peace of the community' and 'trampling on the rights' of the people, General Wool's acts were so strikingly marked by caution, temper, and mildness, as to receive the almost universal approbation of the very people whom he is charged with having outraged.

"Another, and the principal accusation contained in the letter of Governor Clay to the War Department, (evidently founded on the preamble of the said joint resolution,) is, that *General Wool had usurped the powers of the civil tribunals of Alabama*; and the said preamble sets forth that 'a company of volunteers in the service of the United States, under the command of Brigadier General Wool, have been stationed in the country lately owned by the Cherokee tribe of Indians in this State, for the pretended purpose of keeping peace between the said tribe of Indians and the citizens of the State, and have taken upon themselves the authority to adjudicate upon the claims of our citizens to their right to the possession of improvements; and in the enforcements of these adjudications have brought about a most ruinous and fatal conflict between our most worthy citizens, the consequences of which have already resulted in the taking of each other's lives.' The case here referred to has been most fully developed in the evidence; from which it appears that the Indian children of one John Gunter, deceased, through the sheriff (Riddle) of Jackson county, administrator *ex officio* under the orphans' court, claimed the possession of certain improvements, of which Nathaniel Steel, a white man, was in the actual occupancy; that on the application to that effect to General Wool by the sheriff-administrator, General Wool decided the case, with the previous approbation of the said Steel, giving the right of possession to a certain part of the improvements to the administrator, with which decision Steel expressed himself to be satisfied; that Captain Morrow, who commanded a volunteer company three or four miles off, received instructions from General Wool to put the administrator in possession of that part of the improvements adjudged to him; that Steel quietly, and without the application of military force, consented to give up the possession, and began, accordingly, to evacuate the premises; upon which Captain Morrow and the small detachment that was with him withdrew to his camp, distant as aforesaid; and that the conflict which afterwards occurred was neither in the presence nor, at the moment, within the knowledge of any officer or soldier in the service of the United States.

"It is further in proof, and, indeed, fully admitted by General Wool, that he decided many other claims preferred by Indians to improvements wrongfully possessed by citizens of the States; and it would appear that in all these cases his decisions were acquiesced in, not only without conflict, but without complaint. The question now occurs, by what authority did General Wool take upon himself to give decisions on the class of cases just recited; and in doing so did, he, as is solemnly charged from a high quarter, usurp the powers of the civil tribunals of Alabama? The 16th article of the treaty between the United States and the Cherokees, ratified May 23, 1836, allows those Indians to remain in the country therein ceded to the United States up to May 23, 1838, and the United States stipulates 'to protect and defend them (the said Indians) in their possessions and property, and the free use and occupation of the same.' This treaty is repeatedly referred to in the instructions from time to time addressed to General Wool by the War Department, and once emphatically by President Jackson himself, in a letter to the same commanding officer, and in each case as a rule of conduct for the latter. In this letter from the then President, and also in that from the War Office, October 12, 1836, General Wool is directed to consider the 6th article of the said treaty, which confers even a higher power on the commanding officer than the 16th, as applicable to the Cherokees whilst yet residing within the geographical limits of North Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, and Alabama, and consequently that he, General Wool, was, by the 16th article, fully invested with the inferior power of repossessing an Indian claimant of improvements wrongfully withheld by a white intruder, not recognized by the Cherokees as one of their people. Again: the instrument agreed upon by the United States and the Cherokee nation, and ratified by the Senate of the United States May 23, 1836, being called, upon its face, a *treaty*, and repeatedly referred to as such by the President and Secretary of War, General Wool naturally considered it as such an instrument as is spoken of in the 2d

clause, article 6, of the Constitution of the United States—that is, as the supreme law of the land; and consequently believed himself, under it and his instructions, to possess the right, as well as the power, to do justice in the Cherokee country to Indian complainants, without usurping the power of the civil tribunals of Alabama, or that of the tribunals of the other particular States mentioned. Without, however, pushing this view of the subject any further, which might be improper in a military tribunal, this court is of opinion that General Wool, in the acts recited and complained of, cannot be justly charged with having usurped powers belonging to the courts of Alabama.

“In the letter of his excellency Governor Clay to the Secretary of War, dated July 3, 1837, before the court, there is an incidental mention of another letter from the same to the same, complaining of other acts of General Wool, perhaps of the same or a similar character to those already noticed; but this letter not having been submitted to this court by the proper authority, and its contents unknown, except by conjecture, no testimony has been taken, and no opinion is here given on its subject.

“The attention of the court, in its order of appointment, has also been directed to ‘others under his (General Wool’s) command, in reference to’ the matters complained of; but the name of no other officer is given in that order, or mentioned by the legislature or executive of Alabama in the papers from them submitted to the court. It has, however, been incidentally disclosed by the evidence that Captain Morrow, commanding a company of Tennessee volunteers, in the temporary service of the United States, was the individual charged with the execution of General Wool’s decision relative to the improvements of John Gunter, deceased, which were in the possession of Nathaniel Steel. In reference to this excellent officer, (Captain Morrow,) it is sufficient to say that he acted in strict conformity with the orders of his superior, and in such manner as to demand and receive the emphatic approbation of all the parties claiming those improvements, as may be seen in their respective letters to him, annexed to the proceedings of this court.”

II. The President of the United States approves the proceedings in the foregoing case.

III. The court of inquiry, of which Brevet Major General Scott is president, is hereby dissolved.

By order of Alexander Macomb, major general commanding-in-chief.

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

DOCUMENTS ACCOMPANYING PROCEEDINGS.

A.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, *Tuscaloosa, Alabama, July 3, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to forward, herewith, a preamble and joint resolutions of the senate and house of representatives of the State of Alabama in general assembly convened, in relation to certain transactions of the military force of the United States employed in the Cherokee country, within the limits of this State. I am not in possession of any order of General Wool, or any of his subordinate officers, referred to in the preamble or resolutions; but it is represented, in substance, that General Wool has assumed the power of adjudicating and determining the right of possession or ownership of land, and improvements thereon, and of dispossessing one claimant and supplanting him with another *by military force*. Under one of those decisions a contest has taken place in the county of Marshall, which resulted in the death of two individuals, certainly, besides the most serious injury to others, some of whom it is feared may yet die of their wounds.

Having addressed you, on the 17th of April last, in reference to another unwarrantable assumption of General Wool, and received your reply, under date the 25th of the same month, assuring me that you had “*despatched instructions to that officer not to infringe in any respect the rights of the citizens of Alabama, and so to modify his order as not to conflict with the laws of this State,*” I was not prepared to expect another attempt on his part to usurp the powers of our civil tribunals, disturb the peace of the community, and trample on the rights of the very people with whose protection, to some extent at least, he must have considered himself charged. I feel assured the exercise of arbitrary power complained of has been without the sanction of your authority or that of the President; and, to prevent any misunderstanding on the part of the citizens of this State, I have published our correspondence just alluded to.

I trust, sir, the necessary steps will be taken, at as early a moment as practicable, to restrain all military officers in the service of the United States in the Cherokee country or elsewhere within our limits from further infraction of our laws or outrage upon the rights of our citizens. It is also due to the violated sovereignty of the State of Alabama that the conduct of General Wool, or any other officer of the United States who may have assumed such powers as I have mentioned, should be promptly investigated, and receive merited condemnation.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. C. CLAY

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington.*

B.

A PREAMBLE AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS of the senate and house of representatives of the State of Alabama in general assembly convened.

Whereas a company of volunteers in the service of the United States, under the command of Major General Wool, have been stationed in the country lately owned by the Cherokee tribe of Indians in this State, for the pretended purpose of keeping peace between the said tribe of Indians and the citizens of the State, and have taken upon themselves the authority to adjudicate upon the claims of our citizens to the right of their possession to improvements, and in the enforcement of those adjudications have brought about a most ruinous and fatal conflict between our own most worthy citizens, the consequences of which have already resulted in the taking of each other’s lives: Therefore—

Be it resolved by the senate and house of representatives of the State of Alabama in general assembly convened, That for all purposes of keeping the peace, and for the adjustment of any of the conflicting claims of any of the citizens of this State, the courts of our State are invested with ample powers, and are not wanting in inclination to enforce those powers, in the administration of justice to the Indian as well as the white man, and we cannot recognize the right of authority in any military court or volunteer company to exercise those powers.

Resolved, further, That the stationing of an armed force in any portion of our State, for the purposes aforesaid, is uncalled for and unnecessary, and a wanton interference with the powers and authorities of our courts, and should not be permitted to continue.

And be it further resolved, That the continuance of said armed force in our State, exercising the powers aforesaid, is well calculated to produce a breach of the peace, rather than the maintenance of good order, and a violation of rights, rather than the administration of justice, and is a grievance to our citizens and an infringement upon the judicial powers and authorities of this State, and should not be tolerated in a community of ample laws.

Resolved, further, That the governor be requested to address the Secretary of War on the subject of the foregoing preamble and resolutions, and forward to him a copy of the same, and request him either to remove from the limits of this State any volunteer company in the service of the United States, exercising the powers aforesaid, or so restrict their powers as not to conflict with the constituted authorities of the State; that the governor be, and is hereby, directed to take immediate steps to prevent the further progress of said military force in deciding legal controversies within the limits of this State.

A. P. BAYLEY, *Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

H. McVAY, *President of the Senate.*

Approved June 30, 1837.

C. C. CLAY.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S OFFICE, *Tuscaloosa, State of Alabama:*

I, Thomas B. Tunstall, secretary of state, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the preamble and resolutions on file in this office.

[L. S.] Given under my hand and the seal of the State, at Tuscaloosa, this 3d day of July, in the year of our Lord 1837.

T. B. TUNSTALL, *Secretary of State.*

C.

GRANGER COUNTY, *Tennessee, August 19, 1837.*

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your note of yesterday. Your letter from Washington, of the 10th instant, to which you allude, has not been received.

You are, perhaps, not aware that I have ceased to be the chief magistrate of Alabama. I resigned the office of governor on the 17th ultimo, and was succeeded by the Hon. Hugh McVay, who now performs the functions of that office, and whom you can address on the subject of your note at Tuscaloosa, the seat of government of that State. The only official information I ever received, in reference to the conduct of General Wool, will be found in the executive archives.

I am not informed of the names of witnesses to prove charges against General Wool; but I presume the officers who served under him in that part of the Cherokee nation lying in Alabama would be competent to prove the *orders* which were the subject of *complaint*.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. C. CLAY.

Captain W. C. DE HART, *Knoxville, Tennessee.*

D.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, ALABAMA, *Tuscaloosa, August 28, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt, on the 24th instant, of your communication of the 9th, dated at Washington city, and directed to my predecessor, Governor Clay, informing him that a court of inquiry was to be held at Athens, Tennessee, on the 25th instant, to investigate the conduct of General Wool, and requesting him to forward to you "specifications," "names of witnesses," &c.; also, by the succeeding mail, your communication of the 19th instant, dated at Knoxville, Tennessee, directed to and informing me that a court of inquiry was to be held at *that place*, on the 25th instant, "to investigate certain acts of Brigadier General Wool, complained of by the State of Alabama," requesting me to furnish you with the necessary testimony "in the case," names of witnesses, &c.

Having caused an examination to be made, nothing can be found on file in this department which will enable me to furnish the information desired, nor am I able to comply with your request from other sources.

I have caused a copy of your letters and of this to be forwarded to Governor Clay, who is now on his way to Washington city.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. McVAY.

M. C. DE HART, *Judge Advocate, Knoxville, Tennessee.*

E

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE C. N., *New Echota, Georgia, January 23, 1837.*

SIR: I am instructed by General Wool to send you the enclosed letter from James Spencer, a Cherokee Indian, with directions to investigate the case, and cause justice to be done. For all necessary information in relation to the case mentioned in the letter, you are referred to General Moore.

I am also instructed by General Wool to say to you that you have authority to investigate all complaints made to you by the Cherokees, and decide upon the merits of each, and transmit to general headquarters, with your monthly return, the result of each case. All cases upon which you doubt your authority to act will be referred to General Wool.

The general instructs me to say to you that you will afford to the agent, General Moore, who is engaged at that place in collecting and emigrating the Creek Indians, such aid as will be necessary to keep them within their camp and prevent their running through the country, and to restrain all disorders both of the Creek and other Indians, and to prevent the whites from encroaching upon their rights and privileges.

All Creeks who were settled in the Cherokee country prior to the 24th March, 1832, are considered citizens and entitled to protection.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

P. M. WEAR, *Acting Aide-de-camp.*

Captain JAMES MORROW.

F

HEADQUARTERS, *New Echota, March 21, 1837.*

SIR: Herewith I transmit a copy of an application of Colonel John Williams, attorney of the administrator of the estate of John Gunter, deceased, to dispossess Nathaniel Steel, who is said to be in possession of the resident plantation of the said John Gunter, deceased, and put Alexander Riddle, the administrator, in possession. This, it would appear, is a litigated case, and possibly may be of such a character as to cause some excitement, and, perhaps, some difficulty. I wish you to give it a careful examination, and, if the application is a just one, to put Alexander Riddle in possession. If, however, there should be any doubt as to the justice of the application, or if it is one likely to give you much trouble, or to produce unnecessary excitement, you will defer turning out Steel and giving possession to Riddle until further orders, or until I may visit you.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL, *Brigadier General.*

Captain JAMES MORROW, *Commanding at Gunter's Landing.*

G.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE C. N., *New Echota, Georgia, June 3, 1837.*

SIR: I have examined the testimony and documents which you laid before me the 1st instant in the case of Sheriff Riddle, administrator of the estate of John Gunter, senior, deceased, *vs.* Nathaniel Steel.

Sheriff Riddle, as administrator, claims, for the benefit of the heirs, (they being Cherokees,) possession of the dwelling-house and other improvements, with the plantation, of John Gunter, senior, deceased. On examination of the testimony, I am of opinion that Sheriff Riddle, as administrator, is entitled to the possession of the dwelling-house and plantation, for the purpose of selling the same, agreeably to the provisions of the will of John Gunter, senior, deceased, for the benefit of the heirs. You are, accordingly, directed to give him possession of the dwelling-house and plantation, together with the field or fields on the island in the Tennessee river, opposite Gunter's Landing.

In giving Sheriff Riddle possession of the plantation, you will reserve the gin-house near the dwelling-house, and the warehouse and storehouse called the white house, it being doubtful to whom these buildings rightfully belong; that is, whether to the estate of John Gunter, senior, deceased, or to John Gunter, junior, and not include them among the buildings or improvements delivered into his possession. You will also reserve from such possession the stone house occupied by Captain Patterson, the buildings in possession of Kelly and Willoughby, and also all separate buildings erected by Colonel Steel by way of improvement to the place. Such buildings the colonel will be allowed to remove or otherwise dispose of in any way he may deem proper, provided such disposition does not interfere with the interest of the heirs of the estate.

It is, however, to be distinctly understood that, in ordering these reservations, I do not intend to interfere with any rights or claims which the heirs or administrator may have to those buildings. Nor is it to be understood that, by giving possession to the administrator of the dwelling-house and plantation of John Gunter, senior, deceased, that I intend to express any opinion on the litigated points growing out of the case presented for consideration. These belong to the civil courts of the country to settle. My duty as well as my power over the case is limited to restoring the Cherokees where they have been dispossessed, and protecting them in all their rightful possessions, as guaranteed by the treaty of 1835, and ratified by the Senate of the United States on the 23d day of May, 1836.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL, *Brigadier General, Commanding.*

Captain JAMES MORROW, *Commanding at Gunter's Landing, Alabama.*

H.

HUNTSVILLE, *Alabama, July 3, 1837.*

MY DEAR SIR: On my arrival at this place I proceeded forthwith to consult my attorneys upon the different subjects which most interested me at the time; the two most important points being that of a charge for murder and the recovery of my property—I mean my improvement. The first measure advised was, that I bring suit against you, as an officer of the United States, for putting me forcibly out of possession, not, my dear sir, with a view to injure you or to wound your feelings; but being advised that, by bringing suit against you for executing General Wool's order, that, although you might be acting perfectly correct as an officer acting under the general, that the United States was nevertheless bound to pay me suitable damages. Being under this impression, I deem it a duty that I owe to myself and my much-injured family, to pursue the course advised, and would have written you upon this subject at the time the writ was sent on, but for the want of time. But, my dear sir, be perfectly assured that you have my best feelings, and I do firmly believe that you did nothing in the execution of that order but what you believed to be strictly your duty; as such I cannot attach any blame to you whatever; but, on the contrary, I do and shall forever feel more than ordinary friendship and gratitude to you for the kind and gentlemanly protection afforded myself and family and friends in an hour of peril and danger; and let me assure you that your conduct in our behalf has called forth the applause of many of the citizens of Marshall county.

Mr. Lemon was discharged on Wednesday last; the balance of us calculate upon getting out upon bail to-morrow. My brother has had a severe attack of fever and bowel complaint whilst in prison, which has reduced him very low. Our case is very much changed in our favor, as regards public opinion, which appears to be almost entirely in our favor at present. The Claysville party came down for the purpose of having us all ironed down in the dungeon; but instead of effecting their object they were severely reprimanded for bringing the prisoners down in irons. We are permitted to stay in the debtors' room, and frequently I am permitted to walk out in town.

Please to tender my best respects to as many of your company as you may see, and let me beg leave to assure you that you have my best wishes for your health and prosperity.

N. STEELE.

Captain JAMES MORROW, *Commanding at Gunter's Landing, Alabama.*

P. S.—My brother was taken out of prison several days ago, and carried to a private house, to facilitate his recovery.

I.

HUNTSVILLE, *June 21, 1837.*

DEAR SIR: Permit us to tender to you, and through you to your company, our sincere regard and esteem for the prompt, decisive, and manly manner which you have taken to see the civil laws enforced, and the protection afforded us from the hand of our assassins.

Much credit is due to Thomas Lowrey, esq., deputy sheriff, for his humane treatment in conducting N. Steele to Huntsville as a prisoner.

Yours truly,

N. STEELE.
WM. S. COLLINS.
D. WILLIS.
PETER H. LEMON.
G. W. STEELE.

Captain JAMES MORROW.

P. S.—Please not to forget to give my wife or my brother the papers I asked you for, and oblige yours truly. You shall hear from me again.

Yours truly,

N. STEELE.

K.

CLAYSVILLE, *Marshall County, Alabama, June 21, 1837.*

DEAR SIR: At a large and respectable meeting of the citizens of Claysville, it was unanimously resolved that the undersigned should be appointed a committee to invite you to partake of a public dinner at this place, at any time you should be pleased to select, as a token of their friendly feeling towards yourself, and of their esteem for your conduct in the discharge of the important official duties of your station. It was also further resolved that the members and officers of your corps be also respectfully invited to accompany you.

In pursuance of the pleasing duty thus assigned us, we beg leave to tender you the invitation of your fellow-citizens, and add the assurance of our individual esteem.

D. S. DICKINSON,
JOHN S. GOFORTH,
A. C. BEARD,
A. H. MACFARLANE,
W. P. MACFARLANE, } *Committee.*

Captain JAMES MORROW.

No. 1.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *June 20, 1836.*

Sir: You will repair to the Cherokee country without delay, and ascertain the condition and probable designs of the Cherokee Indians. Rumors have reached here that these Indians are meditating hostilities against the United States, and that depredations have actually been committed. It is very desirable that any excitement which exists among them should be allayed; and you are requested to use all proper means, by representation and remonstrance, to allay it. You will please to seek interviews with the principal men, and to urge upon them the necessity of their interfering, and prevailing upon their people to remain quiet and to comply with the treaty stipulations. A treaty has been recently ratified with them, providing liberal sums for their present relief and future support. The moment the necessary appropriations are made, arrangements will be adopted for carrying into effect all these treaty stipulations. In the meantime, as it is probable that the scarcity of provisions among the Cherokees may lead them to commit depredations, you are authorized to issue to such of them as may require this aid, and as evince a friendly disposition, a reasonable quantity of provisions. A copy of the Cherokee treaty is herewith enclosed. By adverting to the eighteenth article you will find a stipulation for these issues of provisions. The amount for provisions and clothing is limited to \$75,000; but a far less sum than this will be sufficient for the issues required to be immediately made. The purchases, if any, will be made upon the best terms, and will be paid for in bills to be drawn upon this department, which will be met as soon as the appropriation is made. It is presumed that pork, beef, flour, corn, and salt, are all the articles that it will be found necessary to distribute. You will cause the provisions to be issued and accounted for upon provision returns, corresponding, as near as may be, with the army practice; and you are at liberty to employ such persons as you may find necessary to perform this business under your directions, and to allow them a reasonable compensation for their services.

You will apply at the offices of the adjutant general, the commissary general of subsistence, and the colonel of ordnance; and you will ascertain in detail the arrangements that have already been made to meet any difficulties among the Cherokees.

You will find that the governor of Tennessee was some time since requested to raise a body of volunteers under the late volunteer act. A portion of these—the number depending on the organization, and amounting to from one thousand to twelve hundred, one-half mounted and one-half infantry—were assigned to East Tennessee. It appears by the governor's letter received this day that he is about organizing this force, and that he will call into immediate service the quota assigned to East Tennessee. These troops will rendezvous at Athens on the 7th July. You will take the immediate command of them, and station them in such parts of the Cherokee country as you may think best. You will find from Governor Cannon's letter that these troops will be supplied with arms.

A quantity of arms, ammunition, and provisions, were directed some time since to be sent to that quarter, and to be deposited at Hiwassee, under the direction of Major Payne, of the army. These provisions you are authorized, in case of necessity, to issue to the Cherokees, in lieu of those above referred to.

Should the Cherokees commence hostilities, you will employ the above-mentioned force in reducing them to unconditional submission; and if you should, not deem it sufficient for that purpose, you are authorized to call upon the executives of Tennessee, Georgia, and North Carolina, for such additional force as you may judge necessary. I have this day written to the governors of those States, requesting them to call into the service of the United States such militia force as you may require. The volunteers under the late act must serve for one year, the ordinary militia force must serve at least three months after reaching the place of rendezvous, unless such volunteers or militia shall be sooner discharged. Provision has already been made for mustering the brigade of Tennessee volunteers. If that, however, should not have been done, you will have it attended to; and you will likewise cause the other troops to be mustered into service by some competent officer of the United States. I need not insist upon the necessity of all proper economy in your expenditures, and likewise upon the due preservation and accountability of the public property.

Should the conduct of the Cherokees require the application of force, you will proceed to subdue them with as much expedition as possible. When this is effected, their arms will be immediately taken from them, and they will be kept together, under proper guards, till you can complete your arrangements for their removal west. A copy of the general instructions for the removal of the Indians will be furnished you from the office of the commissary general of subsistence; and you will conform, in this duty, as far as possible, to these regulations. Should a portion of the Cherokees remain friendly, you will still require them to deliver up their arms; but they will not be confined, and will be allowed a reasonable time to remove themselves, in conformity with the stipulations of the treaty.

You are aware that General Scott and General Jesup are in the Creek country, conducting the operations against the Creek Indians. Copies of these instructions will be sent to each of them, and they will be requested to communicate fully with you. Should you find that any troops, in addition to the Tennessee volunteers, will be required in the Cherokee country, I think it probable that a portion, or the whole of them, may be furnished from the forces under the command of General Scott; and if so, it may render it unnecessary for you to call into service any other militia troops. The state of affairs in the Creek country will, I hope, soon render unnecessary the employment there of the whole force now in the field.

The President directs that you be assigned to do duty as a brevet brigadier general. During your command as such, you will receive the pay and emoluments of a brigadier general, and will be allowed to select an aide-de-camp.

You will immediately consult with the heads of the respective bureaus, and take care that every necessary arrangement is made for furnishing all the supplies that may be required. You will look particularly to these arrangements yourself, so as not to run the risk of any disappointment. The necessary orders upon this subject will be given to these bureaus. I desire that you will keep the department informed of your proceedings.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

LEWIS CASS.

Brevet Brigadier General JOHN E. WOOL, *Washington.*

No. 2.

Extract from a treaty concluded between the United States and the Cherokee tribe of Indians on the 29th day of December, 1835, and ratified on the 23d day of May, 1836.

ARTICLE 6. Perpetual peace and friendship shall exist between the citizens of the United States and the Cherokee Indians. The United States agree to protect the Cherokee nation from domestic strife and foreign enemies, and against intestine wars between the several tribes. The Cherokees shall endeavor to preserve and maintain the peace of the country, and not make war upon their neighbors. They shall also be protected against interruption and intrusion from citizens of the United States who may attempt to settle in the country without their consent, and all such persons shall be removed from the same by order of the President of the United States; but this is not intended to prevent the residence among them of useful farmers, mechanics, and teachers for the instruction of Indians, according to treaty stipulations.

ARTICLE 16. It is hereby stipulated and agreed by the Cherokees that they shall remove to their new homes within two years from the ratification of this treaty; and that during such time the United States shall protect and defend them in their possessions and property, and free use and occupation of the same; and such persons as have been dispossessed of their improvements and houses, and for which no grant has actually issued previously to the enactment of the law of the State of Georgia of December, 1835, to regulate Indian occupancy, shall be again put in possession, and placed in the same situation and condition, in reference to the laws of the State of Georgia, as the Indians that have not been dispossessed; and if this is not done, and the people left unprotected, then the United States shall pay the several Cherokees for the losses and damages sustained by them in consequence thereof. And it is also stipulated and agreed that the public buildings and improvements on which they are situated at New Echota, for which no grant has actually been made previous to the passage of the above-recited act, if not occupied by the Cherokee people, shall be reserved for the public and free use of the United States and Cherokee Indians for the purpose of settling and closing all the Indian business arising under this treaty between the commissioners of claims and the Indians.

No. 3.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *July 30, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th instant.

In reference to your remark that "with a less force we shall have difficulty to induce the Indians to emigrate, for I have little doubt they will resist removal as long as they can with safety," I beg leave to observe that your instructions of the 20th June contemplated the application of a military force only in the event of hostilities being commenced by the Cherokees. The treaty provides that they shall remove within two years, and that during that time they shall be protected in the peaceable possession of their country. Unwillingness to remove, or even resistance to a removal, will not authorize the employment of force. No intimidation nor coercion must be used.

I may have misapprehended your remark, but it seemed proper to call your attention to one obvious construction of it, and to its incompatibility, so construed, with the stipulations of the treaty.

Your draft for \$10,000 for provisions will be paid on presentation.

The other subjects in your letter have been answered in previous communications from this department.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

C. A. HARRIS, *Acting Secretary of War.*

Brevet Brigadier General JOHN E. WOOL, *Commanding Army, Athens, Tennessee.*

No. 4.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF E. T. AND C. N., *Valley River, August 4, 1836.*

SIR: You will proceed without delay to New Echota and such other parts of the Cherokee nation within the limits of Georgia as may be necessary to give protection both to the Cherokees and the white inhabitants residing in that section of the country. You will allow no encroachments upon either side. Both will be protected in their persons and property. You will prevent, as far as practicable, all collisions between your troops and the Indians. You will also prevent any interference on the part of the Georgia troops with the Cherokees. You will ascertain by whose authority they have been raised and stationed in that country, and if not legally authorized to maintain themselves and exercise military control, you will order them to disband or leave the country. If authorized by the authorities of Georgia, they will immediately report to me and receive my orders. At all events, you will prevent every improper exercise of military control over the Indians or the white inhabitants. The whole subject is left to your sound discretion, taking care to do nothing which will bring you in conflict with the authorities of Georgia. The sovereignty of the State and its laws must be respected. You will recollect in your proceedings that the State and the citizens are still laboring under a state of excitement caused by the cruelties of a savage warfare. Therefore great prudence and discretion should be exercised in all your intercourse with the nation, and particularly in all measures which might have a bearing upon the rights and interests of the State and people of Georgia.

I will visit in a few days that part of the country, with the view of ascertaining the sincerity of the professions of the people residing therein.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL, *Brigadier General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General DUNLAP, *Commanding East Tennessee Volunteers.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF E. T. AND C. N., *Valley Town, N. C., August 12, 1837.*

SIR: Captain Vernon, stationed at New Echota, informs me that John Ridge has complained to him that some white man is about to take forcible possession of his ferry on the Coosa river. You will, without delay, inquire into the case; and if you should find the complaint to be just, you will, until further orders, protect Ridge in his rights and property. This order will apply to all cases of a similar character in the Cherokee country.

You are further directed that, in case you should find any troops within the limits of the Cherokee nation, whether in Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, or North Carolina, not belonging to the East Tennessee brigade, to notify them that they are exclusively subject to my authority, and, unless they report to me without delay and become subject to my orders, will either leave the nation or be disbanded. In your proceedings you will be governed by your instructions of the 4th instant.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL, *Brigadier General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General DUNLAP, *Brigade East Tennessee Volunteers.*

No. 5.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF E. T. AND C. N., *Valley Town, N. C., August 15, 1836.*

SIR: Being on the eve of a tour through the Cherokee nation, I herewith forward to you copies of such letters and orders, from 1 to 5 inclusive, as may give the Department of War a correct idea of the course I have pursued towards the Cherokees and the white inhabitants residing among them. I do this lest some false impressions may have been made in relation to the course I would adopt by some hasty remarks in my correspondence with the department. I can assure the Secretary of War, notwithstanding anything I may have said in my correspondence with him since my arrival in this country, I have done nothing which is not in strict accordance with the treaty and my instructions, and which will not meet with the approbation of the people of the United States, as well as that of the Department of War.

On my arrival here I informed the Cherokees that I had been sent by the President of the United States to carry into effect the late treaty concluded with them; that I came not to make war upon them, but to preserve peace and to protect them in the enjoyment of all their rights. For this I only exacted of them a declaration of submission to the terms of the treaty, and a promise that they would remain peaceably and quietly at their homes until the time arrived for their removal to the west.

Several meetings were held with the chiefs and headmen in this part of the nation upon the subject of submitting to the terms of the treaty and of distributing rations and clothing among the poorer Indians. At the last of these meetings they abruptly separated without coming to any conclusion, although they had promised me to do so. Such conduct I could view in no other light than as exhibiting strong feelings of opposition to the treaty, if not a disposition to resist its execution by force, and such as required prompt and decided measures. I instantly sent a detachment in pursuit, and had the principal men brought to my headquarters and detained under guard for the night. In the morning they admitted their error, and promised a compliance with the treaty. Although I could place but little confidence in declarations made under such circumstances, I nevertheless permitted them to return to their homes, with orders that they should require the young men to bring in their arms. About one hundred have been brought in, and the remainder in this section of the country, including those of the Che-o-ee Indians, will be in in the course of the week. This measure will, in all probability, prevent hostilities and enforce a compliance with the treaty. Yet it is not to be disguised that nineteen-twentieths, if not ninety-nine out of every hundred, of the Indians in North Carolina are opposed to its execution, and will not comply with it unless compelled to do so by the presence of a military force. They say they will go to the west, but not by their own consent; and none but a few miserable creatures will receive anything from the United States, lest it might be construed into an act of submission to the treaty, or of having consented to its ratification. Without four or five hundred men present at the time when the greater part of the nation must set out for the west, I would not guarantee that we shall not have the same scenes enacted in this country which have taken place in Georgia, Alabama, and Florida. With four hundred regular troops I can insure peace and quiet, and the removal of the Indians to Alabama without difficulty.

I have mentioned regular troops, because it appears to be the desire of the Secretary of War that the volunteers should be disbanded whenever regular troops could be obtained to supply their places. I called on General Jesup for the number which I supposed would be requisite, who returned me for answer that he had not any to spare at this time, and would not until about the 10th of September next.

I have now about nine hundred men, including a company of regular troops at Fort Cass. A part of this force I shall discharge as soon as the Indians of this country have delivered up their arms, and as soon as I have completed the tour of the nation, which I shall commence to-morrow. This tour I had contemplated to have made before this, and would have, but for the opposition I meet with here, which is the most troublesome part of the nation.

In the course of next week I shall call together the committee mentioned in the twelfth article of the treaty, to advise on the subject of furnishing rations and clothing to the poor of the nation. That part of the committee residing in this part of the country, except Timpson, are unwilling to act. Roman Nose and Siteewagee were both, previous to the reception of your communication of the 25th ultimo, consulted on the subject of issuing rations to the poor Indians, but they would neither take themselves nor advise others to do so. As soon as the committee have been consulted on the subject, regulations will be made in regard to the issues, a copy of which will be transmitted to the War Department. It may be proper to remark, however, that I have little doubt, from information received from the Cherokees in Georgia, that demands will be made to consume the whole of the seventy thousand dollars in the course of the fall. I shall not fail to distribute this sum in clothing and rations among the poor throughout the nation as equitably and economically as may be practicable. As it may be attended with less inconvenience to the War Department as well as myself, I would, as you have suggested, recommend to have the seventy thousand dollars passed to my credit in some bank either in Philadelphia or New York. I would recommend this course more particularly, from the circumstance that the deposit bank in Knoxville charges

one and a quarter per cent., as you have already been apprised, on bills of exchange, when they will take checks on eastern banks at par.

I have as yet heard nothing from the commissioners appointed under this treaty, nor have I seen Major Currey, although I understand he has arrived at the agency.

It may be proper to remark that, from the temper manifested at present by the Indians, independent of any other consideration, a force would be required to be kept in this country during the operations of the commissioners and the appraisers of improvements.

In conclusion, I beg leave to remark to the Secretary that, from the total inexperience of the paymaster ordered to this country, I apprehend that much difficulty will arise in the payment of the volunteers—a service at all times perplexing, and should have been intrusted to an experienced paymaster.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL, *Brigadier General, Commanding.*

C. A. HARRIS, Esq., *Acting Secretary of War.*

No. 6.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *September 1, 1836.*

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 16th ultimo, with its enclosures, and have to express my high gratification at the tenor of the orders which you have issued for the preservation of quiet in the Cherokee country, which appear to me very judicious.

I am glad to perceive that your views correspond with those expressed in my letter to you of the 23d ultimo, which you have not yet received. The distinction laid down in your original instructions from this department must not be lost sight of; that is, the different nature of your duties in a state of peace and of war, or of a condition leading to war. While the Cherokees do not disturb the public tranquillity, and while you have not just grounds to suspect that they are preparing to do so, you will regulate all your movements, so far as regards them, by the stipulations of the treaty. When, however, this state of things is interrupted by their own conduct, then the law of self-defence will justify us in subduing and removing them.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

LEWIS CASS.

Brigadier General JOHN E. WOOL, *Athens, Tennessee.*

No. 7.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF E. T. AND C. N., *New Echota, August 27, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 13th instant, received yesterday on my way to this place from Ross's Landing.

Your impressions are altogether erroneous as to the course I would pursue in relation to the Cherokees; no man can feel more kindly to these people than I do, and no man will go further to secure to them the benefits of the late treaty; but, in doing this, it is necessary to be firm and decided, or you will not convince them that the government is serious in its intentions of having the treaty executed. A large majority of the nation are still under the delusion that the treaty will be modified, if not altogether rendered void; and John Ross, it would appear, is not without such hopes. The War Department does not understand these people, and no man can understand them until he goes among them. For three weeks after my arrival at Athens, from the daily reports made to me, I was induced to believe that a large proportion of the nation was prepared to submit to the treaty and to remove west at the proper time; a few days at the mouth of Valley river convinced me I was mistaken. A few white men and some few half-breeds only could be found to advocate a submission to the treaty. This is not fiction but truth. The same remarks, although not to the same extent, will apply to this section of the country; that is, at least a large majority are opposed to the treaty and against removing to the west. What course, under such circumstances, would you pursue? Would you permit these people to remain until the period arrived for their removal before you undertake to convince them that you are serious, and that a treaty has been made with them which must be executed? I would be just to these people; but before they will allow me or any one else to be so, they must be convinced that a treaty has been made with them (which they disavow) and that within two years it must be fulfilled. How would you do this? Would you merely say to them that they shall not be molested or interfered with if they will remain peaceably and quietly at their homes until the expiration of the two years? Such a course, I have no hesitation to say, would produce the same scenes which have just been exhibited in Florida and the Creek country. Not a man would be ready to move; nor will one of them, with some few exceptions, move without compulsion. If possible, that is, if the government would avoid war, some four or five thousand should be prevailed upon to go this fall. If all remain, and all should be required to move at the same time, a much larger force than I now have will be required to preserve the peace of the country. Again, if we would serve and promote the interests of these people, we ought to use every honorable means to induce them to leave this country as soon as practicable. They are the prey of the white men; and if they remain in this country two years very few would have anything left to carry with them to the west; the white men would have debts against them sufficient to cover all that they would receive from the government. It is in vain to say that you would not pay these debts; the Indians would be claimed by the civil authorities of the several States in which they reside under the expectation that the government would pay these debts. I hope you do not understand me to say that I would hurry the people unnecessarily to the west, or that I would use harsh measures to force them out of the country. On the contrary, I would convince them that they must go; and in the next place, I would endeavor to convince them that it was for their interest that a part should go this fall. In the meantime I would protect them in the full enjoyment of all the rights secured to them by the treaty; and, above all, I would prevent the white men from turning them out of doors and taking possession of their property, which has

been done so often in this State. If such proceedings on the part of the whites cannot be stopped, these people will be driven to a state of desperation, when the result may be learned by reading the history of the late Creek war.

If the officer in command has no discretionary power over the white or red men, he ought not to remain here, for it would be utterly impossible for him to do his duty either towards the government, the Indians, or the white men residing in the Cherokee country.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL, *Brigadier General, Commanding.*

C. A. HARRIS, Esq., *Acting Secretary of War.*

No. 8.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *September 13, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th ultimo, and am happy to perceive that your views of your duty, in the execution of the Cherokee treaty, accord with those of the department. I think it will occur to you, upon reflection, that the determination of the government to carry into effect the treaty may be as strongly manifested by fulfilling its provisions respecting the payment of claims, debts, and for improvements, as by requiring or urging an immediate removal, which the treaty does not authorize. As these provisions are all beneficial, it would seem that their prompt and just execution could hardly fail of conciliating many who are now opposed to the treaty. The arrangements in the power of the department for removing all who will go willingly have been made, and it only remains, by every proper precaution, to prevent any infringement of the treaty by any portion of the Cherokees.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

C. A. HARRIS, *Acting Secretary of War.*

General JOHN E. WOOL, *Athens, Tennessee.*

No. 9.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, *New Echota, Georgia, August 30, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 7th instant, on my way to this place from Valley river, with a copy of one to the Acting Secretary of War. In reply to so much of the latter as relates to the apportionment of the ten thousand volunteers among the several States, allow me to say that I knew nothing of such a measure until some time after I had received the volunteers assembled at Athens. In what number and to what States these were apportioned I was wholly unacquainted with until I received yours of the 7th instant.

When at Fort Cass (or Calloun) on my way to Ross's Landing I met with Mr. John Ross, just arrived from his visit to Washington. He, like many others of the nation, expressed a strong desire to have a council of the Cherokee people for the purpose of laying before them the whole proceedings of the delegation assembled at Washington in relation to the late treaty; at the same time asked me if I had the authority to prevent such a meeting, which, he said, would be in accordance with the practice and laws of the nation. I replied that I had no authority to prevent such a meeting. I advised him, however, to be careful how he advocated such a measure if he had for object any other course than merely explaining the treaty and with reference to an entire submission to its terms. That any discussion or explanation tending to a different result I was confident would find no favor with the President, who was determined to have the treaty executed. He merely replied that he thought the President would be convinced that he had been in error, and that he would finally yield, and be willing to do justice to the Cherokees. I answered that it was a subject upon which I would not converse; that the President I knew was determined to have the treaty executed, and I was sent, with others, to aid in carrying his intentions into effect.

Since my arrival at this place I have been informed that Mr. Ross has sent runners through the country, disseminating his views, which I am apprehensive will do much injury, and very much retard emigration to the west, particularly this fall. Will there not be a danger, if such a course is allowed, that he will make good his declaration, which will be found at the close of his letter dated "Washington, June 21, 1836," in answer to inquiries by a friend, viz: "The delegation must repeat, the instrument entered into at New Echota, purporting to be a treaty, is deceptive to the world, and a fraud upon the Cherokee people. If a doubt exists as to the truth of their statement, a committee of investigation can learn the facts; and it may also learn that if the Cherokees are removed under that instrument it will be by force." Your attention is called to the subject, in order that I may more particularly learn your wishes in regard to the course I ought to pursue under such circumstances. I ask it because, as you will perceive by the enclosed abstract of a letter from the War Department, I am very much restricted, and have little or no discretionary power left me in any case, except actual hostilities. No man can be more kindly disposed to these people than I am, and it certainly is my intentions, as all my proceedings will prove, to be just towards them, and as far as it is in my power to protect them in all the rights secured to them by the treaty. Still they ought to be convinced that a treaty has been made with them, and that it is the intention of the government to have it executed. Certainly no commander will be respected without some discretionary power. Circumstances may arise when firmness, decision, and promptness may be indispensable to the preservation of peace and to prevent hostilities. By the extract I am restricted from action, except only in case of actual hostilities.

The commissioners have not yet arrived. Governor Lumpkin, it is expected, is on his way to this place. We have heard nothing as yet from General Carroll. The friendly Indians are extremely impatient for their arrival. Everything must be retarded until they do arrive. If they do not enter upon their duties soon, I am apprehensive that very few will pass the Mississippi the approaching season. I think it all important to the interests of these people that they should be sent away as soon as possible; and particu-

larly in this section of the country, where they are constantly annoyed by the white people, who are daily taking possession of their property and improvements, in violation of the treaty. I particularly wish instructions on this subject.

In conclusion, allow me to call your attention to the latter clause of the 16th article of the treaty and the 4th article of the supplementary articles, both of which relate to the agency at Fort Cass. The question under consideration is, whether it is contemplated by those articles to permit the occupant to erect other buildings on the premises than were there at the ratification of the treaty. If not, Major Currey desires that Lewis Ross may be stopped from erecting a large house or store at the agency. By my instructions I do not consider myself authorized to act in the case, and therefore would respectfully request your opinion on the subject.

Mr. Rogers, who takes this with other letters express, will wait for any communication the President may think proper to make in return.

Herewith I enclose to you a circular from John Ross to John Ridge and others, inviting them to meet in council for the purpose of giving an account of the conduct of the delegation, and of laying before it the whole proceedings in relation to the treaty. It is thought that this meeting and its proceedings will do much mischief, and will very much interrupt the business of the commissioners, and consequently retard emigration. John Ridge and Major Currey are both of opinion that it will do much. Your instructions are requested on the subject.

I have the honor to be, with considerations of the highest respect, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL, *Brigadier General, Commanding.*

General ANDREW JACKSON, *President of the United States.*

No. 10.

HERMITAGE, *September 7, 1836.*

SIR: Your letter of the 30th ultimo has just been handed to me by Mr. Rogers, the express. Being in a state of preparation for setting out for Washington, and surrounded by much company, I have but a moment to reply to it.

In relation to your observations respecting the apportionment of the ten thousand volunteers, I need not say more here than that the requisition on the governor of the State was a sufficient guide for the organization of the part allotted to Tennessee. This requisition was for twenty-five hundred men, to be raised in two brigades, one in East and the other in West Tennessee, and there could be no authority to muster more into the service. The remainder of the ten thousand had been required from other States and Territories.

I have turned to the letter of the adjutant general to which you have called my attention. You will find, I think, that it relates to the volunteers called for agreeably to the requisition on the governor of Tennessee for twenty-five hundred. I cannot suppose that it was expected of you to receive a greater number than this into the service.

As you have the treaty before you, and the instructions of the Acting Secretary of War, I do not see that I can add anything more on this subject at present. The treaty is to be religiously fulfilled; you may assure all concerned that no modification or alteration in it will be made by me. Of this Mr. John Ross is fully advised. His friend, Mr. Standefer, who waited upon me at Washington and made the inquiry whether I would agree to a supplemental article admitting the Rosses and their delegation in as chiefs, was informed that I would not. You will therefore make known to the Cherokee people that no alteration in the treaty will be made, but that all its terms and conditions will be faithfully and fully executed. Should you find any evil-disposed white man in the nation exciting the Indians not to comply with the treaty, you will forthwith order him or them out of the nation; and if they refuse to go, the facts being thoroughly established, you will take the steps necessary to put them out. Such characters must be considered in the light of intruders, prohibited by the treaty from living within the limits of the nation.

You will caution John Ross from calling any council of the Cherokee people with the view of opposing or altering the treaty. He knows that there will be no further negotiation on the subject; that the Cherokees are to emigrate in two years from the ratification of the treaty, and will be obliged to go within that period; that the collisions between them and the whites have been too long continued for the gratification of himself at the expense of the poor in the nation.

I have had a letter from Governor Carroll. He will leave Pontotoc at as early a moment as he can, and expects to meet Governor Lumpkin early in October next.

With these hasty remarks, I remain your obedient servant,

ANDREW JACKSON.

General J. E. Wool, *East Tennessee.*

No. 11.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF E. T. AND C. N., *New Echota, Georgia, September 12, 1836.*

SIR: To-morrow I shall leave this place for the encampment which I have ordered to be formed near the council ground at Red Clay. The council, as I have already informed you, will take place on the 15th instant. Previous to my departure I would call your attention to so much of your previous communications as relates to the continuance of the volunteers in service. You appear to be anxious to have them discharged. However pacific the Cherokees may appear, I think it would be highly imprudent, until the treaty is executed, to leave this country entirely without troops. I have again and again informed you of the feelings and disposition of a large majority of the nation. The people are opposed to the treaty, and are unwilling to leave this country for the Arkansas. The amount of force necessary to be kept in this country will entirely depend on the course which John Ross and his party will pursue. If the policy

of John Ross should be pacific, and not in opposition to the execution of the treaty, a comparatively small force only will be required to preserve peace and guard the commissioners whilst in the discharge of their duties. On the other hand, if the course of John Ross—for he can control the nation—should be in opposition to the execution of the treaty, the force required will be comparatively large. If Mr. Ross should pursue the pacific course, perhaps six or eight companies of United States infantry, commanded by a vigilant and discreet officer, would be sufficient to give ample protection to the country. But if his course should be hostile, I would not guarantee the preservation of the peace short of eight hundred men. Six hundred might answer, with a very efficient officer to command them; this force, however, should be composed of four hundred regulars and two hundred mounted volunteers. If, under these circumstances, the War Department should deem it prudent and proper to keep a military force in the Cherokee country, whether it is to consist of regulars or volunteers, or of both, I ought to know it soon, because it will soon be time to make preparations for quartering them during the winter.

Governor Lumpkin, who is here, is under the impression that the commissioners will locate themselves here to transact the business of the nation. In such a case, he says he shall consider two companies necessary at this place for their protection and to facilitate the execution of their duties. Should the commissioners determine to select this place to transact their business, and consequently two companies be stationed here, which I think will be necessary, winter quarters must be built and provisions deposited for them before the roads become impassable for wagons. Besides this place, I would select Calhoun for another position for four companies, which we have at this time. Should this be approved, it will be necessary to build winter quarters for them. I would also station two companies in North Carolina, either at Camp Armistead or near the mouth of Valley river—the latter place would be the most suitable position in regard to the Indians. It commands the passage of the Hiwassee, the Valley river, and the roads to Georgia and to Tennessee. The only objection to it is the difficulty of getting supplies to it in the winter season. If we establish a post at this place or Camp Armistead, winter quarters must be built for the troops.

After the council of the 15th instant I shall be able to inform you of the force which I think will be necessary for the Cherokee country. At the same time I will order estimates to be forwarded for building winter quarters for the same. They will, of course, be of temporary construction, and put up at the smallest possible cost.

That which I am the most anxious to know, however, is whether any regular force can be sent to this country in the course of the fall. As I have already informed the War Department, agreeably to instructions from the Secretary, I made a call on General Jesup for four hundred. He returned me for answer that he could not spare any until about the 10th instant; I have heard nothing from him since on the subject. He certainly cannot require the force which he has under his command to control the Creeks. Is it possible that the whole of General Jesup's command is intended for Florida? Independent of the force he now has in Florida, he has fifteen hundred Tennesseans destined for that country, and how many Georgians and Alabamians I know not. I should think that a part of his regular force might be sent to this country, which will enable me to dispense with nearly or quite all of the volunteers, which, as you know, are very expensive.

Governor Lumpkin, in one of his communications to the Secretary of War, says he has suggested whether it would not be expedient to allow some of the committee, or all of the members, who may have furnished subsistence to the poor and needy Cherokees, previous to my issuing rations to them, to be paid out of the fund appropriated for that object, agreeably to the eighteenth article of the treaty. In calling your attention to the subject, I would remark, that if you allow such debts to be paid in one case, would you not be compelled to allow debts in all cases of a similar character? There are many of this character, and they would give me or whoever may attend to the duties endless trouble. Debts of this kind against the Indians would consume more than \$72,000.

Again: some of the committee are anxious to have a part of this fund appropriated to feeding all those who may attend upon the commissioners to transact business. If this was established and generally known, no man would come prepared to subsist himself, and the consequence would be that this fund would be distributed but partially, and to those persons who are not properly entitled to it. Besides, if the Indians should come in and submit to the terms of the treaty, the fund would not last two weeks, the number of visitors would be so great. If they knew they would be subsisted they would come whether they had business or not. I must positively set my face against such a proposition. My object is to distribute it impartially, and in such a way as to do the most good. The great body of the poorer class resides in North Carolina, and would not get their due proportion of subsistence if I should accede to the proposition above alluded to. I know not whether it has been submitted to you for your consideration. I can only say it would never do if you will be just.

On all these subjects I could wish your opinion as soon as circumstances will permit.

On the 1st instant I discharged one company of mounted volunteers, and on the 8th instant General Dunlap and staff.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL, *Brigadier General, Commanding.*

HON. LEWIS CASS, *Secretary of War.*

SIR: I have just received your letter of the 20th ultimo, and approve entirely the views taken by you in the conversation with John Ross, concerning the council proposed by him to be held with the Cherokees. If the Indians are to be assembled with the fair intention of explaining to them their duty under the treaty, and the necessity of an immediate compliance with its terms, the measure may perhaps be useful. Of this, however, you can better judge from the temper that may be displayed there than I can. If you think good can result from it, you are at liberty to encourage the measure. But if the object is to discuss the validity of the treaty, and thus to excite the Cherokees ultimately to opposition, it is certainly proper that you should express your decided disapprobation of the proposition. I would not,

however, have you use actual force till you are satisfied that the measure will have a tendency to provoke disturbances; in that event it must be put a stop to.

I imagine you misunderstood Mr. Harris's views in the letter to which you allude. This department certainly never expected that you should sit still and see the Indians prepare for hostilities without interruption. The distinction which you suppose was drawn between hostilities actually commenced and those meditated was not intended to be laid down. The distinction was between hostilities, whether meditated or commenced, and a state of peace, from which no danger was to be apprehended. You command in an important section of the country and at a moment of much anxiety. While everything is quiet, and no appearance of hostile designs meditated, your measures will be adapted to a state of peace; or, in other words, nothing more will be necessary than to keep your force upon the alert and to watch the movements of the Indians. But if you have just grounds to believe that they are preparing for disturbances, you will then adopt measures adequate to the emergency. I have great confidence as well in your judgment as in your energy, and I am satisfied that the result will prove that confidence to be well founded.

The circumstances you state respecting the employment of the additional Tennessee troops, although they will not enable this department to recognize their services, yet furnish strong considerations which may well have produced an effect upon you.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

LEWIS CASS.

Brevet Brigadier General JOHN E. WOOL, *Athens, Tennessee.*

No. 13.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 12, 1836.*

SIR: I have had the honor to receive and to submit to the President your letters of the 12th, 18th, 21st, and 25th ultimo.

It has never been the intention of the department that the military force in the Cherokee country should be withdrawn or reduced, while its presence was necessary for the accomplishment of any objects connected with the treaty. A proper regard to economy, however, requires that no more should be retained than is sufficient for this purpose.

The marine corps having proceeded to Florida, there is no portion of the regular army that can be placed at your disposal.

The number of volunteers that you may require will, in accordance with the suggestion of Governor Lumpkin, in which you seem to concur, and which is approved by the President, be drawn from the States respectively in which they are to be stationed. And the President has directed me to request that you will muster, pay, and suffer to return to their homes such portion of the Tennessee troops as, in the opinion of the commissioners and yourself, will not be wanted within the limits of that State while the execution of the treaty is in progress. Having engaged to serve twelve months, unless sooner discharged, they must be distinctly informed that they are liable to be called into service at any time during the period of their original engagement. It would be improper to part with any of the Tennessee troops until ample arrangements are made to guard the other States, unless yourself and the commissioners should think that less than the whole number can effect this object.

It is apprehended that many, if not all the volunteers from Georgia and Alabama, lately in service, have been finally discharged. Should this not be the case, you will call upon the governors of those States, respectively, for as many of these yet liable to serve as may be required within the limits of each. Should they have been discharged, you can then make your requisitions for the same number of new troops. As none have yet been in service from North Carolina, those called out for that State will, of course, be new troops.

The letter from this department of the 20th of June last gave you authority to call for militia from the States of Tennessee, Georgia, and North Carolina, but it will now be preferable to make your requisitions for volunteers under the act of Congress of the 23d of May last. I enclose a copy of the act, an extract from a letter to the governors of some of the States from which volunteers were called, and a copy of a memorandum that accompanied it, in which the principles of the organization of volunteer troops are distinctly laid down, by which you will be guided so far as they are applicable. The number you may call for will be received into service for twelve months, unless sooner discharged.

This arrangement, however, so far as it respects North Carolina, will not be carried into effect if you and the commissioners should be of opinion that, in consequence of the small number of Indians in that State, every necessary service can be rendered by the troops from the other States.

I understand from your letter of the 12th ultimo that your present impression is that eight hundred men are sufficient for a permanent force for the whole Cherokee country. This number, therefore, will not be exceeded in carrying out the arrangements indicated in this letter, and I presume it will not be necessary to keep a greater number of the Tennessee troops in service until it can be completed. As many of the eight hundred men may be mounted as you and the commissioners may think proper.

In determining upon the various points herein presented, the number and kind of volunteers to be employed, and the stations of the several detachments, I would recommend that you consult the commissioners, whose character and knowledge of Indian temper and habits and of the localities of the country entitle their opinions to great consideration.

You are authorized to have the necessary winter quarters provided for the troops you may call into service.

The declarations made by you to Mr. John Ross, as stated in your letter of the 18th ultimo, will be sustained. The President will not depart from the determination expressed in his letter to you of September 7: "The treaty is to be religiously fulfilled." No delegation sent to this place with a view to obtain new terms or a modification of those of the existing treaty will be received or recognized, nor will any intercourse be had with them, directly or indirectly, orally or in writing. You will repeat this determination of the President to Mr. Ross and to all others in the strongest terms. If any of our own citizens enter the Indian country and incite opposition to the execution of the treaty, you will ascertain

whether there is no law of the State which can be brought to bear upon them and under which they can be removed. If they cannot be reached in this way, it is the opinion of the President that they may be removed under the sixth article of the treaty, in which the United States guarantee that the Cherokees shall "be protected against interruption and intrusion from citizens of the United States who may attempt to settle in the country without their consent." It is not to be presumed that this consent will be given by those of the committee who are acting under the twelfth article, and by the terms of that article they alone are authorized to give it.

If any officer of the army should countenance resistance or opposition to the treaty, you will arrest him and order a court of inquiry. If the fact be established, the President will dismiss him from the service. And the commissioners will be instructed to suspend any of the agents employed under the treaty who may be guilty of the like offence.

I am instructed to express the surprise of the President that you permitted the council of the Cherokees to remain in session a moment after it became apparent that it was determined to declare the treaty void. This was the contingency contemplated in the letter of the department of September 3, in which you were instructed to interfere and disperse such assemblage. If upon any future occasion the non-execution of the treaty should be discussed in council you will immediately close its session. You will inform Mr. Ross that the President regards the proceedings of himself and associates in council as in direct contravention of the plighted faith of their people, and a repetition of them will be considered as indicative of a design to prevent the execution of the treaty, even at the hazard of actual hostilities, and they will be promptly repressed. You will also inform him that if a delegation proceed to the Cherokees west of the Mississippi for the purpose of procuring their co-operation in an attempt to set aside or modify the existing treaty or to obtain a new one, the acting superintendent of the western territory will be instructed to enforce the provisions of the 13th section of the intercourse law of 1834, and to employ military aid, if necessary, under the authority of the 23d section.

I annex copies of these sections, which, as well as a copy of this letter, you will deliver to Mr. Ross.

The direction you have given to Major Nelson, and your general views respecting the Creeks residing among the Cherokees, meet the concurrence of the President, so far as they may affect Creeks settled in the Cherokee country prior to the extension of the jurisdiction of the States over the Indian country, and to the treaty with the Creeks of March 24, 1832. Those who have settled there since will be required to join their people west of the Mississippi, and military force will be applied to effect that object if necessary.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. A. HARRIS, *Acting Secretary of War.*

Brevet Brigadier General JOHN E. WOOL, *Athens, Tennessee.*

No. 14.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF E. T. AND C. N., *Red Clay, Tennessee, September 18, 1836.*

SIR: It is with peculiar pleasure that I acknowledge the receipt of your several communications of the 1st and 3d instant from Athens, by express. They have, indeed, revived my hopes, for I had begun to think that all confidence was lost in both my judgment and discretion. I am happy to find that it is otherwise.

The Cherokees are fast coming in from all parts of the nation to attend the council. I presume at least three thousand are present. My camp is within a quarter of a mile of the council ground.

I have had two interviews with Mr. John Ross. I endeavored to convince him of the folly of any attempt to resist the execution of the treaty, or to obtain a modification of it; at the same time informed him of the determination of the President to have it executed in all its parts, and cautioned him, as the President directed in his communication of the 7th instant, an extract of which is herewith submitted. I have little doubt that the council will declare its dissent to the treaty, and appoint a new delegation to go to Washington for the purpose of making a new treaty, or to procure a modification of the present one. This, Mr. Ross informed me, was the wish of the people and, of course, his wish, for, as he says, he has always conformed to their desires. He has unquestionably unbounded influence over them, and can wield them as he pleases. I told him that the destinies of these people were in his hands. It was in his power to do them much good or much evil, and the latter would be the result if they adopted at this council the plan he had suggested. The last interview was held in the presence of Lowrey, Taylor, Lewis Ross, and the two Gunters. I read to all the President's letter. I called their attention to the situation of the Creeks, not only those who had sought refuge in the Cherokee country, but those who had long resided with them, and were connected with them by marriage; who were now hunted up like wolves, in all directions, and carried to the west, leaving all they had behind them. The policy he was about to pursue would, beyond all question, lead to the same result. His people would not be ready, and the consequence would be that they would be hurried off without the benefits now offered by the treaty. All which did not appear to produce the slightest impression. His only reply was, that he should leave the whole subject to his people and abide the result. What that will be I have already informed you.

On the subject of the Creeks, I would call your attention to the enclosed letters, from 1 to 3 inclusive. Some check ought to be put to the course now pursued. Humanity revolts at such a course. Many of these Creeks have not participated in the late hostilities, but have lived many years in the Cherokee nation, and are connected with that people by the ties of blood and marriage. They ought not to be hunted and dragged like so many beasts to the emigrating camp. Certainly a distinction ought to be made in favor of those who have become nationalized, and, according to the laws and customs of the Cherokee nation, are permitted to partake of the benefits of the treaty.

I hope the subject will receive your immediate attention, in order that a decision may be had upon these delicate and intricate questions. What possible objections can the government have to their being permitted, if the Cherokees are willing, to come in and remove under the treaty with them to the west?

It is expected that the Valley River Indians will not give their names to the appraisers appointed to value their property in that section of the country.

On Monday next the council will commence business. I can only look on and guard against any disturbance which might grow out of so large an assemblage of Indians.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL, *Brigadier General, Commanding.*

Hon. LEWIS CASS, *Secretary of War.*

No. 15.

[Extract.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF E. T. AND C. N., *Fort Cass, Tennessee, November 2, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 12th and your several communications of the 17th ultimo. In answer to which, I would respectfully request that you will do me the favor to inform the President of the United States that it has not only been my pleasure, as it will be so long as I hold a commission in the service of the United States, to obey all orders emanating from the President of the United States, and to spare no exertion to discharge every trust confided to me in such a manner as to merit his high approbation as well as that of my countrymen in general. It was with such feelings that I entered upon the important duties assigned me in the Cherokee country; and I can assure the President that, since I have been in command, I have zealously, perseveringly, faithfully, and firmly discharged my duties, at the same time pursuing a just and honorable course towards both the red and the white man, and such a one as I believe would have accomplished in due time all the objects contemplated by the late treaty with the Cherokees. Of this I am sure the President will be convinced when he is made acquainted with all the facts in relation to my course, which I will transmit in a report to the War Department, with a request that it may be laid before the President, as soon as I can complete the arrangements required by the last instructions from the War Department. As it is evident, however, from the communications received from the department, and the restrictions imposed upon me, that I do not possess that confidence which should belong to a military commander in this country, peculiarly situated as it is, I would most respectfully but earnestly request, in order that another may be sent possessing more of the President's confidence, that I may be recalled from this command.

JOHN E. WOOL, *Brigadier General, Commanding.*

G. A. HARRIS, Esq., *Acting Secretary of War.*

No. 16.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *November 16, 1836.*

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 2d instant, which has been submitted to the President. He directs me to assure you that he has full confidence in your capacity, fidelity, and zeal, and that so far as your proceedings, since you assumed the command in the Cherokee country, have been made known to him, they have met his decided approbation, with the exceptions indicated in his communication addressed to you from the Hermitage, and in the letters from this department of the 12th and 17th ultimo. In regard to the points there excepted to, he instructs me to say that the errors of judgment into which he supposes you to have fallen were not such as to lessen his confidence in your character as an officer, or in your general ability and prudence. He therefore sees no adequate reason for recalling you from the command; and he trusts that, on a review of the whole matter, you will be satisfied that you may remain in it with honor and satisfaction, so long as the public service shall require.

The particular measures stated in your letter to have been taken by you in execution of the instructions of the 12th ultimo are entirely satisfactory.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War ad interim.*

Brigadier General JOHN E. WOOL, *Athens, Tennessee.*

No. 17.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY E. T. AND C. N., *Fort Cass, Tennessee, November 6, 1836.*

SIR: Agreeably to my communication of the 2d instant, I have the honor herewith to transmit a report relating to my conduct as an officer, and the course I have pursued since I took charge of the important trust confided to me in this section of the country, connecting therewith a part of the correspondence relating thereto between the Secretary of War and myself, with the confident expectation that, so far from finding cause to censure me for the course I have pursued since I have commanded in the Cherokee nation, my conduct throughout will command your high approbation and praise, as well as that of my countrymen in general.

By my instructions from the Hon. Lewis Cass, Secretary of War, dated June 20, 1836, I was directed to repair to this country without delay, and take command of the troops destined to operate in the Cherokee nation; to allay all excitement which might exist among the Cherokees; to seek interviews with the principal men of the nation, and to urge upon them the necessity of their interference, and prevailing upon their people to remain quiet, and to comply with the late treaty stipulations; and, in case the necessities of the people should require them, to furnish them, conformably to the 18th article of the treaty, a reasonable quantity of provisions to all such as evinced a friendly disposition to the United States; and in case of

hostilities on their part, to employ such force as I might deem necessary to suppress them and subdue them to unconditional submission; and in case I should deem the force to be raised by the governor of Tennessee insufficient, I was authorized to call for such additional force as I might deem necessary, upon the executives of Tennessee, Georgia, and North Carolina.

Agreeably to my instructions, I set out, accompanied by Assistant Quartermaster Hetzel, on the 20th of June, the day on which I received them, and travelled night and day over the very worst possible roads, until I arrived at Knoxville. Here I met Lieutenant Howe, assistant commissary, stationed at Fort Cass, from whom I learned that it would be necessary to purchase at that place various supplies for the troops of whom I was about to take command. This occupied me and my assistant quartermaster for three days, when I left for Athens, the place of rendezvous for the brigade of East Tennessee volunteers, where I arrived on the 4th of July. Although twenty-five hundred men were marching on that place, instead of twelve hundred as called for by the Secretary of War, no preparations had been made to receive them. Everything therefore was to be done immediately, with only Major M. M. Payne, Lieutenant Howe, assistant commissary, and Lieutenant Hetzel, assistant quartermaster, to assist me. Subsistence, forage, store-houses, tents, and camp equipage, were to be provided before the 7th of July, the day the troops were to be assembled. They commenced arriving on the evening of the 5th, and on the 7th all were present; and all were mounted except two companies, and without the means of providing themselves with either forage or subsistence. At the request of Governor Cannon I furnished them with both.

On the 8th and 9th of July Governor Cannon organized this force, according to the laws of Tennessee, into a brigade of three regiments, and turned it over to me, with Brigadier General Dunlap at its head. I objected to receive it. But on the urgent solicitations of the governor, with a solemn pledge that the State of Tennessee would pay the expense if the President would not authorize it; a letter from General Gaines to the governor, requesting him to have (I believe) a brigade of mounted men in readiness for the southwestern frontier; and the rumors of the day of a general war with the Indians on our western borders, all conspired to induce me to receive the whole number, on conditions that the supernumeraries, over and above the call of the Secretary of War, should return to their homes, and there await, without pay, the future call of the President of the United States, or the commanding general of the Cherokee forces. It was an organized force, and ready to be called into service at any moment, with no other expense than is allowed for going to and returning from the place of rendezvous to their homes. It was at least a precautionary measure, and, as I conceived, warranted by circumstances, independent of the pledge of a chief of a sovereign State, which no officer could well refuse without giving offence to the State. Besides, it prevented an excitement, the extent of which no man could foresee, and which I have little doubt would have been turned, under the circumstances, against the administration and myself, and more especially if I had disregarded the pledge of the governor. For, I would ask, what justification could I have offered to the volunteers for not receiving them, after the State of Tennessee was pledged through its chief to pay the expense? Besides, I had little doubt, whether or not I received them, that Congress would, under the circumstances, pay the expense of their going to and returning home from the place of rendezvous. And in this opinion it would seem that I am sustained by the high authority of the President himself, for, although he censured me for receiving them, he says, in a communication to the Acting Secretary of War, dated the 7th of August: "Those men obeyed the summons of their country, and ought not to suffer for the indiscretion of those who caused more of them to turn out than could be received into the service." "They ought to be paid for their travel and expenses to, at, and from the place of rendezvous, and Congress will doubtless pass the necessary law. Their promptness in tendering their services and equipping themselves for the field is a high evidence of patriotism, and deserves the thanks of their country." I may have done wrong in receiving those troops, and yet I am unable to perceive how I could have avoided it.

It was under such circumstances that I received the brigade, and immediately ordered Brigadier General Dunlap to reorganize it into two regiments of ten companies each, and ordered the remaining companies, fourteen in number, besides one rejected, to their homes, and there to await, without pay, the future call of the President, &c. This occupied General Dunlap two days. During that period I ordered Lieutenant Howe, assistant commissary, to establish depots of provisions for the troops which I intended for active service at the mouth of Valley river in the mountains of North Carolina, at Ross's Landing in Tennessee, and at New Echota in Georgia. At the same time I ordered ten thousand rations to be deposited at each of the above depots for the poorer class of the Cherokees.

The brigade being organized, but having no ammunition for their muskets, and not being able to learn that any was on the way between any of the United States arsenals and Athens, I armed such of the companies as I intended for immediate service with rifles, and ordered the necessary ammunition and equipments to be purchased and prepared at Athens. On the 16th of July Captain Morrow, an intelligent, discreet, and vigilant officer, being ready, I directed him with his company to make a tour of the greatest part of the Cherokee nation, in order to ascertain the temper and disposition of the people, and to disseminate the views of the government amongst them, and to urge them to remain quiet and submit to the terms of the treaty. On the same day I ordered the two infantry companies to proceed and repair the road through the mountains of North Carolina to the mouth of Valley river, which was necessary before provisions could be transported to that section of the country.

On the 20th of July Lieutenant Howe, assistant commissary, and Lieutenant Hetzel, assistant quartermaster, having previously made, agreeably to my orders, the requisite arrangement for transporting the supplies to the several points designated, I ordered five companies, under the command of Colonel Bird, to Ross's Landing; one company, under the command of Captain Vernon, to New Echota, Georgia; and five companies, under the command of Colonel Smith, to the mouth of the Valley river. Each command arrived at its destined position about the same time—the 27th of July. The remaining five companies I ordered to be discharged the 31st of July—leaving myself with only eleven companies of volunteers and one of United States infantry. This force I conceive indispensable to make the necessary impression upon the Cherokees, and, as I informed the Secretary of War on the 19th of July, to induce the Indians to emigrate; for I had little doubt they would resist removal as long as they could with safety.—(See my letter to the Secretary of War on the 15th of July.)

On the 22d of July, in consequence of the information received from officers and agents in the Cherokee country, I was induced to make the following remarks to the Secretary of War: "From information recently received, growing out of the force assembled at this place, a favorable change, it would appear, has been produced in the minds of many of the friends of John Ross, notwithstanding he has recently encouraged them with the hope that he would obtain a rehearing, and eventually set aside the late treaty. I have cautioned the Cherokees in regard to the advice of John Ross, and informed them that they

had no hope but that of removal according to the treaty. Any other hope would lead to their destruction and all those concerned with them. The treaty must be executed, and that as soon as circumstances would permit. Such communications have had their effect, and the Cherokees are now willing to be advised. *If I am not interfered with, one-half of the Cherokees will, if necessary, go this fall, notwithstanding a powerful influence is excited against it.*"—(See also my letter to the Secretary of War dated the 25th of July.)

On the 27th July, a little more than a month after I received my instructions from the Secretary of War, having travelled eight hundred miles, armed and equipped a brigade of volunteers, established several depots of provisions for both troops and Indians in the Cherokee country, appointed agents to issue rations to the Indians, made regulations for their government as well as the volunteers, and repaired thirty miles of road, I established my headquarters in the mountains of North Carolina, near the mouth of Valley river, in the midst of the most savage and troublesome part of the Cherokees, who are nearly or quite all opposed to the late treaty. Conformably with my instructions of the 20th of June, I assembled the chiefs and headmen residing in that section of the country, and endeavored to prevail on them, as well as their people in general, to submit to the terms of the treaty, and send their poor to receive rations and clothing. After three several meetings, without coming to any conclusion on the subject, although they promised me they would, at the last of which they abruptly departed, without waiting for my arrival at the time appointed, or furnishing me with any excuse for their sudden departure. Such conduct, after my giving them every assurance of protection, and promising to guard them against any and every violence, either in person or property, as guaranteed in the treaty, I could view in no other light than as exhibiting strong feelings of opposition to the treaty, if not a determination to resist its execution, and which I conceived called for prompt and decided measures. I immediately ordered a force to pursue them, which brought the principal men to my headquarters, whom I placed under guard for the night. The next morning they apologized for their conduct, and promised submission to the terms of the treaty. As I could not rely on promises made under such circumstances, I permitted them to return to their homes, but with directions that their young men should bring in and deliver up their arms, which was complied with to nearly one hundred stand. This measure had a decided effect, and did more than anything else to convince them that a treaty had been made with them, and that it was to be executed; and if I had been permitted to pursue the same determined course throughout the nation, we should never have heard of the council of Red Clay, and I should have been spared the censure of the President of the United States. The course pursued on that occasion commanded not only their respect but their obedience; nay, more, it commanded the confidence and respect of all the white men as well as the red men. Not a murmur was heard against it in this section of the country. All parties, including Governor Lumpkin, Ridge, Boudinot, Bell, and Currey, approbated it, and declared it was the true course, and the only one which would insure a peaceable and quiet execution of the treaty. It convinced a large proportion of the Cherokees that a treaty had been made with them, and that they had to go to the west; and they began to think seriously of removing as soon as the commissioners could settle their claims, and the emigrating and disbursing agents furnish the means. Everything, in fact, was going on as well as the government could possibly desire, when I received the following communication from the Department of War :

"WAR DEPARTMENT, July 30, 1836.

"SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th instant.

"In reference to your remark, that 'with a less force we shall have difficulty to induce the Indians to emigrate, for I have little doubt they will resist removal as long as they can with safety,' I beg leave to observe that your instructions of the 20th June contemplated the application of military force only in the event of hostilities being commenced by the Cherokees. The treaty provides that they shall remove within two years, and that during that time they shall be protected in the peaceable possession of their country. *Unwillingness to remove, or even resistance to a removal, will not authorize the employment of force; no intimidation or coercion must be used.*

"I may have misapprehended your remark, but it seems proper to call your attention to our obvious construction of it, and to its incompatibility, so construed, with the stipulations of the treaty."

The Secretary of War can, under the circumstances, easily imagine what my feelings must have been when I received this communication, which deprived me of all power, except "in the event of hostilities." "*Unwillingness to remove, or resistance to a removal, will not authorize the employment of force; no intimidation or coercion must be used.*" Nothing was left me but to stand and look on until the Indians had raised the tomahawk and scalping-knife. This was not all. Another of the 1st, and still another of the 13th August, with private letters from the War Department, filled with the most alarming and foreboding apprehensions of the course I was pursuing. I frankly confess that these communications not only surprised me, but excited in me the most painful anxiety. I foresaw that what followed would be the result: that the people, so soon as they knew I was divested of discretionary power, would lapse into the arms of John Ross. Hence I wrote to the Secretary of War, dated the 20th August, at Fort Cass, calling his attention to my peculiar situation, and particularly in relation to the council proposed by John Ross. In that letter I remarked as follows, on the communication of the War Department, dated 30th July, speaking of John Ross: "I cautioned him to be careful how he advised such a procedure, (alluding to a council,) unless it was for the purpose of explaining to the people the late treaty, with reference to their entire submission to its terms. That any discussion having for its object a different result would, I was confident, meet with no favor on the part of the government of the United States." I said thus much to Mr. Ross; more I could not say with propriety, after the letter of the Acting Secretary of War, dated the 30th July, upon which I shall make no other comment than, if I understood my instructions of the 20th June last, and understood the Secretary of War, I was not only sent to suppress hostilities, but to prevent them, and to preserve the peace of the country. If I am to do nothing until hostilities have commenced, I can only say that I cannot be recalled too soon from this command. I will never consent to risk my reputation as an officer with the restrictions embraced in the Acting Secretary's letters. By timely and decided measures the Florida and Creek wars might have been prevented. One Cherokee, (alluding to John Ross,) whenever he pleases, can unite the whole nation, at least a large majority, in a war against the United States."

Again: on the 27th August, after I had seen and consulted with Governor Lumpkin, showing him the instructions I had received from the War Department, expressing to him my great anxiety on account of the restrictions which had been imposed on me, and which appeared as unaccountable to him as to myself,

for he declared there had been but one voice in relation to my conduct, and that was universal approbation, saying for himself he did not believe any other officer could have done better, if as well as myself, I wrote to the War Department in answer to the Acting Secretary's letter of the 13th August, when I endeavored to convince the Secretary that there was but one course which ought to be pursued towards this people, and that was a firm and decided one, at the same time to protect them in all the rights and privileges secured to them by the treaty, and concluded by observing: "If the officer in command has no discretionary power over the white or red men, he ought not to remain in the country, for it would be utterly impossible for him to do his duty, either in regard to the government, himself, the Indians, or the white men."

Again: on the 1st of September I wrote to the Acting Secretary, when I remarked: "Since my last to you, Mr. John Ross has issued his circular, calling a council of the nation, for the purpose of laying before it the proceedings of the delegation at Washington, and at the same time to give an account of their conduct in relation to the late treaty. This council is to meet on the 15th instant. I have sent one of the circulars to the President of the United States by express, with a request that he would give me his views on the subject, and advise the course I ought to pursue in relation to it. One thing is certain: no good will result from it, and much evil may be anticipated. Major Currey and John Ridge have been here; they both predict much evil from the meeting. We shall be disappointed if a formal protest of the council be not made and published against the treaty. This is the time for decision and action. Those who are opposed to the treaty should be told that the time has passed for discussing the question, and that they have nothing to do but to comply with its terms. This, you may rely upon it, is the true course. I shall however wait, and do nothing until I have further instructions from the War Department or the President." And why did I say I would "do nothing until I have further instructions from the War Department or the President?" It was because of the instructions of the 30th July, which would not allow even of "intimidation or coercion."

In my letter of the 30th of August, forwarded by express to the President of the United States, to which I have alluded above, I transmitted to him one of John Ross's circulars calling a council; and in order to show him the extent of the restrictions imposed on me by the War Department, I forwarded a copy of the Acting Secretary's letter of the 30th of July, with a request that he would give me his wishes in regard to the course I ought to pursue. I asked it because, as I remarked in my letter, I was very much restricted, and had very little or no discretionary power left me in any case except "actual hostilities." At the same time I informed him that it was thought that the meeting and its proceedings would do much mischief, and would interrupt very much the business of the commissioners, and retard emigration. At the time I sent this letter no one doubted that the President would give me all the authority necessary in the case. Such was the opinion of Governor Lumpkin, Ridge, Boudinot, Rogers, and others. The President, however, did not think proper to do so. In his reply, dated September 7, he says: "As you have the treaty before you, and the instructions of the Acting Secretary of War, I do not see that I can add anything more on this subject at present. The treaty is to be religiously fulfilled. You may assure all concerned that no modification or alteration in it will be made by me. Of this Mr. John Ross is fully advised. His friend, Mr. Standefer, who waited upon me at Washington and made the inquiry whether I would agree to a supplemental article, admitting the Rosses and their delegation in as chiefs, was informed that I would not. You will, therefore, make known to the Cherokee people that no alteration in the treaty will be made, but that all its terms and conditions will be faithfully and fully executed.

"You will caution John Ross from calling a council of the Cherokee people, with a view of altering or opposing the treaty. He knows that there will be no further negotiation on the subject; that the Cherokees are to emigrate in two years from the ratification of the treaty, and will be obliged to go within that period; that collision between them and the whites has been too long continued for the gratification of himself at the expense of the poor of the nation." I could view this letter in no other light than as a full confirmation of the Acting Secretary's letter of the 30th July, which deprived me of all power except in case of hostilities.

It appears, however, by the communication of the Acting Secretary of the 12th October, that the President expressed his surprise that I should have "permitted the council to remain in session a moment after it became apparent that it was determined to declare the treaty void. This was the contingency contemplated in the letter of the department of September 3, in which you were instructed to interfere and disperse such assemblage." Surely, from the course I had previously pursued at Valley river, and where I told the Cherokees they could not counsel with John Ross, for I would not permit it, at the same time I informed them that I was the only one with whom they could advise, (the commissioners had not then arrived,) and I advised with no one but the President, and he was determined to have the treaty executed. I repeat, surely, after so firm and decided a course, together with my earnest appeals against the restrictions imposed upon me by the War Department, no one will believe that I would have permitted the council to remain in session a moment if I could have drawn from the letter of the 3d of September the same conclusions that the President did. It would have been contrary to my whole course since I have been in the country, in words, actions, and feelings, and which caused so much alarm at Washington that it was apprehended that I might commit some rash and indiscreet act, which would not only compromise myself but the government.—(See my letter of the 30th of July.) It was a peaceable assemblage, conducting its proceedings with order and decorum, without noise, commotion, or disturbance. It is true that it decided the treaty was no treaty, but not until the last day of the session, when the council immediately dispersed, and before I was made acquainted with its decision. Although I well understood the object of the meeting, yet no one could tell until the vote was taken what the final result would be. The subject was not discussed in general council, but, as I understood, in private and around the family fires. Not one circumstance, however, occurred during the whole sitting that, according to my construction of the Secretary's letter, would have justified me in breaking it up. He says, in the second paragraph, "You command in an important section of the country, and at a moment of much anxiety. While everything is quiet, and no appearance of hostile designs meditated, your measures will be adapted to a state of peace, or, in other words, nothing more will be necessary than to keep your force on the alert, and to watch the movements of the Indians. But if you have just grounds to believe that they are preparing for disturbances, you will adopt measures adequate to the emergency." I had no grounds to believe that they were preparing for disturbances, although their measures might eventually lead to such a result. The letter, although it expresses great confidence in my judgment as well as my energy, contains many qualifications. In one sentence it gives power, and in another it takes it away. I thought it more of a *diplomatic* than a *military* letter. On examining, however, and comparing all the letters referred to, I

could not discover that any of them invested me with the necessary power. Whether or not the Secretary's letter contained the authority, I did not consider it the letter by which I was to be governed. The President's letter was the proper and only one to which, under the circumstances, I could look for authority. He was nearer the scene of action. He had been sent to by express, in order to obtain his views on the subject. He had the circular of John Ross before him, as also the Acting Secretary's letter to me of the 30th July, which deprived me of all power except "in the event of hostilities." Mr. Rogers, the bearer of my letter, was with the President. He was anxious to have the council broken up, and was particularly requested to call the attention of the President to the subject, and more especially as I had no power to act in the case. Mr. Rogers returned; no one doubted that he had brought with him the requisite authority. Governor Lumpkin saw Mr. Rogers before he arrived at my camp with the reply of the President, and under the impression that it contained the necessary power, wrote to me on the subject, anticipating that I would give the death-blow to the influence of John Ross. He, however, was mistaken, as well as the rest of us. The President's letter contained no such authority. On the contrary, it only contained a confirmation of the restrictions of the Acting Secretary, with a caution to John Ross, and orders to inform the Cherokee people that the treaty was to be "religiously fulfilled without alteration or modification." It being the last letter, and coming from the President of the United States, according to military rules it could neither be disregarded nor disobeyed. It was obeyed to the letter, and to the exclusion of all others; and, as I could not doubt, properly and rightly under the circumstances.—(See my communication to the department of the 18th of September.)

As to the transmission of the communication of John Ross and his associates, I can truly say that I intended no disrespect to any one, much less to the President or the Senate of the United States. Of such an act I am wholly incapable. My object in sending it to the War Department was merely to let them see what had transpired at the council, in order that such measure might be adopted, in the opinion of the Secretary, the circumstances required.

In relation to the instructions of the President, as communicated through the War Department, of the 17th of October, by which I am required to consult the commissioners, and "acquiesce in their judgment, and carry into effect any measures or operations, civil or military, they may determine to be proper;" I would observe, they are too humiliating to an officer who has served his country honorably and faithfully, both in peace and in war, for more than twenty-four years without the slightest censure from a superior, to be submitted to without at least a remonstrance, lest the blood which flowed from his veins at Queenstown should rise in judgment against him. For a military commander to be held responsible for the peace, protection, and defence of a country, and at the same time to be placed under the control of civil officers, has no parallel in the military annals of our country. I will not believe the President intended to impose upon me, as military commander of this country, such degrading conditions. I have done nothing to deserve it. If I am culpable, let me be arraigned and tried, but do not degrade me until I am proved guilty. I have yet to learn that I have been wanting in judgment, firmness, or decision, or that I have, in a single instance, neglected my duty or the interest of my country. Nor have I been wanting in courtesy or attention to the commissioner, who has been waiting for many weeks for his colleague to enter upon the duties of his office. His high and responsible station is a sufficient guarantee to command my respect, and induce me to consult him on all proper occasions. I am sure Governor Lumpkin will not say that I have not consulted him on all proper occasions, or that there has been any want of union or action between him and myself. On the contrary, we have communicated freely and frankly with each other on all subjects connected with our stations and our duties, without disagreement or difference of opinion. I have no objection, however, to the military command of this country being given to one or both of the commissioners; and I have no doubt, if they should be invested with it, they will do honor to themselves and their country; but I hope and trust the President will not require me to act the subordinate.

In closing this communication to the Secretary of War, I would respectfully observe that I hope nothing therein will be construed as intended to be disrespectful to any one, and certainly not to the President of the United States, who is the last person I would think of treating with disrespect. The object of this communication is, a vindication of my honor, and, if possible, to remove suspicions which appear to hang over me, and to convince the President, as well as the Secretary of War, that I am not deserving of censure in any respect whatever, and that my whole course, since I have been intrusted with the command of this country, has been directed with a single eye to the accomplishment of the objects of the government, and to promote the interests of my country. That I have faithfully, honestly, and fearlessly discharged all my duties, doing justice to the red as well as to the white man, and protecting all, as far as it was in my power, in their rights and privileges, as secured to them by the late treaty, I am confident will be awarded to me by the people of this country.

With considerations of the highest respect, I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL, *Brigadier General, Commanding.*

Hon. B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War ad interim.*

No. 18.

WAR DEPARTMENT, November 23, 1836.

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your communication of the 6th instant, containing a detailed report of the course you have pursued in your present command, and explaining certain measures to which exception has heretofore been taken by the President and by this department. In consequence of the severe illness of the President, I have not yet been able to submit your letter, as you desired, to his inspection; but will do so, as soon as the state of his health will permit. In the meantime, I beg leave to refer you to my letter of the 16th instant, in which the President authorized me to express to you, in decided terms, his continued confidence, and his desire that you should remain in command in the Cherokee country. The favorable views there expressed will, no doubt, be greatly strengthened by the various considerations stated in your report, which abundantly shows (what, indeed, was never doubted by this department) that, throughout your arduous and important duties, you have been influenced by the most honorable motives, and have acted with great fidelity and zeal.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War ad interim.*

Brigadier General JOHN E. WOOL, *Athens, Tennessee.*

No. 19.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE C. N., *New Echota, Georgia, November 28, 1836.*

SIR: Herewith I have the honor to enclose the Athens Republican of 23d instant. Under the editorial head will be found the following observations, viz: "The inference deducible from the various propositions taken by the writer, (An Observer,) induced the superintendent of the Cherokee removals to call on us, while in this place last week, when he showed to us a communication from the War Department instructing him to give publicity to the views of the President of the United States, as contained in the copy of a letter from the Acting Secretary of War to General Wool, dated October 12, 1836, in which this language is employed: 'I am instructed to express the surprise of the President that you permitted the council of the Cherokees to remain in session one moment after it became apparent that it was determined to declare the treaty void. This was the contingency contemplated in the letter of the department of September 3, in which you were instructed to interfere and disperse such assemblage.'"

I cannot believe the War Department has adopted this new and most extraordinary mode of giving publicity to the censures of the President of the United States against an officer of the army. Still it comes in such a shape that I am constrained to ask the Secretary of War if a communication was transmitted from the War Department to the superintendent of Cherokee removals, instructing him to give publicity to the views of the President of the United States, as contained in the copy of a letter from the Acting Secretary of War to General Wool, dated October 12, 1836? If such instructions had been given, it appears to me that my instructions and the correspondence between the President, the Secretary of War, and myself, on the subject would have been transmitted with them. To order the publicity of one without the other, especially through a civil officer, would be no less unjust than it would deprive me of the only mode left of defending myself and vindicating my honor, and the course I have pursued since I have commanded in this country. Surely the President does not intend to condemn me unheard, nor without affording me an opportunity of showing that I am innocent; and I cannot only prove that I am wholly guiltless, but that I have not, in a single instance, lost sight of the objects which I was sent to accomplish in this country. Nay, more, I will prove that I have not, in a single instance, nor for a single moment, neglected my duties, nor the interests of my country.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL, *Brigadier General, Commanding.*

Hon. B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War.*

No. 20.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *December 24, 1836.*

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your several letters of the 16th, 20th, and 28th ultimo. Conceiving that the two former have been sufficiently anticipated by the communications of this department, addressed to you under date of November 16 and 23, I deem it unnecessary to make any particular reply to them. The like observation is applicable, in some respects, to your letter of the 28th.

In regard to the publication contained in the newspaper transmitted with your last letter, it is due to the department, as well as to yourself, to state that a copy of the letter from the Acting Secretary of War, of October 12, 1836, was furnished by the Indian office to the superintendent of Cherokee removals, in order to keep him advised of the measures taken and contemplated by the department on subjects connected with his official duties; and that he was instructed to give publicity to the views therein expressed, for the purpose of enabling him, in his intercourse with the Indians and others, to counteract any injurious effects which might result from the proceedings of John Ross and his associates, and to impress on all concerned the determination of the President to enforce the execution of the treaty, and not to allow its validity to be called in question. The publication of an extract from that letter, in the manner and under the circumstances in which it has been made, was not contemplated, and is not approved by this department, and the superintendent has been so advised by a letter this day addressed him. On the other hand, there is room to question the propriety of the publication previously inserted in the same newspaper, which led to the communication of the extract above referred to, if, as seems highly probable, it emanated from an officer under your command. The superintendent evidently supposed that the publication of that article made it proper to give publicity, through the same medium, to the extract selected by him from the letter of October 12.

Should you deem it necessary to your character and usefulness as an officer, you are at liberty to publish the whole letter of October 12, together with the letters of this department of November 16 and 23, or either of them, and this letter, which will be included in any publication you may make. It is not perceived that any necessity exists for the publication of any other part of the correspondence.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War ad interim.*

Brigadier General JOHN E. WOOL, *Athens, Tennessee.*

No. 21.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE C. N., *New Echota, Georgia, March 31, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to inform the Secretary of War that I have this day discharged, except one company, the East Tennessee volunteers, ordered home agreeable to Order No. 66, issued the 1st November last. This order has not been issued in consequence of any apparent change of feelings on the part of the Cherokees in favor of removing to the west, but because I do not apprehend any danger or disturbance from them until about the time they will be called on to take their departure for their new homes. As long as they have a ray of hope of remaining in this country, and will not be obliged to remove to the west, there

will be no danger of war or disturbance with the Cherokees. But when the period arrives when all hopes of remaining in the lands of their forefathers shall be dissipated, and they find that they must go, whoever may be in command in this country at that time may consider himself more than fortunate if he should succeed in removing them without the shedding of human blood. I will not trouble you with a detail of circumstances which are to produce such a scene. It is sufficient to say that the rights of this people have been too often disregarded, too often trampled upon, too often violated without a cause or justification, with impunity, not to have sunk deep into their hearts, and which, I have little doubt, will be made most signally manifest before they finally take their departure, unless prevented by the most efficient and judicious measures. By these remarks I only intend reference to the acts of individuals who reside among them, and who seem bent on drenching this country with blood.

Recent occurrences, which are but repetitions of those which have heretofore taken place, show plainly that it is in vain to appeal to the civil authorities of the country to repress the disposition of the whites to oppress this people and trample on their rights. In illustration, I would refer to a case of an aggravated cast which occurred a few days since within a few miles of this place. An Indian at his home was shot down and basely murdered by a party of white men, who had not the semblance of provocation, unless an attempt to escape from their barbarity be so considered. These men were arrested by my order, and immediately turned over to the civil authority to be dealt with according to their deserts; but so strongly have the prejudices of the people, stimulated by avarice, been excited against the Indians, that it is exceedingly doubtful if justice can be done in the case. With these people it really seems to be no crime to kill an Indian. They do not look to the probable consequences. This circumstance, together with the daily efforts of the whites to dispossess the Indians of their houses and lands, has created a state of feverish excitement which it will be exceedingly difficult to repress when the hour of their departure arrives. To check these aggressions on the part of the whites, and to allay the consequent excitement of the Cherokees, and, if possible, induce them to prepare to remove peaceably to the west, have induced me to propose making the tour through the Cherokee nation, to which I alluded in my last communication. In the meantime I would most earnestly renew my application, made through the Adjutant General's office, to Major General Macomb, in my letter of the 18th of February last, for a regiment of United States infantry to be sent to this country. Such a force, together with the volunteers I can always have at my command in Georgia and Tennessee, will perhaps enable me to preserve the peace of the country, and remove the Cherokees without the horrors of another Indian war.

In addition to the above, I would observe that Lieutenant Deas, of the United States army, has arrived with agents to receive for emigration the refugee Creeks scattered through this country. From the information I have recently received, I think there cannot be less than one thousand. These, it would appear, like many of the Cherokees, are determined not to leave the country until they are forced out of it. On the first intimation of a design to collect them for removal, they fled to the mountains of Georgia and North Carolina. But few have yet been taken. I have little doubt, however, that the greater part will be taken in the course of a month. I have several parties of volunteers in pursuit of them.

I have the honor to be, with considerations of the highest respect, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL, *Brigadier General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

No. 22.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 17, 1836.*

SIR: I have had the honor to receive and to lay before the President your letter of the 2d instant, enclosing a communication of John Ross and others to you.

I am directed by the President to return the communication to you, and to express his astonishment that you should have received or transmitted a paper so disrespectful to him to the Senate, and through them to the people of the United States. You will immediately return it to those who have signed it, and express to them his decided disapprobation of their proceedings and those of the council, and of the measures contemplated by Ross and his associates.

The expression in your letter, "if the government intended seriously to execute it (the treaty) within the period prescribed," leaves room to suppose that you yet entertain a doubt as to the intentions of the President. To prevent any misapprehension on this subject, I am instructed to repeat, in the most explicit terms, that it is the settled determination of the President that the present treaty shall be executed without modification, and with all the despatch consistent with propriety and justice.

You will deliver a copy of this communication to Mr. Ross, and will thereafter cease to hold any communication with him, either orally or in writing, in regard to the treaty.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

C. A. HARRIS, *Acting Secretary of War.*

Brevet Brig. Gen. J. E. Woor, *New Echota, Georgia.*

No. 23.

HEADQUARTERS, *Washington, July 19, 1837.*

SIR: I have, since my arrival in this city, seen a letter, dated July 3, 1837, from his excellency C. C. Clay, governor of Alabama, in which it is represented that, in consequence of certain orders of mine, issued whilst in command of the Cherokee nation, "a contest has taken place in the county of Marshall, which resulted in the death of two individuals certainly, besides the most serious injury to others, some of whom it is feared may yet die of their wounds," and requests that the affair should be promptly investigated, in order that those concerned in it "may meet merited condemnation."

With a view that justice may be done to myself, and that my conduct whilst in command in the Cherokee nation may be duly appreciated, at the same time to prevent false impressions from growing out

of the affairs complained of, I earnestly request that the President of the United States will institute a court of inquiry, not only to investigate my conduct in relation to the case in question, but in relation to all my conduct as commanding general in the Cherokee country, from the time I entered it until I relinquished the command to Colonel Lindsay, the 1st of July instant.

I have the honor to be, with considerations of the highest respect,

JOHN E. WOOL, *Brigadier General U. S. Army.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

No. 24.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *July 27, 1837.*

Sir: I have attentively considered your letter of the 19th instant, and, after mature reflection, feel myself constrained to refuse your request to extend the inquiries of the court, which, at the instance of the State of Alabama, had been previously ordered, so as to embrace a general investigation of the whole of your conduct as commanding general in the Cherokee country, from the time you entered it until you relinquished the command to Colonel Lindsay. Such a course is unusual, and, as a precedent, might be prejudicial to the service. No accusation has been made against you with regard to any other part of your conduct while in command in the Cherokee country; nor was it intended by this department, in any orders given to Colonel Lindsay, to convey any censure of your proceedings. By the laws, regulations, and usage of the service, every officer who is accused is entitled to a court of inquiry; but, in the entire absence of all charges against him, it is unusual to ask, and it is deemed inexpedient to grant, a court to inquire generally in relation to his conduct during the period of his particular service.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Brevet Brigadier General JOHN E. WOOL, *Nassau, New York.*

No. 25.

NEW YORK, *August 6, 1837.*

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 27th ultimo, by which it appears that the President refuses to grant my request for a court to inquire into my conduct as commanding general in the Cherokee country, from the time I entered it until I relinquished the command to Colonel Lindsay, because "no accusation has been made against me with regard to any part of my conduct while in command in the Cherokee country;" excepting one from the governor of Alabama, on which an investigation has been ordered.

It appears from a communication addressed to the officers of the Georgia volunteers by the Secretary of War, dated May 20, 1837, that I was recalled at my own request. It is true that, in consequence of the censures and degrading orders of the President of the United States, as contained in the communications of the War Department, dated the 12th and 17th of October, 1836, and circulated by the order of the Acting Secretary of War through the Cherokee nation, and partially published in the Athens Republican of the 23d of November, 1836, I did request to be recalled. The President, however, did not deem it expedient to comply with my request, "as he saw no adequate reason for recalling me from the command," and I remained in the country.

After the lapse of several months the recall is ordered, and one of the reasons assigned is the application made in November, which was then refused. As something new must have occurred subsequently to November, which has been deemed by the President of sufficient importance to induce a recall even on an application which had been refused, and which had not been renewed; and as Colonel Lindsay, my successor and junior in rank, has been directed, upon the complaint of Mr. John Ross and others, to investigate certain parts of my conduct, and report the facts to the department; and as all partial inquiries may lead to injustice, it would be but an act of palpable justice to make the inquiry general. Therefore I again respectfully but earnestly request that the court which is to assemble at Athens, in Tennessee, on the 25th instant, may be authorized to make such inquiry, and report their opinions, with the facts.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL, *Brigadier General U. S. Army.*

Hon. JOEL R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

No. 26.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *August 11, 1837.*

Sir: I have received your letter of the 6th instant.

Your application for a general inquiry into your conduct while commanding in the Cherokee country has been reconsidered, but the President still sees no reasons for changing the determination already communicated to you.

There is no charge brought against you, and the mere circumstance of your recall from the command, and the appointment of a successor, though your junior, does not furnish any ground either for complaint or for a right to call for a court of inquiry. No censure was intended by this measure, nor by the order to Colonel Lindsay to report the facts in a matter in which this department desires information.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

JOEL R. POINSETT.

Brigadier General JOHN E. WOOL, *City of New York.*

No. 27.

[Extract.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF E. T. AND C. N., *Fort Cass, October 13, 1836.*

SIR: "From New Echota I proceeded to Red Clay, where I had ordered a camp to be formed of four companies to watch the movements of the Cherokees and to prevent disturbances at the council held from the 15th to the 25th ultimo. During the whole of the session of the council the volunteers conducted themselves with great propriety.

"I had several interviews with Mr. John Ross and other principal men of the nation on the subject of the council, the object of which was to explain the conduct of the late delegation at Washington, and to denounce the treaty made with the Cherokees and ratified by the Senate of the United States the 25th of May last. I endeavored to convince them of the extreme folly of any attempt to set aside or modify it; that if he persisted in the plan suggested, he would not only bring down ruin upon himself, but on his friends also. I informed him of the determination of the President to adhere to the treaty, and 'to have it executed in all its parts, terms, and conditions.' I called his attention to the situation of the Creeks, not only those who had been engaged in the recent hostilities, but those who had been friendly and had resided for many years in the Cherokee nation, who were now hunted up and carried to the Creek emigrating camp and forced to the west. I asked him if he was prepared to witness such scenes among his own people, which would inevitably be the result if he persisted in his present course of policy. He replied that his will was that of his people; he should submit the question to them, and abide the result. That result has been transmitted to the War Department.

"From Red Clay I proceeded to this place, where I have been busily engaged since the 7th instant in examining and signing abstracts of issues and making out my accounts with the government of the United States.

"I have only to add to the above that I have done everything in my power not only to conciliate the Cherokees, but to protect them in all the rights and privileges secured to them by the treaty. This they have no hesitation to acknowledge. Scarcely a day passes that some complaint is not made that a Cherokee has either lost a horse, a hog, or a cow, or his house or lands, which require my interference. I think I have restored four stolen horses within the last two weeks, and protected numbers in the possession of their houses, lands, and ferries. This, with the supplies which have been furnished in rations and clothing, has given me a claim to their confidence, and my decided course has commanded their respect and obedience."

JOHN E. WOOL, *Brigadier General, Commanding.*Major General A. MACOMB, *Commanding the United States Army.*

No. 28.

RED CLAY COUNCIL GROUND, *Cherokee Nation, September 30, 1836.*

SIR: The undersigned, chiefs and representatives of the Cherokee people, beg leave to address you, as the commanding general intrusted with the execution of the orders of the President of the United States, concerning the instrument purporting to be a treaty between the United States and the Cherokee nation east of the Mississippi, and have the honor to state that your communications of the 19th instant to the Cherokee people, respecting your instructions on the subject, were promptly read and interpreted to them in general council assembled. The result of their deliberations, and the expression of sentiments adopted by upwards of twenty-one hundred male adults on this occasion, the undersigned would also most respectfully communicate, through you, to the government of the United States, as follows, to wit: The chiefs, national committee, and council, and the people of the Cherokee nation in general council assembled, have resolved that the instrument purporting to be a treaty made at New Echota, on the 29th day of December, 1835, by the Rev. John F. Schermerhorn, commissioner of the United States, and the chiefs, headmen, and people of the Cherokee tribe of Indians, is a fraud upon the government of the United States and an act of oppression on the Cherokee people; that those who are represented as acting on the part of the Cherokees, and who assumed the style of "chiefs and headmen," hold no such title or designation from the Cherokees, nor have they received authority from the nation to form said instrument; therefore said instrument is null and void, and can never, in justice, be enforced upon the nation, as they do most solemnly disclaim and utterly reject said instrument in its principles and all its provisions; that a respectful memorial to the government of the United States be prepared, on behalf of the Cherokee people, praying that the said instrument may be set aside; that a delegation, consisting of John Ross, principal chief, Richard Taylor, Samuel Gunter, George Sanders, Walter S. Adair, John Binge, James Brown, and Stephen Foreman, be and are appointed, with full powers, to represent the Cherokee people before the government of the United States, and to enter into arrangements for the final adjustment of all their existing difficulties; that this delegation are instructed to confer with the Cherokees west of the Mississippi on the subject of their acting in concert for the interests and happiness of the whole Cherokee family; that any irresponsible individuals assuming to themselves the power to act in the name of the nation, without authority first legitimately obtained, will be deemed guilty of infringing the prerogatives of the nation and violating the rights of the Cherokee people, who will assuredly never sanction such usurpation, nor acquiesce in the doings of such persons; that in the course they have adopted in reference to the instrument in question, no departure from the most respectful and friendly feelings towards the President, the government, and the people of the United States is contemplated; but, on the contrary, their determination is to maintain and cultivate those friendly relations which have long subsisted between the government and people of the United States and their nation; that, in compliance with a law of Congress which directs that "Indian annuities shall be paid to the chiefs, or such persons as the tribe shall appoint," the above-named delegation have been authorized and appointed to receive from the proper officers of the government of the United States all sums of money due the Cherokee nation east of the Mississippi, and to receipt for the

same for and on account of the said Cherokee nation; that the doings of the general council now assembled render the meeting of the committee and council on the second Monday in October next inexpedient, and said meeting is therefore dispensed with.

In thus frankly communicating the sentiments of the Cherokee people and the doings of the general council, the undersigned beg leave to reassure you that they are actuated from the purest motives and the most friendly feelings towards the public functionaries and the private citizens of the United States; that the only hope of the Cherokees for a further hearing from the government on the subject of their grievances, and for a more satisfactory and final adjustment of their existing difficulties, rests on the justice of their case, and the unremitting confidence entertained in the good faith, magnanimity, and justice of the President and the Congress of the United States, and to realize which they desire that the whole truth may be fairly stated respecting the manner and circumstances under which the instrument complained of was negotiated, and that the same may be fully understood and impartially investigated.

The Cherokees are deeply sensible of their peculiar and dependent situation, consequently are not ignorant that their very existence as a people is at the mercy of the United States, and subject to their will and pleasure. Their course is plain, and has ever been directed in the path of peace and friendship, though not influenced by the dastardly feelings of fear, but by those pleasing ties of confidence and social relations which have so long and so happily subsisted between them and their white brethren. Much may be said, by way of objections in detail, of the instrument in question, but it is deemed unnecessary. The mutual interests and welfare of the whole Cherokee family, those in the east as well as those in the west, would require that in any final arrangement that their approbation should be equally consulted, in order that harmony among themselves may be insured; policy as well as common justice would seem to require this.

In conclusion, will you please to permit us to state that, in compliance with the desire of the Cherokees of the valley towns, it is respectfully asked that their guns may now be restored to them, which have been surrendered up in compliance with your orders, as it is to be hoped there will not be found any necessity for retaining them longer. The undersigned beg you to accept their cordial thanks and sincere regard for your honorable course in the discharge of your military duties here, and also for the gentlemanly deportment of the officers, and the orderly conduct of the soldiers under your command during the sitting of the general council.

With great respect, they have the honor to be, sir, your obedient, humble servants,

John Ross, *principal chief*.
 George Lowrey, *assistant principal chief*.
 Young Snake, *speaker of national council*.
 Archibald Campbell.
 The Bark.
 Chu-nuh-gee.
 Young Glass.
 Sleeping Rabbit.
 John Watts.
 James Spears.
 Sittiwazee.
 Charles.
 Chu-wa-lu-gee.
 John Wane.
 White Path.
 John Oterlifter.
 Softshell Turtle.

Bean Stick.
 Walking Stick.
 Tarquoh.
 Money Crier.
 Jesse Bushyhead, *clerk of national council*.
 R. Taylor, *president of national council*.
 Thomas Foreman.
 George Still.
 James Hawkins.
 Nah-hoo-hah.
 John F. Boldrige.
 Old Fields.
 Hair Conrod.
 Choo-noo-luh-hno-kee.
 James D. Woffard.
 Stephen Foreman, *clerk of national council*.

Brigadier General JOHN E. WOOL, *Commanding United States Army in Cherokee Nation*.

No. 29.

DEFENCE OF BRIGADIER GENERAL WOOL.

MR. PRESIDENT: It was very far from my expectation, when I took leave of my command on the 1st of July last, in obedience to instructions from the War Department, that I should so soon again be compelled to revisit this country, particularly under the circumstances in which I now appear before you. I frankly confess that, when I took my departure, I was flattered with the pleasing reflection that I carried with me the approbation and kind wishes of all—the Tennesseans, the Georgians, the North Carolinians, and the Alabamians. It appears, however, that I was mistaken; and the pleasing allusion which I had so fondly cherished was soon and rudely to be dispelled; for, on my arrival at Washington, I learned from the Secretary of War that I had been charged by the executive of Alabama with usurping the powers of the civil tribunals of the State, disturbing the peace of the community, and trampling upon the rights of its citizens; and that a court had been instituted to inquire into the circumstances, and report the facts to the War Department. My surprise was great; for, of all that could be alleged against me, during the period I commanded in the Cherokee nation, the charges preferred against me were the most foreign to my feelings and intentions, and which every measure adopted, with reference to the Cherokees and the white inhabitants, will clearly prove. I did not go to that country, Mr. President, to tarnish what little reputation I may have previously acquired, by acts of oppression or cruelty, nor by violating the laws of my country. My object was a faithful execution of the treaty with the Cherokees, to protect all in their rights, as guaranteed by it—the white men and the red—the weak as well as the strong. These were the cardinal rules for my conduct, which I steadily kept in view, and which I never lost sight of for a single moment, from the time I entered the country until I left it.

But it is not my intention, Mr. President, to detain this court, or weary its patience by attestations of my innocence, or a labored defence of my conduct whilst commanding in the Cherokee nation. The President of the United States having refused my request for a general inquiry into my conduct, and the present inquiry being limited to a single complaint, I will at once proceed, in as brief a manner as circumstances

will permit, to present my views of the subject to the consideration of the court. The facts by which this court is to be guided in the formation of its opinion are now upon its records. I await the result of its deliberations and the judgment of the American people, when your proceedings shall be made public, with undoubting confidence.

My instructions, Mr. President, of the 20th June, 1836, in which a copy of the late treaty with the Cherokees was enclosed, are before you, marked 1. With what energy, zeal, and promptitude I discharged the important duties thus assigned me, the court will be able to judge from the facts and the documents before it. As directed, I repaired to Athens, in Tennessee, with as much despatch as practicable; and after organizing a brigade of volunteers, arming and equipping such a force as I considered the nature of the service required, and establishing depots of provisions in suitable places for both the troops and the poorer class of Cherokees, distributing the troops in such positions as would afford the greatest facilities for operating and controlling the Cherokees, in case of hostilities, I established my headquarters on the 27th of July, (a little more than a month after I left Washington,) near the mouth of Valley river, North Carolina, in the midst of the most obstinate and warlike of the Cherokees, and the most devotedly attached to their country. I was not slow in discovering that the command I had assumed was one of delicacy in its nature, and extremely troublesome in the execution. I found the Indians laboring under a state of excitement produced by the means adopted to force upon them the late treaty, which they most explicitly disavowed, "declaring that they had made no such treaty with the United States, and that the paper which purported to be one was made by a few unauthorized individuals, without the sanction of the nation, assisted by corrupt agents of the government." This state of feeling was heightened by the daily encroachment of the whites, who were flocking into the nation and driving them from their homes. This excitement was still greater in Georgia and Alabama, where the Indians were not only dispossessed of their houses and fields, but, in consequence, also, of the conduct of the troops of those States, who, in pursuit of Creek Indians who had fled for refuge among the Cherokees from the war that was raging in their own country, not unfrequently captured the Cherokees and conveyed them to the Creek emigrating camp for transportation to the west. By this means husbands were frequently separated from their wives, and children from the parents. Such was the perplexed and embarrassing state of things with which I had to struggle on my entrance into the Cherokee country.

To allay this excitement, to correct these abuses, and to induce the Cherokees to acquiesce and submit to the conditions imposed by the treaty, the best energies of which I was master were put in requisition. The testimony before the court will show that I devoted myself unceasingly to accomplish the objects of my mission to the Cherokee country, to execute the treaty honorably to the government and justly to the Indians. I have the satisfaction of believing that the measures adopted would have produced the desired effect. The Cherokees were beginning to relax in their opposition, and were making preparations for removal to the west.

I have thus endeavored, Mr. President, briefly to lay before you the state of the Cherokee nation in August and September, 1836. If, at that time, I had been sustained in my course by the government of the United States, and the commissioners had been present to enter upon the discharge of their duties at the same time, I have no doubt, and I think I will be sustained in the declaration by the more intelligent part of the nation, that at least five thousand of the Cherokees would have removed to their new homes during the last fall and winter. This would have induced the removal of the residue of the nation without trouble or difficulty.

As an indication of the course pursued by me during my command in the Cherokee country, and as showing the means by which I acquired the confidence of the Indians, and the approbation of the white citizens of the nation and the neighboring country, I would call the attention of the court to my communications to Brigadier General Dunlap, of the 4th and 12th of August, 1836. In that of the 4th of August the following directions will be found: "You will proceed without delay to New Echota, and such other parts of the Cherokee nation within the limits of Georgia as may be necessary to give protection both to the Cherokees and the white inhabitants residing in that section of the country. You will allow no encroachments on either side. *Both will be protected in their persons and property.* You will prevent, as far as practicable, all collisions between your troops and the Indians. You will also prevent any interference on the part of the Georgia troops with the Cherokees. At all events, you will prevent any improper exercise of military control over the Indians or the white inhabitants. The whole subject is left to your sound discretion, taking care to do nothing that will bring you in conflict with the authorities of Georgia. The sovereignty of the State and its laws must be respected. You will recollect in your proceedings that the State and the citizens are still laboring under a state of excitement caused by the cruelties of a savage warfare; therefore great prudence and discretion should be exercised in all your intercourse with the nation, and particularly in all measures which might have a bearing upon the rights and interests of the State and people of Georgia."

Again: on the 12th of August, the court will find I transmitted to General Dunlap the following instructions: "Captain Vernon, stationed at New Echota, informs me that John Ridge has complained to him that some white man is about to take forcible possession of his ferry on Coosa river. You will, without delay, inquire into the case, and if you should find the complaints to be just, you will, until further orders, protect Ridge in his rights and property. This order will apply to all cases of a similar character in the Cherokee country. *In your proceedings you will be governed by your instructions of the 4th instant.*" Ridge's ferry was in Alabama.

By examination of the testimony of Captain Morrow, Colonel Byrd, Captain Shaw, and Major Lyon, the court will discover that I gave similar instructions to every officer ordered on command, and particularly to Captain Morrow, stationed near Gunter's Landing, Alabama, and yet I have been charged by his excellency C. C. Clay, now Senator Clay, (in violation of the laws of Alabama,) of assuming the power of adjudicating and determining the right of possession or ownership of land and improvements thereon, and of dispossessing one claimant and supplanting him with another by military force. Under one of these decisions a conflict took place in the county of Marshall, as the governor states, "which resulted in the death of two individuals certainly, besides the most serious injury to others, some of whom it is feared may yet die of their wounds."

The letter of his excellency is so far correct in this, that I did on the occasion alluded to, and at other times, dispossess white men of Indian improvements which they had unjustly taken, and "supplanted them," not with another white man, as it might be inferred, but with an Indian claiming the benefits and protection of the late Cherokee treaty; and for this I believe that I was fully warranted by the letter and

spirit of the treaty, and that justice demanded the exercise of such a power. On this point I shall have occasion to speak more fully hereafter.

The facts of this case are simply these : The heirs of John Gunter, sen., deceased, through their administrator of the estate, Mr. Riddle, applied to me to restore them to the possession of a certain improvement which they claimed as Cherokees under the treaty of 1835, then in the possession of Nathaniel Steel. Having satisfied myself by a thorough investigation that it was an Indian improvement, and that it rightfully belonged to the heirs of John Gunter, sen., deceased, and that Steel had no claim whatever to it, I considered it my imperative duty, having the treaty before me, which I could view in no other light than part of my instructions to transmit the instructions before the court of the 3d of June, marked G, to Captain Morrow. You have it in testimony before the court that these instructions were obeyed, and the administrator put in possession. I would, however, call the attention of the court to the concluding paragraph of those instructions, as clearly indicating my desire in nowise to interfere with that which properly belonged to the civil tribunals of the country.

It will be remembered by the court that Mr. Riddle was an officer acting under the laws which I am charged with having outraged and trampled upon ; that he states in his testimony, most explicitly, that he applied to me for relief, because he believed he had no adequate remedy under the laws of Alabama. I also refer to the very clear testimony of Captain Morrow on this point. I wish it also to be understood that the government of the United States was distinctly informed, and approved of the course for which I have received the denunciations of the governor of Alabama. For this purpose I would refer the court to my letter of the 15th of August, 1836, to the honorable Lewis Cass, (marked 5,) enclosing instructions to General Dumlup, of the 4th and 12th of August, and the answer to that letter, dated the 1st of September, (marked 6 ;) also, to my letter of the 27th of August, (marked 7,) and the answer of the Acting Secretary of War, of the 13th of September, (marked 8,) to the letter of the President of the United States of the 7th of September, (marked 10,) the following extract of which is very explicit : "Should you find any evil-disposed white man in the nation exciting the Indians not to comply with the treaty, you will forthwith order him or them out of the nation; and if they refuse to go, the facts being thoroughly established, you will take the steps necessary to put them out. Such characters must be considered in the light of intruders, prohibited by the treaty from living within the limits of the nation."

Again : In my instructions of the 12th of October, (marked 13,) it will be perceived I was authorized not only to have dispossessed Steel, but to have turned him out of the country; for it is there laid down that, "*If any of our citizens enter the Indian country, and incite opposition to the execution of the treaty, you will ascertain whether there is any law of the State which can be brought to bear upon them, and under which they can be removed. If they cannot be reached in this way, it is the opinion of the President that they may be removed under the sixth article of the treaty, in which the United States guarantee that the Cherokees shall be protected against interruption and intrusion from citizens of the United States who may attempt to settle in the country without their consent.*"

Thus it will be seen, Mr. President, that my course was not only approved, when I informed the War Department of my intention to protect the Cherokees in their property from the lawlessness of intruders, but the President of the United States, who is my superior officer, and whom I am bound to obey, directed me, in the most positive manner, to turn any white man out of the nation who should incite opposition to the treaty ; and the important principle is there recognized, that the United States, having guaranteed that the Cherokees shall be protected from all interruption and intrusion of the white man, has the authority to turn them out of the nation, unless they are there by the assent of the Cherokees themselves. Surely, if I had the power to turn them out of the nation as intruders, I had also that less obnoxious, but more useful power to dispossess them of an Indian house, when they had violently and unjustly obtruded themselves.

Mr. President, before I close this brief defence, upon an intimation to that effect from one for whose opinion I have the greatest respect, I will, as concisely as I can, bring to view the reflections which brought to my mind the convictions that the laws of Alabama, extending her jurisdiction over the Indians and their country, are contrary to treaties and the statutes of the Union, and therefore void. I approach the discussion of such a question as this with much embarrassment. It is properly and purely a judicial question, and I make no pretensions to legal attainments. Besides, I am well aware of the angry discussions which it has elicited, and of the jealous sensitiveness of the States upon this point, which at one time threatened to overthrow the Union. Neither can I suppose, for a moment, that I shall be able to convince the court upon a question which has divided the most eminent statesmen of the day, and has undergone the rigid scrutiny of such minds as Marshall and Story, and Wirt and Sergeant, and many others, who have adorned the bench, the bar, and the Senate of our country, and whose names give lustre to the age. My object shall be to present to the court my own reflections, with a reference to such decisions, treaties, and statutes as the court may conveniently consult, should it be inclined to pursue the investigation.

I shall pass by the discussion of the rights which discovery or conquest conferred upon the nations of Europe over the aborigines of this continent, barely remarking that all the powers of the British crown over the savage tribes inhabiting this country passed by the revolution to the United States of America, and not to the individual States. All subsequent rights have been acquired by treaty stipulation or conferred by the Constitution upon Congress.

The Constitution of the United States declares that laws made in pursuance of it, and treaties made or to be made, are the supreme law of the land, anything in any State constitution or law to the contrary notwithstanding.

The Indian tribes inhabiting this continent have been always recognized as independent communities capable of making treaties and of sustaining the relations of peace and war. "The United States," says Chancellor Kent, "have never dealt with these people within our national limits as extinguished sovereignties. They have constantly treated with them as independent nations, governed by their own usages, and possessing governments competent to make and maintain treaties. They have considered them as public enemies in war and allied friends in peace."—(Godell vs. Jackson, 20 Johns's Rep., 714.) The Supreme Court of the United States declared (6 Peters's Rep., 554) that, "by the ninth article of the treaty of Hopewell a surrender of self-government was never intended by the Cherokees, and so to hold would be a perversion of the necessary meaning of the Indians." In the same case the court used the following language: "Is it credible that they should have considered themselves as surrendering to the United States the right to dictate their future cessions, and the terms on which they should be made, or to compel their submission to the violence of licentious and disorderly intruders?"

All the treaties with the Cherokees, from 1785 up to this time, recognize them as a nation capable of living under their own laws. The principal provisions in those treaties have been thus summed up: "Perpetual peace; grant of land by the nation; express designation of boundaries; to give up offenders taking refuge among them; that retaliation shall cease; the exclusion of the whites from the lands retained by the Indians; acknowledgment of the protection of the United States, and of no other sovereign whatever; that Congress shall have the sole and exclusive right of regulating trade with them, and managing all their affairs as that body shall think proper, (treaty of 1785;) a solemn guarantee to the Cherokees of all their lands not ceded; that it shall be against the law for white men to settle on such lands, and such intruders to be punished as the Indians think proper."—(Judge Peck's opinion, 8 Yer. Rep.) "In the treaty of Hopewell the Cherokees are treated as a nation, and throughout that instrument their distinctive character as a separate political community is kept up and clearly acknowledged. The treaty of Holstein, 1791, recognizes them as a nation, and guarantees the Cherokees all their lands not thereby ceded. All subsequent treaties recognize and acknowledge the operative force of these treaties."—(Judge Green's opinion, chapter 8, report 344.)

Is it necessary for language to be stronger? Where can you find rights more clearly defined or more solemnly guaranteed? Lands are ceded, boundaries are expressly designated, a guarantee for those retained, and assurance of protection from the intrusion of the whites. Are these, then, treaties, and have they the operative force of such an instrument as known to the Constitution? It has never been doubted. They have been approved by the President, ratified by the Senate, published to the world as such, and recognized in the highest judicial tribunals as the supreme law of the land.

Was the United States competent to enter into stipulations of this kind; and is it able to perform them? Or did this magnanimous government designedly bind itself to terms which it could not enforce with a handful of rude, unlettered savages, while it compelled performance on their part; and, when they demanded a fulfilment of the conditions, coldly to inform them we cannot comply, you must rely upon the justice of the States, and the tender mercies of the bordering white men?

Was it ever contemplated by the Indians, when they received the solemn assurance of the United States of protection from all intrusion of the whites, that they were to become subject to a body of laws imposed on them by the States, the language of which they did not even understand, and so entirely dissimilar to all their habits and customs? In the language of the Supreme Court of the United States, "it is incredible." It would be a perversion of language to suppose so, and a fraud upon the Indians to give it that operation; or, did this government, in the formation of these treaties, condescend to "palter in a double sense to keep the word of promise to the ear, and break it to the hope?" I trust that such punic faith will never stain our national character.

In *Worcester vs. the State of Georgia*, (6 Peters's Rep. 561,) the Supreme Court of the United States held that "the Cherokees are a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of North Carolina could have no force, and which the citizens of North Carolina had no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves." This is, perhaps, the last case involving this question which has been before the Supreme Court of the United States, the only tribunal recognized in the Constitution for the decision of such questions. The opinion was pronounced by that pure-hearted man and most eminent jurist, Chief Justice Marshall, whose expositions of the Constitution will be revered while that instrument itself endures. The time and the circumstances give to this decision unusual solemnity and importance. The court will remember that the Union was agitated from one extreme to the other, and threatened no less than an overthrow of the Constitution. At such a time how calm must have been the deliberations of Marshall, how earnest his convictions!

The Constitution of the United States also prescribes that Congress shall have the power of regulating commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.

It has been decided that personal intercourse was commerce in the sense of the Constitution. The laws of Alabama are, therefore, void, as being repugnant to the provisions of the act of Congress of March, 1802, commonly called the intercourse act. And it would seem that the Congress of the United States was of the opinion that the act of 1802 was still in force as late as the year 1834, at which time an act was passed regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes west of the Mississippi, and in which the act of 1802 was declared not repealed as to the tribes east.—(See the act of 1834, act of 1802.)

Upon what argument, then, rests the right of the States to extend their laws over these people? We are told that the Indian tribes are within the chartered limits of the States, and that the States are sovereign within those limits, and cannot be restrained. But are they not parties to the formation of these treaties? Where were the senators of these States at the time of their ratification? Does their solemn protest stand upon the records of the Senate against this usurpation of the general government? They were present, and themselves parties to the act.

But the State of Alabama became a member of the Union with this tribe of Indians then in her borders, with most of these treaties existing in full force, pledging the protection of the United States, guaranteeing to them the undisturbed possession of their country and the enjoyment of their usages and customs, prohibiting the intrusion of the whites upon their soil, and laws enacted to carry out these provisions, and penalties prescribed for their infraction. By accepting membership with these conditions before her, she became a party to the acts, and cannot disavow them.

Under the repeated and solemn guarantees of the United States to the Cherokees for the occupation of their lands not ceded, would the government have permitted the State of Alabama to have called upon the military force of her State and expelled these people from her borders by the use of the bayonet? The question need not be answered. It cannot be doubted by any one familiar with the condition of the country that they can be as effectually expelled, though not quite so promptly, by means of legislation as by the point of the bayonet. They have not the privilege of an oath before the judicial tribunals, no voice in the legislative hall. Is it not equally a breach of faith to permit that to be accomplished by indirect means which would be prohibited if attempted directly and forcibly.

The testimony on your records establishes the fact that, if all controversies of which they have assumed cognizance were submitted to the adjudication of the civil tribunals of that country, it would be impossible to execute the Cherokee treaty justly and faithfully. There must be some other less interested power to interpose between them and the white people residing among them, who, from their superior cunning and knowledge of the laws, and the fact that the Indian is not allowed his oath, must of necessity be always successful in defrauding and oppressing them.

With these views of my duty, Mr. President, with my instructions before me, holding in my hand the late Cherokee treaty, which solemnly guarantees to the Cherokees the possession of their property, and

the free use and occupation of the same until the time fixed for their removal to the west, what should have been my course? If I had acted otherwise than I did, I should have considered myself recreant to the sacred trust reposed in me. An Indian presents himself before me, and in the language of nature details his complaint. He says: I have been dispossessed by the white man of the house which I built, and the fields which I have cultivated for years; my property has been taken from me, and my family turned out to the shelter of the forest; your government is pledged to protect me, you have the treaty before you, and you were sent to enforce it; I ask justice at your hands. I say to him, go to the civil tribunals of the States, they will redress your wrongs. What would be his answer, what would be your answer, or that of any other man in the community? It would be the voice of nature, universal as the human family. He would say, you insult me with such protection; it is a miserable mockery. Is this your justice? This your faith, so often, so solemnly pledged to us? In the language of Scripture he might exclaim, I have asked you for bread, and you have given me a stone.

My crime has been not in using the language here supposed, but in listening to his complaints and redressing his wrongs. I have endeavored to do him justice without inquiry into the particular provision of this or that State law. I have not perplexed myself with the subtle arguments of politicians about the indivisibility of sovereignty, or such like cobwebs of the brain; but the path of justice being clear, I but obeyed the still small voice of conscience which frequently, in the advance of reasoning, overleaps those barriers with which subtlety and ingenuity sometimes successfully opposes its progress.

The course of justice and humanity are but the dictates of an enlarged and liberal policy. By such a course the Indians were taught that some remains of justice, some touches of feeling yet existed in the bosoms of white men for their unfortunate and peculiar situation. I trust that it softened in some degree the asperities of their feelings, and caused them to look with some confidence to the future. Suppose a different course had been pursued—that every species of oppression and cruelty was practiced towards them, and they could find no redress. Might they not justly say: We can but die, let us first be revenged? Do we seek in vain in the pages of history for such resolutions prompted by despair?

But, Mr. President, I am happy that no charges which should dishonor me as a man, or disgrace me as an officer, have appeared against me. That I may have committed errors of judgment I cannot doubt, but the case before the court I cannot think is one; and although the consequences of this case were tragical indeed, surely I am not responsible for the violence of human passions which caused such a result. No one can regret it more than I do.

Mr. President, I return the court my thanks for their courtesy and unwearied attention during the investigation.

JOHN E. WOOL, *Brigadier General United States Army.*

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 745.

[2D SESSION.]

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, SHOWING THE CONDITION OF THAT DEPARTMENT IN 1837.

COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS WITH THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE DECEMBER 5, 1837.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *December 2, 1837.*

SIR: In compliance with your instructions, and in conformity with established usage to present annually to you, for the information of Congress, a statement of the transactions of this department, together with such suggestions in relation to the various subjects under its administration as the public interests may seem to require, I have the honor to submit the following report.

It will be seen, by the statement of the commanding general, that the principal part of the regular forces has been drawn from the posts on the frontiers and concentrated in Florida; and his account of the military transactions in that Territory will exhibit the progress of the war to the close of the last, and the events attending the commencement of the present campaign. The proposals made by the Indians to submit to the terms of the treaty, and the negotiations entered into with them to this effect, caused the cessation of hostilities at a period when they might have been carried on to advantage.

This measure on the part of the general commanding the army of the south, although productive of delay and increased expense, was dictated by humanity and a laudable desire to avoid, if practicable, the necessity of further enforcing, by arms, the execution of the treaty, and was approved by the department. Nor can any just blame be attached to the conduct of that officer for keeping his faith with the Indians, and rather suffering himself to be deceived by them than to violate his engagements, by securing the chiefs who had entered his camp and placed themselves in his power, under the pledge of receiving his protection.

The enemy proved faithless, and the season for active operations passed away without any important results. Great expense was incurred in preparations for the removal of the Indians, which their treachery rendered abortive. But the honor of the government, which is beyond all price, was preserved; and it is satisfactory to know that the renewal of hostilities has only taken place after every effort had been tried, in vain, to persuade these deluded people to submit peaceably to the execution of the law. It is unnecessary to recapitulate the circumstances which led to this war, they are already well understood; but it may be important to state the causes which have enabled an enemy, so inferior in number and resources, to baffle the efforts of the government to subdue them, and which have rendered the contest not only so disastrously protracted, but so very expensive. The theatre of war, remarkable for its natural difficulties, was entirely unknown to the commanding officers of our army. They were compelled to move their forces with the utmost caution, in the face of a bold, active, and wily foe, thoroughly acquainted with the passes

of the rivers and morasses which intersect the country, and who hovered about their flanks, concentrating their numbers upon a point of attack with unexampled rapidity, and flying from the open ground with a swiftness that baffled the pursuit of the white man. The difficulties of transportation, on which the success of all military operations must depend, always great, and in such a country involving unusual labor, expense, and delay, were in some cases insurmountable. In several instances, when within reach of the enemy, our troops were compelled to fall back upon their magazines or baggage trains for supplies, and thus lose the opportunity of striking an effective blow, because the subsistence stores could not be brought up for their use. Whenever it was possible, supplies were transported by water to points near the theatre of operations; but having to ascend rivers, steamboats were necessarily employed at an enormous cost to government. From these points the transportation became still more expensive as well as difficult and dangerous. Numerous and well-appointed escorts had to be furnished; wagons to be dragged over pathless tracts of spongy pine barren, through almost impassable swamps and across marshy rivers; temporary magazines to be built; and posts to be established in the wilderness, to which further supplies of provisions and forage were to be brought; for the country is entirely destitute of both, and the baggage train can transport its own forage for a few days' consumption only. When it is considered that these difficulties had to be encountered and surmounted by raw, undisciplined troops, in the face of an active enemy, that destroys unseen, delivering a deadly fire at an unexpected moment, and disappearing in morasses impenetrable to the eye of the white man, the zeal and persevering courage of our officers and men are worthy of all praise. It is under such circumstances that our Indian allies have proved so useful. Their peculiar sagacity in detecting the stratagems of their race, and their untiring vigilance and activity in the field, are the best protection against the ambuscades, night assaults, and surprises which constitute the warfare of these tribes, and are so harassing and destructive to our troops. To the strong arms and brave hearts of our own men we may safely rely for victory in action; but we must depend upon the Indian to detect the lurking place of the Indian; to trace him in his devious path and rapid flight; to guard against his wily approach, and to discover his deadly presence at every difficult pass. For these reasons the friendly Creeks were employed in the army of the south during the last campaign; but as it had been found necessary to retain their families at great expense, until they could all be transported together to the west, they were discharged, and are on their way to their new homes. Before their departure measures were taken to supply their places by engaging Indians of other tribes. In extending the necessary orders a clerical error was made, by which the Indians were offered higher pay than the law allows to volunteers. The error was corrected as soon as discovered; but as about two hundred men have been brought to Florida under the first instructions, I beg leave to suggest that an appropriation be asked of Congress to enable the department to preserve its faith with these Indians; which I venture to hope will not be refused.

Another cause of unusual expense is to be found in the character of the troops employed. At first they were drafted men, or volunteers engaged for so short a period of service as to render their employment not only expensive but inefficient; and when they were engaged for a longer time, the inexperience of their staff officers occasioned great and unnecessary expenditures, while the description of force, chiefly mounted men, augmented very much the cost of the campaign. The remuneration this irregular cavalry received from government merely for the use of their horses amounted in six months to a sum nearly if not quite equal to their real value. The government has had, besides, to pay a large amount for horses that perished for want of forage, which the state of the country rendered it impracticable to transport in sufficient quantities for the supply of so large a body of cavalry. The irregular force thus employed in Florida during the campaign of 1836 amounted to about ten thousand men, one-half of which were cavalry, at an expense greatly exceeding that of regular troops, and by no means so efficient as one-half the number of that description of force.

Notwithstanding the experience gained during the last two campaigns showed the great cost of employing volunteers, the department had no alternative but to engage them again, which the patriotic offers of the citizens from every part of the country enabled it to do. The nature of the climate of Florida requires that the active operations of the campaign should be concentrated into a short period of time, and this can only be effected by bringing into the field a much greater number of troops than would otherwise be necessary. The regular force, although collected from every point, was deemed inadequate, and resort has been had to militia, in order to make up, with the regulars, four columns, having each the component parts of an army sufficient to encounter the whole force of the enemy, and destined to move into the interior of the peninsula from distinct points of the coast. Added to these means of offensive operations, the squadron on that station may confidently be relied upon to scour the coast and intercept all communication from without, and in every way practicable to contribute, by its co-operation, to the success of the land forces.

Throughout the whole conduct of this war the West India squadron has co-operated with the army in the most active and efficient manner, not only by promptly furnishing every aid which the appropriate duties of that branch of the service required, but by the officers taking upon themselves the defence of posts on shore, and lending the aid of their professional skill in every situation in which it could be usefully applied, with that persevering courage, zeal, and ability which have at all times distinguished our gallant navy. The revenue cutters placed under the command of the commodore of that squadron have likewise rendered the most efficient service under the direction of that excellent officer. Part of the marine corps, which volunteered its services in Florida, and distinguished itself during the last campaign, still remains there, and it is hoped that they may be permitted to continue their valuable services to the army of the south until the close of the war.

The events of this war, and the heavy expenses attending it, have shown the propriety and even necessity of increasing and organizing the staff and of augmenting the army of the United States. In the last annual report from this department this measure is strongly recommended, and the reasons for its adoption ably urged. I do not think, however, that the manner of augmenting the forces proposed by the bill, which received the favorable action of one branch of the legislature, ought to be carried into effect. The organization of the army, when it was reduced to the peace establishment, ought not to be abandoned. It is fitted to render the greatest service in time of peace, and to afford a basis for the augmentation of the effective forces of the country to a much greater extent in time of war. This arrangement should not, therefore, be disturbed, but the same system carried out in making new levies. I would recommend the addition of three regiments of infantry, and one company to each regiment of artillery, and that the companies, both of artillery and infantry, should be increased to sixty-four rank and file, with authority vested in the President to augment their number, not to exceed one hundred men, whenever the exigencies

of the country may require it. This would secure all the advantages of the present peace establishment, and enable the Executive on any sudden emergency to place the army on a respectable footing of defence.

Sound policy and an enlightened economy equally require that every department of the staff of the army should be augmented. A properly organized staff would have rendered the conduct of the war in which we have lately been engaged both more effective and more economical. As the army is now constituted, officers are drawn off for staff duties, to the great injury of the service of the line; and these duties are by no means so well performed as they would be by officers properly instructed and entirely devoted to them. The present organization does not give to regiments or companies any supernumerary officers. They are no more than the performance of the various duties of their military command actually requires, and to reduce the number must weaken the army, render it irregular and inefficient in its operations, and greatly impair its discipline. Such, however, is the present defective state of every branch of the staff, that all are supplied from subalterns of the line. The departments of the quartermaster general, the commissary general, the engineers, the ordnance, the paymaster general, and the topographical corps, are all compelled to make drafts from the line of the army for the performance of their indispensable duties; and the returns of the Adjutant General's office of the regiments in the field during the last campaigns in Alabama and Florida exhibit a lamentable deficiency of officers to fulfil the duties properly belonging to them.

The quartermaster's department requires not only some enlargement, but the addition of higher grades, to render it adequate to the duties required of it. The functions of this branch of the staff, comprising, as they do, the quartering, supplying, and moving the army, with all its stores, and the execution of various objects of national improvement, are important at all times, but they become peculiarly so in seasons of active operations, like the present, when large bodies of irregular troops are necessarily called into service to aid our limited regular force.

The deficiency in the number of officers provided for this service has been sensibly felt from the commencement of our late border disturbances, and especially during the past season; and with respect to higher grades than those now authorized, experience has clearly shown the necessity of some clothed with the adequate ranks to enable them to take the charge of remote districts, and supervise the expenditure, and direct and control the complicated operations of the department in the field. It is certain that there can be no effective military operations without a high degree of efficiency in that branch of the staff which is to move and supply the army. I would therefore recommend the addition of some officers of rank, with a limited number of that subordinate but useful class of agents—forge, wagon, and barrack masters.

The department of the adjutant general is entirely inadequate to perform its appropriate duties even to our small army; and I respectfully recommend that it be enlarged, so as to supply assistant adjutant generals to each division and department of the army.

Since the establishment of the commissariat of subsistence, great regularity and economy have been introduced in furnishing the supplies of the army; but in order to render it more complete, and to enable it to perform all the duties assigned to it in the most economical and efficient manner, I recommend an addition to the present establishment of at least four officers.

I would recommend an immediate increase of the corps of topographical engineers. The extensive range of duties which have of late years devolved upon this corps renders its increase a matter of necessity as well as of economy. It is physically impracticable, as the corps is now constituted, to obey the injunctions of Congress. Important surveys are neglected; works of improvement are slowly and imperfectly carried on, and the expectations of the country disappointed.

By a reference to the statements of the officer at the head of that branch of the service it will be seen that the entire corps consists but of ten officers; and to these it has been found necessary to add during the present year about thirty individuals, employed as civil engineers, at compensations greater than are allowed to military engineers; thus making the entire cost of this branch of service much greater than it would be in the form of a properly organized corps. In addition to this consideration, discipline and a proper subordination cannot be introduced in a mixed service where the smaller part only is subject to the rules and articles of war, the greater being entirely exempt, and without those positive distinctions of authority and of rank upon which discipline so eminently depends.

The duties of this corps require the combined knowledge of the military and civil engineers. Their military duties consist in surveys for the defence of the frontier, inland and Atlantic, and of positions for fortifications; in reconnoissances of the country through which an army has to pass, or in which it has to operate, the examination of all routes of communication by land or water, both for supplies and for military movements; the construction of military bridges; the position and erection of field-works; the defences of encampments, fords, ferries, and bridges. For these purposes topographical engineers should always accompany armies in the field; and without their aid the organization of a staff is defective and incomplete. Their civil employment consists in the survey of the coast, rivers, harbors, bays, and watercourses, in order to their being improved for commercial and other purposes, and in superintending the various works for these improvements; in surveys of roads and canals under the law of April 30, 1824; and in conducting all civil constructions connected with the commerce of the country, and such international communications as Congress may direct. This brief recapitulation of the various military and civil duties of the corps clearly points out the necessity of its complete organization, and indicates the propriety of attaching it to the general staff of the army. The direction of all the works, both civil and military herein described, properly belongs to this branch of the service. A simple enumeration of the functions of the quartermaster general will show that the duties of his office cannot be performed without the assistance of the officers of the topographical corps. They are to insure an efficient system of supply, and to give facility and effect to the movements and operations of the army, which cannot be accomplished without a thorough knowledge of the topography of the country. It is his duty, likewise, to select sites for encampments, and to assign to the different corps the grounds they are to occupy; a duty which requires the aid of topographical engineers, as does the superintendence of the works at the several posts, the construction of military roads, the acquisition of such knowledge as the department is expected to possess with regard to the military resources of the country, the means and facilities of transportation, the state of the frontiers, with the most eligible points for concentrating troops and collecting supplies, whether in relation to offensive or defensive operations. This information cannot be obtained without the active co-operation of the topographical corps.

I cannot dismiss this subject without adverting to the opinion of my predecessor in relation to the employment of the topographical engineers of the army by States and incorporated companies, in which I

fully concur. At a period when it became a practice of the government to permit these officers to aid in the construction of the public works in the several States, the description of talent and knowledge which they possessed was uncommon in our country, and works of great public utility would have been suspended or abandoned altogether if this permission had been withheld. A different state of things now exists. The demand for civil engineers has created them; and not only is it no longer necessary to aid States and companies by lending them officers of the army, but, in doing so, an act of injustice is committed towards the civil engineers of the country. There can be no doubt that the practice impairs, very sensibly, the efficiency of the corps as a branch of the army, and deprives the government of their services for military surveys and the erection and superintendence of works of national utility. The commander of the army of the south says, emphatically, in a late communication to the adjutant general: "Had the topographical engineers been employed in their appropriate duties in Florida only one year of the sixteen since we obtained possession of the country, from two to three millions of dollars might have been saved in the expenditures of the war." The ignorance of the topography of the country here complained of exists with regard to other important regions of our country, which will, probably, sooner or later, become the theatres of war; and I earnestly hope the department will have it in its power to remedy this defect by confining the members of the corps to their appropriate duties, of examining and surveying the country, for the purposes of national improvements and national defence, and superintending the erection of national works.

Having stated the increase which appears to me indispensably necessary to render the several parts of the general staff of the army effective, it becomes my duty to submit to your consideration the defects of the present system, and to suggest a better organization of this most useful and important branch of the service. On examining the functions of each of the separate divisions, it will be seen that in the moving and subsisting the army, providing for clothing and supplies, including transportation, barracks, camp equipage, and all things necessary for the health, comfort, and efficiency of the troops, the duties of every branch of the general staff are so connected and dependent upon each other that the best-planned measures may be defeated by the failure or neglect of any one of them. Notwithstanding which, they are distinct bodies, entirely independent of each other, differently organized, governed by different regulations, and, although purely military in their functions, depending only upon the civil authority at the head of the Department of War. Such an arrangement is complex and incompatible with the uniformity and subordination which ought to distinguish the organization of every branch of the military service. I recommend, therefore, that there be created a staff corps, to consist of one brigadier general, (chief of the staff,) six colonels, six lieutenant colonels, eight majors, twenty captains, and twenty first lieutenants, who shall exercise all the functions and perform all the duties at present exercised and performed by the quartermaster general, adjutant general, inspectors general, commissary general of subsistence, and their assistants; and also by the topographical engineers and assistant topographical engineers; and that the commissariat of purchases and the medical staff of the army be attached to the said staff corps; thus uniting under one head a homogeneous body, sufficiently numerous to insure promotion within itself, create an *esprit du corps*, excite emulation, and keep alive hope. This organization, at the same time that it secures uniformity and efficiency to the operations of the staff, is entirely compatible with its present division into separate bureaus, and will not disturb the existing relations of the present officers of the corps with the branch to which they are now attached.

This increase of the rank and file and staff of the army here recommended, by which its efficiency would be greatly augmented, and its administration rendered much more economical, has become necessary, independently of the causes assigned, from our greatly-extended frontier, from the number and description of our maritime fortresses, and from the large body of Indians which the humane and enlightened policy pursued by the government towards that people has concentrated upon our western borders. When in 1821 the army was reduced to 6,127 men, the extent of our frontier did not exceed 6,373 miles; along the inland portion of which the Indian tribes were sparsely scattered, a large proportion of their numbers being within the States, and rendered harmless by the surrounding white population; and the maritime frontier was occupied by a few inconsiderable forts. Since that period, its extent has been increased, by the acquisition of Florida and other causes, to 8,500 miles; most of our principal harbors and bays have been fortified by extensive works, and the Indians concentrated upon the western line so as to present a front of not less than 45,000 warriors. The protection due by the government to the inhabitants of this extensive and exposed portion of our country would require a much larger force than is here proposed, if their safety were made to depend entirely upon the regular army; and I would respectfully recommend the construction of a chain of permanent fortresses along that line, and a competent organization of the militia of the frontier States, as important and necessary auxiliaries for this purpose. If any danger is to be apprehended from an army of 15,000 men, scattered along a frontier of more than 8,000 miles, and commanded by officers educated to reverence the laws and cherish the freedom of their country, it is effectually to be guarded against by a proper organization of the militia. Their aggregate force, now, is little short of a million and a half of men; and whatever may be their efficiency against a foreign enemy, they may always be relied upon when the liberties of the country are assailed.

That the necessity of this measure may be fully understood, I have annexed statements, furnished by the chief engineer, exhibiting the number and names of the different fortifications completed and under construction, and the full armament and amount of force which each requires to arm and garrison it; of the works projected by the board of engineers, but which are not yet commenced; and for the prominent points along the sea frontier which require protection, and for which no plans or *projets* have yet been made; and a list of the posts on the inland frontier of the United States, with a notice of the garrisons deemed necessary for them in time of peace, and to preserve peace, furnished by the acting quartermaster general.

The measures of defence for the border settlements, which the policy of the government towards the Indians has rendered it their imperative duty to adopt, have engaged the anxious consideration of this department, and the matter will be fully treated in answer to a call of Congress for information on that subject.

The report of the chief engineer, which is herewith submitted, contains a summary of the numerous and important works under the superintendence of this branch of the service. It is manifest, from a review of this document, that some further increase of this corps is rendered necessary from the great accumulation of the public works confided to its charge. But the high order of talent, united to great acquirements, which have hitherto distinguished this corps, and which are required in the discharge of duties involving not only large expenditures, but in many cases the safety and honor of the country,

demand that this should be done with the utmost caution. The youth who exhibit the greatest aptitude for such studies, and who, in their progress through the Military Academy, distinguish themselves above their fellows, and are deemed worthy to enter the corps by those who are appointed by government to decide the relative merit of the candidates, ought alone to be added to it; nor should they be placed in charge of any work until they have been at least two years assistants to some older and more experienced officer. It is due to this corps to say that their pay and emoluments are insufficient for their support. Performing duties that require the exercise of talents and attainments which, in civil life, command the highest rate of remuneration, and in a manner honorable to themselves and useful to the country, they receive a less amount of pay than any other branch of the service. I beg leave, therefore, respectfully to recommend that the officers of this corps be placed on the same footing as those of the cavalry of the United States. A proper regard to the interests of this branch of the public service induces me to recommend the appointment of an inspector of fortifications, with the rank of colonel, whose duty it shall be, under the orders of the chief engineer, to make regular and systematic inspections of all the fortifications and public works under the superintendence of that officer.

The very important work of deepening the channel at the mouth of the Mississippi has not yet been commenced. Three plans were submitted by Captain Chase, of the engineers, who was intrusted with the necessary examinations: first, by deepening one or more passes by dredging; secondly, by closing all but one pass where they leave the trunk of the river; and thirdly, by cutting a ship channel from the river. The Engineer department suggested the propriety of adopting the first plan as the least costly and the soonest executed; and preparations were made, and all things in readiness to commence the work by the middle of December. In consequence, however, of representations received by the department from the New Orleans Chamber of Commerce, the whole matter was submitted to a board of engineers consisting of Colonel Totten, Colonel Thayer, and Captain Chase, who have required further preliminary surveys, in order to enable them to form a correct opinion as to the character of the works most likely to be successful in improving the navigation of the mouths of this river; a request which, considering the very important nature of the works, and their bearing upon the commerce of the whole valley of the Mississippi and its tributaries, has been acceded to by the department.

The operations on the great raft in the Red river closed on the 25th of May for want of funds, with the exception of one boat, which worked until the end of June.

During the season twelve miles and a half of this dense mass of wood, comprising the remaining portion of what is styled the old raft, have been removed. The part now remaining, being four hundred and forty yards in length, was formed by the freshet of 1836, and is by no means so dense or difficult to remove; and the timber of this portion of it will be employed to stop up the only bayou which now remains to be closed. It is estimated that the cost of completing the operation, which will effectually open the navigation of this river throughout its whole course, will amount to fifty thousand dollars. If the appropriation be made early in the next session, the work may be completed, or nearly so, by May next; otherwise, it must lie over until the autumn of 1838, to the serious injury of the increasing population of the valley of the river, and to the great detriment of the work itself, from the constant accumulation of drift timber which must necessarily take place until there is a free current in the river. If the work be delayed, the superintendent estimates that the increased expense from this cause alone will amount to twenty thousand dollars.

The act of the 2d of July, 1836, which appropriates \$100,000 for surveying and opening a military road along the western frontier, imposes on the President the duty of selecting situations near it for the military posts which, in his opinion, may be most proper for the protection of the frontier, and for the preservation of the necessary communications. On taking up this subject for consideration, it appeared manifest that the conditions of defence, which it is supposed Congress had in view in making this appropriation, could not be fulfilled if the road were surveyed and opened before the sites for the permanent military stations were determined upon; as, without a knowledge of their ultimate position, the road might not approach them sufficiently near to afford "the necessary communications" contemplated by the act.

The selection of these sites has to be made without regard to lateral communications, but with a view to the tribes in front, and to the facility of approach from the rear. I am also of opinion that the contemplated communications, in reference to the security of the fortresses and the protection of the borders, ought to be perpendicular to the line of defence, and not lateral.

Parties are now making the required examinations, and, as soon as they are completed, and the sites for permanent posts determined upon, the survey and works for opening the road designated by Congress will be commenced; unless, upon a review of the subject, they may think proper to adopt the plan of defence for the western frontier, which, as has been before observed, will be presented to them in accordance with a resolution of the Senate to that effect.

The state of Charleston harbor demanded and received the early attention of the department. It was represented that Sullivan's island was being washed away, and the channels, which form the entrance of the harbor, filling up with the sand from its beach. By direction of the Engineer department a minute examination of the situation of the island was made in June last by Lieutenant Mansfield, who submitted a plan for its protection against the encroachments of the sea that was approved by this department.

It is stated in the report of the engineer that the island and southwestern peninsula will be entirely carried away by the action of the currents and storms, unless timely measures be adopted to arrest the progress of destruction; that this island shelters the port of Charleston from the fury of the northeastern storms; and that its destruction would expose the harbor to the violent gales of the autumnal equinox by leaving it open from northeast to southeast, besides the probability of lessening the depth of water on the bars.

Independently of the necessity of the proposed works for the preservation of the port, they are essential for its defence. The island forms the site of Fort Moultrie, which checked the approach of the British squadron during the revolutionary war, and now constitutes, in conjunction with Fort Sumter, the only defence of this important harbor. These considerations induce me to recommend that an appropriation be asked of Congress to commence these works without delay.

It is my duty to call your attention to the present state of the works for the protection of the waters of the Chesapeake. Fort Monroe will require further repairs and new works to render it even defensible. One front of the fort is peculiarly liable to attack, for it is more exposed to a *coup de main* than any other, and is at the same time the only front liable to siege, and the only one exposed to land batteries within reasonable distance. The works intended to protect this front were commenced, and a large body of

earth collected to complete them, and so arranged as in some measure to shelter the vital parts until the whole should be completed. From some misunderstanding, without the knowledge or participation of the Engineer department, this mound was levelled. Earth has also been placed upon the parapet wall. These operations have proved injurious to the works, and immediate measures must be taken to repair the evils they have produced. In loading the parapet it was found the masonry was not sufficiently dry and consolidated to bear the pressure of the great superincumbent weight; and although, from their original strength and solidity, the walls have not yet sustained any material injury, still it is of a nature to call for prompt repairs. I recommend, therefore, that proper measures to protect this fort from a *coup de main*, to which it is now so evidently exposed as to invite attack, be adopted without delay, together with the necessary repairs to strengthen the existing works.

From an examination of the state of the works at the Rip Raps, it appears that the subsidence of the artificial foundation of stone, on which it is intended to erect Fort Calhoun, has not yet entirely ceased; and orders have been given to replace the mass of materials collected for the completion of the fort upon the arches in such a manner as to render the subsidence uniform; and when this is done, it will be prudent to leave it there for some time longer before recommencing the works.

The great difficulty which has been experienced in fixing upon a suitable site for the new fort ordered to be constructed on or near the Arkansas frontier, and in determining its precise position, has occasioned unusual and unexpected delay in the commencement of the work. The commissioners appointed to make the selection by my predecessor being military men, fixed upon a site with a single eye to its military properties; whereas it is believed to have been the intention of Congress to erect a fortress which should serve as a refuge for the border settlers, who are exposed from their situation to the hostile incursions of the Indians, and it became necessary to direct a subsequent examination in order to meet that object. A board of competent officers was, accordingly, appointed, and proceeded in the execution of this duty. Their report may be looked for daily, and the work will be commenced as soon as the situation is fixed upon by the department.

From a variety of causes not necessary to recapitulate here, but chiefly from a disputed title, which has been only recently decided by the courts, the land on which Fort Delaware is situated has not yet been acquired by the government. The Pea Patch island might have been purchased when the fort was projected for comparatively a small sum, and, since the commencement of its construction, was offered to the United States for a slightly advanced price. Since the decision in their favor, \$100,000, with interest from that date, are asked for it by the proprietors; and it remains to be decided whether this large sum shall be paid for the land, or the works be abandoned.

The importance of having a fort upon this island, in order to protect the harbor of Philadelphia, has been recognized by every board of military engineers that have examined the subject. It is the lowest point at which, in connexion with works upon the main land, Philadelphia is defensible; and, while it covers that harbor, Chester, and Newcastle, prevents an enemy from finding shelter in Delaware bay, secures the debouché of an important link in the great inland chain of water communication—the Delaware and Chesapeake canal—and covers the extensive powder manufactories near Wilmington. For these reasons it is important that the United States should possess it; but whether it is to be acquired at the price now asked for it, or after an equitable appraisement of its real value, is a subject to be decided by the wisdom of Congress. In the meantime the works in progress there will render its abandonment more costly hereafter, and may enhance still further the value of the island. An early decision is therefore highly desirable.

The ordnance corps, organized in 1832, requires some enlargement, in order to render it efficient. At present there is not an officer to superintend each arsenal, and it appears to me that the public interest will be promoted by the addition of two majors and ten first lieutenants. But, above all, this branch of the service demands the creation, by law, of a mixed board of artillery and ordnance, to be composed of officers of rank and experience, to digest a general system of ordnance and small arms for the use of the United States. Similar boards have been formed from time to time by regulations of the War Department; but experience proves the necessity of some legal enactment to insure the due performance of this important duty; for up to this time there exists no general system such as I propose, and such as is absolutely necessary to place this branch of the service on a level with that of other countries, and preserve it there.

Doubts having been entertained by my predecessor in office of the power of the department to enter into contracts for supplies of cannon and arms without previous advertisement, it has become the practice of the Ordnance office to make informal arrangements with the proprietors of founderies and manufactories of arms to receive a certain amount of cannon and muskets on inspection, at a settled price—an engagement equally binding as a written contract on the part of the department, but uncertain in its obligation upon the manufacturer. The former method of contracting for limited periods is, in every respect, preferable. These establishments require expensive preparations, and, having no other market than that afforded by the demand of government, ought to have some assurance of the articles they may manufacture being taken off their hands. A contract for a limited period gives this assurance, enabling them to secure the most competent workmen, and encouraging them to render their machinery as perfect as possible. A recent opinion of the Attorney General declares this method to be legal, and it will be followed in future, unless prohibited by legislative enactment. The existence of our own armories enables the government to establish a standard of comparison to which the private manufacturers are compelled to conform, and secures the acquisition of good arms at equitable prices. With the same view the establishment of a national foundery has been frequently urged, and I beg leave, respectfully, to repeat the recommendation. It is not intended that this establishment should at once furnish the amount of cannon and projectiles required, but it would enable the Ordnance department to make the necessary trials and experiments so as to determine the proper mixture of metals to combine the greatest strength with the greatest lightness, and produce the most perfect models. This would secure, at all times, a sufficient supply of the best arms at fair prices. Intending to submit a plan by which the casting of cannon and projectiles, and the manufacture of gunpowder, shall be placed under the supervision of a joint board of the united service of army and navy, the proposed establishment will, if adopted, be made useful to both branches of the service.

The erection of a manufactory of small arms west of the Alleghany mountains cannot be too strongly recommended. The transportation of the armament required by the western portion of our Union is very expensive, and ought to be avoided. It appears to me that the establishment best suited for that country is one for finishing, polishing, and putting together the several parts of the muskets to be made by indi-

vidual artisans, after models furnished them by the superintendent, and received on inspection. In this manner the works can be curtailed or extended to any amount that may be required, without inconvenience, and this description of manufacture become familiar to a large class of mechanics. The buildings and fixtures suitable for this purpose would be much less expensive than those of the present national armories, and, unlike them, the number of arms fabricated might be increased tenfold without requiring any addition to the original establishment. This armory might embrace the manufacture and inspection of rifles for the supply of the friendly Indians, of which numbers are now purchased annually.

Disputes have arisen with persons who withhold the rent lead due by them to the United States, under the terms of a license to smelt lead ore on lands belonging to government; and, on full consideration of this subject, I think it my duty to state that, in my opinion, the reservations of the lands in the lead region, and the plan now pursued of collecting rent on their produce for the use of government, whatever may have been its former advantages, is now prejudicial to that portion of the country where they are situated, and injurious to the interests it was intended to foster. Individuals will not engage in extensive, systematic, and costly works, such as are required in mining operations, without some better security than a mere license for smelting ore. Nothing more is done, therefore, than to scarify the surface of the earth; and the mine is given up at a time when it yields most ore, because its further extraction would require an outlay not justified by the tenure of the land. The miner then removes to another spot, where the same process is followed, and the whole region is dotted over with these imperfect and abandoned works; whereas, if these lands were brought into market to be sold at moderate prices, in small tracts, to those who will actually settle there and work the mines, they might be purchased by enterprising and industrious individuals, who would erect permanent works, develop fully the mineral resources of that region, and render iron and lead so abundant and cheap that government would be benefited by the reduction in the price there of articles of which it is so large a consumer, as well as by the general improvement of that portion of the country. For these reasons, it appears expedient that authority be asked of Congress to dispose of these lands, and also of all ore banks and lands containing minerals of any description whatsoever under the control of the War Department.

The accompanying report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs contains a full and lucid statement of the various and important matters under the control of that office. The complicated and arduous duties of that branch of the War Department have been performed in a manner highly creditable to the officers charged with their execution; but there are some important subjects connected with these duties which require the early attention of Congress. The Commissioner represents "that the present system of disbursing through the agency of military officers has proved inconvenient, in consequence of their frequent transfer to other duties;" and it is, in my opinion, liable to still stronger objections, as it imposes upon these officers duties foreign to their profession, and of great responsibility; abstracts them from their regiments, and not unfrequently unfits them to return to them. I would recommend that this method of disbursing these funds be abandoned, and a sufficient number of civil agents be appointed, so that disbursements may be made by persons giving bond for the faithful discharge of their duties. I concur with the Commissioner in the propriety of providing by law for the more liberal compensation of agents and interpreters. On their faithful execution of the trusts reposed in them depends the success of all our efforts to civilize the tribes and maintain the peace of the frontiers; and the price now paid for such important services is not equivalent to that received by the same class of persons in the employment of trading companies, whose interests are not, I am sorry to say, identical with those of the government, and whose conduct too frequently counteracts the humane policy of the United States towards the Indians.

In accordance with the opinion of the Commissioner, I would recommend the passage of a law by which all sums accruing on moneys invested for the use of the several Indian tribes be deposited in the treasury, to be drawn out upon the requisitions of this department in the usual form; and further, that the whole business connected with the investment of the funds for the interest of the Indians, and the management thereof, be transferred from this department to that of the treasury, to which it properly belongs.

Intelligence was received at this department, early in the spring, that the Indians were in an inquiet state on our northwestern frontier, and apprehensions were expressed that the hostile feelings which existed between the Sioux and Sacs and Foxes might endanger the peace of our border settlements. Sensible of the weakness of our forces in that quarter—having been compelled, from the state of our army, to strip both the inland and maritime frontiers of their garrisons, to supply the army of Florida with a sufficient regular force—it was deemed most prudent to bring down to the seat of government the principal chiefs of those warlike tribes. It is believed to be important to exhibit to those people the strength of the nation with which they would have to contend in venturing to attack our defenceless borders, and at the same time to impress upon them the advantages which flow from civilization. With several of these tribes it was made our duty to treat; and it would have been in a high degree imprudent, in the excited state of feeling which existed among them, to assemble large bodies in the neighborhood of our ungarrisoned posts, thereby exposing our utmost weakness at a period when it was important to display our utmost strength. The superintendents were therefore instructed to invite them to send deputations of their chiefs to Washington; and, on their arrival here, treaties were negotiated with several of the tribes, by which large tracts of land have been purchased, and the object so much desired by government, to extinguish the title to all the Indian land east of the Mississippi, nearly accomplished.

The Sioux of the Mississippi have ceded their possessions east of that stream, together with all the islands belonging to them, and are to remove to the western shore. The Winnebagoes have at length agreed to dispose of their lands in East Wisconsin, and retire to the neutral ground on the west of the river. It is probable that their sojourn there will be temporary, and therefore a portion only of the neutral ground has been allotted to them, with permission to hunt upon the remainder. The interests of the country appear to require the existence of a line of frontier States between the Mississippi and the Missouri; and the extinguishment of the Indian title to all the land east of the Missouri, to 43° of north latitude, would effect that object. With that view the Winnebagoes would have been at once removed south of the Missouri, had the country been previously explored and a tract of land of sufficient extent set apart for their future permanent residence. The situation of that tribe—fast sinking under the degrading influences which surround them, and pressed upon by the whites—renders it a measure of humanity to remove them promptly across the Mississippi; but they were given to understand that they were not to consider the neutral ground as their permanent home. A treaty, likewise, has been negotiated by Governor Dodge with the Chippewas, by which that tribe ceded a large tract of country east of the Mississippi, and have agreed to retire to lands west of that river.

A mistake had been committed by the surveyors of the United States in determining the boundary line of the land ceded to the government by the confederated tribes of the Sacs and Foxes by the treaty of September, 1832; and it was immediately determined to do justice to the Indian proprietors of the soil, and correct the mistake. The true line, however, would have excluded a fine portion of country which was already settled and improved; and, whatever may be the ultimate policy the government may think proper to adopt towards the settlers who improve new and unoccupied lands in order to acquire a title to them by future purchase, the department is of opinion that, so long as custom and the practice of government sanction their acquiring rights by such means, their claims ought to be respected, and therefore entered into negotiations with the Sacs and Foxes to extinguish their title to this strip of country. In doing so, it is deemed expedient to establish a line that will no longer be subject to doubt or dispute.

In this treaty, as in all the Indian treaties concluded at Washington, regard has been paid to the permanent benefit of the several tribes. Provision is made for the establishment of schools, as well as for instructing the people in the arts of husbandry, and for the investment of the purchase money so as to secure to the Indians a perpetual rent, a portion of which is to be applied in such manner as you may deem most useful and beneficial to them. Much more remains to be done in order to insure the faithful application of the funds destined for the support and comfort of the Indians. It now appears that their annuities really go into the coffers of the traders, in payment of debts incurred, in a great measure, by the idle and dissolute, but which are charged to the whole nation and paid out of the common fund. The effect of such an arrangement is obvious: it encourages the vicious and deprives the industrious of all incentive to exertion. The whole of this subject is of such vast importance, both as regards the condition of the tribes and the character of the government, that I propose to treat it in a separate report, and to suggest such improvements in the existing laws and regulations as may insure the faithful application of their funds to the individual wants of the Indians.

Of the propriety of persevering in the system of removing the Indians beyond the civil influences which surround them within the States and Territories, and which were fast working their destruction, there can be no doubt. In its origin, the government appears to have been actuated only by considerations of policy and expediency; but subsequently a better spirit prevailed in our intercourse with the red men, and their removal from beyond the limits of the States and Territories—rendered imperative by the peculiar circumstances of their situation—was connected with liberal and beneficial provisions for the amelioration of their condition. From a frontier people—roaming free and unrestrained over trackless forests and extensive plains, and subsisting on the products of the chase—they had suddenly, by the rapid spread of the whites, become communities surrounded by an agricultural, enterprising, and enlightened people, seeking to develop the resources of the country, and, in their eagerness to obtain possession of their lands, pressing them into the narrowest limits. Deprived of their only resource from the diminution of the game, and incapable or unwilling to resort to agriculture for subsistence, their situation became deplorable, and their distress was still further aggravated by the decision which deprived them of the protection of the general government and extended the jurisdiction of the States over them. The inaptitude of the Indian character to conform to a state of society moulded and regulated by a system of laws based on the principles and habits of civilized life, and adapted to give security to its multiform pursuits and interests, all differing from their own, is obvious. The only alternative was removal beyond the limits of the States; and the beneficent hand of the government was extended to relieve that people from the operation of laws beyond their comprehension to understand or their ability to observe, and to remove them to distant lands abounding in game, and guaranteed to them forever from the intrusion of the whites.

The results of this policy have surpassed the expectations of the most sanguine.

The reports of the superintendents represent the early emigrants as living in comfort and abundance, and improving in the useful arts; and hopes may now be entertained of the preservation of the aboriginal inhabitants of this continent, and of their gradual civilization.

Ample provision has been made for their education; and the only duty of the government which remains undischarged is the formation of a suitable territorial government, and their admission to such a supervisory care in the general legislation as is granted by the laws to other Territories of the United States, and for the exercise of which they appear to be sufficiently prepared.

The subject is confessedly difficult and embarrassing; but the bill introduced into Congress at the last session and partially acted upon would seem to offer a fair prospect of success, and to secure to these Indians the enjoyment of all the advantages of free government which the necessity of stretching over them the protecting arm of the government will admit.

This scheme has been submitted to several of the tribes, and been approved by them, and may safely be carried into effect and remain in operation until experience shall point out the alterations and amendments it may require.

Having received information early in the spring of this year, from sources to be relied upon, that the Comanche Indians had committed outrages upon our citizens, and carried off some women, whom they retained as prisoners, and that apprehensions were entertained of their committing other acts of hostility if their complaints were not listened to and their grievances redressed, instructions were given, with your sanction, to Mr. A. P. Chouteau to repair to that country and ascertain the facts connected with these outrages, and the causes of complaint, if any really existed; to give assurances of ample reparation, and exact the same from them; and to obtain the release of the prisoners, and restore them to their families and friends. With a view, likewise, of preserving the peace of that frontier, Mr. Chouteau was instructed to invite this powerful tribe to send a deputation to Washington, that they might represent their own grievances, and at the same time become acquainted with the real strength and resources of the nation they have hitherto deemed lightly of, from seeing only a few posts thinly scattered along the frontiers and feebly garrisoned. It is understood that Mr. Chouteau has succeeded in this part of his mission. These measures of precaution were taken, from the necessity of the case, without any appropriation or legal provision for defraying the expenses, and I respectfully recommend that the subject be submitted to Congress for its sanction, and the necessary appropriations asked to enable the department to discharge its obligations to Mr. Chouteau; and further, that a small sum be intrusted to the direction of the Executive, to be expended on emergencies like this, requiring prompt action to preserve the peace of the country.

The report of the Commissioner of Pensions shows the probable increase of the disbursements for the ensuing year, raising the estimate from \$1,593,936 to \$2,532,149, principally from the operation of the third section of the law of the 4th of July, 1836. It will be seen, likewise, from this report, that

some legislative action is required to deter persons employed as agents of pensioners from defrauding them. This appears to be done both by withholding a portion of the money received in trust for the disabled soldier or destitute widow and orphan, and by charging them an exorbitant percentage for collecting the stipend awarded them by the bounty of the government.

Although I do not concur in a former recommendation to extend the provisions of the pension laws to any other classes than those embraced by the acts now in force, I beg leave to reiterate that which proposes some legal organization for the purpose of establishing a fund for the support of invalid officers, and the widows and children of such of them as may die in the service. This may be done by making a moderate deduction from their pay to such an amount and in such manner as may be agreed upon by the officers themselves. Similar provision may be made in like manner for invalid and disabled soldiers, and the widows and children of those who die in the service, not now provided for by law. This provision will become more necessary should the period of enlistment be restored to five years, a change which cannot be too strongly recommended. It is unnecessary to enter into the details of these plans for providing for the support of invalid officers and soldiers and their families. They may be so framed as to obviate all the objections which have been urged against their adoption, and are called for by every consideration of policy and humanity. Intimately connected with this subject is that of the pay of the officers of the line of the army. The very proper increase of pay made at the last session of Congress for the civil officers serving in the several departments conveys an acknowledgment of the necessity of increasing all salaries of public servants which are below a certain amount—a principle which applies with great force to the condition of the officers of the army. In pursuance of this policy, I would recommend a moderate increase of pay to soldiers, non-commissioned and commissioned officers of the artillery and infantry of the United States, from the rank of second lieutenant to that of lieutenant colonel. The high price of labor, the demand throughout the country for that description of talent possessed, in an eminent degree, by the officers of our army, and which commands the highest rate of remuneration, together with the enhanced cost of all the comforts and necessities of life, render this measure just and necessary, and I confidently ask your concurrence to procure for it the favorable consideration of Congress.

In the present uncertainty which prevails on the subject of the intention of Congress permanently to prohibit by law officers of the army from claiming or receiving any remuneration for disbursing moneys, the different interpretations given to the act render its operation unequal and unjust. In almost all instances where the officers have withheld moneys and brought suits for the recovery of sums charged for commissions on their disbursements, the courts have awarded the full amount claimed; whereas those who have accounted for all they have received remain without any remuneration. If the proviso attached to the appropriation act of 1835, for the improvement of certain harbors, which prohibits any allowance to officers for extra official duties and responsibilities, is intended to be permanent, it ought to be fully and explicitly stated, so as to bind the decisions of the courts of law. But if Congress be of opinion that it is just to allow some remuneration for extra services, in cases where great responsibilities are incurred, then it would appear better to determine that compensation by law. I would by no means recommend that any allowance should be made for disbursing the usual and ordinary appropriations for the military service; but where heavy and extra duties are imposed upon officers, involving great risk from circumstances beyond their control, and against which no human precaution can protect them, it appears equitable that some compensation should be allowed, which, on every account, it would be better to fix by law.

By your instructions, in pursuance of the provisions of the act of the 3d of March, 1837, authorizing you to select and cause to be purchased, for the use and benefit of sick seamen and boatmen, and all other navigators on the western rivers and lakes, suitable sites for hospitals, a commission of able and experienced surgeons of the army was appointed to discharge this duty. The accompanying report shows that they have performed it with the zeal and ability which characterize this branch of the service; and the contracts made by them to effect the purchase of the sites selected would have been sanctioned by the department had the sum been within the amount appropriated by Congress for this purpose. The whole amount required will be \$39,968, being an excess over and above the sum appropriated of \$24,968.

The beneficent object intended to be accomplished by Congress in directing this examination, and the purchase of the several sites selected, will not, I trust, be defeated by this circumstance; and, in this hope, plans and estimates for the construction of the hospitals accompany this report.

All which is respectfully submitted.

J. R. POINSETT.

The PRESIDENT of the *United States*.

List of documents accompanying the report of the Secretary of War.

- No. 1. Statement exhibiting the number and names of the different fortifications completed and under construction, and the full armament and amount of force which each requires to arm and garrison it.
- No. 2. List of works projected by the board of engineers, but not yet commenced.
- No. 3. Statement showing the prominent points along the sea frontier which will require protection, and for which no plans or *projets* have yet been made by the board of engineers.
- No. 4. List of the military posts on the inland frontier of the United States, with the garrison deemed necessary for them in time of peace and for the preservation of peace.
- No. 5. Report of the medical board appointed to examine and select sites for marine hospitals.
- No. 6. Plans and estimates for the same.
- No. 7. Report and documents of the major general commanding the army.
- No. 8. Report of the acting quartermaster general.
- No. 9. Report and statement of the commissary general of subsistence.
- No. 10. Report of the acting surgeon general.
- No. 11. Report and statement of the paymaster general.
- No. 12. Report and statements of the commissary general of purchases.
- No. 13. Report and documents of the chief engineer.
- No. 14. Report and statements of the chief topographical engineer.
- No. 15. Report and statements of the chief of the Ordnance department.

No. 1.

Statement exhibiting the number and names of the different fortifications completed and under construction, and the full armament and amount of force which each requires to arm and garrison it.

No.	Designation.	No. of guns.	Garrison.	
			Peace.	War.
NEW FORTS COMPLETED.				
1	Fort Hamilton, New York harbor	130	50	650
2	Fort Lafayette, New York harbor.....	96	50	480
3	Fort Washington, Potomac river.....	79	50	395
4	Fort Macon, Beaufort, North Carolina	51	50	255
5	Castle Pinckney, Charleston harbor, South Carolina.....	21	50	105
6	Fort Morgan, Mobile, Alabama	161	50	805
7	Fort Pickens, Pensacola, Florida	252	100	1,260
8	Fort Pike, Rigolets, Louisiana	88	50	440
9	Fort Wood, Chef Menteur, Louisiana.....	88	50	440
10	Fort Jackson, Louisiana.....	156	50	780
11	Battery Bienvenue, Louisiana	32	50	160
12	Tower at Bayou Dupré, Louisiana.....	24	50	120
		1,178	650	5,890
FORTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION.				
1	Fort Warren, Boston harbor, Massachusetts	300	100	1,500
2	Fort Adams, Newport, Rhode Island.....	468	100	2,440
3	Fort Schuyler, New York, New York	250	100	1,250
4	Fort Columbus, &c., Governor's island, New York harbor.....	207	100	535
5	Fort Monroe, Old Point Comfort, Virginia	350	500	2,450
6	Fort Calhoun, Rip Raps, Virginia	232	50	1,016
7	Fort Caswell, Oak island, North Carolina.....	90	50	450
8	Fort Sumter, Charleston harbor, South Carolina.....	300	100	1,500
9	Fort Pulaski, Cocks spur island, Georgia... ..	172	50	860
10	Fort on Foster's Bank, Florida.....	144	50	720
11	Fort at Grande Terre, Louisiana	60	50	400
		2,573	1,250	13,265
FORTS REBUILDING AND REPAIRING.				
1	Fort Independence, repairing, Boston harbor.....	79	50	395
2	Fort Delaware, rebuilding, Delaware river.....	250	100	1,250
3	Fort Mifflin, repairing, Delaware river.....	53	50	265
4	Fort McHenry, repairing, Baltimore harbor, Maryland.....	100	100	845
5	Fort Moultrie,* Charleston harbor.....	300	100	1,500
		782	400	4,255

* To be rebuilt; no plan and estimate of cost as yet submitted. The operations at present at this work are confined to the preservation of its site.

No. 2.

A list of works projected by the board of engineers, but which are not yet commenced.

No.	Designation.	No. of guns.	Garrison.	
			Peace.	War.
1	Fort at the Narrows of Penobscot, Maine.....	145	50	500
2	Fort Preble, Portland harbor, Maine.....	82	50	300
3	Fort on House island, Portland harbor, Maine.....	53	25	260
4	Fort Pickering, Salem harbor, Massachusetts	50	50	250
5	Fort Winthrop, Boston harbor, Massachusetts, repairs of.....	50	10	250
6	Fort at Nangus Head, Salem harbor, Massachusetts	38	25	180
7	Fort Sewall, Marblehead harbor, Massachusetts	55	50	280
8	Fort and outworks on Nantasket Head, Boston harbor, Massachusetts	297	160	1,550
9	Fort at Jack's Point, Marblehead harbor, Massachusetts.....	60	25	280
10	Redoubt on Hog island, Boston harbor, Massachusetts	21	25	150
11	Fort on Rose island, Narraganset Roads, Rhode Island.....	96	25	580
12	Works on Conanicut island, Narraganset Roads, Rhode Island.....	386	100	1,800
13	Fort Griswold, New London harbor, Connecticut	106	50	830
14	Fort Trumbull, New London harbor, Connecticut.....	62	50	460
15	Fort Hall, New Haven harbor, Connecticut.....	30	10	220
16	Fort Wooster, New Haven harbor, Connecticut.....	16	10	155
17	Fort on Wilkins's Point, New York harbor, New York.....	184	50	1,336

No. 2.—A list of works projected by the board of engineers, but which are not yet commenced—Continued.

No.	Designation.	No. of guns.	Garrison.	
			Peace.	War.
18	Fort Tompkins and dependencies, New York.....	114	50	970
19	Fort on Middle Ground shoal, New York harbor, New York.....	342	100	1,760
20	Fort on East Bank shoal, New York harbor, New York.....	332	100	1,760
21	Fort opposite Fort Delaware, on right bank, Delaware.....	112	50	760
22	Fort on Elk river, to cover the debouche of the Chesapeake and Delaware canal and railroad, Maryland....	112	50	760
23	Fort on Sollers's Point flats, below Baltimore, Maryland.....	159	100	835
24	Fort on Point Patience, Patuxent river, Maryland.....	80	50	400
25	Fort on Hawkins's Point, below Baltimore, Maryland....	121	100	845
26	Fort on Thomas's Point, Patuxent river, Maryland.....	70	25	350
27	Fort on Baldhead island, Cape Fear river, North Carolina.....	90	50	450
28	Iteboubt on Federal Point, Cape Fear river, North Carolina.....	43	25	200
29	Fort on Dauphin island, Mobile bay, Alabama.....	128	100	900
30	Tower at Pass au Heron, Mobile bay, Alabama.....	12	10	60
31	Fort St. Philip, Mississippi river, Louisiana.....	60	50	400
		3,506	1,565	19,831

No. 3.

A statement showing the prominent points along the sea frontier which will require protection, and for which no plans or projets have yet been made by the board of engineers.

No.	Designation.	No. of guns.	Garrison.	
			Peace.	War.
1	Fort at the mouth of Kennebec, Maine.....	150	50	500
2	Works at Eastport, mouth of St. Croix, Maine.....	50	25	250
3	Works at Machias harbor, Maine.....	50	25	250
4	Works at Mount Desert island, Maine.....	200	50	1,000
5	Works at Castine, Maine.....	25	10	125
6	Works at St. George's bay, Maine.....	200	100	1,000
7	Works at Broad bay, Maine.....			
8	Works at Damariscotta bay, Maine.....			
9	Works at Sheepscot bay, Maine.....	30	25	100
10	Works on Hog Island channel, Portland harbor, Maine.....			
11	Works at the mouth of Saco, Maine.....			
12	Works at the mouth of the Kennebunk, Maine.....	300	150	1,500
13	Works at York, Maine.....			
14	Works in Portsmouth harbor, New Hampshire.....			
15	Works at Provincetown, Massachusetts.....	300	50	1,500
16	Works at New Bedford, Massachusetts.....	150	50	750
17	Works at Newburyport, Massachusetts.....	50	25	250
18	Works at Beverly, Massachusetts.....	25	10	125
19	Reducing depth of water in Broad Sound passage, Massachusetts.....			
20	Reducing altitude of Gallop's island, Massachusetts.....			
21	Works at Nantucket harbor, Massachusetts.....	125	50	625
22	Works at Edgartown harbor, Massachusetts.....			
23	Works at Falmouth harbor, Massachusetts.....			
24	Works at Holmes's Hole, Massachusetts.....	100	50	500
25	Works at Tarpaulin cove, Massachusetts.....			
26	Fort at Gloucester, Massachusetts.....			
27	Fort at Gurnet Point, Plymouth, Massachusetts.....	50	25	250
28	Repairs and modifications of old Fort Wolcott, Newport harbor, Rhode Island.....	45	50	250
29	Repairs and modifications of old Fort Greene, Rhode Island.....	8		50
30	Closing west passage of Narraganset Roads, Rhode Island.....			
31	Fort at Stonington harbor, Connecticut.....	75	50	375
32	Works at the mouth of Connecticut river, Connecticut.....	50	25	250
33	Works for the defence of several harbors and towns between New Haven and New York, on both sides of the sound, Connecticut.....	100	50	500
34	Works at Gardiner's bay, New York.....	150	50	750
35	Works at Sag Harbor, New York.....	50	25	250
36	Fort Wood, repairs of, New York harbor, New York.....	45	25	225
37	Fort Gibson, repairs of, New York harbor, New York.....	14	25	100
38	Works to cover Delaware Breakwater harbor, Delaware.....	225	100	1,125
39	Fort on Cedar Point, Potomac river, Maryland.....	110	50	550
40	Works on St. Mary's river, Maryland.....	110	50	550
41	Works at Annapolis harbor, Maryland.....	100	50	500
42	Works in Port Royal Roads, South Carolina.....	110	50	550
43	Works at Georgetown harbor, South Carolina.....	100	50	500

No. 3.—A statement showing the prominent points along the sea frontier, &c.—Continued.

No.	Designation.	No. of guns.	Garrison.	
			Peace.	War.
44	Works at the mouth of the Santee, at Bull's bay, and at other inlets between Georgetown and Charleston, South Carolina	50	25	250
45	Works at Stono inlet, South Carolina	25	10	125
46	Works at North Edisto inlet, South Carolina	25	10	125
47	Works at South Edisto inlet, South Carolina	25	10	125
48	Works at St. Helena sound, South Carolina	75	50	375
49	Fort on Tybee island, Georgia	75	25	300
50	Fort Jackson, Savannah river, repairs on, Georgia	30	25	200
51	Works to command entrance to Cumberland sound, mouth of St. Mary's river, Georgia	110	50	550
52	Works at Warsaw sound, Georgia	100	50	500
53	Works at Ossabaw sound, Georgia	100	50	500
54	Works at St. Catharine's sound, Georgia	100	50	500
55	Works at Sapelo sound, Georgia	100	50	500
56	Works at Doboy inlet, Georgia	100	50	500
57	Works at Altamaha sound, Georgia	100	50	500
58	Works at St. Simon's sound, Georgia	100	50	500
59	Works at St. Andrew's sound, Georgia	100	50	500
60	Works to protect the navy yard, Pensacola, from lateral attack through the bays, Florida	50	50	1,000
61	Fort at Barrancas, Pensacola, Florida	50	50	250
62	Works at St. Augustine, Florida	20	25	100
63	Works at Key West and Tortugas, Florida	500	500	2,500
64	Works at Charlotte harbor, Florida	250	250	1,250
65	Works at Espiritu Santo bay, Florida			
66	Works at Apalachicola, Florida			
67	Works at Apalache bay, Florida			
68	Works at St. Joseph's bay, Florida	100	50	500
69	Works at St. Rosa bay, Florida			
70	Works at Perdido bay, Alabama	100	50	500
		5,282	2,875	26,900

No. 4.

List of military posts on the inland frontier of the United States, with the garrisons deemed necessary for them in time of peace, and to preserve peace.

No.	Names of posts.	Where situated.	Garrisons deemed necessary.
			<i>Men.</i>
1	Hancock Barracks	At Houlton, on the northeastern boundary of the United States	300
2	Madison Barracks	At Sackett's Harbor, New York	100
3	Fort Niagara	On the Niagara river	100
4	Fort Gratiot	Outlet of Lake Huron	100
5	Fort Mackinac	Island of Mackinac	100
6	Fort Brady	Sault Ste. Marie	200
7	Fort Howard	Green Bay	200
8	Fort Winnebago	Portage of Fox and Wisconsin	300
9	Fort Crawford	Prairie du Chien	500
10	Fort Snelling	Falls of St. Anthony	300
11	Fort Leavenworth	Missouri river	1,000
12	Fort Gibson	Arkansas river	1,500
13	Fort Towson	Red river	800
14	Fort Jesup	Louisiana	300
15	Baton Rouge Barracks	Baton Rouge, Louisiana	300
16	Jefferson Barracks	Missouri	1,500

NOTE.—The above is the estimate of force for the posts already in existence; 1,500 men might be added for those on an inner line on the western frontier, which, it is believed, will become necessary for the protection of the border settlements.

The force assigned to Jefferson Barracks is intended as a corps of reserve for the Upper Mississippi, the Missouri, and the Arkansas. From its central position and proximity to the mouths of those rivers, reinforcements may be thrown out from that place to almost every point on the frontier with great ease and rapidity. A reserve there is, in fact, an available force, for the whole line of frontier from the Upper Mississippi to the Arkansas. It should, indeed, be even stronger than is here estimated. The whole force assigned to the western frontier from Fort Snelling, on the right, to Fort Towson, on the left, a line of more than one thousand miles in extent, is 5,100 men, including the reserve at Jefferson Barracks. This may appear large; but whoever shall undertake the defence of that frontier, under existing circumstances, with less, will be likely to find himself sadly embarrassed. It is at least but a force to prevent war, not to carry it on effectually. If ever a general war should commence along that extended line, conducted with the skill that many of the tribes are known to possess, it will require an army of 30,000 men, and all our energy to prevent them from making serious inroads upon our settlements.

WASHINGTON, November 3, 1837.

No. 5.

REPORT OF MEDICAL BOARD ON MARINE HOSPITALS.

WASHINGTON, November 17, 1837.

Sir: Agreeably to "General Orders No. 28," the board of medical officers appointed in pursuance of an act of the last session of Congress, (approved March 3, 1837,) to select and purchase sites for marine hospitals on the Mississippi and Ohio rivers and Lake Erie, have the honor respectfully to report:

The board assembled, in obedience to orders, at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and organized for business on the 18th day of June last. Their line of operations extended, on the Mississippi, from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, to Dubuque, Wisconsin Territory; and on the Ohio, from its mouth to Steubenville. From thence, passing over to Lake Erie, an examination was made of the prominent places on that shore.

The act of Congress authorized the selection and purchase, "for the use and benefit of sick seamen, and boatmen, and all other navigators of the western rivers and lakes, of suitable sites for marine hospitals," amounting in all to seven, (exclusive of one in New Orleans;) of which three were to be established on the Mississippi, three on the Ohio, and one on Lake Erie; for the purchase of which fifteen thousand dollars were appropriated.

Although the board were aware of the importance to the western people of the proposed institutions, and of the great amount of suffering which is yearly experienced from disease and numerous casualties, the information which they derived in the prosecution of their duties impressed them still more deeply with the importance of the subject, and of the benefits which would accrue to a numerous class of industrious citizens, by the establishment of a chain of well-regulated hospitals. The hardy and industrious farmer, who, with the fruits of his toil, embarks on the flatboat and seeks a market at the great emporium of the southwest, exposed to the heat of the mid-day sun, and the more baneful vapors of night; and the steamboatman, who, in addition to those causes of disease, is subjected to frequent and dangerous casualties, instead of being thrown upon the charity of strangers, would then have an asylum where skill and attention would unite to restore him to renovated health, and enable him to return with gladness to his expecting friends

The steady and rapidly increasing commerce of the west is perhaps without parallel in the history of the world. Twenty-six years ago the productions of the country washed by the Ohio and Mississippi and their tributaries were exclusively carried in flat and keel-boats to find a market in New Orleans. Men employed on these boats were obliged either to return to their homes on foot, traversing a wilderness five hundred miles in extent, or to take passage in some vessel bound for one of the northern ports. Sixteen weeks was then the ordinary time required for a keel-boat to ascend from New Orleans to Pittsburg. But with the introduction of steam commenced a new era, as important in its effects as it was magical in its influences. The first steamboat which attracted the gaze of the amazed Indians, and the no less astonished settler, descended the Ohio and Mississippi in December, 1811. Until then, no sound save the report of the hunter's or warrior's rifle, or the woodman's axe, had disturbed the solemn stillness of the primeval forest. The sovereignty of nature seemed complete. But the art of man was at work, and a revolution at hand. Steamboats increased; forests were felled; cities, and towns, and farms, usurped their place; and the tenants of the woods fled before an enterprising, industrious, and thriving population.

According to the most authentic official information which the board have been able to procure, the number of steamboats in commission on the Ohio and Mississippi and their tributaries from 1834 to September 30, 1837, inclusive, was as follows:

In 1834	262 steamboats.
In 1835	399 "
In 1836	502 "
In 1837, (September 30)	638 "

The number of flat and keel-boats cannot be ascertained with perfect accuracy. Dr. Drake, who has bestowed considerable attention to the subject, states that "several years ago it was ascertained that 10,000 flatboats arrived at New Orleans in a single year." At Louisville the average number of flat and keel-boats that passed the canal from December 31, 1831, to December 31, 1836, was 400 per annum, and the estimated number that passed over the falls 1,600, making 2,000 per annum. Concurring in the opinion of Dr. Drake, that the increase of steamboats has somewhat diminished the number of flat and keel-boats, the number of these last descending the Ohio and Mississippi may be set down at 6,000.

On Lake Erie, agreeably to official information obtained from the collector of the port of Cleveland, the number of ships, brigs, schooners, and sloops navigating the lake is 300; number of steamboats, 42; boats on the Ohio canal, 256.

RECAPITULATION.

Ohio and Mississippi rivers.

Number of steamboats, 638; average number of officers and hands.....	15, 950
Number of flat and keel-boats, &c., 6,000; average number of officers and hands, 5.....	30, 000
Total	45, 950

Lake Erie.

Number of ships, brigs, schooners, and sloops, 300; average number of officers and hands, 7.....	2, 100
Number of steamboats, 42; average number of officers and hands, 30	1, 260
Number of canal boats, 256; average number of officers and hands, 7.....	1, 792
	5, 152
Grand total.....	51, 102

In selecting the sites for the proposed hospitals, the board kept in view the following rules for their guidance:

- 1st. A preference for those points that would benefit the greatest number of boatmen and other navigators.
- 2d. Healthiness of position.
- 3d. Appropriate distances between the several sites—the more sickly the region the shorter the distances, and *vice versa*.
- 4th. The resources of the country around for supplying the sick.

In regard to the quantity of land necessary for the buildings and other purposes, eight acres was deemed the *minimum* amount which ought to be purchased, while a greater quantity would be preferable where the position of the ground and other circumstances would permit its being secured. Besides having a sufficiency of ground for the buildings, it was considered indispensably necessary, for the comfort of the sick and convalescent, to secure enough for gardens, walks, &c. Another consideration of no less importance and weight with the board was to make their selections as convenient to the general landing places as circumstances and a proper regard for healthiness of position would permit, so as to lessen as much as possible the fatigue and exposure incident to conveying the sick to the hospitals. Nor was the beneficial effect overlooked of a view of the water, and the impressions and associations it would naturally awaken in the minds of men whose occupations were so intimately connected with it.

Sites thus situated necessarily cost more than if they had been selected at a greater distance from the public landings; but when the national character of the institutions is taken into consideration, and that the comfort and oftentimes the lives of the sick would require that they should be convenient, not only to the great thoroughfares, but particularly to the usual landings, the board confidently believe that in carrying out their own views they only anticipated those of the government. Moreover, to erect costly buildings which would doubtless endure for ages on sites remote and inconvenient, merely to save a few thousand dollars, would in effect be defeating the very object of their creation.

It became early manifest, however, that the amount of the appropriation was utterly insufficient for purchasing the required number of sites, besides defraying the expenses of the commission, including legal services, charges for surveying, &c. When it is considered that, to be useful, it would be necessary for most of the hospitals to be built in the vicinity of the principal commercial cities and towns, where ground is measured and sold by the foot, every one at all acquainted with the value of property in the neighborhood of such places will fully concur in the impossibility of purchasing seven hospital sites, and of defraying the necessary expenses with the appropriation for that purpose.

Under such circumstances, one of two courses was left for the adoption of the board: 1st, to purchase only a part of the number of sites required by the act of Congress; or, 2d, to purchase the whole number, the contracts to be subject to the approval of the Secretary of War. After mature deliberation, it was determined to adopt the latter, not doubting that, upon proper representations being made, Congress would not hesitate to make up the deficiency by an additional appropriation.

The foregoing preliminaries having been adopted, the board commenced their examinations at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and prosecuted the same as heretofore stated. Their reconnoissance, conducted with all the care which the importance of the trust demanded, resulted in their selecting and purchasing sites

For the Mississippi river—

At Natchez, 10 acres, amounting to	\$7,000 00
At Napeleon, mouth of the Arkansas, 10 acres and a fraction	1,000 00
At St. Louis, 18 acres and a fraction	7,468 00
On the Ohio—	
At Paducah, 10 acres	1,000 00
At Louisville, 8 acres and a fraction	6,000 00
At Wheeling, 11 acres	5,500 00
On Lake Erie—	
At Cleveland, 8 acres and a fraction	12,000 00
	39,968 00

To this amount are to be added other incidental expenses alluded to in another part of this report, to cover all which will require an additional appropriation of _____ dollars.

As the sites were purchased for considerably less than the same ground could have been bought for private purposes, it is respectfully recommended that the early attention of Congress be called to the subject, in order that, if the selections should be approved by the proper authority, the land may be paid for and secured.

According to the best information as to the number of sick likely to require aid at the places above enumerated, the board respectfully recommend that the hospitals be divided into two classes: the largest to be built at Natchez, St. Louis, Louisville, and Cleveland, and to be capable of accommodating one hundred patients each; the smallest at the mouth of the Arkansas, Paducah, and Wheeling, to accommodate fifty patients each. The buildings should be planned with a view to their future enlargement, without injury to symmetry, so as to meet any future augmentation of patients. It will be important, also, that they should be constructed to suit the latitude in which they are respectively situated: those on the Mississippi with a special view to coolness and free circulation of air; the others, particularly the one at Cleveland, besides having these important objects attended to, should be capable of excluding cold and of counteracting the vicissitudes of the weather.

In conclusion, the board ask your indulgence for presenting, briefly, a few of the prominent reasons which influenced them in giving a preference to the points they did. Natchez was the first place above New Orleans which was selected, because of its commercial importance, the numerous boatmen trading to that place, its appropriate distance (about 300 miles) from New Orleans, and the large number who are annually taken sick at that place.

Napoleon (mouth of the Arkansas) was next chosen because of its convenient distance from Natchez, (300 miles,) its advantageous geographical position, being at the mouth of the largest tributary of the Lower Mississippi, and only ten miles below White river; the trade of both which is rapidly increasing. A hospital site at this point, therefore, combines many advantages which could not have been secured if it had been selected higher up the river.

St. Louis, as the site for the third and last hospital on the Mississippi, presents such superior and

evident claims over every other town on the upper portion of the river that it is hardly deemed necessary to enumerate them.

In selecting the sites on the Ohio, Louisville, from its position at the falls, being a place of deposit and transfer, is, in a great degree, the central point of trade on that river. These facts being considered indisputable, there could be little hesitation as to the propriety of selecting that place as the central position on the Ohio for the establishment of a hospital.

It was equally manifest that the two remaining sites should be selected above and below this fixed point, and that the latter should be as near to the mouth of the river as circumstances would permit.

In ascending, Paducah is the first point deserving of particular notice after leaving the malaria region. It is forty-four miles distant from the junction of the Ohio with the Mississippi, and upwards of three hundred from Louisville. It is, moreover, for several months in the year, at the head of navigation for boats of the largest class, owing to the difficulty and oftentimes impossibility of passing the Cumberland bar, near the mouth of the Cumberland river. Another most important consideration is its geographical position, being situated at the mouth of the Tennessee river, and thirteen miles below the mouth of the Cumberland, through which the productions of a part of Kentucky and all of Tennessee and North Alabama must pass to find a market, giving employment, consequently, to a very large number of boatmen. For all these reasons, involving the important consideration that a hospital here would benefit a larger number of men than at any other point below Louisville, there could be no hesitation in selecting it as the site of the lower hospital. Any point materially higher up the river would be approaching too near to Louisville; besides that, it would be depriving the boatmen of the Tennessee and Cumberland, as well as a part of the Ohio, of all the advantages to be derived from the hospitals on this river. The same objection cannot apply to the site selected, for all the boatmen above must pass Paducah, both in going to and returning from New Orleans and other ports on the Mississippi.

Wheeling was selected as the third and last site on the Ohio river. In so doing, the board were not unmindful of the importance of Cincinnati or the claims of its citizens. Its proximity to Louisville, and the brief time in which trips are performed between the two cities, (being from twelve to fifteen hours in descending, and from twenty to twenty-four hours in ascending,) would, without great inconvenience, enable the sick to avail themselves of the advantages of the hospital at the former place. For this reason, and believing that the benefits should be diffused as much as possible, a site higher up was preferable. Wheeling was, therefore, selected because of its greater and more desirable distance from the central site, and likewise from its situation at the head of navigation for boats of the ordinary class for a considerable part of the year, which always includes the sickly season.

On Lake Erie, to which the attention of the board was confined by the act of Congress, a site was selected at Cleveland, as it is the terminating point of the Ohio canal, and a central position in its relation to the trade of the lakes, combining to render it a place of great and growing importance.

All which is respectfully submitted.

B. F. HARNEY, *Surgeon*,
H. L. HEISKELL, *Assistant Surgeon*, } *Medical Board*.
J. M. CUYLER, *Assistant Surgeon*, }

HON. JOEL R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War*.

No. 6.

PLANS AND ESTIMATES FOR MARINE HOSPITALS.

CITY OF WASHINGTON, *November 30, 1837.*

SIR: Agreeably to your instructions, I have prepared two designs for the marine hospitals proposed to be erected on the western waters, embracing in their accommodations the two different numbers of patients to be provided for, viz: one building of a size to accommodate one hundred patients, and another building to accommodate fifty patients. The plans are so arranged as to admit of extension at any future time to meet increased accommodations, without deranging or disfiguring the symmetry of the main building.

In arranging these plans, reference has been had to several essential points connected with the hospitals: ample space, free ventilation, separation of patients by classes into distinct wards, and extensive galleries on the level of each floor, as well for shelter as exercise. Besides these, attention has been paid to suitable economy in the construction of the buildings, consistent with a proper regard to architectural decency. A little variation of the two designs is presented, in the style of façade, so as to distinguish them. One plan also represents but two floors, while the other gives three, including the basement story. The nature of the ground and other considerations will determine which would be most proper to adopt.

The openings in the wards are so disposed that all the beds receive the benefit of a free ventilation, without subjecting the patients to injury by the air blowing directly upon them. Not more than eight beds are placed in each ward, which allows five feet for each bed and space between, in their width, and a passage-way between the foot of the beds of near eight feet. All these passages lead, one way, into spacious corridors, and the other into wide piazzas; besides this, every ward is capable of being ventilated over-head. Provision is made also for diffusing a current of warm air in winter throughout the wards, and in summer a current of cool air, so that every disagreeable vapor may be dissipated.

The material of which these hospitals will be built will vary according to location; where stone is on the spot, this may be preferred to brick. As economy is to be observed with durability, we will, in forming an estimate, have reference to brick as the main material for the walls. The price of labor and materials will vary also in the different places where these buildings will be erected. At Natchez, at Napoleon, (mouth of Arkansas river,) and St. Louis, a larger amount would have to be appropriated for each building than at Paducah, Louisville, Wheeling, and Cleveland. Assuming an aggregate sum for the whole, I would estimate the hospital to accommodate 100 patients upon the plan proposed at \$50,000; and the hospital to accommodate 50 patients at \$25,000.

There being four for 100 patients each, these will amount to.....	\$200, 000
And three for 50 patients each will amount to	75, 000
Total for the seven	<u>275, 000</u>

Annexed to the book of drawings will be found a description of each design. When contracts are required to be made, more detailed drawings and descriptions will be furnished. As they are not necessary at present, they are omitted.

I would respectfully suggest, in the construction of these buildings, that the first or basement story should be, at least, in part made fire-proof, and every floor counter-ceiled and made as safe as possible from the effects of fire.

It is an awful idea to think of a fire taking place in a house like this, filled with helpless sick, where no check is afforded to stay its ravages; special care, therefore, should be used to make the buildings as safe as possible against fire. Heating the rooms with warm air, by its superseding the necessity of fires, will afford much security against accidents of this nature; and if the rooms where large fires are necessarily kept are made fire-proof, there would be little to apprehend from this cause.

All which is respectfully submitted.

ROBERT MILLS, *Architect.*

HON. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

Description of plan No. 1 for a marine hospital, proposed to accommodate one hundred patients.

The plan presents the complete parallelogram form, one hundred and fifty feet by eighty feet, including the piazzas, and the elevation of three floors, including the basement or ground story. The first floor provides for the domestic offices of the establishment. The rooms, fifteen in number, and of various sizes, are laid off on each side of a wide corridor. Outside of these rooms, on each front, are the arcaded passages or covered walks, one hundred feet long, terminated by the wing buildings. Two of the entrances are under these arcades, and two at each end of the corridors. In some situations, the rooms in this story designated for the kitchen, washhouse, refectory, &c., may be appropriated to these uses; in other situations, these may be provided for in outbuildings, in which case the rooms may be used for other purposes. The second floor is divided into twelve rooms, besides the vestibules and staircase, disposed on each side of a corridor fifteen feet wide. Fronting these rooms, outside, are the piazzas, one hundred feet long and eleven feet wide. The south rooms on this floor are arranged as wards—four nineteen by twenty feet, containing six to eight beds each, and four thirty by twenty-two feet, embracing ten to twelve beds each. The north rooms are appropriated to the accommodation of the officers and offices of the establishment, viz: the superintendent's and refectory rooms in the wings, twenty-two by thirty feet; the physician's, apothecary's, matron's, and parlor rooms between the wings, all opening into the piazza in front. From without you ascend by steps into this piazza, which leads into a hall nineteen by twenty feet, opening into the corridor fifteen feet wide; and in front is the great staircase, leading to the rooms above. Ascending these stairs, you land in a spacious vestibule, opening outwards into the piazzas, ranging both fronts between the wings. On each side of this vestibule large Venetian doorways open into wide corridors communicating with the different wards, as well as with the nurses' and other rooms. Two large wards in the wings, twenty-two by thirty feet, are capable of containing comfortably ten or twelve beds each; eight other rooms, nineteen by twenty feet, six to eight beds each; and two larger rooms (which may each be divided into two other rooms) for the nurses and physicians in attendance.

By a reference to the plans, the above description may be better understood; and it will be seen that every attention has been paid to comfort and convenience, economy of space and of construction. Spacious promenades, both within and without, are provided; ample passages between the beds in the wards; free ventilation of the rooms in summer, and a supply of warm fresh air in winter, by means of air-furnaces placed in the basement story. It will be seen, also, that the beds are so disposed that the patients will suffer no inconvenience from a draught of air passing through the rooms when this is required. Should the emergency require it, the spaces allotted for corridors, &c., may be allotted to beds, and thus a greater number of sick may be accommodated.

The main stories are each thirteen feet high in the clear, and the basement story ten feet. The floors are proposed to be all counter-ceiled, not only to prevent the passage of sound, but as a safeguard from fire, and avoiding any under-currents through the floors.

The façades, front and rear, present a double piazza or colonnade, in the Greek style of architecture, elevated upon an arcade, and flanked by wings, rising above the centre building and receiving the roof.

The attic story of the wings will provide for additional wards, if required.

Enclosures are provided for every story of the piazzas, and the whole surmounted by an iron railing. A reference to the drawing will give a better idea of these façades than can be conveyed by words.

With respect to the materials for the walls, this will depend upon the facility of procuring brick or stone, or both; but, in any case, one or the other, or both, of these materials is to be used.

ROBERT MILLS, *Architect.*

Description of plan No. 2 for a marine hospital, proposed to accommodate fifty patients.

This plan presents nearly a geometrical form, flanked at each angle by a square tower, which projects from the main building in front sufficiently to receive the piazzas forming each façade. The elevation provides for two floors, raised upon a low basement.

A flight of six steps in front lands in a piazza forty feet long, flanked by two small rooms, eleven and a half feet square, for the clerk's and superintendent's offices. Opposite the steps a doorway leads into a

vestibule eighteen by twenty feet, which opens into a corridor twelve feet wide, that communicates with a suite of rooms on one side, three in number, eighteen by twenty feet, containing six or eight beds each, and two rooms on the other for the matron and warden.

The ward rooms open back into a piazza like that in front, at each end of which are two small rooms, eleven and a half feet square, for the nurse and apothecary.

At each end of the corridor roomy stairways lead to the second floor, which is disposed into five wards, 18 by 20 feet, containing from 6 to 8 beds; a physician's room, 18 by 20 feet; and four rooms in the tower wings, 11½ feet square, for the nurses and apothecary.

All these rooms open outwards into spacious piazzas, and inwards into roomy corridors. The whole of this floor presents the appearance of one great ward, yet divided so as to render at pleasure each part private. The beds are disposed in the same way as represented in plan No. 1, and the patients will possess the same advantages in point of comfort. The drawings annexed will explain more particularly the details of the plan, and also show in what manner this building may be enlarged to meet future requisitions to provide accommodation for other patients.

The façade of this building, 68 feet in extent, is in the plain Gothic style, and presents a double piazza of two stories, supported by clustered columns, elevated upon a low basement, and flanked by two wings as towers. The piazzas as well as towers are surmounted with battlement enclosures.

By reference to the drawing, the architectural effect of this arrangement of façade may be judged of. As respects the material to be used in constructing the walls of this building, economy will point out brick as the most probable, except stone is plenty and easily quarried in its neighborhood.

Whatever materials are used in the building they are intended to be of the best quality, and the work done in the best and most workmanlike manner.

ROBERT MILLS, *Architect.*

No. 7.

REPORT OF THE MAJOR GENERAL OF THE ARMY.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, November—, 1837.*

SIR: In accordance with your instructions dated on the 7th of September last, I have the honor herewith to submit the following statements and returns:

- 1st. A statement showing the organization of the army, marked A.
- 2d. A general return of the army, marked B.
- 3d. Distribution of the troops in the eastern division, marked C.
- 4th. Distribution of the troops in the western division, marked D.
- 5th. A return showing the number of troops under the command of Major General Jesup, serving in Florida against the Seminole Indians, marked Z.

6th. A statement showing the number of recruits enlisted in the army from January 1, 1837, marked E.

My last report shows Governor Call, of Florida, the commander of our forces against the Seminole Indians, to have fallen back upon Fort Drane for a supply of provisions and other necessaries. On the 10th of November, 1836, Governor Call, with some regulars, about 750 Creek Indians, and 1,200 mounted Tennesseans, again left Fort Drane, and on the 13th arrived at the Withlacoochee, which was crossed without opposition by a part of the army. On the 17th a large encampment of the enemy was discovered, and General Armstrong, with one regiment of the Tennessee volunteers, was ordered to attack them in a swamp, to which they had retreated. This was soon done in a spirited manner, and the Indians driven from their strongholds and pursued. In the action, which lasted 30 minutes, the enemy are reported to have lost 20, left dead on the field; our own loss being 11 killed and wounded.

On the 18th another attack was made by 550 Tennesseans on a hammock, which was resisted, it is supposed by Governor Call, by about 600 or 700 Indians. The enemy was driven as before, after an engagement of half an hour, till out of sight. Their loss was considerable: 25 were reported found dead on the field; but as their wounded were carried off, the total loss could not be estimated. Our loss was 15 killed and wounded. On the 20th a junction was formed by the force of Governor Call with the regulars under Lieutenant Colonel Pierce of the army. On the 21st of November the whole command moved towards a swamp in which the enemy awaited its approach. A charge was made forthwith, and the enemy driven at all points. By means of a trail, however, after a considerable time and the utmost difficulty, the Indians were discovered by Captain Brown, of the 4th regiment of United States artillery, commanding the Creek regiment, who attacked them. In the meanwhile the Tennessee and Florida militia and regulars, under brevet Lieutenant Colonel Pierce, of the 1st regiment United States artillery, arrived, and joined in the contest, which resulted in the repulse of the enemy, whose loss in this affair is supposed by Governor Call to have been not less than fifty; our own being 21 killed and wounded. The officers and men engaged throughout are spoken of in the highest terms; and had they not been prevented from holding the position gained by want of provisions, much more might have been effected.

Immediately after the War Department was apprised of the failure of Governor Call to cross the Withlacoochee, when first attempted in October, 1836, he was directed to turn over the command of the Florida army to Major General Jesup, who, about the 15th of October, had entered the Territory with a part of the forces employed in subduing the Creek Indians.

General Jesup was detained, for want of transportation, at Tampa, till the 27th of November, on which day he moved towards the scene of Governor Call's operations on the Withlacoochee. Before he proceeded far he found that Governor Call had been in and scoured that part of the country, and retired with his force on Volusia. General Jesup then ordered a countermarch, and with 400 men joined Governor Call at Volusia on the 4th of December. On the 8th of December he relieved Governor Call and assumed the command, agreeably to the order of the War Department.

From Fort Dade, on the Withlacoochee, General Jesup reports his command, consisting of the Tennessee brigade, 300 regular troops, the Alabama battalion, about 320 strong, and 500 Creek warriors, to have examined the Wahoo swamp without meeting with the enemy.

On the 23d of December General Jesup writes from Tampa that he left Brevet Brigadier General

Armistead, of the army, on the Withlacoochee to make further examination of the country between Fort Dade and Fort King.

On the 1st of January, 1837, General Jesup writes from Tampa that much sickness prevails among the troops, and that the Indians in our service are completely broken down.

On the 17th of January General Jesup reports that the swamps of the Withlacoochee were thoroughly examined, but no Indians found. On the reports received from different quarters, various detachments of troops were sent in different directions without decisive results, the enemy generally having dispersed. Sometimes a few stragglers, women and negroes, were taken, from whom information as to the position of the enemy was received.

On the 22d of January the main body of the army, under the immediate command of General Jesup, marched to the headwaters of the Ocklawaha, where it was supposed were the strongholds of the enemy. Cooper and his band of Indians were surprised; himself and three warriors killed, and seventeen Indian women and negroes taken prisoners. Here it was ascertained that the mass of Indians had gone in a southeasterly direction, and pursuit was accordingly made. The enemy was found on the Hatcheelustee and attacked; his baggage and horses were soon captured, and himself driven into a thick swamp. On the day after the skirmish (28th) a prisoner was sent to his people with an offer of peace; on the night of the 29th he returned, and brought peaceful messages from Alligator and Abraham, two hostile chiefs. On the 3d of February others came in and entered into arrangements to cause hostilities to be suspended until a conference could be had, for which the 18th of February, 1837, was fixed.

On the 8th of February a band of the enemy under Philip, unacquainted, it is supposed, with the temporary suspension of hostilities, attacked the post on Lake Monroe, garrisoned by detachments of the 2d United States dragoons and artillery, under Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Fanning, of the 4th regiment of artillery. In the defence of this post, Captain Mellon, of the 2d artillery, was killed, and Passed Midshipman J. T. McLaughlin, of the navy, a volunteer, wounded; after which the enemy were driven off without much injury to our troops. On the 17th of February General Jesup writes and says, on account of the attack of the Indians on the fort commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Fanning, he doubts the sincerity of the Indians as to their coming in on the 18th, according to agreement. On the 22d of February the general writes that some of the Indian chiefs had come in, but the rest seemed very loath to follow. In March a convention, or agreement, was made between the Seminole chiefs and General Jesup. On the 26th of March General Jesup, on account of the arrival at Tampa Bay of great numbers of the enemy, and some important characters belonging to them, expresses a belief that the war was at an end, and commenced to discharge his volunteers. On the 8th of May he wrote that the Indians continued to come in, and that they would probably be emigrated in the course of the winter. On the 5th of June the general informed the department that the Indians who had surrendered and were in camp near Tampa for the purpose of emigration were surrounded by a party of their own warriors and carried off, thus causing the unsuccessful termination of the campaign.

About this time active operations ceased; the climate during the summer not permitting of them, and the army was so distributed as to render the frontiers as safe as possible. Much sickness prevailed in the interior, the several posts of which were in consequence abandoned. Hospitals were established, and many of the invalids, on the surgeon's recommendation, were removed to Fort Monroe, in Virginia, and Fort Hamilton, in the harbor of New York.

On the 31st of August General Jesup reports that the Creek regiment had been discharged.

Although the hostile Indians acted on the defensive, our mounted men were kept moving from one post to another, making examinations and gaining information for future operations.

Brigadier General Hernandez, of the Florida militia, having learned from some negroes who had escaped from the Indians the position of some Indians under the chief Philip, on the 7th of September organized a small force of dragoons, artillery, and militia, and went in search of them. They soon came to the camp and surprised them. They resisted for a short time, but were all either slain or taken prisoners. Some important chiefs were among the number. The officers and men are reported to have behaved very gallantly. Lieutenant McNeil, of the 2d dragoons, a young and gallant officer, was killed in this affair. From time to time several parties of Indians and negroes have surrendered themselves or been taken prisoners; among others, Yose Ya Hola, (Powell,) who began the war, and many influential chiefs, who are now in confinement at St. Augustine.

On the 21st of October General Jesup reports that since he took the command thirty of the enemy had been slain and about five hundred captured.

The army in Florida, reduced by disease and the discharge of those whose term of service had expired, has been recruited and augmented by detachments of the regular troops, drawn from various points, and by numerous volunteer forces.

In the month of January last seven companies of the 6th regiment of infantry arrived at Tampa Bay from the western frontier, and six companies of the 2d regiment of dragoons, one company of the 2d artillery, and one company of the 3d artillery, recruited at the north, sailed from New York and Norfolk, and arrived in the St. John's. In September last the 1st regiment of infantry, from the Upper Mississippi, left Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, and a battalion of the 2d infantry, from the lakes, left New York for Tampa Bay, and are now at their destination. In the same month three companies of the 2d dragoons, under Colonel Twiggs, left Jefferson Barracks to march or cross the country for Florida, and when last heard from were at Garey's Ferry, in that Territory.

In addition to the above-named organized force, 1,900 recruits for the regiments of the army serving in Florida have recently reached there from Norfolk and New York, and from the interior.

The aggregate force under the command of Major General Jesup in Florida, it will appear by the statement accompanying this report, amounts to 8,993 men, consisting of—

Regulars.....	4, 637
Volunteers.....	4, 078
Seamen.....	100
Indians.....	178
Total.....	<u>8, 993</u>

By the last advices from General Jesup, active operations on his part have commenced; and every hope is entertained that, with the arrangements made by him, and the ample aid furnished by the War Department, the object for which the army is assembled in Florida will, by the close of the season, be fully and completely attained.

In consequence of information having been communicated to Colonel Many, commanding the troops at Fort Jesup, that an insurrection among the negroes was apprehended at Alexandria, Louisiana, that officer ordered thither two companies of his command, to afford the desired protection.

When the vast extent of the frontiers of the United States is compared with the amount of regular force allotted by law for their defence, it must strike every thinking man that the present military establishment is by no means adequate to afford what might be regarded a reasonable means for maintaining peace on the Indian borders and protection to the seaboard, without taking into account the preservation of the great amount of public property which has been collected in our various arsenals and in our maritime fortresses. The number of the rank and file of the army, according to existing laws, is less than 7,000; and these men are organized into two regiments of dragoons, four regiments of artillery, and seven regiments of infantry, occupying, when at their proper stations, between fifty and sixty posts, extending along the whole frontier of the United States, inland and Atlantic. But at present most of these posts are in a defenceless state, in consequence of the Florida war requiring almost the whole military force; in fact, every post on the Atlantic, from Maine to the Sabine, is without a single company to garrison it, or to take charge of the public property. The western frontier, especially that portion which covers the States of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri, and the Territory of Wisconsin, separates from the white population numerous tribes of Indians. These tribes are the original inhabitants of the country, and emigrated Indians sent from among the States to lands allotted to them on that frontier. They are estimated to amount in the aggregate to more than 250,000, and can furnish 30,000 warriors. Such a population cannot be viewed otherwise than as dangerous neighbors, and should be kept in check by a proper disposition of military force.

The disasters and consequences of an Indian war are too well known to be here dwelt on. Disturbances continually occur which produce alarm and agitate the country, and sometimes lead to open hostilities. On such occasions, for the want of sufficient numbers of regular troops on the frontiers, the distant posts are obliged to be evacuated to furnish means of defence, and a militia force called out; and heavy expenditures, by the loss of property near the scenes of these troubles, are the consequence. But if the force permanently embodied on that frontier were sufficient to overawe the Indians, or to subdue them in the commencement of hostilities, much expense would be saved, as well as a proper protection afforded to the frontier States, without the necessity of calling out the militia, which is always attended with heavy expenditure of money and loss of life by disease, and is highly detrimental to the concerns of individuals. An augmentation of the army, therefore, to a reasonable extent, is called for by a policy of humanity and economy.

I would, therefore, respectfully submit to your consideration the propriety of augmenting the numerical force of the army, so as to furnish an effective rank and file of 15,000 men, to be organized according to the accompanying table, marked No. 1. With such a force the frontiers might expect to enjoy tranquility; and by the occasional concentration of the troops in sufficient force to practice the evolutions of the line, a great improvement in the discipline and efficiency of the army would naturally be the result; and if war should break out with any civilized power, the army, thus augmented, would furnish a basis on which could be built a regular force adequate to meet the exigency.

The table marked No. 2 will exhibit the manner in which the proposed force would be distributed.

The regiments of artillery and infantry, since the late war with Great Britain, have been placed, as to rank and file, on the lowest possible establishment consistent with a regard to the preservation of military knowledge and discipline among them; but for operations in the face of an enemy, the rank and file, as experience has proved, were reduced too low for any efficient service—a company of artillery having, when full, only 49 rank and file, and a company of infantry 46. Taking into consideration the shortness of the term of enlistment—which is now but three years—the nature of the service, and the diseases to which the troops are subjected by constant exposure, especially in insalubrious climates, without reckoning the casualties of war, it is not to be expected that any company will be able, one month after taking the field, to present under arms more than two-thirds of its original number. The army, operating for the most part in uninhabited parts of the country, or where the population is very sparse, is obliged to furnish from the line the drivers of trains, and the laborers on all occasions where labor for the service is required—such as opening roads, building bridges and causeways, and other fatiguing duties. It is recommended, in order to render the army efficient, and capable of performing the duties required, that every company of artillery and infantry be augmented to 80 men, with authority to increase them to 100, should circumstances render it proper; so that there may always be in each regiment, for duty with arms, a respectable force.

The propriety of increasing the engineer department, including the topographical engineers, the ordnance department, and the quartermaster's department, has been frequently urged. The duties required of these several staff departments have been so extensive and multifarious that they have not been able to perform them without the assistance of a great number of officers from the line; and consequently it has diminished measurably the efficiency of the regiments from which these assisting officers have been withdrawn.

In consequence of these drafts upon the line, it frequently happens that several companies of a regiment are left without a single officer to command them or take charge of the interests of the soldiers. I cannot, therefore, too strongly recommend that provision be made at once for a sufficient number of officers for the several branches of the staff, and that each branch be organized into a distinct corps or department complete in itself, and sufficient to meet every exigency which has reference to it. The chiefs of the several staff departments will in their reports indicate what is required to render their respective departments efficient.

The duties of the inspector generals since my last report have been various. Brigadier General Wool, until within a short time, has been in command of the forces assembled in the Cherokee country; but having been relieved from that duty by Colonel Lindsay, of the 2d artillery, he has been attached as chief of the staff of the eastern division, under Major General Scott.

Colonel Croghan, since my last report, has completed the inspection of the troops on the Mississippi; he has been likewise engaged in mustering several corps of volunteers called into the service of the United States. He is now attached as chief of the staff of the western division, under Major General

Gaines. According to your instructions, General Gaines, with the assistance of Inspector General Croghan and several topographical engineers, has been ordered to make, as early as practicable, a reconnoissance of the western frontier, with a view of projecting a system of defence for its protection, in conformity with a resolution of the House of Representatives.

Major General Scott, in like manner, has been directed, with the assistance of Brigadier General Wool, inspector general, and a topographical engineer, to make a reconnoissance of the northern and eastern frontiers, for the establishment of a system of defence for that portion of the country, in conformity with a resolution of the Senate.

The recruiting service has been more successful this year than usual, as will be seen by the statement marked E.

The term of enlistment, however, is found by experience to be too short, it being only for three years. The time consumed in recruiting the men, in instructing and transporting them to their respective regiments, some of which are very distant, diminishes the period of actual service nearly one-third; unnecessary expense is thereby created, and the army is filled with raw and inexperienced soldiers. I therefore strongly recommend that instead of *three years*, the term of service of the enlisted soldier be extended to five years, as heretofore. Indeed, it is essential to the character and efficiency of the army that the enlisted men should become habituated to the life of a soldier, and be well instructed in his duties, which cannot be the case if the term of enlistment continue at the short period of only three years; for by the time a soldier is well initiated into all his duties, and is capable of assuming a military air, his term of service expires and a new recruit supplies his place. The cavalry service especially requires a much longer period than three years; for in that time they can hardly be considered anything more than recruits.

It is of great consequence that the several regiments and corps should be effective in officers as well as in men. From age and exposure officers are liable to be rendered unfit for active service, or, indeed, for any service at all; but as there is no provision by law for superannuated or decayed officers who may have spent their best days in the public military service, and thus officers so situated cannot for the want of means retire—their pay during their period of activity having barely supported them—there has occurred to me, and I beg leave to recommend to your consideration, a plan by which such officers might be provided for out of the appropriation for the support of the several regiments, thus: suppose the colonel of a regiment having served thirty years, and finding himself unfit for the active duties of the field, is desirous of retiring, it would be profitable to the government to allow him to do so, and to receive the full pay of his rank without any other allowances during the existence of his regiment or of his own natural life; then the lieutenant colonel highest in rank, who would, according to the established rules of promotion, be entitled to be promoted to his place in case of his death or resignation, should be promoted accordingly, but to enjoy the pay of lieutenant colonel and the rank and emoluments and allowances of colonel; so the major first in the regular course of promotion to become lieutenant colonel, with the pay of major and the emoluments of lieutenant colonel; and the captain first in order of promotion to become the major, with the pay of captain and the emoluments of major; and so on with the first lieutenant, who should become captain; a second lieutenant should become first lieutenant, and the brevet second lieutenant become second lieutenant; and thus the place of every other officer unfit for service would be filled by an effective officer. As soon as any of the retired officers may die, the officers acting in their places should receive the full pay of their respective ranks. Such a plan, while it would refresh the army and render it more vigorous and effective, could not be otherwise than very gratifying to all concerned.

I beg leave to draw your attention to the fact that there is no provision made by law for the widows and orphans of the officers of the regular army who may die in consequence of wounds received or diseases contracted by exposure in the service, while there is a provision of that nature for all other description of troops, whether militia, rangers, sea-fencibles, or volunteers, as will appear by the act of July 4, 1836. There are the widows of several meritorious officers and soldiers now suffering by the deprivation of their natural protectors, who have sacrificed their lives in their country's service, to whom the extension of the provisions of that law would be a great relief; and I am sure, with a knowledge of that fact, you will see the justice of urging on Congress the application of the benefits of that law to the widows and orphans of the members of the regular army who have thus died in the service.

Respectfully submitted.

ALEX. MACOMB, *Major General, Commanding-in-chief.*

HON. JOEL R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

A.—Organization of the army of the United States, 1837.

	Major General.	Brigadier general.	Adjutant general.	Inspectors general.	Quartermaster general.	Quartermasters.	Commissary general of subsistence.	Commissaries.	Surgeon general.	Surgeons.	Assistant surgeons.	Paymaster general.	Paymasters.	Commissary general of purchases.	Military storekeepers.	Colonels.	Lieutenant colonels.	Majors.	Adjutants.	Captains.	First lieutenants.	Second lieutenants.	Sergeant majors.	Quartermaster sergeants.	Sergents.	Corporals.	Principal musicians.	Chief buglers.	Buglers.	Musicians.	Farrers and blacksmiths.	Artificers.	Enlisted men for ordnance.	Privates.	Total commissioned.	Total non-commissioned officers, musicians, artificers, and privates.	Aggregate.
General staff.....	1	2	1	2	1	4	1	2																										14	14	14	
Medical department.....									1	15	60																								76	76	76
Pay department.....												1	17																						18	18	18
Purchasing department.....														1	2																				3	3	3
Corps of engineers.....																1	1	2		6	6	6													22	22	22
Topographical engineers.....																1	1	2			4														10	10	10
Ordnance department.....																1	1	2		10					44							250		14	294	308	
First regiment of dragoons.....																1	1	1	1	10	10	10	1	1	40	40	1	2	20				600	34	715	749	
Second regiment of dragoons.....																1	1	1	1	10	10	10	1	1	40	40	1	2	20				600	34	715	749	
Aggregate of dragoons.....																2	2	2	2	20	20	20	2	2	80	80	2	4	40				1,200	68	1,430	1,498	
First regiment of artillery.....																1	1	1		9	18	18	1	1	36	36				18		27		378	48	497	545
Second regiment of artillery.....																1	1	1		9	18	18	1	1	36	36				18		27		378	48	497	545
Third regiment of artillery.....																1	1	1		9	18	18	1	1	36	36				18		27		378	48	497	545
Fourth regiment of artillery.....																1	1	1		9	18	18	1	1	36	36				18		27		378	48	497	545
Aggregate of artillery.....																4	4	4		36	72	72	4	4	144	144				72		108		1,512	192	1,988	2,180
First regiment of infantry.....																1	1	1		10	10	10	1	1	30	40	2			20				420	33	514	547
Second regiment of infantry.....																1	1	1		10	10	10	1	1	30	40	2			20				420	33	514	547
Third regiment of infantry.....																1	1	1		10	10	10	1	1	30	40	2			20				420	33	514	547
Fourth regiment of infantry.....																1	1	1		10	10	10	1	1	30	40	2			20				420	33	514	547
Fifth regiment of infantry.....																1	1	1		10	10	10	1	1	30	40	2			20				420	33	514	547
Sixth regiment of infantry.....																1	1	1		10	10	10	1	1	30	40	2			20				420	33	514	547
Seventh regiment of infantry.....																1	1	1		10	10	10	1	1	30	40	2			20				420	33	514	547
Aggregate of infantry.....																7	7	7		70	70	70	7	7	210	280	14			140				2,940	231	3,598	3,829
Grand aggregate.....	1	2	1	2	1	4	1	2	1	15	60	1	17	1	2	15	15	23	2	146	168	168	13	13	478	504	16	4	40	212	20	108	250	5,652	648	7,310	7,958

NOTE.—The law authorizes the appointment of any number of assistant commissaries of subsistence and twenty assistant quartermasters, to be taken from the line of the army. The former are confined to the rank of lieutenants.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, November 30, 1837.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, Washington, November 30, 1837.

ALEX. MACOMB, Major General, Commanding-in-chief.

R. JONES, Adjutant General of the Army.

B.—General return of the army of the United States for the year 1837.

															PRESENT.																				
															For duty.																				
	Major general.	Brigadier generals.	Adjutant general.	Inspectors general.	Quartermaster general.	Quartermasters,	Commissary general of subsistence.	Commissaries.	Surgeon general.	Surgeons.	Assistant surgeons.	Paymaster general.	Paymasters.	Commissary general of purchases.	Military storekeepers.	Colonels.	Lieutenant colonels.	Majors.	Adjutants.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Sergeant majors.	Quartermaster sergeants.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Principal musicians.	Chief buglers.	Buglers.	Musicians.	Farrices and blacksmiths.	Artificers.	Privates.			
General staff.....	1	2	1	2	1	4	1	2																											
Medical staff.....									1	15	60																								
Pay department.....											1	17																							
Purchasing department.....													1	2																					
Corps of engineers.....															1	1	2		6	18															
Topographical engineers.....																	6	4																	
Ordnance department.....															1	1	2		10																
Aggregate.....	1	2	1	2	1	4	1	2	1	15	60	1	17	1	2	2	2	10	20	18															
First regiment of dragoons.....															1	1	1	1	7	14	1		29	23		1	12			8			277		
Second regiment of dragoons.....															1	1	1	1	10	19	1		28	29	1	1	16			5			384		
Aggregate of dragoons.....															2	2	2	2	17	33	2		57	51	1	2	28			13			661		
First regiment of artillery.....																	1		6	14			5	13						3		10		288	
Second regiment of artillery.....																1			5	22			14	15						7		13		230	
Third regiment of artillery.....																1	1		3	18	1		15	14						7		8		163	
Fourth regiment of artillery.....																1	1		5	18			20	22						8		9		238	
Aggregate of artillery.....																3	3		19	72	1		54	64						25		40		919	
First regiment of infantry.....															1	1			8	9	1	1	20	17	1		1	6					167		
Second regiment of infantry.....																1	1		7	16	1	1	17	28	2				15				345		
Third regiment of infantry.....															1	1			7	14	1	1	20	20	2		1	10					171		
Fourth regiment of infantry.....																1	1		3	11	1	1	14	25	1				12				284		
Fifth regiment of infantry.....															1				5	16			21	12	1		1	8					115		
Sixth regiment of infantry.....																1	1		5	13	1		11	10					3				293		
Seventh regiment of infantry.....																1	1		5	9	1	1	21	26	2			2	12				284		
Aggregate of infantry.....																3	6	5	40	88	6	6	124	138	9		5	66					1,659		
Recruits and unattached soldiers.....																																			
Grand aggregate.....	1	2	1	2	1	4	1	2	1	15	60	1	17	1	2	7	13	20	2	96	211	9	6	235	253	10	2	33	91	13	40		3,239		

B.—General return of the army of the United States for the year 1837—Continued.

	PRESENT.											ABSENT.						Present and absent.							
	Sick.				On extra or daily duty.			In arrest or confinement.				Commissioned officers.	Non-commissioned officers, musicians, artificers, and privates.	Detached service.			With leave or on furlough.			Total.	Aggregate.				
	Field officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Non-commissioned officers, musicians, artificers, and privates.	Field officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Non-commissioned officers, musicians, artificers, and privates.	Field officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.			Non-commissioned officers, musicians, artificers, and privates.	Field officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Non-commissioned officers, musicians, artificers, and privates.	Non-commissioned officers, &c., sick.						
General staff.....											13											13			
Medical staff.....											76												76		
Pay department.....											18												18		
Purchasing department.....											3												3		
Corps of engineers.....											28												28		
Topographical engineers.....											10												10		
Ordnance department.....											14	195											195	209	
Aggregate.....											162	195											195	357	
First regiment of dragoons.....			1	120	1		62				30	27	562			2	3	61					623	657	
Second regiment of dragoons.....				68			22				8	33	563			1	17						64	644	
Aggregate of dragoons.....			1	188	1		84				38	60	1,125			2	4	78					64	1,267	
First regiment of artillery.....				31	1		2				4	24	363	1	2	12	11		1	6	2	21	397	443	
Second regiment of artillery.....			1	23		1	5				10	35	333	2	1	8	10		1		6	18	367	414	
Third regiment of artillery.....				25	1		2				4	26	253		5	10	11		1	2	1	18	283	327	
Fourth regiment of artillery.....				27		1	5				6	31	347	1	3	11	7			2	7	13	374	422	
Aggregate of artillery.....			1	106	2	2	14				24	116	1,296	4	11	41	30		3	10	16	70	1,421	1,606	
First regiment of infantry.....				50			12				6	19	282	1	2	7	2			3	1	3	288	320	
Second regiment of infantry.....				38		1	46				21	26	514	1	1	4	3				2	8	527	560	
Third regiment of infantry.....				26			99				33	24	384	1	3	3	11			1		9	404	436	
Fourth regiment of infantry.....				53			23				6	17	419	1	7	5	10			3		74	503	536	
Fifth regiment of infantry.....				11			37				1	23	208	1	5	2	13			2	2	6	229	262	
Sixth regiment of infantry.....				38			24				5	20	385	1	4	4	6			1	1	6	32	429	
Seventh regiment of infantry.....				68	1		54				23	18	494		5	6	11			4	5	1	511	544	
Aggregate of infantry.....				284	1	1	3				95	147	2,686	6	27	31	56			2	14	16	133	2,891	
Recruits and unattached soldiers.....												1,418											1,418	1,418	
Grand aggregate.....			1	1	578	3	4	17			441		157	485	6,720	10	40	76	173		5	26	32	267	7,192

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, November 30, 1837.
 ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, Washington, November 30, 1837.

ALEXANDER MACOMB, Major General, Commanding-in-chief.
 R. JONES, Adjutant General of the Army.

C.—Position and distribution of the troops of the eastern division, &c.—Continued.

Regiments.	Present.										Absent.						Present and absent.					
	Number of companies.	Colonels.	Lieutenant colonels.	Major.	Surgeons.	Assistant surgeons.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Non-commissioned officers, musicians, artificers, and privates.	Total commissioned.	Aggregate.	Field officers.	Surgeons and assistant surgeons.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Non-commissioned officers, musicians, artificers, and privates.	Total commissioned.	Aggregate.	Commissioned officers.	Non-commissioned officers, musicians, artificers, and privates.	Aggregate.	
2d regiment of dragoons..	10	1	1	1	10	20	563	33	596	1	81	1	82	34	644	678	
1st regiment of artillery..	9	1	1	6	16	363	24	387	1	3	18	34	22	56	46	397	443	
2d regiment of artillery..	8	1	6	25	279	32	311	2	2	7	33	11	44	43	312	355	
3d regiment of artillery..	9	1	1	1	3	20	253	26	279	6	12	30	18	48	44	283	327	
4th regiment of artillery..	9	1	1	6	23	347	31	378	1	3	13	27	17	44	48	374	422	
Aggregate.....	35	2	3	3	21	84	1,242	113	1,355	4	14	50	124	68	192	181	1,366	1,547	
1st regiment of infantry..	10	1	1	8	9	282	19	301	1	2	10	6	13	19	32	288	320	
2d regiment of infantry..	6	1	5	10	332	16	348	1	1	2	10	4	14	20	342	362	
4th regiment of infantry..	9	1	3	4	379	8	397	2	6	12	81	20	101	28	460	488	
6th regiment of infantry..	7	1	3	5	294	9	303	1	4	6	38	11	49	20	332	352	
Aggregate.....	32	1	4	19	28	1,287	52	1,339	5	13	30	135	48	183	100	1,422	1,522	
Recruits	1,060	1,060	1,060	1,060
Marines	1	3	170	4	174	1	15	16	185	190
Aggregate.....	77	4	8	4	5	20	51	135	4,322	227	4,552	9	27	82	355	117	473	312	4,677	5,022	

C—Continued.

No.	Posts.	Remarks.
1	Fort Winnebago	
2	Fort Brady.....	
3	Fort Mackinac	Abandoned; garrison withdrawn June 10, 1837.
4	*Fort Howard	Garrison withdrawn August 24, 1837.
5	Fort Dearborn	Abandoned; garrison withdrawn December 29, 1836.
6	Fort Gratiot.....	Abandoned; garrison withdrawn June 9, 1837.
7	Fort Niagara	Abandoned; garrison withdrawn May 10, 1834.
8	Madison Barracks.....	Abandoned; garrison withdrawn May 20, 1832. o
9	Hancock Barracks.....	
10	*Fort Sullivan.....	Garrison withdrawn July—, 1836.
11	*Fort Preble.....	Garrison withdrawn May 30, 1836.
12	*Fort Constitution	Garrison withdrawn May 27, 1836.
13	*Fort Independence	Garrison withdrawn May 29, 1836.
14	*Fort Wolcott.....	Garrison withdrawn May 22, 1836.
15	*Fort Trumbull.....	Garrison withdrawn May 23, 1836.
16	West Point.....	
17	*Fort Columbus.....	Garrison withdrawn May and June, 1836.
18	*Fort Hamilton.....	Do. do.
19	*Fort Lafayette	Do. do.
20	*Fort McHenry	Garrison withdrawn May 20, 1836.
21	*Fort Severn.....	Garrison withdrawn February 8, 1836.
22	*Fort Washington	Garrison withdrawn June 27, 1836.
23	*Fort Monroe.....	Garrison withdrawn May —, 1836.
24	*Fort Johnston.....	Garrison withdrawn February 3, 1836.
25	*Fort Caswell	
26	*Fort Macon.....	Garrison withdrawn February 2, 1836.
27	*Fort Moultrie	Garrison withdrawn January and February, 1836.
28	*Castle Pinckney.....	Do. do.
29	*Oglethorpe Barracks.....	Garrison withdrawn June 29, 1836.
30	†Fort Marion.....	
31	*Key West.....	Garrison withdrawn September —, 1836.
32	†Fort Brooke.....	
33	†Fort King	
34	*Fort Mitchell.....	Abandoned; garrison withdrawn November 15, 1837.
35	*Fort Pickens	Garrison withdrawn November 24, 1835.
36	*Fort Morgan	Garrison withdrawn November 30, 1835.
37	*New Orleans.....	Abandoned; garrison withdrawn February —, 1836.
38	Fort Pike.....	
39	*Fort Wood.....	Garrison withdrawn December 19, 1835.
40	*Baton Rouge.....	Garrison withdrawn June 29, 1836. .
41	Fort Cass.....	

Memorandum of regular troops serving in Florida, under the command of Brevet Major General Thomas S. Jesup.

GENERAL AND FIELD OFFICERS OF THE ARMY.

Brevet Brigadier General W. K. Armistead; Brevet Brigadier General A. Eustis; Colonel Z. Taylor, 1st infantry; Colonel D. E. Twiggs, 2d dragoons; Lieutenant Colonel A. Cummings, 2d infantry; Lieutenant Colonel W. Davenport, 1st infantry; Lieutenant Colonel J. Bankhead, 4th artillery; Lieutenant Colonel J. B. Crane, 2d artillery; Lieutenant Colonel W. S. Foster, 4th infantry; Lieutenant Colonel W. S. Harney, 2d dragoons; Lieutenant Colonel A. R. Thompson, 6th infantry; Lieutenant Colonel W. Gates, 3d artillery; Brevet Lieutenant Colonel A. C. W. Fanning, major 4th artillery; Major S. Churchill, 3d artillery; Brevet Lieutenant Colonel B. K. Pierce, major 1st artillery; Major T. T. Fauntleroy, 2d dragoons; Major B. Riley, 4th infantry.

REMARKS.

1. The garrisons have been withdrawn from posts marked (*), and are now serving in Florida.
2. The troops at these posts, (†) although regarded as permanent stations, so often vary in number, &c., that they are considered as being in the field rather than in garrison, and are therefore omitted in the table. According to the last returns, the force at each was as follows:

	Com'd officers	Men.
Fort Marion, St. Augustine.....	7	82
Fort King, Florida	7	159
Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay	65	1,596

Troops are also stationed at various other places in Florida, but the specification of the force present is, for the same reason, omitted.

3. Many of the officers reported "absent" by their respective commanders are serving elsewhere in Florida, on duty connected with the service in that quarter.

The number on the sick list, as reported October 31, is about 359 present.

STAFF.

Four aides-de-camp, two quartermasters, six assistant quartermasters, one commissary, five surgeons, twenty assistant surgeons.

R. JONES, *Adjutant General of the Army.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, November 30, 1837.*

Memorandum of the volunteer force provided for the service in Florida in aid of the suppression of the hostilities of the Seminole Indians.

Missouri mounted volunteers, about	477
Tennessee mounted volunteers, about	504
Alabama mounted volunteers, about	906
Washington city, D. C., (foot).....	66
Philadelphia, (foot)	425
Louisiana, (foot).....	250

2, 628

The above statement of volunteers is derived from the muster-rolls received at the Adjutant General's office, (except the 250 raised at New Orleans,) which force is supposed to have arrived in Florida in all November. Volunteers for Florida have been authorized to be raised in New York and Baltimore, but it is not known how many will be mustered into service.

Returns of the Florida volunteers are irregular and seldom received, and are supposed to be but partially made; the commanding general reports the difficulties and the delay in obtaining them. The number of volunteers of the Territory may be *estimated* at about.....

1, 400

Total volunteers	4, 028
United States seamen, under Lieutenant Powell of the navy	100
Of the Indian force authorized to be raised for the Florida service, 178 under Lieutenant Poole, 3d artillery, left Jefferson Barracks for Tampa Bay on October 11	178

4, 306

ALEX. MACOMB, *Major General, Commanding-in-chief.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, November 30, 1837.*

D.

Position and distribution of the troops of the western division, under the command of Brevet Major General Edmund P. Gaines.

No.	Posts.	Situation.	Commanding officers.	Regiments.	Number of companies.	Present.										Absent.						Present and absent.			
						Colonels.	Lieutenant colonels.	Majors.	Surgeons.	Assistant surgeons.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Non-commissioned officers, musicians, artificers, &c.	Total commissioned.	Aggregate.	Field officers.	Surgeons and asst. surgeons.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Non-commissioned officers, musicians, artificers, &c.	Total commissioned.	Aggregate.	Commissioned officers.	Non-commissioned officers, musicians, artificers, &c.	Aggregate.
1	Fort Snelling.....	Upper Mississippi.....	Brevet Major Plympton ...	5th infantry..	4					1	2	6	57	9	66			2	2	11	4	15	13	68	81
2	Fort Crawford	Prairie du Chien	Captain W. Alexander	do.....	2				1	1	3	49	6	55			1	1	6	2	8	3	55	63	
3	Fort Armstrong*.....	Rock Island, Illinois.....																							
4	Fort Des Moines†.....	Right bank of the Mississippi.....																							
5	Fort Leavenworth	Right bank of Missouri, near Little Platte	Colonel S. W. Kearney	1st dragoons..	6	1	1		1	2	4	12	391	21	412			2	1	16	3	19	24	407	431
6	Jefferson Barracks‡.....	Near St. Louis, Missouri.....	Brig. Gen. Atkinson.....																						
7	Fort Gibson	Arkansas	Bvt. Brig. Gen. Arbuttle. {	1st dragoons..	4			1		1	3	3	206	8	214			1	4	7	5	12	13	213	226
				7th infantry..	9	1	1	1		1	3	7	447	14	461			6	11	13	17	30	31	460	491
8	Fort Coffee ...	do.....	Captain J. Steuart	do.....	1					1	1	1	47	3	50				1	4	1	5	4	51	55
9	Fort Towson	On the Klamichi, Arkansas.....	Lieut. Col. Vose.....	3d infantry..	4		1			2	1	3	90	7	97			3	5	5	8	13	15	95	110
10	Fort Jesup §.....	Near Natchitoches, Louisiana	Colonel Many	do.....	6	1			1	2	5	8	294	17	311	1		1	3	15	5	20	22	309	331
11	Fort Jackson 	Near New Orleans, Louisiana																							
12	Camp Sabine.....	Near Fort Jesup, Louisiana.....	Major Glassell	6th infantry..	3					1	1	3	91	6	97			2	3	6	5	11	11	97	108
					39	3	3	3	3	12	21	46	1,672	91	1,763	1		18	31	83	50	133	141	1,755	1,896

* Abandoned; garrison withdrawn May 4, 1836.

† Two companies of the Fort Jesup garrison (temporarily absent) are engaged in removing obstructions from the Sabine river.

‡ Abandoned; garrison withdrawn June 1, 1837.

§ Garrison withdrawn October 1, 1837.

|| Garrison withdrawn May 11, 1835.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, November 30, 1837.
 ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, Washington, November 30, 1837.

ALEX. MACOMB, Major General, Commanding-in-chief.
 R. JONES, Adjutant General of the Army.

Z.—Return of the army employed in Florida against the Seminole Indians, &c.—Continued.

Regiments and corps.	Number of companies.	Letters of companies.	PRESENT.				ABSENT.								PRESENT AND ABSENT.			
			In arrest or confinement.		Non-commissioned officers, musicians, artificers, and privates.	On detached service.				Furloughed, or with leave.			Without leave.		Total.	Aggregate.	Number of recruits required.	
			Non-commissioned officers.	Privates.		Commissioned officers.	Field officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	Non-commissioned officers, &c., sick.				Non-commissioned officers, &c., confined.
Staff					28											28	28
Second regiment of dragoons	10	A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K...	1	7	33	563			1	17			61	3		644	678	71
First regiment of artillery	9	A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I.....	2	2	24	363	1	2	13	11	1	6	2	18	3	397	443	100
Second regiment of artillery.....	8	B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I.....	1	9	32	279	2	1	7	9	1	6	18	312	355	130
Third regiment of artillery.....	9	A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I....	1	3	26	253	5	10	11	1	2	1	17	1	283	327	214
Fourth regiment of artillery.....	9	A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I.....	6	31	347	1	3	11	7	2	7	11	2	374	422	123
Aggregate of artillery.....	35	4	20	113	1,242	4	11	40	38	3	10	16	64	6	1,366	1,547	567
First regiment of infantry	10	A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K...	6	19	282	1	2	7	2	3	1	1	2	288	330	22
Second regiment of infantry	6	A, B, F, G, H, K.....	2	16	332	1	1	2	3	2	4	342	362
Fourth regiment of infantry.....	9	A, B, C, D, E, G, H, I, K.....	2	8	379	2	5	10	10	1	2	71	460	488	3
Sixth regiment of infantry.....	7	A, B, F, G, H, I, K.....	3	9	294	1	3	6	2	1	6	29	1	333	352	29
Aggregate of infantry.....	32	13	52	1,287	5	11	25	17	2	5	7	103	7	1,422	1,523	54
Marines			1	3	4	170	1	13	1	1	185	190
Recruits in Florida, but not assigned to companies, at the dates of last returns.....			1,060	1,060	1,060
Aggregate of regular troops.....			6	43	230	4,322	9	22	67	85	5	15	24	229	16	4,677	5,025

Z.—Return of the army employed in Florida against the Seminole Indians, &c.—Continued.

Regiments and corps.	Number of companies.	Letters of companies.	PRESENT.				ABSENT.								PRESENT AND ABSENT.		Number of recruits required.		
			In arrest or confinement.		Commissioned officers.	Non-commissioned officers, musicians, artificers, and privates.	On detached service.				Furloughed, or with leave.			Without leave.		Total.		Aggregate.	
			Non-commissioned officers.	Privates.			Field officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	Non-commissioned officers, &c., sick.	Non-commissioned officers, &c., confined.				Commissioned officers.
VOLUNTEERS.																			
Missouri, mounted	10				38	436												436	474
Tennessee, mounted	6				28	504												504	532
Alabama, mounted	12				44	906												906	950
Washington, D. C., foot	1				3	69												69	72
Philadelphia, foot	6				18	458												458	476
New Orleans, foot	4				15	235												235	250
Florida	20				74	1,207			6	49			76	9				1,341	1,421
Seamen					1	100												100	101
Aggregate of volunteers	59				221	3,915			6	49			76	9				4,049	4,276
Indians					4	174												174	178
Grand aggregate					6	43	455	8,411	9	22	73	133	5	15	100	238	16	8,900	9,479

NOTE.—Many of the officers and men reported "absent" by their respective commanders are serving elsewhere in Florida on duty connected with the service in that quarter; and of the number reported "sick absent" about eighty have returned to the army.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, November 30, 1837.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, Washington, November 30, 1837.

ALEX. MACOMB, Major General, Commanding-in-chief.

R. JONES, Adjutant General of the Army.

E.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, November 30, 1837.**Statement showing the whole number of recruits enlisted in the army from January 1 to September 30, 1837, inclusive, according to the last returns received.*

GENERAL RECRUITING SERVICE, EASTERN DEPARTMENT.

Colonel E. Culler, 4th infantry, general superintendent.

New York, New York.....	816	Martinsburg, Pennsylvania.....	10
Albany, New York.....	164	Providence, Rhode Island.....	8
Utica, New York.....	103	Pittsburg, Pennsylvania.....	77
Rochester, New York.....	110	Brooklyn, New York.....	42
Syracuse, New York.....	117	Portland, Maine.....	11
Schenectady, New York.....	98	Newport, Kentucky.....	53
Buffalo, New York.....	219	Newark, New Jersey.....	34
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.....	369	Eastport, Maine.....	18
Baltimore, Maryland.....	192	Lynchburg, Virginia.....	12
Frederick, Maryland.....	24	Dover, New Hampshire.....	4
Boston, Massachusetts.....	286		
Hartford, Connecticut.....	260	Total No. enlisted in eastern department.	3, 027

WESTERN DEPARTMENT.*

Lieutenant Colonel John Bliss, 6th infantry, general superintendent.

Newport, Kentucky.....	10	Cincinnati, Ohio.....	4
Pittsburg, Pennsylvania.....	11		
Louisville, Kentucky.....	10	Total No. enlisted in western department.	46
St. Louis, Missouri.....	11		
			3, 073

BY REGIMENTS.

1st regiment of dragoons.....	31	1st regiment of infantry.....	51
2d regiment of dragoons.....	233	2d regiment of infantry.....	90
Total dragoons.....	264	3d regiment of infantry.....	58
1st regiment of artillery.....	11	4th regiment of infantry.....	61
2d regiment of artillery.....	71	5th regiment of infantry.....	30
3d regiment of artillery.....	20	6th regiment of infantry.....	24
4th regiment of artillery.....	10	7th regiment of infantry.....	64
Total artillery.....	112	Total infantry.....	378
Total number enlisted from January 1 to September 30, 1837.....		West Point detachment.....	32
To the above may be added the number of recruits ascertained to have been enlisted during the month of October, 1837.....			
			3, 859
Total number enlisted from January 1 to September 30, 1837.....			357
			4, 216
Amount of recruiting funds advanced to officers of the army from January 1 to September 30, 1837.....			\$24, 750 00
Amount of those funds accounted for within the same period.....			22, 858 55
Balance in hands of recruiting officers on the 30th of September, 1837.....			1, 891 45

Respectfully submitted.

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*Major General ALEXANDER MACOMB, *General-in-chief, Washington, D. C.*

* The inconsiderable number of men enlisted in the western country induced the discontinuance of the recruiting service in this department since the 1st of May, when a portion of the officers were ordered to the eastern department, and the residue to join their regiments. The station and depot at Newport, Kentucky, has been continued, and Louisville recently re-established; and both are under the direction of the general superintendent at New York.

No. 1.

Proposed organization of each regiment of dragoons, artillery, and infantry.

Regiment of—	Colonel.	Lieutenant colonel.	Major.	Adjutant.	Sub-adjutants.	Sword-master.	Riding-master.	Captains.	First lieutenants.	Second lieutenants.	Sergeant majors.	Quartermaster sergeants.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Saddlers.	Blacksmiths and farriers.	Artificers.	Privates.	Total commissioned.	Total non-commissioned officers, privates, &c.	Aggregate.
Dragoons	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	10	10	10	10	10	40	40	20	10	10	660	34	804	838
Artillery	1	1	1	1	2	10	20	20	10	10	40	40	20	30	650	54	802	865
Infantry.....	1	1	1	1	2	10	10	10	10	10	40	40	20	680	34	802	836

NOTE.—The adjutant is to be taken from among the subalterns, and to be an additional officer.

2 regiments of dragoons.....	1,676
4 regiments of artillery.....	3,424
12 regiments of infantry.....	10,032
Proposed force of artillery, infantry, and dragoons.....	<u>15,132</u>

No. 1—Continued.

Proposed organization of each company of dragoons, artillery, and infantry.

Company of—	Captain.	First lieutenants.	Second lieutenants.	Sergeant major.	Quartermaster sergeant.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Saddler.	Blacksmith and furrier.	Artificers.	Privates.	Total commissioned.	Total non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates.	Aggregate.
Dragoons	1	1	1	1	1	4	4	2	1	1	66	3	80	83
Artillery	1	2	2	1	1	4	4	2	3	65	5	80	85
Infantry.....	1	1	1	1	1	4	4	2	68	3	80	83

No. 2.

Proposed distribution of the troops.

	Regiments.			Total regi-ments.
	Dragoons.	Artillery.	Infantry.	
For the seaboard, including the forts on the Gulf of Mexico.....	4	4
For the posts in Florida and Alabama.....	1	1
For Baton Rouge.....	1	1
For the Texan frontier.....	2	2
For the Arkansas frontier.....	1	2	3
For the Missouri frontier.....	1	1	2
For Jefferson Barracks, reserve	2	2
For the Upper Mississippi and across the country to the lakes.....	1	1
For the lake frontier.....	1	1
For the northern and eastern frontier.....	1	1
	2	4	12	18

No. 8.

REPORT OF THE ACTING QUARTERMASTER GENERAL.

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, November 20, 1837.*

SIR: In compliance with your order, I have the honor to submit a report of the operations of the quartermaster's department during the fiscal year which terminated with the 30th of September last

By the last annual report which embraced in part the expenditures of the third quarter of the year 1836, the aggregate balance in the hands of the various disbursing officers and agents for which accounts had not then been rendered, was..... \$1, 001, 538 71

To which is to be added—

1. The remittances made to those officers, namely:		
In the fourth quarter of 1836	\$837, 213 89	
In the first quarter of 1837.....	1, 309, 577 22	
In the second quarter of 1837.....	815, 386 24	
In the third quarter of 1837	907, 483 99	
		3, 869, 661 34
2. The funds derived from the sales of public property which had become unfit for service, or was no longer required for public use, and from rents for public grounds and buildings not occupied for military purposes.....		38, 769 47
Making an aggregate, comprising the outstanding balances, the remittances, the funds derived from other sources, of.....		\$4, 909, 969 52
Of which the following sums have been accounted for:		
1. By expenditures, namely:		
In the fourth quarter of 1835, and the first, second, and third quarters of 1836, the accounts for which were received after the date of the last annual report.....		284, 687 96
In the fourth quarter of 1836	1, 118, 188 18	
In the first quarter of 1837.....	1, 106, 479 46	
In the second quarter of 1837.....	837, 411 43	
In the third quarter of 1837, so far as the accounts have been received at this date.....		911, 805 17
		4, 258, 572 20
2. By payments into the treasury, and warrants rendered unavailable by the casualties of service, which were returned and cancelled.....		46, 355 13
Making the aggregate accounted for during the fiscal year.....		4, 304, 927 33
And leaving in the hands of disbursing officers and agents, to be hereafter accounted for, an aggregate balance of		605, 042 19

The various objects of improvement which were in a state of suspense at the date of the last annual report, from the want of officers to superintend their execution, have remained so during the present year; nor can they be resumed or prosecuted with effect, under existing circumstances, without some augmentation of the force of the department. The only one in which any progress has been made is the contemplated "military road" along the western frontier, extending from the Upper Mississippi to Red river; and you are aware, from a special report lately submitted to you on this subject, that but little has been done towards that object.

The commissioners to whom were assigned the survey and location of the route of this road are now engaged in an examination of that extensive frontier, and in treating with the various Indian tribes through whose country it will pass for a right of way, in conformity to the provisions of the law; but of their precise progress and success I am now unable to inform you, not having received a final report of their operations. It is believed, however, that no injury will result from the delay that has occurred, as it will afford an opportunity of reviewing the subject in connexion with a general plan of defence, and of correcting what appears to me to be an error in the present scheme, which regards this road as a very important element in the means of protecting the frontier.

I have already had occasion, in complying with a previous call on me, to present to you my humble views in detail on this subject. It will, therefore, only be necessary to observe here, that while roads leading *towards* the frontier, from the great sources of supply in the interior, are of the utmost importance as a means of defence, by facilitating military operations, those running *parallel* with the frontier, and passing through the Indian country by a gratuitous concession, cannot be of much utility, even in time of peace, and, from their liability to constant interruption by the enemy, will become wholly useless in time of war.

This feature in the present plan of defence seems to have originated in the idea of making the posts on the line of the frontier, though very widely separated, dependent on each other for support, while, by the plainest principle of military science, they should rely in common upon reserves stationed at eligible positions in the rear, held in readiness to be thrown forward to the point of alarm by rapid water conveyance and by roads diverging to the frontier.

I would therefore respectfully submit for your consideration the expediency of suspending the application of the money appropriated by the act of July 2, 1836, so far as it relates to opening a military road along the frontier, passing west of the States of Missouri and Arkansas, as the law enjoins, and of obtaining authority to apply the amount provided for that object to the construction of roads leading from the depots of supplies and the stations of the reserves to such posts as it may be deemed necessary to establish on the frontier for the protection of the border settlements.

I would respectfully invite your attention to a serious embarrassment under which some of the dis-

bursing officers of this department labor, on account of payments made by them under orders from superior officers for shoeing the horses of mounted volunteers called into service under the act of May 23, 1836. Those payments have been rejected by the accounting officers of the treasury as repugnant to the act of March 19, 1836, which provides forty cents per day to volunteers "for the use and risk" of their horses. As shoeing is indispensably necessary to insure the efficiency of the horses after they are received into service, and appears to me to be no more precluded by the allowance made for their use and risk than forage, which is allowed with a view to the same object, I do not concur in the decision of the accounting officers. But as the difficulty is supposed to result from the law, it will require legislative provision to relieve the disbursing agents from their embarrassment. The volunteers having been discharged from service, the payments, even if they be wrong, cannot possibly be recovered from them; and unless the case be provided for, the losses must ultimately fall on the officers who gave the orders, some of whom have likewise been discharged from the public service.

In the last annual report, which it devolved on me to make to your predecessor, I urged, in general terms, the necessity for enlarging and improving the organization of the quartermaster's department, so as to enable it to discharge its heavy duties with becoming promptness and efficiency; and in a subsequent special report, dated the 14th of January last, I endeavored to show the expediency of the measure by more detailed illustrations. As it would not be proper to repeat my suggestions here, I beg leave to refer you to those reports; they present, very fully, my humble views on the subject, and I could add but little more than to say that those views have been strengthened and confirmed by the experience of another year.

A reference to the fiscal exhibits of the department for the last two years will serve to convey some idea of the vast extent of its responsibilities, though a very inadequate one of its duties, and the labor incident to such heavy operations. The expenditures for that period have somewhat exceeded six million three hundred and fifty thousand dollars. From the want of an adequate organization, a considerable portion of those expenditures has necessarily been thrown upon temporary agents, without sufficient experience to enable them to guard the public interest effectually, and heavy losses have undoubtedly been sustained by want of proper system and arrangement, even where all may have acted in perfect good faith.

But, from discoveries recently made, there is reason to fear that, in spite of all the vigilance that can be exercised by the accounting officers in the scrutiny of accounts, extensive frauds have been practiced upon the public by some of those temporary agents, acting in collusion with claimants in some instances, and in others with officers of the militia and volunteers in the service of the United States, who have thus shown themselves capable of tarnishing an honorable profession by associating with it a sordid spirit of gain. It has already been my duty to bring to your notice two cases of this kind, and under your order civil prosecutions are now in progress against the offenders, for the recovery of the money and the punishment of the crime. As it is due to justice that the guilty should be exposed in order that the innocent may be relieved from suspicion, I annex to this report copies of all the papers in the cases referred to.

With an adequate organization, composed of faithful and experienced officers, the chief of a department may be held to a just responsibility for the proper application to the public service of the funds confided to his administrative control; but if, from the want of such provision, the expenditure of a large portion of those funds is necessarily thrown upon faithless or incompetent agents, in whose selection he has had no hand, that responsibility will be much impaired, if not entirely destroyed.

It is gratifying to perceive that the name of no officer of the regular army is associated with the transactions referred to, except as the detector and exposé of the frauds. Though serving their country for a pittance which is scarcely adequate to a decent support, they yet maintain their integrity unblemished, and show themselves superior to the temptations of gain, as well as the corrupting influence of the vicious associations into which a more than doubtful policy has thrown them.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

T. CROSS, *Acting Quartermaster General.*

Hon. JOEL R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

Documents accompanying the Quartermaster General's annual report.

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, August 21, 1837.*

SIR: I submit, for your information and order in the case, a letter from Lieutenant S. P. Heintzelman, acting assistant quartermaster at Columbus, Georgia, enclosing sundry papers going to establish the perpetration of an extensive fraud which has been committed against the United States, in that vicinity, by a collusive understanding between Captain James C. Boyd, of the Alabama mounted volunteers, John M. Sanders, lieutenant, and Michael Connel, who styles himself "quartermaster of Captain Boyd's company."

Lieutenant Heintzelman had innocently paid those fictitious accounts, amounting to \$6,570 20, without suspicion, on the joint certificate of Captain Boyd and his self-styled quartermaster, setting forth their general correctness, and specifically "that the forage had been actually purchased of J. M. Sanders, and justly and necessarily issued to the company; and that the team charged for as hired to haul provisions, forage, and baggage, was thus employed in the service of the United States during the period stated, and was necessary to enable the troops to operate against the Creek Indians."

The accompanying letter of Mr. Leonard Abercrombie and the deposition of Jeremiah Walker will show how far those certificates conformed to the truth. The transaction needs no comment. Supposing it to be truly represented, (and, so far, Captain Boyd, though apprised of the imputations against him, has produced no counter-evidence,) it is eminently disgraceful to those concerned in it, considering that they were all at the time holding commissions in the military service, which entitled their certificates to credit in establishing the facts which are to determine the propriety of claims against the United States. I know not whether these individuals are yet in service, nor whether there is any effective mode of reaching them; but if there is, both justice and policy require that they should be made examples of.

Lieutenant Heintzelman cannot be made responsible for the accuracy of facts of which he could know nothing, and which were vouched for by his superior officer with the usual formality. He was, I think, under the circumstances, and the latitude with which militia transactions are always regarded, justified

in making the payments, and should, therefore, receive credit for the amount. But this will involve the very grave principle of admitting a charge against the public treasury, knowing it to be fraudulent.

How else he is to be relieved from the heavy responsibility in which he has thus been involved by the acts of others I am not able to suggest; but that he is entitled to relief cannot, I think, be denied.

I fear, sir, this is but one detected case out of hundreds of like character that have occurred during the late disturbances on the frontiers. Such abuses are incidental to the vicious system of employing a large militia and volunteer force to effect, at an almost countless expense, what might be so much better done by a moderate increase of the regular army. If, in despite of experience, that species of force is to be relied upon, we cannot too soon extend the disbursing departments of the regular staff, so as to have trustworthy agents sufficient to attend them, and thus keep the expenditures in faithful hands.

In no other way, allow me to add, can a just accountability be attained.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

T. CROSS, *Acting Quartermaster General.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington.*

COLUMBUS, Georgia, July 12, 1837.

Sir: I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of an affidavit of Jeremiah S. Walker, in reference to some accounts I paid on Captain James C. Boyd's certificate for team hire and forage for the use of his company.

Since I have had the affidavit, Captain Boyd has been here, and assured me he could furnish counter-affidavit to this statement, and that it is all a political affair. I yesterday saw an individual from the neighborhood where the company was stationed, and have had letters from there stating that Captain Boyd had offered half the amount he got for team hire to the individual purporting to have signed the account to induce him to remain quiet, and is obtaining certificates from individuals of his company under the promise of reward; and further, that he seldom had over a dozen men of his command embodied at one time.

The three accounts I have paid are vouchers Nos. 108, 109, and 110, abstract B, 2d quarter 1837. The two forage accounts are signed by John M. Sanders, a lieutenant of the company.

I have no doubt the accounts certified to by Captain Boyd are entirely fictitious, and that no such transactions took place.

He is also accused of having forged the names of several persons to a power of attorney, and has drawn pay for several individuals who never rendered any service. He will probably be prosecuted for this last act.

The above statement, &c., are respectfully laid before you for instructions.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. HEINTZELMAN, *Lieutenant and A. A. Quartermaster.*

Major TRUEMAN CROSS, *Acting Quartermaster General U. S. Army, Washington.*

P. S.—I also enclose a copy of a letter received from a respectable gentleman in that neighborhood
S. P. H.

MUSCOGEE COUNTY, Georgia:

Personally appeared before me, George Chatfield, one of the justices of the peace in and for said county, Jeremiah S. Walker, and made oath that he was a private in Captain James C. Boyd's company of mounted Alabama volunteers, in the service of the United States for the suppression of Indian hostilities; and that the men of said company, during their term of service, furnished their own rations of provisions and forage, and that there was no team hired for the transportation of the provisions, forage, &c., and the transportation of the baggage of said company, but that the men of said company furnished and carried, themselves, their own provisions, forage, baggage, &c.; and that the team said to be hired of John Barkley was never employed for the use of said company; and that no forage was furnished by J. M. Sanders, as certified to by Captain James C. Boyd in two accounts against the United States, receipts bearing date June 14, 1837.

JEREMIAH S. WALKER.

GEORGE CHATFIELD, *Justice of the Peace.*

COLUMBUS, Georgia, June 29, 1837.

A true copy.

S. P. HEINTZELMAN, *Lieutenant 2d U. S. Infantry.*

[Voucher 108—Abstract B.]

The United States to John M. Sanders, Dr.

March 29, 1837.—For 166½ bushels of corn, at \$2 per bushel, is.....	\$332 50
For 5,320 pounds of fodder, at three cents per pound.....	159 60
	492 10

MONTGOMERY, *Alabama* :

I do certify that the above account, amounting to four hundred and ninety-two dollars and ten cents, is correct and just; and that the forage was actually purchased of said Sanders for the use of Captain Boyd's company of mounted Alabama volunteers, in the service of the United States for the suppression of Indian hostilities; and that it has been correctly and necessarily issued to the command.

MICHAEL CONNEL,
Quartermaster of Captain Boyd's company of Alabama volunteers, in service of the United States.
 JAMES C. BOYD, *Captain, Commanding.*

Received, Columbus, Georgia, June 14, 1837, of Lieutenant S. P. Heintzelman, assistant quartermaster United States army, the sum of four hundred and ninety-two dollars and ten cents, in full of the above account.

JOHN M. SANDERS.

[Voucher 109—Abstract B.]

The United States to Jno. Barkley, Dr.

1837.—For the service of one wagon and team, and driver, in hauling provisions and forage, &c., and in transporting the baggage of the troops operating against the Creek Indians, from the twenty-ninth of January to the tenth of June, 1837, being one hundred and thirty-three days, at \$5 per day.....	\$665 00
--	----------

I do certify that the above account is correct; that the wagon, team, and driver, were employed in the service of the United States during the period therein stated, and for the purposes therein mentioned; and that the services were necessary to enable the troops to operate against the Creek Indians.

MICHAEL CONNEL,
Quartermaster of Captain Boyd's company of Alabama volunteers, in service of the United States.
 JAMES C. BOYD, *Captain, Commanding.*

Received, Columbus, Georgia, June 14, 1837, of Lieutenant S. P. Heintzelman, acting assistant quartermaster United States army, the sum of six hundred and sixty-five dollars, in full of the above account.

JOHN BARKLEY.

[Voucher 110—Abstract B.]

The United States to John M. Sanders, Dr.

1837.—For 1,823½ bushels corn, at \$2.....	\$3,657 50
For 58,520 pounds fodder, at \$3.....	1,755 00
	5,413 10

MACON COUNTY, *Alabama* :

I do certify that the above account, amounting to five thousand four hundred and thirteen dollars and ten cents, is just and correct, and that the said forage was purchased of the said Sanders, for the use of Captain Boyd's company of mounted Alabama volunteers, in the United States service for the suppression of Indian hostilities; and that the forage has been justly and necessarily issued to the command.

MICHAEL CONNEL,
Quartermaster of Captain Boyd's company of Alabama volunteers, in service of the United States.
 JAMES C. BOYD, *Captain, Commanding.*

Received, Columbus, Georgia, June 14, 1837, of Lieutenant S. P. Heintzelman, acting assistant quartermaster United States army, the sum of five thousand four hundred and thirteen dollars and ten cents, in full of the above account.

JOHN M. SANDERS.

CUBAHACHA, *July 8, 1837.*

SIR: I have seen a copy of the accounts presented to you by Captain James C. Boyd and Lieutenant Sanders, who commanded a few volunteers in this neighborhood for a short time during the Indian war. A great fraud has been practiced on the government. It is a fact that can be testified to by fifty or more respectable men, that Mr. Barkley had no wagon in the service, and that there never was any forage supplied by Mr. Sanders. I have Mr. Barkley's certificate that he never had any team in the service, and that he never authorized any person to draw or receipt for any money; and the quartermaster, Michael Connel, declares he never made out those forage accounts and certificates accompanying them. Many persons are returned as members of that company that did not belong to the company, and their pay drawn as members and withheld from them. These facts can be established, and this community wishes this fraud examined into and corrected.

You will excuse the liberty I take, as a stranger, with you. Judge Colquett, or Seaborn Jones, esq., can inform you what reliance should be placed in my statement, and who I am.

Yours, respectfully,

LEONARD ABERCROMBIE.

P. S.—Captain Boyd is obtaining certificates from some of the members of his company upon promises of reward.

L. A.

A true copy.

S. P. HEINTZELMAN, *Lieutenant and Acting Assistant Quartermaster.*

COLUMBUS, Georgia, August 21, 1837.

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith a paper received from Captain James C. Boyd, in relation to some accounts I paid on his certificate, referred to in a letter addressed to your office dated Columbus, Georgia, July 12, 1837.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. HEINTZELMAN, *Lieutenant and Acting Assistant Quartermaster.*

Major TRUEMAN CROSS, *Acting Quartermaster General U. S. Army, Washington.*

JULY 6, 1837.

STATE OF ALABAMA, *Macon County:*

We, the undersigned, do affirm, upon a strict examination of all the facts and circumstances relative to Captain Boyd's course of conduct in having his company discharged, and paying them off and drawing the pay from government officers, that he has acted honorably and with a strict regard to the interest of said company. We approve all he has done, being done with the knowledge and approbation of the company.

As regards turning over the amount of money drawn by names on the roll who never did any military duty to others, who did: that that would be the course, was known and approved of months previous to receiving the money. It is unjust any exceptions should be taken to Captain Boyd's using said names. It meets our entire approbation. As regards the affidavit of Jeremiah S. Walker, filed in your office, it is not true. Teams were employed in hauling forage, &c., for the use of company, and Captain Boyd has paid, or is responsible for, the amount of wages, forage, and provision.

Rations were distributed to company.

We do not hesitate to declare all opposition to Captain Boyd in this matter has grown out of the worst feelings—malice, envy, jealousy, &c.; that Walker was influenced by others to take the unwarrantable course he has, which merits the utmost contempt of every worthy citizen.

In testimony of the above, we do hereunto affix our names as members of Captain Boyd's company.

John M. Sanders, first lieutenant P. C. R.	John McPhawl.
Thomas Harris, second lieutenant.	Elijah Sedder.
Samuel McNeil, first sergeant.	Darlen Jones.
John H. Craddock, second sergeant.	Malcolm Gillis.
John Brown, third sergeant.	Stephen Nolen.
Alexander Brown.	Alexander Nolen.
A. J. Durant.	Robert Murphey.
William Durant.	Eleaz. W. Jones.
Z. Green.	John Wolf.
John Heath, substitute.	David Quarles.
Daniel McGill, second corporal.	Toliver Norris.
Benjamin Simmons, third corporal.	C. L. Motley.
William Simmons.	Gilbert Gilchrist.
William Myrick.	Robert Peques.
James Myrick.	M. Connel.
Abram Myrick.	C. Connel.
William Reynolds.	T. Connel.
Alexander McDaniel.	C. S. Reynolds.
John Gillis.	

I do hereby certify Captain Boyd's conduct concerning this matter is correct, to the best of my knowledge.

JULY 12, 1837.

ALABAMA, *Macon County:*

I do hereby certify the above is a correct copy of the original.

JOSEPH P. CLOUGH, *J. C. M. C.*

AUGUST 5, 1837.

Decision of the Secretary of War on the case of Captain Boyd.

"August 24, 1837.

"Prompt measures ought to be taken to investigate the facts set forth in this report, and, if they prove correct, to bring the parties to this scandalous fraud to trial." A civil suit ought likewise to be brought against them to recover the money which they have obtained thus fraudulently. Let such a statement be made as will enable the Secretary to place the matter in the hands of the Solicitor of the Treasury, in order to the bringing of a civil suit, and an indictment be lodged against the parties for presenting false accounts.

"J. R. POINSETT."

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, August 25, 1837.*

SIR: I availed myself of the first moment of time that could be spared from more pressing engagements, in reference to supplies for the next campaign in Florida, to lay your report of the 12th ultimo, together with its enclosures and the vouchers therein mentioned, before the Secretary of War. He has called for such a statement of the case as will enable him to place the subject in the hands of the Solicitor of the Treasury, with a view to a civil suit against Captain Boyd and his colleagues in the fraud for the recovery of the money, and to an indictment against them for presenting false accounts. You will therefore take measures to collect additional testimony in the case, and report any further facts that may disclose themselves in the course of your investigations. Henceforth you will discredit the certificates of all the parties to this fraud, and pay no claim contracted by all or any one of them, or depending upon their testimony. If this company be still in service you will notify Captain Boyd that he must make his requisitions on you for all supplies due to his command, and then you will furnish them in the usual way. I enclose you a printed copy of the act of Congress of March 19, 1836, "to provide for the payment of volunteers and militia corps in the service of the United States," from which you will perceive that where they furnish themselves with forage (which they must do where there is no authorized agent to provide it) they are entitled to a commutation of money, to be received through the pay department.

The accounts in question, even if they had been contracted in good faith, were not accompanied by the collateral evidence which might reasonably have been required by you to warrant their payment. You should, at least, have had requisitions showing the number of horses and the period for which they had been foraged.

As it is, there is nothing to show the proper application of the forage which you paid for, amounting to near six thousand dollars—whether it was fed to the company in a week or a month. You should not have paid for more than the regulated allowance, and this could only be ascertained by the number of horses and the time they had been in service.

The expenditures at your station have greatly exceeded my calculations, and I think it time they had nearly ceased. You will not draw any further drafts for funds. Such as are necessary will be remitted on your estimates, which must be made sparingly. I am, myself, not aware of the necessity of keeping a volunteer force in service in your vicinity. It is presumed, however, to have been called out by competent authority.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. CROSS, *Acting Quartermaster General.*Lieutenant S. P. HEINTZELMAN, *Acting Assistant Quartermaster, Columbus, Georgia.*COLUMBUS, *Georgia, September 14, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated August 25, 1837, referring to some accounts presented by Captain J. C. Boyd, of the Alabama volunteers.

Since my former letter I have seen several persons from the neighborhood where these transactions took place. They all assert that the accounts presented by Captain Boyd and his first lieutenant, J. M. Sanders, are fictitious, and that no such transactions took place.

They corroborate, in every particular, Walker's affidavit. Philip H. Raisford, postmaster at Cubahachee, Michael Connel, acting as quartermaster to the company, Nathan Crawford, Daniel Scurlock, L. Abercrombie, with many more in the same neighborhood, can testify to these facts.

Several suits will be commenced by individuals against Captain Boyd for forgery, in signing their names to a power of attorney, on which he drew their pay from the paymaster, as soon as the original power of attorney can be procured from Major Muhlenberg, the paymaster.

The statement furnished by Captain Boyd, and signed by some members of his company, which I have forwarded to your office, is of no weight, as such papers can easily be obtained in this country from the ignorant and vicious. Swindling the government is, by many, considered as no crime.

Captain Boyd furnished me requisitions, showing the number of horses and time for which forage was drawn. From these I made out a statement, and found that the accounts did not quite cover the requisitions. I could have had a formal requisition made out to cover the amount paid for, which the captain, I have no doubt, would have signed without any hesitation; but it would have been no check to the fraudulent transaction.

There has been a much larger volunteer force in this country, and for a much longer period, than I supposed necessary; but they were called out by proper authority, and have been mustered and paid.

It was necessary they should have supplies. If I had not furnished them, they would have procured them from other sources, and the government, in the end, put to a much greater expense.

I have always furnished a much smaller quantity than their estimates called for, but always found that to be enough.

An officer of the army, of rank, with a few regular troops, I have no doubt, would, in a much shorter time, have picked up all stragglers and prevented some outrages, with a great saving of expense.

There are, at present, but two companies of volunteers in service near the line of Alabama and West Florida, and from 100 to 150 miles from Irwinton, from whence they draw most of their forage.

I wished them to draw their supplies from the Gulf of Mexico, by means of the rivers traversing the district of country to which the Indians have fled, which would have saved a very difficult and expensive land carriage; but they objected on account of there being no roads.

Colonel Welborn, who has command, is sick; when he gets well, I understand, he intends to scour the country below, pick up the last stragglers, and disband his forces.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, &c.,

S. P. HEINTZELMAN, *Lieutenant and Acting Assistant Quartermaster.*

Major TRUEMAN CROSS, *Acting Quartermaster General U. S. Army, Washington.*

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, October 7, 1837.*

SIR: I enclose you, by direction of the Secretary of War, the National Intelligencer of this date, containing a speech of Mr. Wise, of the House of Representatives, alleging a fraudulent transaction on the part of D. G. Skinner, quartermaster of the Alabama militia, with W. W. Crenshaw, clerk of the steamer Anna Calhoun. On a reference to your accounts (supposing that you might have reimbursed the amount alleged to have been paid) I do not find trace of any such transaction, and the only evidence on file of the agency of Skinner is his receipt to Lieutenant Colonel Henry Stanton for one hundred dollars, placed in his hands, with the sanction of General Jesup, on the 23d September, 1836, for expenditure at Irwinton. For this advance he has not rendered any account.

You will immediately institute a thorough investigation in the case, and report the result to this office as early as practicable.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. CROSS, *Acting Quartermaster General.*

Lieut. S. P. HEINTZELMAN, *Acting Assistant Quartermaster, Columbus, Georgia.*

COLUMBUS, *Georgia, November 3, 1837.*

SIR: In obedience to your instructions in your letter of the 7th October, I have instituted a thorough investigation into Mr. Skinner's case.

Mr. Calhoun, one of the owners of the Anna Calhoun steamboat, has had the books of the boat thoroughly examined, but can find no trace of the transaction in the entries of freight carried, and no such name as A. Y. Smith occurs in the list of passengers carried by the boat.

In February, 1836, Mr. Skinner was a merchant in Irwinton, and had no connexion with the army until some months later. He assisted the militia commissary in May, at Irwinton; and the latter part of June, or beginning of July, was appointed in General Irwin's staff as quartermaster.

In December last he was mustered out of service by Lieutenant Peyton and appointed agent to take charge of some government supplies until I could visit Irwinton and dispose of them. January, 1837, he was, by Captain Page, on the renewal of Creek hostilities, placed in his former situation, in which capacity he still acts.

On the 24th January, 1837, the steamboat Anna Calhoun left for Mount Vernon arsenal, Alabama, under contract for the United States, and has not been on the Chattahoochee since.

I have seen Mr. Skinner upon the subject, but can learn nothing from him.

Mr. Calhoun, who has warmly interested himself in the investigation, and in whose employ W. W. Crenshaw now is as clerk of the steamboat Muscogee, has sent for him; but he will not be here until the river rises, which may not be for two months from this time. This is the only opportunity I can see of throwing any light upon the subject.

When I saw Mr. Skinner I suggested to him a plan to disprove the slander; but he does not appear to take much interest in the matter, or to be willing to follow my suggestion.

With Mr. Calhoun's assistance I think I will be able to arrive at the truth on W. W. Crenshaw's arrival.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. HEINTZELMAN, *Lieutenant and Acting Assistant Quartermaster.*

Major TRUEMAN CROSS, *Acting Quartermaster General U. S. A., Washington City.*

COLUMBUS, *Georgia, November 8, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith an affidavit from W. W. Crenshaw, in explanation of the alleged fraud said to have been perpetrated by Skinner and himself.

Voucher 74, abstract B, second quarter 1837, the account paid A. Y. Smith for transportation, will explain the affidavit.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. HEINTZELMAN, *Lieutenant and Acting Assistant Quartermaster.*

Major TRUEMAN CROSS, *Acting Quartermaster General U. S. A., Washington.*

MUSCOGEE COUNTY, *Georgia:*

Personally appeared before me, Michael N. Clarke, one of the justices of the peace in and for said county, W. W. Crenshaw, and, being duly sworn, made oath as follows: That I was clerk on board the steamboat Hyperion, Captain J. Y. Smith, when she was chartered at Apalachicola by A. H. Falconer,

United States agent, to transport some sick Georgia volunteers to Columbus, Georgia; and that the charter was eleven hundred dollars, of which amount one thousand was to go to the boat for the transportation, and one hundred to the said Falconer—one thousand being all Captain Smith asked for the transportation; that I had a conversation with A. Y. Smith, at Columbus, Georgia, on the subject of frauds against the United States, but that Skinner's name was not mentioned in connexion with the subject, nor any other name; and, further, that no such transaction ever took place on board the steambot Anna Galhoun as that sworn to by A. Y. Smith in an affidavit dated Wheeling, September 30, 1837, and published in the National Intelligencer, dated October 7, 1837.

W. W. CRENSHAW.
MICHAEL N. CLARKE, *J. P.*

COLUMBUS, *Georgia*, November 8, 1837.

ORDER No. 92.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, Florida*, April 24, 1837.

1. The sick of the Alabama and Georgia battalions of mounted volunteers which have been designated by the inspector general as unfit for further service in the field during the present season, with the necessary number of attendants, will be moved immediately to their homes. The detachment of Alabamians will proceed, under charge of Lieutenant Padget, *via* New Orleans, the Mississippi and Tennessee rivers, to Bellefonte landing, on the latter river, where they will be debarked. The Georgia detachment will proceed, under charge of an officer or some competent non-commissioned officer, to be designated by Captain Bishop, *via* the Apalachicola and Chattahoochee rivers, to Columbus, Georgia, where they will be debarked.

By order of Major General Jesup.

J. A. CHAMBERS, *Lieutenant, A. D. C., and Acting Adjutant General.*

Know all men by these presents that James Y. Smith, master and part owner of the steamer Hyperion, now being in this port, hath contracted with A. H. Falconer, agent for the United States at this place, to receive on board said steamer, and transport to Columbus, Surgeon John Maddin and sixty-four men, composing a detachment of Georgia volunteers, just arrived from Fort Brooke in the schooner Henry Lee, Captain Norton; for which said James Y. Smith is to receive eleven hundred dollars on delivery of the above persons (as enumerated in this list now in possession of Sergeant Mays, of said detachment) to any United States quartermaster in Columbus, (say Lieutenant Heintzelman.)

It is understood that the men find their own provisions, and have all the necessary privileges of cooking, and going to and fro on the deck, they being found in necessary wood and water.

In witness whereof, we have signed duplicates of this contract this 30th day of April, 1837, in Apalachicola.

JAMES Y. SMITH.
A. H. FALCONER.

Witness: JOHN MADDIN, *Surgeon to the M. G. V.*

We hereby certify that the foregoing contract has been fulfilled by the captain, James Y. Smith, and owners of the said boat, and should be paid by the United States.

JOHN MADDIN, *Surgeon to the G. M. V.*
B. R. MAYS, *Commanding.*

COLUMBUS, *May* 3, 1837.

[No. 74.—Abstract B, 2d quarter 1837.]

The United States to James Y. Smith, Dr.

1837.—For hire of the steamer Hyperion, from Apalachicola, Florida, to Columbus, Georgia, transporting troops, per contract with A. H. Falconer, agent for the United States, Apalachicola, Florida, dated April 30, 1837 \$1, 100 00

I certify that the above account is correct and just, and that the transportation was accomplished agreeably to contract.

Received, Columbus, Georgia, May 3, 1837, of Lieutenant S. P. Heintzelman, acting assistant quartermaster United States army, eleven hundred dollars, in full of the above account.
\$1,100.

JAMES Y. SMITH.

COLUMBUS, *Georgia*, November 2, 1837.

Sir: I have the honor to enclose herewith J. M. Morrison's account for rent of house for hospital, and for mattresses for wounded Alabama volunteers, at Irwinton, Alabama, for your decision.

Mr. Skinner has presented near \$3,000 worth of accounts for forage for the Barbour county rangers.

It is all for fodder. At the time it is said to have been purchased, I do not believe so much could have been obtained in the country.

Some of these accounts seem to be similar to those I paid Captain Boyd's and declined paying Captain Brodnax's companies. Mr. Skinner does not know that it was purchased. He authorized the companies to purchase when they could find, and has certified the accounts to the amount of their requisitions. The plan pursued was for an officer or some member of the company who had funds to purchase all the fodder they met with, and introduce it in one account at some fixed price.

The impression among the volunteers appears to be, that if the government does not furnish all the supplies they are entitled to, they can make out fictitious accounts for the balance, and divide the amount among the members.

My object for making this statement is to inquire whether I shall pay these accounts in their present form; and if not, what evidence I shall require from the claimants to prove that it has not been a fictitious transaction.

The forage accounts of two more companies remain unpaid besides these.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. HEINTZELMAN, *Lieutenant and Acting Assistant Quartermaster.*

Major TRUEMAN CROSS, *Acting Quartermaster General, Washington City.*

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, November 29, 1837.*

Sir: After the recent developments of frauds upon the public in your vicinity, it is no longer safe, either for yourself or the public interest, to continue the payment of claims purporting to have been contracted by civil agents and officers of militia or volunteers, and certified by them. You will, therefore, confine your payments hereafter to claims contracted by yourself, or coming so fully under your observation as to enable you to testify to their entire correctness.

You have erred very much in adopting the vouchers of D. G. Skinner, who calls himself quartermaster general of Alabama volunteers, into your accounts, and thus giving them the appearance of being your own transactions. In the present state of the papers, it would seem that you had paid the money directly to the claimants themselves, when in fact, as I infer from your reports, it was paid over by you to Mr. Skinner as a reimbursement of the amount purporting to have been expended by him. Under these circumstances, you will perceive there is no certainty that the money will ever reach the claimants even where the accounts are founded upon *bona fide* transactions connected with the public service; but of this, after what we have seen, there can be no assurance whatever.

You will immediately discharge A. H. Falconer from service, as an agent of the United States at Apalachicola, and all other civil agents who may be in employ in your vicinity. It is not known here by whom Mr. Falconer was constituted a public agent, nor has he ever been recognized as such by this office, or at the War Department. The same may be said of Mr. Skinner's agency before he came into service as quartermaster of Alabama volunteers.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. CROSS, *Acting Quartermaster General.*

Lieutenant S. P. HEINTZELMAN, *Acting Assistant Quartermaster, St. Augustine, Florida.*

No. 9.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSARY GENERAL OF SUBSISTENCE.

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSARY GENERAL OF SUBSISTENCE, *Washington, November 20, 1837.*

Sir: In conformity with your instructions of September 7 and 21st ultimo, I have the honor to present to your view a statement of moneys remitted and charged to contractors and disbursing officers of this department during the first, second, and third quarters of the year, together with the balances in their possession December 31, 1836, amounting to..... \$1, 002, 553 95
To which are to be added the balances due the latter on the settlement of their accounts 116, 287 58

Aggregating..... 1, 118, 841 53
Accounted for during the same period..... 955, 372 07

Leaving..... 163, 469 46

From which is to be deducted—

This sum, charged to contractors as the difference in price of stores purchased to supply deficiencies arising from failures \$922 77

Remittances made to disbursing officers late in the third, for the fourth quarter of the year..... 52,800 00

This sum, being in possession of officers who have ceased to disburse, and who have been ordered to deposit it in banks, to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States..... 28,363 68

This sum, expended in the removal and subsistence of emigrating Indians, and credited on that account, and to be refunded from that appropriation.... 5,000 00

87, 086 45

Leaving the sum of..... 76, 383 01
actually in possession of the disbursing officers of the department applicable to the expenditures of the fourth quarter of the year.

Of one hundred and forty officers disbursing the public moneys, under the control of the commissary general of subsistence, during the period above embraced, the accounts of seventeen were not received at the completion of this statement; five have been received since, leaving only twelve whose accounts are not now furnished; but there is no doubt they will reach the office in a few days. These officers have been actively engaged in the operations preparatory to the Florida campaign the approaching winter, and their accounts could not be settled and forwarded with that punctuality and promptitude displayed by them on ordinary service; but it is confidently believed that, if received, they would be productive of but little difference in the result of the statement.

The balance to the credit of the appropriation for subsistence on the 31st of December, 1836, was.....	\$275, 255 05
Appropriated for 1837.....	913, 445 00
Refunded in 1837.....	18, 191 49
	<hr/>
Total applicable to the service of the year.....	1, 206, 891 54
The requests drawn for remittances amount to.....	696, 008 16
	<hr/>
Leaving to the credit of the appropriation on the 30th of September, inclusive.....	510, 883 38
	<hr/>
Total amount applicable to the service of the department during the year, as above.....	1, 206, 891 54
Amount expended per statement.....	955, 372 07
	<hr/>
Which, if it had been drawn from the treasury, would have left no more than.....	251, 519 47
But to this sum is to be added—	
Balances in the hands of assistant commissaries December 31, 1836.....	\$135, 539 26
Balances due to assistant commissaries September 30, 1837.....	116, 237 58
And this sum, being on account of sales to officers and citizens on the frontier posts.....	7, 487 07
	<hr/>
	259, 363 91
	<hr/>
Making the above balance..	510, 883 38
	<hr/> <hr/>

The balances due to the disbursing officers on the settlement of their accounts arise principally from bills of exchange drawn by them and credited in the third, although not paid until after the commencement of the fourth quarter.

The operations of the department have been carried on upon a scale much more extensive than at any former period; provisions have been supplied with the earliest despatch from every quarter whence purchased, and to every point required; the comfort and health of the troops have been carefully considered; in lieu of the customary ration in Florida, low-priced French and Catalonia wines have been issued during the summer; and onions, potatoes, and other vegetables of an antiscorbutic nature, have been occasionally substituted for beans; and the assistant commissaries have received instructions to provide such change of diet and to add such condiments as might be required to prevent the appearance and to aid in the cure of disease; and every suggestion made by officers in the field to ameliorate the condition of the soldier has been cheerfully and promptly complied with; and it affords me very great pleasure to add that the reports of various officers bear ample testimony to the most beneficial results from the course pursued.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

GEO. GIBSON, *Commissary General of Subsistence.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

Statement exhibiting the moneys remitted to contractors from January 1 to September 30, 1837; the sums charged to them on account of failures, and the amount accounted for by them; the balances in the hands of the disbursing officers of the department December 31, 1836; the remittances to them in the 1st, 2d, and 3d quarters of 1837; the sums charged to them as transfers from one office to another; sales to officers and citizens on the frontier posts; sales of surplus provisions, empty boxes, barrels, &c., and the amounts accounted for by them during the same period; together with the residence of the contractors, the station of the officers, and the balances in their possession at the expiration of the 3d quarter of the year.

Names.	Residence and stations.	Balances on hand December 31, 1836.	Remitted.	Charged on account of failures.	Transfers, sales, &c.	Total charged.	Accounted for.	Balances due to assistant commissaries of subsistence September 30, 1837.	Balances due by assistant commissaries of subsistence September 30, 1837.	Remarks.
Daniel Bradford.....contractor..	Georgetown, Ky.		\$13,081 25			\$13,081 25	\$13,081 25			
Samuel & I. Bell.....do.....	Louisville, Ky.....		4,385 03			4,385 03	4,385 03			
Bruce & Baldwin.....do.....	Green Bay, W. T.....		16,626 60			16,626 60	16,626 60			
H. & D. Cothcal.....do.....	New York, N. Y.....		1,569 50			1,569 50	1,569 50			
John S. Finley.....do.....	Georgetown, Ky.		23,364 56			23,364 56	23,364 56			
Hempstead & Beebe.....do.....	St. Louis, Mo.....		25,877 16			25,877 16	25,877 16			
Hill & McGunnegle.....do.....	do.....		6,484 21			6,484 21	6,484 21			
McGunnegle & Way.....do.....	do.....		6,690 54			6,690 54	6,690 54			
Charles Moody.....do.....	Portland, Mo.....		34 45			34 45	34 45			
O. Newberry.....do.....	Detroit, M. T.....		3,684 24			3,684 24	3,684 24			
Newberry & Gondell.....do.....	do.....		10,589 49			10,589 49	10,589 49			
Peebles & Stewart.....do.....	Pittsburg, Pa.....		15,969 10	\$40 00		16,009 10	16,009 10			
V. Sanchez.....do.....	St. Augustine, Fla.....		2,342 42			2,342 42	2,342 42			
J. L. Sanford.....do.....	Baltimore, Md.....		489 22			489 22	489 22			
Joseph Sayer.....do.....	Newport, R. I.....		33 75			33 75	33 75			
William Stewart.....do.....	Pittsburg, Pa.....		9,650 91			9,650 91	9,650 91			
Joseph Smith.....do.....	Cincinnati, Ohio.....		8,110 86			8,110 86	8,110 86			
Francis J. Smith.....do.....	Richmond, Va.....		1,384 15			1,384 15	1,384 15			
Turnham & Arthur.....do.....	Liberty, Mo.....		105 44			105 44	105 44			
G. B. Wilson & Co.....do.....	Baltimore, Md.....		35,087 65	883 77		35,970 42	35,087 65		\$883 77	To be deducted from their December delivery.
Asa Ames.....special contractor..	Boston, Mass.....		1,025 00			1,025 00	1,025 00			
J. H. Brewster.....do.....	Wilmington, N. C.....		224 40			224 40	224 40			
H. Campbell.....contractor..	Rochester, N. Y.....		63 09			63 09	63 09			
Cassidy & McGuigan.....do.....	Albany, N. Y.....		813 97			813 97	813 97			
S. Comstock.....do.....	Utica, N. Y.....		700 46			700 46	700 46			
Samuel Coolidge.....do.....	St. Louis, Mo.....		87 78			87 78	87 78			
T. B. Curtis.....do.....	Wheeling, Va.....		111 60			111 60	111 60			
B. Dana.....do.....	Watertown, Mass.....		985 43			985 43	985 43			
J. W. Davis, jr., & Co.....do.....	Newport, R. I.....		46 17			46 17	46 17			
N. Eggleston.....do.....	Hartford, Conn.....		1,337 06			1,337 06	1,337 06			
Patriek Foster.....do.....	Vergennes, Vt.....		248 84			248 84	248 84			
James Graham.....do.....	Dearbornville, M. T.....		365 47			365 47	365 47			
John K. Graham.....do.....	Philadelphia, Pa.....		1,373 29			1,373 29	1,373 29			

Statement exhibiting the moneys remitted to contractors from January 1 to September 30, 1837, &c.—Continued.

Names.	Residence and stations.	Balances on hand December 31, 1836.	Remitted.	Charged on account of failures.	Transfers, sales, &c.	Total charged.	Accounted for.	Balances due to assistant commissaries of subsistence September 30, 1837.	Balances due by assistant commissaries of subsistence September 30, 1837.	Remarks.
L. Howard & Co.....contractor..	Charlestown, Ind.....		\$873 74			\$873 74	\$873 74			
Johnston & McKay.....do.....	Front Royal, Va.....		118 12			118 12	118 12			
John Kerney.....do.....	Pittsburg, Pa.....		539 03			539 03	539 03			
R. H. Lee.....do.....	Buffalo, N. Y.....		1,465 93			1,465 93	1,465 93			
Samuel Moulson.....do.....	Rochester, N. Y.....		834 73			834 73	834 73			
Mudge & Doty.....do.....	Rome, N. Y.....		513 03			513 03	513 03			
Luther Parks & Co.....do.....	Louisville, Ky.....		389 29			389 29	389 29			
L. O. Phinney.....do.....	Syracuse, N. Y.....		1,571 10			1,571 10	1,571 10			
John Price.....do.....	Winchester, Va.....		16 00			16 00	16 00			
S. Pendleton.....do.....	New Haven, Conn.....		2,541 50			2,541 50	2,541 50			
W. K. Potter.....do.....	Providence, R. I.....		410 00			410 00	410 00			
Sable Rogers.....do.....	Springfield, Mass.....		11 40			11 40	11 40			
H. & D. C. Steiner.....do.....	Frederick, Md.....		175 86			175 86	175 86			
W. H. Tredway.....do.....	Schenectady, N. Y.....		613 06			613 06	613 06			
O. P. Tillinghast.....do.....	Fayetteville, N. O.....		240 68			240 68	240 68			
W. N. Thompson.....do.....	Martinsburg, Va.....		143 75			143 75	143 75			
Calvin Whiting.....do.....	Portland, Me.....		97 24			97 24	97 24			
Lieut. R. H. Archer.....A. C. S..	Fort Brooke, Fla.....				\$568 69	568 69	571 52	\$2 83		Due him on settlement.
Lieut. T. B. Arden.....do.....	Nacogdoches, Texas.....	\$1,079 21			39 48	1,118 69	1,178 46	59 77		Do.
Lieut. E. B. Babbitt.....do.....	Fort Towson, Ark.....	126 05			2,310 95	2,437 00	2,437 00			Closed.
Lieut. W. H. Betts.....do.....	Augusta, Ga.....	4 12	800 00			804 12	626 07		\$178 05	Disbursing.
Lieut. A. G. Blanchard.....do.....	Camp Sabine, La.....				1,000 00	1,000 00			1,000 00	Disbursing; for 4th quarter of year.
Lieut. J. S. Brunsford.....do.....	Fort Mellon, Fla.....				54 75	54 75	54 75			Closed.
Capt. E. K. Barnum.....A. A. C. S..	Baltimore, Md.....	282 72	9,600 00			9,882 72	9,882 72			Do.
Capt. H. Brown.....do.....	St. Augustine, Fla.....		1,000 00			1,000 00	1,000 00			Do.
Capt. George Boyd.....do.....	Fort Armstrong, Fla.....				1,985 47	1,985 47	1,985 47			Do.
Lieut. E. D. Bullock.....A. C. S..	Jefferson Barracks, Mo.....				1,070 61	1,070 61	27 85		1,042 76	Disbursing.
Lieut. J. H. K. Burgwin.....do.....	Des Moines, Ill.....	365 93				365 93	8 75		357 18	Disbursing; account 3d quarter not received.
Lieut. M. J. Burke.....do.....	Fort Foster, Fla.....				231 22	231 22	231 22			Closed.
Lieut. Martin Burke.....do.....	Mount Vernon, Ala.....				331 50	331 50	15 89		315 61	Disbursing.
Lieut. J. R. D. Burnett.....do.....	Fort Brady, M. T.....		1,000 00		769 29	1,769 29	1,769 29			Closed.
Capt. J. R. Butler.....A. A. C. S..	Pittsburg, Pa.....	159 38	1,100 00		364 13	1,623 51	1,469 19		154 32	Disbursing.
Lieut. T. S. Bryant.....do.....	Fredericksburg, Va.....	293 70	700 00			993 70	950 65		43 05	Due United States on settlement.
Sutler T. M. Chandler.....do.....	Augusta, Ga.....	14 59	350 00		29 00	394 49	394 49			Closed.
Lieut. R. E. Clary.....A. C. S..	Fort Howard, M. T.....				2,822 40	2,822 40	154 92		2,667 48	Disbursing.
Lieut. L. F. Carter.....do.....	Fort Gibson, Ark.....	4,255 35			517 23	4,722 58	4,186 81		585 77	Dead; amount secured.

Statement exhibiting the moneys remitted to contractors from January 1 to September 30, 1837, &c.—Continued.

281—HA TOA

Names.	Residence or station.	Balances on hand December 31, 1836.	Remitted.	Charged on account of failures.	Transfers, sales, &c.	Total charged.	Accounted for.	Balances due to assistant commissaries of subsistence, September 30, 1837.	Balances due by assistant commissaries of subsistence, September 30, 1837.	Remarks.
Col. J. B. Crane.....	A. A. C. S., Fort Trumbull, Conn.....		\$300 00		\$1 50	\$301 50	\$301 50			Closed.
Lieut. John C. Casey.....	A. C. S., Tampa, Fla.....	\$1,858 94	5,000 00		1,935 96	8,794 90	3,408 13		\$5,386 77	Disbursing; account 3d quarter not received.
Lieut. Silas Casey.....	do do Lowndes, Ga.....	37 59				37 59	2,574 67	\$2,537 08		Due him on account of quartermaster's funds.
Capt. T. Childs.....	A. A. C. S., Fort Sullivan, Me.....	115 30				115 30	60 59		54 71	Due United States on settlement.
Lieut. B. Conklin.....	A. C. S., Florida.....				5 24	5 24				Closed.
Lieut. C. O. Collins.....	do do Savannah, Ga.....	2 00			153 03	155 03	153 03		2 00	Due United States on settlement.
Sergeant A. Cox.....	A. A. C. S., New Echota, Ga.....				1,000 00	1,000 00	602 92		397 08	Disbursing.
Major G. Dearborn.....	do do Lowndes, Ga.....						265 75	265 75		Due him on settlement.
Lieut. J. Donaldson.....	A. C. S., Frederick, Md.....		100 00		20 00	120 00	48 00		72 00	Disbursing.
Lieut. J. Duncan.....	do do Fort Trumbull, Conn.....	88 16	150 00		214 28	452 44	411 97		40 47	Disbursing.
Lieut. S. H. Drum.....	do do St. Augustine, Fla.....	68 04	6,000 00		1,762 68	7,850 72	4,586 56		3,264 16	Disbursing; account 3d quarter not received; \$3,000 remitted late in 3d for 4th quarter.
Lieut. A. B. Eaton.....	do do Fort Gratiot, M. T.....	788 17	500 00		3,429 50	4,717 67	2,181 91		2,535 76	Disbursing.
Major J. Erving.....	A. A. C. S., Beaufort, N. C.....		400 00			400 00				Closed.
Lieut. G. P. Field.....	A. C. S., Erie, Pa.....		100 00			100 00	24 03		75 97	Disbursing.
Capt. L. Ford.....	A. A. C. S., Charlestown, Ind.....		100 00			100 00			100 00	Account not received.
Capt. W. M. Fulton.....	do do Richmond, Va.....	62 77	900 00			962 77			962 77	Do.
Major J. Garland.....	do do Detroit, M. T.....		100 00			100 00			100 00	Do.
Brevet Capt. C. Graham.....	A. C. S., Pittsburg, Pa.....		1,150 00		145 64	1,295 64	1,295 64			Closed.
Lieut. J. B. Grayson.....	do do New Orleans, La.....	13,458 54	95,000 00		2,016 04	110,474 58	222,669 29	112,194 71		Disbursing. This balance due him arises from drafts credited in his account for the 3d and not paid until the 4th quarter.
Brevet Capt. Timothy Green.....	do do Fort Monroe, Va.....	1,348 66	23,500 00		5,873 67	30,722 53	22,913 87		7,808 66	Disbursing; \$5,000 remitted late in 3d for 4th quarter.
Lieut. W. N. Grier.....	do do Camp Benton, Mo.....	504 35				504 35	504 35			Closed.
Lieut. W. Gilpin.....	do do New Orleans, La.....				100 00	100 00	29 55		70 45	Disbursing.
Capt. E. Harding.....	A. A. C. S., Mount Vernon, Ala.....	5,701 06	15,000 00			20,701 06	14,815 31		5,885 75	Ordered to deposit to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States.
Lieut. W. S. Henry.....	A. C. S., Camp Sabine, La.....	71 58			14 00	85 58	85 58			Closed.
Lieut. J. M. Hill.....	do do Hancock Barracks, Maine.....	615 29			211 98	827 27	827 27			Do.
Estate of Capt. R. Holmes.....	do do St. Louis, Mo.....	15,142 29	714 25			15,856 54	15,856 54			Do.
Lieut. William Hoffman.....	do do Fort Dade, Fla.....	647 06			161 73	808 79	807 29		1 50	Due United States on settlement.
Lieut. C. S. Hoskins.....	do do New Echota, Ga.....				9,529 79	9,529 79	9,461 47		68 32	Disbursing.
Lieut. C. S. Howe.....	do do Calhoun, Tenn.....	7,464 49			36,268 57	43,753 05	42,901 01		853 04	Do.
Lieut. M. S. Howe.....	do do Florida.....				792 61	792 61	688 01		104 60	Do.
Lieut. A. A. Humphreys.....	do do Florida.....	3 35				3 35	3 35			Closed.
Major T. F. Hunt.....	A. A. C. S., Savannah, Ga.....		45,000 00		3,499 06	48,499 06	36,332 74		12,166 32	Disbursing; account 3d quarter not received.

1837]

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

617

Statement exhibiting the moneys remitted to contractors from January 1 to September 30, 1837, &c.—Continued.

Names.	Residence or station.	Balances on hand December 31, 1836.	Remitted.	Charged on account of failures.	Transfers, sales, &c.	Total charged.	Accounted for.	Balances due to assistant commissaries of subsistence, September 30, 1837.	Balances due by assistant commissaries of subsistence, September 30, 1837.	Remarks.
Lieut. F. E. Hunt..... A. C. S.	Micanopy, Fla.....				\$419 31	\$419 31	\$625 06	\$205 75		Disbursing.
Capt. G. C. Hutter..... A. A. C. S.	Florida.....						199 00	129 90		Due him on settlement.
Capt. L. T. Jamison..... do.....	Chicago, Ill.....	\$469 74			2,491 29	2,961 03	859 01		\$2,102 02	Disbursing.
Lieut. J. R. B. Gardenier..... A. C. S.	Trenton, N. J.....	49 25	\$200 00			249 25	247 87		1 38	Do.
Sergeant T. Johnson..... do.....	Florida.....				597 21	597 21	597 21			Closed.
Lieut. J. F. Kennedy..... do.....	St. Augustine, Fla.....	164 00	2,000 00		25 62	2,189 62	2,189 62			Do.
Lieut. W. S. Ketchum..... do.....	Jefferson Barracks, Mo.....	239 81			347 19	587 00	587 00			Do.
Lieut. E. Kibby..... do.....	Mount Vernon, Ala.....	1,266 28			3,657 77	4,924 05	1,538 94		3,385 11	Disbursing.
Lieut. J. W. Kingsbury..... do.....	St. Louis, Mo.....	11,591 77	27,000 00		2,207 15	40,798 92	23,953 43		17,845 49	Disbursing; \$10,000 remitted late in 3d for 4th quarter.
Lieut. E. M. Lacy..... do.....	Fort Winnebago, W. T.....	550 08			600 00	1,150 08			1,150 08	Disbursing; account 3d quarter not received.
C. H. Larned..... do.....	Newark, N. J.....		100 00			100 00			100 00	Disbursing; \$100 remitted late in 3d quarter.
Major W. W. Lear..... A. A. C. S.	Baton Rouge, La.....		700 00			700 00	597 70		102 30	Disbursing.
Lieut. R. B. Lawton..... A. C. S.	New York.....				13 48	13 48			13 48	Ordered to pay over.
Lieut. J. L'Engle..... do.....	Charleston, S. C.....	3,635 24	25,571 49			29,206 73	24,813 90		4,392 83	Disbursing; \$5,000 remitted late in 3d for 4th quarter.
Lieut. G. F. Lindsay..... do.....	Florida.....				1,313 83	1,313 83	1,312 81		1 01	Due United States on settlement.
Lieut. E. R. Long..... do.....	Newport, Ky.....		2,900 00			2,900 00	2,642 32		257 68	Disbursing.
Lieut. R. A. Luther..... do.....	Fort Mitchell, Ala.....				17,026 89	17,026 89	10,172 42		6,854 47	Do.
Lieut. N. C. Macrae..... do.....	Fort Jesup, La.....	4,307 76			3,602 58	7,910 34	4,294 58		3,615 76	Do.
Major Zenas Mackay..... A. A. C. S.	Philadelphia, Pa.....		3,174 87			3,174 87	1,174 87		2,000 00	Disbursing; \$2,000 remitted late in 3d for 4th quarter.
Lieut. J. W. McCrabb..... A. C. S.	Boston, Mass.....	2,475 37			147 13	2,622 50	27 25		2,595 25	Disbursing; account 3d quarter not received; ordered to deposit to credit of Treasurer of United States.
Lieut. J. B. Magruder..... do.....	Fort Washington, Md.....	157 36				157 36	157 36			Closed.
Lieut. G. W. McLean..... do.....	Florida.....	6,269 20				6,269 20	6,269 20			Do.
Capt. B. Macomber..... A. A. C. S.	Florida.....				166 37	166 37	162 32		4 05	Due United States on settlement.
Lieut. J. W. McClure..... A. C. S.	Fort Snelling, Miss.....	1,826 60			1,172 29	2,998 89	2,998 89			Closed.
Lieut. H. McKavett..... do.....	Fort Coffee, Ark.....	549 02			516 23	1,065 25	415 32		649 93	Disbursing; account 3d quarter not received.
Lieut. W. Maynard..... do.....	Pikesville, Md.....		100 00		181 69	281 69	225 49		56 20	Do.
Lieut. Z. P. Maury..... do.....	Carlisle, Pa.....				93 22	93 22			93 22	Ordered to pay over.
Lieut. M. E. Merrill..... do.....	Green Bay, W. T.....	464 23	800 00		7,291 99	8,556 22	8,556 22			Closed.
Lieut. J. H. Miller..... do.....	Montgomery, Ala.....	1,823 31	5,000 00		634 89	7,507 20				Do.
Sutler P. Milliken..... A. A. C. S.	Eastport, Me.....	42 30	200 00		4 20	246 50	188 25		57 55	Disbursing.
Capt. D. S. Miles..... do.....	Baltimore, Md.....		16,800 00		517 30	17,317 30	17,317 30			Closed.
Capt. A. Mordecai..... do.....	Frankford, Pa.....	20 52	1,300 00			1,320 52	1,310 60		9 92	Disbursing.
Capt. C. S. Merchant..... do.....	Picolata, Fla.....				673 73	673 73	159 49		514 24	Do.
Lieut. A. Montgomery..... A. C. S.	Cherokee nation.....				2,637 18	2,637 18	2,335 64		301 54	Do.
Lieut. Gouverneur Morris..... do.....	Florida.....	2,127 16				2,127 16	2,127 16			Closed.

Statement exhibiting the moneys remitted to contractors from January 1 to September 30, 1837, &c.—Continued.

Names.	Residence or station.	Balances on hand December 31, 1836.	Remitted.	Charged on account of failures.	Transfers, sales, &c.	Total charged.	Accounted for.	Balances due to assistant commissaries of subsistence, September 30, 1837.	Balances due by assistant commissaries of subsistence, September 30, 1837.	Remarks.
Capt. W. W. Morris.....	A. A. C. S. Fort Brooke, Fla.....				\$508 45	\$508 45	\$508 45			Closed.
Mr. J. C. Noyes.....	do. Eastport, Me.....	\$64 81	\$125 00		189 81	189 81	179 88	\$9 93		Disbursing.
Capt. John Page.....	Indian agent. Fort Mitehen, Ala.....				5,000 00	5,000 00		5,000 00		Credited in accounts for removing and subsisting Indians.
Lieut. M. R. Patrick.....	A. C. S. Mackinac, M. T.....	69 91	1,000 00		4,393 49	5,463 40	4,831 54	631 86		Disbursing.
Lieut. J. W. Penrose.....	do. Hancock Barracks, Mo.....	7,962 80			1,471 30	9,434 10	7,324 56	2,109 54		Do.
Lieut. Henry Prince.....	do. Key West, Fla.....				10 88	10 88	10 88			Closed.
Capt. G. D. Ramsay.....	do. Washington, D. C.....		700 00			700 00		700 00		Remitted late in 3d for 4th quarter.
Lieut. J. R. V. D. Reeve.....	do. Florida.....				871 43	871 43	828 50	42 93		Disbursing.
Capt. J. W. Ripley.....	A. A. C. S. Augusta, Mo.....	19 50	100 00		8 00	127 50	180 26	\$52 76		Do.
Lieut. B. S. Roberts.....	A. C. S. Des Moines, Ill.....	1,300 08			408 18	1,708 26	639 22	1,069 04		Do.
Lieut. R. H. Ross.....	do. Fort Gibson, Ark.....	1,752 14	11,100 00		3,710 57	16,562 71	7,989 94	8,572 77		Disbursing; account 3d quarter not received; \$5,000 remitted late in 3d for 4th quarter.
Capt. E. L. Russell.....	A. A. C. S. Hancock Barracks.....				266 54	266 54	208 97	57 57		Due United States on settlement.
Capt. W. C. Sanders.....	do. Florida.....	11,924 81				11,924 81	11,924 81			Closed.
Dr. J. H. Sargent.....	A. C. S. Portsmouth, N. H.....	66 30				66 30	85 58	19 28		Due him on settlement.
Major H. Saunders.....	A. A. C. S. Fort Washington, Md.....	211 07				211 07	169 38	41 69		Disbursing.
Lieut. F. Searle.....	A. C. S. Florida.....	52 65			1,010 15	1,062 80	1,062 80			Closed.
Lieut. T. W. Sherman.....	do. Florida.....				552 98	552 98	1,098 81	545 83		Disbursing.
Lieut. R. C. Smead.....	do. Florida.....				134 53	134 53	134 53			Closed.
Lieut. A. E. Shiras.....	do. New York.....	5,045 19	98,000 00		154 60	103,199 79	83,440 98	19,749 81		Disbursing; \$15,000 remitted late in 3d for 4th quarter.
Lieut. W. W. Setliffe.....	do. Florida.....	13 15			31 37	44 52	14 66	29 86		Disbursing.
Lieut. J. R. Smith.....	do. Sackett's Harbor, N. Y.....	23 23	650 00		3 70	677 03	605 03	72 00		Do.
Lieut. J. H. Simpson.....	do. Florida.....	703 56			407 87	1,111 43	703 56	407 87		Do.
Lieut. E. Schriver.....	A. A. C. S. Washington city.....		100 00			100 00	25 60	74 40		Do.
Lieut. H. Swartwout.....	A. C. S. West Point, N. Y.....	85 90			45 03	130 93	57 08	73 85		Do.
Lieut. J. H. Stokes.....	do. Florida.....	128 78			46 76	175 54	3 30	172 24		Disbursing; account 3d quarter not received.
Lieut. R. G. Stockton.....	do. Florida.....				100 00	100 00	100 00			Closed.
Lieut. J. B. Scott.....	do. Washington city.....	330 73	1,800 00		178 21	2,308 94	2,308 94			Do.
Capt. J. Symington.....	A. A. C. S. St. Louis, Mo.....	66 16	100 00		138 25	304 41	198 72	105 69		Disbursing.
Capt. J. P. Taylor.....	commissary. Louisville, Ky.....	1,304 81	23,000 00			24,304 81	23,687 00	617 81		Do.
Lieut. F. Taylor.....	A. C. S. Baltimore, Md.....		6,000 00		848 31	6,848 31	6,184 39	663 92		Do.
Lieut. R. E. Temple.....	do. Watervliet, N. Y.....	61 83	1,725 00			1,786 83	1,786 83			Closed.
Lieut. B. A. Terrott.....	do. Fort Leavenworth, Mo.....	274 68			1,786 05	2,060 73	1,788 98	271 75		Disbursing; account 3d quarter not received.
Lieut. P. R. Thompson.....	do. Fort Leavenworth, Mo.....				250 00	250 00	250 00			Closed.
Lieut. W. A. Thornton.....	do. Watervliet, N. Y.....		600 00			600 00	555 18	34 82		Disbursing.
Lieut. D. H. Tufts.....	do. Florida.....				4,310 36	4,340 36	2,974 48	1,365 88		Do.

Statement exhibiting the moneys remitted to contractors from January 1 to September 30, 1837, &c.—Continued.

Names.	Residence or station.	Balances on hand December 31, 1836.	Remitted.	Charged on account of failures.	Transfers, sales, &c.	Total charged.	Accounted for.	Balances due to assistant commissaries of subsistence, September 30, 1837.	Balances due by assistant commissaries of subsistence, September 30, 1837.	Remarks.
Dr. W. Turner.....	A. A. C. S. Newport, R. I.....		\$200 00			\$200 00	\$50 45		\$149 55	Disbursing.
Lieut. J. S. Van Derveer.....	A. C. S. Boston, Mass.....	\$1 32	300 00			301 32	300 00		1 32	Due United States on settlement.
Lieut. R. D. A. Wade.....	do Newport, R. I.....	12 16	300 00			312 16	240 13		72 03	Do. do.
Capt. C. A. Waite.....	A. A. C. S. Boston, Mass.....		500 00		\$53 19	553 19				Closed.
Colonel J. B. Walbach.....	do Annapolis, Md.....	7 02	100 00			107 02	108 19	\$1 17		Disbursing.
Lieut. A. B. Walbach.....	A. C. S. Florida.....				127 77	127 77	127 77			Closed.
Lieut. W. Wall.....	do Florida.....				1,208 22	1,208 22	407 89		800 33	Disbursing.
Lieut. J. L. C. Watkins.....	do Florida.....	115 77				115 77			115 77	Account not received.
Lieut. G. Watson.....	do Florida.....	526 37				526 27	526 37			Closed.
Lieut. G. E. Weaver.....	do Florida.....						72 75	72 75		Disbursing.
Lieut. H. W. Wessells.....	do Fort Gratiot, M. T.....						200 00	200 00		Do.
Capt. Otis Wheeler.....	A. A. C. S. Fort Jesup, La.....	50 00			2,150 86	2,200 86	2,200 86			Closed.
Lieut. J. H. Winder.....	A. C. S. Florida.....	55	1,000 00		3,536 23	4,536 78	1,199 76		3,337 02	Disbursing; account 3d quarter not received.
Capt. E. S. Winder.....	A. A. C. S. Baltimore, Md.....				38 93	38 92	38 92			Closed.
Capt. George Wright.....	do Harrisburg, Pa.....		100 00			100 00	100 00			Do.
Lieut. George Wilson.....	A. C. S. Fort Crawford.....	1,401 97			9,070 83	10,472 80	7,324 21		3,148 59	Disbursing.
Lieut. R. H. Whiteley.....	do Augusta, Ga.....				29 37	29 37	29 37			Closed.
Major H. Whiting.....	A. A. C. S. Detroit, M. T.....	23 17			2,151 74	2,173 91	1,366 80		807 11	Disbursing.
General John E. Wool.....	do Athens, Tenn.....	9,323 05	50,000 00			59,323 05	39,440 37		19,882 68	Ordered to be deposited to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States.
		135,589 26	696,008 16	\$922 77	170,033 76	1,003,553 76	955,372 07	116,287 58	163,469 46	

RECAPITULATION.

Total charged.....	\$1,002,553 95
Balances due to disbursing officers on the settlement of their accounts.....	116,287 58
	1,118,841 53
Total accounted for.....	955,372 07
Deduct:	163,469 46
This sum, charged to contractors as the difference in price of stores purchased to supply deficiencies arising from their failures.....	\$922 77
For remittances late in the 3d for expenditures in the 4th quarter.....	52,800 00
This sum, being in the possession of officers who have ceased to disburse, and who have been ordered to deposit it in banks to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States.....	28,363 68
This sum, being expended in the removal and subsistence of Indians, and so credited on that account.....	5,000 00
	87,086 45
Leaving in the hands of the disbursing officers of the department on the 30th of September, 1837, applicable to the expenditures of the 4th quarter of the year.....	76,383 01

GEORGE GIBSON, *Commissary General of Subsistence.*

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSARY GENERAL OF SUBSISTENCE, Washington, November 18, 1837.

No. 10.

REPORT OF THE ACTING SURGEON GENERAL.

SURGEON GENERAL'S OFFICE, *November 29, 1837.*

SIR: In compliance with your instructions, I have the honor to report that the medical and hospital supplies for the army during the past year were put up and transmitted to the several posts in due time, and were all received in good order, with the exception of those intended for Fort Towson, which were lost by the sinking of a keel-boat while ascending the Red river. As soon as the fact of their loss was reported to this office; directions were given to the medical purveyor to forward another supply to that post, which was immediately done. These supplies, with the public property previously in charge of the officer of this department, have all been satisfactorily accounted for by the returns of the surgeons and assistant surgeons, which also show that the hospitals have been well supplied with all the necessary articles of the best quality for the comfort and convenience of the sick; and, from the well-arranged system of responsibility adopted, all has been done at the smallest possible expense to the department.

The law requiring an examination of all candidates by a medical board before admission into the medical staff of the army still continues to prove of the greatest advantage, by securing that professional knowledge so essentially necessary to enable officers of this department to perform the very important duties required of them.

Since the last annual report *thirty* applicants, who had been recommended as well qualified for appointment, were invited to present themselves for examination before an army medical board which was convened in the city of New York in the month of May last; of which number fifteen declined the invitation or failed to attend; and of the remaining fifteen who presented themselves, eight were rejected, and two withdrew, leaving only *five* who were found qualified for the appointment they had solicited—being just *one-sixth* of those who had been authorized to attend the board.

The assistant surgeons, as well as the surgeons of the army, being at all times liable to be called on to decide in the most important and critical cases, remote from all professional aid or assistance, it is necessary they should be well versed in the details of practice, in addition to being well grounded in the elementary branches of their profession. The medical board have therefore been instructed in all cases to make the most full and rigid examination of every candidate relative to his professional acquirements, physical qualifications, and moral habits, and to report favorably on no case admitting of a reasonable doubt.

It may here be proper for me to inform you that during the last year two applicants, who had at their own expense attended the examinations, and were approved by the board, declined to accept commissions when tendered to them; and as the number of applicants is far less numerous than formerly, I fear much difficulty will be found in procuring competent persons to fill the department, unless their compensation shall be increased.

The amount advanced on account of the medical and hospital department of the army during the fourth quarter of 1836, and the first, second, and third quarters of the present year, has been \$15,516 12; of which sum \$10,314 66 has been expended, and for which accounts have been rendered and settled, leaving in the hands of the disbursing officers of this department, on the 30th of September last, \$5,201 46, for which they are held responsible.

The amount paid by warrants on the treasury for claims of private physicians and others, presented and admitted during the period above stated, has been \$13,131 87½. There has also been advanced during the year stated to disbursing officers of this department, on account of the appropriation for preventing and suppressing Indian hostilities, \$10,522 24, of which \$9,365 42 has been expended, and for which their accounts have been received and settled, leaving a balance at the end of the third quarter of the present year in their hands of \$1,156 84.

I have again respectfully to call the attention of the department to the regulations relative to hospital stewards. There is no class of persons in the employment of the government so badly paid as they are. Their services are very arduous and important; hence it is necessary they should be intelligent, honest, and sober, and capable of compounding and administering to the sick the prescriptions of the surgeons. As such individuals cannot be obtained for the compensation allowed them by the present regulations, I most respectfully recommend that the steward to a post of four or more companies be allowed the pay, clothing, and rations of a sergeant of ordnance, and the steward at all other posts be allowed the pay, clothing, and rations of the first sergeant of a company.

I must also call the attention of the department to the condition of the hospitals at the different military posts, many of which are entirely without a building for the accommodation of the sick, and at others the buildings used for this purpose are old and totally unsuited for the purpose for which they are appropriated. I must therefore request that an appropriation may be asked for to erect such hospitals during the ensuing year as are absolutely necessary.

The whole number of cases which have been under the medical treatment of the officers of this department during the year ending the 30th of September last has been 18,949, of which number 32 have died of remittent fever, 25 of typhus fever, 14 of pneumonia, 20 of phthisis, 22 of diarrhœa, 19 of dysentery, 3 of epilepsy, 7 of wounds, 8 of dropsy, 9 of gastro-enteritis, 9 of intemperance, 4 of apoplexy, and 22 from other diseases, making 194 deaths during the year. Of these, 10 died at Fort Monroe, 19 at Fort Gibson and the dragoon camp near that post, 113 at the various forts and stations in Florida, 7 at Fort Leavenworth, 12 at Fort Mitchell, 10 at Fort Jesup, 7 at Nacogdoches and Camp Sabine, 6 at Fort Towson, and 10 at other places—the largest number of deaths occurred in the fourth quarter of 1836 and the third quarter of the present year.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

BENJAMIN KING, *Acting Surgeon General.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington.*

No. 11.

REPORT OF THE PAYMASTER GENERAL.

PAYMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, November 30, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor herewith to lay before you a statement of the transactions of the pay department for the fiscal year ending the 30th of September, 1837.

The balances in the hands of paymasters on the 1st of October, 1836, and the advances made to them within the year, amount to \$3,817,272 16. Of this, \$3,183,618 21 have been expended and accounted for, and \$422,269 35 are applicable to the payments of the present quarter, leaving a balance of \$211,384 60 to be accounted for.

The troops are paid to as late dates as they generally are at this season of the year, with the exception of those in Paymaster Rector's district; and in that district the commanding officer would not permit the paymaster to use the funds furnished for that purpose.

It will be seen by the tabular statement accompanying this that the advances for the regular troops amount to \$1,591,577 59, and for volunteers and militia to \$2,225,694 57. In comparing the expenses of the two forces, it must be recollected that the service of the regular troops is continuous; that of volunteers for short periods; that the latter are allowed clothing to the time they agree to serve, and not for the time they actually do serve; that, on an average, one-fifth of the time paid for is taken up in going from and returning home; and that the pay and allowances of a *mounted* volunteer, including the expenses of his horse, are equal to the cost of four privates of infantry. The reluctance of volunteers to serve on foot has compelled the employment of an undue proportion of *mounted* troops; and to this, in a great measure, may be ascribed the heavy expense of the late Indian wars. Not one cent appropriated for the suppression of Indian hostilities has been expended by this department in payment of regular troops. So far as the *army* has been employed, it has cost the United States no more than is appropriated for it in time of peace, except for transportation.

The heavy duty of the department for the last year made it necessary to obtain the services of officers from the line of the army, as provided for by the 3d section of the act of July 4, 1836. So far as the department is concerned, this is the best arrangement that can be made for cases of emergency, as the knowledge officers possess of military usage enables them to comprehend the duties of the office in less time than any other description of persons; but it produces inconvenience to the line, by depriving it of valuable officers when their services are most wanted; and I respectfully recommend, if any change is made in the army, that the appointment of temporary paymasters shall not be confined to officers of the line. This is the only alteration considered necessary in the organization of the pay department, unless it be the one suggested in my letter to your predecessor, of the 19th November, 1836, which applies to all staff departments.

It is the opinion of paymasters that Congress intended their compensation should be equal to that of other officers of the staff, who received the pay and emoluments of majors, and they have heretofore claimed it. The accounting officers put a different construction on the law; in consequence of which, paymasters do not receive as much as majors of the staff by forty-six dollars per month, including the double rations of the latter. The question has been before the United States courts, and different decisions given. On an appeal, in one case, to the Supreme Court, the decision was adverse to the claim of the officer; but it is believed to have been on grounds that do not affect the merits of the question. Concurring, as I do, in opinion with paymasters, and knowing that the many disallowances in the settlement of their accounts, and other losses, would reduce their compensation, if they received cavalry pay, to less than that of majors of infantry, I consider it my duty to request that the subject may be presented to Congress in the way best calculated to obtain the passage of an act explanatory of the 3d section of the act of 24th April, 1816, fixing the pay and emoluments of paymasters so as to place them on a footing with other disbursing officers of the staff.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. TOWSON, *Paymaster General.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

Statement of moneys drawn from the appropriations for the pay department and remitted to disbursing officers on account of payments for the fourth quarter of 1836 and the first, second, and third quarters of 1837; the amount unexpended and forming part of their estimates for the fourth quarter of 1837; the balances to be accounted for; the periods to which the troops have been paid and accounts rendered.

Paymasters.	Amount of funds remitted in the fourth quarter of 1836 and the first three quarters of 1837.						Amount unexpended and forming part of estimates for the fourth quarter of 1837.				
	Pay.	Subsistence.	Forage.	Servants' clothing.	Payments in lieu of clothing.	Amount.	Pay.	Subsistence.	Forage.	Clothing.	Amount.
<i>Army.</i>											
B. F. Larned	\$63,000 00	\$22,700	\$1,300 00	\$600 00	\$2,500	\$90,100 00
D. S. Townsend.....	37,400 00	9,900	1,450 00	750 00	1,600	51,100 00	\$2,020 68	\$244 57	\$571 83	\$463 91	\$3,300 99
Daniel Randall.....	98,200 00	30,450	2,550 00	1,100 00	1,700	134,000 00	5,834 51	5,834 51
C. H. Smith.....	78,100 00	22,950	900 00	650 00	3,400	106,000 00	12,001 01	12,001 01
A. A. Massias.....	124,100 00	27,800	1,600 00	1,000 00	5,500	160,000 00
T. P. Andrews.....	59,500 00	31,300	1,300 00	1,000 00	1,900	95,000 00
Edmund Kirby.....	68,250 00	24,800	1,500 00	850 00	1,600	97,000 00	4,181 44	55 10	4,236 54
L. G. De Russey.....	21,000 00	8,400	400 00	200 00	30,000 00
R. A. Forsyth.....	39,000 00	18,400	600 00	500 00	1,500	60,000 00
A. D. Stuart.....	18,000 00	5,500	400 00	200 00	24,100 00	46 03	46 03
W. S. Harney.....
J. S. Lytle	38,800 00	18,300	700 00	500 00	1,700	60,000 00	22,076 72	22,076 72
Peter Muhlenberg	7,000 00	2,750	150 00	100 00	10,000 00
Elbert Herring.....	60,200 00	26,850	900 00	550 00	1,500	90,000 00	8,066 14	8,066 14
Wharton Rector.....	25,750 00	13,000	450 00	300 00	1,300	40,800 00
Christopher Andrews.....	105,100 00	38,250	1,250 00	900 00	4,500	150,000 00
Donald Fraser.....	39,000 00	10,200	500 00	300 00	50,000 00
Thomas J. Leslie.....	84,250 00	43,180	1,540 00	1,160 00	160	130,300 00	2,741 37	4,463 20	260 65	441 03	7,906 30
Benjamin Walker.....	20,000 00	7,400	400 00	200 00	2,000	30,000 00
Isaac Clark.....	4,000 00	1,000	5,000 00
M. C. Buck.....	10,000 00	10,000 00
Richard Bennett.....	7,750 00	1,750	300 00	200 00	10,000 00	2,116 44	289 46	11 37	92 03	2,509 35
J. B. Grayson.....	11,000 00	7,600	200 00	200 00	1,000	20,000 00	338 48	338 48
Unexpended balances of the 3d quarter of 1836, per last statement, since expended	1,019,400 00	372,490	18,390 00	11,260 00	31,860	1,453,400 00	59,422 82	4,997 23	843 85	1,052 17	66,316 07
Balances remaining to be accounted for on last statement, since settled.....	114,785 99	903 71	942 65	116,632 35
Total of army.....	1,155,731 23	372,490	19,293 71	12,202 65	31,860	1,591,577 59	59,422 82	4,997 23	843 85	1,052 17	66,316 07
<i>Militia.</i>											
D. Randall.....	6,000 00	6,000 00
C. S. Smith.....	155,000 00	155,000 00
T. P. Andrews.....	540,000 00	540,000 00
R. A. Forsyth.....	100,000 00	100,000 00	43,657 23	43,657 23
A. D. Stuart.....	333,310 00	333,310 00	1,310 53	1,310 53
J. S. Lytle.....	20,000 00	20,000 00
C. Mapes.....	45,000 00	45,000 00
P. Muhlenberg.....	130,000 00	130,000 00	37,502 31	37,502 31
W. Rector.....	140,000 00	140,000 00	13,219 76	13,219 76
C. Andrews.....	145,000 00	145,000 00	120,484 99	120,484 99
D. Fraser.....	150,450 92	150,450 92	46,940 40	46,940 40
M. C. Buck.....	175,000 00	175,000 00	64,476 97	64,476 97
R. Bennett.....	133,000 00	133,000 00	4,411 68	4,411 68
R. D. A. Wade.....	55,000 00	55,000 00	32 59	32 59
J. B. Grayson.....	13,732 41	13,732 41
J. C. Casey.....	8,184 41	8,184 41
D. Perkins.....	2,000 00	2,000 00
Unexpended balances of the 3d quarter of 1836, per last statement, since expended	2,127,760 92	2,127,760 92	355,953 28	355,953 28
Balances remaining to be accounted for on last statement, since settled.....	38,776 43	38,776 43
Total of militia.....	2,225,694 57	2,225,694 57	355,953 28	355,953 28
Total army and militia.....	3,381,425 80	372,490	19,293 71	12,202 65	31,860	3,817,272 16	415,376 10	4,997 23	843 85	1,052 17	422,269 35

Statement of moneys drawn from the appropriations for the pay department, &c.—Continued.

Paymasters.	Balances remaining to be accounted for.			Periods to which the troops have been paid, for which accounts have been rendered.	Remarks.
	Pay.	Subsistence.	Amount.		
<i>Army.</i>					
B. F. Larned				September 1, 1837...	
D. S. Townsenddo	
Daniel Randall				November 1, 1837....	
C. H. Smithdo	
A. A. Massias	\$70,113 01	\$17,800 00	\$87,913 01	May 1, 1837.....	The troops of this district are reported to be paid to November 1, 1837, and the accounts are daily expected.
T. P. Andrews				November 1, 1837....	
Edmund Kirby				September 1, 1837....	
L. G. De Russey				March 1, 1837.....	On furlough from July 10 to November 2, 1837; turned over his funds to Paymaster Walker, who is charged with the payment of the district.—(See remarks opposite his name.)
R. A. Forsyth				May 1 and Sept. 1, 1837	
A. D. Steuart					District paid by Paymaster Massias. Paymaster Steuart has been employed in paying the volunteers of Kentucky and Tennessee.
W. S. Harney.....	12,427 65		12,427 65		Resigned.
J. S. Lytle.....				September 1, 1837....	
Peter Muhlenberg.....				July 1 and Sept. 1, 1837	
Eibert Herring				November 1, 1837....	
Wharton Rector	20,800 00		20,800 00	Nov. 1, 1836, and Jan. 1, 1837.	The commanding officer forbade the payment of the troops of this district in the funds furnished to the paymaster.
Christopher Andrews.....				September 1, 1837....	Refunded \$50,000 to the treasury, the paymaster not being able to use the drafts.
Donald Fraserdo	
Thomas J. Lesliedo	
Benjamin Walker.....	50,894 34	10,800 01	61,694 35	March 1 and May 1, 1837.	Appointed acting paymaster under the act of July 4, 1836. The payment of this district has been delayed by the troops objecting to receive the funds furnished the paymaster. The objection has been withdrawn, and the district is probably paid to November 1, 1837, but the accounts are not received.
Isaac Clark					Appointed acting paym't under act of July 4, 1836. Resigned.
M. C. Buck					Do. do. do.
Richard Bennett				September 1, 1837....	Do. do. do.
J. B. Grayson.....			do	Do. do. do.
Total of army.....	154,235 00	28,600 01	182,835 01		
<i>Militia.</i>					
D. Randall					
C. H. Smith					
T. P. Andrews					
R. A. Forsyth					
A. D. Steuart					
J. S. Lytle.....					
C. Mapes.....	28,549 59		28,549 59		Paymaster Mapes is now employed in disbursing his balance in Florida.
F. Muhlenberg.....					
W. Rector.....					
C. Andrews					
D. Fraser.....					
M. C. Buck					Appointed acting paymaster under act of July 4, 1836.
R. Bennett					Do. do.
R. D. A. Wade					Do. do.
J. B. Grayson.....					Appointed acting paymaster under act of July 4, 1836. Received funds of Paymaster T. P. Andrews.
J. C. Casey.....					Appointed acting paymaster under act of July 4, 1836. Received funds of Paymaster Fraser.
D. Perkins.....					Appointed acting paymaster under act of July 4, 1836. Received funds of Paymaster Steuart.
Total of militia	28,549 59		28,549 59		
Total army and militia.	182,784 59	28,600 01	211,384 60		

No. 12.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSARY GENERAL OF PURCHASES.

COMMISSARY GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Philadelphia, October 28, 1837.*

SIR: In obedience to instructions from the Department of War, dated on the 11th instant, I have prepared, and have the honor of enclosing, my moneyed estimates for the year 1838, marked A and B, as follows, viz:

A. For clothing, camp equipage, &c., for one year, ending with October, 1839.....	\$318,299 13
B. For the expenses of the Commissary General's office during the year 1838.....	8,000 00
	326,299 13

I likewise enclose twelve statements, numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, prepared in obedience to your order, viz:

No. 1. Statement of moneys drawn from the appropriation for the purchasing department to the 30th September, 1837.

No. 2. Statement of moneys drawn from the appropriation for additional dragoons, &c., to the 30th September, 1837.

No. 3. Statement of moneys drawn from the appropriation for preventing and suppressing Indian hostilities to the 30th September, 1837.

No. 4. Statement of moneys drawn from the special appropriation for the payment of taxes assessed on the public property (United States arsenal near Philadelphia) to 30th September, 1837.

No. 5. Statement of moneys received and disbursed during the first three quarters of 1837 on account of the purchasing department.

No. 6. Statement of moneys received and disbursed during the first three quarters of 1837 on account of additional dragoons or mounted riflemen.

No. 7. Statement of moneys received and disbursed during the first three quarters of 1837 on account of the appropriation for preventing and suppressing Indian hostilities.

No. 8. Statement of moneys remaining on hand on the 1st January, 1837, belonging to the appropriation for volunteers and militia, with its disbursement, to 30th September, 1837.

No. 9. Statement of moneys received and disbursed during the first three quarters of 1837 on account of appropriation for the payment of taxes on the United States arsenal for the years 1835 and 1836.

No. 10. The United States in account current with the commissary general of purchases to 30th September, 1837.

No. 11. Comparative statement of the cost of clothing, &c., for the United States army during the years 1836, 1837, 1838.

No. 12. Statement of the cost of clothing, &c., for the United States army during the year 1838.

The clothing and materials, therefore, that may remain on hand after the completion of the orders for this year, if any, will be so inconsiderable in their amounts that I have deemed it safer not to make any deduction on that account from the moneyed estimate. The duplicates will be forwarded as early as they can be prepared.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

G. IRVINE, *Commissary General of Purchases.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

No. 1.

Statement of moneys drawn from the appropriations for the purchasing department during the first three quarters of the year 1837.

May 19, 1837, by Secretary of the Treasury's warrant No. 6548.....	\$15,000 00
May 19, 1837, by Secretary of the Treasury's warrant No. 6549.....	15,000 00
May 27, 1837, by Treasurer's draft No. 44.....	15,000 00
May 27, 1837, by Treasurer's draft No. 45.....	15,000 00
June 23, 1837, by Treasurer's draft No. 340.....	15,000 00
July 10, 1837, by Treasurer's draft No. 730.....	20,000 00
July 31, 1837, by Treasurer's draft No. 1720.....	15,443 65
August 11, 1837, by Treasurer's draft No. 1935.....	15,000 00
August 14, 1837, by Treasurer's draft No. 1934.....	10,000 00
September 12, 1837, by Treasurer's draft No. 2365.....	20,000 00
September 30, 1837, by transfer from appropriation for suppressing and preventing Indian hostilities.....	40,000 00
	195,443 65

COMMISSARY GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Philadelphia, October 28, 1837.*

G. IRVINE, *Commissary General of Purchases.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

No. 2.

Statement of moneys drawn from the appropriation for additional dragoons or mounted riflemen during the first three quarters of 1837.

January 5, 1837, received Secretary of the Treasury's warrant No. 5373, dated December 31, 1836, paid January 5, 1837..... \$35,000 00

COMMISSARY GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Philadelphia, October 28, 1837.*

C. IRVINE, *Commissary General of Purchases.*

HON. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

No. 3.

Statement of moneys drawn from the appropriation for preventing and suppressing Indian hostilities during the first three quarters of 1837.

March 16, 1837, received Secretary of the Treasury's warrant No. 5895..... \$11,000 00
 March 25, 1837, received Secretary of the Treasury's warrant No. 6067..... 40,000 00

51,000 00

COMMISSARY GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Philadelphia, October 28, 1837.*

C. IRVINE, *Commissary General of Purchases.*

HON. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

No. 4.

Statement of moneys drawn from the special appropriation for the payment of taxes assessed on the public property (United States arsenal) near this city during the first three quarters of 1837.

March 25, 1837, received Secretary of the Treasury's warrant No. 6057..... \$1,450 50

COMMISSARY GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Philadelphia, October 28, 1837.*

C. IRVINE, *Commissary General of Purchases.*

HON. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

No. 5.

Statement of moneys received and disbursed by the commissary general of purchases during the first three quarters of the year 1837 on account of the purchasing department.

To amount of moneys drawn from the Treasury Department from the 11th May, 1837, to the 30th September following, on account of purchasing department, as per statement No. 1, \$195,443 65
 By amount expended during the first quarter of 1837, passed to the credit of the commissary general of purchases, as per account settled by the Second Auditor of the Treasury Department..... \$34,109 19
 By amount expended during the second quarter of 1837, passed to the credit of the commissary general of purchases, as per account settled by the Second Auditor of the Treasury Department..... 108,842 75
 By amount expended during the third quarter of 1837, per the commissary general of purchases, per account now in preparation for transmission to the Second Auditor of the Treasury Department for examination and settlement..... 76,962 18

219,914 12

Disbursed beyond the amount received..... 24,470 47

COMMISSARY GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Philadelphia, October 28, 1837.*

C. IRVINE, *Commissary General of Purchases.*

HON. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

No. 6.

Statement of moneys received and disbursed on account of appropriation for additional dragoons or mounted riflemen during the first three quarters of the year 1837.

To amount received from the Treasury Department on the 5th January, 1837, as per statement No. 2.....		\$35,000 00
By amount disbursed during the first quarter of 1837, passed to the credit of the commissary general of purchases, as per account settled by the Second Auditor of the Treasury Department.....	\$4,206 28	
By amount disbursed during the second quarter of 1837, passed to the credit of the commissary general of purchases, as per account settled by the Second Auditor of the Treasury Department.....	11,575 17	
By amount expended during the third quarter of 1837, per the commissary general of purchases, as per account now in preparation for transmission to the Second Auditor for examination and settlement.....	8,513 29	
		<u>24,294 74</u>
Deduct amount embraced in the settlement of the fourth quarter of 1836.....		10,705 26
		<u>4,759 07</u>
Balance remaining unexpended October 1, 1837.....		<u>5,946 19</u>

COMMISSARY GENERAL'S OFFICE, Philadelphia, October 28, 1837.

C. IRVINE, Commissary General of Purchases.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, Secretary of War.

No. 7.

Statement of moneys received and disbursed by the commissary general of purchases during the first three quarters of the year 1837 on account of appropriation for preventing and suppressing Indian hostilities.

To amount of moneys drawn from the treasury during the first three quarters of 1837, as per statement No. 3.....		\$51,000 00
By amount expended during the first quarter of 1837, passed to the credit of the commissary general of purchases, as per account settled by the Second Auditor of the Treasury Department.....	\$4,839 37	
By amount expended during the second quarter of 1837, passed to the credit of the commissary general of purchases, as per account settled by Second Auditor of the Treasury Department.....	4,656 88	
By amount expended during the third quarter of 1837, per the commissary general of purchases, per account now in preparation for transmission to the Second Auditor of the Treasury Department for examination and settlement.....	278 62	
By this sum, transferred to the purchasing department on the 30th of September, 1837, per order of Secretary of War.....	40,000 00	
		<u>49,774 87</u>
Balance remaining unexpended October 1, 1837.....		<u>1,225 13</u>

COMMISSARY GENERAL'S OFFICE, Philadelphia, October 28, 1837.

C. IRVINE, Commissary General of Purchases.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, Secretary of War.

No. 8.

Statement of moneys remaining on hand on the 1st of January, 1837, belonging to the appropriation for volunteers and militia, and disbursed up to the 30th of September, 1837.

January 1, 1837.—To balance remaining unexpended.....		\$18,168 23
By amount expended during the first quarter of 1837, passed to the credit of the commissary general of purchases, as per account settled by the Second Auditor of the Treasury Department.....		3,081 64
Balance remaining unexpended October 1, 1837.....		<u>15,086 59</u>

COMMISSARY GENERAL'S OFFICE, Philadelphia, October 28, 1837.

C. IRVINE, Commissary General of Purchases.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, Secretary of War.

No. 9.

Statement of moneys received to 30th of September, 1837, on account of special appropriation for the payment of taxes assessed on the public property (United States arsenal) near Philadelphia for the years 1835 and 1836.

March 25, 1837.—Received Secretary of the Treasury's warrant No. 6057.....	\$1, 450 50
March 28, 1838.—Paid George W. South in full for taxes assessed on the United States arsenal on Schuylkill for the years 1835 and 1836.....	<u>1, 450 50</u>

COMMISSARY GENERAL'S OFFICE, Philadelphia, October 28, 1837.

C. IRVINE, Commissary General of Purchases.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, Secretary of War.

No. 10.

Dr. The United States in account current with Callender Irvine, commissary general of purchases. Cr.

1837.		1837.	
Oct. 1	To balance due C. Irvine, commissary general of purchases, on account of purchasing department, per statement No. 5.....	\$24,470 47	
			Oct. 1 By balance due United States on account of additional dragoons, &c., per statement No. 6.....
			Oct. 1 By balance due United States on account of preventing and suppressing Indian hostilities, per statement No. 7.....
			Oct. 1 By balance due United States on account of volunteers and militia, per statement No. 8.....
			Oct. 1 By balance per contra.....
		<u>24,470 47</u>	\$5,946 19
			1,225 13
			15,086 59
			<u>2,212 56</u>
Oct. 1	To balance due C. Irvine, commissary general of purchases.....	2,212 56	<u>24,470 47</u>

COMMISSARY GENERAL'S OFFICE, Philadelphia, October 28, 1837.

C. IRVINE, Commissary General of Purchases.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, Secretary of War.

No. 11.

Comparative statement of the cost of clothing, &c., for the United States army during the years 1836, 1837, and 1838.

Garments, &c.	Prices in 1836.	Prices in 1837.	Prices in 1838.
Forage caps, artillery and infantry.....	\$0 80	\$0 75	\$0 75
Forage caps, dragoon.....	80	85	85
Uniform caps with metal equipments, artillery and infantry.....	2 05	2 05	2 05
Uniform caps with metal equipments, dragoon.....	2 20	2 46	2 20
Epaulets for non-commissioned staff, pairs.....	2 37½	2 37½	2 50
Epaulets for corporals, pairs.....	1 00	1 00	1 00
Epaulets for sergeants, pairs.....	1 00	1 00	1 00
Shoulder-straps, pairs.....	50	50	50
Aiguillettes, each.....	1 25	1 25	1 75
Sashes, crimson.....	2 12½	1 95	2 25
Sashes, yellow.....	2 12½	1 70	1 95
Pompons for non-commissioned staff.....	37½	37½	37½
Pompons for artillery.....	22	22	20
Pompons for infantry.....	20	20	18
Woollen overalls, sergeants', infantry.....	3 33	3 36¼	3 32¼
Woollen overalls, sergeants', artillery.....	3 33	3 36¼	3 35
Woollen overalls, privates'.....	2 97	3 02	3 05½
Drilling overalls, privates'.....	66	68½	69½
Drilling overalls, sergeants'.....	79	81½	80¾
Infantry sergeants' drilling jackets with sleeves.....	91	96	98½
Infantry privates' drilling jackets with sleeves.....	76	81	81¼
Artillery privates' drilling jackets with sleeves.....	81	86	89¾
Artillery sergeants' drilling jackets with sleeves.....	96	1 01	1 03¾
Artillery sky-blue cloth jackets with sleeves.....	3 41	3 41	3 51
Infantry sky-blue cloth jackets with sleeves.....	3 29	3 29	3 44

Comparative statement—Continued.

Garments, &c.	Prices in 1836.	Prices in 1837.	Prices in 1838.
Cotton shirts, privates'.....	\$0 46	\$0 48 $\frac{1}{2}$	\$0 56 $\frac{1}{2}$
Cotton shirts, sergeants'.....	65	67 $\frac{1}{2}$	66 $\frac{1}{2}$
Flannel shirts.....	1 16	1 18 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 12 $\frac{3}{4}$
Canton flannel drawers.....	53	53	56
Laced bootees, pairs.....	1 46	1 46	1 62 $\frac{1}{2}$
Stockings, pairs.....	35 $\frac{1}{2}$	35	35 $\frac{1}{2}$
Blankets.....	3 00	3 00	3 00
Greatcoats.....	8 31	8 31	9 59
Leather stocks.....	13	13	13
Knapsacks.....	1 55	1 55	1 42
Haversacks.....	25 $\frac{3}{4}$	25 $\frac{3}{4}$	26
Infantry sergeants' coats.....	6 71	6 71	6 40 $\frac{1}{4}$
Infantry privates' coats.....	6 71	6 71	6 38
Infantry musicians' coats.....	8 23	8 23	7 96
Infantry principal musicians' coats.....	10 00	10 00	10 07
Infantry sergeant majors' and quartermaster sergeants' coats.....	8 48	8 48	8 49
Artillery sergeants' coats.....	7 02	7 02	6 85
Artillery privates' coats.....	7 02	7 02	6 82
Artillery musicians' coats.....	8 38	8 38	8 11 $\frac{1}{2}$
Artillery sergeant majors' and quartermaster sergeants' coats.....	9 97	9 97	9 29 $\frac{3}{4}$
Dragoon privates' woollen overalls.....	9 29	4 34	4 47 $\frac{1}{4}$
Dragoon sergeants' woollen overalls.....	4 55	4 61	4 71 $\frac{3}{4}$
Dragoon privates' cotton overalls.....	1 04	1 06 $\frac{1}{4}$	1 14
Dragoon sergeants' cotton overalls.....	1 25	1 30	1 29 $\frac{1}{4}$
Dragoon privates' cloth jackets.....	4 93	5 03	5 02 $\frac{1}{4}$
Dragoon sergeants' cloth jackets.....	5 01	5 11	5 06 $\frac{3}{4}$
Dragoon privates' cotton jackets.....	89	94	99 $\frac{1}{2}$
Dragoon sergeants' cotton jackets.....	1 04	1 11 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 11
Dragoon sergeant majors' coats.....	7 37	7 37 $\frac{1}{2}$	7 56 $\frac{1}{2}$
Dragoon corporals' and privates' coats.....	6 72	6 72	6 07 $\frac{1}{4}$
Dragoon musicians' coats.....	8 24	8 24	7 51
Dragoon principal musicians' coats.....	8 89	8 89	9 00
Dragoon sergeants' coats.....	6 72	6 72	6 13
Dragoon shoulder-straps, brass, pairs.....	94	93	93
Dragoon greatcoats.....	10 52	10 59 $\frac{1}{2}$	11 96 $\frac{1}{4}$
Dragoon hair plumes.....	60	58	60
Dragoon bands and tassels.....	54	60	70
Ordnance sergeants' coats.....	7 02	7 02	6 85
Ordnance privates' coats.....	7 02	7 02	6 82
Ordnance sergeants' woollen overalls.....	3 33	3 36 $\frac{1}{4}$	3 35

COMMISSARY GENERAL'S OFFICE, Philadelphia, October 28, 1837.

C. IRVINE, Commissary General of Purchases.

HON. J. R. POINSETT, Secretary of War.

No. 12.

Cost of clothing, &c., to be provided for the army of the United States in the year 1838.

Dragoon uniform cap.....	\$1 75
Dragoon tulip.....	16 $\frac{1}{2}$
Dragoon cap-plate.....	28 $\frac{1}{2}$
Dragoon band and tassels.....	70
Dragoon hair plume.....	60
Dragoon forage cap.....	85
Dragoon sergeant major's and quartermaster sergeant's coat.....	7 56 $\frac{1}{2}$
Dragoon chief musician's coat.....	9 00
Dragoon sergeant's coat.....	6 13
Dragoon musician's coat.....	7 51
Dragoon corporal's and private's coat.....	6 07 $\frac{1}{4}$
Dragoon shoulder-straps, brass, pair.....	93
Dragoon sash.....	1 95
Dragoon sergeant's cloth jacket.....	5 06 $\frac{3}{4}$
Dragoon private's cloth jacket.....	5 02 $\frac{1}{4}$
Dragoon sergeant's cotton jacket.....	1 11
Dragoon private's cotton jacket.....	99 $\frac{1}{2}$
Dragoon sergeants' woollen overalls.....	4 71 $\frac{3}{4}$
Dragoon privates' woollen overalls.....	4 47 $\frac{1}{2}$

Cost of clothing, &c., to be provided for the army, &c—Continued.

Dragoon sergeants' cotton overalls	\$1 29 $\frac{1}{4}$
Dragoon privates' cotton overalls	1 14
Dragoon greatcoat	11 96 $\frac{1}{4}$
Artillery uniform cap	1 75
Artillery tulip	11
Artillery cap-plate	5
Artillery number	4
Artillery cannon- \times	10
Artillery pompon	20
Artillery pompon for non-commissioned staff	37 $\frac{1}{2}$
Artillery forage cap	75
Artillery sergeant major's and quartermaster sergeant's coat	9 29 $\frac{3}{4}$
Artillery sergeant's coat	6 85
Artillery musician's coat	8 11 $\frac{1}{2}$
Artillery corporal's and private's coat	6 82
Artillery shoulder-straps, pair	50
Artillery epaulets for non-commissioned staff, pair	2 50
Artillery epaulets for sergeants, pair	1 00
Artillery epaulets for corporals, pair	1 00
Artillery aiguillette	1 75
Artillery sash	2 25
Artillery woollen jacket	3 51
Artillery sergeant's cotton jacket	1 03 $\frac{3}{4}$
Artillery private's cotton jacket	89 $\frac{3}{4}$
Artillery sergeants' woollen overalls	3 35
Infantry uniform cap	1 75
Infantry tulip	11
Infantry cap-plate	5
Infantry number	4
Infantry bugle	10
Infantry pompon	18
Infantry pompon for non-commissioned staff	37 $\frac{1}{2}$
Infantry forage cap	75
Infantry sergeant major's and quartermaster sergeant's coat	8 49
Infantry chief musician's coat	10 07 $\frac{1}{4}$
Infantry corporal's and private's coat	6 38
Infantry shoulder-straps, pair	50
Infantry epaulets for non-commissioned staff, pair	2 50
Infantry epaulets for sergeants, pair	1 00
Infantry epaulets for corporals, pair	1 00
Infantry aiguillette	1 75
Infantry sash	2 25
Infantry woollen jacket	3 44
Infantry sergeant's cotton jacket	98 $\frac{1}{2}$
Infantry private's cotton jacket	84 $\frac{3}{4}$
Infantry sergeants' woollen overalls	3 32 $\frac{1}{4}$
Infantry sergeant's coat	6 40 $\frac{1}{4}$
Infantry musician's coat	7 96
Sergeants' cotton overalls	80 $\frac{3}{4}$
Privates' cotton overalls	69 $\frac{1}{2}$
Privates' woollen overalls	3 05 $\frac{1}{2}$
Flannel shirt	1 12 $\frac{3}{4}$
Canton flannel drawers	56
Sergeant's cotton shirt	66 $\frac{1}{2}$
Private's cotton shirt	56 $\frac{1}{2}$
Laced bootees, pair	1 62 $\frac{1}{2}$
Stockings, pair	35 $\frac{1}{3}$
Leather stock	13
Blanket	3 00
Greatcoat	9 59
Knapsack	1 42
Haversack	26
Canteen, (wood,) complete	40
Canteen, (tin,) complete	49
Letters for forage caps	5
Axe	1 25
Spade	62 $\frac{1}{2}$
Camp-kettle	1 00
Mess-pan	40
Bedsack, double	1 73 $\frac{1}{4}$
Bedsack, single	1 40
Hatchet	43
Garrison flag	41 76
Halliards, set, (average 10 pounds, at 37 $\frac{1}{2}$ cents per pound)	3 75
Recruiting flag	7 00
Regimental and battalion colors, set	85 00
Guidon (for dragoons)	9 00
Drum, complete	6 62 $\frac{1}{2}$

Cost of clothing, &c., to be provided for the army, &c.—Continued.

Drum-head batter.....	\$1 00
Drum-head snare.....	50
Drum sling.....	45
Drumsticks, pair.....	75
Drum cord.....	25
Drum snares, set.....	50
Fife.....	25
Bugle, with extra mouth-piece.....	4 50
Trumpet, with extra mouth-piece.....	6 00
Iron pot.....	1 80
Wall tent.....	15 44
Wall tent fly.....	6 50
Hospital tent.....	91 50
Common tent.....	9 32
Wall tent poles, set.....	2 00
Hospital tent poles, set.....	1 50
Common tent poles, set.....	1 50
Bass drum.....	18 00
Nose-bag.....	1 00
Horse blanket.....	2 90
Horse brush.....	40
Iron mane comb.....	12½
Saddle, complete.....	14 00
Crupper.....	37½
Stirrup leathers, pair.....	62½
Girth.....	45
Surcingle.....	68¾
Saddle-bags.....	4 75
Pad and coat straps.....	1 00
Bridle, complete.....	5 00
Martingale.....	1 00
Neck strap and chain.....	1 75
Spurs, pair.....	1 50
Currycomb.....	17
Marquee, complete.....	124 00

COMMISSARY GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Philadelphia*, October 28, 1837.C. IRVINE, *Commissary General of Purchases.*Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

No. 13.

REPORT FROM THE CHIEF ENGINEER.

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, *Washington*, November 30, 1837.

SIR: In conformity with your instructions, I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the operations of this department during the year ending September 30, 1837.

Accompanying it are three tabular statements: the first two relating to the fiscal affairs of the department; the third exhibiting the works projected by the board of engineers, which have not been commenced, and the estimate of their cost.

FORTIFICATIONS.

No appropriations under this head having been made for the service of the past year, operations have been continued, as far as practicable, with the balances of former appropriations.

They have been prosecuted with energy, as some of these balances were large, but by the close of the season will generally have exhausted all available funds.

Fort Warren, Boston harbor, Massachusetts.—Operations were resumed at this work the first of April. The average force employed has been two hundred and forty mechanics and laborers. Up to September 30 there had been laid nine thousand four hundred and seventy-eight cubic yards of stone-work in piers and scarp walls; and two thousand seven hundred and forty-five cubic yards of brick-work, containing 1,781,000 bricks; eight hundred and fifty running feet of scarp wall have been carried up sixteen feet above the ditches along the two channel fronts, and part of another; the piers and arches of nineteen casemates are completed, twelve of which are thirty feet span, and seven smaller. The piers of the other casemates are so far advanced that all the arches for the two channel fronts may be completed the next year.

Fort Independence, Boston harbor, Massachusetts.—About one hundred and thirty mechanics and laborers have been employed during the past season at this work; eight thousand one hundred and seventy-two cubic yards of masonry have been laid, comprising the foundation of the scarp wall along two whole fronts, and part of two others; the superstructure of the same in part completed along two fronts, and twenty of the piers of the casemates on the channel fronts nearly completed. The embrasures of one of the channel fronts are finished.

Fort Adams, Narraganset Roads, Rhode Island.—There having been no appropriation for the present year for Fort Adams, sixty thousand dollars were, by order of the President, transferred from the unexpended balance of appropriations for Fort Monroe; with this, and the remainder of the last year's appro-

priation, the work has been prosecuted. Most of the excavation and embankment, both rock and earth, and a great portion of the masonry, have been completed, and progress has been made in flooring, partitioning, and plastering the casemates along the face of the northeast bastion. There yet remain to be finished portions of the glacis and of the earthen parapets, a small part of the scarps of the north and the west fronts, the remainder of the parade wall, all the breast height walls, part of the permanent wharf above the water, the interior of the quarters and store-rooms, the gun platforms, and a considerable portion of the redoubt. Much of this could be accomplished the next season with an early and liberal appropriation by Congress.

Fort Schuyler, Throg's Neck, East river, New York.—By the purchase of a second steamboat and other auxiliaries, operations have been greatly facilitated at this work, and are now making very satisfactory progress. The sea wall has been finished, with the exception of a small part of the coping, the foundations of a considerable portion of the scarp and counter-scarp walls and piers of casemates laid, and the superstructure commenced. In the graduation of the site nearly all the earth within the space occupied by the fort has been removed; the greater part of the embankment of the glacis and part of the rampart of the coverface have been formed.

Fort Columbus and Castle William, New York.—The repairs of these works are nearly completed; a small quantity of coping stone remains to be executed, and some painting is required.

The sea has lately made encroachments upon the base of Castle William, which should be protected at an early day by a substantial sea wall. The old sea wall around the island requires repairing; five thousand dollars would put it in a state of tolerable security. Stone for traverse circles, and iron plates for the same, are yet wanted; and the two wharves on the Buttermilk channel require thorough repair. A detailed estimate for these several objects will be presented; the amount of \$20,000, it is believed, will complete the repairs of these works.

Fort Mifflin, Delaware river, Pennsylvania.—During the present year a gun-shed has been erected, the terreplein of the fort has been graduated and gravelled, pavements have been made about the quarters, some necessary outbuildings erected, and all the wood-work of the buildings painted; a mess-house and mess-room are now fitting up, and, on their completion, the fort will be ready to receive its garrison.

Rebuilding Fort Delaware, Delaware river.—No exertions were spared to hasten this work the past year, so far as could advantageously be done. It was continued till suspended by the ice in December. Little, however, was accomplished, in consequence of the very late appropriations; of the unusually high price of labor and materials of all kinds; and of the great scarcity of laborers after funds had been furnished. For this season no appropriation was made, but the balance of that of the last year, together with a transfer of \$34,800 from the appropriation for the forts in Charleston harbor, has enabled the officer in charge to prosecute the work vigorously; labor has been abundant and at reduced rates, large supplies of materials contracted for during the fall have been received, and a change in an important part of the operations has been most successful in its results, for economy and rapidity.

The following is a short synopsis of the operations of the season:

1. Excavations for the foundations and the ditches of the fort, amounting to about twenty-seven thousand cubic yards.

2. Driving piles for foundations. In consequence of the nature of the soil, these piles are of the great length of forty-five feet. A great improvement has this season been introduced in the method of driving them, by the substitution of steam power for that of horses; more than fifteen piles per day, on an average, are driven with one pile-engine, which, when worked by horses, drove only three per day; the expense at the same time being very greatly diminished. It is found, too, that from the continuous tremulous motion imparted by the engine, the pile can be driven, not only with greater rapidity, but to a greater depth, without injury. The number of piles driven during the season, up to the 30th of September, is 5,353, the work of about five months, commencing with one engine and never working more than three. The great importance of this change becomes evident when it is considered that at the commencement of the season there were twelve thousand piles to drive. There are now driven the foundations for two fronts, and the others are rapidly progressing.

3. Receiving materials, to wit: Ten thousand six hundred tons of building stone of large dimensions, two hundred and ninety-six thousand bricks, two thousand four hundred and ten piles, and three thousand three hundred cubic yards of building sand.

4. Formation of four jetties projecting from the dike on the north and east sides of the island, to protect it from the abrasion of the river.

Repairs of Fort McHenry.—Since my last report, the parapet of the fort has been strengthened by a brick revetment wall, the scarp wall has been thoroughly repaired, the quarters new floored, painted and roofed, an additional battery nearly completed, one thousand three hundred feet of the sea wall built, and fifteen acres of land purchased. The appropriation of 1836, together with the sum of five thousand dollars from the appropriation for "incidental expenses," will be exhausted by the end of the year. An estimate for further repairs which will be necessary will be submitted.

Fort Monroe, Hampton Roads, Virginia.—There being no officer at the disposal of the department to take charge of this work, the funds appropriated have been transferred, by order of the President, to other works in progress, namely, \$60,000 to Fort Adams and \$90,000 to Fort Pulaski. An especial board of engineers appointed to examine this work having recommended extensive repairs, and its completion, an estimate will be submitted for the requisite appropriation. The bridge now connecting the site of Fort Monroe with the main land is the property of a private company; it is obviously improper, in a military point of view, that this sole direct communication of the fort with the surrounding country should be in any other hands than those of the government; negotiations have therefore been entered into with the company, who are willing to sell it at a reasonable price. An estimate for the amount is submitted, the payment of which, at once, will, in the end, be more economical than the subjection to the heavy tax now imposed on every person and thing that passes.

Fort Calhoun, Hampton Roads, Virginia.—In accordance with previous instructions, the remainder of the stone was this year nearly removed from the foundations of the work, preparatory to commencing the masonry. A board of engineers, appointed in September to inspect it, recommended, however, in the strongest terms, on account of the continued subsidence, the reloading of these foundations; accordingly, with the sanction of the proper department, instructions to this effect were immediately issued, and the reloading is now in progress.

Fort Caswell, Oak island, North Carolina.—Since the 30th of September last, 1,360 cubic yards of masonry have been constructed, and 13,038 cubic yards of earth removed; the sheet-piling has been

driven around the foundations of two of the caponnières, and a considerable portion of the lead roofing has been laid.

The masonry constructed comprises the greater part of the counter-forts and relieving arches intended to strengthen the scarp walls, the breast-height walls of the covered way of the gorge, and of face No. 4, and the permanent tide-lock.

The effect of a storm in August last has been such as to prove conclusively the necessity of protecting the site of this fort from the sea abrasion, which has been progressing for several years. A project for securing it will be submitted as soon as received from the local engineer.

Fortifications in Charleston harbor.—The department having no officer at its disposal for the superintendence of these works, they have been suspended, with the exception of the labor for the preservation of the site of Fort Moultrie, and the greater portion of the appropriation transferred, by order of the President, to other works, viz: to Fort Delaware, \$34,800; to fort on Foster's Bank, \$27,000; to incidental expenses, \$33,200; and to contingencies of fortifications, \$19,000.

The preservation of *Sullivan's island* has been committed to the superintendence of a civil agent, and some progress made therein. The general superintendent urges in his report the necessity of prompt and effectual measures for protecting this site. An inadequate appropriation will tend only to defeat the plan, as the peculiar nature of the case is such as to require that all the parts should progress as fast as practicable, to afford combined resistance against the desolating effect of the waves and currents. With his views I fully coincide, and submit an estimate in accordance therewith.

Fort Pulaski, Cockspar island, Georgia.—The operations at this fort, after preparations were completed in October, 1836, consisted principally in laying masonry of the rampart, embanking the parade, preservation of the island on the north and northeast shore by a breakwater and catch-sand, and constructing the permanent dikes of the island; 4,000 cubic yards of masonry have been laid in completing all the embrasures and piers generally of the north and northeast fronts; in completing seven embrasures, and their corresponding piers of casemates on the southeast front; completion, generally, of piers, and much progress in all the embrasures of the south front; and to the completion, generally, of the piers, walls, &c., of the gorge, to the level of the bottom of casemate floors. Considerable progress has been made in the embankments, and in the construction of the breakwater and permanent dikes.

Repairs of Fort Marion and the sea wall at St. Augustine, Florida.—Operations have been confined to the repair of the sea wall. There was completed, on the 30th of September, a length of 1,500 feet, with an average height of eight feet, and forty-eight feet, with an average height of four feet, making 61,344 cubic feet of solid masonry. Of this, 24,000 cubic feet were from the public quarries three miles distant; the remainder was from the old wall. Besides the quantity laid, 17,000 cubic feet of stone have been quarried. The stone is a shell formation, and well laid in hydraulic cement.

Fort Pickens, Pensacola harbor, Florida.—The small balance of funds applicable to this work has been or will be expended this season on the finishing of the officers' and soldiers' quarters, and some slight repairs.

Fort on Foster's Bank, Florida.—The sum estimated for this work has been found sufficient for its completion, as, by the report of the superintending engineer, it was to have been completed in the month of October. Its site is now considered secure from any inroads of the sea, having been exposed in August last to a very severe gale, from which it sustained no injury. Several parts of the work, subject to the pressure of the arches, have been increased in their dimensions, and the terreplein covered with a terrace of masonry nine inches thick.

Twelve rooms have been fitted up in the casemates for officers' quarters, and six large ones for the soldiers. An appropriation of \$33,000 will be asked for to meet the demand against the work, which, to this amount, has been constructed on the individual credit of the engineer.

Fort Livingston, Grande Terre, Louisiana.—Operations have remained suspended at this work during the year for the want of an officer to superintend it. A keeper and one man are employed to take care of the public property and make sundry small improvements near the site of the work.

CONTINGENCIES OF FORTIFICATIONS.

The balance of former appropriations under this head and a transfer of about \$3,000 from other appropriations, amounting in the whole to about \$12,500, have been applied to making gun traverses and to repairs of fortifications on the Gulf of Mexico.

Incidental expenses attending repairs of fortifications, and for the purchase of land in their neighborhood.—There was no appropriation under this head at the last session of Congress, but a transfer of \$32,000 was made, by order of the President, in conformity with the second section of the act of appropriation of July, 1836, from the appropriation for fortifications in Charleston harbor. This transfer, as well as that of the whole appropriation for Fort Monroe, was made in consequence of the want of officers to superintend the expenditure. These amounts, in addition to an unexpended balance of \$19,000, have been expended as follows: for repairs of Fort Mifflin, \$29,000; repairs of Fort McHenry, \$13,000; purchase of land near Fort Delaware, \$4,000; and for purchase of gun traverses for several works, \$1,500.

HARBORS AND RIVERS.

Chicago harbor, Illinois.—The season had advanced to the 13th of June, when the present superintendent resumed the charge of this work; and since that time the operations have been confined chiefly to building up and finishing the work left unfinished at the close of the last year, and to opening a channel between the piers by dredging.

About 200 cords of stone have been thrown into the last 500 feet of the north pier, which will be levelled, planked, and completed this fall. The south pier, which was only laid in cribs to the surface of the water at the close of the last year, has been levelled and built up throughout its entire length to nearly its requisite height above water; more than 800 cords of stone have been thrown into it. One thousand six hundred and eighty feet in length of this pier will be completed this year.

The only new work commenced this season is 200 feet on the outer end of the south pier, and about the same length on the extension of the north pier in-shore.

The dredging machine has been kept in active operation, and has opened a good channel 80 feet broad along the inner side of the south pier, the least depth of water along which is ten feet; with a northerly wind, vessels have entered drawing 10 feet 10 inches.

In consequence of the remarkable position which the outer bar has assumed, a still further extension of the piers of 200 feet beyond that contemplated last year is rendered necessary. This will carry out the north pier to 14 feet water, a depth which it is supposed cannot for many years be materially lessened by the encroachment of the bars. The sand is constantly accumulating on the north side of the north pier, and will continue to do so till the piers are carried into the deep water of the lake beyond its sensible influence. The extension here proposed will avert the evil for ten or perhaps fifteen years.

Harbors on the south shore of Lake Erie.—For the present condition and wants of these harbors, reference is respectfully made to the accompanying reports of the superintendents, marked A and B.

Genesee river and Oak Orchard creek.—The state of these harbors is shown in the interesting report of the superintendent appended, marked C, to which I beg leave to refer.

A light is necessary at the extremity of the pier at the mouth of the Genesee, and it is recommended to construct there a permanent light-house of good materials to serve as a beacon for the entrance of the harbor, and to supersede, eventually, the old light-house on the main land, which is now in a state of decay. The plan and estimate for this have been transmitted to the proper officer of the treasury.

Big Sodus bay and Oswego, Lake Ontario, New York.—The reports of the superintendents of these two improvements are also appended, marked D and E, as containing interesting detailed information.

Monument on Steele's ledge, Maine.—The unexpended balance of the appropriation for this monument was, at the last session of Congress, reappropriated for "placing buoys in the vicinity of the monument."

The funds have been placed in the hands of an agent, but no report has yet been forwarded.

Breakwater on Stanford's ledge, Portland harbor.—A contract for 401 yards of the inner extremity of this breakwater was made in September, 1836; about 400 feet of this were laid last fall, and the whole is now nearly completed.

Two other contracts were made in the spring for 172 yards additional. There will probably be completed this season a distance of 1,700 feet, containing 20,000 cubic yards of stone.

On account of the difficulty of measuring the mass under water, the remainder will probably not be done by contract, but the stone will be purchased and put in place by the government.

The agent reports that the portion of the breakwater already constructed has been found efficacious in keeping off the heavy swell that formerly swept over the ledge at high water, and caused much damage to the shipping in the harbor.

Piers at Kennebunk, Maine.—The appropriation of July, 1836, for this work, retained until the present season in consequence of the late period at which it became available, has been entirely expended.

The pier-head and a considerable portion of the pier proper are nearly completed.

Three hundred and sixty-five feet remain to be constructed, of which 100 should immediately be built, as the old pier is very weak, and will soon be washed away. An estimate for the amount will be submitted.

Deepening the channel of the Cocheco branch of the Piscataqua river, leading into Dover harbor, New Hampshire.—Operations commenced at a ledge of rocks impeding the navigation, which has been blasted for a depth of about four feet, making a channel 36 feet wide for vessels of far greater burden than could before navigate the river.

They have been carried on also at Trickey's shoal and at the narrows, where the remaining rocks have been raised from the bed of the river.

A quantity of sand has also been excavated. There are still several bars and masses of rock to be removed. Ten thousand dollars, in addition to existing balances of appropriation, will probably meet the expense of the completion of this improvement.

Merrimack river, Massachusetts.—The breakwater at the mouth of this river is finished, but it will require some slight repairs the next spring. Ample funds for this are now in the hands of the agent.

Breakwater at Sandy bay, Massachusetts.—Two hundred feet of this breakwater are finished, and two hundred more, with the exception of the facing on the inside; some progress has been made with the remainder. About 45,000 tons of stone have been deposited, and it is estimated that the same quantity will be required to finish the work. When completed, it will form a harbor accessible at all times of tide, and capable of sheltering more than five hundred sail of vessels.

Preservation of Rainsford island, Massachusetts.—A stone wall for the protection of this island has been built, 1,537 feet in length, about seven feet thick, and from seven to twelve feet high, protected in front by loose ballast stone. The appropriation has been expended to within about \$500, now in the hands of the agent.

To complete the protection of the island, a portion of the wall, of 450 feet in length, will require two more courses of stone, with a pavement of flat stones in the rear. An estimate is herewith submitted.

Duxbury, Massachusetts.—To preserve the point of land designated by the act of appropriation, brush fences have been laid during the season, but no report of operations has been yet received.

Plymouth beach, Massachusetts.—A small remnant of appropriation has been expended this season in repairing the breakwater, and securing and putting in place the drift seaweed, to prevent the drifting of the sand.

The whole extent of Plymouth beach is represented to be now in fine condition; the brush fence is covered with five or six feet of sand, and a growth of beach grass. The wooden foundation sills of a portion of the breakwater having been nearly destroyed by the worms, an estimate for the amount necessary to replace a length of 320 feet, with a substantial stone wall, is herewith submitted.

Provincetown harbor, Massachusetts.—About 220 acres of beach have been planted with grass this year, and the estimate submitted is for the same quantity the next season. The grass grows well, and the protection of the beach will be accomplished, with the necessary appropriations, in 1840.

Hyannis breakwater, Massachusetts.—The eastern end of the breakwater is finished to a length of about 1,140 feet. There remain now but 200 feet at the western end to complete it, an estimate for which will be submitted.

The first proposed height of the breakwater having been found insufficient for security, an additional course of heavy stones has been laid on the latest constructed portions, and it is contemplated to raise the whole in a similar manner. The eastern extremity has been arranged to receive a beacon-light, in anticipation of an appropriation for that object. The work has already proved to be a great auxiliary to the safety of this very important harbor.

Breakwater at the mouth of Bass river.—Of this work, 50 feet in length have been completed this season, 30 feet are in a state of forwardness, and material for 10 feet more is at hand, and will be deposited. The balance of the appropriation will be sufficient for about 18 feet more, making a total length of 108 feet.

The cost of the linear foot of this work is greater than was originally estimated, in consequence of a misapprehension as to the kind of stone to be used, and the increase in its price. Ten thousand dollars can be advantageously expended the next season, and \$30,000, it is now expected, will complete the work.

An idea of the importance of this harbor may be formed from the fact of there being 223 arrivals of vessels from September 10 to October 9, inclusive.

New Bedford harbor, Massachusetts.—The removal of the wreck in this harbor has been effected.

Breakwater at Church's cove, Little Compton, Rhode Island.—Owing to the difficulty of obtaining a deed of the land and privilege of removing the stones necessary for its prosecution, this work was not commenced as early as was anticipated; and after its commencement, heavy winds and sea, and a want of shelter for the vessels transporting stone, prevented its being carried on as rapidly as might have been expected; but these difficulties are in part obviated by its present advanced state, which already affords some security for vessels and scows employed in its construction. Much more, it is hoped, can be accomplished the next year. By the end of October, as stated in the report of the superintendent, there were to have been completed 100 feet in length, requiring 5,246 tons of stone. To complete this work according to the plan proposed, 22,000 tons of stone, at a cost of \$26,767, will be required. In consequence of the increased price of stone, the present estimate for completion will exceed the original one about \$7,200. Vessels that are now driven by stress of weather up the eastern channel of the Narraganset bay are obliged to run several miles above this place to find safe anchorage; the delay and danger attending this will be obviated by the breakwater, which will afford ample security.

Thames river, Connecticut.—In 1836 two piers were constructed on the east side of this river, one of which is 1,500 feet long; the two containing 3,036 cubic yards of stone. During the present season two others have been constructed on the same side, having an aggregate length of 870 feet, and requiring 2,322 cubic yards of stone; also two on the west side, with an aggregate length of 1,100 feet, and requiring 3,444 cubic yards of stone.

Two dredging machines have been employed, and have deepened the channel across the bar called the Haycocks, through a length of 930 feet, and a width of 60 feet.

The superintendent judges, from the effects already produced, that the success of the project for improving the harbor does not admit of a doubt.

Saybrook harbor, Connecticut.—The season was so much advanced when the local agent received the necessary plan and instructions for the contemplated improvement at the mouth of Connecticut river as to render it inexpedient, in his judgment, to commence operations this year. It was concluded, therefore, to make the necessary preparations during the winter, to commence at as early a period in the spring as the weather will permit.

Bridgeport harbor, Connecticut.—A channel of eight feet in depth has been excavated nearly across the outer bar that formerly closed the entrance to this harbor at low tides to vessels drawing more than five feet of water.

The agent reports the probability that the channel will be kept open by the current, as it is now deeper than when first made.

Fairweather island, Connecticut.—Three hundred and sixty feet of the sea wall for the preservation of this island have been finished this season. The ends of it will be exposed to injury from every gale until the whole is completed, which renders an early appropriation desirable. Five hundred feet in length remain to be built.

In order to secure the harbor, the old breakwater should also be repaired. Storms are now washing it away and filling up the harbor.

Southport harbor, Connecticut.—The stone wall for the preservation of the dike has been completed, and, in the opinion of the local agent, will fulfil its purpose. A small sum has been expended upon the breakwater, which is represented as being now strong and permanent. A prolongation of this breakwater is recommended as necessary; to effect which, an estimate will be submitted.

Harbor of Westport, and beach at Cedar Point, Connecticut.—The stone wall on Cedar Point is in a state of rapid advancement, and will, in all probability, be completed in November, affording complete security to that point, and requiring no further aid from the government.

Owing to unexpected delays, the canal through the "Great Marsh," which it was anticipated might be finished the present season, cannot be completed before the early part of next summer.

A small additional appropriation of \$770 will be required to secure the work now under construction.

Hudson river, New York.—The operations of the season for improving the navigation of this river near Albany, the present state of the work, and the projected alterations in the plan, are fully detailed in the report of the superintendent, which is appended, marked F.

Ice-breaker on Staten island, New York.—In consequence of a series of failures on the part of the contractors, but little had been accomplished on this work to the date of the report of the superintendent, (October 28, 1837.) A contract made last fall to construct all the stone piers by this spring was not complied with; another contract was made early in June for the same, with a proviso that either party might withdraw after the completion of one pier; of this proviso the contractor availed himself. An engagement, made late in June with another party, failed through some alleged misapprehension, was renewed in August, and failed again in September through the bad faith of the contractor.

Another engagement has been entered into, and it is now probable that all the stone for the piers will be delivered in the course of November, and the whole eleven piers and the remainder of the piling be finished this year.

New Brunswick harbor, New Jersey.—For the operations of this year in the improvement of this harbor, I beg leave to refer to the accompanying report of the local engineer, marked G.

Little Egg Harbor, New Jersey.—The appropriation for this work has been expended, with the exception of a small balance; and the protection afforded to Tucker's island, which covers the harbor, is, so far, satisfactory. The improvements were conducted upon the general features of the plan reported to the department, with some slight modification, dictated by the experience of the skilful engineer who superintended them. In addition to the brush fence parallel to the shore, he has constructed breakwaters, projecting from high-water mark to low water, 800 feet apart.

The effect of these has been not only to prevent the previous abrasion of the beach, but to cause a deposit of sand between high and low water mark of at least a foot in depth, and a consequent extension into the sea. For any further information, I have the honor to refer to the detailed report of the superintendent already submitted, in answer to a call of the House of Representatives.

Chester harbor, Pennsylvania.—The improvement of this harbor was continued last fall by replacing the defective wood-work of the two northern piers and their connecting bridges and mooring posts until the funds were exhausted.

The appropriation of \$2,000 of March last has been applied to taking down and renewing the sustaining

walls of the southern causeway for a distance of 150 feet; to repairing other parts of it; and to filling in all the wharves, and covering them and the causeways with broken stone. This useful harbor is now in as good order as the nature of the case permits.

Wilmington harbor, Delaware.—The improvement of this harbor, as mentioned in my last report, it was determined to restrict to blasting and dredging.

In August and September last the steam-dredging apparatus, with its accompanying lighters, cranes, &c., was put in operation, and found to be well adapted to its purpose. Up to the 30th September 5,000 cubic yards of mud had been removed from the bed of the river and deposited over the dikes along its margin. The estimate for continuing this work the next year embraces the residue of the sum called for by the original estimate of Major Bache. After the expenditure of this, the future estimates may be better determined from the ascertained effects of the present system.

Harbor of Newcastle, Delaware.—The pier for sheltering vessels from drifting ice, referred to in the last annual report, was sunk before the close of operations in the fall, and, even in its unfinished state, was found useful in protecting much valuable property from the drift ice during the winter.

The funds available for this season not being sufficient to effect the entire contemplated improvement, the superintendent determined to adopt such course as would secure to the harbor the greatest immediate advantage.

Instead, therefore, of finishing the first pier, he concluded to deposit the stone upon it in such a way as to secure uniformity of settling, and, leaving it in this condition, to apply the residue of the funds to putting a second pier in the same state and to removing some obstructions that prevented the entrance of the current into the harbor. The result of this arrangement has been that a safe harbor now exists for as many vessels as are likely to seek shelter here, though in an unfinished state.

Delaware breakwater, Delaware bay.—The officer in charge of this work has not yet been able to furnish a minute account of the present condition of this work, or of the artificial harbor formed by it.

The following facts are, however, extracted from his short memoir, showing generally what has been done and what is yet required:

"The quantity of stone received at the breakwater during the year was 54,766 $\frac{3}{4}$ tons, the whole of which was from the Trappean quarries, in Delaware, and such as I have judged the best for the work. It has been deposited on the breakwater and ice-breaker, raising each of these works, on their entire length, some feet above high water, thereby increasing the capacity of the harbor to the extent to which it is susceptible until the works are prolonged. A portion of each of these works has been raised to the required height. I can discover no change or alteration in the shoals or bottom of the harbor, or about it, during the past year, in any way calculated to affect it as a safe harbor, or differing in the least from former surveys.

"The capacity of the harbor does not keep pace with the necessities and wants of the coasting and foreign trade. At times vessels are so numerous in the harbor as to run foul of and injure each other considerably during the continuance of gales; and some have this season gone ashore for want of shelter under the lee of the works, being compelled to anchor in the seaway near the ends of the work.

"The continued utility of the work is exhibited by the annexed table, giving the number of days' security afforded to vessels annually, from the first season of shelter being formed to September 30, 1837:

	Ships.	Brigs.	Schooners.	Pilot-boats.	Sloops.	Total.
From September 30, 1833, to September 30, 1834.	48	332	735	363	351	1,829
The year ending September 30, 1835.....	111	496	1,176	563	427	2,773
Do.....do.....1836.....	306	1,028	2,923	759	604	5,620
Do.....do.....1837.....	226	576	2,933	754	610	5,099
	691	2,432	7,767	2,439	1,992	15,321

"The wharf or pier that was required to be built from the beach within this harbor has been finished, and some ice-breakers, to guard it from drifting ice, partially finished. No use has been made of this wharf up to the end of October, except by one pilot-boat making fast to it for a short period. A plan of its construction is forwarded."

Mooring buoys in the harbor of Delaware breakwater.—An appropriation of \$2,000 was made at the last session of Congress for placing mooring buoys in the harbor formed by the Delaware breakwater. Three wooden buoys, covered with zinc, of sufficient size and buoyancy to support two men, have been placed in the safest parts of the harbor. They are secured by an inch-and-a-half chain cable to mushroom anchors, weighing each 5,000 pounds. The weight is calculated for the largest class of merchant vessels, and will serve even for a small frigate. The buoys have been made of different shapes, to test their relative advantages in the tide-way and during the period of drifting ice. Their greatest usefulness will be during the winter, but they have already been the means of saving from inevitable destruction one vessel that broke from her moorings.

Harbor of Baltimore, Maryland.—The dredging of this harbor has been prosecuted with energy, and the appropriation exhausted. This operation must necessarily be continuous, and, for its furtherance the next year, the sum of \$25,000 will be asked.

Improvement of the debouches of the Dismal Swamp canal.—At the southern extremity a dredging machine has been employed since August, at the junction of Joyce's creek and the Pasquotank. Laborers are also employed cutting off some of the most prominent points of land on the creek, with a view of straightening the channel, relieving the current, and making room for vessels to pass in narrow places. This portion of the work will require another year to complete it, as a large force cannot be employed to advantage. When done, the navigation will be very good, and it is supposed will remain so.

At the northern extremity of the canal a channel of ten feet in depth was obtained in Deep creek by dredging; but the bottom, which is of sand, has again filled up to within a foot of its former height, proving that no permanent improvement can be effected in this way.

This can probably only be accomplished by a lock and dam, as recommended in 1829, at a cost of about \$27,000.

The Dismal Swamp canal is an important link in the line of inland water communication, as it connects the sounds of the Carolinas with the Chesapeake bay.

Ocracoke inlet, North Carolina.—The jettie recommended in 1835 was commenced in March last, and nearly completed, when a gale in August injured it to such a degree that it was thought inexpedient to proceed with the work.

The depth of water on the shoal to the northwest of the jettie has increased about 18 inches; and it is probable that the jettie in its present state may have very beneficial effects.

The local engineer remarks that the changes which are continually taking place in the navigation of this inlet may, at some future time, present an opportunity of permanently improving it, at a comparatively small expense; for the present, however, he entertains the belief that no immediate benefit can be looked for, and he accordingly recommends a cessation of the work.

Pamlico river, North Carolina.—Towards the close of November last the dredging was progressing satisfactorily, and before the end of December there would have been a channel fifty yards wide and eight feet deep; but on the 30th of November the operations were interrupted by the burning of the boat, supposed, after a careful investigation, to be the work of an incendiary. This boat was transferred from the Ocracoke inlet improvement.

Should it be determined to prosecute the work in Pamlico river, the appropriation must cover the cost of another boat, as well as provide for the labor of dredging; the estimate will be made with this view.

New river and Core sound, North Carolina.—An act was passed at the last session of Congress, appropriating \$20,000 "for the improvement of the navigation of New river and Core sound." The necessary preliminary survey of New river has lately been finished, and it is judged by the officer in charge expedient to confine his operations for its improvement simply to dredging. A beating channel will be necessary, and it is proposed to excavate one 200 yards wide, to a depth of seven feet at high water; for this 400,000 cubic yards must be removed, at an estimated cost of \$62,500. It is supposed that this improvement will be comparatively permanent, and the amelioration of the navigation relieve the inhabitants of Onslow county alone of an annual transportation tax of \$8,000. A dredging boat has been constructed, for the operation of which the ensuing year the appropriation already made will suffice.

No survey of the Core sound was made by the engineer to whom the charge of its improvement will be intrusted, as one was already in progress by a brigade of topographical engineers. A copy of the map of this survey will be supplied him as early as possible, with instructions to report a plan of improvement based thereon.

Savannah river, Georgia.—There having been no action in the legislature of South Carolina relative to the contemplated obstruction between Hutchinson's and Argyle's islands, the operations on this river have this season been confined to dredging.

Eleven thousand two hundred and thirty-two cubic yards of mud and sand have been removed, widening the channel, and giving it an average increased depth of about one foot. A new steamer, to replace the "Essayons," taken away for service in Florida, is now under contract, and will probably be finished by the close of the present month.

Brunswick harbor, Georgia.—No officer being disposable, nothing has this year been done for the improvement of this harbor.

Improvement of the inland navigation between St. Mary's and St. John's, Florida.—During the last season the dredge-boat has been employed in cutting a channel through the oyster banks between the Sisters, near the St. John's river. The channel is now completed to a length of 680 feet, and is 70 feet broad and three feet deep at ordinary low water; 2,990 cubic yards have been excavated. To open the navigation throughout there are yet to be dredged at the Amelia dividings about 500 yards in length, and at the Talbot dividings 1,400 yards. As most of this excavation is from a bottom bare at low water, and can only be carried on when the dredge floats, the operation is necessarily very slow.

From these considerations of the extent of the work, slowness of operations, and great and increasing importance of this pass, the construction of an additional dredge is recommended, the cost of which is included in the estimate of next year.

Apalachicola, Florida.—The application of the appropriation of \$10,000 for removing a shoal called the "Bulkhead," in this harbor, has been intrusted to the intendant and council of the city of Apalachicola; and it is believed that arrangements will be made by which the intended improvement will be speedily commenced. An estimate for its prosecution will be submitted, should it be deemed advisable, after information is obtained of the practicability of removing the existing obstructions.

Mobile harbor, Alabama.—A contract was entered into on October 9, 1836, for dredging the Choctaw Pass; but, in consequence of the delay of the contractor to commence operations, it was annulled in June, 1837, and a contract made with another individual, the execution of which will probably commence by the first of December next, and be prosecuted without further delay.

Preparations are also now making for the vigorous prosecution of the dredging of the Dog River bar. *Pascagoula river, Mississippi.*—The attempt to improve the channel of this river by dredging having been attended with no beneficial results, some portions filling up nearly as fast as excavated, operations have been suspended, and the balance of funds passed to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States.

Red river, Louisiana.—The annexed report of the agent charged with the removal of the great raft, marked H, shows that there now remain but 440 yards of this obstruction. An early appropriation, sufficient to cut away this, is very desirable, on the score both of economy and of immediate great public benefit. The report of the officer of engineers appointed to inspect the operations on this river is also appended, marked H No. 1.

Ohio and Mississippi rivers below the falls of the Ohio, and the Arkansas river.—The reports of the superintendent of these improvements are also appended, marked I and K, together with the inspection report, marked I No. 2, with the estimate for further prosecution.

Ohio river above the falls.—The report of the officer charged with the improvement of this portion of the Ohio is appended, marked L, giving a detailed account of the operations during the year and of the further improvements proposed.

Cumberland river.—For an account of the work performed during the past season for the improvement of this river, I would respectfully refer to the reports of the local agent, marked M and N.

Pier in the Mississippi river, near St. Louis.—An officer of engineers was intrusted with the execution of this work and of several others in August last. It has not yet been commenced, as his time to the present date has been entirely occupied with the necessary preliminary surveys. A matured plan is not

yet submitted, for this reason; but the amount now available being, in his judgment, sufficient for the operations of the next year, no appropriation will be asked for.

Mississippi river above the mouth of the Ohio, and the Missouri river.—The officer charged with the last-named improvement has also the superintendence of this, and, for the reason there mentioned, has been enabled only to make minute surveys of several of the most important points and preparations for a vigorous prosecution of the work early in the spring.

Examinations have been made of the Rock river and Des Moines rapids of the Mississippi, which will be among the first objects of attention.

Time has not allowed an examination of the Missouri.

Deepening the mouths of the Mississippi.—Three several plans for accomplishing this object were submitted by the officer to whom the execution is to be intrusted: 1st, closing all but one of the passes at the point where they leave the main trunk of the river; 2d, cutting a ship canal from the river; 3d, deepening, by steam dredging machines, one or more passes.

The first two projects being deemed costly, uncertain in their issue, and requiring a greater period of time than the other, it has been determined to adopt the latter, so far as to test the advantages that may be derived, before determining on any other involving hazard and great expenses. The operations have therefore been limited to the construction of a steam dredge, the boat to be of 282 tons burden, with a high-pressure engine, which will propel the boat and work the machinery.

Four vessels are also to be built, to receive the excavation, and are expected to be ready by the 15th of December.

In consequence, however, of the great interest felt in this work by the city of New Orleans, and in order to allay any apprehensions that the proper attention had not been bestowed upon it, the department, willing to subject all the different plans that have been proposed to the severest scrutiny, has now laid the whole matter, with all the information in its possession, before a board of engineers.

This board will issue minute instructions to the local superintendent concerning an examination to be made by him of the whole delta of the Mississippi, upon the report of which examination they are to base a project for this highly important improvement.

Survey of the Sabine river.—In fulfilment of your instructions of April last directions were given to Captain H. M. Shreve to examine the upper part of the Sabine, whilst Captain Chase, of the engineers, should cause a survey to be made of the lower part. The duties of the first-named gentleman not allowing him the necessary time, the examination was made by an officer of the line of the army and submitted to the major general. A survey of the mouth, ordered by Captain Chase, was made in April last.

From his report it appears that the debouche of the Sabine is into a lake about twelve miles long and twenty broad, which is connected by a pass with the Gulf.

The obstructions to the navigation of this river are, 1st, bars at the head and mouth of the pass, and shoals in the pass; 2d, the shoalness of the water of the lake; 3d, bars at the debouche of the river into the lake; 4th, two rafts about one hundred miles up the river, very loose, composed merely of logs on the surface of the water.

The result of the survey shows, 1st, that vessels of seven feet draught can ascend the pass to its head; 2d, vessels of five feet draught can cross into the lake and approach to within a mile of the mouth of the river; and 3d, vessels of four feet draught can cross the bar at the debouche of the river into the lake. After passing this bar, eighteen feet of water can be carried a great distance up the river. The soundings, however, about the mouth of this river are subject to very great changes from the winds, tides, freshets, &c. Every heavy gale alters, in some degree, the direction and depth of the channel.

Ten years ago *twelve* feet water could be brought into the pass, and, at a later period, only *five*, where there are now seven. The river could, no doubt, be advantageously improved.

LIGHT-HOUSES AND BEACON-LIGHTS.

Lakes Erie and Ontario.—For the condition of the light-houses and beacons along the south shores of Lakes Erie and Ontario, the construction of which has been committed to this department, I would respectfully refer to the several reports of the superintendents of the public works at those places, which are appended hereto, marked A, D, and E.

Pier, dike, and light-house at Goat island.—The pier on which the light-house is to rest was commenced early in the spring. Its walls, ten and eight feet thick, are built up to low water of cobble work, and the interior filled with boulder stones. The superstructure of the walls is of regular masonry, faced with granite laid in hydraulic mortar, and is nearly completed. The foundation of the light-house is also in a state of forwardness.

Operations for the season were to close with the finishing of the pier.

It is proposed by the local engineer to collect, this winter, sufficient materials to complete the light-house early next summer, and to apply the balance of the amount appropriated to the construction of the dike.

Light-house on Flynn's Knoll, near Sandy Hook.—The plan for this important work is not yet thoroughly matured. The project has been laid before a board of engineers for consideration.

The officer charged with the construction will make every preparation during the winter to commence it as early in the spring as the weather will permit.

ROADS.

Roads from Detroit to Fort Gratiot, and to the mouth of Grand river.—No appropriation was made for either of these roads at the last session of Congress. Some slight repairs have been made on the last named with the small unexpended balance. The arrearages for labor on the Fort Gratiot road, referred to in my last report, are still due, as the balance of a former appropriation carried to the surplus fund has not yet been reappropriated, as there recommended. An estimate to liquidate the same will be submitted.

Roads from Detroit to Chicago; from Sheldon's to the mouth of the river St. Joseph's; from Clinton to Grand River rapids; from Niles's to the mouth of the St. Joseph's; and from Detroit to Saginaw.—These roads have been inspected by Lieutenant Colonel Pierce, of the first artillery; and several reports, marked O, are herewith submitted, showing their present condition and the funds necessary for their repair and completion.

Road from La Plaisance bay to the Detroit and Chicago road.—For particular information relating to this road I would respectfully refer to the report, marked A, of the superintendent. It appears from this that the road is now almost impassable in places. An estimate for the amount to complete it and to meet the existing liabilities is submitted.

Road from Memphis to the St. Francis river.—The report of the superintendent of this road is also appended, marked P.

Cumberland road.—For your information respecting this great national avenue, the reports of the several superintendents are hereto appended, marked Q, R, and S.

Military Academy.—The present condition of this institution is shown in the annual report of the board of visitors herewith, marked T. The wants of the institution are there fully set forth, and to them I would respectfully urge your attention.

Sites for fortifications on Lake Champlain, and for a fort on the Gulf coast of Mississippi.—No reports have been yet received of the surveys for determining either of these sites; as soon as received, the project of defence will be put in train of preparation, and submitted as soon as matured.

Defence of the western frontier.—For the project proposed for this important object, I have the honor to refer you to my report of the 31st October last, furnished in obedience to a call of the House of Representatives.

Waters of Lake Erie.—The minute examination of the shores of Lake Erie, necessary to ascertain if the works at Black Rock have raised the level of its waters, and called for by a resolution of the Senate of March 2, 1837, has not been commenced in consequence of a want of funds. An estimate for the necessary amount will be submitted.

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ENGINEER.

I have the honor again earnestly to call the attention of the Secretary to the insufficiency of numbers in the corps of engineers, for a proper performance of the duties imposed upon them.

In consequence of a want of officers, many important works referred to in this report have been intrusted entirely to the care of civil agents, and others to their immediate charge, under a general superintendence of an officer. This latter course, frequently rendered necessary by the number of works under this department, and the impossibility of procuring capable civil agents, imposes upon each officer the most constant and unremitted labor, while at the same time it is impossible that each work can receive from him more than an occasional inspection. To say nothing of the advantage of securing to each of our important national undertakings the personal superintendence of a competent engineer, and the faithful and economical application of the public funds, the increase of the corps of engineers would be attended with a direct economy considered solely with reference to their pay as public agents. I have therefore the honor to reiterate my recommendations of several past years, that the corps of engineers be increased to double its present number, as that is the least force with which operations can properly be carried on.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

C. GRATIOT, *Chief Engineer.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

No. 1.

Statement exhibiting the fiscal concerns of the Engineer department for the year ending September, 30, 1837, in which the funds that had accrued within that period, and the manner of accruing, are stated and accounted for by showing their application.

Designation of the works.	Available for 1837, and whence derived.			Amount available accounted for.			
	From appropriations for 1837.	From balances remaining in the treasury, and in the hands of agents, on the 30th of September, 1836.	Aggregate available.	Amount applied, corresponding with the amount of accounts rendered to the 30th September, 1837.	Amount undrawn from the treasury September 30, 1837.	Balances in the hands of agents September 30, 1837.	Aggregate accounted for, corresponding with the amount available for 1837.
FORTIFICATIONS.							
Fort Warren.....		\$182,684 55	\$182,684 55	\$154,318 86	\$19,600 00	\$8,765 69	\$182,684 55
Preservation of Castle Island, and repair of Fort Independence		98,267 77	98,267 77	68,833 45	5,500 00	23,934 32	98,267 77
Fort Adams.....		136,160 70	196,160 70	149,362 79	37,000 00	9,797 91	196,160 70
Fort Adams, transferred from Fort Monroe	\$60,000 00						
Fort Schuyler		203,935 46	203,935 46	103,514 85	95,000 00	5,420 61	203,935 46
Repairs of Fort Columbus and Castle William.....		21,021 43	21,021 43	19,461 03		1,560 40	21,021 45
Repairs at Fort Lafayette.....		1,780 15	1,780 15			1,780 15	1,780 15
Fort Hamilton		1,156 12	1,156 12			1,156 12	1,156 12
Purchase of land and right of way at Throg's Point.....		2,000 00	2,000 00	2,000 00			2,000 00
Fort Delaware.....		128,572 41	164,572 41	80,438 00	57,680 00	26,453 71	164,572 41
Fort Delaware, transferred from fortifications in Charleston harbor.....	36,000 00						
Fort McHenry, Redoubt Wood, and Covington battery		48,668 10	48,668 10	48,668 10			48,668 10

No. 1.—Statement exhibiting the fiscal concerns of the Engineer department, &c.—Continued.

Designation of the works.	Available for 1837, and whence derived.			Amount available accounted for.			
	From appropriations for 1837.	From balances remaining in the treasury, and in the hands of agents, on the 30th of September, 1836.	Aggregate available.	Amount applied, corresponding with the amount of accounts rendered to the 30th September, 1837.	Amount undrawn from the treasury September 30, 1837.	Balances in the hands of agents September 30, 1837.	Aggregate accounted for, corresponding with the amount available for 1837.
Fort Monroe, \$150,000*							
Fort Calhoun		\$141,108 59	\$141,108 59	\$125,755 01	\$12,200 00	\$3,153 58	\$141,108 59
Fort Caswell		58,688 72	58,688 72	38,083 88	14,800 00	5,804 84	58,688 72
Fort Pulaski		139,087 69					
Fort Pulaski, transferred from Fort Monroe	\$90,000 00		229,087 69	133,911 34	64,070 59	31,105 76	229,087 69
Fortifications in Charleston harbor, and preservation of the site of Fort Moultrie†		53,388 72	53,388 72	17,213 74	29,190 62	6,984 36	53,388 72
Fort Morgan		789 17	789 17			789 17	789 17
Repairs at Fort Marion, and the sea wall at St. Augustine		51,088 55	51,088 55	37,636 47	12,638 55	813 53	51,088 55
Fort Pickens		3,439 13	3,439 13	1,511 75		1,927 38	3,439 13
Fort at Foster's Bank, Pensacola		6 86					
Ditto, transferred from Charleston harbor	27,000 00		27,006 86	27,006 86			27,006 86
Fort Jackson		733 71	733 71			733 71	733 71
Fort at Grande Terre, Louisiana		53,769 59	53,769 59	1,085 80	15,000 00	37,673 79	53,769 59
Incidental expenses attending repairs of fortifications, and for the purchase of additional land in their neighborhood		49,472 66					
Ditto, transferred from fortifications, Charleston harbor	32,000 00		81,472 66	54,085 56	12,865 00	14,512 10	81,472 66
Contingencies of fortifications		8,412 14					
Ditto, transferred from fortifications, Charleston harbor	1,900 00		11,535 45	1,771 46	3,287 49	6,476 50	11,535 45
Ditto, transferred from Fort Pickens	1,223 31						
	248,123 31	1,384,232 22	1,632,355 53	1,064,679 65	378,832 25	188,843 63	1,632,355 53
ROADS.							
Road from Detroit to Saginaw bay		3,661 95	3,661 95	2,032 76		1,629 19	3,661 95
Road from Detroit to Fort Gratiot		31 88	31 88			31 88	31 88
Road from Detroit to Grand river		5,353 97	5,353 97	3,476 77		1,877 20	5,353 97
Road from Detroit towards Chicago		4,461 28	4,461 28	3,692 22		769 06	4,461 28
Road from La Plaisance bay to the Chicago road		915 42	1,915 42	1,915 42			1,915 42
Road from Sheldon's, on the Chicago road, to St. Joseph's river		1,107 58	1,107 58	733 15		374 43	1,107 58
Road from Clinton, on the Chicago road, to the rapids of Grand river		721 47	721 47	216 77		504 70	721 47
Road between Niles's and the mouth of St. Joseph's river		2,979 97	2,979 97	2,410 90		569 07	2,979 97
Cumberland road in Illinois	100,000 00	169,795 21	269,795 21	57,570 94	161,547 34	50,676 93	269,795 21
Cumberland road in Indiana	100,000 00	189,225 17	289,225 17	173,542 12	83,960 00	31,723 05	289,225 17
Cumberland road in Ohio	190,000 00	108,043 98	296,043 98	234,798 37	50,508 17	10,737 44	296,043 98
Cumberland road east of the Ohio river	7,183 63	32,095 23	39,278 86	39,047 20		231 66	39,278 86
Road from opposite Memphis, on the Mississippi river, to the St. Francis river		133,733 25	133,733 25	55,459 24	26,000 00	52,274 01	133,733 25
	397,123 63	651,126 36	1,048,309 99	574,695 86	322,015 51	151,393 62	1,048,309 99
IMPROVEMENTS OF RIVERS, HARBORS, ETC.							
Improving the harbor of Chicago	40,000 00	19,718 79	59,718 79	48,262 29	4,200 00	7,256 50	59,718 79
Works at the harbor near the mouth of the river Raisin	30,000 00	4,800 99	34,800 99	26,068 23	1,500 00	7,232 76	34,800 99
Removing obstructions at Huron river	2,565 00	5,565 34	8,130 34	6,397 85	1,687 73	44 76	8,130 34
Removing obstructions at Black river	6,410 00	4,445 21	10,855 21	8,921 65		1,933 56	10,855 21
Improving Cleveland harbor	10,000 00	11,184 22	21,184 22	17,947 13		3,237 09	21,184 22
Removing obstructions at Grand river		8,056 57	8,056 57	7,012 73		1,043 84	8,056 57
Piers at La Plaisance bay		82 12	82 12			82 12	82 12
Removing obstructions at Cunningham creek	5,000 00	113 62	5,113 62	4,539 94		573 68	5,113 62
Removing obstructions at Ashtabula creek	8,000 00	1,679 74	9,679 74	5,708 30		3,971 44	9,679 74
Removing obstructions at Conneaut creek	5,000 00	1,730 37	6,730 37	6,149 41		586 96	6,730 37
Improving the harbor of Presque Isle	15,000 00	5,966 47	20,966 47	20,259 65		706 82	20,966 47
Improvements at Dunkirk harbor	15,000 00	7,869 55	22,869 55	21,002 40		1,867 15	22,869 55
Works at Buffalo		1,221 68	1,221 68	683 84		537 84	1,221 68
Improvement at Black Rock harbor		850 00	850 00	545 94		304 05	850 00
Dredging machine for Lake Erie		14,452 87	14,452 87	10,982 00		3,470 87	14,452 87

* \$60,000 transferred to Fort Adams; \$90,000 transferred to Fort Pulaski.

† \$36,000 transferred to Fort Delaware; \$27,000 transferred to fort on Foster's Bank; \$32,000 transferred to incidental, &c.; \$1,900 transferred to contingencies.

No. 1.—Statement exhibiting the fiscal concerns of the Engineer department, &c.—Continued.

Designation of the works.	Available for 1837, and whence derived.			Amount available accounted for.			
	From appropriations for 1837.	From balances remaining in the treasury, and in the hands of agents, on the 30th of September, 1838.	Aggregate available.	Amount applied, corresponding with the amount of accounts rendered to the 30th September, 1837.	Amount undrawn from the treasury September 30, 1837.	Balances in the hands of agents September 30, 1837.	Aggregate accounted for, corresponding with the amount available for 1837.
Improving the harbor at the mouth of Oak Orchard creek	\$5,000 00	\$2,173 86	\$7,173 86	\$2,538 67	\$1,000 00	\$3,635 19	\$7,173 86
Works at the mouth of Genesee river	10,000 00	15,135 77	25,135 77	18,157 81	4,900 00	2,077 96	25,135 77
Improvement of Big Sodus bay	13,000 00	9,164 42	21,164 42	19,164 42	2,000 00	21,164 42
Pier and mole at Oswego	15,000 00	17,632 37	32,632 37	24,371 80	1,200 00	7,060 57	32,632 37
Placing buoys in the vicinity of the monument on Steele's ledge	466 00	164 78	630 78	630 78	630 78
Breakwater at Stanford's ledge, Portland harbor	25,000 00	10,000 00	35,000 00	23,907 55	11,092 45	35,000 00
Piers at Kennebec river	3,000 00	4,498 32	7,498 32	3,023 90	4,474 42	7,498 32
Deepening the channel of the Cochecho branch of the Piscataqua river leading into Dover harbor	5,000 00	3,080 76	8,080 76	4,346 34	2,700 00	1,034 42	8,080 76
Breakwater at the mouth of Merrimack river	4,050 81	4,050 81	75 60	3,985 21	4,050 81
Breakwater at Sandy bay	20,000 00	6,449 95	26,449 95	18,772 26	7,677 69	26,449 95
Preservation of Deer Island, Boston harbor	1,130 00	1,130 00	976 32	153 68	1,130 00
Preservation of Painsford Island, Boston harbor	15,000 00	15,000 00	15,000 00	15,000 00
Preserving the point of land leading to the fort, and light-house at the Gurnet, in Duxbury, Massachusetts	5,096 86	5,096 86	2,147 14	500 00	2,449 72	5,096 86
Preservation of Plymouth beach	431 08	431 08	269 50	161 58	431 08
Preservation of Provincetown harbor	4,572 31	4,572 31	4,481 22	91 09	4,572 31
Improvement of the harbor at the mouth of Bass river	10,000 00	10,000 00	6,970 00	3,030 00	10,000 00
Breakwater at Hyannis harbor	5,000 00	719 12	5,719 12	4,885 06	834 06	5,719 12
Removing the wreck in New Bedford harbor	10,144 69	10,144 69	2,453 32	7,500 00	191 37	10,144 69
Breakwater at Church's cove	10,000 00	10,000 00	3,979 62	3,488 00	2,532 38	10,000 00
Deepening the channel of the river Thames, leading into Norwich harbor	20,000 00	5,514 02	25,514 02	20,815 11	4,000 00	698 91	25,514 02
Improving the harbor of Saybrook	20,000 00	20,000 00	20,000 00	20,000 00
Deepening the channel leading into Bridgeport harbor	10,000 00	10,000 00	8,858 00	1,142 00	10,000 00
Sea wall to preserve Fairweather island, near Black Rock harbor	10,000 00	10,000 00	9,674 48	325 52	10,000 00
Harbor of Southport	1,000 00	1,046 14	2,046 14	2,046 14	2,046 14
Improving the harbor of Westport	3,734 00	3,000 00	6,734 00	2,591 62	2,734 00	1,408 38	6,734 00
Securing the beach at Cedar Point	1,000 00	1,000 00	400 00	500 00	100 00	1,000 00
Ice-breaker at Staten Island	19,500 00	19,500 00	2,920 29	9,500 00	7,079 71	19,500 00
Improving the navigation of Hudson river	100,000 00	57,147 87	157,147 87	133,336 38	3,692 00	20,119 49	157,147 87
Improving the harbor of New Brunswick	6,963 00	7,000 00	13,963 00	5,048 30	6,963 00	1,951 70	13,963 00
Improving Little Egg Harbor	5,000 00	5,000 00	3,148 04	1,851 96	5,000 00
Removing a shoal in the river Delaware, near Fort Mifflin	15,000 00	15,000 00	13 80	14,986 00	15,000 00
Repairs at the harbor of Chester	2,000 00	1,762 43	3,762 43	3,307 17	455 28	3,762 43
Improving the harbor of Wilmington	8,000 00	15,000 00	23,000 00	15,981 30	6,000 00	1,018 70	23,000 00
Improving the harbor of Newcastle	10,000 00	17,402 75	27,402 75	24,235 93	3,000 00	166 82	27,402 75
Delaware breakwater	141,000 00	91,920 55	232,920 55	177,279 68	11,600 00	44,050 67	232,920 55
Mooring buoys in the harbor of the Delaware breakwater	2,000 00	2,000 00	1,793 56	206 44	2,000 00
Deepening the harbor of Baltimore	15,000 00	10,283 00	25,283 00	25,138 12	144 88	25,283 00
Improving the natural channels at the northern and southern entrances of the Dismal Swamp canal	15,000 00	15,000 00	6,632 63	7,200 00	1,167 37	15,000 00
Removing sand shoal in Pamlico river	3,584 25	3,584 25	3,415 60	168 65	3,584 25
Improving Ocracoke inlet	12,050 00	8,962 95	21,012 95	7,950 66	13,062 29	21,012 95
Opening a passage between the town of Beaufort and Pamlico sound, and improving New river	20,000 00	10,000 00	30,000 00	30,000 00	30,000 00
Improving Cape Fear river, below Wilmington	10,000 00	20,019 18	30,019 18	16,578 27	6,082 99	7,377 92	30,019 18
Removing obstructions in Savannah river	20,922 29	20,922 29	3,301 58	17,620 71	20,922 29
Improving the inland channel between St. Mary's and St. John's	5,000 00	6,680 11	11,680 11	4,129 04	7,551 07	11,680 11
Removing the Brunswick bar, to improve the harbor of Brunswick	10,000 00	10,000 00	44 00	9,956 00	10,000 00
Improving the harbor of Mobile	50,000 00	21,070 33	71,070 33	163 01	49,500 00	21,407 32	71,070 33
Deepening the channel in Pascagoula river	3,827 40	3,827 40	826 24	3,001 16	3,827 40
Increasing the depth of water at the mouth of the Mississippi river	210,000 00	75,000 00	285,000 00	51,094 50	215,950 00	17,955 50	285,000 00

No. 1.—Statement exhibiting the fiscal concerns of the Engineer department, &c.—Continued.

Designation of the works.	Available for 1837, and whence derived.			Amount available accounted for.			
	From appropriations for 1837.	From balances remaining in the treasury, and in the hands of agents, on the 30th of September, 1836.	Aggregate available.	Amount applied, corresponding with the amount of accounts rendered to the 30th September, 1837.	Amount undrawn from the treasury September 30, 1837.	Balances in the hands of agents September 30, 1837.	Aggregate accounted for, corresponding with the amount available for 1837.
Removing a mud shoal in the channel of the east pass to Apalachicola.....		\$10,000 00	\$10,000 00	\$100 00	\$9,900 00		\$10,000 00
Improving the navigation of Red river.....	\$65,000 00	694 26	65,694 26	65,694 26			65,694 26
Constructing a boat and working the same in Red river.....		30,000 00	30,000 00	29,981 64		\$18 36	30,000 71
Improving the navigation of Arkansas river.....	25,000 00	34,850 71	59,850 71	29,896 21	2,970 00	26,984 50	59,850 71
Improving the navigation of Cumberland river..	55,000 00	17,491 35	72,491 35	38,491 35	34,000 00		72,491 35
Improving the navigation of the Ohio river above the falls.....	60,000 00	58,087 07	116,087 07	104,645 18	10,000 00	1,441 89	116,087 07
Improving the navigation of the Ohio, Missouri, and Mississippi rivers.....	23,000 00		23,000 00	1,924 00	21,076 00		23,000 00
Improving the navigation of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, from Louisville to New Orleans..	60,000 00	33,528 20	93,528 20	60,677 80	25,695 77	7,154 63	93,528 20
Improving the Mississippi river above the mouth of the Ohio river, and the Missouri river.....	40,000 00	39,158 50	79,158 50	21,250 85	57,000 00	907 65	79,158 50
Pier in the Mississippi river, near St. Louis....	35,000 00	15,000 00	15,000 00	296 37	47,165 88	2,537 75	50,000 00
	1,217,188 00	939,655 62	2,156,843 62	1,208,683 20	638,329 15	309,831 47	2,156,843 62
LIGHT-HOUSES AND BEACON-LIGHTS.							
Beacon-light at Grand river.....		466 04	466 04	81 11		384 93	466 04
Beacon light at Huron river.....		20 20	20 20	20 20			20 20
Beacon-light at Cunningham creek.....		225 00	225 00			225 00	225 00
Beacon-light at Ashtabula creek.....		1,267 76	1,267 76	1,267 76			1,267 76
Beacon-lights at Genesee river and Big Sodus bay.....		2,143 49	2,143 49	963 36		1,180 13	2,143 49
Beacon-light at Oswego.....	715 00	9 32	724 32	724 32			724 32
Beacon-light at Black river.....		1,365 58	1,365 58	1,365 58			1,365 58
Removing light-house at Goat island.....		54,460 11	54,460 11	10,804 81	41,900 00	2,555 30	54,460 11
Removing the light house at Old Point Comfort into Fort Monroe.....	6,000 00		6,000 00		4,000 00	2,000 00	6,000 00
A light-house on Flynn's Knoll, near Sandy Hook.....	200,000 00		200,000 00		200,000 00		200,000 00
Beacon-light at Erie, Pennsylvania.....	674 00		674 00		674 00		674 90
	207,389 00	59,957 50	267,346 50	15,227 14	245,774 00	6,345 36	267,346 50
MISCELLANEOUS.							
Ohio northern boundary.....		12,542 35	12,542 35	10,791 98		1,750 37	12,542 35
Lithographic press of the War Department.....		266 37	266 37	9 12		257 25	266 37
		12,808 72	12,808 72	10,801 10		2,007 62	12,808 72

No. 1.—Statement exhibiting the fiscal concerns of the Engineer department, &c.—Continued.

Designation of the works.	Available for 1837, and whence derived.			Amount available accounted for.			
	From appropriations for 1837.	From balances remaining in the treasury, and in the hands of agents, on the 30th of September, 1836.	Aggregate available.	Amount apportioned, corresponding with the amount of accounts rendered to the 30th September, 1837.	Amount undrawn from the treasury September 30, 1837.	Balances in the hands of agents September 30, 1837.	Aggregate accounted for, corresponding with the amount available, for 1837.
MILITARY ACADEMY.							
Defraying the expenses of the board of visitors.	\$2,007 84						
Fuel, forage, stationery, printing, transportation, and postage	8,000 00						
Repairs, improvements, and expenses of buildings, grounds, roads, wharves, boats, and fences.....	10,178 25						
Pay of adjutant's and quartermaster's clerks....	950 00						
Philosophical apparatus and repairs of the same.	300 00						
Models for the department of engineering	300 00						
Models for the drawing department, apparatus and contingencies of the department of chemistry, and instruments and repairs for the mathematical department.....	850 00						
Incidental expenses of the department of artillery	300 00						
Increase and expenses of the library.....	600 00						
Miscellaneous items and incidental expenses...	1,777 50						
Completing the chapel	1,253 35	\$42,618 79	\$114,085 73	\$39,834 74	\$33,978 89	\$40,270 10	\$114,085 73
Erection of a building to contain the public stores	1,500 00						
Preparation of a yard and construction of permanent shops, suitable for carpenters, painters, blacksmiths, &c., and for safe-keeping of implements and materials	8,000 00						
Erection of a building for recitation and military exercises	30,000 00						
Erection of new barracks for the Military Academy department, to consist of eight buildings.	4,000 00						
Grading grounds about the exercise hall and removing temporary buildings	350 00						
Compensation to the acting professor of chemistry, mineralogy, and geology at the Military Academy	300 00						
A painting room for the professor of drawing....	800 00						
	71,466 94	42,618 79	114,085 73	39,834 74	33,978, 89	40,270 10	114,085 53
RECAPITULATION.							
Fortifications	248,123 31	1,384,232 22	1,632,355 53	1,064,679 65	378,832 25	183,843 63	1,632,355 53
Harbors and rivers ..	1,217,188 00	939,655 82	2,156,843 82	1,208,683 20	638,329 15	309,831 47	2,156,843 82
Roads	397,183 63	651,126 36	1,048,309 99	574,895 86	322,015 51	151,398 62	1,048,309 99
Light-houses	207,389 00	59,957 50	267,346 50	15,227 14	245,774 00	6,345 36	267,346 50
Miscellaneous	12,808 72	12,808 72	10,801 10	2,007 62	12,808 72
Military Academy.....	71,466 94	42,618 79	114,085 73	39,834 74	33,978 89	40,272 10	114,085 73
	2,141,350 88	3,090,399 41	5,231,750 29	2,914,121 69	1,618,929 80	698,698 80	5,231,750 29

No. 2.

Statement showing the amount of funds to be accounted for during the year ending September 30, 1837, by the agents of the Engineer department, embracing the balances in their hands on October 1, 1836; the sums remitted them during the year, and in each quarter of the year; and the amounts received from and for sales of materials, &c.; also showing the manner in which the amount in their hands during the year is accounted for.

Names.	Designation of the objects of disbursements.	For what period.	Amount to be accounted for, and how accruing.				
			Balances in the hands of agents Sept. 30, 1836.	Amounts remitted in each quarter.	Amounts received from former agents.	Amounts received from sales, &c.	Total amount to be accounted for in the year ending Sept. 30, 1837.
Brig. Gen. C. Gratiot....	Fort at Grande Terre, Louisiana.....	4th quarter 1836	\$50,000 00				\$50,000 00
Colonel J. G. Totten....	Fort Adams, Rhode Island	do	4,682 92				
		1st quarter 1837				\$1,037 75	
		2d quarter 1837				207 10	
		3d quarter 1837				232 93	6,160 70
Lieut. Col. R. E. DeRussy	Military Academy	4th quarter 1836	34,819 87			643 28	
		1st quarter 1837		\$7,117 50			
		2d quarter 1837		37,536 19			
		3d quarter 1837					80,116 84
Major J. L. Smith	Fort Schuyler, New York	4th quarter 1836	3,935 46	20,000 00			
		1st quarter 1837					
		2d quarter 1837		50,000 00			
		3d quarter 1837		35,000 00			108,935 46
	Repairs at Fort Columbus and Castle William.	4th quarter 1836	1,021 43	16,000 00			
		1st quarter 1837					
		2d quarter 1837		4,000 00			
		3d quarter 1837					21,021 43
	Repairs at Fort Lafayette.....	4th quarter 1836	1,780 15				
		3d quarter 1837					1,780 15
	Fort Hamilton.....	4th quarter 1836	1,136 12				
		3d quarter 1837					1,136 12
	Contingencies of fortifications.....	1st quarter 1837		550 86			550 86
	Purchase of land at Throg's Point	do		2,000 00			
		2d quarter 1837					2,000 00
	Improvement of Little Egg Harbor.....	3d quarter 1837		5,000 00			5,000 00
	Improving harbor of New Brunswick, New Jersey.	do		7,000 00			7,000 00
	Ice-breaker at Staten island, New York	4th quarter 1836					
		1st & 2d qrs. 1837					
		3d quarter 1837		10,000 00			10,000 00
Captain W. H. Chase....	Fort Pickens, Pensacola, Florida	4th quarter 1836	3,218 13				
		1st quarter 1837					
		2d quarter 1837					
		3d quarter 1837				221 00	3,439 13
	Fort Morgan, Alabama	4th quarter 1836	54 27				
		1st quarter 1837		734 90			
		2d & 3d qrs. 1837					789 17
	Fort on Foster's Bank, Pensacola.....	4th quarter 1836	6 86				
		1st quarter 1837					
		2d quarter 1837		27,000 00			
		3d quarter 1837					27,006 86
	Fort Livingston, Grande Terre, Louisiana	4th quarter 1836	3,769 59				
		1st quarter 1837					
		2d quarter 1837					
		3d quarter 1837					3,769 59
	Fort Jackson, Louisiana	4th quarter 1836	733 71				
		3d quarter 1837					733 71
	Mobile harbor, Alabama.....	4th quarter 1836	20,904 60				
		1st quarter 1837		165 73			
		2d & 3d qrs. 1837					21,070 33
	Pascagoula river, Mississippi	4th quarter 1836	42 55				
		1st quarter 1837		225 00			
		2d & 3d qrs. 1837					267 55
	Contingencies of fortifications.....	4th quarter 1836		7,000 00			
		1st quarter 1837					
		2d quarter 1837					
		3d quarter 1837					7,000 00
	Incidental expenses attending repairs of fortifications, &c.	4th quarter 1836	5,092 75				
		3d quarter 1837					5,092 75
	Improvement at the mouths of the Mississippi river.	1st quarter 1837		6,050 00			
		2d quarter 1837		15,000 00			
		3d quarter 1837					21,050 00
	Removing mud shoal in Apalachicola river.	do		100 00			100 00

No. 2.—Statement showing the amount of funds to be accounted for, &c.—Continued.

Names.	Designation of the objects of disbursements.	For what period.	Amount to be accounted for, and how accruing.				Total amount to be accounted for in the year ending Sept. 30, 1837.
			Balances in the hands of agents Sept. 30, 1836.	Amounts remitted in each quarter.	Amounts received from former agents.	Amounts received from sales, &c.	
Captain R. Delatfield....	Incidental expenses attending repairs of fortifications, &c.	4th quarter 1836	\$33 57	\$33 57
	Removal of bar in Delaware river near Fort Mifflin. do.....	\$13 80	13 80
Captain W. A. Eliason..	Fort Calhoun..... do.....	3,227 73	36,900 00
		1st quarter 1837	21,000 00	\$1,127 57
		2d quarter 1837	20,700 00
		3d quarter 1837	45,200 00	753 29	128,908 59
Captain C. A. Ogden....	Removing the light house at Old Point Comfort.	2d quarter 1837	2,000 00	2,000 00
	Cumberland road in Indiana.....	4th quarter 1836	46,625 17	36,640 00
		1st quarter 1837	32,000 00
		2d quarter 1837
Lieut. A. H. Bowman...	Cumberland road in Illinois.....	4th quarter 1836	40,047 87	80,000 00	195,265 17
		1st quarter 1837	28,200 00
		2d quarter 1836
		3d quarter 1837	40,000 00	108,247 87
Lieut. J. K. F. Mansfield.	Road from opposite Memphis, on the Mississippi, to the river St. Francis.	4th quarter 1836	27,733 25
		1st quarter 1837	50,000 00
		2d quarter 1837
		3d quarter 1837	30,000 00	107,733 25
Lieut. Alex. J. Swift....	Fort Pulaski, Georgia.....	4th quarter 1836	2,911 73	53,500 00
		1st quarter 1837	53,000 00
		2d quarter 1837	17,100 00	4 37
		3d quarter 1837	33,500 00	1 00	165,017 10
	Fortifications in Charleston harbor, South Carolina.	1st quarter 1837	7,100 00
		2d & 3d qrs. 1837	6,000 00	13,100 00
	Improving Savannah river, Georgia.....	4th quarter 1836	3,301 58
		1st quarter 1837	100 00
		2d quarter 1837
		3d quarter 1837	3,401 58
	Improving the inland navigation between St. Mary's and St. John's, Florida.	4th quarter 1836	600 00
		1st quarter 1837	3,300 00
	2d quarter 1837	261 63	
	3d quarter 1837	4,161 63	
	1st quarter 1837	44 00	44 00	
Lieut. Alex. J. Swift....	Removal of bar to improve the harbor of Brunswick, Georgia.	4th quarter 1836	1,000 00
		3d quarter 1837	1,000 00
	Fort Caswell, North Carolina.....	4th quarter 1836	1,443 75	5,400 00
		1st quarter 1837	5,900 00	244 97
		2d quarter 1837	9,900 00
		3d quarter 1837	21,000 00	43,888 72
	Incidental expenses attending repairs of fortifications, &c.	4th quarter 1836	18 74
		3d quarter 1837	18 74
	Improving Pamlico river, North Carolina.	4th quarter 1836	584 25	3,000 00	3,584 25
		2d & 3d qrs. 1837
	Improving Ocracoke inlet.....do.....	4th quarter 1836	12 83
		1st quarter 1837	1,000 00	852 94
	2d quarter 1837	9,900 00	39 50	
	3d quarter 1837	9,207 68	21,012 95	
Improving Cape Fear river.....do.....	4th quarter 1836	5,156 19	5,800 00	
	1st quarter 1837	5,900 00	
	2d quarter 1837	4,000 00	
	3d quarter 1837	3,000 00	100 00	23,956 19	
Opening a passage between the town of Beaufort and Pamlico sound, and improving New river, North Carolina.do.....	30,000 00	
.....	30,000 00	
Lieut. G. W. Cullum ...	Removing the light-house on Goat Island.	4th quarter 1836	76 00
		1st quarter 1837	760 12
Lieut. Wm. Smith.....	Improvement at Genesee river, N. York.	3d quarter 1837	15,100 00	15,100 00
	Improving the harbor at mouth of Oak Orchard creek.do.....	5,400 00	5,400 00
Lieut. R. E. Lee.....	Pier in the Mississippi river, near St. Louis.do.....	2,400 00	2,400 00
	Improvement of the Mississippi river above the mouth of the Ohio river, and the Missouri river.do.....	200 00	\$2,860 87	3,060 87

No. 2.—Statement showing the amount of funds to be accounted for, &c.—Continued.

Names.	Designation of the objects of disbursements.	For what period.	Amount to be accounted for, and how accruing.				
			Balances in the hands of agents Sept. 30, 1836.	Amounts remitted in each quarter.	Amounts received from former agents.	Amounts received from sales, &c.	Total amount to be accounted for in the year ending Sept. 30, 1837.
Lieut. R. C. Smead	Light-house at Oswego ..	3d quarter 1837	\$724 32	\$1,031 02
U. G. White.....	Oswego harbor.....	2d quarter 1837	6,800 00	6,800 00
General Joseph G. Swift.	Improvement at Big Sodus bay	4th quarter 1836	\$3,564 42
		1st quarter 1837
		2d quarter 1837	5,600 00
		3d quarter 1837	10,000 00	19,164 42
	Improvement at Genesee river.....	4th quarter 1836	5,135 77
		1st quarter 1837
		2d quarter 1837
		3d quarter 1837	5,135 77
	Improvement of harbor at the mouth of Oak Orchard creek.	4th quarter 1836	773 86	773 86
		3d quarter 1837
	Beacon-lights at Sodus bay and Genesee river.	4th quarter 1836	2,134 70
		3d quarter 1837	2,134 70
Captain James Allen	Chicago harbor, Illinois.....	4th quarter 1836	12,188 79	6,200 00	\$130 00
		1st & 2d qrs. 1837	21,846 04
		3d quarter 1837	17,000 00	57,364 83
Lieut. J. G. Barnard	Pascagoula river	4th quarter 1836	3,001 16	3,001 16
Lieut. Jno. H. Winder..	Fort Caswell..... do.....	47 36	47 36
	Cape Fear river..... do.....	581 12	581 12
Major H. Saunders..... do..... do.....	15 20	15 20
Lieut. Jno. L'Engle.....	Fortifications, Charleston harbor..... do.....	288 72
		1st quarter 1837	1,000 00	1,288 72
Lieut. T. B. W. Stockton.	Road from Detroit towards Chicago	4th quarter 1836	4,420 59	4,420 59
	Road from Detroit to Saginaw bay..... do.....	3,661 95	3,661 95
	Road from Sheldon's to St. Joseph's river do.....	1,207 19	1,207 19
	Road from Niles's to St. Joseph's river..... do.....	2,979 97	2,979 97
	Road from Clinton to Grand river do.....	721 47	721 47
Lieut. E. S. Sibley.....	Road from Detroit towards Chicago..... do.....	\$4,461 28	4,461 28
	Road from Detroit to Saginaw bay..... do.....	3,661 95	3,661 95
	Road from Sheldon's to St. Joseph's river do.....	1,107 58	1,107 58
	Road from Niles's to St. Joseph's river..... do.....	2,979 97	2,979 97
	Road from Clinton to Grand river..... do.....	721 47	721 47
Major B. K. Pierce.....	Road from Detroit towards Chicago.....	3d quarter 1837	3,659 53	3,659 53
	Road from Detroit to Saginaw bay..... do.....	3,383 29	3,383 29
	Road from Sheldon's to St. Joseph's river do.....	1,107 58	1,107 58
	Road from Niles's to St. Joseph's river do.....	2,979 97	2,979 97
	Road from Clinton to Grand river do.....	721 47	721 47
Captain H. A. Thompson.	Fort McHenry, Redoubt Wood, and Covington battery.....	4th quarter 1836	1,668 31	24,860 00
		1st quarter 1837	7,050 00
		2d quarter 1837	8,700 00
		3d quarter 1837	6,390 00	48,668 31
	Incidental expenses attending repairs of fortifications, &c.	4th quarter 1836	21,234 06
		1st & 2d qrs. 1837
		3d quarter 1837	5,135 00	98 00	26,467 06
Bank of Troy.....	Hudson river, improvement of	4th quarter 1836	24,076 01	33,072 36
		1st quarter 1837	30,000 00
		2d quarter 1837	37,500 00
		3d quarter 1837	28,808 00	153,456 37
Moyamensing Bank	Fort Delaware	4th quarter 1836	5,147 41	30,000 00
		1st quarter 1837	15,000 00
		2d quarter 1837	14,000 00
		3d quarter 1837	16,700 00	45 00	106,692 41
	Delaware breakwater.....	4th quarter 1836	31,092 18	35,000 00
		1st quarter 1837	22,076 60
		2d quarter 1837	15,000 00	3,757 06
		3d quarter 1837	71,000 00	54 71	177,980 55
	Newcastle harbor	4th quarter 1836	9,562 75	7,840 00
		1st quarter 1837	7,000 00
		2d quarter 1837
		3d quarter 1837	24,402 75
	Harbor of Chester.....	4th quarter 1836	1,659 75	102 70
		2d quarter 1837	2,000 00
		3d quarter 1837	3,762 45
	Incidental expenses attending repairs of fortifications, &c.	4th quarter 1836	3,997 59	15,000 00	33 57	10 00
		1st quarter 1837	2,983 39
		2d quarter 1837	9,000 00
		3d quarter 1837	5,000 00	36,024 55
	Mooring buoys at Delaware breakwater..	2d quarter 1837	2,000 00	2,000 00

No. 2.—Statement showing the amount of funds to be accounted for, &c.—Continued.

Names.	Designation of the objects of disbursements.	For what period.	Amount to be accounted for, and how accruing.					
			Balances in the hands of agents Sept. 30, 1836.	Amounts remitted in each quarter.	Amounts received from former agents.	Amounts received from sales, &c.	Total amount to be accounted for in the year ending Sept. 30, 1837.	
Clinton Bank, Columbus, Ohio.	Cumberland road in Ohio.....	4th quarter 1836	\$592 89					
		2d quarter 1837					\$592 89	
Merchants' Bank, Boston.	Fort Warren.....	4th quarter 1836	6,747 05				6,747 05	
		2d quarter 1837						
	Repairs at Fort Independence, &c.....	4th quarter 1836	667 57				667 57	
		Sea wall at Deer island.....	do.....	1,130 00				1,130 00
	Incidental expenses attending repairs of fortifications, &c.....	do.....	5 00				5	
Merchants & Mechanics' Bank, Wheeling.	Cumberland road east of the Ohio river.....	do.....	1,138 48				1,138	
Merchants and Manufacturers' Bank, Pittsburg.	do.....do.....do.....	4th quarter 1836	17,733 84	\$12,273 45		\$115 59		
		1st & 2d qrs. 1837		7,183 63		437 65		
		3d quarter 1837				386 70	38,130 86	
	Cumberland road in Ohio.....	4th quarter 1836	14,178 24	60,000 00				
		1st quarter 1837		30,000 00				
	Improving the Ohio river between Pittsburg and the falls.	2d quarter 1837		65,000 00	\$592 89	397 26		
		3d quarter 1837		75,000 00		367 42	245,535 81	
	Newport Exchange Bank.	Fort Adams.....	4th quarter 1836					
			1st quarter 1837		60,000 00			
			2d quarter 1837		13,000 00			
Light-house on Goat island.....		3d quarter 1837		25,000 00			103,100 94	
		4th quarter 1836		60,000 00				
		1st quarter 1837		60,000 00				
Henry M. Shreve.....	Mississippi river, above the mouth of the Ohio river, and the Missouri river.	2d quarter 1837		35,000 00				
		3d quarter 1837		45,000 00	1,970 58		154,970 58	
		2d quarter 1837		12,600 00	582 37		13,182 37	
	Ohio and Mississippi rivers, from Louisville to New Orleans.	4th quarter 1836	6,958 50					
		1st quarter 1837		15,000 00				
		2d quarter 1837					21,958 50	
	Improving the Red river.....	4th quarter 1836	23,685 43	13,100 00				
		1st quarter 1837						
		2d quarter 1837		14,500 00				
		3d quarter 1837		16,000 00		547 00	67,832 43	
		Constructing and working boat on Red river.	4th quarter 1836	136 76				
			1st & 2d qrs. 1837		60,000 00		557 50	
Improving the Arkansas river.....	3d quarter 1837		4,401 26			65,095 52		
	1st quarter 1837		30,000 00			30,000 00		
	3d quarter 1837					57,030 00		
Ezra Crowell.....	Hyannis harbor.....	4th quarter 1836	719 12					
		1st & 3d qrs. 1837		2,400 00			5,719 12	
Thomas M. Clark.....	Merrimack river.....	3d quarter 1837		2,600 00				
		4th quarter 1836	200 81	3,860 00			4,060 81	
Asa S. Bowley.....	Provincetown harbor.....	3d quarter 1837						
		4th quarter 1836	510 66				4,572 31	
S. Sampson.....	Plymouth beach.....	1st & 2d qrs. 1837		4,061 65				
		4th quarter 1836			431 08		431 08	
A. W. Walworth.....	Cleveland harbor.....	1st quarter 1837						
		2d & 3d qrs. 1837						
		4th quarter 1836			9,200 00		19,200 00	
Henry Phelps.....	Grand river.....	1st & 2d qrs. 1837		5,000 00				
		3d quarter 1837		5,000 00				
		4th quarter 1836			2,554 86	70 00	2,624 86	
Jno. A. Potter.....	Grand river improvement.....	2d quarter 1837			466 04			
		3d quarter 1837		981 11	5,409 30			
		4th quarter 1836					6,390 41	
P. S. V. Hamot.....	Presque Isle harbor.....	1st quarter 1837			418 01			
		2d quarter 1837						
		4th quarter 1836			4,595 60		418 01	
Henry Desbrow.....	Improvement of harbor near river Raisin.	1st quarter 1837		7,000 00				
		2d quarter 1837		8,068 52	1,302 35			
		4th quarter 1836	1,101 09		1,706 77		20,966 47	
N. D. Curtis.....	do.....do.....	1st quarter 1837				2,807 86		
		2d quarter 1837			9,535 61			
		3d quarter 1837		18,500 00	1,658 98	29,694 59		

No. 2.—Statement showing the amount of funds to be accounted for, &c.—Continued.

Names.	Designation of the objects of disbursements.	For what period.	Amount to be accounted for, and how accruing.				
			Balances in the hands of agents Sept. 30, 1836.	Amounts remitted in each quarter.	Amounts received from former agents.	Amounts received from sales, &c.	Total amount to be accounted for in the year ending Sept. 30, 1837.
Ashbel Dart	Conneaut creek	4th quarter 1836	\$1,730 37				
		2d quarter 1837		\$3,000 00			
		3d quarter 1837		2,000 00			\$5,730 37
M. Hubbard	Ashtabula creek	4th quarter 1836			\$2,487 00		
		2d quarter 1837		4,000 00			
		3d quarter 1837		4,000 00			10,487 00
	Beacon light at Ashtabula creek	4th quarter 1836			1,267 76		
		1st quarter 1837					
		2d quarter 1837					
		3d quarter 1837					1,267 76
Jno. Tull	Black river, Ohio	4th quarter 1836			3,227 57	\$214 75	3,442 32
	Beacon-light at Black river	do	1,099 58		121 32		1,220 90
Thos. Forster	Dunkirk harbor	do	429 66		2,000 00		
		1st quarter 1837			1,566 05		
		2d quarter 1837		10,000 00			
		3d quarter 1837		8,058 71	815 13		22,869 55
P. B. Porter	Black Rock harbor	4th quarter 1836			850 00		850 00
W. McKnight	Cumberland river below Nashville	do	6,643 18	6,500 00		100 00	
		1st quarter 1837				30 00	
		2d quarter 1837		5,500 00		10 00	
		3d quarter 1837					18,783 18
	Cumberland river above Nashville	do		21,000 00			21,000 00
F. L. Dancy	Repairs at Fort Marion, &c.	4th quarter 1836		7,700 00			
		1st quarter 1837		10,150 00			
		2d quarter 1837		16,500 00			
		3d quarter 1837		3,000 00		1,100 00	38,450 00
James S. Johnson	Fortifications in Charleston harbor, &c.	do		4,820 00			4,820 00
William Robinson	Harbor of Baltimore	4th quarter 1836	102 00	9,721 00			
		1st & 2d qrs. 1837		9,594 00			
		3d quarter 1837		5,866 00			25,283 00
William Chandler	Harbor of Wilmington	4th quarter 1836		15,000 00			
		1st quarter 1837					
		2d quarter 1837					
		3d quarter 1837		2,090 00			17,700 00
Joshua Herrick	Piers at Kennebunk	4th quarter 1836		1,981 00			
		1st quarter 1837		855 00			
		2d quarter 1837		3,236 00			
		3d quarter 1837		1,426 32			7,498 32
Jeremiah Sturges	Harbor of Southport	4th quarter 1836	546 14				
		2d quarter 1837		1,100 00			
		3d quarter 1837		400 00			2,046 14
Joseph Haskell	Improvement at Sandy bay	4th quarter 1836	1,149 95	5,000 00			
		1st quarter 1837					
		2d quarter 1837		15,000 00			
		3d quarter 1837		5,000 00			26,449 95
Freeman Bradford	Breakwater at Stanford ledge, Portland harbor.	1st quarter 1837		10,000 00			
		2d quarter 1837		6,500 00			
		3d quarter 1837		18,500 00			35,000 00
Marshall Parks	Improvement at the Dismal Swamp canal.	1st quarter 1837		5,000 00			
		2d quarter 1837		2,800 00			
		3d quarter 1837					7,800 00
W. P. Eaton	Improvement in the river Thames, Conn.	4th quarter 1836	514 02	5,000 00			
		1st quarter 1837		1,000 00			
		2d quarter 1837		4,000 00			
		3d quarter 1837		11,000 00			21,514 02
Ezra Coe	Harbor of Church's cove	1st quarter 1837		1,000 00			
		2d quarter 1837		1,000 00			
		3d quarter 1837		4,512 00			6,512 00
L. G. Sampson	Improvement near Duxbury harbor	4th quarter 1836		3,000 00		96 86	
		1st quarter 1837					
		2d quarter 1837		1,500 00			
		3d quarter 1837					4,596 86
D. K. Akin	Improvement at Bass river	2d quarter 1837		4,400 00			
		3d quarter 1837		2,570 00			6,970 00
P. G. Munro	Fort Warren	4th quarter 1836		35,200 00	6,747 05		
		1st quarter 1837					
		2d quarter 1837		54,500 00	346 00	291 50	
		3d quarter 1837		66,000 00			163,084 55
	Repairs at Fort Independence	4th quarter 1836		5,400 00	667 57		
		1st quarter 1837					

No. 2.—Statement showing the amount of funds to be accounted for, &c.—Continued.

Names.	Designation of the objects of disbursements.	For what period.	Amount to be accounted for, and how accruing.				
			Balances in the hands of agents Sept. 30, 1836.	Amounts remitted in each quarter.	Amounts received from former agents.	Amounts received from sales, &c.	Total amount to be accounted for in the year ending Sept. 30, 1837.
P. G. Munroe.....	Repairs at Fort Independence.....	2d quarter 1837	\$41,000 00	\$90 00
		3d quarter 1837	45,000 00	610 20	\$92,767 77
	Preservation of Deer island.....	4th quarter 1836	\$1,130 00
		1st & 2d qrs. 1837	1,130 00
	Incidental expenses attending repairs of fortifications, &c.	4th quarter 1836
2d quarter 1837		5 00	5 00	
John T. Gibbs	Piscataqua river, deepening the Cochecho branch of.	4th quarter 1836	\$580 76
		2d quarter 1837	300 00
		3d quarter 1837	4,500 00	5,380 76
John J. Wendell.....	La Plaisance bay road.....	4th quarter 1836	1,915 42
		2d quarter 1837
		3d quarter 1837	1,915 42
John B. Wilbor.....	Huron river.....	4th quarter 1836	1,336 74
		1st quarter 1837
		2d quarter 1837	2,565 00	2,096 13
		3d quarter 1837	400 00	6,397 87
Conrad Reid.....	Beacon-light at Huron river..... do.....	20 20	20 20
		2d quarter 1837	4,783 42
		3d quarter 1837	1,144 68	5,928 10
James C. Loomis.	Beacon-light at Black river. do.....	144 68	144 68
		1st quarter 1837	1,500 00
		2d quarter 1837	1,500 00
Robert Harper.....	Harbor of Westport	3d quarter 1837	1,000 00	4,000 00
	 do.....	500 00	500 00
		2d quarter 1837	158 34	3,881 60
Isaac S. Smith.....	Cunningham creek.....	3d quarter 1837	500 00	4,539 94
		4th quarter 1836
Samuel Simons.....	Harbor of Buffalo.....	3d quarter 1837	683 84	303 74	978 58
		2d quarter 1837	2,500 00
		3d quarter 1837	7,500 00	10,000 00
Thomas Bartram.	Fairweather island.....	1st quarter 1837	1,000 00
		2d quarter 1837	2,100 00
		3d quarter 1837	6,900 00	10,000 00
D. Laue.....	Placing buoys in the vicinity of the monument on Steele's ledge.	2d quarter 1837	164 78	466 00	630 78
	
Alexander Parris.....	Preservation of Rausford island, Boston harbor.	4th quarter 1836	3,900 00	5,510 00
		2d quarter 1837	3,800 00
		3d quarter 1837	1,790 00	15,000 00
John Price.....	Removing wreck in the harbor of New Bedford.	2d quarter 1837	2,500 00	144 69	2,644 69
	
			509,027 18	2,964,176 87	118,594 25	12,780 15	3,604,578 45

No. 2.—Statement showing the amount of funds to be accounted for, &c.—Continued.

Names.	Designation of the objects of disbursements.	For what period.	Amount accounted for.				
			Amount expended in each quarter.	Amount refunded, or returned to the treasury.	Amount turned over to successors.	Total amount accounted for.	Balance on hand September 30, 1837.
Brig. Gen. C. Gratiot....	Fort at Grande Terre, Louisiana.....	4th quarter 1836..	\$15,000 00	\$15,000 00	\$35,000 00
Col. J. G. Totten.....	Fort Adams, Rhode Island..... do.....
		1st quarter 1837..
		2d quarter 1837..
		3d quarter 1837..	89 69	\$1,970 58	2,060 27	4,100 43
Lt. Col. R. E. DeRussy..	Military Academy.....	4th quarter 1836..	\$14,931 00
		1st quarter 1837..	10,335 41
		2d quarter 1837..	14,578 33
		3d quarter 1837..	39,844 74	40,272 10
Major J. L. Smith	Fort Schuyler, New York	4th quarter 1836..	15,751 68
		1st quarter 1837..	10,514 21
		2d quarter 1837..	40,311 18
		3d quarter 1837..	36,937 78	103,514 85	5,420 61
	Repairs at Fort Columbus and Castle William.	4th quarter 1836..	11,081 48
		1st quarter 1837..	3,036 44
		2d quarter 1837..	4,165 84
		3d quarter 1837..	1,177 27	19,461 03	1,560 40
	Repairs at Fort Lafayette.....	4th quarter 1836..
		3d quarter 1837..	1,760 15
	Fort Hamilton	4th quarter 1836..
		3d quarter 1837..	1,156 12
	Contingencies of fortifications	1st quarter 1837..	550 86	550 86
	Purchase of land at Throg's Point..... do.....
		2d quarter 1837..	2,000 00	2,000 00
	Improvement of Little Egg Harbor....	3d quarter 1837..	3,148 04	3,148 04	1,851 66
	Improving harbor of N. Brunswick, N. J. do.....	5,048 30	5,048 30	1,951 70
	Ice breaker at Staten Island, N. Y. ...	4th quarter 1836..	499 64
		1st & 2d qrs. 1837..	1,715 45
		3d quarter 1837..	705 20	2,920 29	7,079 71
Capt. W. H. Chase	Fort Pickens, Pensacola, Florida	4th quarter 1836..
		1st quarter 1837..	73 75
		2d quarter 1837..	1,438 00
		3d quarter 1837..	1,511 75	1,927 38
	Fort Morgan, Alabama	4th quarter 1836..
		1st quarter 1837..
		2d & 3d qrs 1837..	789 17
	Fort on Foster's Bank, Pensacola.....	4th quarter 1836..
		1st quarter 1837..
		2d quarter 1837..
		3d quarter 1837..	28,540 51	28,540 51
	Fort Livingston, Grande Terre, La. ..	4th quarter 1836..
		1st quarter 1837..	315 80
		2d quarter 1837..	780 00
		3d quarter 1837..	1,095 80	2,673 79
	Fort Jackson, Louisiana.....	4th quarter 1836..	733 71
		3d quarter 1837..
	Mobile harbor, Alabama.....	4th quarter 1836..
		1st quarter 1837..	153 01
		2d & 3d qrs 1837..	153 01	20,917 33
	Pascagoula river, Mississippi.....	4th quarter 1836..	42 55
		1st quarter 1837..
		2d & 3d qrs. 1837..	42 55	225 00
	Contingencies of fortifications	4th quarter 1836..
		1st quarter 1837..	387 00
		2d quarter 1837..	136 50
		3d quarter 1837..	523 50	6,476 50
	Incidental expenses attending repairs of fortifications, &c.	4th quarter 1836..
		3d quarter 1837..	5,092 75
	Improvement at the mouths of the Mississippi river.	1st quarter 1837..	3,885 33
		2d quarter 1837..	50 00
		3d quarter 1837..	3,935 33	17,114 67
	Removing mud shoal in Apalachicola river. do.....	100 00	100 00
Capt. R. Delafield.....	Incidental expenses attending repairs of fortifications, &c.	4th quarter 1836..	33 57	33 57
	Removal of bar in Delaware river, near Fort Millin. do.....	13 80	13 80
Capt. W. A. Eliason	Fort Calhoun do.....	31,884 92
		1st quarter 1837..	19,152 78
		2d quarter 1837..	29,717 74
		3d quarter 1837..	44,999 57	125,755 01	3,153 58

No. 2.—Statement showing the amount of funds to be accounted for, &c.—Continued.

Names.	Designation of the objects of disbursements.	For what period.	Amount accounted for.				
			Amount expended in each quarter.	Amount refunded, or returned to the treasury.	Amount turned over to successors.	Total amount accounted for.	Balance on hand September 30, 1837.
Capt. W. A. Eliason	Removing the light-house at Old Point Comfort.	2d quarter 1837					\$2,000 00
Capt. C. A. Ogden	Cumberland road in Indiana	4th quarter 1836	\$38,316 09				
		1st quarter 1837	24,390 03				
		2d quarter 1837	44,684 62				
		3d quarter 1837	66,151 38			\$173,542 12	21,723 05
	Cumberland road in Illinois	4th quarter 1836	22,173 72				
		1st quarter 1837	6,869 57				
		2d quarter 1837	12,560 13				
		3d quarter 1837	15,967 62			57,570 94	50,676 93
Lieut. A. H. Bowman	Road from opposite Memphis, on the Mississippi, to the river St. Francis.	4th quarter 1836	17,436 83				
		1st quarter 1837	15,729 18				
		2d quarter 1837	12,806 57				
		3d quarter 1837	9,486 66			55,459 24	52,274 01
Lieut. J. K. F. Mansfield	Fort Pulaski, Georgia	4th quarter 1836	44,780 29				
		1st quarter 1837	42,883 31				
		2d quarter 1837	16,288 54				
		3d quarter 1837	29,959 20			133,911 34	31,105 76
	Fortifications in Charleston harbor, S. C.	1st quarter 1837	173 70				
		2d & 3d qrs. 1837	14,230 34			14,404 04	
	Improving Savannah river, Georgia	4th quarter 1836	1,532 10				
		1st quarter 1837	1,765 32				
		2d quarter 1837	1,104 80				
	Improving the inland navigation between St. Mary's and St. John's, Fla.	3d quarter 1837	277 00			4,679 22	
		4th quarter 1836	2,540 18				
		1st quarter 1837	1,962 31				
Removal of bar to improve the harbor of Brunswick, Georgia.	2d quarter 1837	990 09					
	3d quarter 1837	636 51			6,129 09		
	1st quarter 1837	44 00			44 00		
Lieut. Alex. J. Swift	Incidental expenses attending repairs of fortifications, &c.	4th quarter 1836					
		3d quarter 1837				1,000 00	
	Fort Caswell, North Carolina	4th quarter 1836	4,999 33				
		1st quarter 1837	4,401 09				
		2d quarter 1837	10,000 25				
		3d quarter 1837	18,683 21			38,083 88	5,804 84
	Incidental expenses attending repairs of fortifications, &c.	4th quarter 1836					
		3d quarter 1837					18 74
	Improving Pamlico river, N. C.	4th quarter 1836	3,367 88				
		2d & 3d qrs. 1837	47 72			3,415 60	168 65
	Improving Ocracoke inlet, N. C.	4th quarter 1836					
		1st quarter 1837	1,166 46				
2d quarter 1837		2,866 11					
3d quarter 1837		3,918 09			7,950 66	13,062 29	
Improving Cape Fear river, N. C.	4th quarter 1836	2,061 31					
	1st quarter 1837	5,460 29					
	2d quarter 1837	2,577 12					
Opening a passage between the town of Beaufort and Pamlico sound, and improving New river, N. C.	3d quarter 1837	6,479 55			16,578 27	7,377 92	
	do					30,000 00	
	do						
Lieut. G. W. Cullum	Removing light-house on Goat island	4th quarter 1836	93 84				
		1st quarter 1837	83 91		\$582 37	760 12	
Lieut. William Smith	Improvement at Genesee river, N. Y.	3d quarter 1837	14,812 27			14,812 27	287 73
		do	2,538 67			2,538 67	2,861 33
Lieut. R. E. Lee	Pier in the Mississippi river, near St. Louis.	do	62 25			62 25	2,337 75
		do	2,153 22			2,153 22	907 65
Andrew Talcott	Improvement at the mouth of the Mississippi river.	2d quarter 1837	7,081 36				
		3d quarter 1837	38,077 18			45,159 17	840 83
Major Henry Whiting	Road from Detroit to Fort Gratiot	4th quarter 1836					
		2d & 3d qrs. 1837					31 88
	Road from Detroit to Grand river	4th quarter 1836	2,464 18				
		1st quarter 1837	814 59				
Henry Smith	Piers at La Plaisance bay	2d quarter 1837	198 00				
		3d quarter 1837				3,476 77	1,877 20
		4th quarter 1836					82 12

No. 2.—Statement showing the amount of funds to be accounted for, &c.—Continued.

Name.	Designation of the objects of disbursements.	For what period.	Amount accounted for.				
			Amount expended in each quarter.	Amount refunded or re-turned to the treasury.	Amount turned over to successors.	Total amount accounted for.	Balance on hand September 30, 1837.
Henry Smith	La Plaisance Bay road	4th quarter 1836			\$2,194 36	\$2,194 36	
	Port Lawrence and Adrian road.....do					\$18 92
Cleveland harbor	3d quarter 1837					
		4th quarter 1836			3,200 00		
		1st quarter 1837					
Huron river.....	2d quarter 1837					
		3d quarter 1837				3,200 00	1,884 22
		4th quarter 1836					
Grand river.....	1st quarter 1837			2,096 13		
		2d quarter 1837			438 85	2,534 98	44 76
		3d quarter 1837					
Black river	4th quarter 1836					
		1st quarter 1837					
		2d quarter 1837			4,928 10		
Ashtabula creek	3d quarter 1837			1,000 00	5,928 10	1,383 99
		4th quarter 1836			1,787 55		
		1st quarter 1837					
Cunningham creek, Ohio.....	2d quarter 1837			60 75		
		3d quarter 1837				1,848 30	
		1st quarter 1837			50 00		
Presque Isle harbor, Pennsylvania....	2d quarter 1837			3,926 32		
		3d quarter 1837			500 00	4,476 32	573 68
		4th quarter 1836			3,787 62		
Dredging machine for Lake Erie	3d quarter 1837			1,302 35	5,089 97	
		1st quarter 1837	\$3,875 00				
		2d quarter 1837	7,107 00				
Black Rock harbor, New York.....	3d quarter 1837				10,982 00	3,470 87
		4th quarter 1836			850 00		
		1st quarter 1837					
Dunkirk harbor, New York.....	2d quarter 1837				850 00	196 97
		3d quarter 1837					
		4th quarter 1836			2,000 00		
Buffalo harbor, New York.....	1st quarter 1837					
		2d quarter 1837			1,567 49		
		3d quarter 1837				3,567 49	815 13
Beacon-light at Grand river.....	4th quarter 1836					
		1st quarter 1837					
		2d quarter 1837			466 04	466 04	
Beacon-light at Ashtabula creek.....	4th quarter 1836			1,267 76	1,267 76	
	do					
		1st quarter 1837					
Beacon-light at Huron river	2d quarter 1837				266 00	266 00
		3d quarter 1837			266 00		
		4th quarter 1836					
Harbor near the mouth of the river Raisin, Michigan.	3d quarter 1837			20 20	20 20	
		4th quarter 1836			1,706 77		
		1st quarter 1837	1,188 58				
Lieut. R. C. Smead....	Oswego harbor, New York.....	2d quarter 1837			12,334 25		
		3d quarter 1837			2,500 00	17,729 60	
		4th quarter 1836	2,338 73	\$2,993 43			
U. G. White.	Light house at Oswego.....	3d quarter 1837	22,033 07			27,365 23	2,751 35
		4th quarter 1836	297 18	9 52			
		3d quarter 1837	724 32			1,031 02	
General Joseph G. Swift.	Oswego harbor.....	2d quarter 1837			2,490 78	2,490 78	4,309 22
		4th quarter 1836	5,102 54				
		1st quarter 1837	2,191 42				
Improvement at Big Sodus bay	2d quarter 1837	5,492 10				
		3d quarter 1837	8,226 48			21,012 54	
		4th quarter 1836	2,370 17				
Improvement at Genesee river.....	1st quarter 1837	975 37				
		2d quarter 1837					
		3d quarter 1837				3,345 54	1,790 23

No. 2.—Statement showing the amount of funds to be accounted for, &c.—Continued.

Names.	Designation of the objects of disbursements.	For what period.	Amount accounted for.				
			Amount expended in each quarter.	Amount refunded, or returned to the treasury.	Amount turned over to successors.	Total amount accounted for.	Balances on hand September 30, 1837.
General Joseph G. Swift	Improvement of harbor at the mouth of Oak Orchard creek.	4th quarter 1836.....					
		3d quarter 1837.....					\$773 86
		4th quarter 1836.....					
Captain James Allen.....	Chicago harbor, Illinois.....	3d quarter 1837.....	\$954 57			\$954 57	1,180 13
		4th quarter 1836.....	16,672 75	\$1,846 04			
		1st & 2d qrs. 1837.....	9,959 40				
Lieut. J. G. Barnard.....	Pasagoula river.....	3d quarter 1837.....	21,678 49			50,156 68	7,208 15
		4th quarter 1836.....		3,001 16		3,001 16	
Lieut. John H. Winder.....	Fort Caswell.....	do.....			\$47 36	47 36	
	Cape Fear river.....	do.....			581 12	581 12	
Major H. Sanders.....	do.....	do.....			15 20	15 20	
Lieut. John L'Engle.....	Fortifications at Charleston harbor.....	do.....					
Lieut. T. B. W. Stockton.	Road from Detroit towards Chicago.....	1st quarter 1837.....	1,288 72			1,288 72	
		4th quarter 1836.....			4,420 59	4,420 59	
		do.....			3,661 95	3,661 95	
Lieut. E. S. Sibley.....	Road from Sheldon's to St. Joseph's river.	do.....			1,207 19	1,207 19	
		do.....			2,979 97	2,979 97	
		do.....			721 47	721 47	
Major B. K. Pierce.....	Road from Clinton to Grand river.....	do.....			3,659 53	4,461 28	
		do.....	801 75		3,483 29	3,661 95	
		do.....	278 66		1,107 58	1,107 58	
Lieut. E. S. Sibley.....	Road from Sheldon's to St. Joseph's river.	do.....			2,979 97	2,979 97	
		do.....			721 47	721 47	
		do.....			2,979 97	2,979 97	
Major B. K. Pierce.....	Road from Detroit towards Chicago.....	3d quarter 1837.....	2,890 47			2,890 47	769 06
		do.....	1,754 10			1,754 10	1,629 19
		do.....	733 15			733 15	374 43
Capt. H. A. Thompson.	Road from Niles's to St. Joseph's river	do.....	2,410 90			2,410 90	569 07
		do.....	216 77			216 77	504 70
		do.....					
Bank of Troy.....	Hudson river, improvement of.....	4th quarter 1836.....	24,165 02				
		1st quarter 1837.....	5,755 33				
		2d quarter 1837.....	9,019 86				
Moyamensing Bank.....	Fort Delaware.....	3d quarter 1837.....	9,728 10			48,668 31	
		4th quarter 1836.....	14,641 54				
		1st & 2d qrs. 1837.....					
Bank of Troy.....	Hudson river, improvement of.....	3d quarter 1837.....	5,004 18			19,645 72	6,821 34
		4th quarter 1836.....	56,733 76				
		1st quarter 1837.....	15,375 39				
Moyamensing Bank.....	Fort Delaware.....	2d quarter 1837.....	18,758 26			133,336 88	20,119 49
		3d quarter 1837.....	42,469 47				
		4th quarter 1836.....	18,604 90				
Moyamensing Bank.....	Delaware breakwater.....	1st quarter 1837.....	15,579 89				
		2d quarter 1837.....	17,490 15				
		3d quarter 1837.....	28,763 76			80,438 70	26,453 71
Moyamensing Bank.....	Delaware breakwater.....	4th quarter 1836.....	43,501 98				
		1st quarter 1837.....	4,604 39				
		2d quarter 1837.....	44,040 20				
Moyamensing Bank.....	Newcastle harbor.....	3d quarter 1837.....	85,183 31			177,329 88	650 67
		4th quarter 1836.....	8,268 65				
		1st quarter 1837.....	3,290 71				
Moyamensing Bank.....	Harbor of Chester.....	2d quarter 1837.....	5,625 20				
		3d quarter 1837.....	7,051 37			24,235 93	166 82
		4th quarter 1836.....	1,762 45				
Moyamensing Bank.....	Harbor of Chester.....	2d quarter 1837.....	394 62				
		3d quarter 1837.....	1,150 10			3,307 17	455 28
		4th quarter 1836.....	17,042 54				
Moyamensing Bank.....	Incidental expenses attending repairs of fortifications, &c.	1st quarter 1837.....	4,220 43				
		2d quarter 1837.....	4,214 35				
		3d quarter 1837.....	8,967 96			34,445 28	1,579 27
Moyamensing Bank.....	Mooring buoys at Delaware breakwater	2d quarter 1837.....	1,793 58			1,793 56	236 44
		4th quarter 1836.....					
		2d quarter 1837.....			592 89	592 89	
Clinton Bank, Columbus, Ohio.	Cumberland road in Ohio.....	4th quarter 1836.....			6,747 05	6,747 05	
Merchants' Bank, Boston.	Fort Warren.....	2d quarter 1837.....					
		4th quarter 1836.....					
		2d quarter 1837.....			667 57	667 57	
Merchants' Bank, Boston.	Repairs at Fort Independence, &c.....	4th quarter 1836.....			1,130 00	1,130 00	
		do.....					
		do.....			5 00	5 00	
Merchants' Bank, Boston.	Sea wall at Deer island.....	do.....					
		do.....					
		do.....					
Merchants' Bank, Boston.	Incidental expenses attending repairs of fortifications, &c.	do.....					
		do.....					
		do.....					

No. 2.—Statement showing the amount of funds to be accounted for, &c.—Continued.

Names.	Designation of the objects of disbursements.	For what period.	Amount accounted for.					
			Amount expended in each quarter.	Amount refunded or re-turned to the treasury.	Amount turned over to successors.	Total amount accounted for.	Balance on hand September 30, 1837.	
Merchants and Mechanics' Bank, Wheeling. Merchants and Manufacturers' B'k, Pittsburg.	Cumberland road east of the Ohio river.	4th quarter 1836..	\$1,133 48			\$1,133 48		
		4th quarter 1836..	10,789 79					
do.....do.....do.....do.....	1st & 2d qrs. 1837.	15,068 00					
		3d quarter 1837...	12,051 41			37,990 20	\$221 66	
	Cumberland road in Ohio	4th quarter 1836..	68,136 25					
		1st quarter 1837.	27,926 67					
		2d quarter 1837...	67,918 02					
	Improving the Ohio river between Pittsburg and the falls.	3d quarter 1837...	70,817 43			234,798 37	10,737 44	
		4th quarter 1836..	22,706 78					
		1st quarter 1837..	14,924 39					
2d quarter 1837...		30,738 90						
Newport Exchange Bank	Fort Adams.....do.....do.....	3d quarter 1837...	36,298 98			104,659 05	1,441 89	
		4th quarter 1836..	50,841 84					
		1st quarter 1837..	15,932 12					
	Light-house on Goat island.....	2d quarter 1837...	39,734 11			149,363 79	5,607 79	
		3d quarter 1837..	42,864 72					
		2d quarter 1837..	7,287 44					
	Henry M. Shreve.....	Mississippi river, above the mouth of the Ohio river, and the Missouri river.	3d quarter 1837..	3,339 63			10,627 07	2,555 30
			4th quarter 1836..	1,998 11				
			1st quarter 1837.	1,959 50				
		Ohio and Mississippi rivers, from Louisville to New Orleans.	2d quarter 1837...	15,077 34				
3d quarter 1837...			62 68			19,097 63	2,860 87	
4th quarter 1836..			4,752 89					
1st quarter 1837..			12,451 57					
Improving the Red river.....		2d quarter 1837...	40,504 23					
		3d quarter 1837...	2,969 11			60,677 80	7,154 63	
		4th quarter 1836..	17,507 48					
	1st & 2d qrs. 1837.	47,819 30						
Constructing and working boat on Red river.	3d quarter 1837...	124 21			65,450 99			
	1st quarter 1837..	22,436 93						
	3d quarter 1837...	7,544 71			29,981 64	18 36		
	2d quarter 1837...	13,437 45						
Improving the Arkansas river.....	2d quarter 1837...	10,581 98						
	3d quarter 1837...	6,036 07			30,045 50	26,984 50		
	4th quarter 1836..	669 16						
	1st & 2d qrs. 1837.	1,784 18						
Ezra Crowell	Hyannis harbor	3d quarter 1837...	2,431 72			4,885 06	834 06	
		4th quarter 1836..						
Thomas M. Clark.....	Merrimack river	3d quarter 1837...	75 60			75 60	3,985 21	
		4th quarter 1836..						
Asa S. Bowley	Provincetown harbor.....	4th quarter 1836..						
		1st & 2d qrs. 1837.	4,481 22			4,481 22	91 09	
S. Sampson.....	Plymouth beach	4th quarter 1836..	200 40					
		1st quarter 1837..	12 48					
		2d & 3d qrs. 1837..	56 62			269 50	161 58	
A. W. Walworth	Cleveland harbor.....	4th quarter 1836..	8,462 82					
		1st & 2d qrs. 1837.	5,109 97					
		3d quarter 1837...	4,254 34			17,847 13	1,352 87	
Henry Phelps.....	Grand river.....	4th quarter 1836..	950 97					
		2d quarter 1837...	327 56		\$1,346 03	2,624 86		
		3d quarter 1837...	48 03		418 01	466 04		
John A. Potter.....	Beacon-light at Grand river.....	2d quarter 1837...	3,096 60					
		3d quarter 1837...	2,637 30			5,733 90	656 51	
	do.....do.....do.....	33 08			33 08	384 93	
S. V. Hamot.....	Presque Isle harbor	4th quarter 1836..	3,475 85					
		1st quarter 1837..	1,050 24					
		2d quarter 1837...	5,729 37					
		3d quarter 1837...	10,004 19			20,259 65	706 82	
Henry Desbrow.....	Improvement of harbor near river Raisin	4th quarter 1836..	2,350 15					
		1st quarter 1837..	67 77		389 94	2,807 86		
		2d quarter 1837...	8,038 40					
N. D. Curtis.....do.....do.....do.....	3d quarter 1837...	14,493 43			22,461 83	7,232 76	
		4th quarter 1836..	1,405 01					
		2d quarter 1837...	1,992 49					
Ashbel Dart	Conneaut creek.....	3d quarter 1837...	2,751 91			6,149 41	580 96	
		4th quarter 1836..	2,250 41					
		2d quarter 1837...	2,178 86					
M. Hubbard	Ashtabula creek	3d quarter 1837...	2,086 29			6,515 56	3,971 44	
		4th quarter 1836..	606 63					
		2d quarter 1837...	619 07					
		1st quarter 1837..						

No. 2.—Statement showing the amount of funds to be accounted for, &c.—Continued.

Names.	Designation of the objects of disbursements.	For what period.	Amount accounted for.				
			Amount expended in each quarter.	Amount refunded, or returned to the treasury.	Amount turned over to successors.	Total amount accounted for.	Balance on hand September 30, 1837.
M. Hubbard.....	Beacon-light at Ashtabula creek	2d quarter 1837..	\$20 85				
		3d quarter 1837..	21 21			\$1,267 76	
John Tull	Black river, Ohio	4th quarter 1836..	3,442 32			3,442 32	
	Beacon-light at Black river do.....	1,220 90			1,220 90	
Thomas Forster.....	Dunkirk harbor do.....	2,512 76				
		1st quarter 1837..	1,095 34				
		2d quarter 1837..	6,491 49				
		3d quarter 1837..	10,902 81			21,002 40	\$1,867 15
P. B. Porter	Black Rock harbor.....	4th quarter 1836..	545 94			545 94	304 06
W. McKnight.....	Cumberland river below Nashville.... do.....	3,625 58				
		1st quarter 1837..	3,397 16				
		2d quarter 1837..	6,988 38				
		3d quarter 1837..	8,125 39			22,136 51	
	Cumberland river above Nashville do.....	19,049 33			19,049 38	1,950 62
F. L. Dancy.....	Repairs at Fort Marion, &c.	4th quarter 1836..	6,901 05				
		1st quarter 1837..	11,215 78				
		2d quarter 1837..	13,981 31				
		3d quarter 1837..	5,538 33			37,636 47	813 53
James S. Johnson.....	Fortifications in Charleston harbor, &c. do.....	2,825 02			2,825 02	1,994 98
William Robinson	Harbor of Baltimore	4th quarter 1836..	9,763 12				
		1st & 2d qrs. 1837..	8,979 00				
		3d quarter 1837..	6,396 00			25,138 12	144 88
William Chandler.....	Harbor of Wilmington.....	4th quarter 1836..	3,768 17				
		1st quarter 1837..	4,799 13				
		2d quarter 1837..	3,855 72				
		3d quarter 1837..	3,558 28			15,981 30	1,018 70
Joshua Herrick.....	Piers at Kennebunk.....	4th quarter 1836..					
		1st quarter 1837..	836 66				
		2d quarter 1837..					
		3d quarter 1837..	2,187 24			3,023 90	4,474 43
Jeremiah Sturges.....	Harbor of Southport.....	4th quarter 1836..					
		2d quarter 1837..	876 64				
		3d quarter 1837..	1,169 50			2,046 14	
Josiah Haskell.....	Improvement at Sandy bay.....	4th quarter 1836..	1,216 59				
		1st quarter 1837..	4,975 62				
		2d quarter 1837..	12,580 05				
		3d quarter 1837..				18,772 26	7,677 69
Freeman Bradford	Breakwater at Stanford ledge, Portland harbor.	1st quarter 1837..	3,275 00				
		2d quarter 1837..	5,609 68				
		3d quarter 1837..	15,022 87			23,907 55	11,092 45
Marshall Parks	Improvement at the Dismal Swamp canal.	1st quarter 1837..	2,425 15				
		2d quarter 1837..	3,187 25				
		3d quarter 1837..	1,020 23			6,632 63	1,167 37
W. P. Eaton.....	Improvement in the river Thames, Conn.	4th quarter 1836..	3,443 46				
		1st quarter 1837..	1,034 67				
		2d quarter 1837..	5,119 41				
		3d quarter 1837..	11,217 37			20,815 11	698 91
Ezra Coc.....	Harbor of Church's cove.....	1st quarter 1837..					
		2d quarter 1837..					
		3d quarter 1837..	3,979 62			3,979 62	2,532 38
I. G. Sampson	Improvement near Duxbury harbor....	4th quarter 1836..	1,698 70				
		1st quarter 1837..	65 68				
		2d quarter 1837..	117 92				
		3d quarter 1837..	264 84			2,147 14	2,449 72
D. K. Akin	Improvement at Bass river	2d quarter 1837..	4,426 55				
		3d quarter 1837..	3,430 95			7,857 50	
F. G. Munro.....	Fort Warren	4th quarter 1836..	32,579 51				
		1st quarter 1837..	9,003 18				
		2d quarter 1837..	43,580 62				
		3d quarter 1837..	69,155 55			154,318 85	8,765 69
	Repairs at Fort Independence.....	4th quarter 1836..	4,714 42				
		1st quarter 1837..	2,595 70				
		2d quarter 1837..	25,062 75				
		3d quarter 1837..	36,460 58			68,833 45	23,934 32
	Preservation of Deer island.....	4th quarter 1836..	976 32				
		1st & 2d qrs. 1837..					
		2d quarter 1837..				976 32	153 68
	Incidental expenses attending repairs of fortifications, &c.	4th quarter 1836..	125 80				
		2d quarter 1837..				125 80	

No. 2.—Statement showing the amount of funds to be accounted for, &c.—Continued.

Names.	Designation of the objects of disbursements.	For what period.	Amount accounted for.					
			Amount expended in each quarter.	Amount refunded, or returned to the treasury.	Amount turned over to successors.	Total amount accounted for.	Balance on hand, September 30, 1837.	
John T. Gibbs	Piscataqua river, deepening the Cocheco branch of.	4th quarter 1836..	\$208 84					
		2d quarter 1837...	386 84					
		3d quarter 1837...	3,750 66			\$4,346 34	\$1,034 42	
John J. Wendell	La Plaisance bay road.....	4th quarter 1836..	656 00					
		2d quarter 1837...	390 66					
		3d quarter 1837...	868 76			1,915 42		
John B. Wilbor.....	Huron river.....	4th quarter 1836..	1,063 45					
		1st quarter 1837..	30 09					
		2d quarter 1837..	2,913 40					
		3d quarter 1837..	2,433 08			6,440 02		
Conrad Reid.....	Beacon-light at Huron river.....do.....	20 20			20 20		
		Black river	2d quarter 1837..	3,914 59				
			3d quarter 1837..	1,463 74			5,378 33	549 77
James C. Loomis	Beacon-light at Black river.....do.....	144 68			144 68		
		Harbor of Westport.....	1st quarter 1837..	1,437 15				
			2d quarter 1837..	794 25				
Robert Harper	Cedar Point.....	3d quarter 1837..	360 22			2,591 62	1,408 38	
	do.....	400 00			400 00	100 00	
		2d quarter 1837..	2,999 06					
Isaac S. Smith.....	Cunningham creek.....	3d quarter 1837..	1,715 53			4,714 59		
		4th quarter 1836..	6,647 14					
Samuel Simons.....	Harbor of Buffalo.....	3d quarter 1837..	4,237 66			10,884 80		
		2d quarter 1837..	2,818 35					
		3d quarter 1837..	6,039 65			8,858 00	1,142 00	
Thomas Bartram	Fairweather island.....	1st quarter 1837..	14 59					
		2d quarter 1837..	2,793 69					
		3d quarter 1837..	6,866 20			9,674 48	325 52	
D. Lane	Placing buoys in the vicinity of the monument on Steele's ledge.	2d quarter 1837..				630 78		
Alexander Parris.....	Preservation of Rainsford island, Boston harbor.	4th quarter 1836..	6,001 60					
		2d quarter 1837..						
		3d quarter 1837..				6,001 60	8,998 40	
John Price.....	Removing wreck in the harbor of New Bedford.	2d quarter 1837..	2,453 32			2,453 32	191 37	
			2,926,739 48	\$7,939 84	\$94,216 84	3,028,896 16	599,303 71	

No. 3.

Statement exhibiting the works projected by the board of engineers which have not been commenced, and the estimate of their cost.

Designation of the works.	Estimate.
<i>First class—to be commenced as soon as possible.</i>	
Fort St. Philip, Louisiana	\$77,810 79
Fort at Sollers's Point flats, Patapsco river	673,205 44
Fort Tompkins, New York	420,826 14
Redoubt in advance of Fort Tompkins, New York.....	65,162 44
Fort at Wilkins's Point, New York.....	456,845 51
Fort at Dumpling's Point, Rhode Island.....	759,946 57
Fort at Rose island, Rhode Island.....	82,411 74
Dike across the west passage, Narraganset Roads, for the defence of Newport harbor...	205,000 00
Fort on Nantasket Head.....	539,000 00
Lunette in advance of Nantasket Head.....	79,000 00
Redoubt No. 2, in advance of Nantasket Head.....	32,000 00
Redoubt No. 1, (on Hog island,) in advance of Nantasket Head.....	29,000 00
Dike across Broad Sound passage	140,000 00
Cutting off the summit of Gallop island	2,429 00
Narraganset bay, Rhode Island, (works for the defence of Conanicut island).....	220,053 43
	3,782,691 06

Statement exhibiting the works projected by the board of engineers, &c.—Continued.

Designation of the works	Estimate.
<i>Second class—to be commenced at a later period.</i>	
Tower at Pass au Heron, Mobile bay	\$16, 677 41
Fort at Hawkins's Point, Patapsco river	244, 337 14
Fort at St. Mary's, Potomac river	205, 602 33
Fort opposite the Pea Patch, Delaware river	347, 257 71
Fort at the Middle Ground, outer harbor of New York	1, 681, 411 66
Fort at the East Bank, outer harbor of New York	1, 681, 411 66
Fort Hale, Connecticut	31, 815 83
Fort Wooster, Connecticut	27, 793 34
Fort Trumbull, Connecticut	77, 445 21
Fort Griswold, Connecticut	132, 230 41
Fort on Fort Preble Point, Portland harbor, Maine	103, 000 00
Fort on House island, Portland harbor, Maine	32, 000 00
Fort Pickering, Salem	116, 000 00
Fort for Naugus Head	35, 000 00
Fort Seawell, Marblehead	116, 000 00
Fort for Jack's Point	96, 000 00
Fort on Bald Head, North Carolina	120, 000 00
Fort on Federal Point, North Carolina	12, 000 00
	5, 075, 982 70
<i>Third class—to be commenced at a remoter period.</i>	
The rafts to obstruct the channel between Forts Monroe and Calhoun	240, 568 00
Fort on Craney island flats	258, 465 14
Fort at Newport News	244, 337 44
Fort at Naseway shoal, for the defence of Patuxent river	673, 205 00
Fort on Thomas's Point	173, 000 00
Fort on Point Patience	164, 000 00
Fort on the Narrows of Penobscot, Maine	101, 000 00
	1, 854, 575 58
RECAPITULATION.	
First class (15)	3, 782, 691 06
Second class (18)	5, 075, 982 70
Third class (7)	1, 854, 575 58
	10, 713, 249 34

REMARK.—The classification in this table, distinguishing three periods, exhibits the works enumerated in the order of their efficiency to meet the earliest possible emergency.

REPORTS OF OPERATIONS BY THE ENGINEER CORPS.

A.

Annual report, 1837.—Harbors on Lake Erie.

OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, LAKE ERIE,
Monroe, Michigan, September 30, 1837.

SIR: The general supervision of the works at Black Rock, Buffalo, and Dunkirk, New York, and Erie Pennsylvania, was, in pursuance of the arrangement of the Engineer department, surrendered to Thompson S. Brown, esq., on the 1st of May last. I shall therefore confine this report to the subject of the works on the western portion of Lake Erie, to wit: at the mouth of the river Raisin, Michigan, and Huron, Black river, Cleveland, Grand river, Cunningham creek, Ashtabula, and Conneaut, Ohio.

Until the commencement of the system of improvement of the lake harbors by the government of the United States, the immense extent of country occupying the south shore of Lake Erie, or dependent on it for commercial facilities, was a wilderness. The navigation of the lake was attended with the utmost delay, difficulty, and danger. The mouths of the several streams emptying themselves into the lake were uniformly obstructed by sand and vegetable matter, creating stagnant bodies of water which overflowed the lowlands for miles, generating an atmosphere which rendered the country nearly uninhabitable from disease; at the same time that the streams themselves were entirely inaccessible as a refuge for vessels, and in all respects an evil rather than a benefit to the surrounding country. It is almost unnecessary to say that the judicious improvements made under the acts of Congress have entirely changed all this; and many millions of acres of land of the most fertile description, embracing the western portion of the State of New York, the northern part of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, and the whole of Michigan, owe their present settlement and improvement, in a very great degree, to this cause. These improvements

have also been the direct cause of the unexampled sales of the public lands in the northwestern States and Territories, lying along or dependent on the great lakes for their principal means of access and commerce. The mouths of the Huron, Black river, Cuyahoga, Grand river, Ashtabula, and Conneaut (across each of which the beach of the lake was continuous, and the only drain for which was by filtration through the sand) were opened, and kept open by piers and other improvements; beacon light-houses have been erected, and these streams, as well as other works at the east end of the lake, now afford secure harbors, accessible at all times to vessels navigating the lake. The improvement at the mouth of the Raisin, the only one on Lake Erie within the State of Michigan, is of similar character, though from its greater difficulties it has been rather more expensive.

These works, originally but experiments, though now found so admirably to answer the purpose for which they were designed, were built of perishable materials; it is generally to render them permanent that the appropriations are recommended on the estimates for the coming year. The nature of the permanent improvement is to remove the wood-work of the piers, already much decayed, to the depth of two feet below low-water mark, and erect on the old foundation a superstructure of stone. Unless this course is adopted without delay, the action of time and the elements will speedily render useless all that has been found of such vast benefit to the commerce of the west. This has been done at Buffalo heretofore, and has, since my last report, been, under the appropriation of last year, fairly commenced at Cleveland. By using the old work as a foundation, permanent works may be erected, at comparatively small cost, sufficient to defy the action of the elements for ages; but I beg leave to urge again that *the commencement should not be delayed for a moment.*

Although the water of the lake continues at its unusually high stage, yet, in consequence of having received the appropriations for the works early in the season, it has been found practicable to expend the several sums with very great advantage and economy. About one-third more work has been done for the same amount of cost this year than was done during the last year at every work on the lake. The months of June and July, and perhaps August, is the season of the most calm weather on the lake, and work can be prosecuted with greater regard to economy, as well as despatch, in those months than at any other season. With this view early appropriations are respectfully and earnestly recommended.

With the foregoing general remarks, I beg leave to offer the report of the condition and progress of each work.

1. *River Raisin harbor, Michigan.*—This work has been diligently prosecuted on the original plan heretofore submitted to the department. The piling along the sides of the canal is complete in its whole length, and the caps framed and placed thereon. The sheet-piling is also entirely complete, except in the distance of 198 feet, which space will also be finished within this month. About 25,000 yards of earth in the canal have been excavated and removed; a portion of this it was found advantageous to *blast* in the solid and indurated clay. The canal will be completed this season, except about 800 feet of its length, making complete this season 3,387 feet. To effect this, the steam dredging machine is relied on to remove the earth remaining in the portion of the work inundated in 1836—about 16,000 cubic yards. The piers have been carried out to the depth of ten feet of water in the lake. The pier on the south side of the entrance is 597 feet in length, and that on the north is 515 feet long. They are decidedly the best constructed piers which I have seen on Lake Erie, made agreeably to the plan submitted by me heretofore to the department. The stone has been principally quarried and transported to the work by the laborers. It is deemed necessary to construct 200 feet of additional pier-work on each side, which will attain a depth of 12 feet of water. An estimate for a beacon light-house, to be placed on the south pier-head, is submitted herewith. The machinery for this work, which has (much of it) been completed since my last report, is excellent.

Estimating the condition in which the expenditure of the entire appropriation for the present year will leave the work, I submit herewith an estimate for its completion, marked A No. 1; also estimate for a beacon. A drawing of the work, exhibiting its present condition, is also submitted herewith.*

In anticipation of the immediate completion of this harbor, the State of Michigan has passed a law for the construction (by the State) of a railroad from this harbor to New Buffalo, on Lake Michigan, and the road is already commenced. In addition to this, this point appears to be the centre of the commerce of an extended and densely populated country. Railroads are about to be constructed, under charters already granted by this State—one from this place to the navigable waters of the Grand river, a second from this to Ypsilanti, a third to Ann Arbor, a fourth to Detroit, a fifth to the Ohio line, and a sixth to La Plaisance bay. This is furthermore the radiating point for no less than eight ordinary roads, penetrating a country perhaps not excelled in the world for fertility and excellence of soil. The rapidly increasing population is the strongest proof of this. Monroe city has trebled its population within three years; it contains now upwards of three thousand inhabitants.

2. *Huron harbor, Ohio.*—Operations were commenced this season in the month of May, and continued during that month, June, and July, with vigor. Two hundred and ninety feet of the pier-work, which was greatly decayed, (200 on the west and 90 feet on the east pier,) have been taken up to below the surface of the water and rebuilt entirely with new timber, filled anew with stone, and principally planked over; the residue will be planked this season. Sixty feet more of the east pier is also taken up, being entirely decayed, and is in process of repair. It is believed that it will be completed this month, as stone and timber sufficient are on hand. In addition to these labors, stone in large quantities has been purchased and placed on the outside of the west pier, as the commencement of the construction of a permanent work; and to a continuation of this the coming year, after driving a row of contiguous piles at twenty feet outside of the work, to render the inclined plane firm and immovable, the attention of the department, it is respectfully recommended, should be directed; and for this purpose, as well as for the removal of a small bar, I respectfully submit the estimate marked A No. 2.

Accompanying is a drawing exhibiting the present condition of the work.*

3. *Black River harbor, Ohio.*—The sum appropriated at the last session of Congress (\$6,410) for this work has nearly been expended on the objects of the estimate for 1837, and will probably all be expended before the close of the season. The requisite repairs have been made in both the piers, and the portions of the work filled where the stone had been carried away by the storms of the last year, particularly in the eastern pier. About 306 cords of stone have been purchased and deposited along the outside of the piers, principally at the points indicated in the drawing. The object of this is twofold: to protect the present work from the violence of the northeast storms, which have heretofore injured it; and, secondly, laying the

*The drawings and maps referred to in this document are omitted to be printed, under the order of the House of Representatives of September 11, 1837.

foundation of additional width for the permanent work. Both these objects are attained. The dredging has been carried on to as great an extent as the high waters of the lake will allow; though the same cause which *prevents* dredging, (to wit, the very high water,) also renders it at *present* nearly unnecessary.

To continue the erection of a permanent harbor, by widening the foundation of the old work, and depositing stone betwixt the piers and a row of contiguous piles to be driven, estimate A No. 3 is herewith submitted. An item is also inserted for the removal of the remains of the gravel-bar, by means of the newly-constructed steam dredging machine, a very necessary improvement. I also forward a drawing by the local agent, designed to exhibit the present condition of the work.

4. *Beacon light-house, Black river.*—This work was not finished during the fall of 1836, as was confidently anticipated; but, as the department has been already advised, no censure should fall on any person for the delay. The season was unusually stormy in the months of October and November. After the work was entirely framed, a constant watch was kept for such weather as would permit the sinking of the foundation; and the first favorable moment was seized, and as many hands employed in sinking as could work to advantage. The labor was continued until midnight, when a storm arose, which scattered our materials in all directions, and completely destroyed the result of our labors. The materials were again collected, and a new attempt made, with better success, so that our foundation was sunk without further accident. The light-house was finished early in this season, and is one of the *best* structures of the kind on the lake. It is placed on the west pier-head, framed and sunk expressly for the purpose, and secured very strongly by stone and piles; to the latter of which the timbers of the light-house are thoroughly bolted and secured. The cost, after placing to the account of the pier what might very properly be charged to it, has not exceeded the appropriation.

5. *Cleveland harbor, Ohio.*—The labors on this work have been directed to the purpose for which the appropriation on the estimate for 1837 was made, to wit: constructing a permanent stone work on the foundation of the wooden piers forming the mouth of this harbor. The materials procured and on hand last fall have been used, as well as a large amount purchased this season. From the head of the eastern pier entirely to the shore stone has been deposited on the outside; the base equalling twice the altitude; and thus, the surface forming an inclined plane, extending from the bottom to above the surface of the water. The wooden superstructure commencing at the inner end of this pier has been removed to the depth of two feet below the surface of the water, and replaced by the permanent work; large rectangular blocks of stone, the faces of which are of uniform thickness in each course, strongly dowelled together, cramped where it is necessary, and the whole laid in hydraulic cement. The work is thoroughly grouted, and a very excellent coping surmounts the whole. This is nearly finished 180 feet in length, and that distance will be entirely finished this fall. On the western side a row of contiguous piles has been driven, at the distance of 30 feet from the outside of the pier, commencing at the pier-head and extending towards the shore 350 feet. In prosecuting this work it has been necessary to avail ourselves of the favorable weather, as it is impossible to make use of the pile machine in bad weather. The space between this row of piles and the pier is also entirely filled with stone, the surface of which forms an inclination, from two feet below the surface of the water, at the piles, to the surface of the pier. This, with some repairs of the decayed wood-work of the old piers, so as to render them serviceable until they can be permanently rebuilt, enumerates the labor on this work during the season. The finished portion is well, serviceably, and durably done, and not a doubt exists that it will answer the purpose for ages without material repair or other expense.

Cleveland is a point of great importance, not only to the State of Ohio, but in the commerce of the whole west and northwest. Its position, as well as the improvements of the State of Ohio, and of private companies, all tending to this point, render it the thoroughfare for an immense amount of commerce, as well as the depot for very large quantities of produce destined for eastern markets, and of merchandise to supply the western States. The great canal through the State of Ohio, from the Ohio river, enters Lake Erie at this place; another canal is nearly completed by the States of Pennsylvania and Ohio, connecting Cleveland directly with Philadelphia; railroads, also in progress, will speedily connect Cleveland with Baltimore, with Pittsburg, with Buffalo, and Detroit. Another railroad, from Cleveland to Euclid, Ohio, is now being constructed. This last work, it is believed, will materially aid the work at Cleveland harbor, by furnishing excellent stone at reduced prices. Turnpike roads along the lake, and others extending interior in every direction, centre here.

Estimate marked A. No. 4 is submitted herewith, and an appropriation of the whole amount respectfully recommended.

6. *Grand River harbor, Ohio.*—The operations on this work have been directed to the following objects: 1st, rebuilding and repairing the damages sustained in the storms of previous years; 2d, securing, so far as possible, the work against similar injuries from the same cause; and 3d, commencing preparations for the *permanent* work on the foundation of the present. It was found necessary to remove the damaged and useless cribs on the end of the west pier, to the depth of from six to nine feet under the water, they being broomed or torn to pieces to that depth, (five in number,) in a distance of 150 feet, and so shattered that no good foundation could be found on which to rest the new work. The stone had (as has been heretofore reported) been thrown by the action of the lake out of the work and over the pier, to the outside, where (it being useful at present, as well as precisely in position for the permanent work) it now remains. The timber was removed until a fair surface was found, the cribs framed and sunk thereon, and firmly secured to the old work by strong iron bolts, passing through each timber of the new and three or four feet into the old work. These cribs were then loaded with stone, and thoroughly secured with piles, caps, and planks. The storms this fall have been violent, but the work remains uninjured. In several portions (as marked on the sketch herewith) of the old work, repairs had become imperiously necessary; at one point, on the east pier, marked on the sketch *c d*, one hundred and twenty feet of decayed and shattered wood-work was removed to below the surface of the water, and rebuilt with new materials, and again filled with stone and secured; at another point on the west pier the old work has been removed in the whole distance of 300 feet, of the upper course of timber, ties, sleepers, and plank, and replaced by new work, well placed and secured. At several other points the necessary repairs have been made. Some very serviceable machinery has been constructed during the season, amongst which is an excellent crane-scow.

It is found, on examination this season, that portions of the piers (also indicated on the sketch) have been undermined on the inner (or river) side and assumed an inclination inwards, displacing the piles, &c.; stone has been thrown on brush placed at these points, and is found, in a great degree, to arrest the

progress of this injury. A further deposit of stone and brush is absolutely necessary the coming season; this, while securing the present work, is a necessary step in prosecuting the permanent work. For completing these repairs, now absolutely necessary, and for continuing the permanent work, I have the honor herewith to submit estimate A No. 5, and to recommend the appropriation thereon. A drawing is also enclosed by the local superintendent of this work.

Grand river, as a place of refuge for vessels on Lake Erie, appears to meet the preference of the navigators of the lake. Its central situation, great width of entrance, and its depth, all tend to render it a very desirable harbor. It is the natural port to which the commerce of a very fine district of country irresistibly tends. Being the point on Lake Erie as near the Ohio river as any other, with the advantages above mentioned, as might be anticipated, its commerce and its importance rapidly increase. A railroad from the Ohio river (the Fairport and Wellsville) terminates at this point; it is in process of construction, and three miles nearest this harbor completed.

7. *Harbor at Cunningham creek, Ohio.*—This work differs materially from all the foregoing in its character. Although being formed at the mouth of a stream, yet that stream is so inconsiderable that not the slightest benefit is derived from its action in forming or continuing a harbor. The shore of the lake, however, is more declivitous at this point than at any other within my knowledge. The water, as is shown by the accompanying map of a survey, attains depth sufficient for any vessel on the lake at about 150 feet from the shore. In forming this harbor, after creating a shelter for vessels, the object has been not, as in other works, to interrupt the currents of the lake and arrest the sand suspended therein, but to erect a structure which should be a protection against the winds, and at the same time allow the currents of the lake produced by those winds to pass uninterruptedly, and thus maintain the original depth of water without depositing the sand against the piers. Two piers running into the lake, the outer ends approaching each other, with a breakwater (solid) protecting their front, and running nearly parallel with the shore, were designed; the piers running from the shore, composed of separate cribs or blocks of timber loaded with stone, and secured at distances from each other about equalling their length, and connected with each other by bridges, thus allowing, as before stated, the water to flow uninterruptedly betwixt these blocks or piers.

This season the eastern pier has been commenced at the shore, and at a distance from the western pier of 608 feet, and has been carried out (so far as to sink and secure the separate blocks or piers) to the length of 590 feet, leaving a vacancy necessary to be filled by one more crib. Each block or crib is 32 feet in length, built of strong timbers, and secured by posts, iron bolts, and three-inch tree-nails, and loaded with stone. The bottom being rock, and, of course, it being impossible to secure by piles, sills of timber 18 inches square and 40 feet long are sunk under the piers, with posts on the outside of the cribs strongly braced to the sills and connected over the cribs by caps. The appropriation of last Congress was not sufficient to allow of the completion of this portion of the work, or of the commencement of the breakwater. The connecting bridge work remains to be constructed the coming year. Some repairs have been found necessary on the western pier, and made accordingly; these consist in replacing decayed planking and some slight replacing of the timber-work.

To finish the east pier and construct the breakwater, without which the work already done is nearly useless, I submit estimate marked A No. 6. A sketch exhibiting the present condition of the work is also herewith forwarded by the local agent, Colonel R. Harper. The appropriation, if made, should be made without delay, and it is believed the work may be completed the coming season. Of the original necessity for this work I was not the judge, but, as the department is aware, found it commenced already when I assumed my present duties. Being fairly begun, I respectfully recommend its speedy completion. Some important iron-works are situated in the neighborhood of this harbor, which is the point of embarkation and shipment of persons and manufactures connected with those works. The region abounds with iron-ore of an excellent quality, and the district is a highly cultivated agricultural one. The great Ohio railroad (along the whole border of Lake Erie) passes within a few yards of this harbor.

8. *Beacon-light at Cunningham creek.*—Some repairs have been made on the light-house from the balance of the appropriation for that work remaining unexpended. These consist principally in strengthening the foundation of the work, in painting the building, &c., and in repairing the roof and sides, so as to render them impervious to the water.

9. *Ashtabula harbor, Ohio.*—The operations on this work have been carried on very satisfactorily during this season. The addition to the west pier, commenced last fall, has been completed this season in the best possible manner for a wooden structure of the kind. The old wood-work of both piers has been carefully repaired at several points and filled anew. Heretofore much injury has been done to this harbor by immense quantities of sand, which, driving along the coast from the west until arrested by the pier-work, was then thrown up by the action of the waves, became dry, and was then borne by the winds over into the channel. This has been effectually arrested by ranges of brush placed like *abattis* at from 200 to 500 yards to the west of the work. But the principal and most important labor has been the continuation of the excavation into the rock bottom of this harbor. In place of the comparatively slow and inefficient process of *chiselling* the rock, blasting has been resorted to with the happiest results. Frequently at a single blast as much of the rock has been torn up and broken to pieces, so as to be removed by the dredge, as was loosened by the chisel in several days. The drawing herewith shows the depth of the channel and the amount excavated this season. To complete the excavation, (rock,) which will be easily done the coming year, as well as to commence the erection of the permanent piers, estimate marked A No. 7 is submitted herewith.

Ashtabula is a harbor of considerable consequence, and the port of a populous and important district of Ohio. The great Ohio railroad passes through the village of Ashtabula on its route from the Pennsylvania to the Michigan line.

A railroad from the interior also terminates at this point, about three miles of which is in good progress; and it is the converging point of a number of turnpike roads.

10. *Ashtabula beacon.*—This edifice has been entirely and well completed since my last report, of 1836. It is furnished with colored lights, (red,) and is inferior to no other on the lake.

11. *Conneaut harbor, Ohio.*—The excavation of a basin by widening Conneaut creek sufficiently to allow vessels to turn or *wind* has been carried on through the season; at first by *dry* excavation, by means of coffer-dams, and subsequently by dredging. About 15,000 cubic yards have been removed, and about 2,000 more will be removed during the 4th quarter of this year. This will be sufficient to enable vessels to *wind*, the original object of this excavation. But it would seem to be desirable that more room should be made to accommodate the number of vessels at times seeking this harbor, and I accordingly offer

the estimate of the superintendent, Judge Dart, which I have carefully examined and compared with the prices of labor and materials at that period; but of the necessity of continuing this excavation I respectfully beg the department to be the judge. That portion of the estimate for repairs I deem very important, and beg leave to recommend an appropriation accordingly. The outer crib on the western pier is undermined, the sand washed away, and the crib itself has slid or settled so as to leave a space of ten feet between it and the remainder of the pier. This will be entirely destroyed, and another and a larger pier-head is absolutely necessary. For this, the item for repairs is included in estimate A No. 8, herewith submitted.

The great Ohio railroad along the south coast of Lake Erie commences in the neighborhood of Conneaut. This road I have elsewhere alluded to. It connects Pennsylvania and Michigan, and must be, during the winter season, almost the only channel of communication through this district of country from east to west. It is already located, and every prospect exists that it will be rapidly carried forward to completion. A survey and location of a railroad from Conneaut to Beaver, Penn., on the Ohio river, has been made. In the rear of this harbor, and directly on the line of the Beaver and Conneaut railroad, are situated some very valuable and extensive coal beds now wrought, and rapidly coming into general notice. The coal is very abundant, of the best quality, and highly esteemed. Several of the finest boats on Lake Erie have been built at Conneaut, where the advantages for building are great. The statistical table herewith submitted explains more fully the commercial, agricultural, and manufacturing advantages of the district dependent on this harbor.

12. *Beacon-light at Grand river.*—A very thorough repair of this edifice has been made, as well as of its foundation, which has been secured anew. The planking has been laid anew so far as was necessary, and the light-house itself has been painted and sanded.

Steam dredging machine for Lake Erie.—The contract for this machine was forwarded to the department last fall. Models and specifications had been previously prepared. During the winter the building was commenced by the contractors, Messrs. Lyon & Howard, of New York, and it has been carried on under my own inspection. It should have been completed the 1st of July, but a succession of disappointments and delays, many of them beyond the control of the contractors, has procrastinated the completion of the work. It will be done within the present month if no new disappointment occurs. The delays alluded to arose from difficulty of exchanges, from delays in obtaining the machinery from New York, from disappointment from the maker of the steam-engine in Detroit, and the same cause in relation to the boilers. Lastly, a general prostration of their mechanics and laborers has crippled the contractors, and they are thrown on the forbearance of the government. I owe it to them to say that the hull of the boat and of the dredging lighters, the different and complicated machinery of wood and iron, the engine and boilers, are all constructed in the best and most serviceable and durable manner. The contractors have, of their own accord, in several instances exceeded, in the quality of their work and the amount of labor applied on the machine, that contemplated by the contract.

Though undoubtedly the government has sustained damage by their delay, yet the superior performance of the work may fairly be deemed an offset. A drawing of the work, with a report of its performance, will be forwarded so soon as its capacities are fairly put to the test. The entire cost of the machine complete will be \$15,500, and of the lighter scows \$6,600. The machine has locomotive power sufficient, it is believed, to move with its train of scows from any harbor on the lake to any other, in good weather.

I enclose a report from the contractors.

13. *La Plaisance road, Michigan.*—On this work the entire amount heretofore appropriated has been expended, and the contracts all fulfilled thereon. The labor contracted to be executed on the following portions has been done, viz: 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 29th, 41st, and 42d miles. But the department has already been made aware that the sums appropriated have been entirely insufficient to complete this road on the plan originally designed by the Engineer department. Such parts of the work as have been executed agreeably to that plan offer now a fine and useful causeway; but the other parts of the road having had but little labor applied on them, were never serviceable, and now have become almost impassable in places. The estimate marked A No. 9 is submitted; the first class of items in which is for the amount required to complete this very important road as originally designed and as commenced; the second class of items is for the payment of the liabilities of the government absolutely now due, under the decision of the Secretary of War, to refund to contractors the forfeited amounts of 5 per centum per month, respectively, for delays beyond the time specified for the completion of their contracts. The appropriations on this estimate are respectfully recommended.

Accompanying this report are enclosed, besides the estimates and drawings already mentioned, the tabular statements (of the local agents respectively) of appropriations, expenditures, &c., up to the 30th of September, 1837, as well as certain other tables by them forwarded. By this mail is forwarded, also, a map of Lake Erie, with the towns and harbors protracted on an exaggerated scale, with a view to reference for the plan for each work; the relative length of piers, the relative size of towns, and the distances from harbor to harbor. It also exhibits the courses and directions of the different works from the shore.

All which is respectfully submitted by, sir, with perfect respect, your obedient servant,

HENRY SMITH, *Gen. Sup., &c., Public Works, Lake Erie.*

Brig. Gen. GRATIOT, *U. S. Army, Chief Engineer, Washington, D. C.*

A No. 1.

Estimate for 1838 of funds required to complete the River Raisin harbor.

1st. Excavation:		
Canal, 29,704 cubic yards, at 20 cents per yard, (by contract).....	\$5,940	80
River, and between piers.....	10,800	00
		<hr/>
		\$16,740 80

2d. Piers:

For 630 feet additional pier-work on outer harbor to 12 feet water: 21 cribs, for each crib 30 feet long, 15 wide, and 14 feet high, hewn timber 1,260 feet, placed.....	\$88 00	
Tie pieces, 70, (5 to each course,) at 75 cents each, placed.....	53 00	
For piles, 10, at \$3 each, driven.....	30 00	
For brush.....	5 00	
For cap pieces, 85 feet, at 12 cents per foot, placed.....	10 20	
For stone, 39 cords, at \$6 per cord, deposited.....	234 00	
For workmanship, not included above, and contingencies.....	130 00	
	<hr/>	
21 cribs, at each.....	550 20	\$11, 554 20
Superintendent, 12 months, at \$75 per month.....	900 00	
Contingencies, repairs, &c.....	1, 500 00	
Commission on disbursements.....	767 37½	
	<hr/>	3, 167 37½
		<hr/>
		31, 462 37½
		<hr/>

N. D. CURTIS, *Superintendent.*

MONROE, *Michigan, September 29, 1837.*

Approved and respectfully submitted.

H. SMITH, *General Superintendent.*

MONROE, *Michigan, October 12, 1837.*

A No. 2.

Estimate of funds required for the Huron harbor, Ohio, for continuing the improvements during the year 1838.

Nature of workmanship, contingencies, &c., embracing the intended application of funds required for the year 1838.	Amount.
1,200 piles, average length 20 feet, to drive twelve feet outside the west pier, to form a breakwater, at \$1 25 each.....	\$1, 500 00
800 cords stone, to fill in between said piles and the present pier, to form an inclined plane, at \$6 a cord.....	4, 800 00
For a new pile boat, to be built out of the remains of the old one.....	1, 200 00
For dredging.....	475 00
For laborers and mechanics, including contingent expenses, superintendence, &c.....	2, 200 00
	<hr/>
	10, 175 00

JOHN B. WILBOR, *Superintendent Public Works, Huron, Ohio.*

HURON, *Ohio, September 30, 1837.*

Approved and respectfully submitted.

H. SMITH, *General Superintendent.*

MONROE, *Michigan, September 30, 1837.*

A No. 3.

Estimate of funds required for continuing the improvement at Black river, Ohio, in the year 1838, constructing a permanent work on the foundation of the present piers, and also for the purpose of working the steam dredging machine in removing the gravel-bar in the harbor, as follows:

For 500 piles, 20 feet long, at \$1 each.....	\$500 00
For 500 piles, 25 feet long, at \$1 25 each.....	625 00
For 500 piles, 30 feet long, at \$1 50 each.....	750 00
For 1,800 cords stone, at \$5 each.....	9, 000 00
For contingencies, compensation to superintendent, &c.....	1, 000 00
For driving 1,500 piles, at \$1 each.....	1, 500 00
	<hr/>
	13, 375 00
For expenses of the steam dredging machine, in removing the gravel-bar.....	500 00
	<hr/>
	13, 875 00
	<hr/>

The above estimate for dredging is made for the purpose of removing a deposit of earth which extends into the harbor near the south end of the piers, and obstructs the passage of large vessels.
Respectfully submitted.

H. SMITH, *General Superintendent, &c.*

A No. 4.

Estimate of funds required for securing and rebuilding the public works constructing at Cleveland harbor, in the State of Ohio, in a permanent and durable manner, with stone and masonry, for the year 1838.

Nature of the workmanship, materials, and contingencies embraced in the intended application of the funds required for the works, not including the present appropriations.	Extent.	Cost.
Perches stone, blocks, at \$3 50	3, 500	\$12, 250 00
Perches stone, rough, at 80 cents	30, 000	24, 000 00
Water lime, at \$1 a bushel	1, 200	1, 200 00
Quick lime, at 30 cents a bushel	1, 200	360 00
Cast-iron dowels	2, 600	650 00
Wrought-iron clamps	1, 600	1, 000 00
Piles, at \$2	400	800 00
Stone snubbing posts	12	96 00
Mechanics and laborers		6, 000 00
Superintending		1, 500 00
Contingencies		4, 000 00
		51, 856 00

CLEVELAND, October 1, 1837.

Approved and respectfully submitted.

A. W. WALWORTH, *Agent, &c.*

H. SMITH, *General Superintendent, &c.*

A No. 5.

Estimate of funds required for the service of the public works at the mouth of Grand river, Ohio, during the year 1838.

1st. For completing the repairs on that part of the west pier which was destroyed in the fall of 1835, and building three additional cribs, will be required—		
50 oak piles, 32 feet long, 1,600 feet, at 10 cents per foot	\$160 00	
350 feet of 14-inch square, for capping piles, at 10 cents per foot	35 00	
370 sticks for cribs, 30 feet long, 11,100 feet, at 6 cents per foot	666 00	
315 oak ties, 20 feet long, 6,300 feet, at 5 cents per foot	315 00	
110 oak ties, 30 feet long, 3,300 feet, at 5 cents per foot	165 00	
4,280 perches of stone, at 7s. per perch	3, 745 00	
10,000 feet of oak plank, at \$15 per M.	150 00	
400 pounds of spike, at 12½ cents	50 00	
Iron for bolts and smith's work	300 00	
Carpentry, labor of men, and their board	2, 000 00	
Contingencies, brush, forage, &c.	150 00	
		\$7, 736 00
2d. For repairing the old work of the east and west piers in places where it is absolutely necessary—		
6,730 feet of oak timber, at 6 cents per foot	403 80	
75 oak piles, 25 feet long, at 6 cents per foot	112 50	
2,766 perches of stone, at 7s.	2, 420 25	
6,500 feet of plank, at \$15 per M.	97 50	
Carpentry, labor of men, and board	1, 250 00	
		4, 284 05
3d. For forming the proposed bank of stone against the piers at certain places on inside, it will require 800 perches of stone, at 7s.		700 00
4th. For commencing permanent work agreeably with the directions of Colonel Henry Smith, United States agent for the public works on Lake Erie—		
900 piles, 19 feet long, 17,100 feet, at 5 cents per foot	855 00	
Labor in driving piles	750 00	
18,753 perches of stone	16, 409 00	
Forage and other contingencies	250 00	
		18, 264 00
For building a stone scow	400 00	
Repairing and furnishing a new set of rigging for the pile-driver scow	250 00	
		650 00
For superintendent's commission of 2½ per cent. on disbursing the sum of \$31,634 05		790 85
		32, 424 90

This estimate is made and founded upon actual prices that are now paid for materials, &c., and the quantity required is from actual measurement.

All which is respectfully submitted by your obedient servant,

J. ADAMS POTTER, *Superintendent of Public Works of Grand River Harbor.*

Approved and respectfully submitted.

H. SMITH, *General Superintendent, &c.*

A No. 6.

Estimate of funds required for completing the east pier at Cunningham creek, Ohio, for the year 1838.

For 4,800 feet durable square timber, at 8 cents.....	\$384 00
For 4,000 feet durable flat timber, at 4 cents.....	160 00
For 12,000 feet 2½-inch plank, at \$14 per M.....	168 00
For 800 pounds spikes, at \$12 per cwt.....	96 00
For 150 cords of stone, at \$4 per cord.....	600 00
For labor, board of hands, &c.....	1,200 00
For smithery.....	125 00
For two tons of iron, at \$120 per ton.....	240 00
For 1,000 feet of round timber, at 3 cents.....	30 00
	3,003 00

For the construction of a breakwater the following estimate is submitted:

30,720 feet of flat timber, at 4 cents.....	1,228 80
5,520 feet durable square timber, at 8 cents.....	441 60
72 posts, 24 feet long, 16 in. × 16 in. = 1,728 feet, at 8 cents.....	138 24
38 sills, 48 feet long, 20 in. × 20 in. = 1,632 feet, at 8 cents.....	130 56
8,500 feet flooring, at 1 cent.....	85 00
800 feet braces, at 4 cents.....	32 00
1,638 cords of stone, at \$4.....	6,552 00
11,040 feet 2½-inch plank, at \$14 per M.....	154 56
2,000 pounds of spikes, at \$12 per M.....	144 00
2 tons iron, at \$120 per ton.....	240 00
2 crane scows, (large,) at \$300 each.....	600 00
Smithery.....	300 00
Labor and board of hands.....	3,500 00
	13,546 76

East pier.....	\$3,003 00
Breakwater.....	13,546 76
	16,549 76

CUNNINGHAM CREEK, Ohio, October 12, 1837.

R. HARPER, Superintendent.

Approved and respectfully submitted.

H. SMITH, General Superintendent, &c.

MONROE, Michigan, October 16, 1837.

A No. 7.

Estimate of funds required for the service of the public work at Ashtabula, Ohio, during the year 1838.

Nature of materials, &c., to which the funds required will be applied.	Extent.	Cost.		Am't required for the year 1838.	Remarks.
		Amount.	Aggregate.		
For permanent work—					
Timber.....	72,540 feet.....	\$5,589 60	\$12,967 60		For constructing permanent work.
Stone.....	1,410 cords.....	7,050 00			
Iron.....	400 pounds.....	28 00			
Foreman and carpenters.....	1,300 days.....	1,690 00	3,602 00		
Common laborers.....	2,600 days.....	1,404 00			
Smith work.....		188 00	1,342 00		
Superintendent.....	260 days.....	520 00			
Boarding.....	521 weeks.....	1,042 00			
Crane scow.....		200 00			
Boat.....		50 00	1,005 00		
Team work.....	20 days.....	50 00			
Removing portion of old work.....		250 00	250 00		100 feet west pier, inside at angle.
Blasting and excavating rock to complete.....		8,630 00	8,630 00		Sufficient to complete this work.
Forge.....		375 00	}		Connected with the above operations.
Digging.....		100 00			
Contingencies.....		530 00			
				\$27,996 60	
Deduct amount on hand available for the 4th quarter of 1837.....				3,971 44	
Amount required.....				24,025 16	

ASHTABULA, Ohio, October, 1837.

MATTHEW HUBBARD, Superintendent.

A No. 8.

Estimate of funds required for the operations at Conneaut creek, Ohio, for the year 1838, exhibiting in detail the nature, extent, and probable cost of the several objects contemplated in the expenditure.

Nature, workmanship, materials, and contingencies, embraced in the intended application of the funds estimated for the second quarter.	Extent.	Cost.	General designation of the parts of the construction to which it is proposed to apply the objects contemplated by the expenditure anticipated.
	<i>Cubic yards.</i>		
For dredging the earth under water, and delivering the same on lighter scows, at twenty cents per cubic yard	7,000	\$1,400 00	Dredging basin.
Six laborers to attend lighter scow.....		250 00	Do.
Subsistence.....		150 00	Do.
Contingencies		50 00	Do.
Compensation for disbursing.....		50 00	Do.
		1,900 00	
The same for the third quarter.....		1,900 00	Do.
The same for the fourth quarter.....		1,900 00	Do.
		5,700 00	

A No. 8—Continued.

Repairs for pier-head on the west line of the works to protect the outer cribs from the action of the water, and for filling up a breach already formed by the settling of the cribs.

	First quarter.		Second quarter.		General designation of the parts of the construction to which it is proposed to apply the objects contemplated by the expenditure anticipated.
	Extent.	Cost.	Extent.	Cost.	
Chief carpenter	One.....	\$60 00	One.....	\$60 00	Framing and sinking cribs.
Laborers	Eight.....	120 00	Eight.....	120 00	Do. do.
Smithery		20 00		20 00	Repairing tools.
Stone	120 cords.....	540 00	120 cords.....	540 00	Sinking cribs.
Stone	40 cords.....	180 00	40 cords.....	180 00	Repairing breach.
Logs	80.....	80 00	80.....	80 00	For building pier-head and repairing breach.
Logs	40.....	20 00	40.....	20 00	Do. do. do.
Ties	80.....	20 00	80.....	20 00	Do. do. do.
Square timber.....	600 feet.....	50 00	600 feet.....	50 00	Do. do. do.
Plank	1,000 feet.....	10 00	1,000 feet.....	10 00	Do. do. do.
Subsistence		100 00		100 00	
Contingencies		100 00		100 00	
Compensation for disbursing.....		32 00		32 00	
		1,332 00		1,332 00	

REMARKS.

The object to be accomplished by the appropriation asked for at this time (except for repairing the works) is, to carry out the plan of operations of last season, by excavating a place in the channel of the Conneaut creek for steamboats to wind, and at the same time to afford a more safe and commodious harbor for sail vessels seeking shelter in storms.

A sketch of the harbor and river, showing the proposed excavation, is herewith forwarded. The amount excavated this season, up to the 30th September, 1837, is estimated at fifteen thousand cubic yards, and the funds on hand will complete 2,000 cubic yards more up to the end of the 4th quarter. The appropriation now asked for is believed to be sufficient to complete the basin.

For repairs.—This appropriation asked for is to secure the outer crib of the west line of the works, and to repair the breach made by the settling of the outer end of the crib, which has caused a separation of the crib from its fellow of about ten feet wide. To effect the object, it is proposed to sink a new crib or pier-head of larger dimensions than common cribs, strongly built, and well filled with stone, with a sufficient quantity of stone deposited on the outside of it to protect and support the bottom thereof. A pier-head of this description, it is thought, would be sufficiently strong to resist the force and action of the water, even when dashed against it with all the violence of a northeast storm.

A. DART, *Agent.*

Approved and respectfully submitted.

H. SMITH, *General Superintendent.*

MONROE, *Michigan, September 30, 1837.*

A No. 9.

Estimate of funds required to complete the road leading from La Plaisance bay, Michigan, westwardly, to intersect the Detroit and Chicago road, agreeably to the plan of the Engineer department of the 1st of March, A. D. 1833.

No.	How to be applied.	Amount.	Total.
1	For the purpose of completing the whole road, to the width of 60 feet, on the plan of March 1, A. D. 1833, 37 miles, at \$500 per mile	\$18, 500 00	\$19, 412 50
	For commission on disbursements, &c., at 2½ per cent.	462 50	
	For pay of inspector, &c., 6 months, at \$75 per month	450 00	
2	For the purpose of refunding to William H. Montgomery, for completing a portion of impassable road on said La Plaisance road.	100 00	3, 737 50
	For the purpose of refunding to contractors the amount of 5 per cent. per month, heretofore retained, agreeably to the plan and decision of the War Department	1, 580 00	
	For commission on disbursing the above, 2½ per cent.	42 00	
	For compensation of superintendent for one month paying the foregoing.	75 00	
	For amount of contingencies, &c.	1, 940 50	
	Amount required to complete work, &c.	23, 150 00	

JOHN J. WENDELL, *Superintendent.*

Approved and respectfully submitted.

H. SMITH, *General Superintendent, &c.*

B.

DUNKIRK, *New York, September 30, 1837.*

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report in relation to the United States works of improvement on the south shore of Lake Erie, under my general superintendence, for the year ending on the 30th of September, 1837.

Erie, or Presque Isle harbor.—The works commenced in August, 1836, for securing the breach through the neck of the peninsula enclosing Presque Isle bay, and for forming at that point a navigable channel, have progressed as rapidly as the limited means afforded by the appropriation applicable to that object would allow. The pier which is to close up the breach has been extended 1,740 feet, and for the purpose of giving additional stability nine counterforts or lateral spurs have been added, equal in all to a length of 180 feet, making together 1,920 feet, inclusive of the 600 feet built previous to the 30th of September last; the main line of pier-work at the head of Presque Isle bay is now 2,340 feet long. This is about one-third of the whole length which will be required in addition to the channel piers.

At the old works at the east end of the bay \$420 32 has been expended in rebuilding 180 feet of pier at the south end of the south breakwater, where it joins the main shore. This was rendered necessary by the decay of the old wood-work, in consequence of which a channel had begun to be formed across the sand beach around the extremity of the work. Including this 180 feet, the total number of running feet of pier-work built during the year is 2,100.

The workshops and boarding-houses at the new works at the west end of the bay have been much extended and enlarged, at an expense of \$1,000, and are now quite ample for any probable contingency that will arise during the future prosecution of the work.

The amount of funds available for the year, including the appropriation of \$15,000, was \$20,966 46.

The amount which has been expended is \$20,259 64, distributed as follows, viz: for carrying on the new works at the west end of the bay, \$16,650 01; for rebuilding 180 feet of old work at the east end of the bay, \$420 32; charged to the appropriation for pier as the proportional part of the cost of the steam dredge and scows building at Monroe, Michigan, for the United States works on the south shore of Lake Erie, \$2,189 31; and for building additional quarters, workshops, and stables, at the new works, \$1,000. The amount remaining unexpended on the 30th of September was \$706 82, subject to several charges for work done and materials delivered. The funds being exhausted, the works will be immediately brought to a close for the year.

The whole amount of expenditures by the United States, in connexion with the improvement of this harbor, to the 30th of September, 1837, has been \$112,151 61, as follows, viz: for the works at the east end of the bay, \$84,210 24; charged on account of the steam dredge for Lake Erie, \$2,189 31; for houses, workshops, and stables, at the west end of the bay, \$1,600; for machinery and materials remaining on hand and available on the 30th of September, 1837, \$1,802 50; leaving for the construction of a pier 2,340 feet long, at the upper end of the harbor, \$22,349 56.

The success which so far has attended the prosecution of the work at the head of Presque Isle bay has been entirely satisfactory, and every encouragement is given that the plan now in process of execution will be attended with complete success. As fast as the pier has been constructed the sand has collected against it on the lake side, forming a slope or beach which will protect the work from any

danger on account of ice or of storms; and this accumulation has been so rapid that it has been found expedient to dispense, this season, with the piles which it was originally intended should be driven on both sides of the work to insure its stability. The object in view is to close up a shallow opening, now a mile and a quarter in width, interrupted by a few small sand islets which have recently been formed through the neck of the peninsula which formerly enclosed the harbor of Erie; and by leaving a channel four or five hundred feet wide, guarded on each side by channel piers extending from deep water in the bay to deep water in the lake, a distance of 1,200 feet, to cause a navigable channel to be made by the force of the inward and outward currents, constantly produced in this narrow opening by the tendency of the bay to adjust itself to the ever-varying level caused by the action of winds upon the lake; this being precisely the mode in which the excavation of the eastern channel into the bay was effected. It results from this statement of the nature of the operation now in progress that, in proportion as the pier or dam is extended and the opening thereby diminished, the water, concentrated into a narrower space, will immediately commence to grow deeper by the increased action of the current over the surface of the shoal, and that great economy would result from rapidly extending the pier over the whole of the shoal except the portion which it is proposed to leave for a channel. The difference in the cost between proceeding slowly and with rapidity will in the latter stages of the work be equal to the difference in the expense of constructing the pier in water two or three feet deep, and building it in water eight or ten feet deep. In this instance, therefore, besides the ordinary evils resulting from appropriations incommensurate with the objects in view, the nature of the work itself renders it nearly certain that it will cost twice as much to effect this improvement in six years as it would to do it in three. Governed by these views, the minimum estimate for next year has been placed at \$50,000, and it is earnestly recommended to the department that this amount be asked of Congress.

It appears unnecessary to repeat all that has heretofore been said as to the importance of Presque Isle bay, and of this improvement connected with it, in a commercial and military point of view. When the improvements in progress shall have been completed, the government will have at its disposal, for naval purposes, a perfectly safe roadstead, covering an area of upwards of three hundred acres, with a depth of water of from ten to thirty feet, with entrances at each end having channels sufficiently deep to admit the largest vessels which can navigate the lake; and the immense commerce of the lakes will profit to an extent difficult to estimate by the same advantages. This harbor is every day attracting more attention in the State of Pennsylvania; and besides the Pennsylvania canal, which has been located to this point, the stock has recently been subscribed to secure the charter of a great railroad terminating here, and which, connecting with other works, will form a continuous and direct line from Philadelphia to Erie. This railroad will forcibly illustrate the manner in which the enlightened policy pursued by the general government with reference to the lake improvements is felt in its beneficial consequences throughout the whole extent and in the most secluded portions of our country.

Accompanying my report I forward that of the local agent, P. S. V. Hamot, esq., to which I respectfully refer the department for many interesting details and statistical statements. It appears from Mr. Hamot's report that from the opening of the navigation at Erie, on the 17th of April, to September 30, 1837, five hundred and forty-seven steamboats cleared from the port of Erie, whose tonnage amounted to one hundred and eighty-one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one tons, and the number of passengers on board to seventy-nine thousand three hundred and forty-nine; and that during the same period the number of clearances of ships, brigs, and schooners, was one hundred and seven, whose tonnage amounted to seven thousand eight hundred and sixty-seven tons.

The statements and estimates required by the regulations of the Engineer department are herewith transmitted. I also transmit a map, drawn by myself from a survey which I made for the purpose, showing the condition of the works at the head of the bay on the 30th of September, and also the important changes which have taken place in the shores and shoals in that vicinity since the survey of 1835.

Dunkirk.—The operations for the year have consisted: 1st. In continuing last fall, until the lake was obstructed with ice, the repairs of the breakwater, or east pier, which were in progress at the date of the last annual report. 2d. In repairing and refilling with stone two hundred and seventy-three feet of this breakwater, which was carried away in the great gale of December last, in consequence of the decay of the timber. 3d. In adding in ten feet water an extension of three hundred and ninety-four feet of crib-work, twenty feet wide, to the west end of the breakwater, built with timber to the height of between five and six feet above the level of the lake, and filled with stone. This extension leaves for the western or main entrance into the harbor a width of only three hundred and fifty feet, which is as narrow as it is desirable to make it. 4th. In adding in seven feet water an extension of three hundred and thirty feet to the east end of the breakwater. Of this work two hundred and ten feet is built with timber to the height of four and a half feet above the lake, and filled with stone, and the remaining part will be finished in the same manner in the course of the fall. 5th. In adding to the east end of the west pier, in fifteen feet water, a crib forty-five feet by fifteen feet, built with timber, and filled with stone to the surface of the water, intended to give additional support to the pier-head of stone masonry surmounted by a beacon light-house of wood, which have, during the past summer, been erected at this point by the Treasury Department. This beacon was lighted on the 31st of August, and has proved of great advantage to the harbor, the entrance being at all times easy and safe by keeping it and the light-house in range. These additions have increased the length of the breakwater to two thousand and sixty-four feet, and that of the west pier to one thousand nine hundred and thirty-five feet.

Inclusive of the appropriation for 1837 of \$15,000, the amount of funds available for the year was \$22,869 55. The expenditures have amounted to \$21,002 40, leaving in the hands of the agent on the 30th of September, 1837, \$1,867 15, the whole of which will be expended this fall in completing the eastern extension of the breakwater, and in adding two courses of timber to the height of the old part of this work, to enable it more effectually, by that means, to protect the anchorage within the bay, but more especially to give such increased stability to the decayed timber-work above water as will, if possible, enable it to resist the violence of the winter storms.

The whole amount expended by the United States for the improvement of the harbor of Dunkirk has been \$76,579 28, of which \$1,192 20 remains available in materials and machinery on hand, and \$2,040 72 has been paid out of the Dunkirk appropriation towards the building of a steam dredge and scows for Lake Erie, leaving \$73,346 36, which has been applied to the construction of three thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine feet of pier-work in water from six to fifteen feet deep.

The additions during the past year have greatly improved this valuable harbor, but much remains to be done to complete the works in the manner proposed.

The anchorage and wharves are now well sheltered against westerly winds of ordinary violence; but when the waters of the lake are raised, as is occasionally the case in storms of the greatest severity, four or five feet above their ordinary level, the highest of the piers is inadequate to afford the requisite protection. The timber-work above water decays rapidly; and this cause has already been productive of great expense and injury. In the last three years the sum of \$8,000 has been laid out in repairs, which would have been unnecessary if the material used above water had been stone. Nothing can show more forcibly than this fact the propriety of proceeding without delay to place on a permanent footing these government works, which experience has shown to be productive of such immense benefits. On the northeast the harbor still remains open, danger from that quarter having been much less to be apprehended than from the northwest, particularly as easterly winds at Dunkirk lower instead of raise the water of the lake. The amount of the estimate for carrying on the works in 1838 is the same as was stated in the last annual report by my predecessor, Captain H. Smith; and it will be seen that the largest portion of that amount is to be applied to commencing the stone-work which, from the surface of the water upwards, is to replace the present perishable structure of wood. Stone of excellent quality may be obtained from quarries within five miles of Dunkirk; but to enable these quarries to be opened with advantage and economy, a considerable quantity of stone should be contracted for in the first instance.

The importance of the harbor of Dunkirk in a commercial point of view has heretofore been fully set forth. The surface enclosed by the government works will be about two hundred and eighty acres, of which there are eighty acres of excellent anchorage, with clay bottom; and there is wharf room sufficient for the transaction of a very large business. It occupies a position nearly midway between Buffalo and Erie. It is extremely valuable as a port of refuge, and has been much resorted to for that purpose by steamboats and sail vessels, and it has been selected for the termination of the New York and Erie railroad through the southern tier of counties of the State of New York; a work the completion of which will at once place it among the chief harbors on the shores of Lake Erie. The number of steamboats and sail vessels touching at this port has during the past season greatly increased. From the opening of the navigation on the 5th of May to the 30th of September, 1837, the number of arrivals of steamboats was 630, whose probable tonnage amounted to 183,177 tons, and the number of passengers to 78,700. During the same period the number of arrivals of schooners and sloops was 103. Shipping to the amount of 778 tons is owned at the port.

The annual report of the local agent, Thomas Foster, esq., is herewith transmitted, together with the estimates for the year 1838, (marked B No. 1,) and the statements required by the regulations of the department. The report of the agent embraces many important and interesting details which I have omitted. I also transmit a map of Dunkirk harbor, showing the condition of the works on the 30th of September, 1837, together with a plan of those needed for its further improvement.

Buffalo.—At this important point there have been no expenditures during the past year. I transmit herewith the report of the local agent, I. S. Smith, esq., (marked B No. 2,) to which the department is respectfully referred.

The unusual height of the waters of the lake for the past season, and the increased force given thereby to the waves during the violent gales of last fall, have caused considerable injury to the pier at a point which was supposed to have been sufficiently strengthened, and which would, no doubt, have proved so had the lake remained in the situation it was when this part of the work was constructed. A small portion of the outer pavement of the mole, at a point about one-half way from its inner to its outer extremity, has been washed out, owing to the small size of the stones which at this point it was judged safe to use. The outer and still more exposed parts of the work have received no injury, having been paved with stones of a larger size. Parts also of the pavement of the towing-path have settled, and will require to be relaid.

These injuries have not as yet been productive of serious consequences, and are such as are liable to occur to the most permanent works in situations of such extreme exposure as that occupied by the Buffalo mole, until every part shall have been subjected to the test of time and the greatest violence of the elements. It is absolutely necessary, however, that the damage should be repaired without delay, as otherwise a breach will be made through the mole, and thus, in a violent gale, all communication with the light-house at the extremity of the pier might be cut off; a result which, in the present state of the commerce of Lake Erie, almost the whole of which centres at this port, might be attended with the most disastrous consequences.

An estimate is submitted for repairing this injured portion of the outer slope with stones of a larger size than those first used, and also for resetting parts of the pavement of the tow-path. This work cannot with prudence be deferred longer than until the next working season.

Besides the sum necessary for repairs, an appropriation is required to reimburse the superintendent for advances made to bring the works to completion in 1836. These advances were productive of the greatest advantage to the government, and the superintendent is entitled to much praise for his public spirit in making them. Owing to some misunderstanding, the amount was not appropriated at the last session of Congress, and he has in consequence been subjected to much inconvenience. The estimate of the superintendent (marked B No. 3) accompanies this report. I also transmit the requisite statements, and an engraved map of Buffalo, accompanying the local superintendent's report.

There are now fifty steamboats on Lake Erie, whose tonnage amounts to 10,509 tons, and eleven more launched and on the stocks, which will be ready next season, whose tonnage will be about 5,000 tons; and there are two hundred and thirty ships, brigs, schooners, and sloops, amounting to 16,931 tons. The steamboats make their trips once a week, and the sail vessels once in two weeks; so that the coasting trade of the upper lakes next season will amount to 75,904 tons per month. To the residents in this section of country it is well known that the whole of this immense commerce owes its safe existence to the United States harbor improvements.

Black Rock.—Nothing has been done at this place during the past year, and the different works remain in nearly the same situation they were at the time of the last annual report by my predecessor, Captain H. Smith. The mole on Bird island has not been injured by the storms or ice, and it appears to answer perfectly the purpose for which it was intended.

The traverse pier received some injury at the breaking up of the ice in the spring, owing to the current produced by an extensive breach made in the State works forming the Black Rock basin. A few of the large paving-stones and a small portion of the embankment were removed.

The State of New York has very thoroughly repaired the damage done to its work, and the injury to the traverse pier will be repaired this fall. The pier which projects from the main shore for the

purpose of arresting the sand in its progressive motion along the beach, and preventing it from accumulating in the Black Rock basin, has received no injury. The accumulation of sand against the south side of it has, however, been so great that it begins to pass around the outer extremity of the work; and the pier must be extended, or, which would, perhaps, be more economical, a new one constructed, about three hundred yards to the south of it, as was recommended last year, in order to accomplish the object in view. The cause, however, which produces this motion of the sand is constant and uniform in its action, and I believe that nothing will effectually remedy the evil short of entirely protecting the shore between Buffalo and Black Rock from the surf of Lake Erie, or confining the sand in its place by a series of parallel piers projecting from the beach at suitable intervals over nearly the whole of the distance included between the present pier and Buffalo creek. The effect of this latter mode would be to cut this beach into small portions, each of which would assume such a direction that the surf caused by the prevailing westerly winds would no longer produce a progressive motion towards the north in the particles of sand of which the beach is composed. In the summer of 1835, in obedience to that part of the general instructions of the Engineer department which enjoined upon me the duty of making careful surveys of the different harbors under my charge, with a view of determining the precise amount of the changes which are constantly taking place, I surveyed, among others, the harbors of Buffalo and Black Rock, and the small portion of Lake Erie included between them, with that object, and made such connexions with fixed points as would enable me at any future period to determine the precise amount of the change which in the interval had taken place. Since that period an evident alteration has been produced in the shape and position of the shore; but having had no funds at my disposal to make another survey, I am without the means of accurate comparison.

On the chart which, in 1835, I made and transmitted to the department, I traced a sketch of a work which I thought would be of great utility. The same thing was done on the charts of Dunkirk and Erie, which at the same time were submitted. The work at Buffalo, however, appears not to have found favor with those most interested; and I allude to it only for the purpose of stating, with the sanction of the department, that a discrepancy which apparently exists in document 82, 24th Congress, 1st session, House of Representatives, between the statements made by the department and myself in relation to that survey, has no existence in reality, both statements being correct in the senses in which they were intended.

Not having this year received a report from the local agent, General P. B. Porter, I transmit a copy (marked B No. 4) of the one which he made last season, as being applicable to the present circumstances of the work, and I respectfully recommend that the amount of the estimate therein contained be asked for at the approaching session of Congress.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. S. BROWN, *Gen'l Superintendent of the U. S. works
at Erie, Dunkirk, Buffalo, and Black Rock.*

Brigadier General C. GRANT, *Chief Engineer, Washington City, D. C.*

B No. 1.—(a)

Estimate of funds required [at Dunkirk harbor] for constructing a permanent stone wall of nine feet high on the pier at the western entrance into the bay, from the beacon-light, running in-shore.

6,000 cubic yards large quarry stone, at \$2 per yard.....	\$12, 000 00
6,000 cubic yards mason-work, at \$1 30 per yard.....	7, 800 00
3,000 bushels water cement, at 37½ cents per bushel.....	1, 125 00
1 ton bar-iron, for clamps, at \$200 per ton.....	200 00
12 laborers to carry off stone, lime, sand, working scows, machinery, &c., and perform all the required labor while constructing the work, 2,808 days, at 90 cents per day, boarding included.....	2, 527 20
Superintendence, 312 days, at \$2 50 per day.....	780 00
Add 10 per cent. for contingencies on \$23,682 20.....	2, 368 22
Amount required for this object.....	<u>26, 800 42</u>

THOMAS FORSTER, *Superintendent, &c.*

B No. 1.—(b)

Estimate of funds required for extending the breakwater [at Dunkirk harbor] eastward six hundred feet.

22 flat side-sticks, each 32 feet, 13 by 15 inches, at \$2 50.....	\$55 00
46 hard wood cross-ties, 20 feet, 10 inches diameter, at 75 cents.....	34 50
66 feet hewn timber for posts, at 8 cents per foot.....	5 28
19 cords pier stone, at \$8 per cord.....	152 00
33 cords pier stone, at \$4 per cord.....	132 00
12 laborers, 6 days, (72 days,) at \$1 per day.....	72 00
Carpentry.....	61 00
Superintendence and agency.....	30 00
Contingencies.....	75 00
Cost of one crib 30 feet long.....	<u>616 78</u>

Cost of 20 cribs, 30 feet each, at \$616 78, is	\$12, 335 60
Add for unforeseen contingencies.....	863 98
	13, 199 58
Amount required for this object.....	
Total amount required for the service of the year 1838, viz:	
Estimate marked (a).....	26, 800 42
Estimate marked (b).....	13, 199 58
	50, 000 00

Very respectfully submitted by your obedient servant,

THOMAS FORSTER, *Superintendent, &c.*

B No. 2.

Report in relation to Buffalo harbor.

SEPTEMBER 30, 1837.

There having been no appropriation last year, and no balance in the treasury applicable to these works, nothing has been done towards improving them.

The works were constructed with a view to resisting the force of the surf as the level of the lake was several years ago, at which time it was supposed that no wave could reach the summit; but the increased height of the lake (nearly three feet) has of course added that much to the height, and a much greater proportional *force* to the waves; and they have not only reached the top, but have rolled over it in sheets two or three feet deep. The outer part of the mole, paved with large flat stones, has received no injury, although subjected to surf of nearly double the force that was ever anticipated.

The in-shore part of the inclined plane, extending from the eastern angle to the lake, is paved with small flat stones, about one foot in width; it remained entire several years, until the tempest last fall made a break in the paving, and swept out the stones about one-half through the wall; this break, for want of means, has not been repaired. Should the small stones be replaced, it will be constantly liable to damage from the same causes, and cannot be counted upon as permanent. If left as it is, without repairs, the whole work will be exposed to destruction. It is therefore recommended that the whole of that portion of the mole be *repaired* with large stones, like the rest of the work.

The whole area of Buffalo harbor and creek, including the entire surface from the mouth of the creek to the projected south channel, is less than *twenty-eight* acres.

If nothing more effectual be done to enlarge the accommodations for vessels, it will soon be necessary to construct a wall upon the beach or lake side of the peninsula, about one mile in length, at a cost of about forty thousand dollars; some dredging in the creek, cost, perhaps, four thousand dollars; and the wall in front of the government land must be completed, at a cost of about eight thousand dollars.

I present no plan for those operations, preferring to leave the whole until the city authorities (which heretofore opposed the plans for enlarging the harbor) shall have determined upon some that may be feasible.

Herewith I transmit an estimate of funds wanted for the year 1838.

ISAAC S. SMITH, *Agent, &c.*

B No. 3.

Estimate of funds wanted for Buffalo harbor for the year 1838.

To pay arrearages.....	\$9, 897 22	
Contingencies	502 78	
	\$10, 400 00	
To repave the in-shore inclined plane, 8,000 superficial feet of large deep stones, at 60 cents	4, 680 00	
To labor, 16 men, 200 days, each \$1	3, 200 00	
To cranes, tackle, chains, sledges, &c.....	500 00	
To superintendence and contingencies.....	1, 220 00	
	9, 600 00	
	20, 000 00	

ISAAC S. SMITH, *Agent.*

BUFFALO, *September 30, 1837.*

B No. 4.

[Extract.]

BLACK ROCK, *October 31, 1836.*

Sir: The following is an estimate of the expense of completing and strengthening the present works of the Black Rock harbor; and for which it is very desirable that an appropriation should be made at the approaching session of Congress.

The upper part of Black Rock harbor is separated from the Erie canal (which leaves the harbor some distance below its mouth, and passes on to Buffalo, in a line nearly parallel to the lake shore) by a naked sand beach some two or three hundred yards in breadth. The timber and shrubbery which formerly grew on and in the rear of this beach, and which served to arrest and detain the sands in their place, having all been cut off within the last few years, has given greater scope and action to the winds from the lake, which have already driven the sand at the lower part of the beach back in the direction of the canal, to such an extent as to threaten a breach across the sand-bar from the lake to the canal, the effect of which would be to fill the harbor as well as canal with sand.

The object of the work for which an appropriation is now sought is, to guard against this danger by the construction of a mole, three hundred feet in length, along this part of the sand beach, to be composed of piles and stone, and of the expense of which the following is the estimate:

300 piles, twelve feet in length, cost.....	\$300
5,000 feet sheet piling.....	60
300 feet of stone wall, four feet high and four feet in breadth; 60 cords of stone, at \$4 50 per cord.....	270
Pile-driver and hammer, say.....	150
Labor.....	250
Contingencies.....	150
	1, 180
Add balance of Colonel Totten's estimate, now required.....	8, 000
Total.....	9, 180

In the summer of the year 1833 Colonel Totten, of the engineer corps, made a survey of the lake harbors under the direction of the War Department, and in his report recommended the construction of certain works in the Black Rock harbor, the expense of which he estimated at \$20,000. In accordance with this recommendation, Congress, at the succeeding session, made an appropriation of \$12,000, which has been expended in conformity with Colonel Totten's views. The complement of this estimate (\$8,000) could now very advantageously be expended.

P. B. PORTER, *Superintendent.*

C.

ROCHESTER, *October 24, 1837.*

Sir: As the amount required for constructing the pier-head of the western pier, with the view of obtaining a good foundation for the beacon-light, bore so great a proportion to the whole sum available for the public works at the mouth of the Genesee river, New York, for the year 1837, it was found to be impracticable, with a proper regard to economy, to commence the masonry this season; and even had the appropriation been much larger, but little could have been done; for after my arrival here, which was not before the middle of June, arrangements had to be made for obtaining suitable materials. It was therefore determined, as the best course, to finish the pier-head, and expend the balance remaining in the purchase of stone.

The pier-head is now completed; and the contract entered into for three thousand tons of limestone, from the quarries at Chaumont bay, will, in the course of a few days, be fulfilled.

The west pier extends two thousand six hundred and seventy feet into the lake, and the east two thousand six hundred and thirty-four. They are both twenty feet wide, with the exception of a small part of each, which is but sixteen. They consist of crib-work, each crib being sixteen or twenty feet wide and thirty long. The cribs are formed of side pieces, centre pieces, ties, and flooring; to every two side and one centre stick there are four ties; the ties, which run across the piers, instead of being carried up, the one directly above the other, break alternately backwards and forwards, to secure greater strength in the side timbers, and to afford places upon which a portion of the stone with which they are filled may lodge.

Piles have been driven on the outside of the cribs, but they appear to have been productive of no very good effect; stones, thrown in by their sides, preventing the irregular settling of them much better.

The average height of the piers above the surface of the water is nearly three feet. The width of the harbor at its mouth is four hundred and forty-six feet; and, as the piers are not exactly parallel, it becomes broader as you enter.

To obtain a correct delineation of the bottom of the harbor, sections were made across it, sixty-six feet apart, and soundings taken at the end of every ten feet; horizontal planes were passed at one foot apart, and their intersections with the bottom ascertained; the accompanying drawing will, therefore, give a tolerably accurate idea of the present state of the harbor. From it, it will be seen that the greatest depth in the channel, between the piers, is twenty-three feet; and the least, twelve feet four inches; and that at the entrance of the harbor there is seventeen feet water within the piers, and to a distance of about three miles the average depth of the river is twenty-eight feet.

As both piers run across what was once an extensive shoal, it was to be feared that a deposition of sand would take place immediately beyond the mouth of the harbor; but, on examination, it is found that there is no appearance whatever of the formation of any shoal there. From the centre of the channel, between the piers, where the water is seventeen feet deep out to twenty-two feet water, the descent is as gradual and as regular as the natural shore of the lake; the least depth of water beyond the end of the piers is sixteen feet.

The piers have been finished three years; the large shoal over which they run has been entirely removed; and as there is now no evidence of the formation of any bar beyond them, it is reduced to an almost absolute certainty that any further prolongation of the works into the lake will never become necessary.

From the position of the piers and the width of the harbor at its mouth, whether the wind be from the northeast, north, or northwest, it can be entered with equal facility. This is, undoubtedly, a very great advantage, and one of which the navigators of the lake avail themselves; for vessels, when caught in a severe gale, if it be possible to make this harbor, run to it for safety.

For the purpose of contrasting the present state of the harbor with the condition of the mouth of the river previous to the commencement of its improvement, the old line of eight feet water has been laid down on the accompanying drawing. The channel was then crooked, and the depth of water on the bar between eight and nine feet. Besides the want of sufficient water to allow the largest-sized vessels to enter, it was only when the wind was in a particular direction that vessels of any size could enter at all. There is now a channel four hundred and forty-six feet and over wide, perfectly straight, with sufficient depth of water for any vessel that navigates the lake.

The whole work, being an extent of pier something over a mile, has, from its commencement to the 30th of September last, cost one hundred and seventeen thousand eight hundred and twelve dollars. By means of this expenditure a very superior harbor has been obtained at the mouth of the Genesee river; and though the attempt to form an artificial one was at first but an experiment, it is an experiment which has been attended with perfect success.

It now becomes a matter of great importance to secure permanently the advantages that have been obtained.

When the works were examined by Colonel Totten, of the engineer corps, he recommended, as a means of rendering them permanent, the conversion of the wood-work above low-water mark into masonry; his plan was to build on the sides of the piers strong stone walls, using hydraulic mortar, to fill the intervening space with rubble stone, and to cover the top with flagging stone.

The accompanying drawing will show the manner in which it is contemplated to construct the masonry. The average size of the stones obtained from Chaumont bay is five feet long, two feet four inches broad, and one foot nine inches high. With stones of this size for the outside, and smaller ones for the interior, the walls will be built.

They will vary in thickness from three to six feet; three, where least exposed; six, where most. To give the walls a greater bearing on the piers, counterforts, twenty feet apart, two feet deep, and six feet long, will be constructed. They will not only strengthen the walls, but will counteract any tendency they may have to slide; this tendency will arise from the cribs not having in all places settled vertically, the bottom on which they rest being a very fine shifting sand. In some parts the subsidence of the cribs on one side has been considerably more than on the other; and where this inequality is very great, it will be necessary, before building the masonry, to buttress with additional cribs.

The top course is to be three feet wide, and, as each stone of it will be fastened to its adjacent one with two iron bolts, all the stones of this course will be connected together. To prevent the waves from raising and thus displacing any of them, they will be keyed to the course below. As these two courses will then form, as it were, but one, it will be all but impossible for the upper part of the walls to be disturbed, even by the most violent waves.

The most convenient height for the piers above the surface of the water is six feet; and as the waters of Lake Ontario are subject to a change of level of about two feet, they will be built seven feet above the lowest low-water mark.

To render it practicable to reach the end of the western pier, even in the most boisterous weather, a parapet wall, three feet high and three feet thick, will be added.

This is indispensably necessary; for the light at the end of this pier is, of course, much more needed in stormy weather than in fair. The space between the walls will be filled with rubble stone, and the top paved with heavy flagging stone.

The following is a comparative estimate of the funds required for finishing the work, viz:

234,562 cubic feet large sized stone, at 20 cents per foot	\$46, 912 40
113,378 cubic feet inferior sized stone, at 19 cents per foot.....	11, 337 80
76,557 cubic feet paving stones, at 30 cents per foot	22, 967 10
424,124 superficial feet stone, rough hammered, at 5 cents	21, 206 20
382,939 cubic feet masonry laid, at 5 cents	19, 146 95
76,557 cubic feet paving stones, at 4 cents	3, 062 28
12,934 bushels hydraulic lime, at 37½ cents per bushel	4, 850 25
729,119 cubic feet old work removed, at ½ cent per foot	3, 645 59
548,134 cubic feet rubble stone replaced, at ½ cent per foot	2, 740 67
9,000 iron bolts in place, at 50 cents per bolt.....	4, 500 00
200 feet additional crib-work.....	5, 000 00
	<hr/>
	145, 369 24
Contingencies.....	14, 631 76
	<hr/>
	160, 000 00
	<hr/>
Required for 1838.....	50, 000 00
Required for 1839.....	60, 000 00
Required for 1840.....	50, 000 00
	<hr/>

It is respectfully requested that the whole amount asked for for the year 1838 be appropriated; for though the piers still withstand perfectly well the violence of the waves, the top timbers have in many places become very rotten, and if the masonry be not carried on rapidly, the expense of repairs will, in time, be considerable.

The quantity of rubble stone now in the piers above low-water mark is more than sufficient to fill the space between the walls that are to be built; but if they are allowed to be swept away, another item would necessarily have to be added to the estimate.

In compliance with the request of the department, the following facts are subjoined, viz:

Population of Rochester.

Last census.....	17, 160
Increase since 1835.....	2, 764

Commerce.—There are twenty forwarding establishments connected with the business either of Lake Ontario, the Genesee river, or the Erie canal.

Flour trade.

The number of mills.....	20
The number of runs of stone.....	94

These mills, when in full operation, can grind 25,000 bushels of grain per day, turn out 5,000 barrels of flour, and require a daily outlay of from thirty-five to forty thousand dollars. During the year 1836 between four and five hundred thousand barrels of flour were shipped from Rochester, either by the lake or the Erie canal. The annual sales of flour are estimated at about \$5,000,000.

Manufactories.

There is a cotton and woollen cloth and a carpet manufactory, with a great variety of other kinds, the annual sales from which amount to about.....	\$2, 480, 000
Dry goods, &c., annual sales.....	1, 900, 000
Groceries and provisions.....	1, 300, 000
General business of Rochester, estimated at.....	12, 000, 000

Revenue.

Canal tolls for 1836.....	190, 000
Receipt of customs at the port of Rochester in 1836.....	60, 000
Receipt of customs at the port of Rochester in 1835.....	24, 000

Trade with Canada.—The number of bushels of wheat imported in 1836, 200,000. Besides the importation of wheat, there is something done in the lumber business.

Steamboats.—There is one which plies regularly between the port of Rochester and Toronto, and the American boats touch on their way up as well as down the lake.

To facilitate the conveyance of travellers as well as freight between the city of Rochester and its port, a railroad was constructed on the east side of the river, to the head of ship navigation, and is now, and has been for some time, in full operation. A charter was likewise obtained for the construction of another on the west side, to run to the mouth of the river; but this has not yet been commenced. The railroad to Batavia is completed, and it is understood that measures have been taken to carry on with vigor the one that is to be constructed to Auburn.

These two roads form but links of the great chain that will eventually extend from the shores of the Atlantic to Lake Erie.

The Genesee Valley canal, intended to connect the Erie canal at this point with the Alleghany river, is commenced; it will run through a region proverbial for its fertility, and will open another great avenue to the west.

These different improvements, as well as some other of the facts mentioned, cannot be said to have any very direct bearing on the improvement of the harbor; but when it is considered how much the business of Rochester is to be increased by them, and at the same time the mutual effect they must necessarily have on each other, it will not seem irrelevant to have touched upon them. One fact alone will show the increasing importance of the harbor. Previous to the year 1835, the receipts of the custom-house were not sufficient to meet the necessary expenditures; in 1835, about \$24,000 were collected, and in 1836, \$60,000; and there is every reason to believe that, with an increased business, there will be a corresponding increased revenue.

The above facts have been politely furnished me by Henry O'Reily, esq., of Rochester.

As nothing has been done this season at the mouth of the *Oak Orchard creek* towards the construction of the piers, the drawing that was forwarded to the department last year will exhibit the present condition of the work. The sum of money appropriated for this work for the year 1837 being entirely too small to effect any decided improvement in the harbor, it has been expended in procuring timber, building scows, and collecting stone from the lake shore. Of timber, fifty-three thousand feet were received before the 30th of September last, and the whole one hundred thousand contracted for will be delivered by the middle of November. Both the crane scow and the one for carrying stone are finished, and though exertions were made to procure a large quantity of stone from the lake shore, the great height of the water prevented it.

The quarries in this vicinity consist of a red sandstone, which disintegrates almost immediately on exposure to the atmosphere, so that above the surface of the water the cribs will have to be filled with stone from the shores of the lake.

With the one hundred thousand feet of timber twelve hundred and sixty feet of pier can be constructed; and as the timber will be on the spot and ready for use, the work can be carried on vigorously as well as economically next season.

The depth of water on the inside of the bar being over twenty feet, the mouth of the creek is capable of being so improved as to form a very excellent and safe harbor.

The want of a good harbor along this part of the lake is much felt, for vessels in distress have now no place to run to short of Lewistown or Genesee river.

The following is an estimate of funds required for the year 1838, viz:

1,044 ties, 20 feet long, at 75 cents per stick.....	\$783 00
783 side timbers, 30 feet long, at \$1 25 per stick.....	978 75
288 pieces, 24 feet long, at \$1.....	288 00
3,000 cords rubble stone, at \$3 per cord.....	9, 000 00

134,130 feet workmanship, at 5½ cents per foot.	\$7, 377 15
33,600 pounds of iron, worked, at 10 cents per pound.	3, 360 00
288 piles driven, at \$3 per pile	864 00
	22, 650 90
Contingencies.....	2, 349 10
	25, 000 00

With this sum both piers can be carried out to eleven feet water, the west being eleven hundred feet long, and the east nine hundred. It is to be hoped that the amount of the estimate will be appropriated; for besides the necessity of having such a harbor for the safe navigation of the lake, the surrounding country is very fertile, and the situation at the mouth very good for a town, and nothing seems wanting but a good harbor to make it, in a short time, a place of considerable business.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM SMITH, *Second Lieutenant Engineers.*

General C. GRANT, *Chief Engineer, Washington.*

D.

Annual report of the progress and condition of the United States works at Big Sodus bay, September 30, 1837.

The entrance of this bay was a half mile in width, and obstructed by a bar of hardpan, gravel, sand, and pebbles; to remove which, and to secure the entrance from obstruction, was the object of the laws of Congress which authorized the construction of piers from both sides of the bay. These piers have answered every purpose of their construction. But the natural decay of the timber has commenced; and to preserve this harbor, that much of the piers from the water's edge upwards should be prevented from further decaying and falling into the channel by the application of stone masonry, for which object an estimate is herewith presented for the year 1838.

The government, in the year 1836, commenced to open and remove the bar between the piers by the use of dredging machinery, and, to the date of the present report, three-fourths of this work has been accomplished, opening a straight channel of fifteen feet in depth of water, leaving the remainder of the deepening and widening to be completed in the year 1838, for which object an estimate is herewith submitted.

The diagram exhibits the work done and to be done. The opening of channels by dredging has become frequent. But this work at Sodus bay has peculiar features, promising durability. The excavation will not fill in again, because there are no elements in sufficient motion to reform a deposit. The bay is an estuary of the lake, and the streams that flow into this bay are so small in comparison with the bulk of the bay and with the dimensions of the channel, that a velocity from that cause would at no time be created equal to the removal of any sand in the bed of the bay; moreover, there is a small current setting alternately from and to both the bay and the lake in every hour of the day, which will be further noticed.

The beacon-light constructed at the north end of the pier is finished, so far as relates to the building, and lantern, and other fixtures. A guarded passage over the pier of 265 yards in length, and a further deposit of stone to secure the foundation pier, are essential, and for which an estimate is submitted.

Since the construction of the piers, an effect has been produced by the motion of the waves and a new current around the head of the pier to the east, which, together with the high water for several years past, have formed an eddy around Point Charles, which has encroached upon the point marked A on the diagram, and which eddy has also extended its effects to the point of sand B of the isthmus, and caused some variation in its position; to prevent an increase of these effects, it is necessary to deposit a pier at each of those points, and for which an estimate is included. During a storm in August last, aided by the eddy just mentioned, a shallow breach was made in the isthmus of 120 feet in width and three deep, which is now filling up by the construction of piers, as marked on the diagram.

To prevent the recurrence to maps and documents I will state the dimensions of Big Sodus bay. This bay extends to the south five miles from its entrance into Lake Ontario, and two and a half miles in width, which forms a sheet of water of twelve square miles, affording an anchorage to any number of vessels of increasing navigation of the lake, in water of from 12 to 40 feet in depth. This bay is surrounded by a fertile country, and a rapidly increasing population, and is now connecting with Lakes Cayuga and Seneca and the river Susquehanna by a canal and railroad, and with an extensive water-power from the lakes into the bay, and will at an early day become an important point of commerce and intercommunication between the western States, Canada, and Chesapeake bay, and the Atlantic harbors.

Further remarks upon the hourly currents between the piers.—These currents run alternately in and out of the bay and lake once in every hour; the duration and velocity are influenced by the winds. The causes of these currents are not evident. Perhaps they originate by the combined action of wind, tide, and the current occasioned by Niagara falls. Of the wind—it is certain that, in the absence of the other two supposed causes, the wind would occasion a current corresponding to its course, durability, and strength. As, however, these currents exist in calm weather, the wind cannot be the only cause. The natural course of the water down the lake to its exit in the St. Lawrence is, perhaps, disturbed by the volume of water, the surplus of the upper lakes, that falls over Niagara, and flows violently into the more quiet mass at Lake Ontario, and may thus produce a motion across the lake, and, by reflex action, cause an undulation that may influence the alternate currents alluded to. Of tide—the theory that pertains to the ocean does, of course, produce its ratio of effect in the lakes; the mass in Ontario is more than six hundred cubic miles of water. The flow of tides would produce a sensible influence upon such a volume; the motion of which, interrupted by contiguous shores, would cause an undulatory action of the whole mass, that might be evident in the currents at Sodus bay. Further observations upon these currents and upon the motion of the waters at the commencement of the St. Lawrence, to determine whether the velocity there be equable, might be useful to decide this question.

Respectfully submitted.

J. G. SWIFT.

D No. 1.

Estimate for funds required in the year 1838, for the United States works at Big Sodus bay, New York.

1. Dredging the channel, now in operation, 400,000 cubic feet, at 3 cents.....	\$12,000 00
2. For piers at A and B—	
30,000 feet, at 7 cents	2,100 00
2,000 pounds iron, at 10 cents.....	200 00
300 cords stone, at \$3	900 00
	<hr/>
	15,200 00
	<hr/>

J. G. SWIFT.

D No. 2.

Estimate for funds required in the year 1838, for permanent work at Big Sodus bay, New York.

1. To 5,000 tons of stone from Sackett's Harbor, at \$2 50	\$12,500 00
2. For workmanship in laying the same in the water.....	5,000 00
	<hr/>
	17,500 00
	<hr/>

J. G. SWIFT.

D No. 3.

Estimate for securing and travelling to and from the beacon-light.

1. For blacksmith's work.....	\$250 00
2. For 265 yards of a guard-walk, at \$1.....	265 00
3. For 100 cords of stone for foundation, at \$3.....	300 00
	<hr/>
	815 00
	<hr/>

J. G. SWIFT.

E.

OSWEGO, October 16, 1837.

SIR: * * * I resumed the charge of the work on the 17th of June last, but, to save the trouble of making out returns at that time, I received the funds as they were on the 1st of June, and assumed all the payments from that time. Little had been done, except repairing the damages sustained by the works last winter. 1. The pavement, in consequence of the unfinished state in which it was left, and the want of a sufficient quantity of large stone at the foot of that portion of it which was laid down late in the season, was much disturbed and thrown down, and some of the stone carried off into deep water. 2. The east pier was stripped of its flooring and stringers, for about 150 feet in length, and some 20 or 30 cords of stone washed out; and the east pier-head, from some defect of construction of the part below water, settled down on the inner corner about 2 feet, and was otherwise so much injured as to require taking down and rebuilding the upper part of it.

Since I took charge of the work the paving of the mole has been prosecuted and nearly finished, and the work of tearing down the wood-work of the old pier, and substituting masonry for it, has been commenced. About 2,803 tons of limestone for paving mole have been received from contractors since my last report, and about 3,495 tons laid in the mole, which, besides repairing the damages alluded to, has paved about 550 feet in length, or about 19,250 square feet of pavement. There remained on the 30th of September about 110 feet in length of mole unpaved; the materials for finishing it are on hand, and the greater part of it will be finished this fall. There have also been received from contractors about 520 tons of limestone for masonry wall, and about 498 tons of limestone for coping and flagging the top of the pier.

The work of substituting masonry has been commenced at the west end of the west pier. That portion from the shore to the angle, comprising about 230 feet in length, has been removed to a depth of from 3 to 4 feet below the present level of the water, and dry masonry of heavy stones commenced on the timber-work and carried up to the surface, where the masonry in hydraulic lime mortar commences. The exterior wall is composed of heavy limestone, neatly scabbled and laid in courses, and rises 14 feet above the water. The interior wall, against which the vessels lie, is composed of the same materials, and rises 6 feet above the water. The inner wall of the parapet rises 8 feet above the inner portion of the pier, and is composed of common stone from the quarries at this place, neatly hammered and laid in courses. The top is covered with heavy limestone flag, 8 or 10 inches thick, with heavy coping stones 1 foot thick around the edges. I refer you to the plan and profile forwarded with my last annual report. It will form a very beautiful and permanent work.

The plan of the work forwarded with my last annual report contemplated raising the parapet wall 16 feet above the water, and laying the walls of undressed stone. It is now believed that 14 feet is sufficiently high, and that for a wall washed continually by a heavy sea it is necessary to have closer joints than can be made with rough stone, and that, unless the stone be reduced to uniform thicknesses, so as to be laid in courses, the bond cannot be made sufficiently strong. I have therefore introduced the alterations suggested by these considerations into the plan of the work and into the estimate, and submit it for your approval.

On the 30th of September 1,200 perches of masonry had been laid, and 2,500 feet of stone cut. The portion of the wall which is exposed to the action of the waves, about 80 or 100 feet from the angle, will be finished this fall; the rest will be left in an unfinished state for want of funds.

The whole operation, since my last report, involves an expenditure of \$23,681 02; \$22,033 07 of which has been expended since I resumed charge of the work, and for which I now forward vouchers.

The same difficulty has been experienced this year as last, in consequence of the high water in the lake. This has been more felt in commencing the foundations of the walls than in any other part of the work. It has also prevented me from getting out from the quarries the quantity of large stone required for securing the foot of the pavement. Enough, however, has been got out and deposited to insure the paving against any immediate or very serious displacement, but a considerable quantity will be yet required to insure permanency.

The estimate for finishing the work is made with such alterations and amendments of the estimate last furnished as my experience this season in the cost of masonry has suggested. In my last I had estimated too low for the masonry, the labor, lime, sand, and the stone-cutting.

The light-house.—The new light-house is completed, and was lighted the 15th of July last. The foundation has proved to be a good one; no signs of settling have appeared. The appropriation is entirely expended.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. C. SMEAD, *Lieutenant and Agent for Engineer Department.*

General C. GRATIOT, *Chief Engineer, Washington City.*

E No. 1.

Estimate of funds required for the operations at Oswego, N. Y., during the year 1838, exhibiting the nature, extent, cost, and probable application, within the time above specified, of the several objects of contemplated expenditure.

Nature of workmanship, materials, and contingencies embraced in the intended application of the funds estimated for the year 1838.	Extent.	Cost.
Small stone for raising outside of pier, at \$2 50 per cord.....cords..	275	\$687 50
Large limestone for masonry wall, forming exterior perpendicular face of the work towards sea and channel, at \$2 per ton..... tons...	2, 650	5, 300 00
Large limestone for interior wall towards harbor, at \$2 per ton.....do....	2, 000	4, 000 00
Large stone for inner masonry wall of parapet, at \$5 per cord.....cords..	250	1, 250 00
Large limestone flags, eight inches thick, for flagging and coping top of pier, at \$2 50 per ton..... tons...	926	2, 315 00
Large stone posts for fastening vessels to, at \$25 each.....	7	175 00
One-inch copper bolting for dowels to coping, at \$1 25 per foot.....feet...	400	500 00
One by ¾-inch bar iron for cramps to coping, at 13 cents per foot.....do....	2, 250	292 50
Lead for securing cramps, at \$8 per 100 pounds..... lbs....	2, 500	200 00
Water lime, at \$1 50 per barrel..... bbls....	1, 025	1, 537 50
Common lime, at 25 cents per bushel..... bush....	1, 750	437 50
Sand, at 3 cents per bushel..... do.....	17, 702	531 06
Dressing coping stone, at \$1 per foot, (running measure)..... feet...	2, 262	2, 262 00
Cutting limestone for exterior faces of the work, at 37 cents per foot.....do....	13, 434	4, 970 58
Masonry for laying walls, at 75 cents per perch, including tenders.....perch..	6, 328	4, 746 00
Labor of men for completing the paving of the mole, removing the timber-work of old pier, working cranes, unloading vessels, flagging top, &c., at \$1 per day..... days....	12, 000	12, 000 00
Horses for working cranes, at \$80 each.....	2	160 00
Forage for two horses.....		150 00
Per diem allowance of agent, at \$1 per day.....		365 00
Contingencies, 10 per cent. on \$41,879 64.....		4, 187 96
		46, 067 60

R. C. SMEAD, *Lieutenant and Agent for Engineer Department.*

F.

ENGINEER OFFICE, *Hudson River Improvement, Troy, N. Y., October 28, 1837.*

SIR: In compliance with the requisitions of the circular of the department of the 15th of August last, I have the honor to present a report of the progress made in the improvement of the navigation of the Hudson river during the year ending September 30, 1837, together with a project for the prosecution of the improvement during the year 1838.

Progress of the work.—On the upper section the operations have been very limited, being confined solely to dredging such portions of the channel between the sloop lock and the city of Troy as were necessary to afford temporary relief to the few vessels navigating this part of the river. Two thousand four hundred and twenty cubic yards of coarse gravel and paving stones were removed during the months of October and November, 1836, by the employment of one of the United States dredging machines. Operations were brought to a close on this section on the 5th of the latter month, and not resumed again until the 18th of September of this year, when it became necessary to remove a portion of the obstructions swept into the channel in consequence of a very considerable breach made in the State dam after the breaking up of the ice in the spring. Operations were again brought to a close on the 28th of September, being a working period of ten days, during which time 2,471.70 cubic yards of the same coarse material were removed; making the whole quantity dredged from this portion of the river 7,303.70 cubic yards. The estimate of last year contemplated the construction of the low dike, running from the foot of the sloop lock to the head of Hay island, in order to preserve the channel unimpaired by excluding the introduction of any foreign matter that might be brought over the dam. The limited amount, however, of the appropriation for the year, compared with the estimate, compelled a suspension of this work to another season; it being necessary to apply the means afforded to such portions of the work on the two other sections as seemed best adapted to advance the general interests of the navigation. The failure of the State dam, and consequent influx of coarse gravel into the channel, would seem to indicate more clearly the importance of this dike—the channel not being liable to encroachment from any other source, except the deposit which may be introduced through the tail-races of two or three manufactories situated below the lock, and deriving their supply of water from the level above.

On the middle section operations were continued last year until the close of the month of November, when the rapid formation of ice in the river compelled a suspension of the work. Seven hundred and forty-five feet of the dike at Port Schuyler were completed during the months of October and November, together with the bulkheads forming the opening for the passage of vessels to the dock at that place. The quantity of sand and gravel removed from Washington bar during the same period, and placed in the dike, was 18,653 cubic yards. Two steam dredges were employed—one belonging to the government, and the other to the city of Troy, from the authorities of which it was hired for the purpose. Operations were resumed on this section as soon as the spring freshet had sufficiently subsided to admit of the prosecution of the work. One of the United States steam dredges commenced excavating on Van Buren's bar on the 9th of June, and another on Washington bar on the 24th of the same month; the former, however, was removed to the lower section on the 17th of August, where she now remains; and the latter was employed on the upper section for the short period required for her services above Troy, when she was returned to her berth below. The whole quantity dredged and formed into the dike the present season, ending on the 30th of September, was 56,344.07 cubic yards, making the total quantity dredged from the two bars up to the same period, 91,336.07 cubic yards; all of which, with the exception of 6,208 cubic yards excavated by the Troy city dredge in the fall of the year 1835 from Washington bar, was placed in the dike. On the 30th ultimo this latter work had been carried down to the head of Breaker's island, the grading finished throughout its whole extent, and the revetment nearly laid, requiring but about 1,000 yards of stone for that purpose. At the present date this dike is completed, with the exception of covering a small portion of the revetment with gravel, and securing the foot of the channel slope for two thousand feet in length with rubble stone, which it is expected to accomplish early in the coming month. The length of dike completed this season is 3,541 feet, making the whole length of this structure 4,756 feet, and differing from the estimate of the board of engineers 856 feet, which is accounted for, in part, by the extension of the dike above the head of the dock at Port Schuyler—a change noticed in my former report, and the reasons for the same given in a previous communication. The cost of the work, however, when finished, including the opening in the dike for the passage of vessels, which did not enter into the original design, will exceed but little the estimate of the board. This opening it is feared will lessen in some degree the usefulness of the work, if, indeed, it does not finally jeopard its safety. The water in time of a freshet is drawn with great velocity through the opening, thus diverting the downward course of the current at this point, and consequently diminishing its intensity and the uniform abrading action which it was intended to effect. The bulkheads, although well secured, have already given indications that they will require constant supervision during the prevalence of a flood, in order to counteract the evil which this rush of water through the opening is calculated to produce. It is highly probable, therefore, that the results obtained after the action of the next spring freshet will indicate that this opening should be closed, and that the continuity of the line of dike should be unbroken. A further beneficial effect upon the channel might be produced by running a dike from the north bulkhead, tangent to the most projecting point on the west shore. This, in connexion with the proposed wharfing contemplated to be constructed by a company of individuals from the city of Troy to the bend on the east shore, would render the navigation from the lower part of Breaker's island to the city of Troy as perfect as the nature of the river will admit; a depth of water of at least ten feet would thus be obtained at the ordinary low stage, which is abundantly sufficient for the accommodation of all the trade to this place. As a measure of safety, a portion of the most exposed shore of Hart's island opposite the dike will be revetted this season. This work is not estimated for by the board, but its necessity is obvious from the exposed situation of the island and the alluvial character of its soil. The dike at Port Schuyler was in too unfinished a state last year to judge with any degree of accuracy of its effect upon the bars which it is intended to remove. The deposits being heavier and much less homogeneous than those forming the Overslaugh bars, the action of the water may not be sufficiently great to remove the more weighty deposits, which, in that event, would have to be dredged. Of the capability of the dike, however, to keep this portion of the river free from all future deposits there cannot be the slightest doubt.

On the lower section operations ceased about the same time last year as on the middle section, although a small force was continued until the middle of the month of December in placing the work in a more secure state for the winter. One thousand two hundred and fifty-six feet of the dike connecting Bogart and Beacon islands were completed between September 30, 1836, and the close of operations of that year, leaving 864 feet to finish, nearly midway of the islands—the dike having been carried on from both in order to facilitate the progress of the work. During the same period 20,729.84 cubic yards of sand were removed from the Overslaugh bar and placed in this dike towards its formation. Two of the government steam dredges were employed in this section during the months of October and November, and about the middle of the latter month a third was put in operation after its removal from the

upper section. At the date of my last annual report it was hoped that, before the closing of the river by ice, the dike on this section would be so far completed as to produce a beneficial result to the navigation at this point. This hope, however, was not realized in consequence of the unfavorable state of the season. Fully impressed with the importance of closing the dike before the opening of the river in the spring, an application was made to the authorities of the cities of Troy and Albany for the means of progressing with the work during the winter. This having been granted to a limited extent the work was recommenced on the 3d of January of this year. Recourse was had to a gravel bank on the west shore, near the site of the dike, for a material, which was hauled on the ice in sleds and wagons; by these means the gap was filled to within three or four feet of the top of the dike before the breaking up of the ice in the spring, and the work so well secured as to resist the united action of the ice and flood without sustaining any material injury, although the former was of unusual thickness. The beneficial effects of the course pursued were fully developed after the flood had subsided. Where the greatest obstruction existed last year, opposite the northern reach of the old Overslaugh dam, the water has been deepened seven feet; that is, a depth of water has been attained of eleven feet at ordinary low water where there was only four last season. Below this position, to the head of Beacon island, the terminating point of the dike, the water is not so deep, simply from the fact of its being below the finished portion of the work at the period of the flood; the water, of course, passed freely over the low part of the dike towards the west shore before the freshet had attained within three or four feet of the crest of the work. The consequence was, that the velocity of the water below this point was greatly diminished, and the effect of the flood, as was to be expected, but partial in its operation. The depth of water obtained for this portion of the channel is seven feet at the ordinary low stage of water, being an increase of from two to three feet over that of last year. Operations for the season were recommenced on this section the latter part of April, but not effectively until about the same time as on the middle section.

In consequence of the dis severance of what is called Westerloo island from the main, by the freshet of this year, it became necessary to close the breach thus made, in order to cut off the water from the western passage around this island. The dike, for this object, has been completed, and is 365 feet in length. It is constructed upon the same plan with the dike at the Overslaugh; the material for the purpose was dredged within the eastern line of the railroad wharf at Albany, as being the most convenient place for the work, and, of course, without any benefit resulting to the channel. The cost of the dredging, in this instance, will not, therefore, form a separate item, but will properly enter into the cost of the dike; which being a work created by circumstances, its cost does not form part of the estimate of the board of engineers. The dam connecting Westerloo with Bogart island is completed; its length is 421 feet, differing from that estimated by the board 121 feet in length, and nearly proportionally in cost. The manner of construction is similar to that of the dikes; the only variation being in the additional thickness given to the revetment, and an equality of slope on each side of the crest, being three to one in height. A stone apron of considerable width, on the down stream side, protects the foot of the slope from the action of the water when passing over the crest in time of a flood. The same remark applies to this work, in regard to the dredging, as to the dike at the head of Westerloo island—the sand excavated for the formation of the body of the dam having been taken from between the two islands, and entirely remote from the channel. The object of this work is the accumulation of all the water passing by the city of Albany into the east channel, in order to increase the corroding action of the current on the Overslaugh bars. The dike connecting Bogart and Beacon islands is completed, with the exception of covering a portion of the revetment with sand, and the adjustment of the crest to a uniform longitudinal slope, corresponding to the plane of depression of the surface of the flood. The foot of the channel slope will also be protected with stones, as an additional measure of precaution against abrasion. Eight hundred and sixty-four feet of this dike have been finished this year, making the whole length of the dike 4,324 feet, and exceeding the estimate of the board 724 feet, at an additional cost of about \$19,000. This latter is accounted for, in part, from the different manner of doing the work; from its being an experimental undertaking; and from the many difficulties encountered in its prosecution, which the experience of the past season has enabled us to overcome in the works commenced subsequently. Some progress has been made this season in the removal of Van Wie's pier and the old Overslaugh dam. The latter work, although not estimated for by the board, is absolutely necessary to the formation of a straight channel conforming with the direction of the dike. The salient angle of this dam not only tends to deflect the current towards the opposite shore, thereby creating irregularities in the bed of the river, but, from its proximity to the centre of the channel, must be regarded as a great nuisance to the river navigation. A buoy has been placed opposite the eastern point of the dam, to guard vessels against running upon it. Machinery has been recently constructed for the purpose of removing these old works, which it is intended to do, as far as practicable, by dredging. The cost of raising these dams will no doubt greatly exceed the estimate of the board, being solid masses of timber and stones; the former of which material, at the Overslaugh dam, is strongly connected together with iron bolts. A portion of the shore of Beacon island has been filled in with sand, in order to correct the irregularities of its outline, and thus avoid the eddies which the reaction of the water in its curves would have produced. A further improvement, however, will be required next year. In the latter part of June, the dike running from the lower part of this island towards the west shore was commenced; its direction being nearly parallel with the general course of the opposite or eastern shore. The object of this dike is the removal of the lower Overslaugh bar, and the attainment of a comparatively straight channel to Van Wie's Point; 1,700 feet of this dike were graded on the 30th ultimo, and the revetment for the most part completed. It is contemplated, should the weather permit, to finish from 500 to 700 feet more this season; which, with a range of piling and brushing, that has been carried down on the line of the dike for about 1,500 feet, it is expected will give such direction and force to the current as to open a straight channel into the deep water below Van Wie's pier. Two of the government steam dredges have been employed on this section since the recommencement of the work in the summer; and a third was added from the middle section on the 17th of August. The quantity of sand excavated by the machines during the season, to include the 30th of September, and placed in the several works under construction on this section, was 91,307.98 cubic yards; of which 79,040.83 cubic yards were removed from the Overslaugh bars, and 12,267.15 cubic yards from two other points on the river not immediately benefiting the navigation; making the whole quantity of sand dredged and placed in dikes and dam on this section, to include the 30th ultimo, 176,123.82 cubic yards, of which 163,856.67 cubic yards were taken from the Overslaugh.

The principal embarrassment experienced the present season by vessels navigating the Hudson is attributable to several causes, some of which are not generally understood. For many years after the

construction of the old works, which now embarrass the navigation of the river, the channel, after passing the Overslaugh dam, diverged towards the east shore, running close to the bank of the river on that side; the shore being so bold as to admit steamboats and other vessels to lie close alongside the bank. At the same time an extensive flat existed between this channel and Beacon island. After taking a circuitous course, the channel finally passed near the tail of Van Wie's pier, which runs from the east shore, and thus gained the deep water of what was called the west channel. In course of time the eastern shore was so much worn, probably by the united action of the swell created by steamboats and the abrading force of the flood, as to partially fill up the channel. A new outlet was then dredged near to Beacon island, taking the shortest course into deep water on the west side. This channel is what is termed the "Dug-way." The water having been diverted into the new outlet, and sweeping with considerable velocity around the tail of Beacon island, has reduced the alluvial deposit to its present dimensions, or nearly one-half of its former size. The construction of the dike running from the lower part of this island, necessarily involved the closing up of "the Dug-way" channel; which, from the moment it was crossed, cut off the means of communication with Albany and Troy, by vessels drawing over five or six feet water, except during an unusually high tide brought in by a southerly wind. Vessels seeking an outlet were thus grounded on the extensive flat alluded to; and most of the masters attempted to work their vessels over the bar at the extremity of the dike, as it progressed, in order to reach the deep water sooner. This not only delayed our work some six weeks or two months, but aggravated the evil in consequence of the eddies produced by so many vessels in proximity to each other.

The waste sand from the dike and dredges was carried and lodged around the bottoms of the grounded vessels, creating greater difficulties at every step of our progress. The embarrassment finally became so great as to compel the masters of vessels to resort to the old eastern channel, which, although much filled up since its abandonment, afforded considerable relief to vessels of the lighter draught of water, more especially to steamboats. At the request of the authorities of the cities of Troy and Albany, one of the United States steam dredges was employed about the middle of September in excavating a straight channel parallel with the direction of our dike into the deep water beyond. This has been effected within a few days, and I apprehend but little difficulty will be experienced the remainder of the season at this point. It is proper to remark that the water has been lower in the Hudson this year than has been known since the year 1816. This alone would have produced embarrassment to the navigation under ordinary circumstances; much more so when, by the operation of the dredges, the sand was kept in constant motion, forming an accumulating evil below the work, which the water, at its extreme low stage, was unable to alleviate. As the dike progressed, a depth of from $6\frac{1}{2}$ to 7 feet water was obtained by the action of the downward current alone. A freshet of about five feet is now in the river, which will, without doubt, have a beneficial effect in correcting any little irregularities that may exist in the channel.

The progress of the work during the season has been entirely satisfactory. The labor on all the sections has been performed by the day, and the work executed in a more thorough manner, and generally at much less cost to the government than last year. The early date at which the appropriation became available has enabled us to accomplish not only much more than could have been effected had the means been withheld until half the working season had elapsed, but with much greater economy. This has been particularly the case on the middle section, where, by taking advantage of the higher stage of water after the partial subsidence of the spring freshet, that portion of the dike passing over the shoal was constructed at much less expense than it could have been done for during the low stage of water.

A table showing the comparative cost of the different descriptions of work on the several sections for each year, since the commencement of the improvement, will be forwarded to the department as soon as it can be prepared.

Project of operations for the year 1838.—On the upper section it is proposed to construct 1,000 feet of the low dike running from the foot of the sloop lock towards Hog island, and to excavate as much sand from the bed of the river as will be sufficient for the formation of the body of the dike.

On the middle section it is contemplated to finish the revetting of Hart's island and a portion of the east shore above, extending to near the bend. Neither of these works has been estimated for by the board of engineers, but they are necessary for the security of the shore on that side of the river. It is also proposed to revet Base and Lower Patroon's islands, and, with a view to the removal of "Fish-house shoal," to construct a dike connecting this latter island with Upper Patroon's island. This dike is but partially estimated for by the board; its length will be 6,770 feet, while that proposed by the board is only 2,350 feet, extending about 1,000 feet below the old dam at the Fish-house shoal. The cost of the proposed improvement, however, will not greatly exceed the cost of the dike as estimated by the board, together with that of the dam intended to connect Lower Patroon's island with the west shore; which latter work will be unnecessary should the dike itself be continued to the island.

To remove the numerous shoals in the vicinity of those islands, it is conceived, will require more extensive works than those proposed by the board; a project for which will be submitted at some future day. The annual drawing of this year will, however, illustrate their position and extent.

On the lower section it is proposed to carry down the dike running from the foot of Beacon island to within 450 feet of the west shore, conforming in direction generally with the opposite shore of the river. This would enable vessels, after the removal of Van Wie's pier, and two sunken rocks now incommoding the channel, to run a perfectly straight course from Beacon island to Van Wie's Point. This dike will, when completed, be 6,000 feet in length—differing from that proposed by the board 3,100 feet, and exceeding it in cost about \$14,000. The removal of 700 feet of Van Wie's pier, a portion of the old Overslaugh dam, and the sunken rocks before alluded to, is estimated for the next year. Only the former work enters into the project of the board; but the removal of the two latter obstructions is indispensable to the perfecting of the navigation from below Bogart island to Van Wie's Point. The channel shores of Bogart and Beacon islands it is contemplated to straighten and revet anew.

In order to open a more direct channel from the city of Albany to the Overslaugh, it is proposed to construct a continuous dike, joining on to the main near the railroad depot, and running parallel with the southern line of the same until opposite its eastern extremity; from thence pursuing nearly a straight course to its junction with Bogart island. The construction of this dike will render nugatory the object of the dam between Westerloo and Bogart islands; still it will have had its beneficial effects upon the navigation of the river, by throwing the body of water upon the Overslaugh. It will also greatly facilitate the construction of the dike proposed, by cutting off the cross current towards the west shore. The whole length of this dike will be 6,720 feet, and it will supersede the necessity of the following works estimated for by the board, viz: a dam of 200 feet in length, connecting Westerloo with Small

island; a dike 1,700 feet in length, running from the head of the latter island downwards; and a dike connecting with the head of Bogart island, and running upwards for 1,400 feet. The estimated cost of these works differs but little from the probable cost of the dike intended to be substituted for them.

Two other dikes on the opposite shore, and a modification of the one uniting Bogart and Beacon islands, will be necessary to perfect the improvement of the river between the city of Albany and Van Wie's Point. These works, however, are not proposed to be constructed next year, but will be indicated on the annual drawing in illustration of the general effect to be produced, which is the attainment of a comparatively straight and nearly uniform width of channel and consequent equality in the depth of water—the latter being not less than ten feet at its ordinary low stage. A vessel leaving Albany, with the wind free, will then be enabled to reach the head of Beacon island without any variation in her course.

To accomplish all the work proposed for next year will require the construction of two additional steam dredging machines and twenty-eight lighters, the cost of which is included in the estimate. These were proposed to be built the present year, but the appropriation for the improvement was too limited to admit of any portion of the funds being used for that purpose.

Some legislation seems to be absolutely required in order to preserve the machinery employed from damage by vessels and rafts coming in contact with the dredges and lighters whilst operating on the river. They are, from their position, necessarily very much exposed, and have already sustained injury to a large amount, without taking into consideration loss of time and consequent detention to the work. Considerable damage has also resulted to the improvement from the velocity with which the passenger steamboats have been in the practice of passing the works whilst under construction; the great wave created by their rapid motion through the water sweeps over the unfinished portion of the dikes, destroying the newly-made slopes and otherwise injuring the work and machinery. This may be remedied by restricting the speed of steamboats to six miles per hour whilst passing the works under construction, and at such distances before the approach to and departure from them as may be found necessary for their safety. Another great evil under which the work has labored on the lower section has arisen from the reckless manner in which many of the masters of vessels navigating the river have forced them upon and around the work and machinery, by which our operations have been greatly impeded, and, in some instances, entirely suspended. The pecuniary loss to the government from this cause during the months of August and September has been considerable, and the progress of the work very much retarded. Some law is required by which those disposed to interrupt the operations in the manner pointed out may be restrained, in order that a recurrence of the difficulties experienced the last two seasons may be avoided.

As the present improvement is designed to free the Hudson from existing embarrassments as well as from future obstruction, it would seem desirable that as little foreign matter should be introduced into the river as possible. With this view, a prohibitory law is called for against the deposit of mud or other substance in any part of the river within reach of the current. I have called the attention of the department to these matters, believing that the interests of the improvement require some prompt action on the subject.

The annual statement of the amounts expended and funds available, to include the year ending on the 30th of September, 1837, together with the general statement of appropriations, &c., of each year up to the same period, as also the estimate of the amount required to complete the project of operations for the year 1838, are herewith transmitted.

The annual drawing of the works completed and under construction, with those proposed to be built next year, will be forwarded to the department as soon as it can be prepared.

All which is very respectfully submitted.

HENRY BREWERTON, *Captain of the Corps of Engineers.*

Brigadier General CHARLES GRATIOT, *Chief Engineer.*

F No 1.

Estimate of funds requisite for the operations of the improvement of the navigation of the Hudson river, New York, during the year 1838, exhibiting the nature, cost, and application.

FIRST SECTION.

Dredging, 8,000 cubic yards.....	800 00
Dike, 1,000 running feet.....	3, 920 00
Machinery.....	1, 672 41
Contingencies.....	87 37
For first section.....	<u>6, 479 78</u>

SECOND SECTION.

Dredging, 145,390 cubic yards.....	\$5, 939 00
Dike, 6,770 running feet.....	45, 968 30
Protecting islands, 3,800 running feet.....	9, 612 30
Machinery.....	14, 341 44
Contingencies.....	749 24
For second section.....	<u>76, 610 28</u>

THIRD SECTION.

Dredging, 185,790 cubic yards.....	\$8, 128 45
Dike, 10,320 running feet.....	54, 730 00
Protecting islands, 2,230 running feet.....	3, 763 12
Removing old dams, 1,900 running feet.....	20, 524 46
Removing sunken rocks.....	2, 000 00
Machinery.....	28, 286 15
Contingencies.....	1, 477 76
For third section.....	118, 909 94

RECAPITULATION.

First section.....	6, 479 78
Second section.....	76, 610 28
Third section.....	118, 909 94
	202, 000 00

Respectfully submitted.

HENRY BREWERTON, *Captain of Engineers.*

ENGINEER OFFICE HUDSON RIVER IMPROVEMENT, *Troy, New York, October 28, 1837.*

G.

Memoir—Improvement of the harbor of New Brunswick.

"For improving the harbor of New Brunswick, by removing the obstructions in the Raritan river, according to a plan reported to the War Department by Hartman Bache."

GOVERNOR'S ISLAND, *New York, October 15, 1837.*

SIR: The improvement of the harbor of New Brunswick, New Jersey, was commenced in April last, upon the plan reported to the War Department, as referred to in the appropriation above quoted.

The obstructions in the Raritan river proposed to be removed in the plan reported consist of a bar just below New Brunswick; rocks a little above South river, represented in the plan reported to be a continuous ledge across the river; a bar about a mile and a quarter below Crab island, called the Middle Ground; and a bar at the mouth of Red Root creek, called the Stakes.

It was proposed, in the plan reported, to remove the bar obstructions by dredging, and the rocks by blasting.

The principal obstruction is the bar near New Brunswick; it is of greater extent than any of the others, and had less water upon it than any of them before the improvement was begun, the depth in some parts of it having been less than four feet at low water. Dredging has been adopted for its improvement, as proposed in the plan reported. About three-fourths of the work required for this bar has been done; vessels drawing five feet can now pass it at low water; when finished, vessels drawing six feet will be able to pass it. The bar is composed, for the most part, of crumbled fragments of slate of an imperfect formation. The course of the channel over the bar is near the bank of the river, which is formed of this slate.

The accumulation of the fragments constantly falling from the bank has caused the bar to be formed. If a channel made by dredging on the opposite side of the river, where the bank is a meadow, could be maintained in other respects, it would be obstructed in but a comparatively limited degree by the accumulation just referred to. But it is believed it could not be maintained, for the reason that the course of the river is such that the currents would flow with greater velocity in the existing channel, and the effect of this would be to cause the alluvial matter suspended in the current to be deposited where there was the least velocity. The existing channel is on the outward side of a bend in the river, where, as in all similar cases, the currents naturally flow with the greatest velocity.

The crumbled fragments composing the bar are heavier than sand, and are not liable to be displaced, except by the freshets that occur on the breaking up of the ice in the spring. These freshets produce, generally, a slight change in the bar, somewhat beneficial, though not of sufficient extent to be worthy of consideration.

I consider the operation of dredging to be adapted only to situations where there is very little or no current, or where the obstruction to be removed by it, on account of its weight or its tenacity, is not liable to displacement by currents existing, or that may be produced by artificial means. The obstruction near New Brunswick may be ranked with the class last stated, and therefore dredging is well adapted to its removal.

But dredging will not answer so well for the bars at the Middle Ground and the Stakes. They are formed of alluvial deposits, liable to constant displacement by the ordinary currents, which have greater velocity at them than at the bar near New Brunswick, and their velocity may be much increased by artificial means.

They might be deepened by dredging, but the effect of the ordinary currents and the waves would soon fill them up again, unless means should be adopted to contract the width of the channel, and in that way to increase the velocity of the current sufficiently to wear away the lighter particles from the bottom, and to keep them suspended until they should be carried to a point where their being deposited would be attended with no injury to the navigation. In that case the dredging would be a superfluous expense, as

the scraping or scratching the bottom, to facilitate the effect of the currents, would answer every purpose, and would cost a great deal less than dredging.

The width of the river is greatly increased below Crab island, and the sudden expansion is one of the causes of the formation of the bar at the Middle Ground.

By the expansion the freshet current is suddenly exhausted, and it is ultimately checked by the sea current somewhere in the vicinity of the Middle Ground. The channel should be contracted so as to carry it beyond that point, and also beyond the Stakes.

The obstruction at the Stakes appears to be produced by the continuance of the ebb tide in Red Root creek for a longer period than in the Raritan; in consequence of which, it meets the flood tide of the Raritan at the mouth of the creek, and the meeting produces still water, which causes any sediment in either stream to be deposited. The position and shape of the bar seem to indicate the result that might be naturally expected from the circumstances just described.

The remedy would be to run a pier from the upper side of the mouth of the creek down the Raritan far enough to produce and maintain distinctness between its current and that of the creek.

The rock obstruction is not a continuous ledge, as it is represented to be in the plan reported. In the soundings made on two occasions with an iron rod, the rocks encountered were discovered in every instance to be detached; they appeared to be fragments, not very large and not deeply imbedded, as was inferred from the fact that the rod readily penetrated the sand alongside of them. I think it would be easy to remove them, and perhaps more so than to find them.

The work carried on this season for the removal of the bar near New Brunswick has been conducted with means furnished by the Delaware and Raritan Canal Company, and under the immediate management of the officers of that company residing at New Brunswick. A very good dredging machine, belonging to the company, was brought from the Delaware river, with two scows, and put upon the work. The machine is worked by a steam-engine of about a six-horse power. Men in the employ of the company, who are accustomed to work of the kind, were also furnished by the company, and their services have been charged for at the same rate the company had to pay them. The fuel consumed in working the engine is also charged at the rate paid for it; and to cover the expense of providing oil, hemp, &c., and casual repairs, and the allowance that should be made for the wear and tear of the vessels and machinery, a daily rate is charged as the equivalent of the value of these several items. The company does not expect or wish to make any profit directly out of the operations carried on, with the means furnished by them, in the manner described. They know the improvements to be made will be chiefly beneficial to them, and from the time they were commenced they have done all they could in aid of their prosecution, and the assistance they have afforded has been essentially advantageous.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. S. SMITH, *Brevet Major, Corps of Engineers.*

General C. GRATIOT, *Chief Engineer, &c., City of Washington.*

H.

LOUISVILLE, *Kentucky, August 2, 1837.*

SIR: My operations in the great raft of Red river were closed on the 25th of May last, excepting the crew of the steam snag-boat "Eradicator," which was transferred to the steamer "Java," to work until the 25th of June, the Java being a much lighter boat, and better calculated to perform a work highly necessary and important to be executed during that period. The Java worked to the date above specified, and arrived at Louisville on the 12th of July. During the last season the raft was removed quite through that part that had been formed previously to the summer freshet of 1836.

On the 25th of May the work was closed. The Java, the headmost boat in the operation, was within four hundred and forty yards of the extreme upper end of the entire formation of the great raft. That part (four hundred and forty yards) that remained unmoved was by no means as dense and difficult to remove as the average of the last fifty miles below. The water is now flowing freely through the whole of the river where the raft was located. In the last year about twelve and three-quarters miles of it were removed, the distance having been ascertained from the field-notes of Mr Alexander, United States surveyor. A canal was also excavated across a narrow point of land, through which the whole channel of the river now flows, and shortens the distance three miles. The bayous that had formerly drained off from the river a very large portion of the water have all been sufficiently stopped, excepting one, (the Willow chute,) which will take in all the timber that now remains at the head of the raft, and which will sufficiently stop it. The water is now operating with full force on the upper section of the river, where the raft was located, a distance of about fifty miles. From the 25th of May to the 25th of June the steamer Java removed nearly all the roots and snags that had then risen to the surface of the water from the Twelve-Mile bayou to the Willow chute, a distance of about thirty miles. The work now remaining to be executed to open a navigation through the whole line of the raft is to remove the four hundred and forty yards left undisturbed on the 25th May last, and what may accumulate from that time until the work is again resumed, which time will depend entirely on the action of Congress. The appropriation of the last session of \$65,000 has all been expended, and exceeded some few dollars. To complete the work will require an appropriation of fifty thousand dollars, viz.: to remove the balance of the raft, and to extract from the bed of the river the snags that will rise from its bottom, by being loosened from the mud by the action of the water on the bed of the river, in the upper fifty miles; and to remove the numerous trees that will fall into the river in all that part of it where the raft was formerly located, (one hundred and sixty miles;) and to fell the trees that are liable to cave in with the banks where the river is now forcing its bed to the original width of the stream, which is occasioned by the action of a powerful current that is now flowing the whole extent of the former location, and which had been excluded from its natural course for centuries. To enable me to accomplish this important work during the next year it will be necessary for an appropriation to be made at the called session of Congress in September.

The importance of the work is so well understood by the department that it is not necessary for me to make any remarks on that subject, notwithstanding I beg leave respectfully to state that this improvement is of the greatest importance to the government in a military point of view. The Red river leads

to, and, by the removal of the remainder of the raft, will open a safe and easy steamboat navigation to the heart of the Indian settlements on the west side of the Mississippi river, as well as to an extensive line of the Texas frontier. The country above the raft is also populating with great rapidity. Its settlers are now shut in from market, which will be of easy access if the remainder of the raft can be removed, which requires nothing but the means to carry on the work. I can now make a calculation, that I am willing to stake my reputation on, that the whole obstruction can be removed in three months after the appropriation is made, if done in the ensuing fall; but if it is postponed to the regular session the appropriation, if then made, would be too late to admit of executing the work during the ensuing winter and spring, and, consequently, must lie over until the fall of 1838. It is impracticable to obtain laborers to execute that work in the summer months. The country where the raft is located affords no labor. The force necessary to remove these obstructions must be taken from the Ohio river. Under all those circumstances, I hope the department will call for and obtain an appropriation sufficient to finish the improvement at the called session in September next. I must be permitted, also, to state further that, in point of economy, it will be some twenty thousand dollars in favor of an early appropriation, so as to enable me to remove the remainder of the raft during the ensuing winter, instead of allowing the work to lie over one year longer, in which time the quantity of timber to be removed will be much increased by the accumulation on the head of the remaining raft.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY M. SHREVE.

Brigadier General C. GRANT, *Chief Engineer, Washington, D. C.*

H No. 1.

MEMPHIS, April 16, 1837.

SIR: The subjoined report embraces such material facts relating to the removal of the great raft in Red river as a careful examination enabled me to collect, and exhibits the present condition of the work, the results produced by what has already been expended upon its improvement, and contains an exact statement of what remains at this time to be accomplished; all of which is respectfully submitted.

That portion of Red river usually denominated the "raft" at the period when the work of improvement commenced, extended from about the mouth of Loggy bayou to a point five miles below the Caddo village—a space of two hundred and fourteen miles.

The precise proportion of this distance occupied by raft it is not possible to ascertain; to estimate it at one-third, it is believed, would be within the true amount.

Any conjecture as to the probable period of its first formation would be uncertain and unimportant; sufficient evidence, however, exists to fix the date anterior to the settlement of the country, and the banks of the river exhibit indubitable proofs that the raft once extended as low as the rapids, within fifty miles of the confluence of Red river and the Mississippi, to which point the back water of the latter stream frequently extends, and there arrests the drift from Red river. Occasionally, even now, when the waters of the Mississippi are higher than those of Red river, rafts of considerable magnitude accumulate at this point. It is not improbable that at this place and from this cause the raft commenced. Once formed, the serpentine course of the stream is such as to secure it against the possibility of removal, except by artificial means or by the slow process of decay. The annual increment has generally been estimated at two miles. This supposition has not been confirmed by facts. When I visited the raft in 1828 it reached within a very short distance of the Cuschatte chute; it now extends three miles above that point, making the average annual increase less than half a mile. The yearly extension of the raft near its present head has been lessened by the immense quantity of drift that is carried into Lake Sheodo through several large bayous, which in that vicinity have broken from the river into the lake. The upward progress of the raft appears less in the aggregate than it would do if estimated by the extent of each year's addition. Occasionally, large portions detach themselves from rafts of recent formation, and, in descending, carry with them, by their weight, such smaller ones as are unable to resist their momentum; thus gathering strength as it descends, the mass moves on until it is arrested by a raft too firmly fixed to give way. In this manner the accumulation of two or three years is sometimes condensed into less space than was at first occupied by the formation of one season.

At the point of impact of the moving and stationary rafts the logs are subjected to an immense pressure, and consequently assume a very compact form; this, I doubt not, is the origin of what is termed a "sunken raft," the timber of which is confined below the surface of the water, in many places filling the river to the bottom by the pressure thus applied and not by its specific gravity.

This is made manifest in its removal, when the extraction of one large and strong log not unfrequently liberates a score of others before unseen, having been held down by the weight of the timber heaped on them.

The raft region may now be considered under three divisions, viz: that from which the raft is entirely removed, extending one hundred and forty-five miles from the commencement; that in which the raft is cut up and pulled to pieces, but not floated off, thirty-three miles in extent, and that which has not yet been commenced, six miles in extent.

Fully to understand the situation of the obstructed portion of the river at the time the work was commenced, it will be necessary to premise that each raft acted as a dam, and expelled the water from within the banks in proportion to the solidity of the raft. The water thus forced from the channel, after passing through the extensive lakes which lie parallel to the general course of the river on each side, finds its way back into the bed of Old river, only to be again expelled by the first raft it encounters, and ultimately falls in entirely below the raft through Cross bayou, Bayou Pierre, Cuschatte bayou, and numerous other smaller inlets.

The expulsion of the water from the channel caused it to contract, and willow bars have formed on one or the other side of the river throughout nearly the whole raft region.

The removal of the obstructions from the bed of Old river opened successively, as it progressed upwards, the mouths of these several inlets. The refuse of the raft was, as far as practicable, placed in the outlets, thus augmenting at each step the volume of water until it reached Cross bayou, the highest

tributary of any importance. To convey off this enlarged stream, a corresponding increase of the channel is required. If this enlargement could be effected by the removal of the willow bars, little additional labor would be required upon that portion of the river from which the raft has been removed, since these bars, being covered with a small growth, their caving in could not seriously injure the navigation.

This, unfortunately, is not the case; the willow bars are generally points; the caving is in the bends directly opposite to these points, where the growth of timber is of the largest dimensions, and forms, when it falls in, a dangerous obstacle. From the mouth of Bayou Pierre, upwards, the banks are giving way under the action of the current; this furnishes a strong evidence of an increase in the quantity of water in Old river, near the foot of the raft. Another, equally conclusive, is drawn from the fact that streams which, before the commencement of the improvement, flowed from Bayou Pierre into Old river, now run in the opposite direction, carrying off a portion of the surplus water from Old river. These outlets will relieve the banks until the channel has become sufficiently large to contain the stream.

The presence of a snag-boat will be necessary in those portions of the river which have been cleared of rafts, as well to remove the large trees which fall in, as to break up the small rafts that are constantly forming from the descending debris of the large one above. These small rafts are easily removed and are slowly progressing down the stream as they are occasionally detached and set in motion by the passage of a boat. At the commencement of this work there was little or no current; and in all cases that portion of clear river contained between the foot of a raft and the mouth of the inlet next below was either dead water, or had a current so sluggish as to be unavailing in carrying off the detached masses of raft as they were disengaged by the boats. The loosened logs could consequently be disposed of in no other way than by towing them out of the stagnant water or by drawing them on shore or into the island chutes. Either alternative was laborious and slow; the latter expedients were adopted generally.

Much of this timber, by a subsequent rise, floated back into the river, and had to be removed the following season; and as it was not cut into short pieces, it is still occasionally found obstructing the navigation and aiding in the formation of small rafts that will render further labor necessary on that part of the river from which all obstructions have been once removed. Merchant boats are constantly passing and repassing, and will prevent the formation of large rafts; the trees which fall in with the banks can only be removed by the snag-boats. The next portion of the river is that in which the raft has been entirely loosened and the logs cut up, but which remains to be removed by the joint influence of the boats and such current as, it is hoped, will soon find its way from the head of the raft.

With a view to secure in the bed of Old river all the water that percolates the raft, the outlets below have been as well stopped as the use of imperfect materials would admit; much water which transpires through the raft is still carried off by Willow chute and Benoit and Jake's bayous. Although the river above the raft is high, that part which lies in it has experienced but little change. Cross bayou, which brings the largest volume of the water from the head of the raft and discharges it into Old river at its foot, backs up the water of Old river to the present foot of the cut-up raft; here it is likely to remain until the fall of the water shall create a current, or the opening of the raft above shall admit a head of water.

Nearly the whole extent of this section of the river is covered with logs and timber cut up short and divested of all roots or limbs, and entirely freed from anything that might retard its course down; nothing now is wanting but a current to carry it off, and this is daily increasing. The removal of a few yards of solid raft, at the point where the boats are now engaged, caused a fall of eighteen inches in the water above it, and a rise of six below. This is a most flattering indication; and as the remaining parts of the raft, with few exceptions, are of more open formation, a sufficient current to remove the cut-up raft may be created even sooner than is expected. That there must ultimately be a strong current is evident from the fact that above the raft the banks are now overflowed in places, while immediately below it, in Old river, they are seven feet above water. Following on down Old river to Cross bayou, which brings in the water forced out of the river at the head of the raft, and we find but three and a half feet banks. This height of bank continues for some distance down.

There was a rise of several feet coming down from the raft which is a favorable circumstance.

There remain but six miles from the point at which the boats are now operating to the head of the raft; of this nearly one-third is clear river; so that there are in reality but little more than four miles of raft. With the exception of a small portion at the lower extremity, this part of the raft is comparatively loose, and admits of the passage of much water.

The head of water raised by the raft gives a fine current where the boats are now at work, and materially aids the operation by carrying off the refuse as fast as it is extracted from the raft.

From its more recent formation, the timber of this part of the raft is sounder, and consequently more difficult to cut or saw; but this is overbalanced by its being less compactly jammed together; so that, all things considered, the progress of the work is likely to be greater here than it was lower down the river. Ten and a half miles have already been accomplished since December; it is, therefore, probable the work will be completed this season before the 25th of May, at which period the engagements of the hands expire. In this part of the raft there are several chutes putting out on the west side, carrying off into Lake Sheodo a large portion of the water of the river.

These will be closed as soon as practicable, by which a very considerable accession of water will be had. Cuschatte, the most important of these chutes, was, at the time of my first examination, in 1828, above the head of the raft, which now extends three miles beyond this outlet. The effects of the raft in raising the water are nowhere more apparent than in this region; banks that are now overflowed were, in 1828, several feet out of the water, which was then about the same stage as at present.

This effect is also manifest in those parts where it has been removed.

Places which in 1828 were overflowed, now that the obstruction which caused the water to rise has been taken away, are entirely above high-water mark.

This is particularly observable below Coates's bluff. In addition to the removal of the remaining portion of the raft, there is work to be done near the lower bluff, at the head of Bayou Pierre. The river above this place passes along under the bluff, nearly to its lower extremity, where it deflects somewhat to the north, while the bluff makes about an equal deflection to the south. The river continues its new course for a mile and a half, then makes a short turn and flows back in a direction nearly parallel to its former course until it strikes and is reflected back from the bluff at the point where Bayou Pierre leaves the river, assuming a direction again parallel to its first course.

At a distance of about a mile from the bluff, in descending, the channel approaches within forty-two yards of a point on the river a mile above the bluff; this is precisely the place at which it makes the first-mentioned turn. To cut across this neck is a work of small magnitude; the advantages are great. Besides saving two miles in distance, it would be the means of withdrawing a large portion of the water from Bayou Pierre, which, it will be recollected, leaves the river just where it strikes the bluff. It will be the means also of avoiding two very sudden and difficult turns; and, by throwing an increased volume of water in Old river, will facilitate the enlargement of its dimensions, thereby improving the navigation, and decreasing the tendency which now exists to the reformation of rafts in narrow parts of the channel. Bayou Pierre, from its position, carries off a large body of water—perhaps nearly one-half of the whole quantity in the river; and this water does not again return to the channel until within fourteen miles of Natchitoches. An attempt was made to stop Bayou Pierre, but with only partial success.

The proposed cut-off will be more effectual.

It is extremely desirable that this work be completed during the present season, since upon its accomplishment depends, in a great measure, the settlement of an extensive and exceedingly fertile region. Independent of this consideration, there are others of sufficient weight strongly to urge the necessity of finishing the work this year.

The accumulation of raft during the present high water will add to the expense if deferred. I would respectfully suggest that it appears to me indispensable that a snag-boat remain constantly on the river until the whole of the logs composing the raft shall have been floated off, and the current shall have enlarged the present channel till it is capable of holding the water which must pass through it. Until this is accomplished, there will be a constant accumulation of small rafts, formed by the drift lodging against the trees that have fallen in. Unless a boat be kept in the river during the summer, to break up and disperse these small rafts while they are of inconsiderable extent, they will be so consolidated before the winter navigation commences as to give much trouble in their removal, and cause serious difficulty in the navigation. The new boat "Eradicator" is well calculated for this duty, and, with a suitable crew, would render essential services during the season.

It is difficult to form a just conception of the magnitude of this work, or fully to appreciate the important results that are to flow from it.

The river is navigable more than a thousand miles above the raft, and through a region not surpassed in fertility by any on the continent.

This extensive country is comparatively unsettled; its vast resources and wealth remain to be developed. Although enterprise has pushed forward, notwithstanding the apparently insuperable barrier opposed by the raft, yet hundreds are looking to its removal as the signal for entering the country. The success of the undertaking, once involved in doubt, and the permanent advantages which must result from it, are no longer matters of uncertainty.

The indefatigable industry, zeal, and perseverance of the superintendent have triumphed over difficulties well calculated to intimidate him; bayous have been closed with masses of timber; islands of huge logs, for centuries imbedded together, and covered with living trees, have been removed; the timber composing them has been dragged on shore, or, being cut up or cast upon the current, has passed away.

Indeed, every mile in ascending bears evidence of the immense labor bestowed upon its improvement. This work will be rendered permanent by keeping a snag-boat on the river a year or two after the removal of the raft. By that time the channel will have enlarged itself, the refuse from the old raft will have passed off, and such banks as were liable to cave will have fallen. When all this shall have been accomplished, there is no reason to apprehend the recurrence of a raft on Red river more than on any other of similar extent.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

A. H. BOWMAN, *Lieutenant of Engineers.*

General CHARLES GRATIOT, *Chief Engineer.*

H No. 2.

Estimate of funds required for the removal of the great raft in Red river for the year 1838.

1. For one steamboat, fitted up with machinery and tools complete	\$15,000 00
2. For salary of two assistant superintendents six months, at \$125 per month each	1,500 00
3. For salary of three assistants and one physician six months, at \$100 per month	2,400 00
4. For four steam engineers six months	1,500 00
5. For two carpenters six months, at \$50	600 00
6. For two blacksmiths and four overseers six months, at \$45 per month each	1,620 00
7. For 175 men six months, at \$20 per month	21,000 00
8. For subsistence for 195 men six months, at \$8 50 per month each	9,945 00
9. For cordage, lumber, iron, and steel	5,000 00
10. For wood for two boats (same time)	4,000 00
11. For engine stores for same	635 00
12. For two keel-boats, fitted up for quarters for men	1,000 00
13. For repairs and addition to tools, &c.	1,800 00
14. For contingent expenses	4,000 00
	70,000 00

HENRY M. SHREVE, *Superintendent, &c.*

LOUISVILLE, *Kentucky*, November 8, 1837.

I.

LOUISVILLE, *Kentucky*, November 8, 1837.

Sir: By reference to the monthly reports of the masters of the steam snag-boats Helepolis and Archimedes, on file at the department, it will be seen that 1,894 snags have been removed from the bed of the Mississippi river, and that 18,141 trees have been felled from its caving-in banks during the year ending 30th September, 1837. On the 14th of November last the snag-boat Archimedes was stove by raising a large snag, which sunk that boat, and of which the department has heretofore been advised.

The appropriation made by act of Congress of the 2d March, 1837, for replacing that boat has been applied to that service. A new boat has been built, which was launched on the first day of this month, and will be finished and ready to proceed to work early in December.

The steam snag-boat Helepolis continued her operations from the 1st of October, 1836, to the 6th of March, 1837, when that boat was run up to New Albany, Indiana, where her engines were thoroughly repaired and removed from the old hull to a new boat built by authority of the department. The new boat left New Albany on the 22d of July last, and proceeded to work in the Mississippi river, where she is now operating. The new boat has been improved in her construction, so as to add to the facilities in removing snags at least twenty-five per cent., which will be seen by reference to Captain Smith's report of work done in August and September last.

I must again beg leave to recommend the felling of timber from the caving banks of the Mississippi river. Time and experience have sufficiently proved that that operation is very beneficial to the improvement of the navigation, or, rather, to prevent the accumulation of obstructions in its channels. The department has, however, had the opinion of several examining officers of the corps of engineers, who all concur with me in opinion on that subject. I therefore hope that provision will be made for resuming that branch of the work, as per my estimate for next year.

The losses by snags in the Mississippi river during the past year have been but trifling; and those which have occurred have been occasioned by boats being run too close to the shores or heads of islands. There are now no obstructions of consequence in that river, except such as accumulate from year to year.

The work in the Ohio river was resumed by the steamers "Java" and "Souvenir" in September, 1836, and continued until the 24th of November following. In that time the dam running from Dog island to the head of Cumberland island was raised to a sufficient height, about one-half the distance across the river from the head of Cumberland island. The channel at the head of that island has been much improved during the last year by raising the dam, and the action of the current on the sand-bar through which it passes. No difficulty has occurred in passing that point by boats that could get over the other shoals above or below its location. The dams at the Three Sister islands, and at Scuffletown bar, stand firm, and the channels over the shoals at those places are of sufficient depth for all boats to pass without touching the bottom. The dam at Three-Mile island has not yet been finished; still that shoal is by no means so difficult to pass as it formerly was. The dams at French island require to be raised, particularly that on the Kentucky shore.

I have not been able to resume the works on the Ohio river this year for want of sufficient appropriation. The sum appropriated the last year, applicable to the improvement of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, was \$60,000. To rebuild and refit the snag-boat Helepolis required over twenty thousand of that sum. The balance will all be required to work that boat and the Archimedes to the first of March next.

The steamboats formerly bought for the improvement of the Ohio river are all worn out in that service and the Red, Cumberland, and Arkansas rivers, in some of which they were constantly in operation since they were purchased in 1832. To resume the work on the shoals of the Ohio river below the falls, it will be necessary to have two new steamboats, with the necessary small boats to carry rock, quarter men, &c. I must beg leave to recommend that sufficient appropriations be made for recommending that work at the first low water next summer. There is now no longer a doubt of the practicability of deepening the channels of the Ohio river over the bars, so as to afford at least three feet six inches water at its lowest stage, from the Mississippi to Louisville. The works at the Grand chain, Cumberland island, Three Sisters, and Scuffletown bars, are a sufficient test of the entire success of the plan of wing-dams. Those were formerly the four worst shoals on the Ohio river. Three of them, the Chain, the Sisters, and Scuffletown shoals, where the first experiments were made, are now unheard of as shoals in the river. The fourth, Cumberland island, where so much difficulty existed during the progress of the work, and for which I was so much abused by the boatmen, is now a good channel; and during the low water of the past summer no difficulty has existed, nor do I believe it will ever be a shoal hereafter. Still, that work is not yet quite completed. It is necessary to add some rock to the dam to elevate it two feet higher, four hundred yards in length, on the end that joins Dog island.

To enable the superintendent to proceed with this plan of deepening the channels of the Ohio river below Louisville, in 1838, it will require an appropriation of at least \$80,000; and to continue the improvement of the navigation of the Mississippi river, from the mouth of the Ohio to New Orleans, \$50,000, making an aggregate sum for the improvement of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, from Louisville to New Orleans, of \$130,000, and for which I have submitted an estimate as much in detail as the nature of the work will admit.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY M. SHREVE, *Superintendent, &c.*

Brig. Gen. C. GRATION, *Chief Engineer, Washington.*

I No. 1.

Estimate of funds required for continuing the improvement of the navigation of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, from Louisville to New Orleans, during the year 1838.

1. For safe-keeping and repairing the steam snag-boats Helepolis and Archimedes, from the 1st of March to the 1st of July, 1838.....	\$4, 000	
2. For wages of crews of same boats, from the 1st of July, 1838, to the 1st of March, 1839, at \$1,000 per month each.....	16, 000	
3. For subsisting crews of same boats eight months; eighty men, at \$8 50 per month each.....	5, 440	
4. For wood required for the same boats eight months; 5,000 cords, at \$2 75.....	13, 750	
5. For engine stores, iron, lumber, and cordage, for the same boats eight months....	4, 000	
6. For paying and subsisting fifty men four months, to fell timber on the caving-in banks of the Mississippi.....	6, 810	\$50, 000
7. For purchasing two steamboats to tow stone boats to build dams in the Ohio river	24, 000	
8. For thirteen boats to carry rock and quarter laborers in on the Ohio river.....	6, 500	
9. For wages of two assistants, at \$125 for four months.....	1, 000	
10. For wages of fourteen overseers and mechanics.....	3, 000	
11. For wages of two hundred and fifty men four months, at \$20.....	20, 000	
12. For subsisting two hundred and sixty-six men four months, at \$8 50.....	9, 044	
13. For 2,000 cords of wood, at \$2 50.....	5, 000	
14. For iron, steel, and tools, to be added to the stock on hand.....	5, 000	
15. For engine stores, lumber, and cordage.....	1, 456	
16. For contingent expenses, hospital stores, transportation, my allowances, &c.....	5, 000	80, 000
		<u>130, 000</u>

HENRY M. SHREVE, *Superintendent, &c.*

LOUISVILLE, *Kentucky, November 8, 1837.*

I No. 2.

MEMPHIS, *August 31, 1837.*

SIR: In conformity with your instructions, I have twice during the past year visited and inspected the works progressing under the superintendence of Captain H. Shreve, for improving the navigation of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers.

The same policy has been pursued in prosecution of these works during the current year that has hitherto been observed, and with the same satisfactory results.

My first inspection from Memphis to New Orleans was in November, 1836, and from the same point to Louisville in December of that year. The Helepolis and Archimedes commenced work in October, and continued, the first until the 7th of March, 1837, and the latter until the 14th of November, when she was snagged and sunk.

During this period the two boats removed from the bed of the river 1,136 snags; and cut from the banks 17,214 trees, which were likely soon to fall. The new boat Helepolis resumed work in July, and by the end of August had removed 334 snags and cut 927 trees. At my second inspection, in March, 1837, the results of the winter and fall work of these boats was manifest in the increased security of navigation. The snags which had accumulated from the caving in of the banks during the spring flood had been generally removed.

After their return from the Red river, the "Eradicator" and "Java," assisted by two machine boats, were engaged on the Arkansas river. On the 1st of September their books exhibit evidence of the removal of 252 snags from the bed of the river, 198 trees felled from the banks, and 823 logs removed from under the banks. I have seen nothing to change my views as to the propriety of continuing the cutting of trees on the banks. A careful observation of the coast, from New Orleans to Baton Rouge, has served rather to confirm the opinion hitherto expressed, that the Mississippi river can be entirely freed from snags only by removing the trees from such points as are liable to cave.

The river from New Orleans to Baton Rouge is not absolutely free from snags, but they form an obstacle to the navigation too unimportant to merit much attention.

The banks of this part of the river have assumed a more gradual slope, and are consequently less liable to cave than those parts where they are perpendicular and loaded with a growth of stupendous trees. In such places the current impinges against the shore with full force, and rapidly undermines and causes it to fall in, together with its covering of trees.

As the settlement of the country advances, the navigation of the Mississippi will improve.

The time is not far distant when, from the mouth of the Ohio to New Orleans, the navigation will be as safe as it now is from Baton Rouge, and from the same cause, viz: the clearing of the banks. In the meantime the usual annual appropriations will serve to keep it clear from snags. I have visited the works on the Ohio but once during the past year, and as the operations had been limited since the former inspection, it was deemed unnecessary to repeat the visit. The channel at Cumberland island was gradually improving.

That at the Sister islands was in perfect order. The dam at Three-Mile island not having been completed, the desired improvement in the navigation had not been realized at that point. Flint island remained much as it had been the previous year. This bar has during the present low water been worse than any bar on the river. It cannot be permanently better until the works already recommended for its improvement shall have been completed. My duties have not permitted me to visit the Cumberland river.

At those periods when my engagements on the Memphis and St. Francis road would have permitted me to be absent for the purpose the Cumberland has been too high for inspecting the works.

Such has been the case during the current month, when it was my purpose to have visited that river.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. H. BOWMAN, *Lieutenant of Engineers.*

General CHARLES GRATIOT, *Chief Engineer.*

K.

LOUISVILLE, *Kentucky, November 13, 1837.*

SIR: The work for improving the navigation of the Arkansas river was commenced in August last by the steam snag-boat "Eradicator," steamer Java, and two machine boats. By reference to the monthly reports of the captains of those boats, on file at the department, it will be seen that during the months of August and September there were removed from the channel of that river 553 snags, 3,068 logs and trees cut away from under its banks and on bars, and 5,015 trees felled from off the caving-in banks.

The laborers employed on the boats in that river have been unusually sickly. The Java, with the machine boats, still continue the operations, and will continue to work until the spring rise in that river, at which time they will be laid up during the high water. The steam snag-boat Eradicator continued her operations up to the 27th of October, ultimo, when she run up to this place for a new crew and a fresh supply of stores; the crew having been shipped in July last up to the 1st instant, it was then contemplated to send that boat to the Red river raft in this month. That boat is now refitting and shipping another crew to work either for the improvement of the Arkansas or Red river, as directed, and will be ready to proceed to either river by the 20th instant. The steam snag-boat "H. M. Shreve," built by Lieutenant John Sanders for the Ohio river, is also preparing to proceed to the Arkansas river, and will be ready in a few days to proceed to work. I am of the opinion that nearly all the most dangerous obstructions in that river, from its mouth to Little Rock, will be removed during the ensuing winter and spring. Still there will remain much work to be done in that river to render its navigation safe. Its banks cave in with every freshet to great extent. Consequently the accumulation of obstructions is very great, and will require more or less work by snag-boats in the channel for many years to come. It is also necessary to fell the timber on its banks, to prevent the rapid accumulation of snags in its bed. I would therefore beg leave respectfully to recommend a further appropriation at the approaching session of Congress of \$40,000, for which I have forwarded a detailed estimate of funds required for that purpose for the year 1838, which I hope will be approved of by the department and appropriated by Congress.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY M. SHREVE, *Superintendent, &c.*

Brigadier General C. GRATIOT, *Chief Engineer, Washington.*

K No. 1.

Estimate of the amount of funds required for continuing the improvement of the navigation of the Arkansas river during the year 1838.

1. For refitting the steam snag-boat Eradicator.....	\$4, 000
2. For refitting machine boats and furnishing quarters for laborers.....	1, 500
3. For working the steam snag-boat Eradicator six months.....	15, 000
4. For working the machine boats and felling timber from banks.....	8, 000
5. For working steam snag-boat Shreve four months, and refitting the same.....	10, 000
6. For contingencies.....	1, 500
	40, 000

HENRY M. SHREVE, *Superintendent, &c.*

LOUISVILLE, *Kentucky, November 13, 1837.*

OFFICE OHIO RIVER IMPROVEMENT, *Pittsburg, November 4, 1837.*

SIR: In obedience to the circular of the Engineer department, dated 15th August last, I have now the honor to report the progress and state of the operations for the improvement of the navigation of the Ohio river above the falls, on the 30th September, 1837, and to transmit herewith forms Nos. 1, 2, filled up according to the requirements of engineer order No. 4, some drawings of the work and machinery, and an estimate of the funds required for the service of 1838.

The first appropriation for the present improvements was made in 1835, at which time there were neither surveys nor estimates exhibiting the nature of the obstructions, the character of the improvements, or their probable cost. The disposition of this appropriation was placed under the charge of Lieutenant Dutton, who made a reconnaissance of the river, the result of which was reported to the department, with a table exhibiting the number of shoals, the depth of water and nature of bottom, and drawings of some of those points which were considered to present the greatest obstructions to the navigation. The general plan of improvements proposed was to concentrate the water into one volume when divided into several channels, and the removing of snags, logs, and detached rocks, from the bed of the river. Early arrangements were made for effecting the removal of the snags. A drawing of the boat machinery used for that purpose accompanies this report. Five such boats, with the necessary equipments

and tenders, now belong to the river service. In addition to these, a steam snag-boat was constructed this year, so that there is a sufficiency of that kind of machinery to remove all the remaining rocks and snags.

The examination of the river, made by Lieutenant Dutton, was necessarily deficient in many of the details of a survey, which preliminary is of vital necessity in works requiring plans adapted to the irregular features of the bed and channel of the river. Last year the requisite instruments for making a survey were ordered for the works, some of them were received in time for me to have it commenced this summer.

The river has been at a more uniformly high stage this season than during any of the previous ones since the first commencement of the operations for the improvements. Indeed, there has been no extremely low water since the summer of 1833. Throughout the past summer, steamboats either have or could have left this port on any day, the river not having been lower than two feet. It seldom gets below eighteen or twenty inches in the channel. However, the best information I have been enabled to obtain shows that it has been down as low as fifteen inches. It is at this low stage that the best and most satisfactory survey could be made, the bars being then well defined and the water clear. Most of these bars are susceptible of and require improvement. The velocity of the current at each ripple, the fall of the surface, the depth of water, and the area of the cross section, give the elements by which a comparison can be drawn between them. It is found that the shoalest water is at those points where it is most spread; when it is concentrated it is always deep enough, and never so strong that boats cannot ascend it. I doubt whether there is a point above the falls where the surface velocity will exceed five miles per hour. It is not solely the swiftest current that presents the greatest resistance to the passage of ascending boats. The three principal elements of resistance to ascending boats are: 1. The velocity of the stream; 2. The height to be overcome from the fall of the surface; 3. The shoalness of the water. The exact manner in which these are related and combined in making the resistance would be a beautiful but most intricate problem to solve. The steamboat Ploughman, having been found unsuitable for the service, was sold. I had a light draught stern-wheel boat built, particularly adapted to it; this boat has been used to advantage in towing machine boats, stone scows, &c., transporting materials, and in my examination of the river and the works. In January last I made favorable arrangements at Louisville for building a steam snag-boat; the boat was launched in May, the engine put up in June, and all the machinery finished in July, so that on the 1st of August the steam snag-boat "H. M. Shreve," (named in compliment to the worthy and ingenious inventor,) commenced work under an experienced superintendent, Captain J. R. Dillingham. The boat answered my most sanguine expectations; the engine and machinery all working perfectly well. This boat is of sufficiently light draught to work up as far as Letart's falls, drawing but little over three feet. The removal of snags above the falls of the Ohio presents a difficulty and expense not met with in the Mississippi. I refer to the disposition of the root of the snag. In the Mississippi it is dropped into a deep pool, where it immediately imbeds itself in the mud; but in the Ohio there is seldom an opportunity of thus disposing of it; we have to carry the roots ashore, and blast them with powder, so as to prevent them again forming snags. When the root has thus to be disposed of, it causes delay and expense equivalent to double of that when it is dropped into a pool. The removal of large snags in the Ohio will average in cost about fifteen dollars apiece.

The classification of the obstructions removed by the boats is into snags, which are trees anchored by their roots; logs, trees without the root; limbs or branches, parts of a tree; stumps; rocks, varying in size from ten to one hundred cubic feet; piles of drift, consisting of several snags and trees lodged in one place; and sunken boats, generally flatboats laden with coal. The operations for the improvement of the Ohio river are divided into three classes: 1st. The removal of all snags, logs, rocks, and sunken boats from the bed and channel of the river. In addition to which, it is hereafter contemplated to clear away all the leaning and fallen trees from the banks. 2d. The construction of stone dams to concentrate the water into one channel, when it is divided by islands, or from other causes spread over too much space. 3d. A survey of the river, comprising a complete hydrographical and topographical survey, giving the bars, channel, and shores; ascertaining the soundings and velocity of the current; and exhibiting everything necessary for the most judicious location of the dams, and the formation of the best-adapted project of improvements. The removal of snags, &c., was carried on with the steam snag-boat and the machine boats worked by manual power.

The steam snag-boat commenced work at Louisville on the first of August, and worked up as far as Letart's falls, removing only the largest and most dangerous snags from the channel. On the 30th September Captain Dillingham had removed 415 snags, seven branches or tree-tops, two sunken flatboats, and four piles of drift—making a total of 428 obstructions, at a cost of \$4,048 28, being at the rate of \$9 44 for each obstruction. The monthly expenses of this boat are about \$2,000. The most of these snags were very large, many of them having a diameter of six feet at the butt, and being over one hundred feet long.

Machine boat No. 2, under Captain Benjamin Crooks, an experienced pilot and excellent manager of hands, was worked to great advantage. He started in June and worked below Marietta; on the 30th September, having got down as far as Letart's falls, he had removed 317 snags, 85 logs, 20 stumps, 10 rocks, 793 branches, and six sunken boats—making a total of 438 obstructions, (not including limbs,) at a cost of \$3,419 08, being at the rate of \$7 80 for each obstruction.

Machine boat No. 1 commenced at Wheeling on the 1st August, and by the 30th September had got as far down as the Long Reach, having removed 106 snags and logs, seven stumps, three rocks, and two sunken boats—making a total of 123 obstructions, at a cost of \$2,595 43, being at the rate of \$21 10 for each obstruction.

Machine boat No. 3 worked between Wheeling and Brown's island, and on the 30th of September had removed eight snags, sixty-three logs, seven stumps, and fourteen rocks—making a total of ninety-two obstructions, at a cost of \$1,959 11, being at the rate of \$21 29 for each obstruction.

Machine boats Nos. 4 and 5 were not worked this season, being intended to work in low and clear water so as to remove the rocks and logs from the bottom of the river. It was deemed inexpedient to start them out, as the river continued turbid and high.

The steam snag and machine boats were continued at work during the month of October; all the machine boats, boats for quarters, stone scows, &c., are at this time laid up for the winter, in the very safe and excellent harbor of Steubenville. The steam snag-boat will be sent to the Arkansas until she is again required above the falls. From the commencement of the improvement up to the 30th of Sep-

tember, 1837, there have been 3,303 obstructions of various kinds removed from the channel of the river by means of the boats.

In his report of 1835, on the improvement of the Mississippi, Lieutenant Bowman says: "It is a well-established fact that snags do not move far from where they first fall in, the weight of the earth attached to their roots serving as an anchor. It is also well established that trees which once float seldom form snags. Admitting this, it is sufficiently evident that, if the banks are once cleared, there can be no subsequent formation of snags." He estimates the average cost of removing each snag, taken out of the Mississippi in 1834, at \$8, and in 1835 at \$13, the cost increasing as the number in the river is diminished.

His remarks have been confirmed by my own observation on the Ohio. Therefore the cutting down and clearing away all leaning and fallen trees from the banks will hereafter form an essential part of the improvements on the Ohio above the falls. There will be more of this kind of work necessary between Marietta and Maysville than on any other part of the river. The steamboats Baltimore, Roanoke, and William Hulbert, have been sunk by snags during the last year. Several other steamboats have been seriously damaged by running against them. It would be almost impossible to ascertain the exact number of flatboats lost, but there have been a great many.

The construction of the dams at Brown's island for concentrating the water has progressed very favorably and with the most satisfactory result in deepening the water in the channel down the Virginia chute. The bar in this chute, which was heretofore the shoalest in the river, has now more water over it than there is at many other points. The increase in depth of water from the concentration by the dams is between eight and twelve inches. The current has not been increased more than a quarter of a mile an hour at the swiftest place, the greatest velocity being now $3\frac{3}{4}$ miles per hour. These are the only dams that have yet been attempted. The success is, however, sufficient to establish the full efficiency of the plan for improving the navigation at other points. The accompanying maps and drawing will give a good conception of the character and objects of the works at Brown's island. The wing dam at the middle bar was commenced in September, 1836, and finished in August last. It is 2,246 feet long, between three and four feet high, with a base of about twenty feet, containing 3,158 perches of stone, which was quarried and transported to the dam at a cost of \$11,812 79, being at the rate of \$3 74 per perch. This cost includes the purchase of boats and tools, which are applicable to other works. The stone in this dam is generally small, of such dimensions that two men could easily handle it. It was cast promiscuously in the dam from the scows. The dam over the head of the Ohio chute was commenced on the 14th of August last, the stone having been previously quarried. A quarry on the Ohio shore, a short distance below the site of the dam, was opened in October, 1836, to furnish stone for its construction, and another on the Virginia shore for the same purpose. The quarrying at both quarries was suspended in August, when it was supposed that stone enough had been got out, there being between 12,000 and 14,000 perches of stone quarried. On the 30th of September 4,231 perches of this stone had been boated to and thrown into the dam. The entire expenditure for quarrying and transporting stone to the dam, including the purchase of boats for quarters, stone scows, and tools, (all of which are still applicable to future works,) amounts to \$21,489 20. Allowing \$16,000 for the expense of quarrying, \$5,480 20 for boating to and throwing into the dam, it will make the cost of quarrying and transporting stone to the dam average about \$2 25 per perch. It will take about 6,700 perches of stone to complete the dam, after deducting the work done in October, which amounts to about 2,300 perches. The dam has, therefore, at present about half the quantity of stone intended to be put in it. This dam when completed will be about 2,178 feet long, and about 11 feet high at the deepest place. Its section has a base equal to seven times its height, with a flat rounding top, the slope up stream being the greatest, and made of the smallest stone, the large stone being thrown into the lower part or breast of the dam. The top of the dam is to be on a level with the water when the river is at a four feet stage on the shoals. By reference to the drawing, the position of the dam will be found nearly parallel to the opposite shore, and connecting the Ohio shore with the head of the island bar in such a manner as to gently deflect all the water at a low stage down the Virginia chute. This dam has to meet but little resistance, and is relatively so low and so completely submerged at high water that it will not even make a break—boats of all kinds being then able to pass over it with facility.

On account of the unfinished state in which it is necessarily left, I apprehend that a few slight breaches may be made in it this winter; but after it is completed next year I feel confident of its withstanding any shock it may receive from either drift or ice. The survey of the river cannot be carried on with great celerity except at a continued low stage of water. The repeated freshets very much interfered with the prosecution of it this season. It is quite fully completed as far down as Steubenville, and partially so from Steubenville to Wheeling. As soon as the maps and drawings can be made out, copies will be transmitted to the department, with the projected improvements laid out on them.

The fall of the river from Pittsburg to Wheeling is 79.167 feet, and the distance being 88 miles and a fraction, makes the average fall at the rate of 10.69 inches per mile. The greatest surface velocity as yet ascertained at any ripple is at the rate of four miles per hour, and the greatest fall is at the rate of six feet per mile. I have drawn up a table of the bars, ripples, &c., between this place and Wheeling, giving the average depth of water, velocity of current, and rate of fall. The bars and ripples are numerous and close together in the upper part of the river. In low water the fall of the river is confined to the ripples, the intermediate pools being nearly stagnant and almost level; but as the river rises, the water gradually attains a uniform slope or fall on the surface, which becomes nearly parallel with a line passing through all the highest points of the bottom of the channel. The most irregular of those points can be reduced into that line without altering the regimen of the river, and that is as deep as I would be willing to excavate on the bars. The channel from Pittsburg to Wheeling is narrow, and has many short turns, requiring for low-water navigation narrow and short boats. The width can be increased to 200 feet with safety, and the curves straightened. This, united to the concentration of the water and consequent increase of depth, (which I calculate can be improved so as never to be under 30 inches, and seldom lower than 3 feet,) will afford a navigation that will answer all the purposes of commerce and travelling, as it would enable boats of one hundred tons burden, carrying passengers, to run at the lowest stages of the river. Whenever the navigation throughout the season becomes regular and certain, the expenses of the boats will be greatly reduced, and such rates of freight and passage as were unprofitable to the boats this season might then become customary and yield a fair profit to the owners. Merchandise would be transported at the rate of two-thirds of a cent per ton per mile, and passengers at the rate of one-sixth of a cent per mile. I am now well prepared with boats, machinery, and tools for carrying on the improvements, and am sufficiently familiar with those points most urgently requiring improvement to expedite the work to great advantage. So that I would respectfully suggest that an appropria-

tion should be requested as soon as practicable for that purpose. The accompanying estimate, which amounts to \$253,000, will show how it is contemplated to apply the funds called for—about \$95,000 for removing obstructions from the bed and channel of the river and clearing the shores of the fallen and leaning trees; the remainder for building dams, continuing surveys, &c. All the appropriations and the proceeds of the sale of public property amount to \$119,648 02; the expenditures, up to the 30th of September, to \$131,090, leaving a balance of \$11,441 98 available for this quarter. The greater part of this balance has been expended on account of the operations of last month. The amount now on hand will be required for the current expenses of the winter, in taking care of boats, &c. The disbursements on account of the improvements of the river have continued to be made by the Merchants and Manufacturers' Bank of Pittsburg with their former correctness and punctuality, and always in funds which were at par with the currency at the place of payment. All of which is respectfully submitted.

I have the honor to remain, sir, your most obedient servant,

JOHN SANDERS, *Lieutenant of Engineers.*

General C. GRATION, *Chief Engineer, Washington, D. C.*

Estimate of funds required for continuing the operations for improving the navigation of the Ohio river above the falls during the year 1838.

REMOVING SNAGS AND CLEARING SHORES.

Expenses of steam snag-boat, including pay and subsistence of officers and crew and cost of fuel for six months, at the rate of \$2,000 per month.....	\$12, 000
New rigging, tools, materials, and repairs.....	3, 000
Expenses of five machine boats, worked by manual power, including pay and subsistence of superintendents and crews for five months, at the rate of \$1,000 each per month.....	25, 000
Repairing and equipping boats, new rigging, tools, and materials, \$1,000 each.....	5, 000
Cost of five flatboats, fitted up as quarters for sixty men each, with furniture, scows, skiffs, and tools, \$1, 000 each.....	5, 000
Pay, subsistence, and superintendence of five parties of sixty men each, employed in clearing shores of fallen and leaning trees and lodged drift, for six months, at the rate of \$1, 500 per month for each party.....	45, 000

FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF DAMS FOR THE PERMANENT IMPROVEMENT OF THE CHANNEL.

Dam at head of Brunot's island.....	15, 000
Dam at head of Long island, and improvements at Horsetail ripple.....	10, 000
Dam at Duff's bar.....	10, 000
Dam at White's ripple and trap, and widening channel at trap.....	20, 000
Improvements at Dead Man's island.....	5, 000
Dams at Logtown bar, and altering channel.....	15, 000
Dam at Beaver shoals, and the opening of a new channel.....	20, 000
Dam at Raccoon bar.....	5, 000
Dam at Black's island.....	10, 000
Completion of dam at Brown's island.....	6, 500
Dam at Merigo's island.....	10, 000
Dam at Captina island, and opening new channel to the right of the island.....	15, 000
Expenses of light draught steamer for seven months, at the rate of \$700 per month.....	4, 900
Continuation of survey, making maps, drawings, &c.....	5, 000
Instruments, drawing paper, &c.....	600
Office expenses, stationery, &c.....	1, 000
Contingencies.....	5, 000
	253, 000

JOHN SANDERS, *Lieutenant of Engineers.*

Table exhibiting the depth of water, rate of fall, and velocity of current of the various ripples between Pittsburg and Captina island.

Name.	Depth.	Rate of fall.	Velocity of current in miles per hour.
Glasshouse ripple.....	2 6	.1466
Foot of Brunot's island.....	2 4
Horsetail ripple.....	3 6	1-802
Lowrey's ripple.....	3 2	1-1314
Duff's ripple.....	2 4	1-1532
Merriman's ripple.....	2 10	1-1908	2½
White's ripple.....	3 4	1-981	3
Wollery's trap.....	2 4	1-958
Deadman's ripple.....	2 8	1-738	3½
Sewechly bar.....	3 0
Logtown bar.....	2 6	1-1516

Table exhibiting the depth of water, rise of fall, &c.—Continued.

Name	Depth.	Rate of fall	Velocity of current in miles per hour.
Crow's island.....	3 2		
Hog island.....	4 4		
Atkinson's bar.....	3 0		
Beaver shoals, (head).....	3 6		
Do..... (middle).....	3 0		
Do..... (foot).....	2 0		2
Raccoon bar.....	2 4		
Montgomery's island.....	3 2		
Phillis's island.....	3 8	1-1283	4
Georgetown island.....	4 2	1-1837	3½
Line island.....	3 2	1-1216	
Babb's island.....	3 4		
Yellow Creek bar.....	3 4		
Wellsville bar.....			
Baker's island.....	3 0	1-3612	
Kneistloy's cluster.....	2 4		3
Harding's run.....			
Black's island.....	2 6		
Coxen's run.....			
King's Creek bar.....	3 0		
Brown's island.....	3 3	1-1806	3¾
Will's creek.....	4 0		
Steubenville bar.....	3 0		
Will's bar.....	2 8		
Merigo's island.....	2 6		
Cross creek.....	4 0		
Cox's bar.....	2 10		
Wellsburg.....			
Beechbottom bar.....	2 6		
Short creek.....	2 8		
Pike island.....	4 0		
Twin islands, (head).....	3 6		
Do..... (upper).....			
Do..... (foot).....			
Do..... (upper).....		2 4	
Burlington bar.....	2 6		
Wheeling island, (head).....	3 0		
Do..... (foot).....	2 8		
Bogg's island.....	3 0		
McMahon's creek.....	3 0		
Patterson's bar.....			
Little Grave creek.....			
Big Grave creek.....	4 6		
Captina island.....	2 0		

M.

Annual report of the work done to improve the navigation of the Cumberland river, in Tennessee and Kentucky, above Nashville.

The improvement of the navigation of the Cumberland river above Nashville was commenced on the 1st day of September, at Nashville, with eighty laborers, and on the 4th at Carthage, Tennessee, with one hundred laborers. The improvement was confined to cutting down, belting the timber overhanging the channel way, sharp points, deep bends of the river, removing rafts and snags, &c.

The superintendent with his company worked up the river, and cut up everything thought necessary from Nashville to Walton's Ferry, distance ninety miles.

Captain Hone commenced at Carthage on the 4th of September with one hundred laborers, and from that time to September 30, agreeably to his report, cut down 7,168 trees, belted on the banks 1,247 trees, cut loose 15 rafts, and removed 34 snags between Carthage and Buffalo island, distance thirty miles. This gentleman reports this part of the river more difficult and important to improve than any other part of the Cumberland river.

All the laborers under the command of the superintendent, with forty-seven of Captain Hone's company, were paid off at Walton's Ferry on the 30th of September, owing to the river rising. The other company of fifty-three laborers was continued under pay for the purpose of finishing some fifteen miles above the ferry. This company is now at work above Carthage under the command of Captain T. M. Hale.

Herewith you have an estimate of funds necessary to continue this improvement in the summer and fall of 1838.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. McKNIGHT, *Superintendent, &c.*

Brigadier General C. GRATIO, *Chief Engineer, Washington.*

N.

Fifth annual report of work done in improving the navigation of the Cumberland river below Nashville, Tennessee, for the months of October and November, 1836, and the months of April, May, June, July, and August, and the machine snag-boat, for September, 1837.

The improvement of the navigation of the Cumberland river, in Tennessee and Kentucky, below Nashville, was continued from the 1st of October to the 22d of November, 1836, at Dover island, Island chute, and shoals below; first, by constructing a wing-dam from the main left shore across the Island chute, and covering the head of the island, measuring four hundred yards long, and from five to six feet high, base from eight or twelve feet. The embankment in the Island chute is about one hundred and twenty-five yards long and three feet high. The embankment at Dover shoals is four hundred and fifty yards long, and averages five feet high. The boats were then laid up for the winter, and arrangements made to rebuild the machine snag-boat with the officers and laborers employed to take care of the boats.

On the 1st of April, 1837, the work was again commenced at the Harpeth shoals with fifty laborers, and finally increased to seventy-five. They were employed, first, in repairing and adding to the height of the lower embankment, and connecting the upper with the lower wing-dams; thus covering the whole Harpeth island and sand-bar. The new work measures seven hundred and forty yards, making the whole work at this place measure two thousand one hundred and twenty-five yards. This improvement now gives to the large steamboats from two hundred and fifty to three hundred tons more than they could previously convey to Nashville, and to the small boats a safe and uniform channel.

The enclosed sketch,* although imperfect, will give you some idea of its present appearance, with a proposed improvement below the mouth of Sycamore creek and the Harpeth river, now the shoalest water in all the Harpeth shoals; it was between these two points that we grounded the "Laurel," and lost her services from the 27th of August to the 30th of September. About sixty yards of the embankment (new work) at the head of the island gave way in August last.

The machine snag-boat commenced work at the Harpeth shoals on the 1st of August with sixteen laborers, and up to the 30th of September removed from the channel of the river one hundred and ninety-four snags, one hundred and ninety-two logs and roots, one keel-boat hull, and flatboat loaded with iron. She was overtaken at Line island, Kentucky, by high water on the 30th of September, when her crew was paid off, and the boat and quarter boat was towed up to the improvement above Nashville, where she is now at work.

On the 7th of August I arrived at Dover shoals with the United States steamboat Laurel and eighty laborers, and commenced work by preparing and boating rock to the different embankments. On the 15th the water rose some seven or eight feet, and covered all the rock that we had prepared. Left with the steamboat, quarter and rock boats, for the Harpeth shoals, where we arrived on the 17th, and commenced boating rock. The fine stage of water enabled us to load the steamboat. The work was continued up to the 28th of September, the water falling so fast that we grounded the steamboat, and lost her services up to September 30.

The improvement below Nashville will require a further appropriation, or part of the work will be rendered in a short time almost entirely useless; the crevasse at the head of Harpeth and Dover island will continue to give way unless soon secured; and there yet remain the contemplated improvements at the mouth of Sycamore creek, Harpeth river, Palmyra island, Devil's chute, Shelby's island and shoals, and Ingram's shoals, unimproved, as was recommended by Captains Delafield and Shreve in their report in the fall of 1832. Even \$5,000 would be of great service. I believe this amount would enable me to secure the embankments.

Extent of the stone embankments on the Cumberland river below Nashville.

Flax-Patch bar.....	650	
Harpeth island.....	2, 125	
Davis's ripple.....	375	
		3, 150
Dover island, (head).....	400	
Dover Island chute.....	1 25	
Dover Island shoals, below.....	450	
		975
Line island, Kentucky.....	513	
Keel-boat chute.....	485	
Steamboat chute.....	685	
		1, 683
		5, 808

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

Brigadier General C. GRATIOT, *Chief Engineer.*

WM. McKNIGHT, *Superintendent, &c.*

N No. 1.

General estimate of funds required to complete the improvement of the Cumberland river in Tennessee and Kentucky, below Nashville, for the year 1838.

1. A wing-dam at Nashville island..... \$3, 000
2. Improvement at Sycamore creek, one mile below Harpeth's improvement..... 5, 000
3. Securing and making more permanent the embankments at the Harpeth islands..... 2, 500

* The drawing referred to in this document is omitted to be printed, under the order of the House of Representatives of September 11, 1837.

4. Removing a ledge of rocks at the mouth of Harpeth river, and three hundred yards of embankment at the same place.....	\$5, 000
5. A wing-dam at Palmyra island.....	4, 500
6. Repairing and extending the embankments at Dover shoals.....	3, 000
7. Finishing the embankment at Davis's ripple.....	500
8. Removing the obstructions at the Devil's chute, in Kentucky.....	2, 500
9. Improvement at Shelby's island and bar below.....	4, 000
10. Improvement at Ingram's shoals.....	8, 000
11. Removing the obstructions at Martin's Wild Cat, Well's Island shoals, McNabb's bar, Big and Little Eddy, Big and Little Horse Ford, and a reef of rocks below Camp Rowdy.....	12, 000
	50, 000
	50, 000

W. McKNIGHT, *Superintendent, &c.*

HAYSBORO', October 20, 1837.

O No. 1.

Report of the condition of "five roads" in Michigan, by Lieutenant Colonel B. K. Pierce.

WASHINGTON CITY, October 4, 1837.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in compliance with your instructions, I have carefully examined every part of the public road leading from Detroit to Chicago, extending from Detroit to the Indiana line, about one hundred and eighty-four miles. The road from Detroit to Ypsilanti, distance about thirty miles, was made through a low, heavily timbered, and, in some places, marshy country. This part of the road is literally worn out. Horses and loaded wagons sink deep in the mud, and it is difficult for wagons heavily laden to pass over it. It is difficult to make this portion of the road good, consequently it will be expensive to make the repairs and complete it according to the original design. I have estimated the expense to Ypsilanti, thirty miles, at \$500 per mile, making \$15,000. From Ypsilanti to the Indiana line, distance about one hundred and fifty-four miles, the country is generally high and open, and the roads are good. Some portions, however, require repairs. Eight thousand dollars judiciously expended will put the whole of this latter portion in good repair. It is therefore estimated that \$23,000 will be sufficient to put the Chicago road from Detroit, one hundred and eighty-four miles, to the dividing line between Michigan and Indiana in good repair.

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. K. PIERCE, *Lieut. Col. U. S. A., on Engineer Service.*

General CHARLES GRATIOT, *Chief Engineer U. S. A., Washington City, D. C.*

O No. 2.

WASHINGTON, October 4, 1837.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, according to your instructions, I have carefully examined the condition of the road leading from Sheldon's to the mouth of the river St. Joseph's, in the State of Michigan. The distance from Sheldon's to the mouth of the St. Joseph's river is about one hundred and sixty miles. The country through which the road passes is well adapted for roads, being generally high, dry, and hard. This road is generally very good. There are, however, a few exceptions. From the east bank of the river, at the ferry of St. Joseph's, there is a low marsh, over which the road extends nearly a mile. It is there narrow and inundated with water, difficult and unsafe to pass.

I estimated the expense of making this portion of the road a proper width, safe, and permanent, at \$3,000, and the necessary repairs for the remainder of this route at \$2,000, making the amount necessary to put the Sheldon and St. Joseph's road in proper repair \$5,000.

I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. K. PIERCE, *Lieut. Col. U. S. A., on Engineer Service.*

General CHARLES GRATIOT, *Chief Engineer U. S. A., Washington City, D. C.*

O No. 3.

WASHINGTON, October 4, 1837.

SIR: I have the honor to report that I examined a part of the road leading from Clinton to Grand River rapids. The road from Clinton to Jacksontown, on the Grand river, distance about twenty-five miles, runs through an open, high, and dry country, and is generally very good. And from Jacksontown, fifty-six miles in the direction to the rapids, the road runs over a high country, and can be passed without difficulty. From the point last mentioned there is no road to the rapids. I am told that there is a heavy growth of timber all the way through—distance I suppose about seventy miles—and that no survey has yet been made. I have therefore no data from which to form an estimate of what was the original design, nor what may be the expense of making a road through to the rapids of Grand river.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. K. PIERCE, *Lieutenant Colonel United States Army, on Engineer Service.*

General CHARLES GRATIOT, *Chief Engineer United States Army, Washington, D. C.*

O No. 4.

WASHINGTON, October 4, 1837.

SIR: I have the honor to report that I have examined the road leading from Niles's to the mouth of the St. Joseph's river. It runs generally through a heavily timbered country; an equal part of it low and muddy, and generally in bad condition for travelling.

To make a good turnpike road from Niles's to the St. Joseph's, distance twenty-five miles, will require \$10,000.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. K. PIERCE, *Lieutenant Colonel United States Army, on Engineer Service.*

General CHARLES GRATIOT, *Chief Engineer United States Army, Washington, D. C.*

O No. 5.

WASHINGTON, October 4, 1837.

SIR: I have the honor to report that I have examined the Saginaw road, leading from Detroit to Saginaw. The road from Detroit to Bloomfield, distance eighteen miles, passes through a low, heavily timbered, miry country, formerly called the Black Swamp. Although this part of the road appears to have been originally well made, still on my arrival I found it almost impassable for teams. Indeed, the nature of the soil is such as to render it difficult to make a hard road.

A company made an application last session of the legislature of Michigan, and received a grant for a turnpike for the eighteen miles above described, with the right to erect gates and collect tolls for twenty-one years, on condition of the roads being made and kept in good order and repair. I have therefore not made an estimate of that part of the Saginaw road. The road from Bloomfield to Pontiac, and thence four miles beyond the Flint river, is an excellent finished road, and in good repair. The road thence to Saginaw, distance about thirty-four miles, is almost impracticable for horse or footman, and entirely impassable for teams or carriages. I estimated the expense of making a good permanent road over that distance at \$45,000. It seems to be the general impression there that the government is pledged to construct this road, and, for the want of one, the emigrants are disappointed, and prevented from settling in that region of the State. It is deemed very important to the State, and to the government of the United States, (the latter having large bodies of land yet to be sold lying north of the Saginaw river,) that this road should be completed, opening an interior communication between Detroit and Saginaw.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

B. K. PIERCE, *Lieutenant Colonel United States Army, on Engineer Service.*

General CHARLES GRATIOT, *Chief Engineer United States Army, Washington, D. C.*

P.

MEMPHIS, October 9, 1837.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations on the Memphis and St. Francis road during the past year.

The same causes which have hitherto influenced the progress of that work have operated during the current season. It has been found impossible to assemble an adequate force. Upon the approach of the sickly season, the white laborers generally abandoned the road. During August and September there were not twenty laborers left, except slaves, who were employed by the year. The few whites that remained were all sick. Blacks are not liable to the diseases of the swamp, and have generally during the summer been healthy. Early in September the hands began to come in from the upper country, and the prospects of the work were most cheering.

By the 22d of September the number of hands exceeded two hundred, and several other organized companies were on their way to commence work for the winter. Up to this period, the season had been unusually propitious, having been dry and pleasant.

On the 24th of September the rain commenced, and continued, with little interruption, until the 1st of October, by which time the site of the road, from where the embankment was finished to the St. Francis, was one sheet of water, unbroken except by a few solitary ridges of ground, which, being some inches higher than the rest of the country, were not entirely immersed. The effect of this rain, in a country so perfectly level, was most disastrous. Nothing could be done until the waters subsided. The floors of the shanties were flooded; the laborers were driven to the tops of the building, or on the finished embankment, where the most of them encamped in the rain until the waters retreated, which was not until the expiration of a week. This state of things drove many hands from the work, and rendered it necessary to turn off others, who applied for employment at the time. The ditches which had been opened, of large dimensions, for the purpose of draining this part of the bottom, were covered, and in no way distinguishable from the unbroken sheet of water which flowed over them.

The weather since the equinoctial storm has been fine, and the work is now actively progressing, with about two hundred hands on the near end, and one hundred and thirty on the furthest end.

Preparations will be made for the approach of the rainy season, by the establishment of depots of provisions at such points in the swamp as are not liable to overflow from ordinary rains. Unless such magazines are now established, it is impossible to supply the hands—the intermediate road being utterly impassable for vehicles of any description after the rains commence.

Plan of operations.

No change in the plan of operations adopted last year has been found necessary during the current season. The embankment is constructed by hired laborers. The only contract existing at present upon

the road is one for the construction of that portion between the 35th and 38th mile-posts. This was submitted to, and approved by, the honorable Secretary of War on the 1st of November, 1836. So far as it is practicable, the work is finished as it advances into the swamp. This is important to facilitate the transportation of provisions, implements, &c. It is not, however, possible to pursue this plan to the desired extent.

The approach of the rainy season renders it necessary to divide the laborers, and assign them to such elevated points as are above the water. I may here remark that the difficulties encountered from water arise in a great measure from the heavy rains. The annual overflow of the Mississippi and St. Francis rivers seldom reaches far into the swamp, and remains, at longest, but a few weeks. The rains (which commence just at the time when those who have fled from fear of fever are returning) cover the ground from ten to thirty-six inches with water. This has scarcely time to flow off before it is succeeded by another rain. In summer most of the swamp is perfectly dry, then the fever drives all but negro laborers from the road; if these could be had in sufficient numbers the work would speedily be completed.

Causes which have affected the advancement of the work.

The causes which have from its commencement exercised a prejudicial influence over the progress of this work are too well known to the department to need repetition. There is now a probability that labor will be abundant. At present, more hands are offering than can be advantageously employed at this season. The want of laborers has hitherto been a prominent difficulty.

Change in the original plan.

The only change from the original plan is on that portion of the road already referred to as being under contract, viz: from the 35th to the 38th mile-posts. Between these two points the location has been changed further south. Two important advantages were gained by this change, viz: it is shorter than the other route by six hundred yards, and crosses Sand slough at a point where it may be bridged. These circumstances were submitted to the honorable Secretary of War, who decided in favor of the southern route, and at the same time accepted the proposal of the contractor to execute the work of the new route for the same sum he was to have received for the original one.

Progress of the work.

Since the last annual report the work has been completed as far as the 1st quarter of the 20th mile on the east end. The 39th mile on the west end is complete. The 38th mile is nearly finished. The 36th and 37th will probably be done by the expiration of the present year. Ditches have been excavated of large dimensions at the foot of the slopes of the embankment on the 20th, part of the 21st, the 32d, 33d, part of the 34th, 35th, part of the 36th, and 37th miles.

These ditches subserve the double purpose of draining the water of ordinary rains, and the embankment from them serves as a temporary road, and greatly facilitates the transportation of provisions, &c.

Bridges have been erected over Lloyd's bayou, Millseat Lake bayou, the first bayou on the 20th mile, and two sloughs west of Sand slough. Less damage has been sustained, during the current year, from washing of the embankment by heavy rains than during the last season. Since my last report the companies have passed over the whole road, from the 1st to the 20th mile, and repaired such damages as were sustained by the work from the above cause, and also from settling. The aggregate amount of embankment required for the purpose I estimate at one-fifth of the original quantity.

Resources of the country.

It has already been stated that the country, from the 17th to the 38th mile of this road, is wholly incapable of supplying any of the articles of produce required for the support of the laborers on the work, or of contributing in any way to the advancement of the operations, being a low, flat, unproductive waste, not susceptible of any improvement, and, with the exception of a few isolated spots, can never be inhabited. In such a country, innumerable difficulties are to be encountered in the execution of a public improvement that are unknown in a thickly settled and productive region. The importance of this work arises rather from its being the principal inlet to the State of Arkansas, than from any resources which it is likely to develop in the immediate vicinity of its location. The country for 16 miles from the river, on each side of the road, is fertile, and will ultimately be rich in all the products of this latitude. The continuation of the road beyond that point derives its importance wholly from its being the only passable route from the east side of the Mississippi into the interior of Arkansas.

Notwithstanding the difficulties encountered in crossing that portion of the swamp where the road is unfinished, there were eleven hundred and twenty-seven emigrants, one hundred and twenty-seven heavy teams, together with the usual allowance of cattle, horses, &c., passed during the month of September last; the transient passing and the travel in the opposite direction are not included in this statement. An estimate for the completion of the work will accompany this report. The amount called for will fall short of the original estimate, when the difference in the price of labor and provisions at the time that estimate was made (1834) and the present prices is taken into consideration. I beg leave to call the attention of the department to the fact that labor may now be had to any requisite extent, and to urge this in the strongest terms as a reason why the maximum estimate be, if possible, appropriated at the ensuing session of Congress. It will be recollected that the want of a sufficient number of laborers has been the greatest difficulty of this work.

The experience of three years has conclusively shown that laborers will not remain in this swamp when they can find employment elsewhere. It appears to me, therefore, of the utmost importance to take advantage of the present abundance of labor to complete this road—the last appropriation will probably last until the middle of the 1st quarter of 1838. I take this occasion to state that, from the impassable nature of the country between the 21st and 35th miles of this road, during a large portion of the year, the advantages derived from what has already been finished, beyond the facilities given to those occupying

the first 17 miles, will be comparatively small. *If but one mile were left unfinished, it would, during a portion of the year, as effectually cut off all travel as if the whole had remained the unimproved quagmire which I found it three years since.*

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. H. BOWMAN, *Lieutenant of Engineers.*

General CHARLES GRATIOT, *Chief Engineer.*

P No. 1.

Estimate of funds requisite for the operations on the Memphis and St. Francis road during the year 1838.

Nature of workmanship, materials, and contingencies embraced in the intended application of the funds estimated for.	Extent.	Maximum.	Minimum.
Laborers and overseers.....		\$75, 600 00	\$64, 260 00
Provisions for laborers.....		29, 698 50	25, 243 30
Ditching.....		17, 077 00	14, 515 45
Clearing site.....	2½ miles.	1, 250 00	1, 250 00
Bridging.....	725 feet.	1, 625 00	1, 625 00
Teams.....	6 yoke.	300 00	300 00
Implements.....		1, 049 33	891 93
Transportation of provisions.....		4, 504 32	3, 828 67
Contingencies.....		5, 784 00	5, 784 00
		136, 888 15	117, 698 35

Maximum required..... \$136, 888 15
 Minimum required..... 117, 698 35

A. H. BOWMAN, *Lieutenant of Engineers.*

Q.

Memor on the progress of the operations on the Cumberland road east of the Ohio during the year ending September 30, 1837.

PHILADELPHIA, November 14, 1837.

At the date of my last annual report, September 30, 1836, on the repair of the Cumberland road east of the Ohio, there remained unfinished the stone bridge over Will's creek, near Cumberland, and the cast-iron bridge over Dunlap's creek, between Brownsville and Bridgeport.

During the fall of 1836 the masonry of the bridge over Will's creek was finished, the filling between the wing walls was made, the surface or roadway was macadamized, and a wrought-iron railing put up on the whole length of the bridge and wing walls, which completed this structure; the total cost of which has been \$27,101 89, constructed of large masses of compact limestone, crossing the entire valley of Will's creek, measuring 291 feet in length from extremes of the wing walls, 26 feet 8 inches in height from water line to level of the roadway, formed of two elliptical arches, each 59 feet span, with a rise of 15½ feet; the stones forming the voussoirs of the arch being large, massive pieces, cut perfect from extrados to intrados, and side to side of the bridge, to fit the curvature of the arch, and the joints square, with the tangents to the ellipses; the whole laid in lime mortar and pointed with cement—a work of great durability, most excellent material, and skilfully put together, at a total cost very far within the sums usually paid for bridges of like durability, material, and workmanship.

Messrs. McClean and Sumner were the contractors who executed and finished the principal part of this bridge.

The masonry of the Dunlap's creek bridge, the arch of which is to be of cast-iron, was continued during the fall of last year, and finished in September of this year. It is constructed of very large heavy masses of stone, with beds and joints cut true from face to rear of the walls—laid in cement mortar where exposed to the water, and on the outside, and with cement mixed with lime mortar on all other parts.

This work is nowhere in that district of country exceeded in its execution for durability and workmanship, and performed by Messrs. Keys and Searight, under a contract.

The quantity of masonry laid is 3,806 10-25 perches, crossing a valley of 320 feet from extremes of the wing walls, and 42 feet high.

The cast-iron for the arch of this bridge is *not entirely finished*. The five centre sections of the elliptical cylinders (voussoirs) and two flooring plates, or seven pieces of about 8¼ tons, remain yet to be cast. The castings already made weigh 317,476 pounds, composed of 230 pieces, some of them weighing over 6,000 pounds. A few pieces of castings (St. Andrew's crosses, and road-sustaining plates) yet remain to be fitted together. The wrought-iron railing remains to be made, which constitutes of itself about three-sevenths of the work yet to be done.

Last year there was on hand \$29,968 87, when I asked an additional appropriation of \$7,183 67 to finish the repairs of the whole road, at which time I estimated this bridge would cost \$27,870. I now find, after having expended \$27,626 76, that the bridge is not finished, and in the condition just set forth. It has been necessary to build the eastern wing walls deeper than was first supposed necessary,

increasing the masonry thereby 206 perches, and the excavation 190 yards, at a cost of \$1,340; and that there will be 27,356 pounds more of castings than was first estimated, which increases the cost \$1,230; and that the fitting the castings has exceeded the sum estimated by \$2,480 40.

In addition to which, there are some items not enumerated in the estimate of last year—such as Macadam metal for roadway, scaffolding for raising the bridge, tar and paint for preserving it from rust, and earth for filling the wing walls after this winter's settling; making, with the cost of the iron railing, a sum of \$7,000 necessary to finish this bridge.

In again asking an appropriation to finish this work, the only explanations I have to offer for its necessity are the facts set forth above, that have arisen from the novelty of the undertaking; nothing of the kind ever having been executed in this country, so far as I can learn, and no individual concerned in its construction ever having worked on similar operations.

A descriptive memoir of this cast-iron structure, together with two sheets of drawings, illustrating the principles of its construction, and exhibiting the dimensions and details of the various parts, as also a drawing of the Will's creek stone bridge, accompany this memoir.

All the iron castings and other parts of the cast-iron bridge have been placed in storage at Brownsville, and the services of the superintendent and every other individual concerned in its erection dispensed with until funds shall be appropriated for finishing it, which will require about two months' work.

All of which is respectfully submitted by

Your obedient servant,

RICHARD DELAFIELD, *Captain of Engineers.*

Brigadier General C. GRATIOT, *Chief Engineer.*

Q No. 1.

Detailed estimate of the funds required to complete the Dunlap's creek bridge.

For 16,150 pounds of wrought-iron railing, being 680 feet, at \$4.....	\$2, 720 00
For 16,302 pounds of castings, (5 cylinders and 2 flooring plates,) at 4½ cents per pound....	733 59
For 1,500 pounds of wrought-iron bolts, (for St. Andrew's crosses and road-sustaining plates,) at 14 cents per pound.....	210 00
For 25 men, two months, at \$25 per month, shipping remaining castings, and putting up superstructure.....	1, 250 00
For 300 perches of Macadam metal, at \$1.....	300 00
For completing centering.....	200 00
For covering castings with a coat of distilled tar, and painting outside castings.....	250 00
For grading the road on each side of the bridge, and for additional filling that will be required on account of the filling settling during the winter.....	200 00
For services of agent two months, at \$125.....	250 00
For postage, stationery, and office rent.....	50 00
For hauling the castings from foundry to site of work.....	75 00
For blocks and falls for erecting the iron castings.....	50 00
For small items that cannot be foreseen, say.....	711 41
	7, 000 00

RICHARD DELAFIELD, *Captain of Engineers.*

PHILADELPHIA, November 14, 1837.

R.

CUMBERLAND ROAD OFFICE, *Springfield, Ohio, October 30, 1837.*

SIR: Since the date of my last annual report the operations on the Cumberland road in Ohio have been steadily continued, with a partial suspension, occasioned by the intervention of the last winter, which rendered it necessary to discontinue all operations upon the road except the preparation of metal for covering, which has continued without interruption throughout the year.

After the passage of the act of March 3 last, appropriating \$190,000 for continuing the construction of this road, it was determined to apply as much of the available means to the completion of the road from Columbus to Springfield, a distance of 43 miles, as could be done consistently with the general interests of the work, and the balance to the extension of the road to the west of Springfield. The operations in the latter direction could not, however, be carried to the extent desired, and as recommended in my report of last year, in consequence of the sum appropriated having been less than two-thirds of the amount required for the service of this year.

The present season has proved very favorable in this part of the State for road operations, and therefore a large amount of work has been executed during the year; the bulk of which, as also of the expenditures, has been applied to the macadamizing and completion of the division of road comprised between Columbus and Springfield; a small portion only of the funds available for the year remaining unpledged or unexpended on September 30 of this year.

The subdivision of 14 miles west from Columbus to the town of Jefferson was completed during the winter, and received by the executive of the State on the 25th of March last. The preparation of all the metal required for nine miles, in continuation to the 23d mile, was completed in May, and six inches laid on the same on the 10th of June; the remaining three inches being prepared and in readiness to lay thereon as soon as the former shall have been sufficiently packed to receive it, which has not yet taken place in consequence of the travel during the dry weather of the past season, having preferred the by-

roads in preference to passing over metal newly laid. This object will, however, soon be effected by the approaching wet weather.

In the months of May and June last contracts were entered into for the completion with nine inches of metal of the eleven miles immediately east of Springfield, viz: from the 33d to the 43d mile, inclusive; also, for the grading of three miles, from the 30th to the 33d, inclusive; and for completing the delivery on the road, for eight miles, from the 25th to the 32d, of six inches of prepared metal, and of nine inches for the 24th mile. All these contracts are in a state of forwardness, and give promise of a satisfactory completion. The laying of six inches of metal, from the 32d to the 43d mile-stone, in the town of Springfield was completed in September, and all the grading required between Columbus and Springfield will be completed on the 1st of November.

The wooden superstructure of a bridge of 87 feet span across Deer creek, on the 22d mile, was commenced early in the spring and will be finished at the end of this month. All the masonry on the above division has been completed, and the stone bridges furnished with parapets of cut limestone from the quarries at Springfield.

After the successful fulfilment of the contracts now in progress, and the expenditure of the present appropriation, there will remain, to complete the road from Columbus to Springfield, the preparation of the last stratum of 3 inches, or 8,560 perches of metal for the 8 miles from the 25th to the 32d, and the laying of 3 inches, already prepared, upon the 9 miles from the 15th to the 23d, and of 9 inches from thence to the 32d mile—in all estimated to cost \$30,455; after which, this division may be surrendered entire to the State during the next summer.

To the west of Springfield the operations have this season been extended to the Miami river, 61 miles west of Columbus. A contract was entered into, in the month of August, for grubbing 7 miles, from the 55th to the 61st mile, inclusive, to be completed during the ensuing winter.

The abutments of two bridges in the valley of Mad river, of 80 and 150 feet span, respectively, across Buck creek and Mad river, were commenced in June, and are now nearly completed. The foundation of the eastern abutment of the latter bridge was sunk 10 feet below the surface of the stream, and founded, as well as the western abutment, upon solid limestone rock. The bridge across Buck creek was found necessary to afford sufficient vent for the water during the highest freshets, which here spread entirely across the bottom in which the two streams are situated. This part of the work, as well as the quarrying of the material, has been executed by hired workmen. To aid in opening for and raising these works a small body of laborers were kept up during the summer, who, when not occupied upon the bridges, were employed in executing the light grading of the 44th mile, or first west of Springfield. The stone of which these abutments are constructed, with the exception of a small quantity purchased, was obtained from a quarry on the east side of Mad river, at one-fourth and one-half mile from the site of the bridges, which affords a superior quality of building limestone.

During the year ending September 30, 1837, there has been prepared for the cover of the division of a road from Columbus to Springfield 68,550 perches of metal; and the quantity laid upon the road, in the same time, amounted to 62,617 perches.

The grading of seven miles on the above division, comprising all to be done thereon, will be finished at the expiration of the present month of October.

The superstructure of the bridge across Little Darby creek was put in good repair previous to surrendering to the State the section of road upon which it lies; new arches and additional bracing were supplied, and the bridges reshingled and repainted; these repairs costing the sum of \$1,165.

The wooden superstructure of a bridge of 87 feet span, as before stated, has been built this season across Deer creek, on the 22d mile. The principal part of the frame-work of this bridge has been constructed of oak, selected with care from the neighboring timbered land; the weather covering of the bridge, and some portion of the bracing, of poplar, brought from Mad river, a distance of 24 miles.

Of the masonry, 370 perches of cut stone have been laid in wings and parapet walls of stone bridges, in completion of all the work of this description to be done on the above division. On the division west of Springfield, 1,312 perches of masonry have been laid in abutments of bridges across Mad river and Buck creek, and in culverts on the 44th mile.

Several miles of the grubbing contracted for have been partially finished, and the satisfactory completion of the whole in due time expected.

The material used for macadamizing the road from the 15th to the 40th mile, inclusive, for the distance of 24 miles, (excluding the 20th and 21st miles, supplied with quarry stone from Little Darby creek,) has been taken from gravel banks in the vicinity of the road, bordering the valleys of creeks, which, in respect to these miles, have a general direction nearly parallel to the road. These banks afford limestone of the hardest kind, which, when well separated from earth and the finer particles of gravel, by screens of proper construction, and broken to the required size, is found, although requiring a longer time to consolidate, to offer a wearing surface equal, if not superior, to the quarry stone obtained.

The material for covering several miles adjacent to the town of Springfield has been taken from quarries on Buck creek and Mad river, which afford a hard and compact species of limestone, possessing the requisite qualities for forming a good covering for the road.

After the work shall have been completed in a permanent manner, and in case of the exhaustion of the gravel material along the line of the above division, the repairs may be supplied from the quarries on the Sciota, the Darbys, and the nearly inexhaustible sources of gravel on the latter, and from the quarries in the neighborhood of Springfield, on the west of this division, which will supply any requisite quantity of material for the purposes of repair. After the completion and general use of this thoroughfare the needful repairs may be made on very reasonable terms, by contract or otherwise, and fully, it is confidently believed, within the competency of the tolls to meet.

By a proper regulation of the travel, and the encouragement by the rate of tolls or legal enactment of the use of wheels of wide bearing upon vehicles transporting heavy loads, the extent and cost of the repairs may be diminished in a very material ratio. The disadvantages arising from the scarcity of suitable material upon the Columbus and Springfield division will not be experienced to the same extent in the further progress of the operations to the westward of the latter place, as materials of stone, gravel, and lumber, are found to exist in far greater abundance on that division of the road.

The expenditures during the year ending September 30, 1837, as shown by the tabular statements forwarded, amount to \$234,836 89.

Of this, there have been applied towards the completion of the road from Columbus to Springfield.....	\$222, 513 64
To the division lying west of Springfield.....	12, 013 33
Arrearages east of Columbus.....	309 92
	234, 836 89
The available means during the year have amounted to	297, 596 18
Leaving unexpended on the 30th of September, 1837.....	62, 759 29
Of the latter amount there was pledged, at the same date, to meet the fulfilment of certain contracts.....	58, 641 61
Leaving for application on the 30th September, 1837.....	4, 117 68

All of which will be applied during the fourth quarter of the current year.

For the ensuing year the grading and bridging west of Springfield will constitute the principal items of expense, it being proposed to finish the road between this place and Columbus; the whole of which may be surrendered to the State of Ohio early in the ensuing summer, should the funds required be furnished early in the season.

To grade the road to the Western Bluff, on the Miami river, and erect the requisite bridges on that subdivision, or make the necessary arrangements for their construction by contract or otherwise, and to complete the clearing and grubbing of the line through to the State of Indiana—the following being the estimated amount required for the above objects:

For preparing 8,560 perches of metal, at \$2 17	\$18, 575
Laying 3 inches for 9 miles, and 9 inches for the same distance	11, 880
To complete the road from Columbus to Springfield	30, 455
Grubbing to the Indiana State line, 35.7 miles	17, 200
Masonry to the west side of the Miami river	45, 460
Wooden superstructure of bridges, 752 feet	41, 360
Grading to the west side of the Miami river, 20 miles	102, 560
Contingencies	6, 165
Amount required for the year 1838	243, 200

Respectfully submitted.

G. DUTTON, *Lieutenant United States Engineers.*

Brigadier General CHARLES GRATIOT, *Chief Engineer, Washington, D. C.*

S.

Memoir accompanying the annual report of operations, and the annual statements exhibiting the estimates, appropriations, and expenditures, on the Cumberland road, in the States of Indiana and Illinois, for the year ending 30th of September, 1837.

CUMBERLAND ROAD OFFICE, *Terre Haute, Indiana, October 19, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the annual reports of the operations on the Cumberland road in the States of Indiana and Illinois for the year ending 30th of September, 1837; also the annual statements exhibiting the estimates, appropriations, and expenditures, on account of the same works to the same period of time.

CUMBERLAND ROAD, INDIANA.

The law of Congress of 1836, making appropriations for the continuation of this work, restricted the operations to a continuous portion of the road. In consequence of this provision of the law, the operations, with the exception of some slight measures which were deemed essential to the preservation of the road, were confined to that part of it situated between the Illinois State line and twenty miles east of Terre Haute. During the months of October and November, 1836, and since the date of the last annual report, the operations on this portion of the road consisted of—

Grading, at different points along the line;

Quarrying and hauling stone, for bridges, culverts, and macadamizing;

Masonry: cutting stone and laying it in bridges and culverts, and smithery for the same;

Carpentry: getting out timber for superstructure of bridges, for scows or stone-flats for Wabash bridge, and for wooden railway leading from one of the Wabash bridge quarries to the Wabash river; constructing tools, implements, &c.

During this period the operations in the above branches were pushed forward with all possible dispatch; but owing to the excessive rains of the season they were greatly disturbed and retarded. The new grade was cut into ruts and gullies, and partly washed away. The roads leading to the different quarries were rendered almost impracticable for wagons. The pits, sunk to receive the foundations of culverts and bridge abutments, were filled with water; and, in some cases, the sites for the structures were entirely overflowed. Exertions were made to lay the masonry of Clear creek bridge; the pits were opened for the foundations of the abutments, but they were soon overflowed by a rise of the creek, and were filled with sand and rubbish. As soon as the water had subsided they were reopened, only to be overflowed and filled again. The workmen were thus driven from the work three successive times, and were finally compelled to abandon it, leaving only one of the foundations secure.

About the first of December all operations were discontinued, except those of carpentry and cutting

and quarrying stone; the number of quarrymen employed being sufficient only to furnish the cutters with stone. These operations were carried on during the winter at reduced wages; the prices paid being so regulated as to form an equivalent for the services rendered during the short days of this inclement season.

In March last information was received of the early and timely appropriation made for the continuation of this work. The act of Congress making this appropriation annulled the clause of the previous session, which had restricted the operations to a continuous portion of the road, but it provided for a change in the mode of conducting the operations. The method previously pursued, of carrying on the work by hired labor, was to be abandoned, and the contract system, so far as was deemed practicable, was to be introduced.

Shortly after the receipt of this information, the necessary steps were taken preparatory to a resumption of operations by hired labor upon such of the works as had, during the previous season, been brought near to a state of completion, and upon such others as could not, owing to some peculiarity of their nature, be judiciously put out to contract. The few works upon which operations were thus resumed were mostly commenced early in the month of April.

Knowing that it would be impossible for him to make disbursements at more points than one, having no assistants for this purpose, and being informed that no details would be made from the army, the superintendent saw that, anxious as he was to commence operations upon a more extended scale, it would be impossible for him to do so, unless some arrangement could be entered into by which the disbursements could be made. With a view to enlist the services of the banks in this matter, propositions were at an early day submitted to the different branches along the line of the road. Some of these institutions were loath to accede to the propositions, and for a long time declined doing so, until, finally, the citizens of their vicinity came forward, and offered to remunerate them for any services they might perform, and to indemnify them for any expenses they might incur by the undertaking. The Bank of Richmond was an exception. It acceded at once to the propositions, and arrangements were immediately made for starting a party of engineers to that point of the road. A day was appointed for the stage to make its first trip for the season. Seats were engaged, but the road was deemed impracticable; and being thus twice disappointed, a private conveyance was at length obtained, and on the 11th of April a party of engineers, with their instruments, set out for Richmond. The engineers were followed by the superintendent in this, as well as in their other movements of the season. The necessary surveys, drawings, estimates, and specifications having been made, seven sections were put under contract in the month of May and in the early part of June. These works were left under the charge of an assistant engineer, who was directed to prepare for letting out to contract five additional sections, which has since been done. The contracts at this point provide for the grading, draining, and bridging of more than eight and a half miles of the road, commencing within one mile of the Ohio State line, and proceeding west, through the towns of Richmond and Centreville. The sections leading through these towns are to be graded, paved, and covered with broken stone; and the contracts were taken by the respective town corporations, at the engineer's estimate.

Early in the month of June the main party of engineers proceeded to Indianapolis, where, on the 19th and 26th of that month, ten sections of the road were put under contract. One of the sections let on the 19th was declined by the contractor, and was relet on the 26th. The contracts at this point provide for the entire completion of about five miles of the road, leading through the town of Indianapolis, and extending about one mile east and three miles west. With a view of expediting the work as much as possible, and in order to insure the laying on of two coats of metal during the season, one set of contracts was entered into, providing for the repairs of bridges, for grading and draining the road, and for laying on the metal; while another and different set of contracts provided for the timely delivery of the macadamizing materials.

Upon leaving Indianapolis, the party of engineers was divided. Some of them were engaged in making preparations for putting out contracts on the road in the western part of Indiana and in the eastern part of Illinois; while the others, followed by the superintendent, proceeded to Vandalia, Illinois, and, about the first of July, joined an assistant engineer, who had been making preparations at that point during the preceding part of the season. The history of operations in Illinois will be given as we proceed.

After returning from Vandalia, six sections of the road were put under contract at Terre Haute on the 2d and 6th of September. These contracts provided for the grading, draining, and bridging of a portion of the road, commencing about three miles east of Terre Haute, (to which point the grading, draining, and bridging was mostly completed,) and proceeding about three and a half miles to the east. Among the other things provided for by these contracts, was the construction of bridges of sixty feet span over Middle and East Lost creeks.

In the latter part of June a contract was entered into, providing for the delivery of eight thousand perches of building stone upon the bank of the Wabash river, at a point about fifteen miles below Terre Haute. This stone is intended for the Wabash bridge, and will be towed to Terre Haute by a steamboat constructed for the purpose. The estimated cost of delivering this stone was..... \$22, 916 40
The cost by contract is..... 31, 250 00

Excess of contract over estimate..... 8, 333 60

Below is given the number of contracts entered into along the *line* of the road, as well as some of the more prominent works for which they provide:

	Near Richmond.	Near Indian- apolis.	Near Terre Haute.
Number of sections under contract.....	12	10	6
Number of bridges to be built.....	3	1	2
Number of culverts to be built.....	10	3	2
Number of miles to be graded, about.....	8 $\frac{3}{4}$	5	3 $\frac{1}{2}$
Number of miles to be macadamized, about.....	1	5	
To which should be added repairs of bridges and culverts, keeping road in repair, &c.			
Estimated cost of the above works.....	\$61, 202 36	\$44, 947 19	\$23, 715 98
Cost by contract of the above works.....	71, 040 39	73, 854 67	23, 715 98
Excess of contracts over estimates.....	9, 838 03	28, 907 48	

It will thus be seen that the contracts in the vicinity of Terre Haute were taken at the engineer's estimate; that those at Richmond were taken at an advance upon the estimate of less than 20 per cent.; while those at Indianapolis were taken at an advance upon the estimate of more than 60 per cent. When the contracts at Indianapolis were taken at these high (not to say extravagant) rates, it was certainly nothing more than reasonable to suppose that the contractors would push forward and complete their contracts. But these reasonable expectations have in some cases been disappointed; and this is the only point in the State at which the contractors have willingly relinquished and abandoned their contracts; and the reasons assigned for doing so are, that the work cannot be done for the contract prices. Three contracts have been abandoned, and these provided for grading and macadamizing the section leading through the town of Indianapolis, and those immediately east and west of it. One of these was relinquished in July, and the other two were relinquished on the 1st of August. The lateness of the period at which these contracts were relinquished made it impossible to relet them, and to have more than one stratum of metal put on the road during the season. This single stratum, if put on, would have been ground down and buried in the earth long before spring. To have expended money for an object like this would have been to have thrown it away, rather than to have expended it wisely and judiciously.

The operations of grading, macadamizing, &c., on the other two sections, as well as the operations for delivering metal on all the sections at this point, are progressing rapidly, and there is every reason to hope that the works will be completed according to the stipulations of the contracts.

Up to the 30th of September, the date to which this report extends, the season had been unusually favorable to the operations on the road, and the contractors in the vicinity of Richmond and Terre Haute had made such progress upon their several works as to induce the belief that they would have been completed in accordance with the requirements of their respective contracts.

For a more particular description of the contracts entered into during the season, and for a more minute detail of the works for which they provide, I would respectfully refer you to a tabular statement of contracts enclosed and forwarded herewith.

Result of the operations.—Work done by contract.

	Near Richmond.	Near Indian- apolis.	Near Terre Haute.
Number of perches of stone laid in bridges.....	229		
Number of perches of stone laid in culverts.....	49		
Number of yards of excavation.....	25, 115		5, 143
Number of yards made into embankment.....	25, 341		5, 143
Number of rods of grading finished.....	167	1, 124	
Number of perches of metalling delivered.....		8, 167	
Number of perches of metalling broken, about.....	200	850	
Number of rods of metalling laid on.....	70	133	
Number of rods paved.....	165		

With a view of enabling the superintendent to collect in due time the information necessary to the making out of his annual reports, the estimates of work done were made on the 20th instead of the 30th of September, at which time the sections in the vicinity of Terre Haute had been under contract but a few days.

Work done by hired labor.

Number of perches of stone laid in bridges.....	583
Number of perches of stone laid in culverts.....	368
Number of perches of stone quarried.....	6, 397
Number of yards of excavation.....	32, 924
Number of yards made into embankment.....	43, 012
Number of culverts completed near Richmond.....	5
Number of culverts completed near Terre Haute.....	7

The masonry of the abutments of West Lost creek bridge has been finished, with the exception of a few days' work on the parapets. This is a bridge of 100 feet span. The superstructure has been framed and is now in process of being raised and put together.

The masonry of the abutments of Clear Creek bridge has been nearly completed, and the framing of the superstructure will be commenced in a few days.

One stone quarry has been kept in constant operation during the past season. The building stone obtained from it is intended for the Wabash bridge, and the smaller fragments will be broken and used for macadamizing the road. A wooden railway, three-quarters of a mile in length, has been laid from this quarry to a point on the Wabash river, about seven miles below Terre Haute. A stone-breaking machine, propelled by steam power, has been set up at this point, and will, in a few days, go into constant operation. The prepared metal and building stone delivered at this point will be towed up the river to Terre Haute. A steamboat of shallow draught has been constructed for the purpose of collecting materials for the Wabash bridge, and is now at Terre Haute, ready to commence operations. Scows or stone-boats have also been constructed during the past season. The steamboat and scows will, for a time, be principally engaged in towing stone from two points on the river; the one about seven and the other about fifteen miles below Terre Haute. The stone to be delivered at the lower point will be furnished by contract, and the contractor has found it necessary, before commencing the delivery, to lay a wooden railway about four and a half miles in length, which is now nearly completed.

Present condition of the work.

With the exception of a few stumps that may occasionally be found along its sides, the road may be said to be cleared and grubbed throughout its whole extent in the State.

The grading of about two-thirds of the road has been considered as finished. But a considerable portion of it, done in the earlier stages of the work under its former superintendents, was not raised to a sufficient height above the level of the adjacent ground. The side ditches were always too narrow; the water might, perhaps, be collected into them from the surface of the road, but they were not so constructed as to drain it off unless the natural features of the ground happened to produce such a result without the assistance of labor and art. The soil, too, of large sections of the country through which the road passes is of a loose and porous nature, absorbs the water readily, and is liable to become exceedingly muddy. These causes, together with the immense amount of travel which has cut the road in pieces, and the heavy rains which have been washing it away, have brought it into an almost ruinous condition; so much so that to put it in order for receiving the metal will require an amount equal, perhaps, to one-fourth the cost of the original grade.

A large number of culverts have been constructed on the road in this State; but a majority of those constructed in the earlier stages of the work were built of sandstone, which, on being exposed, has disintegrated, and they are now tumbling to pieces, and must be rebuilt. Many of the bridges, too, are composed of bad materials, and must be rebuilt. There are others which are composed of good materials, but which, owing to some fault in the design or execution of the work, must be repaired or rebuilt. A fault common to the bridges on this road is, that their wooden superstructures do not project sufficiently far over the abutments to shelter the timbers which rest upon the abutments from the action of the weather. These timbers, by becoming frequently wet, are liable to rapid decay, and thus endanger the whole structure.

Most of the streams of any importance on the eastern division of the road, embracing that part of it between the Ohio State line and Indianapolis, have been furnished with bridges, which, at the time of their construction, were intended to be of a permanent character; while in most cases the smaller streams and ravines have been furnished with bridges of a temporary character.

The same remarks, with a few exceptions, will apply to the western division of the road, embracing that part of it between Indianapolis and the Illinois State line. On this division Dewees's, Croy's, and Otter creeks have not been furnished with bridges of a permanent character; nor have bridges of any description been built over Deer creek and the Walnut fork of Eel river. These latter streams in times of high water offer serious impediments to the travel on the road. But by far the greatest obstruction on the whole road is the Wabash river and the low bottoms on its western side; these, at times of high water, or when ice is floating in the stream, form an absolute barrier to all communication whatever.

Although these streams at certain periods offer serious and almost insurmountable obstacles to the travel on the road, yet at ordinary times they can scarcely be said to impede it at all. The creeks are easily forded, and the Wabash may be ferried without difficulty. And although the road during the thaws of the spring and at seasons of heavy rains is liable to become exceedingly muddy and almost impassable, yet during the greater portion of the year it is a smooth, firm, and delightful highway. Emigrants, travellers, and others, give it a preference over all the other western routes. The travel on it, though immense, is still increasing; and during the summer and fall months of the year the tide of western emigration rolls along this great national thoroughfare in a continued and almost unbroken stream.

Resources of the country adapted to the construction of roads.

Face of the country, soil, &c.—The face of the country bordering on the road from the Ohio State line to the west fork of White Water, a distance of about twenty miles, is undulating or rolling. From this point to Indianapolis, a distance of fifty-two miles, the face of the country is generally level, and consists principally of "beech flats," which, in their wild and uncultivated state, are wet and marshy. The face of the country would, perhaps, be better described by saying that the undulating grounds are occasionally found along the whole line of the road from the Ohio State line to Indianapolis; and that they constitute about one-half of the whole distance, while the remaining portion of the country is extremely level, and consists of "beech flats."

The undulating grounds are composed of a succession of hills and valleys. They are covered with a growth of black walnut, sugar tree, poplar, and white oak. The soil, which is very productive, is a rich loam, mixed with sand and clay. When dry it is quite firm; but when wet it becomes very muddy.

The "beech flats" may be divided into two classes, the higher and lower; and are found, on this division of the road, in nearly equal proportions, and constituting about one-fourth of the whole distance.

The soil of the "higher beech flats" is generally a white, dense, and tenacious clay. When cleared

and cultivated it becomes dry, and produces tolerably well; but is better adapted to the purposes of grazing. When thrown up it consolidates, becomes dry and firm, and is not easily penetrated by water.

The soil of the "lower beech flats" is dark, rich, and loose, and is composed principally of clay and decayed vegetable matter. When thrown up and well dried it is tolerably firm; but being light and porous it is easily penetrated by water, which destroys all its tenacity, and renders it extremely muddy. These "lower beech flats" are also known by the names of "black swamps" and "black slashes."

On the western division of the road, extending from Indianapolis to the Illinois State line, and comprising a distance of about seventy-six miles, the undulating grounds largely predominate, and the "beech flats" and "slashes" are no longer found.

For a distance of thirty miles west of Indianapolis the country is generally rich and level. The growth is sugar tree, black walnut, poplar, white oak, and beech. The soil is well adapted to cultivation, but is liable to become wet and extremely muddy.

From this point to the Illinois line the country is generally undulating, and is better adapted to the purposes of road-making than any other large portion of the State through which the road passes. The growth is white oak, beech, and poplar. The soil, when cultivated, is tolerably productive, and is well adapted to the purposes of grazing. When thrown up it consolidates and makes a smooth, firm, and delightful road.

The country bordering on the Wabash river is mostly composed of level prairie lands, which are exceedingly fertile.

In embracing such extensive districts of country and giving their general characteristics there are, of course, many traits and peculiarities belonging to the minor divisions which must be passed over and left unnoticed.

Materials, &c.

By making judicious selections, timber of good quality can be conveniently procured for all the purposes of this road.

Sandstone, which was freely used in the earlier constructions of this work, having proved to be a defective and unsafe material, the use of it has been entirely excluded from the road.

From the Ohio State line to the west fork of White Water, a distance of about twenty miles, stone may be obtained in great abundance for the uses of the road. The stone here found is a good secondary limestone; but as the strata in which it occurs are generally very thin, it is not well adapted to building purposes.

From this point to Indianapolis good limestone will be procured with considerable difficulty and expense. The average distance to which it must be hauled will probably not be less than twelve miles. This difficulty will, however, be partially obviated by the frequent occurrence of a species of stone, usually denominated "boulders." These occur in detached spherical masses of various sizes, sometimes upon the surface and sometimes imbedded in the earth. They are a species of granite, are very hard, will answer well for macadamizing, but cannot be used for building.

At no point on the road, perhaps, would it be more difficult to procure a supply of good limestone than at Indianapolis. Good building stone cannot, it is believed, be procured nearer than the Putnamville quarries, a distance of about 30 miles. The macadamizing materials now delivering in that vicinity are boulders and pebbles. The pebbles are principally obtained from the beds of White river and Eagle creek. The same character of materials must be used in macadamizing the road for a considerable distance east and west of that point.

After reaching Belleville, eighteen miles west of Indianapolis, limestone suitable for macadamizing can be obtained. And as we proceed still further west we approach the fine quarries of Putnam county, where limestone is found immediately on the line of the road, of a very superior quality, and in almost inexhaustible quantities. From thence on to the Illinois line limestone can be procured, without any very considerable difficulty, for all the ordinary purposes of the road. A considerable quantity of very large stone being required for the construction of the Wabash bridge, it will be obtained at points near the river, and will be transported by water to the site of the bridge.

Stone in considerable quantities has already been delivered at different points along the line of the road.

For an account of the increase of population, and of the general growth and improvement of the country along the line of the road, I would respectfully refer you to a statistical table forwarded herewith.

Funds, estimates, &c.

By referring to annual statement No. 1, herewith sent, it will be seen that the amount due on contracts on September 30, 1837, exceeded the amount of available funds by \$25,362. It is believed, however, that the materials which the contractors are bound to receive, and the tools which they will probably purchase from the road, together with the amount due on contracts which will probably be relinquished or forfeited prior to their completion, will amount to a sum equal to, if not greater, than this excess. As an evidence of the correctness of this opinion, it may be stated that the contract for section O, on the western division of the road, amounting to \$8,637 27, has been forfeited by the contractor, and has been annulled by the superintendent, since the 30th of September.

In 1834 an estimate was made of the amount necessary to complete the road in this State; and in 1835 an estimate was made of the amount necessary to construct a bridge across the Wabash river. It will be perceived, from annual statement No. 2, that both these amounts have been increased by the estimates of the present year. This increase may be accounted for by the higher prices to be paid for tools, implements, and materials used in construction, and by the great advance in the rates of labor since the dates of the original estimates. Another reason for increasing the estimate of 1834 is, that no estimate has heretofore been made for completing the mile extending through the town of Indianapolis. All measurements, reckonings, and estimates heretofore made of the road have commenced at the eastern and western extremities of Indianapolis, and have proceeded to the east and west; the mile extending through the town having been left entirely out of consideration.

Below is given a plan of operations, which it is proposed to adopt, for the continuation of the Cumberland road in Indiana, during the year 1838, and upon which is founded the estimate of the amount of funds required for its continuation during that year.

Near Richmond.

To macadamize eight miles of the road, the grading, draining, and bridging of which is now under contract.....	\$56,000	
To prepare ten additional miles for the metallic cover.....	56,500	
		\$112,500

Near Indianapolis.

To complete entirely thirty miles of the road; fifteen miles on the east and fifteen miles on the west of the points at which the present contracts terminate. ...	225,000	
		225,000

Near Terre Haute.

To macadamize eight miles of the road, the grading, &c., of which is either finished or under contract.....	52,000	
To prepare eight additional miles for the metallic cover.....	40,000	
To construct bridge abutments in the bottom west of the Wabash river.....	20,500	
		112,500

Wabash bridge.

To collect and prepare materials for the construction of this bridge.....	50,000	50,000
Total amount required for 1838.....		500,000

The above amount of \$500,000 it is respectfully recommended may be furnished at the earliest practicable period.

CUMBERLAND ROAD, ILLINOIS.

The operations on this work were, during the year 1836, confined principally to that portion of the road between the Indiana State line and a point thirty miles west of it. At a late period of the season operations were commenced on the western division of the road, in the vicinity of Vandalia. But the officer having the immediate charge of this division of the road being ordered to join his regiment, the operations were discontinued soon after their commencement.

During the months of October and November, 1836, the operations on the road consisted of—

Grading, at different points between the 6th and 30th and between the 83d and 90th miles of the road, reckoning from the Indiana State line.

Quarrying and hauling stone, for bridges and culverts on the eastern division of the road.

Masonry—cutting stone for bridges and culverts, and laying stone in culverts on the eastern division of the road.

Carpentry—repairing and securing wooden superstructures of bridges; constructing tools, implements, &c., for the use of the road.

The weather being very unfavorable to the operations at that season of the year, but little could be done. Some portions of the grade were finished; but the greater part of it was left, at the close of operations, in an unfinished state.

About the 1st of December all operations were discontinued, except those of carpentry, which were quite limited, and those of cutting and quarrying stone; the number of quarrymen employed being sufficient only to furnish the cutters with stone. These operations were carried on during the winter at reduced wages.

Shortly after the receipt of the information that an additional sum had been appropriated for the continuation of this work, and that a change was to be introduced in the method of conducting the operations, preparations were made for the speedy resumption of operations upon several of the works of masonry on the eastern division of the road. The reasons for commencing these operations, and for continuing them upon several of the works until within a short time of the first letting of contracts, were to retain upon the works those laborers and mechanics whose places, if they left, could not be supplied, to finish such of the works as were liable to be injured by remaining in their then condition, and to insure the hasty completion of such others as were necessary to be finished before the operations of grading, by contract, could be commenced in their vicinity.

After the passage of the law making so radical a change in the method of conducting the operations, an entirely new survey and estimate of those portions of the road intended to be put under contract became necessary. An assistant engineer was despatched to Vandalia, early in the spring, to make these preparations; but his health being ill, and it being impossible to furnish him with any aid until after the lettings in Indiana had taken place at Richmond and Indianapolis, the operations at this point were necessarily delayed until late in the season. He was joined at Vandalia by others of the party about the 1st of July, and on the 20th of that month the first lettings for Illinois took place. The last sections put under contract at Vandalia were let out on the 12th of August. During the season ten sections have been put under contract at Vandalia, amounting to the sum of \$93,765 91. These contracts provide for the completion of the grading, draining, and masonry, from the eighty-first mile of the road to the termination of its location at Vandalia. They embrace a distance of nine miles, and include, among other works, the bridge over the Kaskaskia river, the difficult embankment and large bridges in its bottom, and the smaller bridges over east and west Sand creeks.

After leaving Vandalia, preparations were continued for letting out contracts on the eastern division of the road, and accordingly eleven sections were put under contract at Marshall between the 31st of August and the 25th of September. These contracts comprise all the bridges, the heavy excavations and embankment, and the larger culverts from the State line to the end of the twelfth mile. Within this distance there are a few old culverts which must finally be rebuilt, but being as yet in tolerable condition they were not included in the contracts. Some portions of the old grade were, for the same reasons, not

included. The foundations of the old bridges were so insecure, their abutments were generally composed of such worthless materials, and all of them so wretchedly constructed, that it was found necessary, in every instance, to rebuild them entirely and to construct them of new materials. The wooden superstructures, being generally in good condition and their timbers sound, were permitted to remain. Provisions were made in the contracts, however, for repairing them thoroughly and for remedying the defects in their construction by inserting arches and adding overjets when necessary.

Owing to the scarcity of laborers, the difficulty of procuring mechanics, the great distance to which stone, in many instances, must be hauled, and also to guard against the delay which wet seasons and high waters would occasion, the period fixed for the completion of some of the more important contracts has been made to extend to the 1st of July, 1839. Three contracts on the eastern and one on the western division of the road are to be completed on or before the 31st of December next.

During the present season twenty-one sections of the road in Illinois have been put under contract. These contracts provide for the construction of ten bridges, of spans varying from twenty to three hundred feet, and requiring 6,765 perches of stone for their completion; twenty culverts, to contain, when finished, 1,086 perches of stone, 285,162 cubic yards of earth, to be made into embankment, and about an equal quantity of earth is to be excavated; add draining, paving, sodding, repairing, &c.

Estimated cost of above works	\$186,332 08
Cost by contract.....	213,875 79
Excess of contracts over estimates.....	27,543 71

It will thus be seen that the contracts in this State have been taken at an advance upon the estimate of less than 15 per cent.

For further particulars in relation to the contracts I would respectfully refer you to a statement of those entered into during the season, which is enclosed and forwarded herewith.

Result of the operations.—Work done by hired labor.

Number of yards of excavation	18,592
Number of yards made into embankment.....	23,297
Number of perches of stone quarried.....	5,256
Number of perches of stone delivered at sites of different works.....	2,470
Number of perches of stone laid in masonry.....	947
Number of feet of stone cut.....	9,185

The grading was done previous to the passage of the law directing a change in the method of conducting the operations.

The large arch culvert on the eighth and a Gothic culvert on the ninth mile have been executed in a manner combining every requisite of neatness and durability. The masonry of the arch culverts on the fifth and eleventh miles, and of a Gothic culvert on the tenth mile, were so far progressed with as to insure their completion by the 15th of October. The stone quarried and delivered for the other works on the eastern division of the road, which have since been put under contract, amounts to about three-fourths of the quantity necessary for their construction. A considerable quantity of this stone has also been cut and is now ready for laying in masonry. The wooden superstructures of several bridges, whose abutments were likely to tumble down, have been secured by trestles in such a manner that the old abutments may be torn away and others built in their places.

Work done by contract.

The operations under the contract system not having fairly commenced at the date of the last estimate, (20th September,) they can scarcely be said to have resulted in anything that may be embodied in a report. One hundred and fifteen perches of stone had been delivered, eight hundred and thirty feet of stone had been cut, and twelve thousand three hundred and fifty cubic yards of earth had been excavated and made into embankment. Since that time, however, the number of laborers and mechanics employed has been more than doubled, and the works are now progressing with great rapidity; and should the season continue to prove favorable, the foundations of several of the largest bridges will be laid, a large amount of materials will be collected, and such other progress will be made as will enable the contractors to finish their sections some months before the stipulated time.

Present condition of the work.

The road, to the termination of its location at Vandalia, has been opened throughout its whole extent.

During the earlier stages of the work the grading was principally confined to the more level parts of the timbered land. Several miles of the grade were thrown up at different intervals, and were considered as finished. The grading of a more recent date has been confined chiefly to the heavy cuts and fills, which, on the eastern division of the road particularly, are very numerous.

Those portions of the grade which have been finished make a firm, smooth, and delightful road. The subsoil consists of a grayish clay, with a considerable admixture of sand. When thrown up it consolidates quickly, becomes wet with little rain, dries rapidly without cracking, and again becomes smooth with little travel. Where it is necessary to make cuts in the hills the clay is of a much more tenacious kind, is mixed with small gravel, and is difficult to excavate. Through the prairie lands little grading has been done. During the greater portion of the year the road may be travelled with comparative ease; but during the thaws of the spring and the seasons of heavy rains it cannot be passed without great fatigue and difficulty.

Bridges, either of a temporary or permanent character, have been constructed over nearly all the streams of any importance in this State. All the masonry, however, which was constructed in the earlier progress of the work has been condemned as perishable and insufficient. Not a perch of it, constructed prior to the year 1834, is in a condition to be turned over to the State. Every bridge, without exception, and almost every culvert, will require to be reconstructed of entirely new materials, the cost of the new works being enhanced by the labor of removing the rubbish of the old.

The wooden superstructures, having been secured in their positions by trestles and other facilities, are still accessible to the travel; and the facilities which are thus afforded, together with the improvements which have been made by grading, either partially or entirely, some of the more difficult portions of the road, have given this route, during a considerable portion of the year, a preference over all others in its vicinity, and it is now daily thronged with persons emigrating to the interior of this State, to Missouri, and other portions of the west.

Resources of the country for the construction of the roads.—Face of the country, soil, &c.

The section of Illinois through which the road passes is generally less fertile and less productive than any other portion of the State.

Commencing at the State line, and proceeding along the line of the road for a distance of near thirty miles, the country is broken and interspersed with numerous small streams. The growth is white, black, red, and post oak, and poplar. The soil is a grayish, or rather a whitish clay, mixed with sand in different proportions. When thrown up into embankment it consolidates and becomes firm and smooth.

On the remaining portion of the road the face of the country, broken and lilly on the streams, becomes more undulating as we recede from them, until finally we emerge into the open, flat, and generally wet prairies.

The width of these prairies varies in proportion to the distance between the watercourses from one to fifteen miles.

The growth of the country bordering on the streams is white, burr, red, and post oak, hickory, and ash. The same character of soil (the grayish or whitish clay, mixed with sand) extends generally throughout the whole line of the road, and when thrown up and protected from washing will make a firm, compact, and smooth road, except during the thaws and heavy rains of the spring. These remarks, however, do not apply to those sections of the road extending through the river bottoms, nor to those extending through the cuts of the hills. These portions of the road can never be made good without a metallic cover.

When this road was first laid out it may be said to have been located through an almost uninhabited region. There were but few inhabitants in its vicinity, and only two settlements were found immediately on the line throughout its whole extent. Since that time many settlements and improvements have been made, but chiefly with a view to work on the road, or to accommodate the travel. Of the many towns projected along its line, but a small number have grown into any importance, and many of them do not seem destined to outlive their founders.

Materials, &c.

The timber used as a material on the road, being employed chiefly in the construction of bridges, can, it is believed, be found of suitable quality along the streams and near the sites of the works.

Poplar and several species of the oak are found on the eastern division of the road; but the poplar not being found west of the Little Wabash river, the oak must be relied upon entirely for those structures which are west of that stream.

The scarcity of good building stone, and the great distance to which, in many instances, it must be hauled, constitute one of the greatest difficulties to be overcome in the construction of this road. Except in the vicinity of Big and Little creeks, on the 7th mile, good building stone is nowhere found immediately on the line of the road.

From the State line to the 25th mile of the road building stone of an excellent quality may be procured with comparatively little difficulty and expense, the distance to which it must be hauled varying from a few yards to about seven miles.

From the 25th to the 50th mile the only stone found is a thin, shelly, bastard limestone. This occurs in considerable quantities, but owing to the heavy stripping of earth the quarrying is expensive; and it must be hauled to distances varying from three and a half to fourteen miles. This stone is found on the Embarras river and its tributaries.

From the 50th to the 60th mile bastard limestone of an excellent quality is found, and is rather more conveniently situated to the road.

From the 60th to the 90th mile of the road building stone is less abundant than on any other division in the State. The stone found is an excellent material, but the transportation, varying from six to eighteen miles, will render the cost of the works exceedingly great.

Funds, estimates, &c.

It will be seen by annual statement No. 1, sent herewith, that the amount due on contracts on the 30th of September, 1837, exceeded the amount of available funds by \$8,053 71. It is believed, however, that the materials which the contractors are to receive, and the tools, implements, &c., which they will probably purchase from the road, will amount to a sum equal to if not greater than this excess.

Below is given a plan of operations which it is proposed to adopt for the continuation of the Cumberland road in Illinois during the year 1838, and upon which is based the estimate of the sum required for its continuation during that year.

Eastern division of the road.

To complete the road from the 15th to Embarras river, on the 38th mile, viz: grading 26 miles of the road; constructing culverts on the same; constructing bridge of 80 feet span over west fork of Mill creek, and bridge of 100 feet span over north fork of Embarras river, and constructing several smaller bridges.....	\$150,000 00
--	--------------

Western division of the road.

To complete the road from the 81st to the 62d mile, inclusive, viz: grading 20 miles of road; constructing culverts on the same; constructing bridge of 150 feet span over Little Wabash river, and constructing several smaller bridges.....	150,000 00
---	------------

Total sum required for 1838.....	<u>300,000 00</u>
----------------------------------	-------------------

The sections embraced in this plan of operations, together with the sections now under contract, comprise the whole extent of the road, with the exception of about twenty-four miles, fifteen of which are prairie.

The above amount of \$300,000, it is respectfully recommended, may be furnished at as early a date as practicable.

Remarks applicable to the road in both Sta'es.

It would be difficult to say at what period these works may be expected to be completed, since it will depend principally upon the sums appropriated for their continuance, and upon the seasonableness or unseasonableness of the times at which the appropriations are made. Should, however, the sums annually required be furnished at an early period of each successive year, the works, with the exception, perhaps, of the Wabash bridge, may be completed in three years from this time.

The history of these works, since they came under the charge of their present superintendent, has been one of difficulty and embarrassment throughout, arising partly out of the nature of the previous alterations, the character and scarcity of labor, the small amounts and unseasonableness of the appropriations, the restrictions and changes in the method of conducting the operations, the difficulty of making disbursements, the magnitude and extent of the charge on the superintendent, and the shifting and unsettled character of the assistance allowed him.

Since 1834 an entire change has taken place in the character of the materials and workmanship employed in the construction of the road. Laborers and mechanics have been brought from a distance, and many (not among the least valuable of those in its employ) have learned their trades and obtained a knowledge of their respective arts whilst engaged in the construction of the road.

In the absence of other and necessary assistance, resort has been had to such aid as could be procured from the pursuits of civil life. But a sufficient number of skilful, competent, and efficient engineers being difficult to procure, some others have been employed and assigned to the more ordinary duties of the profession, a promotion in rank and an increase of wages being held out as an inducement to application and improvement.

The recent change introduced in the method of conducting the operations has occasioned a loss to the works of a great portion of the season. Before operations could be commenced by contract, surveys, calculations, estimates, drawings, specifications, &c., were necessary to be made. These preparations were commenced early in April, and between that time and the latter part of September contracts were let out at Richmond, Indianapolis, Terre Haute, Marshall, and Vandalia, providing for operations at different points along the whole extent of the line, a distance of 240 miles.

Among the many difficulties which have beset this work, that of making the disbursements has not been the least. It is impossible for any individual superintending a work of such extent as this to attend to all his various duties and personally to disburse money at different points so remote. No assistants having of late been detailed for this purpose, it became necessary, in order to extend and prosecute the works, that some arrangements should be made. As a last resort, propositions were submitted to the different banks along the line of the road. The only terms that could be offered were, that the banks should receive the money on deposit, make out the accounts, and pay off laborers, contractors, or others, without expense to the United States or to the superintendent. Onerous as these conditions might appear, they were freely accepted by some of the banks, and were, in consequence of voluntary arrangements among the citizens, finally acceded to by all. These institutions are now making the disbursements for the road, but by a single order of the directors the arrangement could be destroyed, and difficulty and embarrassment would inevitably ensue. The speedy adoption of some measures by which the liability to such results may be removed, and by which the money may be disbursed with regularity and certainty, is earnestly but respectfully recommended.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. A. OGDEN, *Captain Corps of Engineers.*

General C. GRATIOT, *Chief Engineer, Washington.*

T.

Report of the Board of Visitors of the Military Academy.

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY, *West Point, June 17, 1837.*

SIR: The board of visitors, who, in compliance with your request, have attended the examination of the United States Military Academy, discovered, in entering on the duties assigned them, that an extensive field of inquiry and observation was presented, deeply important, from the interesting results immediately involved, and the incidental responsibilities attaching to their commission, were induced, as a preliminary step, to ascertain the sources from which their ultimate decisions should be drawn. This was effected with great facility, and they feel a high gratification in acknowledging that every department of the institution was made tributary to the object—every means called for being furnished by the superintendent and the very able and intelligent gentlemen who are at the head of the several departments.

As none of the members of the board had ever been present at any previous examination, it is not in their power to state the progress which may have been made in the improvement of the discipline or the course of studies of the cadets, nor to present a comparison between the actual and any preceding state of the academy; but so far as they were enabled to judge from what passed under their notice, they are gratified in being able to state that the examination of the classes generally in their respective branches of study was highly creditable both to the institution and its pupils.

The first or graduating class was examined on the subjects of civil and military engineering, ethics, rhetoric, constitutional law, and artillery and infantry tactics, on each of which subjects the young gentlemen exhibited a proficiency highly honorable to the class in general, and gratifying to the board. The impression left by this examination on the minds of the board was, that these graduates would pass from the institution ably fitted to the discharge of the important duties of the various stations they may

be called to occupy, whether in the public service of their country, or in those positions in civil life for which the education received at this institution more particularly qualifies them. And the board would further express a confident belief that the results growing out of this education will most fully reflect back on the country the enlarged benefits which are conferred on the pupils of this school.

The second class was examined in natural and experimental philosophy, chemistry, and landscape and topographical drawing. The board would in an especial manner notice the highly creditable performances of this class in each of these branches as alike honorable to the attention and zeal of the instructors and to the application of the pupils.

The third and fourth classes were examined in mathematics and French. The proficiency exhibited by the members of those classes was such as to give the most entire satisfaction to this board, who cannot close this very brief expression of their praise without congratulating the institution that the plan of the highly accomplished professors who but lately occupied the chair of mathematics should have been so ably filled, as the results of this examination fully prove that it is, by the talented young officer who now so advantageously presides in it.

In closing this very brief and general expression of the impressions left upon them by this review of the entire course of studies pursued at the institution, this board must permit themselves to offer a few observations. They regard this examination as a fair and unexceptionable test of the actual acquirements made by the cadets, so far as a public and limited examination on some of the branches of each course of study can be taken as a criterion of the proficiency of the pupil on the whole. The text-books used by each class were placed before this board, and they were invited to select the subject for examination for each cadet, and to put such questions during the examination as they might deem fit. This duty the board performed, and it is upon an examination conducted in chief by gentlemen* who, from their official callings, habits, and pursuits, were especially qualified for such investigation, that the deliberate opinion here expressed is founded.

That all the members of each class should not have appeared with equal advantage when put to so fair a trial, is not ascribable to any cause known to the board, except to that diversity of physical capacity and talent which no education can soon cause to disappear. The professors are generally the same who conducted the studies of preceding classes—gentlemen entirely devoted to the best interests of the institution, and peculiarly fitted for the important duties they discharge. It is not the province of this board to eulogize the services and worth of public servants; but when to talents, rarely the gift to individuals, is combined an active zeal in the performance of laborious duties, involving the highest trusts, the board will not repress an expression of the deep sense they entertain of their merits, nor hesitate to urge, with due respect, their claims upon your kind attention, so far as they can be made available in rendering their positions agreeable and pleasant to them.

The attention of the board was, particularly directed to every point by which the physical comforts of the cadets were in any way affected. They accordingly made a thorough inspection of the barracks, hospital, commons, &c., and found that everything had been and was done by the officers presiding over their respective departments which could in any way contribute to the comfort and convenience of those under their care. Good order and neatness were observable throughout all these arrangements, with such checks instituted into the expenditure of the cadets as must completely secure them from any imposition, should any attempt of that character be ever made.

In examining into the wants of the institution, the board considered the improvements called for in the different branches of the institution, the discipline, the moral training, and the comforts of the cadets.

In the first of these, the board would respectfully call your attention to the inadequate number of officers allowed from the army to the institution to perform the duties of assistant professors. This subject was most pertinently and strongly brought under the notice of the Secretary of War in the able report made by the board of visitors of 1833. No amelioration, so far as this board can learn, grew out of that recommendation; nor have the various representations, which they understand have been subsequently made by the academic staff on the same point, met with more success. Most of the departments of the institution are at this moment laboring under the obstacles thus thrown in their way; and nothing but the most incessant and arduous labor, abridging accorded indulgences, and trenching on the means of health, has enabled several of the professors to carry forward their pupils under this state of things.

The board would not give a positive opinion on the claims of the institution upon the services of officers of the army who have been graduated from it; but it does strike them that there is some claim, perhaps a strong one, arising simply out of the relation of the graduate and his *alma mater*—and it does further appear that the young officer cannot be placed in a position more favorable to the advancement of his own qualifications, or be made more generally useful, than in imparting to others the acquirements he has made at this institution.

The board, in connexion with this subject, would bring under your notice the present position of the acting professor of chemistry. This able officer, with responsibilities and duties in nowise inferior to those of any of his colleagues, has neither the advantages presented by the permanent character, nor by the allowances made them under their commissions. The board, therefore, suggest that it would be not only an act of strict justice to have his chair placed on the same level with those of his colleagues, but that it would advance the best interests of the academy to give him a stake in its concerns, which, though he now acts under its influence, certainly can arise out of nothing but a pure and highly commendable zeal for its cause.

The departments of engineering, natural philosophy, chemistry, drawing, and the library, are still in a very incomplete condition, owing to the want of sufficient models and books appertaining to these different branches, and to suitable accommodations and conveniences in the buildings of the institution for the purposes of the classes taught. The board, therefore, would, in an especial manner, recommend this subject also to your consideration; for they are fully satisfied that results can only be proportioned to the means placed at the disposal of the officer. If the latter are insufficient, it is exacting too much to expect that the former shall be of a favorable character. If much has been done without adequate means, it but seems more forcibly to illustrate the claims of the professor upon the attention of the government, and is a virtual pledge of better future performances with increased means. From what the board have been able to learn, as set forth in the reports of their committees, but small yearly appropriations will be required to enable these departments to keep pace with the rest of the scientific world; and these, they

* Presidents Adams and Wayland, with Professor Dod, were members of the board.

feel a confident hope, will be granted by the country, when their obvious utility, indeed their *indispensable necessity*, are so fully shown.

With regard to the actual discipline of the school, and the moral training of the cadets, as compared with any preceding period, this board can give no information which you do not already possess, for the reasons assigned in the first part of this report. The effects of discipline are rather felt than seen; and it requires a longer habitual intercourse with the young gentlemen of this corps than the board have enjoyed to enable them to speak advisedly or understandingly on this point. There are, however, some suggestions (even under the acknowledged incompetency) which the board would throw out at hazard.

They have great faith in the mode of government for military men, or those training to the profession of arms, which has resulted from the long experience of so many nations; and they therefore would with great hesitation advise any change which would not present almost a moral certainty of ameliorating, and not conflict with the sterner obligations to duty. But as parents, as members of the great Christian family, they would ask whether more security might not arise from the moral influence of a zealous, conscientious chaplain on these youths than by any other known means. Approving of the system of trial by court-martial in an institution like this, they would ask, whether the present practice, which obtains in these trials, is the best that could be devised for convicting and punishing the offender against good morals or discipline. They would ask whether it is not exposing an ingenuous youth to a fearful moral trial, to coerce his presence, and exact from him, under oath, testimony which must go to the conviction of a fellow-comrade, (perhaps no more culpable than himself,) and results in his own dismissal from the academy with disgrace. It is enough to touch thus lightly on the subject; the board do not intend more in this place than to throw out some general remarks; more would, indeed, be unnecessary; for the subject you will find discussed in detail in the very able report of one of the committees. Their object here is only to invite your attention to what struck them as a most momentous concern to the highly intelligent youths with whom they have been brought into contact. Are they all the board could wish them? and they sincerely believe they approach near to that condition, still they would guard them from evil by the most effectual of trials, self-arraignment before the tribunal of conscience. The board do not, sir, offer you a remedy, if one be necessary; they only commit the subject to your care, feeling assured that the parental interest you must take in the institution will lead you to apply the most proper correction.

With regard to the improvements called for in the physical comforts of the cadets, the board would observe that the barracks now occupied by them are ill arranged and inconvenient structures for the purpose to which they are applied. Three or four cadets are huddled together in rooms, some of which are barely sufficient for the comfortable accommodation of two persons, and some not large enough for the comfortable accommodation of one alone. The board would therefore recommend a thorough examination, by a competent board of engineer officers, into the present state of the buildings, to the end that, if they admit of alteration, by which comfort and salubrity can be obtained, it be made as speedily as it can be done.

In connexion with this subject the board would offer some further suggestions which have grown out of their examination into the fiscal concerns of the institution. With every confidence in the officer selected by the Secretary of War to preside over this institution, they would still inquire whether the large improvements in the way of the erection of new buildings, demolishing or removing old ones, changing the physical aspect of the Point, by opening new avenues and clearing away its timber, should not undergo the revision of a board of competent engineer officers before the plans are submitted to the Secretary of War for his approval. This method, the board believe, is pursued in the engineer and ordnance corps, and in other branches of service where large disbursements are made; and it is one which further strikes the board a proper regard for the strict application of the public calls for in all cases, not only to secure the public against damage, but to relieve the officer himself from a heavy responsibility which he ought not unnecessarily to be made to bear.

The board would further recommend that all further disbursements for the library be placed under the care of a committee of the academic staff, to be elected annually from and by their own body; and that it be made their duty to see that this most important auxiliary to the well being of the school be supplied with the most useful and necessary works; and that they be kept in as good a state as the funds yearly granted by Congress for it, when most judiciously applied, will admit of.

They would also advise that no future appropriations be asked for by any department of the institution, except for specific objects, the cost of which shall be previously ascertained as nearly as practicable; and that it be made obligatory upon the heads of each department to see that the appropriation, when granted, be applied promptly and specifically to the purpose for which it was asked; and that in future no sum be allowed to lie over from year to year, to the prejudice of the institution. They would finally suggest and recommend that these provisions for future disbursement be made *immediately* to apply to all unexpended balances now on hand.

The board observed with regret that the subjects of mineralogy and geology, although constituting a part of the regular course of studies prescribed for the cadets, had for some time back been omitted, owing to a want of sufficient instructors in the chemical department. This omission, which the board regard as a serious defect in the general course of instruction, they understand might be remedied by having another assistant professor detailed from the line of the army to attend to this branch. The importance of this study to those engaged in civil engineering, or in the survey of the country, is too obvious to call for any particular remarks from the board. They would therefore simply confine themselves to urging on your consideration the propriety of making such immediate provision for its future prosecution at the Military Academy as your office may place at your disposal; and that, at some opportune moment, the subject be brought before Congress, in order that a more permanent provision be made to carry out those of a temporary character which you may have been pleased to introduce.

The late addition to our military establishment of two regiments of light dragoons, as well as the repeated recommendations of previous boards of visitors, have suggested to this board whether some provision should not be made to have a school of cavalry tactics attached to this academy. The importance of early training to those who are to constitute a permanent part of this force the board deems of sufficient weight to fix your attention upon the best means of accomplishing it. They have not, however, sufficient data to enable them to point out the manner in which the object to be attained might be best arrived at, and would therefore leave its details entirely in your hands as one who is more conversant with the facilities which the service itself offers for giving effect to their recommendations. They therefore only reiterate their convictions of the necessity of some preparatory school for cavalry officers, which, it

strikes them, is scarcely less important than the schools of artillery and infantry tactics, through which the officers of these arms of service are now obliged to pass.

In closing their general report, the board would refer you to the separate reports of their several committees, as containing the most elaborate and ample details on the different subjects confided to their investigation, and which in this place they have been able only to present you with such a very cursory glance. Could the board permit themselves to indulge in all the reflections that have been called forth by the very interesting and highly important duties in which they have been engaged, they are fearful that, however pleasing the theme to themselves and instructive to the public, the report might deter many from its perusal by its length. They will therefore terminate it by asking any candid inquirer after truth, any citizen solicitous for his country's good alone, any patriot proud of the elevated rank she is destined to take among the nations of the earth, whether this institution is fulfilling the great ends of its original founders, and the best wishes of its present friends, in the aid which the country at large is deriving from the number of well-trained youths in the military profession which it yearly sends forth, not only into the regular service of the nation, but into the ranks of the militia, scarcely less the immediate object of public care. Whether the bond of union between these two branches of our military force is not daily deriving more strength from the concert of action which necessarily arises from a common source of instruction at which both are now being supplied. Whether the obstacles to a perpetual union, arising from the great geographical divisions of our country, and to which the monitory voice of the illustrious Washington referred, and so anxiously sought to guard it, can be overcome by any more effective means than in the diffusion of knowledge from a single source, and teaching her sons, when men can alone be taught with the certainty of success, that lesson of divine wisdom, love one another. Whether the country has not reaped, and is not now daily reaping, from building up and sustaining this institution, benefits immeasurably greater than she has conferred in a pecuniary point of view. And whether, finally, a cheaper plan, equally effective, can be devised by human wisdom for attaining the objects, which it was intended to accomplish, of supplying the army and militia with able, intelligent officers, and in the diffusion of sound military instruction throughout the country.

The opinion maturely arrived at by this board, upon a close and laborious investigation into the concerns of the academy, is, that it is altogether worthy of the future patronage of the people—worthy as a proud memorial of that exalted beneficence which, with equal hand, extends its blessings to the rich and poor. It will be a happy recollection, sir, for them to call up at some future day, that the soundness of this opinion has been sustained by the concurring voices of their fellow-citizens, to whom they submit it, with an earnest recommendation that the academy be amply fostered and jealously intrusted *only* to those who shall show themselves worthy of appreciating and carrying out its great purposes.

THOMAS BENNETT, *President, South Carolina.*

JOSEPH ADAMS, *Massachusetts.*

FRANCIS WAYLAND, *Rhode Island.*

JAMES MCKOWN, *New York.*

RUTGER B. MILLER, *New York.*

ALBERT B. DOD, *New Jersey.*

JOHN MILES, *Secretary, Pennsylvania.*

ELLIS LEWIS, *Pennsylvania.*

HENRY ROGERS, *Pennsylvania.*

JACOB WAGENER, *Pennsylvania.*

HENRY HUNTT, *District of Columbia.*

JAMES ROGERS, *South Carolina.*

JAMES S. BULLOCK, *Georgia.*

JOHN C. MULLAY, *Tennessee.*

WM. M. DUNN, *Indiana.*

M. ARBUCKLE, *Brigadier General United States Army.*

HON. SECRETARY OF WAR.

No. 1.

Mr. MILES, from the committee to whom was referred the "military department, including engineering and tactics," made the following report:

The committee, in the performance of the duties assigned them, have endeavored to avoid interfering with the peculiar province of any other of the standing committees of the board. The department allotted to us is undoubtedly one of the most important, because, in its scope and by relation it embraces all the others; but the committee will only advert to those topics which demand their peculiar attention. The institution is based upon the enumerated powers of the general government "to provide for the common defence." It has, therefore, for its grand object the cultivation of *military knowledge* in all its branches, to be used in the service of the country when needed, and by means of which only can the common defence be provided for. In the language of Washington, "the institution of a military academy is recommended by cogent reasons. However pacific the general policy of a nation may be, it ought never to be without a stock of military knowledge for emergencies"* Accordingly, the academy, its instructors, and students, form a part of the army establishment of the United States. The cadets are liable to be called into actual service at any moment, and the whole institution is amenable to the War Department.† When the cadet has graduated, he is placed on the army list for promotion, or he may altogether retire to the walks of civil life. In either case, he has acquired a vast fund of military knowledge, which is ready at the call of his country, whenever made, and which, in time of peace, is devoted to the various works of art which benefit the people; or it diffuses itself among the latter, fostering and establishing the efficiency of a citizen soldiery.

"A military academy," says the Senate of the United States, in an address to the President, December

* Speech of President Washington, December 7, 1796.—(American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. 3, p. 31.)

† Opinion of the Attorney General, August 21, 1819.—(American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. 2, p. 30.)

12, 1796, "may be rendered important. * * * Connected with and supported by such an establishment, a well-regulated militia, constituting the natural defence of the country, would prove the most effectual as well as economical preservative of peace." These objects appear to have been kept steadily in view in the successive legislations of Congress in reference to this institution. It is undoubtedly true that its *plan of instruction* has become more extensive than was originally contemplated. That plan seems to have been designed for a mere tuition of tactics, but in course of time it was found necessary to enlarge the system. By force of the principles of economy and safety of the people, the standing army of the nation is small, but its territories are extensive, and present a vast seaboard and inland frontier. As the population increased, it then became essentially necessary that the officers of that small army should possess a various and extensive knowledge in all the different branches incident and tributary to the art of war. Civil and military engineering thus became important, and other branches were found to be equally necessary. Mineralogy, geology, natural and experimental philosophy, chemistry, mathematics, and drawing, all minister to a useful military knowledge. An acquaintance with constitutional law is also as needful to the soldier as the citizen, in a country where the rights of the people are fixed and sacred. Ethics, as a branch of instruction, is important, if in no other view than this: the students, selected indiscriminately from the several parts of the country, are enlisted in the service for a period of years, and at an age when the mind is best fitted to receive such moral and political impressions as serve to constitute the high character and usefulness of the man in the active scenes of life. To have deprived the students in this academy of that knowledge which is open elsewhere to all other classes of the community, would have been to have sent them forth to the world deficient in those fixed principles which are required in successful public life as well as in the private stations of society—mental discipline; the sense of moral responsibility and the obligations of the Christian religion, therefore, became important in every point of view.

The committee have thus adverted to these matters for the purpose of giving their hearty approbation to the *course of instruction* pursued in this *military* institution, because the whole of it is directed or necessarily incident to the purposes of the common defence, and therefore within the provisions of the Constitution and true to its founders. In a word, its object is the constitution of a true soldier, who shall serve his country "without fear and without reproach." A soldier whose moral as well as purely professional qualities may find deathless examples in the character of a Washington.

It would seem also to be a subject for inquiry whether the practical results of the institution evince that the course of instruction is according to its objects. Your committee have seen no reason to doubt it. No appointments of cadets are made from peculiar or favored classes, as far as the committee could ascertain; on the contrary, the majority of appointments during the last two years have been of persons from the poorer classes of our citizens. And in the administration of the academy, during the period of the cadets' study, the dismissals, punishments, and graduations are awarded with the most entire system of impartiality. We have seen sons of the most distinguished statesmen and soldiers of the land dismissed for misconduct or demerit, while those of the mechanic, the farmer, or the artisan received the proper reward for talent and application. These are adverted to, not because the slightest distinctions are made in favor of the sons of the poor to the disadvantage of those of the rich, because that would be odiously proscriptive, but because it is the fact that all distinctions are unknown, except those which must exist between superior intelligence, industry, skill, and merit, and the reverse.

The "conduct" and "merit" rolls are kept by the heads of the departments, without the slightest reason for combination in an unworthy purpose, so that the committee are unaware of any improvement in the course of instruction in this respect. Your committee do not feel themselves at liberty to comment upon the objections which have occasionally been suggested against the institution in a general point of view. Yet they feel bound to state that the utmost economy has been used by the government, as well as in the institution, consistently with the important objects in view. And a just compensation for the expenditure is yielded to the nation by a service of four years, under a liability to be called into the field in time of need; by the military skill, knowledge, and discipline which is carried into the standing army; by the eminently valuable services which are rendered in after life by those who continue in the army, with but a meager compensation at best, and a distant prospect of promotion to the higher military stations; by the diffusion of military knowledge (including civil engineering) among the mass of the people by those who resign; and by the ability of the latter to take command of and wield the militia defence of the country whenever the footsteps of an invading enemy shall pollute our shores.* As to the *military character* of those who have been in actual service, the history of our wars prove that the children have not disgraced the reputation of their parent school. Wherever they have been engaged they have been noted for their prudence in design and their intrepidity in execution. In the late Florida campaign, scarcely initiated into the active scenes of their profession, they have been found with their wounds in front, shot down "on the battle ground of the advanced guard." We cannot but conclude, and that without disparagement to the character of the militia of the country, that, by force of their education, the deeds of these graduates have been as honorable to themselves as they have been serviceable to their country.

The subjects to which the committee devoted special attention were engineering, and artillery and infantry tactics. The scope of the course of instruction in both civil and military *engineering* has been so frequently described by former boards as to render any detail at this time unnecessary. Of its great value for the purposes of military efficiency the committee entertain the same opinion that has been so often expressed. The first or graduating class are engaged during the ten months of the year in application to this branch, and during the present examination great proficiency was displayed by the cadets. No changes are necessary or advisable, except the proposed adoption of a text-book, about to be published by Professor Mahan, in lieu of the lithographed "notes" or "outlines" formerly prepared by this gentleman, whose acknowledged merit, as an accomplished and skilful professor, gives full assurance that the change will be highly beneficial. The committee, however, beg leave to reiterate the necessity of a supply of sufficient *models*. No new ones (except that of a dry dock) have been procured since 1832. The committee recommend that they be purchased without any unnecessary delay from the funds already appropriated by the government for that purpose. The possession and use of these are so important to the

* Up to May 10, 1837, the total number of graduates at this academy is 890. Of these, there are in the military service, 350; killed in battle, 15; died in service, 120; resigned, 351; declined, 5; disbanded, 27; dropped, 9; dismissed, 13. Of the whole number, there were allotted to corps of engineers, 59; topographical engineers, 2; ordnance, 18; light artillery, 43; light dragoons, 1; dragoons, 13; mounted rangers, 5; artillery, 374; infantry, 368; marines, 5; rifle, 4; civil service, 1.

The total number of graduates for the last three years is 141. Of them, there are in the military service, 90; killed in battle, 2; died in service, 3; resigned, 45; declined, 1.

student, as well as the teacher, that it is exceedingly desirable this recommendation should meet with the earliest practicable attention.

The committee also beg leave to express their satisfaction at the result of the examination in *artillery tactics*. In the examination hall, on the board, in the laboratory, in the field manoeuvres of the battery, mortar practice, and target firing, the class displayed a commendable proficiency. The instruction in this department occupies about four months in the year. The text-books are Lallemand's, and the regulations adopted by the board of officers in 1825. It is much to be regretted that, in this important arm of the service, there has been no system adopted. The committee think it not only of great importance to this institution, but to the country, that immediate steps should be taken by the government towards the establishment of a *system of artillery tactics* embracing the latest improvements of other nations. The academic board have authorized Lieutenant Anderson, under whose charge this department has been conducted, to prepare notes on the service of artillery in the field, in sieges, campaigns, &c.; but the want of a regulation book on this subject, combining the experience and knowledge of the nations most expert in the art of war, is evident. In this important branch, too, the want of a regular professorship, with an assistant, is severely felt, and it is strenuously urged to the consideration of the War Department. In addition to the new field battery which is under progress at the Watervliet arsenal, and which will shortly be finished, in order to render this department complete, there are required the following:

- 1st. Two 12-pounders, iron, with carriages.
- 2d. Two 6-pounders, iron, with carriages.
- 3d. One 24-pounder, howitzer, long, with carriage.
- 4th. One 12-pounder, howitzer, long, with carriage.
- 5th. A siege mortar, iron bed.
- 6th. Regulation eprouvette and balls.
- 7th. Materials for six mortar platforms.

All the deficiencies previously pointed out (with the exception of the light battery for manoeuvring) still remain without a provision for a remedy, which is the subject of the strongest censure.

The committee further request that it may be urged upon the War Department to provide for the procurement of models of carriages of the various kinds used in service, to wit: Field, siege, and garrison carriages; models of Congreve rockets, with pattern guns of each kind of the small arms now in use, or as they may hereafter be adopted, viz: musket, rifle, carbine, and pistols, with accoutrements. All these will greatly assist the professor in giving instruction.

The committee have been informed that there are scattered, at different posts and arsenals of the country, *trophy* pieces of the revolutionary war. Although not strictly within the line of their duty, they take the liberty to suggest that these be ordered by the Secretary of War to be collected and deposited here under the charge of the instructor of artillery. While they will be considered by all as interesting relics, they will serve to awaken associations and remembrances of the glorious deeds of the revolution in the minds of the youths educated here. Your committee therefore think there is no such fitting place for a depot as the Military Academy of the country. The committee further feel it their duty to call attention to the want of horses for instruction in cavalry tactics and the art of horsemanship. This has been so repeatedly urged that nothing remains to be added to the subject, except the suggestion that two files from each company of dragoons in the service might be ordered and stationed here, which, while it would enable the objects to be obtained, would provide a force for police duty.

In *infantry tactics* the course of instruction was carefully inquired into by the committee. The instruction in this branch begins with the encampment in June, including the fourth class (the newly appointed) of the cadets, immediately after the annual examination, and continues till October. It recommences in March, and terminates with the expiration of the academic year, making altogether seven months applicable to this course. The tactical instruction embraces the schools of the soldier and battalion and evolutions of the line, alternately, by recitations and exercises on the blackboard and drills in the field. The battalion of cadets (the number varying in different years from 200 to 250) is divided for this purpose into four companies. The text-book is General Scott's work. No improvement is required in the plan of instruction, and in the execution of it everything has been done which could be attained, as evidenced at the "examination." Every cadet of the first class resolved questions put indiscriminately by verbal answers and demonstration on the board. A battalion drill was conducted in the presence of your committee by cadets ordered from the line for the purpose, and manoeuvres selected by the committee were executed in a highly satisfactory manner; yet this is a subject requiring the action of the department. This part of the instruction is under the direction of Major Fowle, an able tactician, of whose merit successive boards have spoken in high terms. But at present there are but *two* assistant instructors, while there is positive necessity for *four*. To make the course perfect, there should be *one* for each of the four companies of cadets. The instructors are officers ordered to the academy. While at the post they are continually engaged in inspections of barracks, drills, camp and post duties, class parades, &c. One of them, "the officer in charge" of the police and discipline, (see Regulations, 207 to 211,) is constantly engaged from reveille till near eleven o'clock at night. Under these circumstances, independent of the necessity above stated in reference to the system, the duty of the *two* present assistant instructors is excessively severe, and prevents a proper performance of the duties of tactical instruction. Your committee, then, recommend that *four* assistant instructors be always stationed at the Point.

As appropriate to this department, the committee have examined the *small arms* used by the cadets. The muskets are in number 328, and are of different weights, to suit the physical strength of the cadets, according to their respective ages. They are kept in good order. There is, however, a great want of *swords* to supply the cadets who from time to time act as commissioned and non-commissioned officers of their battalion. The present swords were used during the revolution, are worn, scarcely capable of use much longer, and entirely unfitted for the purpose. A plan of a sword is understood to be in the War Department. Thirty-five, at least, are wanting, and the cost would not exceed \$500. Your committee recommend that expenditure.

The attention of the committee was given to the subject of *courts-martial*. They were aware that it has been occasionally suggested by some that, as applicable to the institution, they should be abolished; and, as a substitute, the exercise of a species of parental authority should be vested in the academic board, or a portion of it, with power to counsel, punish, forgive, reinstate, or dismiss. After mature deliberation on this subject, they are satisfied that the present system is the best that can be adopted; and this for several reasons. The institution is a military one, and the cadet is a *soldier*. He should

early be made subject to those forms and rules which are to govern him, and to which he is to be amenable when he comes to exercise his profession in the regular army. Military law is based upon the fundamental principles of justice, which form the groundwork of the civil code, and its administration here is equally as important as that of the latter. As to the rights of the accused, it is sufficient to refer to the report of the committee on "religious, &c., instruction," but as the courts-martial themselves, being composed of different officers from different quarters, with a judge advocate especially selected at different periods, no danger of combination or prejudice against the individual arraigned can exist, while such evils might, by possibility, flow from a stationary, permanent, and resident tribunal of small numbers. As far as inquiry could lead to a proper result, the committee believe that no change is desired, either by the administrative authorities of the institution or the cadets. As to the punishments, they seem to have been carefully proportioned to the offence, and dismissals have been ordered only where, if the offender had remained, the example would have been dangerous. The supervisory power, too, of the Executive prevents the possibility of oppression. This power, however, the committee beg leave earnestly to suggest, should be very rarely used in favor of the sentenced cadet, and only where it is very clearly apparent that injustice has been done. If merely to gratify the pride of a distinguished citizen, to yield to the friendship of personal associations, or to assuage the sorrow of a fond parent, an offending cadet is to be restored to his rank and standing, the very foundation on which the institution has acquired its safety and success, its *discipline*, is undermined. The committee have no reason to believe that this has been the practice, though individual instances may have happened; but they desire that these views should be distinctly made known that there may be no hope through "fear, favor, or affection," of a violation of the rules with impunity. In the language of the late President of the United States, "the members of the institution must look to their obligations and fulfil them faithfully. Unless they do, they must expect to be visited by adequate punishment."*

In conclusion, the committee beg leave to state that they have recommended nothing but what they consider absolutely necessary to remove the obstacles to a completely successful prosecution of the various branches of knowledge included in this department. And they desire that this interesting institution may be recommended to the fostering care of the government. Those who have doubts of its practical utility, or of the industry, fidelity, and skill employed in its tuition and administration, would cast them off did they but examine the subject for themselves. The life of a cadet is not one of mere useless parade and permitted indolence. From the rising of the sun till the late hours of the night, for four years, away from home and the indulgences of parental fondness, and the vices of bad associations—it is a life of study and discipline, both of mind and body, with just sufficient relaxation for purposes of health, and where the objects of temptation to enervate are absent. With plain food, simple garments, and regular hours, the body becomes hardened in strength and vigor, while the mind is fraught with knowledge and taught habits of inquiry. And when the graduate passes forever from the walls of his *alma mater* he is ready to take his position in the armies of the nation, skilled and disciplined, an able and willing soldier, for the purposes of "the common defence."

All of which is respectfully submitted.

JOHN MILES, *Chairman*.

The PRESIDENT, &c.

JUNE 16, 1837.

No. 2.

MILITARY ACADEMY, *West Point*, June 12, 1837.

The committee on the department of moral, religious, and political instructions make the following report:

Your committee have made such inquiries as were deemed necessary for the purpose of acquiring a correct knowledge of the department assigned to them as the subject of their consideration. They also attended the examination of the cadets from day to day, "for the purpose of ascertaining their progress and improvement in the several branches of study and instruction" falling under that department. The examinations have been continued during eight hours of each day, commencing at 6 o'clock a. m. and continuing to 8 a. m.; resuming at 9 a. m. and continuing to 1 p. m.; and again from 2 p. m. to 4 p. m. Those examinations, so far as they relate to this department, closed on Friday evening.

The examination of the cadets upon the subject of moral philosophy was entirely satisfactory to your committee; and it afforded great pleasure to perceive in that exhibition abundant evidence of the talents and industry of the professor and cadets under his charge.

The examination on the subject of constitutional law was also creditable to the parties concerned, considering the multifarious duties assigned to the professor and the limited time allotted by the regulations of the academy to these studies. The progress and improvement of the cadets in this important branch of their education was not so great as, under other circumstances, might have been expected. According to the distribution of time under the present regulations of the academy only two hours during each day are allowed for the *study of moral and political science*, and one hour each day for *recitations* in the sciences. By the regulations adopted by the proper authority, *ethics* is enumerated as one of the branches of knowledge required to be taught, as comprising a complete course of education at the Military Academy. By the same regulations it is declared that "ethics will include moral philosophy and the elements of

* During the two years ending on the 31st of May, 1837, there have been held at this post, for the examination into the conduct of the cadets, sixteen general courts-martial, one garrison court-martial, and three courts of inquiry; the latter at the request of the party accused. The proportion of the cadets of the different classes tried during that time was, of the first class, 12; of the second, 15; of the third, 28; of the fourth, 12; total, 67. Of these there were sentenced to be dismissed by the courts-martial 26, though of these, in several instances, the *same* person was tried, and of these 15 were commuted or remitted by the Executive on recommendation of the court, or from other causes. Of the remaining 11, whose sentences were carried into effect, *six* were subsequently restored, leaving five as the total number actually dismissed during the two years. During the same period 26 have been otherwise punished than by dismissal, by confinement, extra duty, &c., and nine have been acquitted. Of the above 61, cases 53 were for offences of the second grade, counting eight demerits; and eight for offences of the third grade, counting five demerits.

national and political law." Of the ethical instruction and improvement, your committee have already spoken as entirely satisfactory. It is to be regretted that, for the reasons already stated, the committee cannot express themselves entirely satisfied with the proficiency of those examined on constitutional law, while the subject of national law is for the same reason entirely omitted in the present course of studies. The regulations of the army, as applicable to this institution, expressly require that, in addition to a course of "*practical military instruction*" and "*engineering,*" "*the science of war*" shall be taught. This branch of education may be well understood to extend not only to those principles of the law military, which regulate the rights and duties of the officer and the soldier, but to the fundamental doctrines of international law, which, having been adopted as the rules of action by all civilized nations, regulate their mode of warfare and distinguish it from the cruel butcheries of the savage. War, under any circumstances, is one of the greatest calamities which can befall a nation. If it must exist, it is surely the duty of every people to mitigate its evils, by requiring that it shall be conducted according to the law of arms among civilized nations. Every cadet is intended to be qualified for command, and every commander may, in the ordinary prosecution of his duty, be placed in a situation where ignorance of international law would be an unpardonable disqualification for the discharge of his military duty. This disqualification might betray him into acts which would involve his country in a war and tarnish the laurels won by his bravery. The value of this branch of education is acknowledged in civil pursuits. In military life it appears to the committee to be of still greater importance, and that it should receive its due attention in this institution cannot be too strongly urged upon the War Department.

From what has already been said, it will appear that, in the opinion of your committee, the principles of military law were intended by the regulations to be taught at this academy; but these also, with the exception of the army regulations, seem to receive no attention whatever. A knowledge of the rights and duties incidental to military life, the powers of military tribunals for the trial of offences, and the principles governing the trial, may do more than anything else to secure to the officer the obedience to his station, and at the same time to protect the soldier from any unauthorized acts of violence and oppression. This must be the case where discipline and subordination, necessarily rigid, are sought to be enforced over individuals possessed of a high degree of intelligence and reason. Nothing will so readily secure the assent of such minds as a knowledge of the *nature, extent,* and just *foundation* of the authority requiring their obedience. This subject has been brought forcibly to the notice of your committee by the opportunity which they embraced of attending the court-martial which has recently been sitting at this institution for the trial of two of the cadets for offences against the regulations of the academy. Witnesses were called upon to give evidence, who claimed to be excused from answering some of the questions put them upon the ground that they could not do so without criminating themselves, and thereby subjecting themselves to the punishment sought to be inflicted upon the accused. This privilege was not allowed, and the reason assigned was, that "*the witness was not himself upon trial, and therefore could not criminate himself.*" If this privilege is to be denied to every witness upon the ground that he is not himself upon trial, it can never be allowed to any witness, because no witness is ever upon trial at the same time and in the same cause in which he is giving his evidence. If a witness voluntarily consents to cover himself with infamy upon a promise of pardon, for the purpose of convicting a companion in guilt, it is his privilege to do so; but to place him against his consent and remonstrance in a condition in which he must subject himself to punishment and reproach on the one side, or to the guilt of perjury on the other, is leading him into such powerful temptation to falsify as ought not to receive favor anywhere, and more particularly in an institution designed to establish the morals as well as to enlighten the minds of the youth under its instruction. These observations are not designed to cast the slightest censure upon the respectable officers of the courts-martial. These gentlemen, including the accomplished judge advocate, are highly intelligent, and conducted the trial not only with strict impartiality, but, as your committee understand, in conformity with the practice in this respect which has prevailed at the academy; but the existence of such a practice serves to show a defect in the course of studies at this seat of military learning; for there can be no doubt that, so far as witnesses are concerned, it has resulted in a total subversion of a privilege guaranteed to the *soldier* as well as the *citizen*, recognized by the law military* as well as the common law, consistent with the *purest morality* as well as the *noblest feelings* of the human heart, and reposing upon the broad foundation of that holy orison "*lead us not into temptation.*"

The committee have deemed it their duty to speak plainly upon the subjects of knowledge so necessary in military life, because the constitutional authority of Congress to establish this institution depends upon its connexion with the military establishment of the country and the purposes of national defence. It is the pleasure of the nation that those intrusted with the command of its forces should be gentlemen of correct morals and general science. As the hills of the Hudson have constantly answered in faithful reverberations to the sounds of the morning and evening gun at this place, so the hearts of the American people have continually responded with equal fidelity to every effort of the public authorities for the inculcation of general science in this institution. That general science is highly necessary to the purposes of national defence is fully admitted by your committee, but it is equally true that this would be insufficient for these purposes unless the whole science of war, including the elements of martial and international law, shall occupy the prominent ground intended by the founders of this interesting military school.

By the act of Congress of the 14th of April, 1818, it is declared, among other provisions reducing the military peace establishment, that there shall be "*one chaplain stationed at the Military Academy at West Point, who shall be professor of geography, history, and ethics, with the pay and emoluments allowed the professor of mathematics.*" This responsible station is, and has been for a considerable time, held by the Rev. Thomas Warren. He is a clergyman of the Episcopal church, and in addition to his duties as professor of ethics, in quality of chaplain, performs divine service every Sabbath in the chapel erected for the purpose. By his invitation, two of your committee, of different denominations, occupied the pulpit during the last Sabbath, one in the forenoon and the other in the afternoon, for the purpose of religious instruction and divine worship. It is his practice, the committee understand, to extend the same liberality to respectable clergymen of every denomination. The chaplain must necessarily be appointed from among some one of the many denominations abounding in this country of religious liberty and toleration, and the purse of the nation, supplied by all persuasions, must necessarily contribute to his support. If he had no other duties than those of chaplain to perform, there might be just reason to apprehend evil, arising from that tendency of the human mind which too frequently exhibits itself in the pulpit in polemical discussions upon doctrinal questions on which the religious community are divided in opinion. These discussions, however important they may be to particular denominations, cannot, in a national institution, designed for the benefit of all, attended by all, and supported by all, be regarded otherwise than with

great disfavor. Exact justice cannot be done to all denominations where the chaplain must necessarily belong to only one; but the act of Congress establishes a compromise which as nearly approaches to equality, in this respect, as is consistent with the present condition of the religious world. That act, in requiring that the chaplain "shall also be professor of ethics," and the regulations of the academy in enjoining that ethics shall include "the elements of national and political law," have furnished to the people a guarantee that the time and talents of the chaplain shall be largely devoted to the inculcation of those great doctrines of private and public morality in which all denominations agree, and without the observance of which no community can hold a place among civilized nations. A chaplain, competent to teach the doctrines of moral philosophy and properly imbued with its principles, would always feel too strong a sense of the moral obligation he was under to the American public, from whose purse he derived his subsistence, to allow him to prostitute the influence of his clerical station to the dissemination of the peculiar opinions of the sect to which he belonged. He must necessarily possess enlarged views, and his time being greatly devoted to these liberalizing pursuits, would undoubtedly secure their continuance. To the happy union of ethics with religious instructions may be ascribed the confidence which the present professor has secured among the public at large and the cadets in particular. Religion and morality should go hand in hand. There should not be even the appearance of a separation. The great evil which is now afflicting, dividing, and sowing the seeds of all uncharitableness in the religious community, is the too frequent neglect of the doctrines of moral philosophy for the purpose of embarking in sectarian discussions. The establishment of a distinct professorship of ethics might seem to give countenance to this practical divorce, where the union is necessary to the usefulness of both, and where it is of a nature too sacred and resting upon authority too high to be put asunder by the hand of man. The separation ought to be discountenanced, as tending to bring into disrepute among the American people an institution which has been fostered with much care and anxiety, and which, if properly managed, is calculated to be productive of great good. Still some remedy ought to be provided for the existing evils in regard to the department assigned to the consideration of your committee. It is not within the reach of human capacity for one individual to discharge all the duties which ought to be performed by the chaplain and professor of ethics. Nor is it just that he should be denied the privilege of occasional absence for recreation, allowed by the regulations to the other professors.

The committee beg leave to state that, in their opinion, the subject of *rhetoric* does not occupy the place in the course of academic study which its importance demands. The duties of the military officer frequently impose upon him the necessity of carrying on important correspondence, and require an intimate acquaintance with the English language. Most of the cadets enter the academy unacquainted with this branch of study, and they must either obtain it here or enter the service without it. Your committee would therefore recommend that the study of English grammar and the practice of composition be commenced during the first year of the course of study and prosecuted at intervals during the succeeding years, so that every cadet shall have the opportunity afforded of forming a correct, manly, and fluent style.

The committee, having fully and anxiously considered the subjects referred to them, unanimously recommend to the board to urge in their general report the following changes in reference to this department:

1. That proper means be immediately taken to secure to the cadets ample instruction in the "elements of national and political law."
2. That proper means be also taken to secure a due attention to the subject of military law, as forming an important consideration connected with the "science of war," required to be taught in this academy.
3. That two competent assistant professors of ethics shall be furnished, by detailing officers from the army or otherwise, for the purpose of aiding the present professor, and thus securing ample instruction in the various branches of education assigned to this department.
4. That so much of the unexpended appropriations made for the increase and expenses of the library as can be spared for the purpose, be applied to the purchase of works for the use of this department. The library, so far as the committee could perceive for themselves and understand from the professor, is lamentably defective in this particular.
5. That the study of *rhetoric* be commenced during the first year of the academic course and prosecuted at intervals to the close.
6. And lastly, that all the professors (including, of course, the chaplain) be placed upon the same ground in the regulations respecting occasional absence on furlough for the purposes of health and recreation.

All which is respectfully submitted.

ELLIS LEWIS, *Chairman.*

Hon. THOMAS BENNETT, *President of the Board of Visitors.*

No. 3.

Report of committee on pure mathematics.

The committee on the *pure mathematics* beg leave respectfully to report to the board of visitors that they have attended carefully to the duty assigned them. They have found in this department no deficiencies to report. The course of instruction pursued in the academy is extensive and admirably adapted both to discipline the minds of the pupils into habits of patient thought and to prepare them for the study of the many and important branches of science which can be successfully cultivated only by help of the powerful instrument of investigation and analysis furnished by the pure mathematics. The members of the junior classes have been taught, and, your committee are satisfied, *well* taught the various subjects of algebra, plane geometry, trigonometry, descriptive geometry, the history of shades, shadows, and perspective, analytical geometry, and the differential and integral calculus.

Your committee have been highly gratified with the examination upon these several subjects. The accuracy and promptitude with which the young men, in general, demonstrated the propositions assigned to them, and answered all the questions put, give sufficient evidence of diligence and faithfulness on the part both of the teacher and the taught. In proof of the excellency of the system of instruction and

discipline pursued, the committee would call the attention of the board of visitors to the manifestation of thorough scholarship, given almost without exception, by the members even of the lower sections of the different classes.

Signed on behalf of the committee.

ALBERT B. DOD, *Chairman.*

WEST POINT, June 15, 1837.

No. 4.

Report of committee on applied mathematics.

The committee appointed on the applied mathematics, including chemistry, mineralogy, and geology, beg leave respectfully to report:

The department of the pure mathematics furnishes the peculiar language in which a great part of the truths of mechanics, optics, astronomy, and other branches of the applied mathematics (*mathematiques appliquees*) can be most conveniently expressed; and, in respect to exactness, delicacy, flexibility, and power of expression, this branch of language stands unrivalled.

It is by the aid of this peculiar language that the profound and delicate researches of the mathematicians and philosophers of the present and last century have been conducted to a successful issue, and without it their labors must have been comparatively unfruitful in important results. Hence the abstruse and difficult sciences of the applied mathematics have advanced in proportion as the various branches of the pure mathematics have been successfully cultivated. Sir Isaac Newton was compelled to invent the fluxionary calculus before he could successfully investigate the profound truths contained in his *Principia*; and it was necessary that a century should be employed in extending and maturing this calculus, by such men as Clairault, Euler, and La Grange, before it was possible that the *Mecanique Céleste* of La Place could be written.

The elements of the applied mathematics have been taught in the academy from its origin; and it is not known to the committee that any difference of opinion in respect to their value has ever existed among the visitors. They are fundamental in their character and claims to attention, and are an indispensable part of the education of the accomplished citizen soldier. Their importance, as the committee believe, is equally unquestioned and unquestionable. These circumstances have rendered it unnecessary for the committee, in their judgment, to do more than satisfy themselves that these sciences have been actually taught in the academy in a manner and with a degree of success corresponding with their importance.

To this end, a portion of their attention has been given to an examination of the text books in use in this department of instruction. These are—1, Boucharlat's *Mechanics*, translated by Professor Courtenay, and adapted to the use of the academy; 2, Roget's *Treatises of Electricity and Magnetism*, prepared by the author under the patronage of the (English) Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge; 3, Sir David Brewster's *Optics*; 4, Gummete's *Astronomy*; 5, Turner's *Chemistry*.

After a careful examination, the committee think these treatises well adapted to instruction in the respective sciences of which they treat. In respect to their style of research, the analytical method of demonstration, interspersed occasionally, for the sake of variety of proof and illustration, with the synthetical, is used; and they contain numerous examples of its peculiar beauty, symmetry, and power, so far as the elements of those sciences admit. In this respect, as well as in others to which the committee need not on this occasion advert, these works exhibit a most gratifying improvement over those treatises on the same subjects which, within a few years, were in general use in our universities, colleges, and other higher seminaries of instruction. And, without dwelling on the topic, the committee may be justified in observing that the professors of this institution, by introducing an improved style of instruction in mathematics, pure and applied, have exerted in those important departments an indirect but extensive beneficial influence in all the higher seminaries of education in the country.

In the demonstrations and illustrations of this abstruse department of the exact sciences, the committee were generally well satisfied with the performances of the cadets.

In almost every instance they went through the demonstrations and other exercises assigned them, however complicated they might be, with a gratifying degree of promptness, accuracy, and general intelligence. Many questions were put to the young men by the members of the board well calculated to test their knowledge, which were generally answered promptly and satisfactorily. They were often subjected to very severe tests during the course of the examination. The committee are assured that diligent use has been made of the philosophical apparatus in illustrating the several branches of this department. And, in this connexion, it seems proper to observe that the room in which the philosophical apparatus is kept is too small. Some of the most valuable instruments are, for want of room, crowded together so closely, and are placed on shelves so high, and otherwise so inconvenient, that they are in danger of being broken every time they are taken down for use. The committee have been informed, however, that this inconvenience will be remedied when the edifice now erecting is finished.

The attention of the committee has been particularly drawn to the department of chemistry, mineralogy, and geology. The advances made in these kindred sciences during the present century are among the great triumphs of the age in which we live; and the course of instruction in the academy must be imperfect while this department continues to labor under its present disadvantages. The committee think it their duty to bring these disadvantages distinctly to the notice of the visitors.

Most, if not all, the disadvantages under which this important department labors may be traced to the fact that it has never been established by act of Congress. One consequence of this fact has been that the instruction in chemistry, mineralogy, and geology has been given by officers of the army temporarily designated for the purpose. Those officers have performed duties as laborious and responsible as those of any of the professors of the academy without receiving, the committee are assured, any compensation for their services, except a small allowance which has been annually appropriated by Congress during the last two years, but of the continuance of which there is no reasonable assurance. Another consequence of the same fact is, that the acting professor of chemistry, &c., being constantly liable to be ordered away from the academy on ordinary military duty, can feel no sense of security in his situation, and therefore has not the same inducement, which may well influence the other professors, to perfect

himself in his course; since, when by long service and experience he may have rendered himself most competent to give instruction, he may be ordered to other duties. The committee learn, too, that there has lately been but one officer detailed as an assistant in the department of chemistry, mineralogy, and geology, and that the whole of his time, as well as nearly all the time of the acting professor, having been required to give the requisite instruction in *chemistry*, the highly important branches of mineralogy and geology have been almost entirely neglected during several years past. Another assistant is necessary, to allow instruction to be given in those branches, as is enjoined in the course of studies prescribed for the academy.—(See Regulations of the United States Military Academy, page 16.)

The collection of mineralogical specimens belonging to the academy is considerable; large enough, perhaps, for the purpose of ordinary instruction. Of geological specimens and drawings the institution is almost entirely destitute, although it may be safely affirmed that instruction cannot be rendered effective without them. Drawings in series, exhibiting the stratification of rocks and other geological phenomena, have been brought to great perfection, and may be purchased on reasonable terms.

In examining the chemical laboratory and mineralogical cabinet, the very great importance of several changes and improvements forced itself on the attention of the committee.

The laboratory is by far too small, and the delicate and costly instruments are exposed, for want of a separate apartment in which to keep them, to the corrosive gases which are evolved in the course of the experiments. Besides a chemical laboratory in a place peculiarly exposed to danger from fire, accidental explosions, &c., and in consequence of its situation in the same building with the library and philosophical apparatus, these valuable portions of the property of the academy are in constant and imminent hazard of being destroyed. A separate building, large enough to meet the wants of the chemical, mineralogical, and geological department, is imperatively called for by the best interests of the institution.

The committee, at the risk of becoming tedious, beg leave to ask the further indulgence of the board, and to claim its still further attention in behalf of the subjects of mineralogy and geology. No place in the United States, they are well satisfied, possesses equal advantages with West Point for collecting an extensive mineralogical and geological cabinet at a small expense. The first step is to appropriate suitable rooms for the purpose; and the next, to classify and arrange the present cabinet in the most approved order. This being done, if an invitation were given by the Department of War to the officers of the army stationed at the various military posts in the United States to collect and send mineralogical and geological specimens in aid of the cabinet, no doubt is entertained that the invitation would be generally responded to, and the collection would rapidly increase. Another way of increasing the cabinet would be to make exchanges of specimens with individuals and other institutions. To carry this plan into effect the professor of this department ought to have a small appropriation at his command with which to pay the expense of the transportation of minerals and other incidental expenses. It is believed that the numerous graduates would cheerfully lend their aid in furtherance of a plan of this kind; and that a large and very valuable collection, both in mineralogy and geology, might be made in a few years, and with a very moderate expense to the government.

On the ground of the preceding facts and arguments the committee recommend to the board the adoption of the following resolutions, to wit:

1. That the department of chemistry, mineralogy, and geology ought to be established by law on the same footing with the department of mathematics, to wit: with a professor and two assistant professors, to receive the same pay and emoluments, respectively, which are received by the professor of mathematics and his assistants.

2. That a suitable building ought to be erected for the accommodation of the department of chemistry, mineralogy, and geology, apart from the other buildings of the academy, and furnished with the fixtures and other conveniences necessary for successful instruction.

3. That an appropriation of \$400 be recommended for increasing the mineralogical and geological cabinet by the purchase of specimens, \$200 for the purchase of a set of geological drawings, and an *annual* appropriation of \$100 to pay the expense of the transportation of such specimens in this department as may be obtained by exchanges or received as presents.

All which is respectfully submitted.

J. ADAMS, *Chairman.*

WEST POINT UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY, June 15, 1837.

No. 5.

Report of committee on internal police and discipline.

The committee to whom was referred the subject of the internal police and discipline of the institution report:

1st. That, accompanied by several of the professors detailed by Colonel De Russy, they visited the hospital barracks, and were conducted through the various apartments by the surgeon, and are happy in stating that everything had a clean, neat, and comfortable appearance; that they found but one cadet sick, and, on reference to the hospital books and report of the surgeon, not over eight sick on an average for several years past, and but three deaths in ten years—a strong proof of the great care, attention, and skill of the officers in this department, and the healthfulness of the Point.

2d. The barracks for the accommodation of the cadets remarkably clean, and as comfortable as the construction of the buildings will admit of; and your committee beg leave to reiterate the statements of several former boards of visitors as to the construction of all the buildings, and do most earnestly recommend to the Secretary of War the importance of having this matter attended to by the proper authorities.

3d. *The commons or buildings.*—We highly approve of the arrangements made by the superintendent. It insures the cadets a good and wholesome supply of food, and on equitable terms, averaging from \$10 to \$12 per month, according to the market's rise or fall of produce. The steward by this arrangement has no object to give the cadets scanty and inferior provisions, &c. His expenditures are all sustained by proper vouchers, and audited by a committee of officers, one of whom is the major commandant of the corps.

4th. The arrangement for the disbursement of the funds and pay of the cadets, to wit: the supply of clothing, books, &c., display a care and economy highly commendable.

Although not directly connected with our report, yet we have examined into the condition of all the buildings; we state that the rooms appropriated for the professors of chemistry and natural and experimental philosophy, and the apartment for mineral and geological specimens, are quite inadequate, and the philosophical apparatus is constantly subjected to injury and destruction.

JAMES S. BULLOCK, *Chairman.*

WEST POINT, June 16, 1837.

No. 6.

Report of the fiscal committee.

The committee to whom was referred the fiscal concerns of the institution beg leave to report: That they have attempted a discharge of the duties assigned them by the board, and after such inquiries as were deemed necessary to a proper understanding of the subject committed to their care, give the following hasty detail as the result of their labors. They would, however, premise, that it seems to them that the government has the most ample security for an account of the amounts of disbursements intended for the institution, by its connexion and accountability to the treasury and other officers of the government. The committee visited the offices and inspected the books and abstracts of the paymaster and quartermaster's departments, and are happy to inform the board that they seemed, as far as they could learn from a cursory examination, to be kept with neatness, precision, and system. The committee, conceiving it to be within the scope of their duty, made the further inquiry, what sums had been appropriated by Congress during the preceding and present year, and what amounts remained on hand of the miscellaneous objects of expenditure; and received an answer from the department that the sum of \$28,097 27 remained in his hands on the 31st of December, A. D. 1836, of the unexpended balances of the appropriations of former years; for the particulars of which, and a thorough understanding of the various amounts appropriated and expended for the years 1836 and 1837, reference is made to documents marked A and B, which have been furnished them by the department, and which the committee ask may be considered as a part of their report, in order to a proper understanding of the same. The committee further report, that in obedience to a resolution of the board, adopted on the 15th instant, requiring other and further information of the department respecting the precise amount of money in his hands for the extraordinary expenses of the institution, and when it was deposited, which last call for information has been, by a letter of the superintendent, fully answered and explained; in which he states that a balance of \$49,519 27 remains in his hands of the unexpended appropriations for the various uses and departments of the institution, and that the same is deposited in the Mechanics' Bank of New York, and that the balance of the appropriation for the present year of \$33,930 75 remains in the treasury of the United States; all which, without pretending to suggest at this late period of the session of the board what should be done, and leaving it to the discretion of the whole board to direct in this matter, is most respectfully submitted.

In conclusion, the committee suggest the propriety of hereafter paying the annual visitors of this institution either a per diem allowance sufficient to cover actual expenses, or otherwise require the visitor to keep a detailed account of expenses whilst coming to this place, remaining here, and returning home, and let the government pay it, as it is humbly conceived that every public servant is, or ought to be, worth his expenses; which suggestion is, in addition to the above, respectfully submitted to the consideration of the board, and through them to the War Department.

JAMES RODGERS, *Chairman.*

JUNE 16, A. D. 1837.

A.

Statement of disbursements on account of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, in the year 1836, by Lieutenant Colonel R. E. De Russy, United States engineer, and superintendent United States Military Academy.

Heads of appropriations.	Overrun of former appropriations.	Unexpended of former appropriations.	Appropriations for 1836.	Applicable for 1836.	Expended in 1836.	Amount unexpended.	Amount overrun.
For defraying expenses of board of visitors.....	\$332 48	\$2,382 48	\$2,050 00	\$2,057 84	\$7 84
For fuel, forage, stationery, printing, &c.....	\$6,783 46	12,535 00	19,318 46	6,927 73	\$12,390 73
For repairs and improvements.....	53 75	9,066 00	9,119 75	7,411 46	1,708 29
For pay of adjutant and quartermaster's clerks.....	950 00	950 00	950 00
For philosophical apparatus.....	1,585 00	300 00	1,885 00	115 23	1,769 72
For models for department of engineering.....	2,484 77	500 00	2,984 77	210 08	2,774 69
For the departments of drawing, chemistry, and mathematics.....	1,498 37	1,235 00	2,733 37	479 91	2,253 46
For the purchase and repair of instruments for the band.....	392 00	392 00	278 36	113 64
For incidental expenses of the department of artillery.....	50 00	50 00	50 00
For increase and expenses of library.....	1,407 25	800 00	2,207 25	767 08	1,440 17
For department of mineralogy, &c.....	1,838 88	1,838 88	75 85	1,763 03
For miscellaneous and incidental expenses.....	67 15	2,293 00	2,360 15	1,979 26	380 89
For completing the chapel.....	34 81	3,500 00	3,534 81	3,280 64	254 17
For the erection of a building for military and other exercises.....	14,915 34	14,915 34	11,966 86	2,948 48
For compensation to the acting professor of chemistry.....	600 00	600 00	300 00	300 00
Total.....	332 48	30,668 78	34,603 48	64,939 78	36,850 35	28,097 27	7 84

B.

Statement of disbursements on account of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, in the first quarter of the year 1837, by Lieutenant Colonel R. E. De Russy, United States engineer, and superintendent United States Military Academy.

Hheads of appropriations.	Overrun of former appropriations.	Unexpended of former appropriations.	Appropriations for 1837.	Applicable for 1837.	Expended for 1st quarter of 1837.	Amount unexpended.	Amount overrun.
For defraying expenses of board of visitors.....	\$7 84		\$2,007 84	\$2,000 00		\$2,000 00	
For fuel, stationery, printing, transportation, and postage.....		\$12,390 73	8,000 00	20,390 73	\$5,920 41	14,470 32	
For repairs and improvements		1,708 29	10,178 25	11,886 54	741 30	11,145 24	
For pay of adjutant and quartermaster's clerks			950 00	950 00	237 50	712 50	
For philosophical apparatus		1,769 72	300 00	2,069 72	15 00	2,054 72	
For models for department of engineering.....		2,774 69	300 00	3,074 69		3,094 69	
For the department of drawing, chemistry, and mathematics.....		2,253 46	850 00	3,103 46	186 47	2,916 99	
For the purchase and repairs of instruments for the band.....		113 64		113 64	61 75	51 89	
For incidental expenses of the department of artillery			300 00	300 00	13 50	286 50	
For increase and expenses of library.....		1,440 17	600 00	2,040 17	21 12	2,019 05	
For the department of mineralogy, &c.....		1,763 03		1,763 03	74 00	1,689 03	
For miscellaneous and incidental expenses.....		380 89	1,777 50	2,158 39	62 31	2,096 08	
For completing the chapel		254 17	1,253 35	1,507 52	1,507 52		
For the building for military and other exercises		2,948 48	30,000 00	32,948 48	1,494 53	31,453 95	
For compensation to the acting professor of chemistry		300 00	300 00	600 00		600 00	
For a building to contain public stores.....			1,500 00	1,500 00		1,500 00	
For yard and workshops.....			8,000 00	8,000 00		8,000 00	
For new barracks for United States military detachment			4,000 00	4,000 00		4,000 00	
For grading grounds and removing temporary buildings.....			350 00	350 00		350 00	
For a painting room for professor of drawing			800 00	800 00		800 00	
Total.....	7 84	28,097 27	71,466 94	99,556 37	10,335 41	89,220 96	

U.

General estimate of funds required for the service of the United States Military Academy for the year 1838, in addition to funds already appropriated, viz:

For travelling expenses and accommodation of board of visitors	\$1,998 04
For general repairs, fuel, forage, stationery, printing, postage, transportation, miscellaneous and incidental expenses, as per detailed estimate marked U No. 1.....	25,230 00
For the increase and expense of the library.....	800 00
For completion of the building for recitation and military exercises, per detailed estimate marked U No. 2.....	18,254 60
For erection of a barn and public stables.....	1,000 00
For compensation to the acting professor of chemistry for one year, ending September 1, 1839	300 00
	<u>47,582 64</u>

R. E. DE RUSSY, Lieut. Col., Superintendent Military Academy.

U No. 1.

Estimate of funds required for general repairs and improvements of academies, barracks, mess rooms, officers' and professors' quarters, wharf, boats, roads, fences, parade ground, &c., for the year 1838, viz:

3,000 common pine boards, at 16 cents.....	\$480 00
1,500 common hemlock, at 13 cents.....	195 00
800 pine plank, at 25 cents.....	200 00
3,000 feet clear pine plank, at 3 cents.....	90 00
500 joists, at 13 cents.....	65 00
3,000 feet clear pine boards, at 3 cents.....	90 00
500 feet whitewood boards, at 3 cents.....	15 00
25,000 shingles, at \$5 50.....	137 50
20,000 laths for plastering, at \$2 25.....	45 00
10,000 chestnut laths for fences, at \$30.....	300 00
Oak plank for drags, scrapers, and carts.....	50 00
Nails, brads, butts, locks, and screws.....	150 00
Tin, sheet lead, glass, and sash cord	150 00
1,000 casks lime, at \$1 25	125 00

20 casks Rhode Island lime, at \$3 25		\$65 00	
10 casks hydraulic, at \$3		30 00	
500 fire-brick, at 8 cents		40 00	
25 soap-stone backs, at \$1		25 00	
3,000 pounds ground white lead, at 12½ cents		375 00	
150 gallons linseed oil, at \$1 12½		168 75	
50 gallons spirits turpentine, at 62½ cents		31 25	
200 pounds yellow ochre, at 5 cents		10 00	
Spanish whiting, litharge, paint brushes, &c		100 00	
20,000 brick, at \$6		120 00	
Fire grates, stove, stove-pipe, &c		300 00	
Two tons assorted iron		225 00	
300 pounds steel		75 00	
Virginia coal and charcoal for blacksmith		100 00	
Additional compensation to enlisted men employed as mechanics, teamsters, and laborers		2,000 00	
Pay of citizen mechanics employed in repairs		1,000 00	
For the gradual levelling and improvement of the plain and parade ground		500 00	
Fuel: 700 tons coal, at \$7	\$4,900 00		
600 cords wood, at \$5	3,000 00		
			7,900 00
Forage: 50 tons hay, at \$20	1,000 00		
500 bushels corn, at \$1	500 00		
500 bushels oats, at 50 cents	250 00		
500 bushels shorts, at 25 cents	125 00		
		1,875 00	
This same quantity estimated for the last year, but not then appropriated	1,875 00		
			3,750 00
Stationery: 50 reams writing paper, at \$5 50	275 00		
5 reams folio paper, at \$10	50 00		
4 reams envelope paper, at \$5	20 00		
10,000 quills, at \$20	200 00		
Blank books for adjutant, treasurer, &c	75 00		
Sealing-wax, wafers, ink, tape, &c	25 00		
			645 00
Printing: 1,200 academic registers	250 00		
Apparatus and materials for lithographic press	150 00		
Additional pay to three enlisted men employed in the lithographic office	350 00		
			750 00
Postage of letters received and sent by the superintendent and other officers on public service			150 00
Transportation of cadets discharged by order of the War Department	1,500 00		
Transportation of officers' baggage, materials, &c	600 00		
			2,100 00
Clerks: Pay of the disbursing officer's clerk	600 00		
Pay of the adjutant's clerk	500 00		
			1,100 00
Miscellaneous and incidental expenses:			
130 gallons oil for lighting halls, at \$1 25	162 50		
Candles for the adjutant's, paymaster's, and other offices	30 00		
Sand, brooms, brushes, and police tubs	45 00		
Chalk and sponge for recitation rooms	15 00		
Parchment, and printing of diplomas	50 00		
Fifteen cents per day for three enlisted men employed as police and-keepers of public rooms	165 00		
Instruments and music for the band	200 00		
Additional pay to the keeper of the philosophical room	60 00		
Additional pay to the keeper of the chemistry room	120 00		
The per diem allowed to an officer of the engineers, for disbursing	730 00		
			1,577 50
			<u>25,230 00</u>

U No. 2.

Estimate of funds required for the completion of the building for military and other exercises at the United States Military Academy, in addition to the appropriations already made.

or plastering the basement story, 572 yards, at 35 cents		\$200 20
For plastering the exercise room, 1,640 yards at 30 cents		492 00
For plastering the examination hall	520	
For plastering the second story	4,690	
For plastering the third story	4,968	
		10,178 yards, at 40 cents
		4,071 20
For deafening partitions in second story, 1,500 yards, at 25 cents		375 00
For deafening floors in first and second story, 3,027 yards, at 10 cents		302 70

For stucco cornice, 1,274 feet, at 25 cents	\$318 50
For pointing stone walls	400 00
For cementing brick walls outside	100 00
For carpentry	\$3, 345 00
For nails, locks, hinges, &c.	625 00
For lumber for roof	2, 200 00
For scaffolding for cornices	125 00
For tinning roof and gutters	3, 500 00
For castings for window guards	200 00
For castings and iron work for portico and stairs	1, 000 00
For painting	1, 000 00
	11, 995 00
	18, 254 60

No. 14.

REPORT FROM THE TOPOGRAPHICAL BUREAU.

TOPOGRAPHICAL BUREAU, *Washington, November 7, 1837.*

Sir: In obedience to your orders of the 7th of September, I have the honor of submitting to you the following statements and report:

1. Statement A, exhibiting the amount required by the Topographical bureau for the year 1838. This statement embraces the pay for clerks, the pay for a messenger, and the sum required for the contingent expenses of the office, amounting to \$4,035.

2. Statement B, exhibiting the amount required for surveys for the year 1838. It embraces three items: one for military surveys on the coast and inland frontier; another for the continuation of the survey on the coast of North and South Carolina, with views to inland steam navigation on that coast; and the third for surveys under the act of April 30, 1824, amounting to \$60,000.

3. Statement C embraces estimates for the various works of improvement in a state of constructing under this bureau, amounting to \$435,969.

4. Statement D is an exhibit of the amounts transmitted to the disbursing officers of the bureau from the 1st day of October, 1836, to the 30th day of September, 1837, and of the amount for which accounts have been received during the same period.

5. Statement E is an exhibit of the expenditure of the contingent fund of the bureau.

I am further required to present to your consideration a general view of the operations of the bureau since the last annual report. These operations consist in the execution of various surveys and the superintending of constructions for the improvement of harbors and rivers, of which a detailed account of each will now be submitted.

Surveys.

6. The same causes which so seriously limited the operations of the bureau under this head during the last year, being still in existence, have had a similar influence during the present, namely, the inefficient and feeble organization of the corps of topographical engineers; in consequence of which, the duty of surveys has been confined to but little more than the completion of the unfinished work of the previous year.

7. The survey of the ledge of rocks at Owl's Head harbor.

8. The survey of the passage into Cobscook bay.—These two have been completed, and reports, plans, and estimates have been received at the bureau.

9. A survey with a view to the improvement of the navigation of the Kennebec river, from Augusta to the shoals below Gardiner.—This was directed by a resolution of Congress during its winter session of 1837. It has been completed, and the report, plan, and estimate received.

10. A survey of Lynn harbor, Massachusetts, with a view to its improvement.—This survey was the result of an application from certain citizens of Lynn, and was made at their expense. The duty has been completed, and the report, plan, and estimate of the United States engineer who superintended the same have been received at the bureau.

11. The survey of the Crow shoal, Delaware bay, with a view to the construction of an artificial harbor, in pursuance of directions from Congress.—This was an unfinished duty of the past year; but during the present it has been completed, and the report, plan, and estimate are expected at the bureau during the ensuing winter.

12. The survey of the coast of the State of Mississippi, in compliance with a resolution of the Senate, with views referring to additional defences on that coast.—We have not yet been able to commence this survey. It is peculiarly one of a military character, and the army, from which our assistants have been heretofore drawn for such surveys, has been unable to supply them. An effort was made to obtain them from the class of civil engineers of the country; but those of adequate talents and experience were already employed elsewhere, and could not be obtained but at compensations so far exceeding that which it was customary for the United States to pay, or which the appropriation that must have been resorted to could bear, in addition to other demands upon it, that it was deemed advisable to defer it.

No injury is apprehended from this delay, as the work can yet be done in time for the object in contemplation. Efforts will be made to accomplish it during the ensuing winter.

These surveys are a necessary preliminary step in all cases, whether for fortifications or for works of a civil character. A survey is a careful observation of all the peculiarities of a locality, and a correct admeasurement of these and of everything that will bear upon the object contemplated or the plan to be digested.

The portraying of the survey upon paper is the necessary recording of all facts which have been collected, so as to exhibit them in their proper places, upon a scale sufficiently large to show the relative

importance of each, and yet within a limit that will represent a combined view of the whole. The survey, therefore, and the drawings, are a collection, record, and exhibition of the data by which the judgment of the engineer is to be guided in the forming of his plans and estimates, and without which the plans and estimates can be viewed in no other light than a species of empiricism, more liable to be wrong than right, but right or wrong only by hazard, and with which his plans and estimates are the more to be relied upon as the surveys are extensive in the details collected and accurate in the exhibition of them. Hence the importance of these preliminary operations, and the necessity that they should be executed with great care, and by officers of experience as well as of scientific acquirements.

13. The survey of the coast.—The officer heretofore on that duty still continues on the same.

14. The survey of the northern extremity of Lake Champlain, with a view to its military defences, directed by a resolution of the Senate.—This survey commenced in 1836, and, partially made during that year, has now been completed, and the results will probably be received at the bureau during the ensuing winter.

15. The surveys of the St. Francis, Black, and White rivers, in Missouri and Arkansas.—These are now completed, and the reports, plans, and estimates are expected during the course of the ensuing winter:

16. The survey of the Manitowa river, from its mouth to the Winnebago lake, and of the Fox river, from Green bay to the Wisconsin portage, directed by a resolution of the Senate.—So soon as an engineer could be procured he was assigned to this duty, and his plan, report, and estimate are expected in the course of the ensuing winter.

17. A survey of the Alleghany river from Pittsburg to Olean, directed by a resolution of the House of Representatives.—This survey has been completed, and the officer under whose superintendence it was made is now engaged in preparing the plan, report, and estimate.

18. The survey of the Illinois river from its mouth to the termination of the canal, and of the Kaskaskia river from its mouth to Vandalia, directed by a resolution of the House of Representatives.—The superintendence of these two surveys was placed under the same officer; they have both been completed, and the officer is now engaged in preparing the requisite reports, plans, and estimates.

19. The survey from the southern debouche of the Dismal Swamp canal, down the Pasquotank river, to Elizabeth; thence to Croatan sound, Pamlico, and other sounds, near the coast of North Carolina; and thence by the most practicable route to Winyaw bay, in South Carolina, with a view of determining the practicability of opening an inland communication for steam navigation from the Chesapeake bay to Charleston, South Carolina, directed by a law of Congress.—This highly interesting and extensive survey was commenced as soon as the proper arrangements could be made, and has been prosecuted with great industry by the officer under whose superintendence it was placed. The survey has been extended throughout the greater part of the coast of North Carolina, and, although the whole distance to Charleston will not be completed during the present season, nor without an additional appropriation, yet the whole will be examined, and a report of its general character be ready for Congress during its ensuing session.

20. The geological surveys authorized by Congress have been prosecuted with the usual zeal and intelligence of Mr. Featherstonhaugh, and a report full of interest is now being prepared by him.

21. In addition to the surveys above enumerated, topographical officers have been sent to the army in Florida; to the troops in the Cherokee country; to aid in a military reconnoissance of the eastern frontier of Maine; and to aid in a military reconnoissance of the southwestern frontier.

Constructions.

22. Superintending the construction of the Alexandria canal aqueduct.—A more difficult work has been rarely heretofore undertaken. It may with propriety be considered, for boldness of design and skilfulness of execution, as unprecedented among works of that kind. The great interest of the United States involved in the Chesapeake and Ohio canal, of which this connexion with the Potomac at Alexandria forms so important a link, and the amounts which the United States have devoted to the particular structure in question, have been considered sufficient to justify the detail of one of their own engineers as the superintendent of the work. It has been prosecuted with great and successful industry and skill, under the accidents and discouraging circumstances inseparable from works of this kind. Its success is now placed beyond doubt; the fourth pier is about being erected, and no fears are entertained that the whole work will be completed as soon as the canal, of which it forms so important a part, if adequate means are supplied in time.

23. The opening of a road from the State line of Alabama, through Mariana, to Apalachicola, authorized by a law of Congress of June, 1834.—It is expected that this road will be completed during the ensuing winter, the whole being under contract.

24. The building of a breakwater or pier at the harbor of Burlington, Vermont.—The work is progressing with commendable rapidity, two large cribs, each one hundred feet long, having been sunk and secured.

25. Deepening the channel between the two Hero islands, in Lake Champlain.—The impediment is a shoal of very tenacious clay, with stones of various sizes and gravel firmly imbedded in it, upon which no current could well act, and in a situation in which there is no current to act. The only means of deepening the channel is, therefore, to cut out the clay impediment and remove it. For this purpose a dredging machine has been employed, and with considerable effect, and, from the character of the shoal, I have no doubt that the improvement will be permanent.

26. The building of a breakwater or pier in the harbor of Plattsburg.—A crib of 108 feet has been sunk, and timber enough collected for about 300 feet more. Both in this and in the breakwater at Burlington it has been found necessary to sink the cribs in deeper water, and further from the shore than was at first contemplated, in order to furnish a secure harbor, adequate to the increasing commerce of these places, which modification from the first plan will have a proportionate effect in increasing the cost of these structures.

27. This improvement of the harbor of White Hall, New York.—This harbor is a narrow arm of Lake Champlain, into the upper end of which Wood creek discharges itself. It had become obstructed by deposits from the creek; but being already narrower than is convenient for its commerce, the usual method of contracting the water-way and removing the deposits by an increased velocity of the current could not, in consequence, be adopted. It left, therefore, the only alternative—the dredging machine—which has been used to much advantage. But it is clear, from these facts, that the improvement will not

be permanent, and that the use of the machine will have to be occasionally repeated. It is, however, I think, equally clear that, under the circumstances of the case, it was the best plan which could be adopted.

28. The improvement of the harbor of Black river, Jefferson county, New York.—Twenty-six cribs have been finished and placed, making a total length of eight hundred feet. The good effects of the plan are already beginning to develop, and no doubt is entertained that the improvement, when completed, will equal all just anticipations. The estimate now submitted somewhat exceeds that at first made, in which the cost of materials and the quantity of labor were rather underrated. A new item for pile timber has also been introduced.

29. The improvement of the harbor at the mouth of Salmon river, Lake Ontario, New York.—The appropriation for this improvement was so small and so disproportioned to the amount required that but little has been done in comparison to what could have been. That a just estimate of the importance of the position may be made, I subjoin the following extract from the report of the superintending officer:

"The importance of this point as a harbor to the maritime people of Lake Ontario is indisputable. Mexico bay, into which Salmon river empties, is a broad, open bay, with a shore of upwards of forty miles in length, with not a single harbor for vessels of a greater draught than five and a half feet. It not unfrequently happens that vessels found off this bay in northwest, west, or southwest gales, are driven within it, and, from the want of a harbor, are lost. The mouth of Salmon river is the only point within this bay which presents facilities for the construction of a harbor suited to the wants of the increasing commerce of Lake Ontario. Even here, after crossing the bar, vessels are compelled to proceed parallel with the shore and bar, through a narrow channel, for nearly four hundred yards, before they arrive at a place of security; and from the violence with which the sea breaks over the bar and almost entirely across the channel it not unfrequently happens that they lose their steerage way and are driven on shore. The proposed plan of the piers will obviate this difficulty completely. The southwest pier alone will prove a considerable protection, especially from southwest gales. Running along the bar parallel with the channel, it will afford protection the instant a vessel is under its lee. Even the small portion now built (as was seen in the gale of the 21st ultimo) will be of great advantage. There was still water about three hundred feet further out than had ever been known before. A vessel arriving within this space would have been safe.

"That a work of this kind will greatly benefit the surrounding country is evident. No section of country, however rich its soil, however industrious its inhabitants, but must derive great benefit from having a port thrown open to it through which to transport its produce to market. The harbor at the mouth of Salmon river will open a channel through which will flow the products of a country as rich in soil and enterprise as any in the northern part of New York.

"It may be proper to add, in connexion with this subject, that the legislature of this State has granted charters to companies for the construction of a railroad from the village of Port Ontario (near the mouth of the river) to Rome, and a canal from the last-mentioned place to Oneida lake. This canal will be less than twenty miles in length, and when made will open a communication direct from the Hudson to Lake Ontario, over the shortest possible route—the whole distance from Albany to Port Ontario being less than one hundred and seventy miles.

"On the Salmon river, about four miles from its mouth, is situated the flourishing village of Pulaski, with a population of about eight hundred. The water power, though but little used, is considerable, the river having a fall of about sixty feet within the corporate limits of the village. Here are five stores, a grist mill, two tanneries, a woollen factory, and a saw mill; a paper mill is about to go into operation.

"At the mouth of the river is situated the incorporated village of Port Ontario, which was not in existence prior to the first appropriation, in 1836, for the improvement of this harbor. About ten houses and sixty inhabitants occupied the present site. It has now eighty-four buildings, among which are five dry goods stores and four taverns. It has a free bridge of upwards of a quarter of a mile in length, and a population of more than five hundred souls. A company has been chartered for the construction of a hydraulic canal along the bank of the Salmon river, by which a large water power will be brought into action for manufacturing purposes within the village.

"I append a statistical table of Port Ontario, obtained from the collector of the port, to whom I am indebted for information respecting the improvements of the village of Port Ontario."

30. The improvement of the mouth of Cattaraugus creek, Lake Erie, State of New York.—Six hundred and ninety feet of crib-work have been sunk and secured, and the two hundred and seventy feet which had been sunk the season before have been built up and finished. Much more work could have been done but for the inadequacy of the appropriation; yet, even from what has been, the most encouraging effects have resulted.

31. The improvement of the harbor of Portland, Lake Erie, State of New York.—Twenty cribs, making six hundred feet of the western breakwater, were built and sunk this season, and covered with large boulders, forming already a valuable shelter to the harbor in that direction. The work here has, however, also been much less than it would have been if adequate appropriations had been made.

32. The improvement of the harbor of Vermilion, Huron county, State of Ohio.—The operations of the last season were confined to the western pier, of which about four hundred feet were constructed. During the present season both piers have been extended into the lake, one thousand feet of crib-work having been prepared and sunk, and which, by the close of the season, will be raised to the intended height, which will complete the quantity of work contemplated to have been done at that place during this year. In reference to the effect of the structure in improving the entrance into the river the engineer writes: "The object being to change the course of the river, and to direct its current upon the sand-bar which obstructed its mouth, and thereby open a channel into the harbor of sufficient depth, this object has been in a measure accomplished; and, had the spring freshets been as powerful as they usually are on this river, the bar would have been entirely removed. A portion still remains; but I feel confident that the next fall and spring freshets will remove it."

33. The construction of a pier or breakwater at the mouth of the St. Joseph's, Michigan.—Six hundred and sixty-seven feet of continuous crib-work have been made and placed at this harbor, three hundred and eighty feet of which constitute a part of the northern pier, extending outside and across the bar. The southern pier has not yet been commenced. The object is to construct the northern pier first, and then to observe carefully its effect before finally locating the southern pier.

34. The construction of a breakwater and harbor at Michigan City, State of Indiana.—Eleven hundred and sixty feet of crib-work have been partly finished and entirely secured at this place. Also, a few

cribs of the breakwater have been made and sunk, in order to test their durability, and to profit by the experience which will be thereby acquired.

35. The construction of the light-house upon the Brandywine shoal, near the capes of the Delaware.—No more has been done in reference to this extremely difficult and hazardous enterprise than to digest the plan and prepare materials for its execution. In works of this kind a certain quantity must be executed in the same season, or there is no security, if the quantity be less, that it may not be swept away by the ensuing spring. It is therefore necessary that appropriations in the first instance should be large. In the present case the appropriation was not only too small, but was made too late in the season for a judicious commencement of the structure; the bureau was therefore obliged to limit its operations, as already indicated.

While upon this subject it becomes my duty respectfully to state that complaints from the engineers are universal, both in reference to the amounts appropriated, and to the lateness of the season when appropriations are generally made.

The effect of small and late appropriations is to limit the labor and extend the time in which the work can be completed, thereby exposing the department to reproaches of tardy and inefficient action; also to involve the department in forced execution, at enhanced prices, by which estimates, founded on the supposition of a reasonable support, are made to prove inadequate. Under such a system materials cannot be prepared, nor contracts be made, nor labor be commanded in time, nor on as favorable terms as could otherwise be obtained. It also exposes the bureau to the necessity, every fall, of discharging many who could be advantageously employed in preparing materials, and to the inconveniences of a new commencement every season with mechanics and laborers, scattered at distances, and under other engagements; and with having those of ability and experience as contractors, in other avocations, thus destroying confidence and creating embarrassments, which always result in enhanced prices.

The plans pursued on these harbor improvements are, generally, promising of success, and are made necessary from the great and increasing commerce of the lakes, the vast extent of lake coast, and its singular destitution of harbors or places of shelter. These works are, therefore, protections to commerce and to human life. The rivers which empty into the lakes are too small to prevent serious obstructions from bars; and these bars are more the effect, in my opinion, of the action of the surf of the lake than of deposit from the rivers. And as it is a fact beyond dispute that the openings which now exist are the result of the present action of these rivers, in the effort of the current to throw the sands hove up by the surf back again into the lake, we have data upon which plans of improvement can be formed. From these data the plans must be limited to such as, increasing the force of the current of these rivers, enable it to throw back still more of the sand which has been hove up by the surf, and thereby remove still more of the obstructing bar, or to such as protect the mouth of the outlet from the action of the surf, or to the union of both.

The first is what may be denominated the plan of double lines of piers, which contracts the stream, increases its velocity and power, and conducts it over the bar.

The second is the plan of breakwaters. These are artificial structures, placed in the lake at some distance from the shore, and so arranged as to protect the outlet of the stream from the action of the surf. They are, in fact, artificial islands.

When the stream is one of some power, the first is the plan generally adopted, with the modification of extending one pier further out than the other, so as to protect the artificial outlet by a partial breakwater from the direction from which the most violent and most frequent storms occur. Where the stream is very feeble, a harbor cannot well be formed without a combination of both plans; in such cases the double lines of piers are of equal lengths, the artificial outlet being protected from the surf by the breakwater placed off at some distance in the lake.

There is no doubt, in my opinion, that the union of the two plans would, in all cases on these lakes, prove the most efficient and the most durable; but the great expense thus involved has hitherto limited the constructions to the first, with the exception of one case. This exception is that of Michigan City, where a breakwater is being made off in the lake, and the force of the stream is to be increased by parallel piers, so as to enable it to remove the bar at its mouth.

These constructions are combinations of wood and stone. Large cribs of timber are made, and, firmly united, floated to their proper positions, placed adjacent to each other, and sunk and maintained in their places by piles and immense loads of stone.

The ingenuity of the engineers is called into exercise in the construction of his cribs and their size, which must of course depend upon the locality; but the fault least to be avoided is that of making them too strong. The subject being one of daily and increasing interest, I have called upon several officers of the bureau for detailed plans of these structures, and submit those which have been adopted at Salmon river and at Cattaraugus creek, both of which are places without shelter from storms or from the violence of the surf.*

Having now completed the exposition of duties of the past year, I find myself obliged to call your attention to the inefficient organization of this branch of the public service. You have yourself so frequently witnessed the evils growing from this cause, and they have been so often and in so much detail submitted to Congress, that, in order to avoid uninteresting repetitions, I will limit myself to a few remarks.

The force of the bureau consists of eleven officers having military commissions, (there being one brevet captain of artillery on the duty,) of which the highest rank is that of lieutenant colonel, and the lowest that of captain. This single exposition shows that the grades for subordinate duties, and for novitiates, are wanting. Formerly these grades were supplied by details from the army, but they were again withdrawn on every call for active army service; and after many years of experience and of observation, the system of details was abandoned as possessing but few advantages, and as being replete with defects and with injurious consequences to the army as well as to the duty for which the details were made.

But, as the duties of the bureau were not lessened, (in fact, they have been much increased,) and as the aid, however imperfect, from military details could no longer be obtained, the bureau was obliged, from absolute necessity, to seek this aid from other sources. Its attention was turned to the class of civil engineers spread over our country; many of whom, from circumstances beyond their control, were

* The drawings referred to in this document are omitted to be printed, under the order of the House of Representatives of September 11, 1837.

thrown out of employ. From this class, it gives me great pleasure to say, the bureau has been able to select many highly-informed, scientific, and experienced officers. But, being without distinctions of rank, it is difficult to establish rights of seniority or control in such a service, and, of consequence, equally difficult to introduce discipline, subordination, and order. The greater number of these appointments being also temporary, and there being no control by law over them, there is no adequate inducement to exertion, no security for duration of service, and no power that can command services in disagreeable seasons or in exposed and unhealthy localities, while compensations are greater than would be required or expected in a regularly organized and permanent corps.

In such a corps the permanency of the employment and the prospect of advancement are strong inducements to service at moderate compensations, of which the present system is destitute.

The whole force of civil agents of the bureau employed during the last year as engineers amounted to thirty-three, and this also a minimum force, such employments being limited by the necessity of taxing the appropriations for duty as little as possible; and although many of these are temporary, and for the season only, yet, as the number has been required, and will be again, the number and expense are permanent, although individuals may be changed.

From the foregoing, then, it will appear that the engineers of this bureau consist of eleven with military commissions, and thirty-three without.

The former are subject to those rules of discipline and subordination which are to be found in the Rules and Articles of War and the Regulations of the Army; the latter to no other than such as their own convenience and necessities may dictate; and as the greater body is more apt to give character to than to derive it from the smaller, it should not be matter of surprise if irregularities existed not easily to be avoided, nor to be remedied without the aid of law. The law which would remedy the same is a proper organization of the whole in one corps, with the usual gradations of rank and subject to the rules and articles of war.

As, therefore, economy of cost, efficiency of duties, discipline, and a proper responsibility, all unite in favor of such an organization, I cannot abandon the hope that the same will meet with your approbation, and be in that way brought to the consideration of Congress under the most favorable aspect.

That my views in reference to the organization may be the better understood, I have the honor of submitting them to your consideration drawn out in the form of a bill.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

J. J. ABERT, *Lieutenant Colonel Topographical Engineers.*

Hon. JOEL R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

A BILL for the better organization of the corps of topographical engineers.

SECTION 1. *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That the corps of topographical engineers shall be organized and increased by regular promotions in the same, so that the said corps shall consist of one colonel, one lieutenant colonel, four majors, ten captains, ten first lieutenants, and ten second lieutenants; and that graduates from the Military Academy, with brevets of the lowest commission in said corps, may be attached to the same, as is provided by law for other corps and regiments.

SEC. 2. *And be it further enacted,* That vacancies created by said organization, over and above those which can be filled by the present corps, shall be taken from the army and from such as it may be deemed advisable of the civil engineers in the employ of the United States; and that the pay and emoluments to officers of said corps shall be the same as are allowed to the dragoons of the United States.

SEC. 3. *And be it further enacted,* That the authority to employ civil engineers under the act of the 30th of April, 1824, and the authority by law for the employment of the present corps of topographical engineers be, and the same are hereby, repealed; and that all letters and packages on public business to and from the chief of the corps now organized be free from postage.

SEC. 4. *And be it further enacted,* That the officers of said corps shall be subject to the rules and articles of war, and to such regulations as the President may think proper to adopt.

A.

Estimate of funds that will be required for the year 1838, for clerks and messenger, and for the contingent expenses of the Topographical bureau.

For clerks and messenger.....	\$2, 800 00
Viz: For compensation of first clerk in the Topographical bureau.....	\$1,000
Additional 20 per cent., authorized by the act of March 3, 1837.....	200
For compensation of second clerk.....	1,000
For compensation of messenger.....	500
Additional 20 per cent., authorized by the act of March 3, 1837.....	100
For contingencies.....	1, 235 00
Viz: For stationery and office furniture.....	250
For 100 sheets of tracing paper.....	60
For 50 sheets of antiquarian paper.....	75
For binding original maps.....	50
For repairing of instruments returned by the several surveying parties.....	500
For purchase of books and maps.....	200
Fuel for three rooms.....	100
Total.....	<u>4, 035 00</u>

J. J. ABERT, *Lieut. Col. Top. Engineers.*

B.

Estimate of funds that will be required by the Topographical bureau, for the prosecution of surveys for the year 1838.

For defraying the expenses incidental to making examinations and surveys under the act of April 30, 1824, and for geological and mineralogical surveys and examinations.....	\$30,000 00
For surveys of a military character, and for the defences of the Atlantic and western frontier.....	15,000 00
Completing the surveys from the southern debouche of the Dismal Swamp canal to Winyaw bay, South Carolina.....	15,000 00
Total.....	<u>60,000 00</u>

TOPOGRAPHICAL BUREAU, November 7, 1837.

C.

Statement showing the amounts which will be required upon the works named for the year 1838.

Breakwater at the harbor of Burlington, Vermont.....	\$50,000 00
Breakwater at Plattsburg, on Lake Champlain, New York.....	27,500 00
Improvement of the harbor of Whitehall, New York.....	15,000 00
Improvement of the harbor of Black river, New York.....	22,401 00
Improvement of the harbor of Salmon river, New York.....	30,000 00
Improvement of the harbor of Cattaraugus creek, New York.....	32,410 00
Improvement of the harbor of Portland, New York.....	35,466 00
Improvement of the harbor of Vermilion river, Ohio.....	23,626 57
Constructing a pier or breakwater at the mouth of the St. Joseph's, Lake Michigan.....	51,113 00
Constructing a breakwater and pier at Michigan City, Indiana.....	60,733 59
Building the light-house on the Brandywine shoal.....	87,718 95
Total.....	<u>435,969 11</u>

TOPOGRAPHICAL BUREAU, November 7, 1837.

D.

Statement showing the amount of funds remitted to the officers and agents disbursing under the Topographical bureau from the 1st day of October, 1836, to the 30th day of September, 1837, inclusive, and the amount of accounts rendered for settlement by each within the same period.

To whom remitted.	On what account.	Amount remitted.	Amount of accounts rendered.
G. W. Featherstonhaugh, geologist.....	Surveys under the act of April 30, 1824.....	\$2,400 00	\$3,726 82
Lieut. Colonel James Kearney.....	do.....do.....	3,858 00	2,889 17
Lieut. Colonel S. H. Long.....	do.....do.....	1,500 00	969 42
Major H. Bache.....	do.....do.....	2,000 00	1,623 02
Major J. D. Graham.....	do.....do.....	1,378 32	1,726 91
Captain W. G. Williams.....	do.....do.....	1,600 00	1,881 84
Captain W. H. Swift.....	do.....do.....	1,307 66	1,939 57
G. W. Hughes.....	do.....do.....	7,000 00	6,487 72
W. B. Guion.....	do.....do.....	2,900 00	4,746 71
J. B. Petitval.....	do.....do.....	1,700 00	446 80
H. Stansbury.....	do.....do.....	6,800 00	7,214 92
Major J. D. Graham.....	Road to be cut out from the northern boundary of the Territory of Florida, by Marianna, to the town of Apalachicola, within said Territory, under the act of June 30, 1834.....		4,739 75
Lieut. Colonel S. H. Long.....	Survey of a ledge near Owl's Head harbor, per act of July 4, 1836.....		400 00
Do.....	Survey of the passage into Cobscook bay, per act of July 4, 1836.....		300 00
Major H. Bache.....	Survey of Crow shoal, in Delaware bay, per act of July 4, 1836.....		584 37
Do.....	Rebuilding light-house on the Brandywine shoal, per act of March 3, 1837.....		351 17
Moyamensing Bank.....	do.....do.....	7,000 00	338 00
Lieut. Colonel James Kearney.....	Survey from the southern debouche of the Dismal Swamp canal to Winyaw bay, South Carolina, per act of March 3, 1837.....	5,142 00	5,078 36
G. W. Hughes.....	Survey of the headwaters of Chesapeake bay, per act of July 4, 1836.....		485 56
H. Stansbury.....	Survey of James river, State of Virginia, per act of July 4, 1836.....		512 10
W. B. Guion.....	Survey of St. Francis, Black, and White rivers, per act of July 4, 1836.....	2,000 00	1,193 45
Captain A. Canfield.....	Surveys of a military character and for the defences of the Atlantic and Western frontiers, per act of July 4, 1836.....	1,500 00	1,556 07
Captain W. H. Chase.....	do.....do.....do.....	1,332 70	1,332 70
Lieut. J. M. Berrien.....	Survey of the mouth of Milwaukee river, per act of July 4, 1836.....		36 11
T. B. W. Stockton.....	The construction of a harbor at Michigan City, Indiana, per act of July 4, 1836.....	45,031 00	46,889 11
Do.....	The construction of a breakwater at the river St. Joseph's, Michigan, per act of July 4, 1836.....	26,709 00	33,014 40

Statement C presents a view of the general result of the operations at the several arsenals and armories of the United States, in the manufacture, repair, and purchase of the principal articles of ordnance, ordnance stores, and building materials. It exhibits the result of these operations to the extent to which they have been completed during the year between October 1, 1836, and September 30, 1837, indicating, among other articles of ordnance and ordnance stores which have been fabricated or procured, the following, viz:

Of artillery, 55 42-pounder, 31 32-pounder, 193 24-pounder, and 37 6-pounder iron cannon; 2 12-pounder, and 13 6-pounder brass cannon; 13 12-pounder brass howitzers; 1 42-pounder, 168 32-pounder, and 91 24-pounder barbette carriages; 30 42-pounder, 104 32-pounder, and 16 24-pounder casemate carriages; 1 42-pounder, 27 32-pounder, and 3 24-pounder casemate chasses; 34 32-pounder and 81 24-pounder barbette chasses; 149 field-carriages, 56 caissons, 12 travelling forges, 10 mortar beds, and 78 elevating machines.

Of small arms manufactured and procured, viz: 22,931 muskets complete, and 1,018 carbines made at the national armories; and at private factories, 5,450 muskets complete, 400 common and 489 Hall's rifles, 2,500 carbines, 184 double-barrel guns, 1,000 artillery swords, and 4,272 cavalry sabres.

Of accoutrements for small arms, 6,648 sets for infantry, 4,088 for cavalry, 25,523 infantry and cavalry cartridge-boxes, 17,241 cartridge-box belts, 18,028 bayonet scabbards, 25,592 bayonet belts, 1,906 rifle flasks and belts, 6,017 rifle pouches and belts, 8,425 sword and sabre belts, and 10,300 waist belts.

Statement D shows the extent of the operations during the year, between the 1st of October, 1836, and the 30th of September, 1837, which have occurred in procuring ordnance and ordnance stores, under the act of 1808, for arming and equipping the militia of the States and Territories. This statement presents also a view of the expenditures under the act, which have resulted during the same period, in procuring the stores, amounting, for all objects, to \$179,102 38. It exhibits, among other articles of ordnance stores procured, 37 6-pounder iron cannon, 13 12-pounder, 15 9-pounder, and 12 6-pounder field and 8 12-pounder howitzer carriages, with their equipments, &c., complete; 22 caissons, 2 travelling forges, 5,750 muskets, 400 rifles, 200 carbines, 350 pistols, 1,000 artillery swords, and 2,670 cavalry sabres.

Statement E exhibits the amount of ordnance and ordnance stores which have been apportioned, for the year 1836, to the several States and Territories, under the act of 1808 for arming and equipping the militia: this apportionment being founded on the recent returns of the strength of the militia, as made by the adjutant generals of the militia of the several States to the adjutant general of the army.

Statement F shows the several articles of ordnance and stores which have been distributed to the militia of the States and Territories during the year, between the 1st of October, 1836, and the 30th of September, 1837.

Statement G presents a view of the munitions of war issued by this department during the year, between the 1st of October, 1836, and the 30th of September, 1837, to the army. In this it will appear that 4 12-pounder iron, 17 6-pounder iron, and 6 6-pounder brass cannon, and 10 12-pounder brass howitzers, with their carriages and equipments complete, 5 caissons, 3,137 muskets, 2,860 rifles, 1,296 carbines, 2,518 pistols, 1,645 cavalry sabres, 25 swords, 3,901 sets of infantry, 2,400 sets of rifle, and 946 sets of cavalry accoutrements, are among the principal articles issued.

The agent of the United States lead mines at Galena reports that no changes have taken place in relation to the condition of the agency during the year ending on the 30th of September, 1837. No returns of lead have been made during that period, and the suits instituted against the delinquents have not been determined.

It will be seen by a reference to the last annual report from this office that the alleged cause for refusing to pay the stipulated rents was, that the act of the 3d of March, 1807, contained no authority for the collection of rent-lead under a *license* for *smelting* lead ore, and that the law authorizing the *leasing* of public lands within the limits of a State was unconstitutional. The validity of these objections will be tested by the suit now pending.

A full report on the present condition of the agency, and of the mineral lands generally, is expected daily, from an officer of this department who was recently authorized to proceed to that section of the country for that purpose. On the receipt of his report, it will be transmitted to you, with such further remarks as the information he may communicate may seem to require.

In the event of a sale of the public lands herein referred to, under the authority given to the President of the United States by existing laws, or by any that may be passed hereafter, it does not appear expedient that any reservation should be made of those designated as the lead region, whether containing lead, iron, or copper ore, or any other mineral or metal whatsoever, with a view to their being wrought for the benefit of the United States.

The sale of these lands has been recommended by this department in every annual communication for the last six years, and is again recommended as a necessary measure to prevent the conflicts of public and private interests, and advance the prosperity of the country in that quarter.

It is also recommended, as a general measure, that all the right, title, and interest which the United States may possess in and to all other lands, containing mines of any description whatsoever, appertaining to and being under control of the Department of War, unless required for purposes unconnected with the Ordnance department, may likewise be sold without reservation, and that the authority of Congress be obtained for that purpose.

In addition to the information exhibited in these various statements, it may be communicated, generally, in regard to the operations of this department, that they have been conducted at the several arsenals, armories, and in the contract service, with the usual fidelity and ability which characterize the agents of this department; and that they have been only limited and impeded by the difficulty so often alluded to, on the occasions of former reports for years past, and specially referred to in the last annual report, (dated the 12th of November, 1836,) viz: the want of additional officers; but a special report having been made as you have directed, presenting at large the views of this office in regard to an adequate military organization for the service of this department, a further allusion to it does not occur to me as necessary now.

I have the honor to be, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. BOMFORD, *Colonel of Ordnance.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

A.—Statement of the money expended through the Ordnance department in the year 1836.

Officers' names.	Stations.	AMOUNT OF SUMS REMITTED, INCLUDING THE BALANCES IN THE HANDS OF AGENTS JANUARY 1, 1836.									
		Appropriations.									
		National armories.	Current expenses of the ordnance service.	Arsenals.	Armament of fortifications.	Arming and equipping the militia.	Stating roofs of workshops.	For building a pay office.	For the new arsenal.	National armories at Springfield, Mass.	Constructing water-wheels and machinery.
Charles Howard.....	Armory, Springfield, Massachusetts.....	\$173,119 60				\$4,431 19	\$202 29	\$155 89	\$1,780 57	\$25,500 00	
Daniel Bedinger.....	Armory, Harper's Ferry, Virginia.....	178,811 74					186 58				\$317 73
Captain J. W. Ripley.....	Arsenal, Augusta, Maine.....		\$656 42	\$15,850 00	\$5,000 00						
Major H. K. Craig.....	Arsenal, Watertown, Massachusetts.....		2,347 63	2,111 82	16,663 08	18,156 52					
Captain B. Huger.....	Arsenal, Fort Monroe, Virginia.....		3,333 00	8,609 69	30,624 91						
Captain N. Lowd.....	Arsenal, Vergennes, Vermont.....		128 52								
S. Lansing, jr.....	Arsenal, West Troy, New York.....		21,157 95	31,360 00	68,260 00	43,853 38					
Captain S. Perkins and Captain H. S. Mallory.....	Arsenal, Rome, New York.....		2,475 00								
Captain J. R. Butler.....	Arsenal, Pittsburg, Pennsylvania.....		16,043 04	16,221 54	574 99	14,085 65					
Captain A. Mordecai.....	Arsenal, Frankford, Pennsylvania.....		4,289 45	10,021 18	50 00	588 90					
Captain C. Graham and Lieutenant W. Maynadier.....	Arsenal, Pikesville, Maryland.....		1,067 00	995 00	463 26						
Marcus C. Buck.....	Arsenal, Washington city.....		9,297 26	16,079 85	38,000 00	1,643 83					
Moses McArthur.....	Arsenal, near Richmond, Virginia.....		123 73								
Major N. Baden and Thomas M. Chandler.....	Arsenal, Augusta, Georgia.....		1,182 59	970 81							
Captain E. Harding.....	Arsenal, Mount Vernon, Alabama.....		2,264 58	26,000 00	1,424 93						
Lieutenant J. Williamson.....	Arsenal, Apalachicola, Florida.....			43,445 53							
Captain W. S. Newton.....	Arsenal, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.....		3,623 96	18,588 18	894 46	2,530 90					
Captain J. Symington.....	Arsenal, St. Louis, Missouri.....		7,832 81	18,380 00		350 00					
Captain S. H. Webb.....	Arsenal, Detroit, Michigan.....		764 78	16,413 70							
Captain J. A. J. Bradford and L. L. Van Kleeck.....	Depot, city of New York.....		3,830 30	11,438 94		2,541 83					
W. L. Poole.....	Depot, Charleston, South Carolina.....		833 64			117 35					
Captain J. A. d'Lagnel.....	Depot, Gray's Ferry, Florida.....										
Captain J. A. J. Bradford.....	Arsenal, Fayetteville, North Carolina.....										
Major T. C. Legate and J. H. Weber.....	Lead mines, Galena, Illinois.....		1,951 52								
Major R. B. Lee.....	Arsenal, Little Rock, Arkansas.....										
Lieutenant J. F. Kennedy.....	Depot, St. Augustine, Florida.....										
Sundry persons for cannon, gun-carriages, cannon balls, and small arms.....					128,731 01	123,577 14					
Settlements on audited accounts.....			1,719 38	784 42							
Total.....		351,931 34	84,920 56	247,270 66	290,686 64	211,876 69	368 87	155 89	1,780 57	25,500 00	317 73

A.—Statement of the money expended through the Ordnance department in the year 1836—Continued.

		AMOUNT OF SUMS REMITTED, INCLUDING THE BALANCES IN THE HANDS OF AGENTS JANUARY 1, 1836.										
		Appropriations.										
Officers' names.	Stations.	Repairing of the walls of four workshops.	Repair and extension of the public dam.	Erecting storehouses.	Completion of machinery.	Erecting new dwelling-houses.	National armory at Harper's Ferry.	Purchase, &c., of light field artillery.	Suppression of Indian hostilities.	Supplying the arsenals with ordnance stores.	Accountments for the army.	The purchase of accoutrements.
Charles Howard	Armory, Springfield, Massachusetts				\$7,693 58							
Daniel Bedinger	Armory, Harper's Ferry, Virginia	\$850 05	\$793 66	\$4,575 02	8,948 32	\$922 59	\$25,838 00					
Captain J. W. Ripley	Arsenal, Augusta, Maine											
Major H. K. Craig	Arsenal, Watertown, Massachusetts									\$20,958 00		\$24,250 00
Captain B. Huger	Arsenal, Fort Monroe, Virginia											
Captain N. Lowd	Arsenal, Vergennes, Vermont											
S. Lansing, Jr.	Arsenal, West Troy, New York							\$24,680 00				
Captain S. Perkins and Captain H. S. Mallory	Arsenal, Rome, New York											
Captain J. R. Butler	Arsenal, Pittsburg, Pennsylvania							11,500 00	\$38,250 00		\$35,000 00	
Captain A. Mordecai	Arsenal, Frankford, Pennsylvania											
Captain C. Graham and Lieutenant W. Maynadier	Arsenal, Pikesville, Maryland											
Marcus C. Buck	Arsenal, Washington city							16,000 00				
Moses McArthur	Arsenal, near Richmond, Virginia											
Major N. Baden and Thomas M. Chandler	Arsenal, Augusta, Georgia								1,933 28			
Captain E. Harding	Arsenal, Mount Vernon, Alabama								23,000 00			
Lieutenant J. Williamson	Arsenal, Apalachicola, Florida											
Captain W. S. Newton	Arsenal, Baton Rouge, Louisiana											
Captain J. Symington	Arsenal, St. Louis, Missouri								1,800 00			
Captain S. H. Webb	Arsenal, Detroit, Michigan											
Captain J. A. J. Bradford and L. L. Van Kleeck	Depot, city of New York								10,950 00	27,175 00		
W. L. Poole	Depot, Charleston, South Carolina								151 60			
Captain J. A. d'Lagnel	Depot, Garey's Ferry, Florida								2,000 00			
Captain J. A. J. Bradford	Arsenal, Fayetteville, North Carolina											
Major T. C. Legate and J. H. Weber	Lead mines, Galena, Illinois											
Major R. B. Lee	Arsenal, Little Rock, Arkansas											
Lieutenant J. F. Kennedy	Depot, St. Augustine, Florida								878 00			
Sundry persons for cannon, gun-carriages, cannon balls, and small arms												
Settlements on audited accounts												
Total		650 05	793 66	4,575 02	16,641 90	922 59	25,838 00	52,180 00	78,962 88	48,133 00	35,000 00	14,250 00

A.—Statement of the money expended through the Ordnance department in the year 1836—Continued.

Officers' names.	Stations.	AMOUNT OF SUMS REMITTED, INCLUDING THE BALANCES IN THE HANDS OF AGENTS JANUARY 1, 1836.							Total.	Amount expended and accounted for.	Balances remaining in the hands of disbursing officers, Dec. 31, 1836.
		Appropriations.									
		Constructing furnaces for heating cannon balls.	Purchase of three acres of land, &c., at Mt. Vernon.	Purchase of gunpowder.	Purchase of sites and construction of arsenals in Ark-ness, Missouri, and Tennessee.	Purchase of a site and construction of an arsenal at Fayetteville, N. C.	Purchase of cannon balls.	Arsenal at St. Louis.			
Charles Howard	Armory, Springfield, Massachusetts								\$212,883 13	\$190,613 91	\$22,269 21
Daniel Bedinger	Armory, Harper's Ferry, Virginia								221,103 68	198,657 96	22,445 72
Captain J. W. Ripley	Arsenal, Augusta, Maine								21,506 42	13,222 19	8,284 23
Major H. K. Craig	Arsenal, Watertown, Massachusetts								74,487 05	61,049 88	13,437 17
Captain B. Huger	Arsenal, Fort Monroe, Virginia	\$2,800 00							45,367 60	39,978 88	5,388 72
Captain N. Lowd	Arsenal, Vergennes, Vermont								128 52	103 02	25 50
S. Lansing, Jr.	Arsenal, West Troy, New York								189,311 33	174,220 27	15,091 06
Captain S. Perkins and Captain H. S. Mallory	Arsenal, Rome, New York								2,475 00	2,467 77	7 23
Captain J. R. Butler	Arsenal, Pittsburg, Pennsylvania								131,675 22	100,418 97	31,256 25
Captain A. Mordecai	Arsenal, Frankford, Pennsylvania			\$62,000 00					76,949 53	74,315 53	2,634 00
Captain C. Graham and Lieutenant W. Maynadler	Arsenal, Pikesville, Maryland								2,525 26	2,002 14	523 12
Marcus C. Buck	Arsenal, Washington city								81,020 94	62,267 39	18,753 55
Moses McArthur	Arsenal, near Richmond, Virginia								122 73	118 00	4 73
Major N. Baden and Thomas M. Chandler	Arsenal, Augusta, Georgia								4,026 68	4,005 98	20 70
Captain E. Harding	Arsenal, Mount Vernon, Alabama		\$1,800 50						64,490 01	30,350 68	34,139 33
Lieutenant J. Williamson	Arsenal, Apalachicola, Florida								43,445 53	38,562 81	4,882 72
Captain W. S. Newton	Arsenal, Baton Rouge, Louisiana								25,637 50	2,440 21	23,197 29
Captain J. Symington	Arsenal, St. Louis, Missouri				\$5,000 00			\$3,071 62	36,434 43	24,622 28	11,792 15
Captain S. H. Webb	Arsenal, Detroit, Michigan								17,178 48	17,178 48	
Captain J. A. J. Bradford and L. L. Van Kleeck	Depot, city of New York								55,936 07	39,693 22	16,042 85
W. L. Poole	Depot, Charleston, South Carolina								1,101 59	855 53	246 06
Captain J. A. d'Lagnel	Depot, Gary's Ferry, Florida								2,000 00	2,000 00	
Captain J. A. J. Bradford	Arsenal, Fayetteville, North Carolina					\$7,590 00			7,590 00	4,202 95	3,387 05
Major T. C. Legate and J. H. Weber	Lead mines, Galena, Illinois								1,951 52	1,951 52	
Major R. B. Lee	Arsenal, Little Rock, Arkansas				5,000 00				5,000 00		5,000 00
Lieutenant J. F. Kennedy	Depot, St. Augustine, Florida								878 00	874 02	3 98
Sundry persons for cannon, gun-carriages, cannon balls, and small arms								\$13,621 94	265,930 09	265,930 09	
Settlements on audited accounts									2,503 80	2,503 80	
Total		2,800 00	1,800 50	62,000 00	10,000 00	7,590 00	13,621 94	3,071 62	1,593,720 10	1,354,827 48	238,892 62

B.

Statement of the money expended through the Ordnance department during the first, second, and third quarters of 1837.

Rations.	Amounts transmitted in the first, second, and third quarters of 1837, and balances remaining in officers' hands at the close of the year 1836.	Amount of accounts rendered in the first, second, and third quarters of the year 1837.	Balances remaining in officers' hands on the 1st of October, 1837.
Armory, Springfield, Massachusetts.....	\$190, 212 16	\$170, 054 85	\$20, 157 31
Armory, Harper's Ferry, Virginia.....	238, 411 84	199, 951 97	38, 459 87
Arsenal, Augusta, Maine.....	62, 267 14	18, 000 33	44, 266 81
Arsenal, Watertown, Massachusetts.....	112, 218 67	96, 064 42	16, 154 25
Arsenal, Fort Monroe, Virginia.....	54, 090 72	46, 784 52	7, 306 20
Arsenal, Vergennes, Vermont.....	86 50	86 50
Arsenal, West Troy, New York.....	200, 712 06	200, 108 96	603 10
Arsenal, Rome, New York.....	1, 296 23	1, 236 65	59 58
Arsenal, Pittsburg, Pennsylvania.....	100, 847 25	89, 280 91	11, 566 34
Arsenal, Franford, Pennsylvania.....	124, 654 00	124, 204 36	449 64
Arsenal, Pikesville, Maryland.....	4, 831 00	3, 731 00	1, 100 00
Arsenal, Washington city.....	68, 777 56	62, 532 32	6, 245 24
Arsenal near Richmond, Virginia.....	91 73	32 61	59 12
Arsenal, Augusta, Georgia.....	5, 871 32	5, 070 38	800 94
Arsenal, Mount Vernon, Alabama.....	46, 139 33	42, 512 49	3, 626 84
Arsenal, Apalachicola, Florida.....	43, 882 72	34, 485 60	8, 897 12
Arsenal, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.....	23, 197 29	9, 143 75	14, 053 54
Arsenals, St. Louis, Liberty, Missouri, and Memphis, Tennessee.....	58, 783 09	44, 361 58	14, 421 51
Arsenal, Detroit, Michigan.....	17, 052 13	17, 052 13
Arsenal, Fayetteville, North Carolina.....	30, 387 05	26, 705 29	3, 681 76
Arsenal, Little Rock, Arkansas.....	7, 120 00	1, 516 05	5, 603 95
Depot, city of New York.....	24, 096 96	11, 490 12	12, 606 84
Depot, Charleston, South Carolina.....	3, 260 62	3, 020 24	240 38
Depot, Garey's Ferry, Florida.....	10, 500 00	9, 908 53	591 47
Depot, St. Augustine.....	831 98	548 65	283 33
Lead mines, Galena, Illinois.....	1, 218 00	1, 218 00
Sundry persons for cannon, gun-carriages, cannon balls, and small arms.....	240, 733 62	240, 733 62
Settlements on audited accounts.....	228 86	228 86
Total.....	1, 671, 299 83	1, 460, 064 69	211, 235 14

GEORGE BOMFORD, Colonel of Ordnance.

ORDNANCE OFFICE, Washington, November 20, 1837.

C.

Statement of work done and articles fabricated, procured, and repaired at the national and private armories and ordnance stations from the 1st of October, 1836, to the 30th of September, 1837, inclusive.

MADE AND PROCURED.

Class 1.		Class 2.	
12-pounder brass cannon.....	2	42-pounder carriages, barbette.....	1
6-pounder brass cannon.....	13	32-pounder carriages, barbette.....	10
12-pounder brass howitzer.....	1	24-pounder carriages, barbette.....	17
12-pounder brass howitzer, mountain....	12	32-pounder carriages, casemate.....	4
42-pounder iron cannon.....	55	24-pounder carriages, casemate.....	2
32-pounder iron cannon.....	31	32-pounder carriages, upper, barbette....	158
24-pounder iron cannon.....	193	24-pounder carriages, upper, barbette....	74
6-pounder iron cannon.....	37	42-pounder chasses, casemate.....	1
24-pounder iron howitzer.....	1	32-pounder chasses, casemate.....	27
12-pounder iron howitzer.....	1	24-pounder chasses, casemate.....	3

Statement of work done at the national and private armories, &c.—Continued.*

32-pounder chasses, barbette.....	34		
24-pounder chasses, barbette.....	81		
42-pounder carriages, iron, casemate, upper.....	26		
42-pounder carriages, iron, casemate, upper.....	72		
24-pounder carriages, iron, casemate, upper.....	14		
Iron chasses apparatus, sets complete...	112		
12-pounder stock trail carriages.....	24		
9-pounder stock trail carriages.....	26		
6-pounder stock trail carriages.....	42		
24-pounder stock trail howitzer carriages..	40		
12-pounder mountain howitzer carriages..	17		
10-inch mortar beds.....	10		
Caissons, assorted.....	56		
Elevating machines.....	78		
Travelling forges.....	12		
<i>Class 3.</i>			
Rammers and sponges, assorted.....	303		
Rammers and staves, assorted.....	209		
Sponges and staves, assorted.....	197		
Ladles and worms, assorted.....	57		
Ladles and staves, assorted.....	138		
Worms and staves, assorted.....	122		
Lead aprons.....	158		
Tarpaulings.....	104		
Bricoles.....	113		
Drag ropes.....	12		
Tompions.....	108		
Priming wires.....	39		
Sponges.....	3, 648		
Sponge covers.....	772		
Sponge buckets.....	496		
Tar buckets.....	202		
Water buckets.....	153		
Linstocks.....	344		
Portfire stocks.....	342		
Portfire cases.....	825		
Portfire clippers.....	195		
Prolonges.....	192		
Tube pouches.....	276		
Tube boxes.....	165		
Gunners' gimlets.....	21		
Gunners' haversacks.....	509		
Artillery harness, sets for four horses...	149		
Artillery saddles.....	19		
Traversing handspikes.....	400		
Trail handspikes.....	122		
Budge barrels.....	719		
Cannon locks, percussion.....	5		
Thumbstalls.....	59		
Thermometers.....	6		
Verifying instruments, set.....	1		
Spirit levels.....	3		
Ladles for hot shot.....	40		
Tongs for hot shot, pairs.....	10		
Dark lanterns.....	6		
Implement straps, sets.....	472		
<i>Class 4.</i>			
24-pounder grape shot.....	52		
12-pounder grape shot.....	333		
6-pounder grape shot.....	313		
12-pounder canister shot.....	34		
6-pounder canister shot.....	100		
6-pounder loose canister shot, pounds...	513		
12-pounder shells, strapped.....	33		
Iron stands for grape shot.....	731		
42-pounder cannon balls.....	4, 029		
32-pounder cannon balls.....	36, 460		
24-pounder cannon balls.....	3, 621		
10-inch shells.....	1, 911		
<i>Class 5.</i>			
6-pounder grape shot, fixed.....	1, 032		
12-pounder howitzer ammunition, fixed..	273		
24-pounder howitzer canisters, filled....	441		
12-pounder strapped shot, fixed.....	112		
6-pounder strapped shot, fixed.....	685		
12-pounder canister shot, fixed.....	280		
6-pounder canister shot, fixed.....	1, 700		
<i>Class 6.</i>			
Muskets, national armory, complete....	22, 931		
Muskets, contract, complete.....	5, 450		
Hall's rifles, complete.....	489		
Hall's carbines, complete.....	2, 500		
Double-barrel guns, complete.....	184		
Prussian model guns, complete.....	1		
Common rifles, complete.....	400		
Pistols, complete.....	3, 000		
Artillery swords.....	1, 000		
Dragoon sabres.....	4, 272		
Cane-cutters.....	402		
Screw-drivers.....	25, 745		
Wipers.....	21, 254		
Ball-screws.....	545		
Spring vices.....	3, 377		
Bullet moulds.....	485		
<i>Class 7.</i>			
Infantry accoutrements, sets complete...	6, 648		
Dragoon accoutrements, sets complete...	4, 088		
Cartridge-boxes, infantry.....	20, 811		
Cartridge-boxes, dragoon.....	4, 712		
Cartridge-box belts, buff.....	15, 253		
Cartridge-box belts, black.....	1, 988		
Bayonet scabbards.....	13, 028		
Bayonet belts, buff.....	20, 798		
Bayonet belts, black.....	4, 794		
Sabre belts, buff.....	2, 000		
Sabre belts, webbing.....	300		
Artillery sword belts, buff.....	6, 225		
Rifle flasks and belts.....	1, 906		
Rifle pouches and belts.....	6, 017		
Rifle pouches.....	6, 524		
Rifle flasks.....	1, 316		
Rifle waist belts.....	10, 300		
Holsters, pairs.....	4, 303		
Housings.....	5, 423		
Gun slings.....	26, 133		
Brushes and picks.....	20, 941		
Buckets and straps, carbine.....	252		
Swivels, carbine.....	748		
Flints, assorted.....	10, 000		
Flint caps.....	65, 450		
<i>Class 8.</i>			
Powder, cannon, pounds.....	748, 700		
Powder, musket, pounds.....	251		
Powder, rifle, pounds.....	69, 600		
Powder, mealed, cartridges.....	3, 650		
42-pounder flannel cartridges.....	21		
32-pounder flannel cartridges.....	21		
24-pounder flannel cartridges.....	113		
12-pounder flannel cartridges.....	318		
9-pounder flannel cartridges.....	210		
6-pounder flannel cartridges.....	3, 162		
24-pounder howitzer flannel cartridges..	529		
Cartridge bags, flannel, assorted.....	19, 442		
Musket-ball and buck-shot cartridges....	868, 131		
Pistol-ball cartridges.....	138, 025		
Carbine cartridges.....	414, 280		
Rifle cartridges.....	157, 473		
Musket blank cartridges.....	106, 930		

Statement of work done at the national and private armories, &c.—Continued.

Grates.....	9
Kettles, iron.....	8
Pots.....	8
Chalk, pounds.....	356
Nave boxes, brass.....	75
Nave boxes, iron.....	42
Emery, pounds.....	1, 375
Glue, pounds.....	341
Bristles, pounds.....	350
Sand paper, quires.....	1, 372
Ox horns, number.....	100
Jack chains.....	66

Laboratory stores.

Acid, muriatic, pounds.....	1
Acid, nitric, pounds.....	320
Acid, sulphuric, pounds.....	1, 527
Alcohol, gallons.....	168
Whiskey, gallons.....	12
Alum, pounds.....	9
Antimony, pounds.....	63
Arsenic, pounds.....	2
Beeswax, pounds.....	30
Borax, pounds.....	334
Candles, pounds.....	1, 151
Copperas, pounds.....	81
Flour, pounds.....	465
Gum arabic, pounds.....	9
Gum camphor, pounds.....	5
Gum copal, pounds.....	37
Gum shellac, pounds.....	23
Rosin, pounds.....	533
Sal ammoniac, pounds.....	55
Soap, pounds.....	421
Spelter, pounds.....	1, 405
Spirits of nitre, pounds.....	7
Tallow, pounds.....	1, 272
Vitriol, oil of, pounds.....	1, 717
Vitriol, blue, pounds.....	7
Woollen rags, pounds.....	2, 211
Zinc, pounds.....	4, 909

Lumber, gun-carriage timber, building materials, &c.

Barbette carriage timber, sets.....	36
Casemate carriage timber, sets.....	31
Sea-coast mortar bed timber, sets.....	17
Sea-coast carriage timber, feet.....	32, 206
Carriage timber, assorted, feet.....	261, 271
Oak timber, square, board measure, feet.....	172, 521
Oak logs, number.....	6
Pine logs, number.....	82
Hickory logs, number.....	155
Locust timber, board measure, feet.....	3, 186
Pine timber, board measure, feet.....	140, 790
Pine timber, cubic feet.....	4, 181
Cypress timber, cubic feet.....	501
Plank, assorted, feet.....	787, 879
Boards, assorted, feet.....	900, 935
Scantling, feet.....	220, 804
Joist, feet.....	121, 825
Shingles, feet.....	487, 764
Laths, number.....	171, 000
Mahogany, feet.....	264
Lignum vitæ, pounds.....	472
Scaffolding poles, number.....	111
Hoop poles, number.....	3, 463
Fence posts, number.....	572
Musket stocks, number.....	33, 825
Rifle and carbine stocks, number.....	3, 377
Naves, number.....	22
Spokes, number.....	1, 247
Hammer handles, number.....	1, 300
Brick, number.....	3, 551, 375
Brick, fire, number.....	3, 648
Stone, building, perches.....	2, 010
Stone, cut and hewn, feet.....	31, 995

Slate, squares.....	421
Slate, number.....	8, 350
Lime, bushels.....	15, 993
Cement, bushels.....	1, 901
Sand, bushels.....	21, 800
Hair, bushels.....	202
Plaster of Paris, pounds.....	4, 960

Leather, &c.

Leather, assorted, pounds.....	19, 918
Leather, assorted, sides.....	5, 290
Leather, buff, hides.....	2, 249
Leather, buff, pounds.....	1, 066
Bear skins.....	248
Calf skins.....	194
Sheep skins.....	120
Morocco skins.....	428
Goat skins.....	66
Old leather, bushels.....	1, 227

Paints, oil, glass, &c.

Lead, black, pounds.....	20
Lead, red, pounds.....	104
Lead, white, pounds.....	20, 884
Ochre, red, pounds.....	34
Ochre, yellow, pounds.....	3, 436
Crome, yellow, pounds.....	142
Crome, green, pounds.....	127
Dragon's blood, pounds.....	2
Prussian blue, pounds.....	11
Spanish brown, pounds.....	196
Sugar of lead, pounds.....	45
Lampblack, pounds.....	471
Litharge, pounds.....	210
Putty, pounds.....	70
Terra de Sienna, pounds.....	8
Umber, pounds.....	64
Venetian red, pounds.....	23
Verdigris, pounds.....	177
Whiting, pounds.....	4, 468
Paints, mixed, pounds.....	14, 179
Oils, assorted, gallons.....	5, 540
Varnish, gallons.....	100
Lacquer, gallons.....	38
Spirits turpentine, gallons.....	260
Tar, gallons.....	248
Pitch, gallons.....	16
Pit-coal tar, pounds.....	310
Glass, feet.....	17, 175
Glass, lights.....	4, 124

Stationery.

Blank books.....	111
Blank accounts, quires.....	86
Paper, cap, quires.....	737
Paper, post and letter, quires.....	1, 417
Paper, envelope, quires.....	512
Paper, drawing, sheets.....	266
Pens, steel.....	411
Pencils.....	560
Quills.....	7, 594
Sand, writing, pounds.....	92
Sealing-wax, pounds.....	10
Wafers, pounds.....	7
Ink, black, gallons.....	16
Ink, red, gallons.....	4
Braid, pieces.....	29
Tape, pieces.....	199

Tools.

Adzes.....	9
Anvils.....	29
Augers.....	300
Awls.....	553

Statement of work done at the national and private armories, &c.—Continued.

Cannon powder, rolled, aired, &c., pounds	500	Tar buckets	13
Musket powder, rolled, aired, &c., pounds	5,000	Linstocks	39
Ammunition kegs	516	Portfire stocks	27
Packing boxes	156	Portfire cases	19
Shot and shells, cleaned, lacquered, &c. .	3,249	Portfire clippers	11
Sponge buckets	15	Files, recut	1,349

D.

Statement of the arms, accoutrements, &c., procured, and of the expenditures made, under the act for arming and equipping the militia, from October 1, 1836, to September 30, 1837.

ARMS, ETC., PROCURED.

Six-pounder iron cannon	37
Twelve-pounder field-carriages, with implements, harness, &c., complete	13
Nine-pounder field-carriages, with implements, harness, &c., complete	15
Six-pounder field-carriages, with implements, harness, &c., complete	12
Twelve-pounder howitzer carriages, with implements, harness, &c., complete	8
Caissons	22
Travelling forges	2
Muskets	5,750
Rifles	400
Carbines	200
Pistols	350
Artillery swords	1,000
Cavalry sabres	2,670
Infantry and cavalry cartridge-boxes	5,637
Bayonet and waist belts	2,420
Sword and sabre belts	400
Holsters, (pairs)	1,664
Sets cavalry accoutrements	207

EXPENDITURES, VIZ:

Amount paid for arms, &c.	\$171,673 87
Amount paid for inspection, packing-boxes, storage, and distribution to the States and Territories	7,338 51
	<u>179,012 38</u>

GEORGE BOMFORD, *Colonel of Ordnance.*

ORDNANCE OFFICE, *Washington, November 20, 1837.*

E.

Apportionment of arms to the militia for the year 1836, under the act of 1808 for arming and equipping the whole body of the militia.

States and Territories.	Date of return.	Number of militia.	Number of arms apportioned in muskets.
Maine	1836	42,468	478
New Hampshire	1836	27,473	310
Massachusetts	1836	44,911	505
Vermont	1824	25,581	287
Rhode Island	1832	1,377	15
Connecticut	1836	23,826	268
New York	1836	184,728	2,078
New Jersey	1829	39,171	442
Pennsylvania	1834	202,281	2,275
Delaware	1827	9,229	104
Maryland	1836	46,854	528
Virginia	1836	101,838	1,146

Apportionment of arms to the militia for the year 1836, &c.—Continued.

States and Territories.	Date of return.	Number of militia.	Number of arms apportioned in muskets.
North Carolina.....	1835	64, 415	724
South Carolina.....	1833	51, 112	576
Georgia.....	1834	48, 461	545
Alabama.....	1829	14, 892	167
Louisiana.....	1830	14, 808	166
Mississippi.....	1830	13, 724	154
Tennessee.....	1830	60, 982	687
Kentucky.....	1836	71, 483	805
Ohio.....	1836	146, 428	1, 647
Indiana.....	1833	53, 913	606
Illinois.....	1831	27, 336	309
Missouri.....	1835	6, 170	70
Arkansas.....	1825	2, 028	23
Michigan.....	1831	5, 476	62
Florida Territory.....	1831	827	9
Wisconsin Territory.....	None.		
District of Columbia.....	1832	1, 249	14
		1, 333, 091	15, 000

GEORGE BOMFORD, *Colonel of Ordnance.*ORDNANCE OFFICE, *Washington, November 20, 1837.*

F.

Statement of the ordnance and ordnance stores distributed to the militia, under the act of April, 1808, from the 1st of October, 1836, to the 30th September, 1837.

- 20 6-pounder iron cannon.
- 6 12-pounder field-carriages, with implements, &c., complete.
- 12 9-pounder field-carriages, with implements, &c., complete.
- 36 6-pounder field-carriages, with implements, &c., complete.
- 32 24-pounder howitzer carriages, with implements, &c., complete.
- 1 12-pounder howitzer carriage, with implements, &c., complete.
- 16 caissons, complete.
- 1,345 muskets and appendages.
- 3 rifles and appendages.
- 1,020 pistols and appendages.
- 100 artillery swords.
- 722 cavalry sabres.
- 1,936 sets infantry accoutrements.
- 320 sets rifle accoutrements.
- 412 sets cavalry accoutrements.
- 612 sabre and sword belts.
- 1,378 infantry and cavalry cartridge-boxes.
- 565 holsters, (pairs.)

The whole being equivalent in value to 7,525 muskets.

GEORGE BOMFORD, *Colonel of Ordnance.*ORDNANCE OFFICE, *Washington, November 20, 1837.*

G.

Statement of the artillery, small arms, accoutrements, and other ordnance stores issued to the troops and the Engineer department, from the 1st of October, 1836, to the 30th of September, 1837.

FIRST CLASS.				
12-pounder iron guns, with carriages complete.....	4		Slings and swivels	587
6-pounder iron guns, with carriages complete	17		Spring vices	12
6-pounder brass guns, with carriages complete.....	6		Wipers	38
12-pounder brass mountain howitzers, complete.....	10		Screw-drivers	186
			Rifle bullet moulds.....	21
			Musket flints	38, 212
			Rifle flints	20, 000
			Pistol flints.....	19, 500
SECOND CLASS.			EIGHTH CLASS.	
12-pounder mountain howitzer carriages.....	4		Cannon powder, pounds	4, 500
6-pounder truck-wheel carriages.....	8		Musket powder, pounds.....	2, 500
12-pounder caissons	1		Rifle powder, pounds	6, 500
6-pounder caissons	4		6-pounder cartridge bags.....	2, 800
Travelling forges.....	5		Musket-ball cartridges.....	95, 000
			Musket-ball and buck-shot cartridges....	81, 560
THIRD CLASS.			Musket buck-shot cartridges	40, 320
Gunners' quadrants	6		Musket blank cartridges.....	45, 000
Priming wires	4		Rifle-ball cartridges.....	30, 000
Sponges.....	22		Carbine-ball cartridges	214, 030
Portfire cases.....	12		Carbine blank cartridges.....	34, 000
Prolonge.....	1		Pistol-ball cartridges.....	105, 000
Bricoles	2		Pistol blank cartridges.....	30, 000
Portfire clipper	1		Rifle bullets, pounds.....	500
Artillery harness, set.....	1		Buck shot, pounds	500
Tarpaulings	9		Tubes, filled	3, 100
Fusee extractor.....	1		Portfires	700
Shell hooks, pairs.....	4		Slowmatch, pounds	230
Fusee implements, sets.....	4		Cartridge paper, pounds.....	560
Shot ladles.....	6		Fusees, filled.....	400
Budge barrels	4		Percussion caps.....	171, 210
			Refined nitre, pounds.....	300
FOURTH CLASS.			Priming boxes	1, 050
24-pounder cannon balls.....	100		Rockets	350
12-pounder cannon balls.....	100		MISCELLANEOUS.	
6-pounder cannon balls.....	300		Belt plates.....	33
24-pounder shells.....	44		Twine, pounds	40
			Flannel, yards	300
FIFTH CLASS.			Cartridge thread, pounds.....	20
6-pounder strapped shot, fixed.....	1, 012		Cotton thread, pounds.....	5
6-pounder grape shot, fixed.....	100		Rope, pounds.....	100
6-pounder canister shot, fixed.....	1, 247		Junk, pounds.....	1, 000
6-pounder spherical case shot, fixed.....	250		Sling cart	1
12-pounder shells, fixed	166		Gin-fall	1
24-pounder grape shot, fixed	100		Gin handspikes.....	2
SIXTH CLASS.			Beam, scales, and weights.....	1
Muskets, complete	3, 137		Bar lead, pounds.....	2, 500
Hall's rifles.....	860		Linseed oil, gallons.....	5½
Common rifles.....	2, 000		Lampblack, pounds	1
Carbines.....	1, 296		White lead, pounds	48
Pistols	2, 518		Litharge, pound.....	1
Sabres.....	1, 645		Spirits turpentine, gallons	3½
Swords	25		Lacquer, gallons.....	8
Cane-cutters	400		Neat's foot oil, gallons.....	6
SEVENTH CLASS.			Prussian blue, pound.....	½
Infantry accoutrements, sets.....	3, 901		Browning, gallons	2
Rifle accoutrements, sets.....	2, 400		Musket and rifle charges.....	2
Cavalry accoutrements, sets.....	946		Wad former.....	1
Infantry cartridge-boxes.....	64		Copper driver.....	1
Cartridge-box belts	68		Dredging boxes.....	3
Bayonet belts	117		Copper pans.....	6
Bayonet scabbards	410		Powder measures.....	3
Brushes and picks.....	293		Funnels.....	2
Gun slings	90		Copper adze.....	1
Carbine cartridge-boxes	1, 775		Laboratory knives.....	24
Holsters, pairs	354		Rosin, pounds.....	50
Sabre belts.....	916		Antimony, pounds.....	30
Sword belts.....	25		Refined whiskey, gallons	10
Throggs	50		Artificers' tools, set.....	1
			Armorsers' tools, set.....	1
			Smiths' tools, set.....	2
			Laboratory tools, sets.....	1

GEORGE BOMFORD, Colonel of Ordnance.

ORDNANCE OFFICE, *Washington, October 27, 1837.*

SIR: Agreeably to your orders, I have the honor to present herewith a project of a bill exhibiting the views of this department as to the increase of the number of officers in the Ordnance department rendered necessary by its present extended operations.

Before proceeding to examine the features of this project, it is deemed proper to state, for your satisfaction, that it is not a proposition of recent origin; but, on the contrary, as a measure of importance in the right organization of this department, it has been agitated many years past, having received the sanction of the War Department during that time, and that of the late President of the United States in a special message to the Senate of the 3d of June, 1836. It is nearly the same in substance as that of the Senate bill No. 5 of the second session of the 24th Congress, which passed the Senate, and, with many other bills, failed in the House of Representatives, as was generally understood, for want of time. A project for an increase, in most respects similar in its provisions, was transmitted to the chairman of the Military Committee of the Senate in a communication from the Department of War of the 11th May, 1836, with the recommendation of that department; and an increase of this corps was strongly recommended, in general terms, in the annual report of the Secretary of War of the 3d December, 1836, such increase being also urged in the annual message of the President of the United States of the 5th December, 1836. It is evident, therefore, that the late administration was strongly impressed with the necessity of additional officers for the service of this department.

But in order to show the grounds for the favorable opinion herein referred to, it may be well to take a general view of the changes in its organization since the war of 1812; exhibiting, at the same time, as briefly and as little in detail as is consistent with a proper understanding of the subject, its gradual enlargement since that period, as shown in the increase of its annual expenditures, its number of posts, its number of operatives annually employed, and the whole amount of ordnance and ordnance stores in the land service subject to its constant supervision, with a view to preservation and repair, issue and reception, and quarter-yearly accountability.

By the act of the 14th May, 1812, the Ordnance department consisted of fourteen officers at a time when there were seven posts. But it was found necessary, in consequence of its insufficiency to meet the exigencies of the service, to increase this number to nineteen officers, which was effected by the act of the 2d August, 1813. This force continued in being until the year 1815, during which interval such great inconveniences were experienced from that diminutive organization, (when, too, there were only eight posts,) that the department was enlarged to the number of forty-four officers by the operation of the act of 8th February, 1815.

To show the important view in which it was considered at that day, it is to be remarked that, in the general reduction of the army which took place within one month after the passage of this act, all the other corps of the army were reduced, save only that of the engineers, which was retained on the war establishment. The enlargement, therefore, of the ordnance to more than double its number of officers, and the reduction of all other corps excepting the engineers, surely presents strong evidence of its importance at that period; yet, at that time, its extent was at least two-thirds less than at present. But the attention of the government happened to be drawn to it then from the advantages of its operations which had been developed during the struggles of the then recent war. This organization continued during an interval of six years, until 1821, when the number of posts had increased from eight to fourteen, and the average number of operatives employed in the department had increased from about three hundred to five hundred.

By the fourth section of the act of the 2d March, 1821, to reduce and fix the military peace establishment of the United States, the ordnance was merged in the artillery, and all its duties were thenceforth to be performed by details of officers from that corps. This very defective organization continued until 1832, a period of eleven years, during which time it exercised a disastrous influence upon the concerns of the department. This was more especially felt during that interval, as it was then undergoing a rapid enlargement in all its branches, from the gradual extension of the annual expenditures, which had increased during that period from \$543,883 14 to \$869,820 36; from the number of operatives annually employed, which had increased from five hundred to nine hundred and forty-nine; from the number of posts, which had increased from fourteen to nineteen; and from the great accumulation of ordnance and ordnance stores at the arsenals and fortifications—the necessary consequence of the expenditure of these large sums in the department.

These inconveniences, which were incessantly complained of during that period, arose principally from two causes, operating upon the department, then in a state of expansion by the effects of the policy of the government. The first of these was the small number of officers. These being suddenly reduced from forty-four to an average number of little more than one-half, during a period when the number of operatives annually employed, and the amount of expenditures, had nearly doubled; when the number of posts had increased nearly one-half; and when all the other duties were proportionally increased. Instead, therefore, of an increase of the military organization of this department proportioned to this gradual extension, there was a sudden reduction of one-half of its officers, accompanied by the still greater inconvenience of,

Secondly, a want of permanency in the details. It is admitted that, in each regular business of life, the frequent change of persons to whom its transactions may have been confided, and the substitution of new and, of consequence, inexperienced hands, is invariably accompanied with a loss which is greater or less, and always proportioned to the complicacy of the business, the capital employed, and the frequency of the change. But this inconvenience, so universally admitted in the ordinary transactions of life, is always found to be increased when the new persons employed are taken without the advantages of selection for some peculiar general fitness. In addition, it is to be considered as an aggravation of the difficulties of frequent change, that the persons destined to this brief service find little inducement for exertion beyond a degree which is barely necessary to carry them through it with ordinary credit. They do not know at what moment the change may arrive; they only know that it will soon happen, and that it will not be delayed from any peculiar fitness they may have for the position they occupy, in general ability, knowledge, industry, and devotion to the employer. They are thus placed in a state of constant suspense; during which, little besides plain indispensable duty is accomplished. The little knowledge they might acquire can present no inducement for exertion, from the want of time to bring it to the necessary maturity to admit of practical utility hereafter.

It is hence perceived that the employer, who suffers from this vicious system of change, may contend,

not only with the inconveniences of inexperience and a want of selection even among those uninformed in his particular business, but with a want of exertion, application, and devotion, during the time employed; and thus all the thousand mechanical and other economical arrangements for saving time and expenditure, and perfecting and beautifying the various objects to be accomplished, are entirely lost to the employer. But he is still more injuriously affected by this system when the change extends to superintendents—persons who control large departments of extended business transactions. Such is the case in the changing temporary supply for the ordnance, of officers from the line of the army, many of whom are at once placed in the control of large and varied departments of public business.

These are principles of general application, but they point especially to all the departments of military affairs, in which it is peculiarly necessary that frequent change should be avoided, as its direct tendency is the destruction of system, order, uniformity, discipline, and, of consequence, that decided efficiency and energy which are so necessary in the action of all military bodies; for the reason, that their failure in military enterprises may often result in signal national disasters.

It is the singular misfortune of the present system of supplying officers of ordnance from the line of the army, as it was of the system of the eleven years referred to, that the above-enumerated evils are not only disastrous in their effects upon the ordnance, but they apply with equal disadvantage to the line of the army, whence the change is made; the difference being only in this, that it requires a state of war to perceive them forcibly in the latter, (and hence they have been so sensibly felt in the late Indian wars;) while in the ordnance, where the operations are nearly the same in peace and in war, they are constantly remarked in all their injurious tendency.

The ordnance officer must be a soldier, an engineer, (civil and military, for his duties refer to both departments,) as well as a person capable of superintending extended business affairs. He commands troops; attends to their police, clothing, arms, &c.; is frequently their commissary and quartermaster.

As an engineer, he frequently has the control, preservation, repair, and general improvement of property, to the amount of \$1,000,000; the superintendency, in the erection of public buildings, of large numbers of mechanics and laborers, of machinery and mechanical operations; the devising economical ways and means for the execution of those operations, which arise so often in the manufacture of the various weapons of war. As a man of business, he superintends and controls, and accounts to the treasury for all the expenditures for so large an establishment; and surely, in the transaction of duties of such extent and importance, something like stability and permanency ought to be substituted for a vacillating system of change, equally injurious to the line of the army and to the service of this department.

Yet the act of the 5th April, 1832, now in force, only partially relieved the department from this evil system, as it assigned but fourteen permanent officers; the remainder necessary (when they could be obtained at all) being still supplied under the old system of detail. This act, in fact, placed the department on the footing it occupied in 1812 as to officers, at which period there were also fourteen permanent officers, who had also assistance from officers of other corps of the army from time to time; yet, how different the extent and importance of the department at the two periods at which these organizations were in force, viz: 1812 and 1837! At the former, there were but seven posts, 300 or 400 men, and property and expenditures in proportion. At the latter, there are twenty-four posts, at which 1,733 men are employed; and away from the posts, employed under contracts, subject to the supervision of ordnance officers, at least 500 more, making a total of about 2,300 men, with appropriations to be expended to the extent of \$2,282,115, and an amount of public property in charge, of \$19,500,000. Yet, the fourteen officers authorized in 1812 were found inadequate, and were increased in 1813 to *nineteen*, and in 1815 to *forty-four*, when there were only nine posts.

Seeing, therefore, this large amount of duty to be performed, and the diminutive and disproportionate means to effect it; and being aware, also, of the pressure existing at this time in the department for the want of officers, it is not probable that you would consider the enclosed project of a bill, affording an organization of thirty-six officers in all, as at all exorbitant, but rather the contrary. But if additional reasons were necessary, they might be presented in the still further enlargement of the department, which may be anticipated from bills which have been matured in the Senate, going to establish a national armory in the west, and five or six additional arsenals; with which, however, it would be impracticable to proceed without the proposed increase.

In regard to the proposed *organization*, I beg leave to state, a little in detail, what appear as advantageous views on the subject.

1st. It is the same as that of the Senate bill alluded to, save only in the rank of the twenty lieutenants, who, by this project, are all proposed to be first lieutenants: this being obviously preferable to having ten first and ten second lieutenants; for the reason, that the vacancies in the ordnance may, in the former case, be invariably filled from the young first lieutenants or old second lieutenants in the line of the army; and thus the places in the ordnance, which always require experience of men and business, will be filled by officers who have served from five to ten years in the line of the army, and who have, during that period, acquired salutary views of discipline and other military knowledge of wide practical utility, when applied to their new positions in the ordnance. This connexion of the line of the army with the ordnance, by which a healthful military spirit is continually infused into the ordnance, is, in consequence, deemed of the first importance. But the advantages of this connexion cannot be acquired, if the lower grade of this corps consists of second lieutenants; for then the vacancies in the ordnance will be filled from young second lieutenants, or brevet second lieutenants in the line, or from citizens, or from cadets, having little or no military experience; since the senior second lieutenants, or junior first lieutenants of the line, will not sacrifice rank to enter the ordnance as the lowest second lieutenant; and thus all the advantages of military knowledge and general experience which result from the grade of first lieutenants would be lost in a department where it is essentially necessary.

2d. For your satisfaction, it may be proper to exhibit the positions which these thirty-six officers would occupy, or the points in the country where their services would be required; as by this a further judgment may be formed of the necessity of that force:

	GRADES OF OFFICERS.					
	Colonel.	Lieut. colonel.	Majors.	Captains.	1st lieutenants.	Total.
1st. Engaged in the Ordnance office, Washington, in the general superintendence of the department.....	1	1	1	3
2d. Engaged in the periodical inspection of the whole material of the department, distributed in twenty-four different posts throughout the country.....
3d. Engaged in the periodical inspection of cannon, shot, and shells, gun-carriages, &c., made at the six founderies, and intended for the gradual armament of the old and new fortifications, and for the field.....
4th. Engaged in the periodical inspection and reception of swords, pistols, rifles, and muskets, at eight private armories.....
5th. Engaged in the periodical inspection for preservation of gun-carriages, cannon, shot, and shells, now at, and yet to be transported from time to time to the fortifications for their armament.....	1	2	3
6th. Engaged in the command and other service at the two great arsenals—Watervliet, in New York, and Allegheny, at Pittsburg, Pennsylvania.....	2	6	8
7th. Engaged in the command and other service at the remaining twenty-two posts in the department.....	9	13	22
	1	1	4	10	20	36

Leaving but one officer to a post; from which it is plain that the proposed number should rather be increased than diminished. Yet, by a system of instruction for the junior officers of other corps in ordnance affairs; by suitable temporary details, which might be made from time to time from the line of the army, this deficiency of officers might be remedied, without a larger organization, at least for the present.

3d. You are aware of the straitened circumstances under which the officers of the ordnance labor, along with their brethren in other corps of the army, as to compensation, and will no doubt propose suitable measures of relief. By the act of the 14th of May, 1812, the officers of this department were allowed the rank and pay of infantry officers, with additional rations; captains being allowed forage. The act of the 8th February, 1815, authorized the pay of dragoons, forage being excepted to those below the rank of field officers. Experience has shown that ordnance officers are required to be mounted to accomplish their duties, whether at various points immediately around their posts, with which they are generally in constant communication on matters of public business, or whether they be with an army in the field; and it is especially necessary now, as the regulations allow no transportation of officers, even though on urgent public business, for distances under twenty miles.

In completing this very general view of the concerns of the Ordnance department, I would beg leave to call your further attention to the situation of the clerks in this office as to salary, and to request that they may be put on a footing of equality, in this respect, with those in the offices of the quartermaster general, the paymaster general, and subsistence department. This seems but a measure of justice to these faithful and efficient public agents, not only because they are in the performance of duties equally arduous, of equal complicity and importance with those of the other subordinate departments, but because of their present inadequate compensation. For these reasons, no doubt is entertained but that your kind attention will be drawn to this subject, in which, among others, the welfare of the department is also concerned.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

GEORGE BOMFORD, *Colonel of Ordnance.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

AN ACT providing for the increase of the Ordnance department.

SECTION 1. *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to add to the Ordnance department, whenever he may deem it expedient to increase the same, two majors and twenty first lieutenants; that after the said increase shall have been made, all vacancies happening in the Ordnance department shall be filled from the line of the army; that the pay and emoluments of the officers of the said department shall be the same as those allowed to the officers of the regiments of dragoons; and that they shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

SECTION 2. *Be it further enacted,* That so much of the 4th section of the act passed April 5, 1832, for the organization of the Ordnance department as authorizes the officers of ordnance to receive the same pay and emoluments now allowed to artillery officers, be construed to include the ten dollars per month additional pay to every officer in the actual command of a company, as compensation for the duties and responsibilities with respect to clothing, arms, and accoutrements of the company, under the authority of the second section of the act passed March 2, 1827, giving further compensation to the captains and

subalterns of the army of the United States, in certain cases: *Provided*, That the officers of the Ordnance department claiming the compensation for such duties and responsibilities shall have been actually in the command of enlisted men of the ordnance, and shall have incurred the aforesaid responsibilities in the same manner as officers commanding companies in the line of the army.

SECTION 3. *Be it further enacted*, That all officers and enlisted men of the Ordnance department shall be subject to the rules and articles of war.

SECTION 4. *And be it further enacted*, That the compensation hereafter to be allowed to such ordnance storekeepers as shall be designated as paymasters shall not exceed the pay and allowances of a captain of ordnance; and that the chief of the Ordnance department shall have power to frank letters and packages having reference to the public service of the Ordnance department.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 746.

[2D SESSION.]

ON CLAIMS OF TENNESSEE VOLUNTEERS CALLED OUT ON REQUISITION OF MAJOR GENERAL GAINES TO SUPPRESS INDIAN HOSTILITIES IN FLORIDA, ALABAMA, ETC., FOR PAY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DECEMBER 19, 1837.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *December 18, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit a report of the paymaster general, accompanied by the copies of documents relating to the claims of certain Tennessee volunteers, required by a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 11th instant.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Hon. JAMES K. POLK, *Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

PAYMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, December 15, 1837.*

SIR: In compliance with your instructions, I have the honor herewith to lay before you copies of such documents as are on file in this office relating to the claims for compensation of certain companies of Tennessee volunteers, called for by the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 7th instant.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. TOWSON, *Paymaster General.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, *Nashville, July 12, 1837.*

SIR: Major Steuart has commenced the pay of the volunteers at this place, having, I believe, nearly completed the payment of three companies, as well as a good many of the absentees that were under General Armstrong in Florida, and as yet I have heard of none refusing the notes of our banks.

Captain Perkins has gone, I learn, to East Tennessee, to pay also in that section.

I am informed by Major Steuart that the appropriation of three thousand dollars for the payment of my staff is not quite enough for that object.

This may have happened in consequence of the executive staff in Tennessee having higher rank than in other States, or than, perhaps, is known in the United States army.

The enclosed is the account of Colonel Hardeman, who was one of my aids, and acted under all the different calls as such, and was a most useful and vigilant officer, who fell a victim to his ambition and exertion to make a faithful discharge of every duty I had required of him. He was taken sick on his return home from attending the rendezvous of the last volunteers at Jackson, in this State, under the call of General Gaines, and died shortly after, much lamented by all who knew him, leaving a widow and children. Major Steuart feels at some loss to know how to proceed in paying him, as the certificate is not signed, and of course cannot be.

I know that Colonel Hardeman had the number of servants and horses the whole time, though he may not have used them *all*, the whole time, in the service. He used all that were necessary, at all times, for the most vigorous despatch of duty, whether more or less, and may, for aught I know, have used more at particular times than the number allowed. His rule was to stop at nothing that seemed necessary for despatch of duty, and was often at great expense, as well as myself, while engaged in this business, which, it seems to me, ought to be met by the general government.

Having superintended in person the organization of the volunteers under the different calls, and at long distances from the seat of government, at Fayetteville and Athens, as well as their assembling and being mustered at various other different points, kept me constantly engaged in service under all the calls from the 28th of April until the 25th or last of August. How, then, I would respectfully inquire, am I to be remunerated for this service and expense? Since I wrote you last on the subject of the appropriation to meet the liabilities I had incurred in the Union Bank for expenditures to subsist the volunteers and their horses at different points, some of the officers, whose lands I held for the amounts I had advanced them on those occasions, have come forward and refunded to me the amount they had received, so as to

reduce the amount of liabilities several thousand dollars; and I have placed in the hands of Major Steuart similar vouchers, to be settled as he goes round paying the different companies; which, if done, will reduce the amount for which I am liable below the amount appropriated by Congress for that object, instead of its falling short, as I had anticipated.

Should this be the case, as I have no doubt of it, could not the deficiency for the executive staff be made up out of that, or some other appropriation for the volunteers? Such have been their expenses that I would greatly regret the delay of the payment of a single one on any account, if it could be possibly avoided. It will require some time for Major Steuart to finish the payment of all the volunteers in our State, as they are scattered over a vast extent of territory, and I have deemed it best, under the circumstances, to require him to attend at the town of each county where there is a company to be paid. There are several companies who were reported and received by the executive, who have not been mustered, nor did they attend any place of rendezvous under my orders, before they learned that their services were dispensed with, and hence did not march from home, or their respective neighborhoods, who, as I understand the act of Congress, are provided for also. When Colonel Croghan passed here on his return from Mississippi, he informed me that he expected to return for the purpose of performing duties in relation to this class. But as yet he has not returned, though it will likely be a month or more before Major Steuart gets round the places he has now advertised to attend, and after which I hope the said last class will be also attended to.

The account of Colonel Hardeman is also enclosed, in order that you may give such special instructions to Major Steuart as the case requires.

I would also like to know the rule in relation to my own case, which, however, I feel some delicacy in introducing to your attention.

Whilst I have the honor to assure you of the high respect and continued esteem of your obedient servant,

N. CANNON.

Hon. JOEL R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, *Nashville, August 1, 1837.*

SIR: I have received a note from Colonel Croghan, dated at Washington the 22d of July, requesting me to cause him to be informed, at that place, the time when his presence was necessary here to act on the rolls of the different companies who have not been mustered under the different calls for volunteers made on the executive of Tennessee during the year 1836, and were not mustered; in answer to which I have the honor to state that said rolls are nearly all ready now, and will be completed in a few days, ready for his action; there being fifteen or sixteen companies in that situation, I believe. You will see by the enclosed advertisement of Major Steuart, who is now paying the middle and western part of the State, that he finishes the payment of the companies whose rolls were made out at Washington, and ordered to be paid on the 16th instant; Captain Porterfield's being the last of those.

The rolls of those others that have not been mustered will all be ready before that time, when it would be advisable that he might pay them also as soon as possible; and that Colonel Croghan should be here to act on them by that time, otherwise authorize Major Steuart or some other person to do so in his stead, though it is feared this notice cannot reach you at Washington, and Colonel Croghan, in time for him to reach here at that precise time, which, however, may not be very material. But those who are expecting pay are waiting, and it is hoped that no unnecessary delay will take place.

With much respect, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

N. CANNON.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

P. S.—I have not heard yet of a single instance of refusal to take the notes of our banks.

N. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *August 12, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st instant. Its contents have been communicated to the paymaster general and to Colonel Croghan. The colonel will set out to-morrow for Tennessee.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, *Nashville, August 30, 1837.*

SIR: I have herewith enclosed to you the rolls of five companies of the volunteers who were received during the summer of 1836, but were not mustered or called into actual service. They were received under the requisition of the Secretary of War, dated May 25, 1836, which was for twelve months' service; but on a pledge given by me to relieve with a fresh force at the end of six months, should the war continue, (and it was required by the general government,) the President agreed reluctantly, on my solicitation, to receive them for six months' service. The President expressed a desire that one half of these troops should be raised in East Tennessee, and the other half in West Tennessee. He begged that I would be as prompt as possible in the arrangement of the whole matter. In compliance with which I issued my proclamation of the 6th of June, calling for said volunteers in the most expeditious manner, and appointing the rendezvous for the western part of the State, at Fayetteville, on the 1st of July, 1836; and at Athens, for the eastern part, the 7th of the same month, so as to afford time, with the utmost

diligence, to attend the organization at both places in person, with a part of my staff, which was done. I had previously despatched the adjutant general of the State to the eastern part of the State to encourage our citizens to turn out under this call. But all the information I had received from him before, and up to the rendezvous at Fayetteville, induced me to believe that not more than half the number assigned to the eastern part of the State could be raised there. Hence I determined to supply the deficiency that might happen there with the surplus companies I had received in the west, over and above what was requisite to make the brigade organized under General Armstrong, at Fayetteville, on the 1st of July, and march forthwith for the south, as required. Receiving and holding in readiness the supernumerary companies in the western part of the State, for the purpose of supplying, in the first instance, the expected deficiency in East Tennessee; and, secondly, to supply, if *necessary*, the place of those in actual service at the expiration of the term of six months, for which they had been received, under such a pledge from me, as will be seen by my letter to the Secretary of War on that subject, and his reply thereto. It seemed to me to be the only safe course for the great expedition that had been required. Colonel Croghan has declined acting on these rolls, on the ground that the executives of the States could not legally receive more than were actually required by the call from the Secretary of War, which in this case seemed to me actually necessary, in order to meet promptly the wishes of the President, and to be in readiness at the same time to redeem the pledge I had given to relieve with an equal force, if necessary, at the expiration of the term of six months, which I have been in readiness to perform or redeem the pledge, had it been required; which, however, has not been.

I hope that, by a liberal construction of the 3d section of the act of Congress of the 1st of March, 1837, you will believe, as I do, that Congress intended to embrace these cases, which I think must appear by a reference to the memorial and documents from this State, on which, I presume, the law was mostly predicated. There are three or four other companies of the same class which were not prepared, at this time, to be forwarded; also a few, perhaps four or five, under the first requisition of General Gaines, who were also received but were not mustered, which Colonel Croghan does not feel authorized to order the payment of, because General Gaines's call was not made in the *summer*, which happens to be the expression in the third section, instead of the *year*.

Should, however, your department, on a full view of the subject, not feel authorized to embrace these cases, I must respectfully request that it be submitted to Congress, in order that justice may be extended to those classes of the volunteers of Tennessee, whom I had supposed were provided for by the act referred to, and have encountered the same expenses in preparing for the service as those who have been paid, and merely because they had been mustered. I must wait the result, with some confidence that a second appeal to Congress in their behalf will not be necessary.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. CANNON.

Hon. Mr. POINSETT, *Secretary of War*.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, *Nashville, September 18, 1837.*

SIR: Enclosed herewith I send you the balance of the rolls of the volunteer companies who have not been mustered, but were received, as certified on each roll, and are submitted for your decision as to their payment.

In the case of Captain Crozier's company, the facts, I doubt not, were as stated in the captain's certificate. The company was received by the adjutant general of the State, who had authority from me, and who afterwards induced them to leave Athens without being mustered. Had they remained they would have been mustered and received by General Wool with the other companies.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. CANNON.

Hon. Mr. POINSETT, *Secretary of War*.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, *Nashville, September 12, 1837.*

SIR: Enclosed are the rolls of three more companies of the volunteers of Tennessee who are unpaid, to wit:

The company of Captain John H. Hamilton, of Jackson county; Captain Hugh C. Armstrong's, of Overton county, and Henry S. Maxwell's, of Overton county also, who are in the same situation as the five companies heretofore forwarded, I presume.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. CANNON.

Hon. Mr. POINSETT, *Secretary of War*.

LOUISVILLE, *September 1, 1837.*

SIR: My stay at Nashville was but short; long enough, however, for me to affix my official signature to the muster-rolls of the only two companies remaining to be paid of those called into service under the requisition of Major General Gaines, of date June 28, 1836.

Other rolls of companies received under previous requisitions were submitted to me, but I declined all action upon them for the reasons stated in my letter to Governor Cannon of the 28th August, 1837, a copy of which is hereunto appended.

His excellency was greatly disappointed in my refusal to note all his rolls for payment, but his disappointment was not equal to my surprise at finding that eight out of the ten companies which I had been ordered to muster (as I thought) had been *already paid*, and upon rolls which had been forwarded to Washington *during the fall of 1836*.

I will remain here for a few days, and then proceed immediately on to Washington city.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. CROGHAN, *Inspector General*.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War*.

NASHVILLE, August 28, 1837.

SIR: Let my wishes on the subject of the volunteers who were called into service, and whose services were accepted by your excellency during the year 1836, be as they may, I cannot, consistently with my understanding of the third section of the act of March 1, 1837, making appropriations for the support of the army for the year 1837, authorize the payment of any other companies than the two which remain to be mustered under the last call of General Gaines, of date June 28, 1836.

The first call of General Gaines is not considered in the third section of the act just named, for it refers exclusively to requisitions made during the summer of 1836; and it is equally certain that it does not warrant any further payments under the requisition of the Secretary of War of May 25, 1836, as more than the number of men required by that requisition have been already mustered and paid.

I would advise that the rolls which I have declined indorsing be sent to Washington to be laid before Congress for its action thereon, should the Secretary of War, on their being submitted to him, agree with me that they come not within the provisions of the third section of the act of March 1, 1837.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

GEO. CROGHAN, *Inspector General*.

His Excellency NEWTON CANNON, *Governor*.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, Nashville, September 2, 1837.

SIR: Being very desirous that the acts of the executive of Tennessee should be as fully known as possible, under the different calls made on this State for volunteers during the year 1836, I must submit to you this brief statement of facts, as being important in deciding finally on the cases which Colonel Croghan refused to indorse for payment, as you will see by the enclosed extracts from his letter to me on that subject.

April 8, 1836, is the date of the first requisition of General Gaines.

April 28, 1836, is the date of the proclamation of the governor of Tennessee.

June 1, the rendezvous of them at Memphis, by general orders dated May 2, 1836.

May 13, their further movement suspended by the request of General Gaines.

May 4, 1836, General Gaines's call, sanctioned by letter to Governor Cannon from the Secretary of War, and the last of May and 1st of June a *part* of the companies who had been received were mustered and discharged at different places by Captain Wickliffe of the United States army, some companies failing to attend for that purpose, knowing their services were not required, who are part of those *excluded* now by the decision of Colonel Croghan, on the word *summer*, &c.

The next in order is the call of the Secretary of War, dated May 25, 1836, for 2,560, a division of volunteers, in which promptitude is urged, and the equal division between the east and west of the State, &c., to which I must request particular attention; also to my letter requesting their reception for six instead of twelve months, pledging to relieve, if required, with fresh troops, &c.

June 6, 1836, proclamation of the governor under the same.

July 1, rendezvous at Fayetteville, where General Armstrong's *brigade* was organized and marched forthwith.

The 7th of the same month, rendezvous at Athens, having despatched the adjutant general to East Tennessee with the proclamation immediately. I had received information from him previous to meeting the volunteers at Fayetteville, stating that he believed there would be but five companies raised in East Tennessee under this call, in consequence of a *part* being required to be *footmen*, while *all* in the west were mounted, and up to July 1, at Fayetteville, I had no information which would authorize the belief that there would be more than five or six companies, at most, at Athens under this call.

Here, also, I received an answer from the Secretary of War to my request to the President to receive for six instead of twelve months, on the pledge that their places would be supplied, if required, at the end of six months by fresh volunteers; hence I determined to receive all the organized companies who had tendered their services up to that time in the west, in order to supply promptly, and without any delay, any deficiency that might happen in the eastern part of the State; also to be ready promptly to redeem the pledge given to the President to supply their places, if desired, at the end of six months, for which time they were received on said pledge. It turned out, however, that instead of any deficiency, as had been anticipated, in East Tennessee, there was an excess; but were received by General Wool into service, and did not require the act of Congress for their payment.

Then the companies that were not mustered under the call of the Secretary of War and received (in the west) by me up to the 1st of July, when General Armstrong's *brigade* was organized and marched, which have been held in readiness, if called at the end of six months, are also excluded from the benefits of the third section of the act of March 1, 1837, (as I think, under all the circumstances, improperly and unjustly,) and leaving none in Tennessee who are benefited, except the two companies referred to in the letter of Colonel Croghan.

I trust, when you refer to the requisitions fully, and the dates and circumstances attending the executive action of the governor of Tennessee, and steps taken to comply with the calls, not only of the

President and Secretary of War, but also the general commanding, you will be satisfied of the strict propriety of holding in readiness these companies to redeem the pledge given the President, had it been required, and guarding against every contingency calculated to produce a failure to meet the requirements of the general government in the most prompt and efficient manner.

June 28, 1836, date of the last call of General Gaines.

July 20, 1836, date of the governor's proclamation, in pursuance, taking into service ten companies of those previously organized and held in readiness, as before stated. *No new companies* were raised under this call.

In addition to this, a reference to the memorial of the legislature of Tennessee and the accompanying documents, on which this act of Congress was predicated, may afford some additional light, going to convince that the very companies of the volunteers of Tennessee now unpaid are those that were intended to be provided for by said third section.

In reply to the letter of Colonel Towson on the subject of the rank of the executive staff, I must beg leave to call your attention to our militia law, (copies of which I have forwarded to him and yourself,) and the first call of General Gaines, being for a *brigade*. To show that the whole number of companies received by the governor of Tennessee under that requisition does not exceed a brigade under our law, (a few of which companies, as before stated, did not attend the places of rendezvous to be mustered by Captain Wickliffe,) and are yet unpaid, being excluded by the opinion of Colonel Croghan, it will be seen that our brigades are formed by counties, and contain no regular specific number of companies, but, in fact, vary from about *fifty to eighty* companies, whereas only about *sixteen or eighteen* companies have been paid under this call, and about half as many more were received by the governor, but were not mustered and are not paid, and to whose case your attention is invited respectfully.

I must remark, while on this subject, that the company of Captain John E. Crouch (called the Franklin Blues) were received under this first call of General Gaines, and were actually mustered by Captain Wickliffe at this place at the same time he mustered the other companies here under his call, and I supposed had been returned accordingly as others, of which roll I can get no account, as I am informed by Major Steuart he has not received it. I must request, therefore, that inquiry be made at the proper office at Washington for the same—it may have been mislaid. I regret that I feel it my duty to trouble you thus, and assure you that I am extremely anxious to arrive at the close of this whole volunteer business of the year 1836.

Very respectfully, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

N. CANNON.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War*.

Extracts from the letter of Colonel Croghan to the governor of Tennessee.

NASHVILLE, August 28, 1837.

"I cannot, consistently with my understanding of the third section of the act of March 1, 1837, making appropriations for the support of the army for the year 1837, authorize the payment of any other companies than the two which remain to be mustered under the last call of General Gaines, dated June 28, 1836."

"The first requisition of General Gaines is not considered in the third section of the act just named, for it refers exclusively to requisitions made during the *summer* of 1836; and it is equally certain that it does not warrant any further payments under the requisition of the Secretary of War of May 25, 1836, as more than the number of men required by that requisition have been already mustered and paid."

"I would advise that the rolls which I have declined indorsing be sent to Washington to be laid before Congress for its action thereon, should the Secretary of War, on their being submitted to him, agree with me that they come not within the provisions of the third section of the act of March 1, 1837."

This decision excludes all under the first call of General Gaines from the benefit of the third section, and also all the supernumerary companies under the call of the Secretary of War that were received by the governor and held in readiness—

1st. To supply a deficiency that was expected in East Tennessee at Athens; and,

2d. To supply the place of the whole number called for at the end of *six months*, should it be required by the President, to whom a pledge had been given for that purpose by Governor Cannon in his letter asking him to receive the troops under this call for *six* instead of *twelve* months; which was assented to, as is supposed, on that condition.

No new companies were required to be organized under the last call of General Gaines, as will be seen by the proclamation of Governor Cannon of the 20th of July under it. The call for ten of the companies already organized was under the two previous calls, one from Gaines and the other from the Secretary of War, and thus that call was met out of a *part* of the companies that had been previously organized and were waiting in readiness, as before stated.

Respectfully,

N. CANNON.

WASHINGTON, October 13, 1837.

SIR: Agreeably to your request, I have perused the letter of his excellency Governor Cannon to the Secretary of War, of date the 2d ultimo, on the subject of my refusal to admit for payment certain muster-rolls during my recent visit to Nashville, but without finding in it any arguments calculated to lessen my confidence in the correctness of the position assumed by me in my note to his excellency of the 28th of August last.

The limited construction given by me to the term *summer*, as used in the third section of the act of March 1, 1837, making appropriations for the support of the army, &c., for 1837, is particularly objected to, as by it many of the volunteer companies under the first call of General Gaines are excluded from the

benefits of said act. Now, for argument sake, let us admit that by *summer* is meant the entire year, how are the companies whose claims are held forth to be benefited thereby, seeing that the act in question provides for the payment of those companies only who were *called into service* and their services *accepted by the governor of the State under a requisition, &c.*, and the governor, in his message of October 8, 1836, states that *their services were not accepted by him?*

The services of nineteen companies, and no more, were accepted by the governor (vide message October 8) under the first requisition of General Gaines. Of those, sixteen companies were mustered for payment by Captain Wickliffe in September, 1836; one, (Captain Cannon's,) very shortly after, was admitted for payment in this city on the certificate of his excellency himself; and the remaining two companies (Totten's and Curry's) were mustered for payment by myself on the 28th of August last, they having been presented to me as the ninth and tenth companies under the second call of General Gaines.

The claimants under the requisition from the Secretary of War of May 25, 1836, are in no manner provided for by the act above named; if ever paid, it must be under some future act of Congress. The requisition from the Secretary of War was for 2,500 men, and already have more than 4,000 been paid, viz: the 1,550 who were formed into a brigade under General Armstrong, and about 2,500 who joined General Wool.

The second requisition from General Gaines in June, 1836, was for ten companies; eight only, however, were accepted at the time by the governor, (see message October 8,) and they were mustered for payment by Captain Wickliffe in September, 1836; and on the 28th of August, 1837, I admitted for payment the two companies of Totten and Curry, as before stated, upon the assurance of the governor that, although accepted by him under the *first* call of General Gaines, they were in like manner accepted by him under the second call.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. CROGHAN, *Inspector General.*

Brigadier General N. Towson, *Paymaster General.*

PAYMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, *October 14, 1837.*

SIR: I heretofore have been prevented by ill health from reporting on Governor Cannon's letter to you of September 2, which was referred to me for that purpose.

As the mustering and certifying troops for payment is the appropriate duty of the inspecting officers, I handed the governor's letter to Colonel Croghan, with the request that he would make such reply to the arguments as he should deem proper, and have just received from him the enclosed.

The first subject in the governor's letter is the call of General Gaines for a brigade, to consist of two or three battalions, and each battalion from eight to ten companies. Governor Cannon says a part did assemble at different places, and were mustered and discharged by Captain Wickliffe; that some companies failing to attend for that purpose, knowing their services were not required, have been excluded by Colonel Croghan's decision from the benefit of the third section of the act of March 1, 1837.

It will be seen by the extract of Colonel Croghan's letter to Governor Cannon, and the enclosed to me, that the inspector general is of opinion the companies that did not attend for the purpose of being mustered cannot be lawfully paid under the third section, that being confined to volunteers "whose services were *accepted* by the executives of the States, respectively, during the *summer* of the year 1836, the transactions having taken place before the *summer* of 1836;" and it also appearing, by the governor's communication to the legislature, that nineteen companies only were accepted—all of which have been paid.

The next claim presented by Governor Cannon is for pay of the supernumerary companies accepted by him for the purpose of relieving the volunteers under Generals Wool and Armstrong at the expiration of six months, they having refused to volunteer for twelve months, as called for by the Secretary of War in his letter of May 25, 1836.

The governor intimates that there is in the correspondence between the Secretary and himself an implied assent to this arrangement. The inspector general thinks that, as the number of volunteers called for was but 2,500, (2,560,) no more supernumeraries can be paid under that call than are specially provided for in the appropriation of \$90,000 in the second section of said act, and that the third section is confined to volunteers who were duly called into *service "under requisitions from the Secretary of War, or from generals commanding the troops of the United States."*

I have no knowledge that any more troops were called for, or authorized by the President or Secretary of War, than the 2,560; on the contrary, I have understood the President complained to the Secretary of War, in a letter from the Hermitage, that General Wool had accepted more than he was authorized to receive. The records of the War Office, I presume, will show the views of the President and Secretary relative thereto.

The next subject referred to is the volunteers accepted under the last call of General Gaines. I presume this reference is only for the purpose of showing that they were not intended to be provided for by the third section, and that therefore it must apply to the others.

The governor refers to the military laws of Tennessee to show the rank of the officers of the executive staff, and contends that they should be paid according to that rank. This is in answer to the letter I had the honor to address you on the 28th of August last, to which I have nothing more to add. He also refers to the law to show that a brigade may consist of more companies than were paid under the first call of General Gaines, which is not disputed. The above, I believe, are all the points that require decision, and they appear to be legal rather than military questions.

The muster-roll of Captain Crouch's company, which the governor thinks was forwarded to Washington, has not been received either at the Adjutant General's or at this office.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. TOWSON, *Paymaster General.*

Hon. JOEL R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 20, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit you a report of the paymaster general in reference to the claims of the volunteers referred to in your letter of the 2d ultimo.

After a careful examination, I find no authority for the payment of these cases by the department, and application had therefore better be made to Congress at the next session for such an extension of the law as would cause it to embrace them.

In reference to the implication alluded to by the paymaster general, I find nothing in the letters from this department to your excellency to warrant it. An arrangement as to raising men to supply the place of those who enlisted only for six months, when that time had expired, is not even alluded to.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

His Excellency N. CANNON, *Governor of Tennessee, Nashville.*

CELINA, *June 8, 1837.*

DEAR SIR: Your favor of the 22d of May has come safe to hand, and I hasten to comply with your request. The company which was organized by myself, and started for Fayetteville, was as follows, and was raised by myself in the forty-ninth regiment, Tennessee militia.

JOHN H. HAMILTON.

Governor NEWTON CANNON.

Muster-roll of Captain John H. Hamilton's company of Tennessee mounted volunteer militia.

No.	Names—present and absent.	Rank.	No.	Names—present and absent.	Rank.
1	John H. Hamilton.....	Captain.....	32	Benjamin Homes.....
2	Ervine Langferd.....	First lieutenant..	33	Vatchel Clarke.....
3	Samuel H. Fitch... ..	Second lieutenant	34	Sanford Walker.....
4	John Savage.....	Ensign.....	35	Holyard Adkins.....
5	John Herard.....	36	William Johnston.....
6	Nero Kirkpatrick.....	37	Andrew Flin.....
7	Jonathan Crawford.....	38	Clarke Gideons.....
8	Joel Rich.....	39	James Carniham.....
9	John Richardson.....	40	Hiram Bailey.....
10	John W. Walker.....	41	Thomas Strong.....
11	Samuel Peake.....	42	John Wilson.....
12	Robert Foster.....	43	J. H. Hendricks.....
13	Jessey Savage.....	44	R. N. Riggs.....
14	Joseph Carter.....	45	Samuel H. Fitch.....
15	Alfred Riston.....	46	G. H. Bell.....
16	William Comes.....	47	N. Coons.....
17	Peter Ricar.....	48	Charles Williams.....
18	Berry Carter.....	49	Green Copeland.....
19	Vincent Carter.....	50	David Vaney.....
20	David Armor.....	51	James M. Strong.....
21	William P. Stith.....	52	James Saygo.....
22	Henry Eakle.....	53	Joseph Green.....
23	John Eakle.....	54	William Linsby.....
24	Stewart Henderson.....	55	Hambleton West.....
25	Thomas J. Wood.....	56	Abner Waddle.....
26	Jonathan Eakle.....	57	William Saleman.....
27	William Lay.....	*59	James Cole.....
28	Bayley Elder.....	60	Francis Colter.....
29	John H. Clarke.....	61	John Slacey.....
30	Thomas Brown.....	62	Hardin Smith.....
31	William Bosel.....	63	Benjamin Eakle.....

STATE OF TENNESSEE, *Jackson County:*

This day came Colonel John H. Hamilton before John W. Chew, one of the acting justices of the peace for said county, and made oath that the annexed roll, as it stands, contains the names of all the men which enrolled themselves under the proclamation of the governor of the State of Tennessee for volunteers in 1836, and that about fifty started for the place of rendezvous at Fayetteville; and I have no doubt but the most of them would have followed on if they had not understood that their services would not be accepted of.

JOHN H. HAMILTON.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 9th day of June, 1837.

JOHN W. CHEW, *J. P.*

I hereby certify that I reported to Governor Cannon a full and complete roll of a company of volunteers who tendered their services to the United States under Governor N. Cannon's proclamation of the 6th of June, 1836, which report I made some time past, and furthermore understood that said company was accepted by his excellency This is an additional report to the one referred to.

Given under my hand, August 19, 1837.

JOHN H. HAMILTON, *Captain, Commanding the Jackson Blues.*

STATE OF TENNESSEE, *Jackson County*:

This day personally appeared John H. Hamilton before me, M. L. Armstrong, an acting justice of the peace for said county, and makes oath that the facts set forth in the foregoing are correct.

JOHN H. HAMILTON, *Captain*.

Sworn to and subscribed before me on the 19th day of August, 1837.

M. L. ARMSTRONG, *J. P.*

STATE OF TENNESSEE, *Executive Department*:

I, Newton Cannon, governor of the State of Tennessee, do hereby certify that the company of Captain John H. Hamilton was received by me, as stated in his certificate, and held in readiness to supply any deficiency that might occur in raising the East Tennessee brigade, or the place of those who might retire from the service at the expiration of the six months for which they were received.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the great seal of the State to be [L. s.] affixed, at Nashville, the 12th day of September, 1837.

N. CANNON.

By the governor:

LUKE LEA, *Secretary of State*.

WOODBURY, *August 4, 1837.*

DEAR SIR: I hereby certify that the annexed is a correct roll of the company of volunteers who tendered their services to the United States under my command, and were received by Governor Cannon under his proclamation of June 6, 1836.

JAMES SOAP, *Captain*.

His Excellency N. CANNON.

I hereby certify that James Soap, whose signature is placed to the above certificate, made oath in due form, before me, the day it bears date, that the annexed roll is a correct account of the volunteers named who volunteered according to the above proclamation of June 6, 1836.

ELIJAH STEVENS, *J. P.*

Muster-roll of Captain Soap's company of Tennessee volunteers.

James Soap, captain.	James C. Green.	Philip Welber.
Thomas Barton, 1st lieutenant.	G. W. Knox.	James Higdon.
James O. George, 2d lieutenant.	W. Goodwin.	Abraham Brandon.
Wm. M. Knox, ensign.	Thomas E. Woodfin.	Robert J. Patton.
Milton Fowler, 1st sergeant.	Caleb Martin.	David R. Burton.
Samuel J. Rund, 2d sergeant.	Mark Adcock.	Jacob Falkenbury.
U. D. Allen, 3d sergeant.	Henry Young.	Greenbury Smith.
William Barnett.	Ransom Young.	William Stroud.
William Nevins.	R. C. Dogier.	Abn. Baty.
Thomas Hodges.	Charles Bowen.	James Baty.
Samuel Russell.	John Vassor.	Jacob More.
John Bowen.	Martin Stroud.	William Spicer.
William Potterfield.	D. C. Mereight.	James Edwards.
Robert H. Patton.	Archibald Edwards.	Edmund Finley.
Thomas C. Meloud.	Henry Markey.	Eli Bailey.
William Boyd.	William Phillips.	Caswell Saron.
George Walker.	James H. Alexander.	Richard Edwins.
William Allen.	Isaac Soap.	Levi Pelham.
Thomas Crary.	William Reynolds.	Joseph Hollany.
M. A. Morterfield.	Thomas J. Hicks.	John R. Cummings.
William Patton.	Roswell Soap.	

STATE OF TENNESSEE, *Executive Department*:

I, Newton Cannon, governor of the State of Tennessee, do hereby certify that the officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, whose names are enrolled upon this roll, were duly called into service, and their services accepted by me, during the summer of 1836, under my proclamation of June 6, 1836, to meet the requisition of the Secretary of War, dated May 25, 1836.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the great seal of the State to be [L. s.] affixed, at Nashville, the 30th day of August, 1837.

N. CANNON.

By the governor:

LUKE LEA, *Secretary of State*.

Muster-roll of Mountain District volunteers of Overton county, State of Tennessee, June, 1836.

No.	Names—present and absent.	Rank.	No.	Names—present and absent.	Rank.
1	H. C. Armstrong	Captain	33	Robert Ketchum	Private
2	J. F. Jouett	1st lieutenant	34	Robert Matlock	do.
3	W. H. Turner	2d lieutenant	35	Elias S. Anderson	do.
4	Joseph Harrison	Ensign	36	Perry R. Hicklin	do.
1	R. S. Windle	1st sergeant	37	Henry Dickson	do.
2	J. P. Pyrtle	2d sergeant	38	W. L. Armstrong, jr.	do.
3	A. C. Sevier	3d sergeant	39	Colby C. Barry	do.
4	George McDonald	4th sergeant	40	Gabriel Dennis	do.
1	S. M. Windle	1st corporal	41	Levi H. Dennis	do.
2	A. S. Brown	2d corporal	42	Benjamin B. Sevier	do.
3	C. G. Nevins	3d corporal	43	Sparks Neely	do.
4	T. H. Smith	4th corporal	44	William Neely	do.
1	W. C. Harrison	Trumpeter	45	George Boalman	do.
1	Valentine Sevier	Private	46	Edmond P. Lyon	do.
2	G. W. Wallis	do.	47	Milton Daugherty	do.
3	A. R. Sevier	do.	48	Mitchell Boatman	do.
4	William Ashlock	do.	49	Sells. McDonald	do.
5	James F. Turner	do.	50	Charles Stanton	do.
6	John Saylor	do.	51	Jesse Stanton	do.
7	George Greer	do.	52	Thomas McDonald	do.
8	Joseph F. Daviss	do.	53	John M. Elder	do.
9	John McDonald	do.	54	Cornelius B. Daugherty	do.
10	Jonathan Daviss	do.	55	James F. Daugherty	do.
11	John Parish	do.	56	David Mullins	do.
12	Burrell Chouning	do.	57	Parskill Lanier	do.
13	John P. Gearhart	do.	58	Dempsey Vann	do.
14	James Colson	do.	59	John Patrick, jr.	do.
15	Campbell Colson	do.	60	Strather Stigall	do.
16	Wilson Harvey	do.	61	Care Pyrtle	do.
17	Samuel S. Davis	do.	62	Richard Lee	do.
18	Elias Johnson	do.	63	William Lynn	do.
19	Willie Peterman	do.	64	Vineyard C. Brock	do.
20	William Chouning	do.	65	John L. White	do.
21	James B. Lovell	do.	66	David J. Bullard	do.
22	John Arney	do.	67	Robert Hardin	do.
23	Joseph Martin	do.	68	Valentine Matlock	do.
24	Jeremiah Skipworth	do.	69	William Daniel	do.
25	William P. Overstreet	do.	70	V. M. Armstrong	do.
26	John M. Denniss	do.	71	W. A. Beason	do.
27	Robeson Chouning	do.	72	Abraham Odle	do.
28	Willie Roberts	do.	73	J. L. Kennedy	do.
29	Owen P. Turner	do.	74	Jesse Livingston	do.
30	G. W. Campbell	do.	75	Washington Ashburn	do.
31	Nelson Davis	do.	76	B. L. Bledsoe	do.
32	Mathew Jouett	do.			

I hereby certify that I reported to Governor Cannon a full and complete roll of a company of volunteers who tendered their services to the United States under Governor N. Cannon's proclamation of the 6th day of June, 1836, which report I made some few days past; and furthermore understood that said company was accepted by his excellency, and received a letter from him to hold my company in readiness, which was done. This is an additional report to the one made and reported.

Given under my hand August 19, 1837.

H. C. ARMSTRONG, *Captain,*
Commanding the Mountain District Volunteers of Overton County, Tennessee.

STATE OF TENNESSEE, *Jackson County:*

This day personally appeared H. C. Armstrong before me, U. L. Armstrong, an acting justice of the peace for said county, and makes oath that the facts set forth in the foregoing are correct.

H. C. ARMSTRONG, *Captain.*

Sworn and subscribed before me on the 19th day of August, 1837.

U. L. ARMSTRONG, *Justice of the Peace.*

STATE OF TENNESSEE, *Executive Department:*

I, Newton Cannon, governor of the State aforesaid, do hereby certify the company of Captain H. C. Armstrong were received by me as stated in his certificate, and held in readiness to supply any deficiency that might occur in raising the East Tennessee brigade, or the place of those who might retire from the service at the expiration of the six months for which they were received.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the great seal of the State to be [L. s.] affixed, at Nashville, the 19th day of September, 1837.

N. CANNON.

By the governor:

LUKE LEA, *Secretary of State.*

Muster-roll of a company of volunteers that marched to Athens under Captain John B. Crozier.

Names—present and absent.	Rank.	Names—present and absent.	Rank.
John B. Crozier.....	Captain.....	Jacob Stewksbury.....
John M. Lamar.....	1st lieutenant...	James Dikes.....
Aloses Overton.....	2d lieutenant...	John Renolds.....
Samuel C. Young.....	Ensign.....	George Sailor.....
Alexander Galbraith.....	1st sergeant.....	John Reatherford.....
John Sailor.....	2d sergeant.....	William Machin.....
David Vandagraff.....	3d sergeant.....	James Hall.....
Ezekiel Sailor.....	1st corporal.....	Isaam Nance.....
Christian Henderson.....	2d corporal.....	Lewis Weaver.....
Caswell Magberay.....	3d corporal.....	John Havens.....
Elvin Kirke.....	Trumpeter.....	Edwin Hart.....
Michael Oaks.....	Seth Q. Waddell.....
John Ross.....	Isaac Jarmon.....
John Yorke.....	Grandison Jarmon.....
William M. Levi.....	William Brown.....
Joseph E. Moore.....	William Bookant.....
Clark B. Sartin.....	James Dale.....
Pleasant Stover.....	Henry Renolds.....
Preston Sodd.....	James H. Cox.....
Joseph Keeny.....	James Kirk.....
Thomas M. Edmonson.....	H. L. Hightower.....
James Andrews.....

I now hereby certify that the above is a correct roll of a company organized on the 28th day of June, 1836, and tendered for the service of the United States, under my command, to Richard G. Dunlap, acting adjutant general of the State of Tennessee, and were marched to Athens, under the proclamation of Governor Cannon of the 6th of June, 1836, but left Athens without being mustered into service, in consequence of being informed that I could not be received in said service unless I could parade sixty-three men, rank and file, which I could not do, owing to the circumstance of some of my men having turned back, they being informed that there were already more men at Athens at that time than would be received by the government; the circumstance of these men turning back, before they reached the encampment, reduced my company below the number before stated. I further certify that I tendered said company as above stated on the 7th day of July, 1836.

JOHN B. CROZIER, *Captain.*

STATE OF TENNESSEE, *Anderson County:*

I, William Cross, clerk of the county court of said county, do now hereby certify that to my knowledge John B. Crozier raised a company of volunteers in the summer of 1836 in said county, and I saw him take up the line of march for Athens, Tennessee, the place of rendezvous, under the proclamation of Governor Cannon of the 6th of June, 1836; and I further certify that the above certificate of Captain Crozier is correct, from good authority.

Given under my hand, at Clinton, this 9th of September, 1837.

WILLIAM CROSS, *Clerk of the County Court.*

STATE OF TENNESSEE, *Anderson County:*

I, Hardy F. Marshall, do now certify that I was a first lieutenant in Captain Childs's company, from Anderson county, at Athens, on the 7th day of July, 1836, and that I saw Captain John B. Crozier and his company there at the same time.

HARDY F. MARSHALL.

I, Andrew Thompson, second lieutenant in said Childs's company, do now hereby confirm the above certificate of Hardy F. Marshall.

ANDREW THOMPSON.

Muster-roll of Captain Willie B. Watkins's company of Tennessee volunteer mounted militia, ordered into the service of the United States by Governor Newton Cannon.

No.	Names—present and absent.	Rank.	Enrolment			
			When.	Where.	By whom.	Period.
1	Willie B. Watkins.....	Captain.....	June 18, 1836.	Shelbyville, Bedford county.	Capt. Watkins ..	6 months.
2	George W. Hudlow	First lieutenant.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
3	John Galbreath	Second lieutenant.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
4	Thomas Hollond, jun.....	Ensign.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
1	Isaac A. Anderson.....	Private.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
2	John S. Burdett.....	First sergeant.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
3	Joel B. Burdett.....	Private.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
4	Thomas Brown.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
5	William Buffaloe.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
6	Willis Cochran.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
7	Henry Coats.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
8	Hosea G. Cardwell.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
9	William S. Chapman.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
10	John J. Frigid.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
11	John S. Green.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
12	James Green.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
13	Martin J. Gray.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
14	H. H. Greer.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
15	Michael Green, jun.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
16	Dawson Goodrick.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
17	Michael W. Green.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
18	Hugh C. Hurst.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
19	Wm. A. Hartsfield.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
20	G. G. W. Harmon.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
21	Lackin Humphreys.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
22	Labourn Hancock.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
23	Joseph M. Harris.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
24	Leander W. Harvey.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
25	William S. Hughes.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
26	Israel Harris.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
27	James Higgins.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
28	John E. Harrison.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
29	Low S. Harmon.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
30	David W. Head.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
31	John S. King.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
32	J. L. Lacey.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
33	Robert Matthews.....	Orderly sergeant.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
34	Robert Maddin.....	Private.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
35	William D. Maddin.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
36	Robert McLoaney.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
37	James C. Martin.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
38	John Maxwell.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
39	James McClintock.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
40	Anderson Olive.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
41	John Pauldwin.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
42	Samuel McKey Patton.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
43	H. H. Prewitt.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
44	James Patterson.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
45	Larkin B. Pinson.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
46	Charles Shanks.....	Second sergeant.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
47	Joshua H. Stewart.....	Private.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
48	James Smith.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
49	Joseph S. Shanks.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
50	Barnett Stevens.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
51	William B. Solomon.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
52	Joseph Travis.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
53	H. L. Thompson.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
54	Isaac Van Wee.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
55	C. D. Westerman.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
56	C. E. Wade.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
57	William Winters.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
58	Hampton Winters.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
59	William H. Wisner.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
60	William D. Warner.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
61	David M. Williams.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
62	Samuel Winter.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
63	Asa W. Young.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
64	E. H. Moore.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
65	William W. Wilson.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....

STATE OF TENNESSEE, *Executive Department* :

I, Newton Cannon, governor of the State aforesaid, do hereby certify that the officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, whose names are enrolled upon this roll, were duly called into service, and their services accepted by me during the summer of 1836, under my proclamation of June 6, 1836, to meet a requisition from the Secretary of War, dated the 25th day of May, 1836.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the great seal of the State to be [L. s.] affixed, at Nashville, the 30th day of August, 1837.

N. CANNON.

By the governor :

LUKE LEE, *Secretary of State*.

I certify, on honor, that this muster-roll exhibits the true state of Captain Willie B. Watkins's company of the Tennessee volunteer mounted militia, under the requisition of the Secretary of War of May 25, 1836, and Governor Cannon's proclamation of June 6, 1836, which was received by Governor Cannon for the period herein mentioned; that the remarks set opposite the name of each officer and soldier are accurate and just.

W. B. WATKINS, *Commanding the Company.*

Sworn to before me, September 9, 1837.

E. S. HALL, *Justice of the Peace.*

*Muster-roll of Captain Adrian Northcut's company.**

No.	Names—present and absent.	Rank.	Enrolment.				Travelling to place of rendezvous.
			When.	Where.	By whom.	Period.	
			1836.				
1	Adrian Northcut	Captain	June 23	Warren county	A. Northcut	Six months.	Morrison's + Roads.
2	Henry Moffat	1st lieut.	do	do	do	do	do
3	Wilson Stoner	2d lieut.	do	do	do	do	do
4	Thomas Thompson	Ensign	do	do	do	do	do
1	Daniel Oscar	Sergeant	do	do	do	do	do
2	Bartlett S. Wilson	do	do	do	do	do	do
3	Randolph Stone	do	do	do	do	do	do
4	James Moffer	do	do	do	do	do	do
1	Benjamin Wharton	Corporal	do	do	do	do	do
2	William Henshaw	do	do	do	do	do	do
3	Alfred Stokes	do	do	do	do	do	do
	Stephen McCorkle	Bugler	do	do	do	do	do
1	Owens Baker	Private	do	do	do	do	do
2	Thomas Barnes	do	do	do	do	do	do
3	Stephen Cope	do	do	do	do	do	do
4	John England	do	do	do	do	do	do
5	Daniel England	do	do	do	do	do	do
6	Archibald Eddy	do	do	do	do	do	do
7	William Eddy	do	do	do	do	do	do
8	James Gibbs	do	do	do	do	do	do
9	Thomas Gibbs	do	do	do	do	do	do
10	Hiram Heneger	do	do	do	do	do	do
11	John Hobs	do	do	do	do	do	do
12	Christopher Hobs	do	do	do	do	do	do
13	Abraham Hobs	do	do	do	do	do	do
14	Adrian Hobs	do	do	do	do	do	do
15	Richard Hobs	do	do	do	do	do	do
16	James Hobs	do	do	do	do	do	do
17	Benton Johnson	do	do	do	do	do	do
18	William Jones	do	do	do	do	do	do
19	John Lett	do	do	do	do	do	do
20	Jefferson Myers	do	do	do	do	do	do
21	Robert McCorkle	do	do	do	do	do	do
22	Hammond Morton	do	do	do	do	do	do
23	Stewart Myers	do	do	do	do	do	do
24	Thomas Mackay	do	do	do	do	do	do
25	John Myers	do	do	do	do	do	do
26	John Northcut	do	do	do	do	do	do
27	John Newton	do	do	do	do	do	do
28	Richard Owens	do	do	do	do	do	do
29	John Owens	do	do	do	do	do	do
30	James Packet	do	do	do	do	do	do
31	John Patunk	do	do	do	do	do	do
32	Newman N. Robinson	do	do	do	do	do	do
33	Thomas Ross	do	do	do	do	do	do
34	James Stoner	do	do	do	do	do	do
35	Richard Step	do	do	do	do	do	do
36	Andly Scott	do	do	do	do	do	do
37	Reuben Smart	do	do	do	do	do	do
38	Jonathan Scott	do	do	do	do	do	do
39	J. C. Strickler	do	do	do	do	do	do
40	John Smart	do	do	do	do	do	do
41	Edward Smith	do	do	do	do	do	do
42	Aaron Hanley	do	do	do	do	do	do
43	John S. Stanly	do	do	do	do	do	do
44	Alexander Smith	do	do	do	do	do	do
45	Samuel Savage	do	do	do	do	do	do
46	J. Savage	do	do	do	do	do	do
47	William Stoner	do	do	do	do	do	do
48	William Stokes	do	do	do	do	do	do
49	Robert H. Tate	do	do	do	do	do	do
50	James Tate	do	do	do	do	do	do
51	Madison Turner	do	do	do	do	do	do
52	William Warren	do	do	do	do	do	do

* This company rendezvoused at Morrison's + Roads, Warren county, elected officers on the 23d of June, 1836. Captain Northcut reported his company to his excellency Governor Cannon on same day, said company holding itself ready to march to the general rendezvous, Fayetteville, until Tuesday, the 28th of same month; at which time Captain Northcut received Governor Cannon's answer that his company could not be continued in the brigade at Fayetteville. Captain Northcut then dismissed his company to their homes, to wait further orders.

STATE OF TENNESSEE, *Executive Department* :

I, Newton Cannon, governor of the State aforesaid, do hereby certify that the officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, whose names are enrolled upon this roll, were duly called into service, and their services accepted by me, during the summer of 1836, under my proclamation of June 6, 1836, to meet the requisition of the Secretary of War, dated the 25th of May, 1836.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the great seal of the State to be [L. s.] affixed, at Nashville, the 30th day of August, 1837.

N. CANNON.

By the governor :

LUKE LEA, *Secretary of State.*

STATE OF TENNESSEE, *Warren County* :

I, Adrian Northcut, do hereby certify that the annexed is a correct roll of the volunteer company who tendered their services to the United States, under my command, and were received by Governor Cannon, under the proclamation of the 6th of June, 1836.

Given under my hand this 7th day of August, 1837.

ADRIAN NORTH CUT, *Captain, Commanding the Company.*

STATE OF TENNESSEE, *Warren County* :

This day personally appeared the above-named Adrian Northcut before me, William McGregor, an acting justice of the peace in and for said county of Warren, and made oath that the facts stated in the last and foregoing certificate are true, to the best of his knowledge and belief.

ADRIAN NORTH CUT.

Sworn and subscribed before me this 7th day of August, 1837.

W. MCGREGOR, *Justice of the Peace for said County.*

Muster-roll of Captain Benet G. White's company of the brigade of Tennessee volunteer mounted militia, ordered into the service of the United States by his excellency Governor Cannon, from the 27th day of June, 1836, to the 26th day of June, 1837.

No.	Names—present and absent.	Rank.	Enrolment.			
			When.	Where.	By whom.	Period.
1	B. G. White.....	Captain.....	June 21, 1836.	Millersburg, Rutherford county.	B. G. White.....	12 months.
2	William W. Miller.....	1st lieutenant.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
3	E. A. C. Norman.....	2d lieutenant.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
4	Willis Banks.....	Cornet.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
1	Stokely C. White.....	1st sergeant.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
2	L. D. Newman.....	2d sergeant.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
3	William Hartless.....	3d sergeant.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
1	William R. Bleekly.....	1st corporal.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
2	Jesse Scott.....	2d corporal.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
3	Edward Curry.....	3d corporal.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
1	Edward Adcock.....	Private.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
2	Josiah Alexana.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
3	Morgan Abor.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
4	Richard Brown.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
5	Hamon Bullock.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
6	Moses C. Bughan.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
7	Champion Bailey.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
8	James Burkes.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
9	William Burkes.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
10	George Burkes.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
11	William A. Blackborn.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
12	Lazareth Belt.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
13	William Carter.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
14	R. E. Cluckerbud.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
15	Reuben Curry.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
16	William R. Clark.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
17	Newton A. Clark.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
18	M. J. Clemens.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
19	George W. Dalton.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
20	Lyman P. Elliot.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
21	John Estus.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
22	Joseph Fox.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
23	Abraham Gregory.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
24	Allen Gowen.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
25	Reuben Gordon.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
26	William Gowen.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
27	George B. Hill.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....

Muster-roll of Captain Benet G. White's company—Continued.

No.	Names—present and absent.	Rank.	Enrolment.			
			When.	Where.	By whom.	Period.
28	Lewis Howland.....	Private.....	June 21, 1836.	Millersburg, Rutler- ford county.	B. G. White	12 months.
29	Henry Harse.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
30	John F. Howland.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
31	Stephen U. Jamison.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
32	William Johnson.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
33	Columbus M. Johnson.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
34	H. B. Johnson.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
35	William Lynch.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
36	Andrew I. Lynch.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
37	Isaac J. Miller.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
38	Joseph T. Miller.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
39	Robert J. Mayfield.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
40	Robert McGill.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
41	John Miller.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
42	Samuel Marr.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
43	Henry McCullen.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
44	Alfred Marr.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
45	John McCoy.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
46	Milton McMellon.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
47	Mathew Miller.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
48	Milton McClew.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
49	William Mallory.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
50	John Newman.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
51	William Norman.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
52	Jesse F. Nichol.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
53	Francis E. J. Naire.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
54	Henry Norman.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
55	John Preuit.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
56	William Preuit.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
57	James S. Perry.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
58	Mathew H. Prewit.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
59	John Rawlins.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
60	Edward Rouse.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
61	Lemon Rouse.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
62	Jordan Scott.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
63	John Smothers.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
64	J. D. Scott.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
65	Joab Scott.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
66	John A. Stafford.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
67	Stephen Stovall.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
68	Hollis Thomas.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
69	Richard S. Thomas.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
70	Edward Waller.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
71	James G. Wooten.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....
72	Alexander C. Wooten.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	do.....

STATE OF TENNESSEE, *Executive Department* :

I, Newton Cannon, governor of the State aforesaid, do hereby certify that the officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, whose names are enrolled upon this roll, were duly called into service, and their services accepted by me, during the summer of 1836, under my proclamation of June 6, 1836, to meet a requisition from the Secretary of War, dated the 25th day of May, 1836.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the great seal of the State to be [L. s.] affixed, at Nashville, the 26th day of August, 1837.

N. CANNON.

By the governor:

LUKE LEA, *Secretary of State.*

I hereby certify that the annexed is a correct roll of the volunteer company that was tendered for the service of the United States under my command, and received by Governor Cannon, under the proclamation of June 6, 1836.

B. G. WHITE, *Captain.*

Sworn and subscribed before me this 7th day of August, 1837.

STOKELY WHITE, *Justice of the Peace.*

I certify, on honor, that this muster-roll exhibits the true state of Captain B. G. White's company of the Tennessee mounted volunteers, under the requisition of the Secretary of War, dated May 25, 1836, and Governor Cannon's proclamation of June 6, 1836, for the period herein mentioned; that the remarks set opposite the name of each officer and soldier are accurate and just.

B. G. WHITE, *Captain, Commanding the Company.*

Sworn and subscribed before me, July 7, 1837.

JOHN P. GREER, *Justice of the Peace.*

Muster-roll of Captain Henry S. Maxwell's company of Tennessee volunteer mounted militia, ordered into service of the United States by Governor Newton Cannon, from the 18th day of June, 1836, to the 18th day of June, 1837.

No.	Names—present and absent	Rank.	Enrolment.			
			When.	Where.	By whom.	Period.
1	Henry S. Maxwell	Captain	June 18, 1836	Livingston T., Overton county.	Captain Maxwell.	6 months.
2	George W. Gore	1st lieutenant	do	do	do	do
3	John B. Chester	2d lieutenant	do	do	do	do
4	John Mathews	Ensign	do	do	do	do
1	James R. Copeland	Sergeant	do	do	do	do
2	James Eldridge	do	do	do	do	do
3	Thomas Maxwell	do	do	do	do	do
4	Lawrence Mathews	Corporal	do	do	do	do
5	Adam Dick	do	do	do	do	do
6	John Riggs	do	do	do	do	do
1	Walter S. Alley	Private	do	do	do	do
2	Washington Ashburn	do	do	do	do	do
3	Philip Askins	do	do	do	do	do
4	Samuel Allred	do	do	do	do	do
5	P. M. Armstrong	do	do	do	do	do
6	Benjamin Bilyer	do	do	do	do	do
7	John S. Bailey	do	do	do	do	do
8	John Bunch	do	do	do	do	do
9	Charles Bunch	do	do	do	do	do
10	George Barrett	do	do	do	do	do
11	John Carmack	do	do	do	do	do
12	Albert S. Christian	do	do	do	do	do
13	Isaac Carmack	do	do	do	do	do
14	Wilkinson Copeland	do	do	do	do	do
15	George Cain	do	do	do	do	do
16	Alvin Collum	do	do	do	do	do
17	Thompson Cash	do	do	do	do	do
18	Robert A. Chesney	do	do	do	do	do
19	George W. Christian	do	do	do	do	do
20	Josiah S. Copeland	do	do	do	do	do
21	Abi Deck	do	do	do	do	do
22	Thomas J. Doss	do	do	do	do	do
23	James C. Oglesby	do	do	do	do	do
24	John D. Eldridge	do	do	do	do	do
25	Granville Finley	do	do	do	do	do
26	Thomas Fancher	do	do	do	do	do
27	Gideon Gardenhier	do	do	do	do	do
28	William Holman	do	do	do	do	do
29	Mathew Holford	do	do	do	do	do
30	William S. Harris	do	do	do	do	do
31	Augustus Humble	do	do	do	do	do
32	John G. Hewson	do	do	do	do	do
33	Samuel Hardy	do	do	do	do	do
34	John Jones	do	do	do	do	do
35	James S. Lunday	do	do	do	do	do
36	William Matthews	do	do	do	do	do
37	Breanson G. Murphy	do	do	do	do	do
38	Absalom Matlock	do	do	do	do	do
39	Emberson Miller	do	do	do	do	do
40	Richard Morris	do	do	do	do	do
41	James Maxwell	do	do	do	do	do
42	Harris Matlock	do	do	do	do	do
43	William D. Officer	do	do	do	do	do
44	William A. Officer	do	do	do	do	do
45	Pleasant Ogletree	do	do	do	do	do
46	Jesse Phillips	do	do	do	do	do
47	Solomon Pool	do	do	do	do	do
48	Richard Poston	do	do	do	do	do
49	John Patterson	do	do	do	do	do
50	Martin Qualls	do	do	do	do	do
51	George A. Ray	do	do	do	do	do
52	Thomas G. Riggs	do	do	do	do	do
53	George W. Ruckman	do	do	do	do	do
54	Benjamin K. Stewart	do	do	do	do	do
55	William Smith	do	do	do	do	do
56	James Sims	do	do	do	do	do
57	George W. Shepperd	do	do	do	do	do
58	Thomas Sisco	do	do	do	do	do
59	Preston Speck	do	do	do	do	do
60	Thomas J. Strane	do	do	do	do	do
61	Morgan Speck	do	do	do	do	do
62	Benjamin C. Stewart	do	do	do	do	do
63	Thomas Shepherd	do	do	do	do	do
64	James B. Timcock	do	do	do	do	do
65	Michael Teague	do	do	do	do	do
66	John W. Teague	do	do	do	do	do
67	William Taylor	do	do	do	do	do
68	Abner Vickeray	do	do	do	do	do
69	Gramblin Weeks	do	do	do	do	do

Muster-roll of Henry S. Maxwell's company—Continued.

No.	Names—present and absent.	Rank	Enrolment.			
			When.	Where.	By whom.	Period.
70	Reuben J. West	Private	June 18, 1836	Livingston T., Overton county.	Captain Maxwell.	6 months.
71	Alexander O. Walker	do	do	do	do	do
72	Martin G. White	do	do	do	do	do
73	Armistead Walker	do	do	do	do	do
74	John K. Young	do	do	do	do	do
75	Josiah L. Watson	do	do	do	do	do

STATE OF TENNESSEE, *Executive Department* :

I, Newton Cannon, governor of the State aforesaid, do hereby certify that the company of Captain Maxwell was received by me, as stated in his certificate, and held in readiness to supply any deficiency in organizing the East Tennessee brigade, or the place of those who might retire from the service at the expiration of the six months for which they were received.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the great seal of the State to be [L. s.] affixed, at Nashville, the 12th day of September, 1837.

N. CANNON.

By the governor:

LUKE LEA, *Secretary of State.*

I certify, on honor, that this muster-roll exhibits the true state of Captain Henry S. Maxwell's company of the Tennessee volunteer mounted militia, under the requisition of the Secretary of War of May 25, 1836, and Governor Cannon's proclamation of June 6, 1836, for the period herein mentioned, and that the remarks set opposite the name of each officer and soldier are accurate and just.

H. S. MAXWELL, *Commanding the Company.*

Sworn to before me, September 1, 1837.

E. S. HALL, *Justice of the Peace.*

Muster-roll of Captain William Lauderdale's company of the brigade of Tennessee mounted volunteer militia, ordered into service of the United States by Governor Newton Cannon, from June 17, 1836, to June 17, 1837.

Number.	Names—present and absent.	Rank.	Enrolment.				Travelling.		Subsistence furnished by themselves.	Forage furnished by themselves.
			When.	Where.	By whom.	Period.	To place of rendezvous.	From place of discharge home.		
1	William Lauderdale*	Captain.....	June 17, 1836	Sumner county ..	Wm. Lauderdale ..	Months.	Miles.	Miles.	Days.	Days.
2	R. B. Alexander†	1st lieutenant...	do	do	do	12	105	5	5
3	E. R. Dalton	2d lieutenant...	do	do	do	12	105	10	10
4	Young Ball	Ensign	do	do	do	12
1	Patrick Duffey	1st sergeant	do	do	do	12	105	105	10	10
2	B. W. Miles	2d sergeant	do	do	do	12	105	105	10	10
3	J. M. Alexander‡	3d sergeant	do	do	do	12	5	5
4	Robert Parsley	4th sergeant	do	do	do	12	105	10	10
1	J. W. Dalton	1st corporal	do	do	do	12	105	105	10	10
2	P. W. Duncan	2d corporal	do	do	do	12	105	105	10	10
3	A. Penyear	3d corporal	do	do	do	12	105	105	10	10
4	Joseph Griffin	Bugleman	do	do	do	12	105	105	10	10
1	Robert Brown§	Private	do	do	do	12	105	5	5
2	Charles Burnsley	do	do	do	do	12	105	10	10
3	Archibald Brice	do	do	do	do	12	105	105	10	10
4	John W. Briggs	do	do	do	do	12	105	105	10	10
5	Martin L. Brown	do	do	do	do	12	105	105	10	10
6	John Crenshaw	do	do	do	do	12	105	105	10	10
7	J. Caro	do	do	do	do	12	105	105	10	10
8	Jordan Carr	do	do	do	do	12	105	105	10	10
9	Robert C. Dalton	do	do	do	do	12	105	105	10	10

* Appointed captain spy company July 2, 1836.
 † Joined Captain Bledsoe's company by enrolment July 2, 1836.

‡ Appointed 1st lieutenant spy company July 2, 1836.
 § Joined Captain Henry's company by enrolment July 2, 1836.

Muster-roll of Captain William Lauderdale's company—Continued.

Number.	Names—present and absent.	Rank.	Enrolment.				Travelling.		Subsistence furnished by themselves.	Forage furnished by themselves.
			When.	Where.	By whom.	Period.	To place of rendezvous.	From place of rendezvous.		
						Months.	Miles.	Miles.	Days.	Days.
10	Brooker H. Dalton	Private	June 17, 1836	Sumner county	Wm. Lauderdale	12	105	105	10	10
11	J. T. Farlong	do	do	do	do	12	105	105	10	10
12	H. J. Ford	do	do	do	do	12	105	105	10	10
13	William G. Ford	do	do	do	do	12	105	105	10	10
14	William Graham	do	do	do	do	12	105	105	10	10
15	William L. Hughes	do	do	do	do	12	105	105	10	10
16	Jesse Holt	do	do	do	do	12	105	105	10	10
17	William E. Johnson*	do	do	do	do	12			5	5
18	John Kerby*	do	do	do	do	12			5	5
19	King Kerby	do	do	do	do	12		105	10	10
20	Richard S. McConnell	do	do	do	do	12		105	10	10
21	James A. Moore	do	do	do	do	12		105	10	10
22	John McConnell	do	do	do	do	12		105	10	10
23	Daniel P. Morgan	do	do	do	do	12		105	10	10
24	John Moppin	do	do	do	do	12		105	10	10
25	Lot Murphy	do	do	do	do	12		105	10	10
26	A. D. Martin†	do	do	do	do	12			5	5
27	William Proctor‡	do	do	do	do	12			5	5
28	Thomas Penyear	do	do	do	do	12		105	10	10
29	Henry Reckman	do	do	do	do	12		105	10	10
30	John W. Reese	do	do	do	do	12		105	10	10
31	John Rhodes*	do	do	do	do	12			5	5
32	John H. Seawell†	do	do	do	do	12			5	5
33	J. P. Seawell‡	do	do	do	do	12			5	5
34	Wm. W. Sommersett	do	do	do	do	12		105	10	10
35	Charles N. Tully	do	do	do	do	12		105	10	10
36	William A. Thompson	do	do	do	do	12		105	10	10
37	Hend. W. Fowler†	do	do	do	do	12			5	5
38	William Vance	do	do	do	do	12		105	10	10
39	William Young	do	do	do	do	12		105	10	10
40	Samuel Grigg*	do	do	do	do	12			5	5
41	James Sharp	do	do	do	do	12		105	10	10
42	H. Moore	do	do	do	do	12		105	10	10

* Joined Captain Henry's company by enrolment July 2, 1836.

† Joined Captain Fletcher's company by enrolment July 2, 1836.

‡ Joined Captain Bledsoe's company by enrolment July 2, 1836.

STATE OF TENNESSEE, Executive Department :

I, Newton Cannon, governor of the State aforesaid, do hereby certify that the officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, whose names are enrolled in this roll, were duly called into service, and their services accepted by me, during the summer of 1836, under my proclamation of June 6, 1836, to meet the requisition of the Secretary of War, dated May 25, 1836.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the great seal of the State to be [L. S.] affixed, at Nashville, the 30th day of August, 1837.

N. CANNON.

By the governor:

LUKE LEA, Secretary of State.

I certify, on honor, that this muster-roll exhibits the true state of Captain William Lauderdale's company of Tennessee mounted volunteers, under the requisition of the Secretary of War, dated May 25, 1836, and Governor Cannon's proclamation of June 6, 1836, for the period herein mentioned; that the remarks set opposite the name of each officer and private are accurate and just; and that said company marched from Sumner county to Fayetteville, being 105 miles, when said company was dismissed July 2, to wait for further orders, having remained in camp four days.

WM. LAUDERDALE, Commanding the Company.

STATE OF TENNESSEE, Sumner County :

Subscribed and sworn to this August 18, 1837, before me.

S. G. GOODALL, an acting Justice of the Peace for said County

Muste-roll of Captain Patrick Callaway's company of the brigade of Tennessee mounted volunteer militia, ordered into the service of the United States by Governor Newton Cannon, from the 17th day of June, 1836, to the 17th day of June, 1837.

No.	Names—present and absent.	Rank.	Enrolment.			
			When.	Where.	By whom.	Period.
1	Patrick Callaway	Captain	June 17, 1836	Salem, Franklin Co.	P. Callaway	12 months.
2	James M. Crauly	1st lieutenant	do	do	do	do
3	Rufus C. Petts ^o	2d lieutenant	do	do	do	do
4	Thomas B. Griffin	Ensign	do	do	do	do
1	Clinton Hunt ^o	Sergeant	do	do	do	do
2	Coleman Aldridge	Private	do	do	do	do
3	John B. Adway	do	do	do	do	do
4	D. M. Brittain	do	do	do	do	do
5	Michael Beryhill	do	do	do	do	do
6	Andrew Brant	do	do	do	do	do
7	James Burke	do	do	do	do	do
8	John Blair	do	do	do	do	do
9	John Austin	do	do	do	do	do
10	John M. Cavenagh	do	do	do	do	do
11	Wm. Chasteen	do	do	do	do	do
12	Pleartas Collins	do	do	do	do	do
13	Daniel Donathew	do	do	do	do	do
14	Wm. N. Donathew	do	do	do	do	do
15	James Davis	do	do	do	do	do
16	Cornelius Davis	do	do	do	do	do
17	E. McLane Dicky	do	do	do	do	do
18	George Dicky	do	do	do	do	do
19	Greer B. Conway	do	do	do	do	do
20	Edward Foster	do	do	do	do	do
21	Stephen Frost	do	do	do	do	do
22	Isaac D. Gore	do	do	do	do	do
23	George W. Hunt	do	do	do	do	do
24	Francis Hill	do	do	do	do	do
25	Stanley Hale	do	do	do	do	do
26	Noah Jarett	do	do	do	do	do
27	Jery Kent	do	do	do	do	do
28	James N. Kitchers	do	do	do	do	do
29	Daniel Kitchers	do	do	do	do	do
30	Sam. S. Kitchers	do	do	do	do	do
31	Peter Lanbork	do	do	do	do	do
32	Thomas J. Matlock	do	do	do	do	do
33	R. W. McLane ^o	do	do	do	do	do
34	Thomas F. Morely	do	do	do	do	do
35	John Miles	do	do	do	do	do
36	Pearson Miller	do	do	do	do	do
37	William Mauro	do	do	do	do	do
38	John F. Martin	do	do	do	do	do
39	Thomas McClure	do	do	do	do	do
40	Edward Martin	do	do	do	do	do
41	Asa Oliver ^o	do	do	do	do	do
42	Samuel Perckett	do	do	do	do	do
43	Step. M. Polcock	do	do	do	do	do
44	Preston Rich	do	do	do	do	do
45	A. A. Rutledge	do	do	do	do	do
46	James Smith	do	do	do	do	do
47	G. A. Stovall	do	do	do	do	do
48	Alf. R. Sisk	do	do	do	do	do
49	Hezekiah Legett	do	do	do	do	do
50	John H. Smith	do	do	do	do	do
51	Thos. J. Saundridge	do	do	do	do	do
52	Joseph W. Trigg	do	do	do	do	do
53	Thomas Tailor	do	do	do	do	do
54	John J. Travis	do	do	do	do	do
55	James E. Travis	do	do	do	do	do
56	Rob. W. Thompson	do	do	do	do	do
57	Wm. C. Woods	do	do	do	do	do
58	Hiram Wallace	do	do	do	do	do
59	Isaac C. Whitaker	do	do	do	do	do
60	Alfred Young	do	do	do	do	do
61	Alfred Bostick ^o	do	do	do	do	do
62	James S. Freeman	do	do	do	do	do

^o Joined Captain Roberts's company July 1, 1836.

STATE OF TENNESSEE, *Executive Department*:

I, Newton Cannon, governor of the State of Tennessee aforesaid, do hereby certify that the officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, whose names are enrolled on this roll, were duly called into service, and their services accepted by me, during the summer of 1836, under my proclamation of June 6, 1836, to meet a requisition of the Secretary of War, dated the 25th day of May, 1836.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the great seal of the State to be [L. s.] affixed, at Nashville, the 30th day of August, 1837.

N. CANNON.

By the governor:

LUKE LEA, *Secretary of State.*

I certify, on honor, that this muster-roll exhibits the true state of Captain Patrick Callaway's company of the Tennessee mounted volunteer militia, under the requisition of the Secretary of War, dated May 25, and Governor Cannon's proclamation of June 6, 1836, for the period herein mentioned; that the remarks set opposite the name of each officer and soldier are accurate and just, and that said company continued to hold itself in readiness for service from date of organization to July 15, 1836.

PATRICK CALLAWAY, *Captain, Commanding the Company.*

Sworn and subscribed before me August 20, 1837.

JOHN WRIGHT, *Justice of the Peace.*

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 747.

[2D SESSION.]

ON THE IMPORTANCE AND SUPERIORITY OF HALL'S RIFLE FOR THE PUBLIC SERVICE,
AND THE PROPRIETY OF MAKING COMPENSATION TO THE INVENTOR FOR ITS USE.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE DECEMBER 21, 1837.

Mr. TIFTON, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred the petition of John H. Hall, reported :

That this case has again received the consideration which its nature demanded, and which has brought into view the following state of facts :

The petitioner, John H. Hall, is the inventor of fire-arms embracing advantages for the public service over all others hitherto discovered.

Hall's rifles attracted the earnest attention of the appropriate branch of the military department as early as 1817, and were purchased for the use of the government, at that time, at \$25 per stand.

The importance of these arms in the military service having become more obvious, the inventor was engaged, by contract with the Ordnance department, to superintend their fabrication at the national armory at Harper's Ferry, on the 19th of March, 1819, which engagement was renewed under contracts made March 8, 1827, and April 22, 1828, and has been continued up to the present time.

The invention being of a nature calculated almost exclusively for the public service, and being found to merit the continued attention of the government, every proper encouragement within the power of the Executive has been extended to the inventor in the manufacture of these arms, and it appears that, from the invention and improvement of the machinery used in their fabrication, he has effected a great saving to the government, so that this rifle is now obtained at \$14 50, being one-half of its original cost.

The reputation of this arm rests not alone upon experimental trial, by which, however, it has undergone the most severe test and scrutiny, but has been fully established by practical use in the hands of the appropriate corps of the army, and, by withstanding the ordeal incident to the vicissitudes of the military service, has established the strongest claim to continue the proper defence of that corps.

The testimony upon which the committee relies is deemed conclusive as to the facts above stated, and will be found embodied in the report made by the Military Committee of the House of Representatives, on February 24, 1836, and the documents connected therewith; the documents submitted with the report from the committee of the Senate on January 14, 1837, and the documents communicated by the Secretary of War on the 19th of September last, in compliance with a resolution of the Senate of January 21, 1837; all of which reports and documents have been printed and placed among the documents of Congress.

As these documents may easily be referred to, it is considered unnecessary by the committee to cause them to be again printed; nor is it deemed requisite to make any extracts from them, further than a few words from the concluding remarks of the board of officers convened for the purpose of instituting a comparison between Hall's fire-arms and others of merit, under the resolution of the Senate before referred to.

After many trials and scientific deductions, this highly respectable board of experienced officers state that "the board is confirmed in the opinion that the arm of Hall is entitled to all the favorable consideration which has heretofore been bestowed upon it by previously constituted boards and commissions," and "having successfully undergone the trials of service and the examination and thorough inspection of those commissions, has again exhibited to this board powers and excellencies (capable, doubtless, of augmentation) far superior, in the opinion of the board, to those possessed by any other arm which has been subjected to its examination."

From these premises, the facts being established and the invention being of a nature calculated, if not exclusively, certainly in a material degree, for the public service alone, and not likely, from any probable application to private use, to remunerate the individual for the cost and merit of its discovery and improvement, the committee deem it but just that a suitable pecuniary reward should be extended to him by the government, under such conditions as may secure the entire right of the inventions and the services of the inventor to the United States.

In conformity with these views, the committee report a bill for the benefit of the petitioner.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 748.

[2D SESSION.]

ON THE NECESSARY FORTIFICATIONS FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE HARBOR OF NEW LONDON, CONNECTICUT, AND THE FACILITIES FOR ESTABLISHING A NAVY YARD AT THAT PLACE.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DECEMBER 22, 1837.

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, *Washington, December 19, 1837.*

SIR: In answer to your query respecting Fort Griswold, I have the honor to state that it is not included in the list of works estimated for this year. The custom of the department has heretofore been to submit estimates for those works only the construction of which has been authorized by law. Fort Griswold, not being of that number, was therefore not included. The harbor of New London is, however, an important one, and it will be seen by the enclosed copy of a letter to the Hon. A. T. Judson, of May 12, 1836, that its defence has already engaged the attention of the Senate. The board of engineers have placed in the class of works "to be constructed immediately" a work for the defence of New London, estimated to cost \$198,000; and were the services of an officer of engineers available, the preparatory surveys might be commenced at once with great advantage to the public security.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. GRATIOT, *Chief Engineer.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *May 12, 1836.*

SIR: In answer to your letter of yesterday, I have the honor to state that two works have been projected by the engineer board as necessary for the defence of New London: one, placed by them in the first class, for Fort Griswold, which you will find at page 58 of document 243, estimated to cost \$198,000; and the other, in the second class, for Fort Trumbull, and estimated to cost \$116,000, which you will find at page 60 of the same document.

The bill before the House contemplates, I believe, no appropriation for New London; it is embraced in bill No. 123, before the Senate.

The amount is \$100,000, and is referred to in the 19th page of the same document as among the works that ought to be constructed.

Should the sum of \$100,000 be appropriated, as proposed, a re-examination will take place previous to the expenditure, and the necessary amount will be applied in such manner as the public interest may seem to require.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

LEWIS CASS.

Hon. A. T. JUDSON, *House of Representatives.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *December 19, 1837.*

SIR: The accompanying letter of the chief engineer explains the reasons why the defences of New London were not included in the estimates furnished by this department.

The defence of New London is regarded by this department to be of great importance, and it is recommended that, after the necessary preliminary survey, the works for Fort Griswold be commenced at an early day, and that \$50,000 be appropriated for that purpose.

The papers are herewith returned.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Hon. C. C. CAMBRELENG, *Chairman Committee of Ways and Means, House of Representatives.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *January 17, 1837.*

SIR: Herewith I have the honor to transmit you a copy of a letter addressed to me by the honorable Messrs. Ingham and Haley, of the House of Representatives, relative to the making of some provision for the defence of the mouth of the Connecticut river and of the harbor of New London. I concur with these gentlemen in their views of the importance of the subject, and beg leave to respectfully recommend the adoption of such measures, on the part of the Committee on Military Affairs, as will insure the insertion in the proper bill of \$50,000 for the erection of defences for the harbor of New London, and of \$20,000 for a like object for the mouth of the Connecticut river.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War ad interim.*

Hon. R. M. JOHNSON, *Chairman Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives.*

I am directed by the Military Committee to say to the Committee of Ways and Means that they concur with the Secretary of War in his views, and ask the Committee of Ways and Means to make the appropriation in some appropriate bill, and oblige

RICHARD M. JOHNSON, *Chairman.*

JANUARY 26, 1837.

WASHINGTON, *December 27, 1836.*

Sir: We very much regret that we feel ourselves under the necessity of again troubling you in relation to the fortifications at New London harbor and the mouth of Connecticut river. It is not necessary for us at this time to point out the extreme suffering of the inhabitants of New London and the adjacent towns in the revolutionary and late wars, a great part of which was for the want of a little protection from the general government. Now, to say that the most horrible scene of human butchery took place at Fort Griswold in the revolutionary war, as well as the train of misery, with the destruction of property which immediately followed, is saying what is well known; and, sir, nothing but a want of information, on the part of the British, of the situation of the posts at New London, during the late war, saved the frigates and sloop-of-war, then in the harbor, from being taken out or destroyed by the enemy, had they followed them up at the time they entered the harbor. Now, as representatives of the inhabitants of that section of the State where those scenes have transpired, we ask at the hands of the Secretary of War to recommend to the Committee of Ways and Means an appropriation for the protection of the lives and the property of the inhabitants of that place, as well as the property of the United States, which have and probably may again want protection, which they obtained not so much from the forts as from the inhabitants in the vicinity. But to this there seems to be at least two objections: the first is, that the report made by the Committee of Ways and Means embraces no other fortifications than those that are now in progress; and the other is, that if an appropriation should be recommended for the fortifications in Connecticut, it would endanger the whole bill. In answer to the first objection, we would observe that, although the bill does not embrace any other fortifications than those now in progress, it does not go to show that the fortifications in Connecticut should be entirely neglected. If the fortifications at New London harbor and the one at Saybrook had been placed where they ought to have been—with Fort Adams, in Rhode Island, and the fortifications at Boston harbor, and others further west—we should have been placed in the same situation with the two adjoining States on the seaboard. But not one dollar was appropriated for fortifications in the State of Connecticut at the last session of Congress, when the sum of \$200,000 was appropriated for one single fort in Rhode Island, and others, both east and west of us, receiving a like proportion from the government; and we believe about the same sum is recommended for those highly favored States to be expended the ensuing year, while the whole coast of Connecticut, of one hundred miles in length, is totally neglected, although more exposed to the enemy in time of war than any other part of the United States, for the plain reason that Long Island lies the whole length of the State, and forms a harbor that large ships can be safe at any season of the year, and watching every opportunity for plunder and every depredation that is in their power to commit. But it seems that our suffering is not yet complete, and that we must be left in the like exposed condition. I believe General Gratiot observed that if amendments were offered, it would endanger the whole bill; but we see it to be an every day's practice, when bills are before the House, for amendments to be offered, and, as in the present case, to make them more perfect. I think the House will consider it so, and more especially when they know that it is recommended by the authority to which we have applied.

The vast amount of business of almost every description which is prosecuted in the great and fertile valley of the Connecticut is dependent more or less upon the commerce of Connecticut river. This is the largest river, and it is believed that the amount of commerce upon it is not surpassed by that of any other river in New England. All the commercial intercourse of the whole valley, with New York and other Atlantic as well as foreign towns and cities, is carried on through the mouth of Connecticut river. During the last war an armed force from Commodore Hardy's squadron entered this river in the night season and destroyed more private property in two hours than it would have cost to have erected a good and permanent fort and garrisoned it during the whole war. It is confidently believed that there are no two places in this country that present stronger claims upon the justice of government than New London and the mouth of Connecticut river, while there are none of their importance that have been so entirely neglected.

As there is no other bill for fortifications which we think will be likely to pass the present session of Congress, we therefore hope your honor will see the necessity of recommending a reasonable sum to be expended on those fortifications above alluded to.

We are, sir, with the greatest respect, your most obedient, humble servants,

ELISHA HALEY.
SAMUEL INGHAM.

Hon. BENJAMIN F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War*

REPRESENTATIVES CHAMBER, *January 24, 1837.*

Sir: My situation as one of the representatives of the people of the State of Connecticut impresses upon me the duty of submitting to you a brief statement relating to public works for the defence of a particular point in that State—the mouth of Connecticut river.

The Connecticut is the largest river in New England. The great extent of the valley of that river—reaching, as it does, through Connecticut, Massachusetts, Vermont, and New Hampshire—the vast amount of business, agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial, transacted in it, is matter of public notoriety. The numerous large, thriving, and wealthy towns and villages upon its banks, the very easy approach to them from Long Island sound, with many other important considerations, unite to furnish the strongest motives to a public enemy to enter the river and destroy the property upon and near it.

Long Island sound, into which the waters of the Connecticut are discharged, furnishes one of the best harbors in the world for ships-of-war. They can ride there in perfect safety in sight and within cannon-shot of our shores, and, seizing upon a favorable opportunity, may throw themselves in sufficient force on to the river, complete their work of destruction, and make safe their retreat.

Near the mouth of this river, on its right bank, are the remains of a fort which was erected in 1640. A garrison was maintained there many years during the early history of that section of our country. It was rebuilt and garrisoned during the whole of the revolutionary war. So important was it considered that it was again rebuilt and garrisoned in the commencement of the late war, and continued to be so garrisoned until about April 1, 1814, when the troops were withdrawn to defend the city of New London, about 18 miles distant, and the ships-of-war United States and Macedonian, which had taken refuge in the river Thames for protection.

Taking advantage of this absence of the troops from the fort, an armed force from the British squadron, then in Long Island sound, blockading all the ports and harbors of Connecticut, entered the river in launches, in the night season, ascended about eight miles, and *burned 21 sail of vessels*; among which were some of the finest ships that ever floated—all private property. One-half the amount which was at that time reduced to ashes would be sufficient to rebuild and construct a fort on the most approved plan for the defence of that point, and to have garrisoned it during the whole of the last war.

There is scarcely a more important point in New England; but few furnishing higher inducements for attack, and none more exposed.

It is therefore respectfully submitted that public justice, as well as the reasonable claims of that section of the country, require that an appropriation should be made to rebuild said fort upon a permanent plan, and put that important point in a proper state of defence.

With great respect, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

SAMUEL INGHAM.

Hon. R. M. JOHNSON, *Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs.*

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, *Washington, January 28, 1837.*

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 24th instant, enclosing certain communications in reference to permanently fortifying the mouth of the Connecticut river and the harbor of New London, and requesting further information in relation to the works formerly erected at these points, and as to the best mode and form of making an appropriation for their defence. By reference to document No. 243, House of Representatives, of last session, vol. 6, p. 40, you will perceive that the importance of these positions has not been overlooked by the board of engineers, and that permanent works are there proposed for their protection. The old forts at New London are in a dilapidated condition, contracted in their dimensions, easy of escalade, and would require to be rebuilt anew. In the report of the board of engineers above alluded to, these give place to more efficient works, the plans of which are all matured, and merely require an appropriation for their commencement. The work at the mouth of the Connecticut river, it is believed, was originally built by the militia of the county, to protect its banks and commerce from the pillage of an enemy, to which, upon any attack upon our coast, it is so liable from its accessible position, its neighborhood to the great harbors on that frontier, and the inducements held out to marauding parties. No survey has yet been made of this position, nor has the mode of defending it yet been determined on. The appropriation recommended by the Secretary of War will enable the department to mature the necessary plans, and make preparations for commencing the work the coming season. The annexed form of a bill is presented for your consideration, and the papers communicated with your letter are herewith returned.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

C. GRATIOT.

Hon. C. C. CAMBRELENG, *Chairman Committee of Ways and Means, House of Representatives.*

AN ACT making appropriations for certain fortifications of the United States for the year 1837.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the following sums be, and the same are hereby, appropriated, to be paid out of any unappropriated money in the treasury, for certain fortifications, viz:

For fortifications at New London harbor, fifty thousand dollars.

For fortifications at the mouth of the Connecticut river, twenty thousand dollars.

New London offers, in the roads of Thames river, a safe and landlocked harbor to first-rate vessels; and they can sail up this stream, which never freezes, to five and a half miles above the city, or seven and a quarter miles above the mouth of the river. The Thames is three-quarters of a mile wide in front of the light-house, and its channel for receiving vessels of 24 feet draught half a mile wide; its greatest depth, $5\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms. Its direction is north, as far as Gales's Ferry, seven or eight miles above the light-house, and it retains a breadth of 500 or 600 yards to half a mile above Fort Trumbull. In front of New London the channel is 400 yards wide, and its breadth diminishes gradually to 200 yards below Mamocock Point, 150 above it, and 100 at Galestown and Gales's Ferry.

Dividing into two branches, three-quarters of a mile below this last point, the eastern division runs under the point at Galestown, and the western under the point of Gales's Ferry.

The first offers successively 3, $3\frac{1}{2}$, 4, $3\frac{1}{2}$, 4, $3\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms; the second, $2\frac{1}{2}$, 3, $3\frac{1}{2}$, $4\frac{1}{2}$. From the light-house to Fort Trumbull the distance is one mile and three-quarters, and to New London two and a half miles.

The channel of the Thames is defended by Fort Trumbull and Fort Griswold. The rock on which the first is built rises 40 feet above low-water level; its distance from the west side of the channel is 500 yards; the channel itself is 575 yards wide, and the whole breadth of the river is 1,150 yards.

Fort Griswold commands 130 feet above the river. The fort is 425, and its lower batteries 225 yards distant from the eastern limit of the channel. Its distance from New London is 1,200 yards, and the channel in front of it is 400 yards wide.

The lower battery commands 80 feet over the level of the stream at low water. Fort Trumbull is 1,600 yards distant from this battery, and 1,800 yards from Fort Griswold.

We shall conclude this description of Thames river by some details of the position of Gales's Ferry, which offers many advantages as a site for a navy yard. The shore presents here a suitable and convenient space for erecting all the buildings, docks, launches, &c., required in such an establishment; the channel, 125 or 130 yards wide, runs at 100 yards from the shore, and gives every facility for launching vessels; a fall in Horton cove, north of the peninsula of Gales's Ferry, might be advantageously employed to feed the mills and founderies, and fill the dry docks; and as Thames river never freezes, (probably in consequence of a number of springs which it receives under water,) vessels would have nothing to fear from the ice, and the communication between the navy yard and the ocean would be open at all seasons. From what we have mentioned above, first-rate vessels cannot, however, sail up to Galestown or Gales's Ferry; and if built at either of those places, must therefore receive their complete armament below, at three-quarters of a mile distance. The whole breadth of the river between Galestown and Gales's Ferry is 440 yards.

The distance between Thames river and Narraganset bay is about 51 miles, in following the windings of the coast. Stonington harbor lies in that interval, and may be considered as the most eastern anchorage in Long Island sound. Watch Point forms the eastern extremity of the coast of Connecticut; and from thence to Narraganset bay, the coast offers no place of shelter.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 749.

[2D SESSION.]

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE ESTIMATES FOR THE SEVERAL BRANCHES OF THE
MILITARY SERVICE FOR THE YEAR 1838.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DECEMBER 22, 1837.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *December 20, 1837.*

SIR: Your letter of the 16th instant, asking explanations in respect to certain items in the estimates of this department which are to be embraced in the bill for the support of the army, and requesting an answer on Monday last, did not reach the department till yesterday.

The cause of the increase of the first, noted by you, that for subsistence, exclusive of that of officers, you will find accounted for in the enclosed letter of the commissary general of subsistence.

The reason of an increased amount being asked for clothing for the army is explained in the accompanying report of the officer in charge of the Clothing bureau.

The notes appended to the estimate of the acting quartermaster general, herewith transmitted, explain the necessity of the greater amount required for the transportation of troops and supplies, and show that the sum of ninety-two thousand dollars, asked for the incidental expenses of that department, is correct. The excess in the amount required for this branch of expenditure last year over that which is wanted for this was caused almost wholly by there having been included in the former the sum that was necessary to purchase horses for the purpose of mounting the second regiment of dragoons.

Your desire for explanations in respect to the amounts estimated for arrearages, payable through the Second and Third Auditor's offices, has reference, it is presumed, to the fact of there having been nothing asked last year for these payments through the first-mentioned office, while in the present estimates a considerable sum is specified; and to the circumstance of the increased amount put down as necessary for 1838, for the like object, in the last-mentioned office.

At the time when the estimate for the service of 1837 was made out, there was applicable to payments of the kind in question, through the Second Auditor's office, a balance of an unexpended appropriation, that rendered it unnecessary to ask for more. And at this time there is still left sufficient of this appropriation for the service of 1838, but which cannot be so applied, because by law it must revert to the surplus fund at the end of the present year. Hence the necessity of another appropriation for the Second Auditor's office. A large unexpended balance, applicable in 1837 to these payments through the Third Auditor's office, and there being no such balance to be made use of for the same object in 1838, accounts also for the difference in the estimates for that office.

You express a wish for explanation in regard to the estimate for the taxes on the Passyunk arsenal also. I presume this wish arises from your not seeing this item in the annual estimates of last year, while you find it in those of the present.

Congress having failed to make an appropriation for this object for the years 1835 and 1836, it was found, after the annual estimates were made up last year, that the taxes for those years were still due, and the matter was specially presented to the Committee of Ways and Means, which committee had the amount included in one of the appropriation bills. And it being recollected, before the estimates were completed this year, that the taxes for 1837 had not been provided for, and that a sum for this object would be necessary in 1838 also, the amount for both years was included in those estimates.

Learning that you had called on the Ordnance office for explanations of the estimates for the service of that branch of this department, I transmit you a copy of its estimates, with explanations in detail, which will, I trust, prove satisfactory.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

HON. C. C. CAMBRELENG, *Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, House of Representatives.*

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSARY GENERAL OF SUBSISTENCE, *Washington, November 21, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to accompany this with estimates for 1838.

The first is for the probable amount required to subsist the regular troops.....	\$730,912 50
Militia and volunteers.....	309,885 00
Aggregating.....	<u>1,040,797 50</u>

This sum exceeds the estimate for 1837 \$127,352 50, and arises from two causes, viz: the continued increase in the price of provisions and the addition of fifty per centum to the sugar and coffee ration issued to troops in the field, together with an occasional substitution of onions, potatoes, and other vegetables, for some of the former component parts of the ration.

The second, for clerks' salaries, exceeds the estimate of last year \$580, occasioned by the act of Congress of March 3, 1837, authorizing an addition of ten per centum in some, and twenty per centum in other instances, to the regularly appropriated sums.

The amount asked for contingent expenses of the office is precisely the same as that for the present year.

The compensation paid to the messenger of the office was merely authorized by an appropriation, and will require either an act of appointment or a like appropriation for 1838.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

GEO. GIBSON, *Commissary General of Subsistence.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Clothing Bureau, Washington, December 20, 1837.*

SIR: In obedience to your direction to explain why the estimate for clothing of the army, &c., is higher than it was the last year, I have the honor to report as follows: \$95,000 of the amount estimated for is to make good the deficiencies of the present year. The balance, \$318,299 03, is increased by one additional regiment of dragoons, and in consequence of there being no clothing or equipage on hand, as has been the case heretofore, and also by the estimate of last year not having been sufficiently full. The present estimate is made to meet the wants of the army, supposing each regiment to be filled to its legal establishment.

With great respect, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

L. WHITING, *Major United States Army.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, October 27, 1837.*

SIR: In compliance with your directions, I have the honor to submit herewith the following estimate of funds for the ensuing year:

For the current service of the quartermaster's department, and for special objects connected therewith, marked A.

For salaries of clerks and messenger, and for contingencies of the Quartermaster General's office, marked B.

The balance remaining of the appropriation for contingencies of the army being deemed quite sufficient for the service of the next year, I do not present any estimate for that object.

I am, sir, with high respect, your obedient servant,

T. GROSS, *Acting Quartermaster General.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

A.

Estimate of funds for the current service of the quartermaster's department for the year 1838.

I. REGULAR SUPPLIES.

For fuel.....	\$70,000
For forage for the horses of officers, when required in kind, and for horses, mules, and oxen, in the service of the quartermaster's department at the various posts.....	30,000
For forage for the horses of two regiments of dragoons.....	90,000
For straw for soldiers' bedding.....	3,000
For stationery, including company and other blank books for the army, certificates for discharged soldiers, blank forms for the pay and quartermaster's departments, and the printing of department orders, army registers, and general regulations.....	10,000
	<u>\$203,000</u>

2. BARRACKS, QUARTERS, AND STOREHOUSES, &c.

For repairing and enlarging barracks, quarters, storehouses, and hospitals, at the several posts; for erecting temporary cantonments at such posts as shall be occupied during the year, and gun-houses for the protection of the cannon at the forts on the seaboard, including the necessary tools and materials for the objects enumerated, and for the authorized furniture for the barrack rooms of non-commissioned officers and soldiers.....	\$50, 000	
For rent of quarters for officers and barracks for troops at posts where there are no public buildings for their accommodation, and of storehouses for the safe-keeping of subsistence, clothing, &c.; and of grounds for summer cantonments and encampments, and for military practice.....	45, 000	<u>\$95, 000</u>

3. TRANSPORTATION OF OFFICERS' BAGGAGE.

For mileage to officers, or the allowance made to them for transportation of their baggage when travelling on duty without troops.....	50, 000
--	---------

4. TRANSPORTATION OF TROOPS AND SUPPLIES.

Of the army, including the baggage of troops when moving either by land or water; freights and ferriages; the purchase or hire of horses, mules, oxen, carts, wagons, and boats for the transportation of troops and supplies and for garrison purposes, drayage, and cartage at the several posts, hire of teamsters, transportation of funds for the pay department, the expense of sailing a public transport between the posts on the Gulf of Mexico, and of procuring water at such posts as from their situation require it.....	\$130, 000	
Of clothing from the depot at Philadelphia to the stations of the troops.....	10, 000	
Of subsistence from the places of purchase and the points of delivery under contracts to such places as the circumstances of the service may require it to be sent.....	20, 000	
Of ordnance, ordnance stores, and small arms, from the founderies and armories to the arsenals, fortifications, and frontier posts, and of lead from the western mines to the arsenals of construction.....	35, 000	<u>\$195, 000</u>

5. INCIDENTAL EXPENSES.

For postage of letters and packets received by officers on public service.....	13, 000	
For expenses of courts-martial and courts of inquiry, including the additional compensation of judge advocates, members, and witnesses, while on that service, under the act of the 16th of March, 1802.....	10, 000	
For extra pay to soldiers employed in the erection of barracks and quarters, the construction of roads, and on other constant labor for a period of not less than ten days, under the act of 2d of March, 1819.....	15, 000	
For expenses of expresses from the frontier posts; of escorts to paymasters; of the necessary articles for the interment of non-commissioned officers and soldiers, hire of laborers, compensation to clerks in the offices of the quartermasters and assistant quartermasters at posts where their duties cannot be performed without such aid, and compensation to temporary agents in charge of dismantled works, and in the performance of other duties.....	14, 000	
For various expenditures necessary to keep the two regiments of dragoons complete, including the purchase of horses to supply the place of those which may be lost and become unfit for service.....	40, 000	<u>92, 000</u>
Total for current service.....		<u><u>635, 000</u></u>

NOTE.—The following items have been reduced below the estimate and appropriation for the present year, namely:

Fuel.....	\$5, 000
Expenses of courts-martial.....	10, 000
Extra pay to soldiers.....	5, 000
And the item for mounting the second regiment of dragoons altogether dispensed with.....	85, 000
Making a total reduction of.....	<u><u>105, 000</u></u>

The item for transportation of subsistence has been necessarily increased \$8,000, in consequence of the more frequent movement of provisions from post to post, after their delivery under contract, resulting from the movement of the troops, alterations in the strength of garrisons, and the occasional abandonment of posts. The expenditure under that head, during the present year, will have exceeded \$25,000. For the next year it is estimated at \$20,000.

The item for transportation of ordnance, small arms, &c., has been increased \$10,000, to meet the increased expenditure under that head, growing out of the distribution of the heavy stock of small arms which has accumulated at the national armories. The sum estimated for the present year for that object was \$25,000, while the expenditures will have exceeded \$40,000. For the next year this item is put at

\$35,000, on the supposition that the operations will not be quite so extensive as they have been during the present.

The result is a reduction of \$87,000 in the aggregate of the estimate and appropriation for the present year for the current service of the department.

Estimates for special objects.

To complete the military road from Fort Howard, at Green Bay, to Fort Crawford, on the Mississippi river, by way of Fort Winnebago.....	\$10,000
To complete the erection of permanent barracks and quarters at Fort Leavenworth, on the frontier of Missouri, for four companies of dragoons, including stables for their horses, according to a plan approved by the Secretary of War.....	80,000
	<u>90,000</u>

NOTE.—The works at Fort Leavenworth have been commenced during the present season, by order of the Secretary of War, from the appropriation for the current service of the quartermaster's department, which contains an item for the repair and enlargement of barracks and quarters. The detailed estimate, furnished by the superintendent, calls for \$98,500, to complete the establishment according to the plan prescribed. As it is supposed that about \$18,500 has been expended on this object from the general appropriation for the present year, that amount has been deducted from the estimate, leaving \$80,000, for which a special appropriation will be necessary—the item for the repair and enlargement of barracks, in the general estimate, being altogether inadequate to meet such an expenditure as that contemplated at Fort Leavenworth. The buildings in progress are of brick material upon stone foundations, and will be of the most durable character.

T. CROSS, Major, Acting Quartermaster General.

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, Washington City, October 27, 1837.

B.

Estimate of salaries of clerks and messenger, and of contingent expenses of the Quartermaster General's office, for the year 1838.

One clerk at \$1,600 per annum.....	\$1,600
One clerk at \$1,200 per annum.....	1,200
Four clerks at \$1,000 per annum.....	4,000
One messenger at \$500 per annum.....	500
	<u>7,300</u>
As per act of Congress of May 9, 1836.	
For contingencies.....	600
	<u>600</u>

T. CROSS, Major, Acting Quartermaster General.

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, Washington City, October 27, 1837.

Estimate for the service of the Ordnance department for the year 1838.

(a) For the national armories.....	\$360,000
(b) For the armament of fortifications, viz: providing, in part, the cannon, howitzers, mortars, cannon balls, shells, gun-carriages, mortar beds, &c., for the fortifications completed, and for those now erecting.....	200,000
(c) For the current expenses of the ordnance service, viz:	
Repairing small arms at the several arsenals and depots.....	\$33,550
Repairing field artillery carriages.....	12,000
Ordinary repairs to keep the public buildings in order at the several arsenals and depots.....	13,000
Repairing and preserving military stores at arsenals and forts.....	9,000
Providing ordinary military supplies for the army, including primers and primer cases for the dragoons.....	13,000
Miscellaneous expenses at arsenals, including stationery, printing, fuel, forage for public horses, and other incidental expenses.....	11,000
For the purchase of three fire-engines, with hose, buckets, &c., for use at the Frankford, Kennebec, and Washington arsenals.....	2,500
Expenses at the lead mines, viz:	
Compensation to persons employed in collecting rents, receiving and distributing lead.....	\$1,550
Stationery, printing, fuel, &c.....	450
	<u>2,000</u>
Carried forward.....	96,050
	<u>560,000</u>

Brought forward.....	\$96,050	\$560,000
For the payment of one superior practical mechanic and draughtsman, as model-master or superintendent of the model office, at \$3 75 per day.....	\$1,170	
For the payment of the assistant mechanic to ditto, at \$2 50 per day....	780	
	<u>1,950</u>	98,000
(d) For the purchase of 250 swords for the use of the cadets at the Military Academy at West Point, \$10 each.....		2,500
ARSENALS.		
(e) Kennebec arsenal, Maine:		
For building a stone tower or addition to the main arsenal for the advantages of additional space, strength, and general convenience.....	4,900	
For repairing the arsenal, finishing the upper story for the reception of arms in racks, and for making the same.....	2,558	
For building carriage-makers' and blacksmiths' shops.....	14,703	
For building stable for the accommodation of public team.....	1,500	
For building an addition of stone to quarters No. 1, for kitchen, &c.....	1,960	
For building a guard and engine house.....	930	
For rebuilding and extending the wharf.....	2,300	
For building culverts in the north and south ravines, (situated in the lots recently purchased,) and for filling up said ravines.....	3,735	
	<u>32,586</u>	
(f) Watervliet, New York:		
For erecting a new arsenal building, 140 feet long, 40 feet wide, and three stories high, of stone and brick, with slated roof.....	21,000	
For erecting two gun-carriage houses, each 180 feet long, 36 feet wide, and one story high, of brick and stone.....	12,000	
For erecting an addition to the machine shop, 66 feet long, 36 feet wide, and two stories high, of stone and brick.....	5,500	
For completing grading of public grounds around the buildings, including those to be erected.....	500	
For repairing and painting quarters, barracks, storehouses, fences, &c.....	700	
	<u>39,700</u>	
(g) Frankford, Pennsylvania:		
For completing the permanent enclosure of the grounds at this arsenal with a brick wall and coping, commenced in 1837.....	4,000	
For repairs to buildings and reslating one of the buildings occupied as officers' quarters with new slate.....	1,000	
	<u>5,000</u>	
(h) Pittsburg, Pennsylvania:		
For erecting a timber shed, 100 by 30 feet; for erecting a gun-carriage shed, 100 by 30 feet.....	3,000	
For purchasing and setting permanent iron skidding for the preservation of cannon.....	3,000	
For the purchase of a tower clock for the arsenal.....	300	
	<u>6,300</u>	
(i) Pikesville, Maryland:		
For the erection of a small brick laboratory, with the necessary fixtures.....	2,140	
For new floors for the cellars under the barracks and quarters, including work- manship and materials.....	540	
For repairs to quarters, including a new roof to the piazza.....	120	
	<u>2,800</u>	
(k) Fort Monroe, Virginia:		
For repairs of four casemate magazines.....	2,000	
For additional machinery and fixtures to smiths and finishing shops.....	1,500	
For repairs to timber sheds, workshops, and other buildings, new fences, &c.....	1,900	
For the construction of one shed for the preservation of gun-carriages and other finished articles.....	1,500	
	<u>6,900</u>	
(l) Washington city:		
For completing the filling up the marsh on the southeast and east fronts of the arsenal ground, between the sea wall and present shore, containing 30,000 cubic yards of earth, at 35 cents per yard.....	10,500	
For constructing a smith's and finishing shop at this post, 200 feet long by 36 feet wide, to contain 14 forges with bellows complete, including room for the steam- engine, tilt-hammer, and machinery for driving the same.....	8,000	
For the erection of a gun shed, 202 by 30 feet.....	2,500	
For constructing new fences around the buildings at this post.....	1,000	
For constructing piazza to public quarters.....	\$1,000	
For repairs of public quarters.....	500	
	<u>1,500</u>	
Carried forward.....	23,500	753,786

Brought forward.....	\$23, 500	\$753, 786
For the erection of a model office of brick, with slated roof, 50 by 36 feet, 2 stories high, with a basement.....	7, 000	
		30, 500

NOTE.—In the act of appropriation approved May 14, 1836, page 50, acts 1st session 24th Congress, the sum of \$231,502 was appropriated for arsenals, based upon the estimates (document No. 29, H. R., 24th Congress, 1st session) for the service of the ordnance department for the year 1836. This estimate embraced the same sum for arsenals, viz: \$231,502, and seems, from the above appropriation, to have been adopted without objection or alteration; thus clearly indicating the intention of Congress that the several provisions in the estimate for arsenals should be carried into effect. Among these provisions is one under the head for the arsenal in Washington city, viz: "For the purchase of a site and cost of construction of a new magazine and keeper's house, \$7,500." And it thus appears to be the intention of the act that this site should be purchased. Yet, on comparing the above act with the seventh section of that of May 1, 1820, it seems doubtful whether it would be perfectly legal to purchase the land, although agreeable to the provisions of the estimate, and evidently sanctioned by Congress in making the appropriation.

In conformity, therefore, with the act of May 1, 1820, a special law is requested, authorizing the purchase of the said magazine site.

(m) Baton Rouge, Louisiana:

For completing the powder magazine and quarters for enlisted and hired men at this post.....	5, 700	
For building a stable for the public horses.....	700	
For constructing a timber shed, 105 feet long and 30 feet wide.....	2, 340	
For repairing and new flooring the artillery shed.....	1, 248	
For making a road from the magazine to the river, purchase of two pumps, erecting new gates to the enclosures, and repairs to fences.....	1, 300	
		11, 288

(n) St. Louis, Missouri:

For completing the stone wall for enclosing the arsenal grounds at this post....	1, 031	
For finishing the fence to enclose the ground around the magazine.....	380	
For filling up the low ground within the river wall and north side of the timber shed.....	600	
For the completion of roads around the front of buildings within the area, and for surface gutters of paved stone.....	500	
For fitting up the machinery of the armory, tilt-hammer, and smiths' shops.....	1, 200	
		3, 711

(o) Fayetteville, North Carolina:

Towards completing the arsenal and other buildings near Fayetteville, North Carolina, under the act approved June 14, 1836.....	30, 000	
---	---------	--

(p) Apalachicola, Florida:

Towards completing the arsenal and other buildings in Florida, under the act approved April 5, 1832.....	25, 000	
--	---------	--

(q) Detroit, Michigan:

For completing the additional officers' quarters, grading the arsenal square and ground outside the surrounding wall, and for enclosing the public land reserved for the use of this arsenal, comprising 224 acres.....	10, 000	
---	---------	--

(r) Little Rock, Arkansas:

Towards completing the arsenal and other buildings commenced at Little Rock....	30, 000	
---	---------	--

(s) Liberty, Missouri:

For the completion of an ordnance depot and magazine at this place.....	10, 173	
---	---------	--

(t) Memphis, Tennessee:

For the completion of an ordnance depot and magazine at this post.....	13, 315	
--	---------	--

(u) Rome, New York:

For painting the public buildings and repairs to quarters.....	1, 000	
		119, 488

(v) For the purchase and manufacture of light field artillery, viz:

Fifteen 12-pounder light brass howitzers.....	6, 600	
Seventy-five 6-pounder iron field cannon.....	6, 375	
Constructing fifty field artillery carriages with implements and equipments complete, ten 6-pounder and eight 12-pounder caissons, and six travelling forges..	26, 978	
		39, 953

(w) For the manufacture of 250 elevating machines for barbette and casemate carriages, for the batteries preparing in the gradual armament of fortifications.....

5, 000

(x) For the purchase of 60 tons of grape shot for the fortifications and field service, \$150 per ton.....

7, 500

(y) For the purchase of gunpowder, viz:

1,000 barrels of musket and 500 barrels of rifle powder, at \$20 per barrel.....	30, 000	
--	---------	--

1, 001, 226

Recapitulation.

For the national armories.....	\$360, 000
For the armament of fortifications.....	200, 000
For the current expenses of the ordnance service.....	98, 000
For the purchase of swords for the cadets.....	2, 500
For the arsenals.....	258, 273
For the purchase and manufacture of light field artillery, &c.....	39, 953
For the manufacture of elevating machines.....	5, 000
For the purchase of grape shot.....	7, 500
For the purchase of gunpowder.....	30, 000
	1, 001, 226

NOTES.

(a) The sum of \$360,000, herein estimated for the national armories, is the same in amount as has been appropriated for those establishments since 1822, excepting only for two years, and is considered as necessary for the public interest now as on any former occasion.

(b) In the report from this office of March 8, 1836, in answer to a resolution of the Senate, \$17,840,249 was stated to be required to arm completely, and supply with munitions, all the fortifications then finished, progressing, or in contemplation by the board of engineers; but the armament of the forts and batteries more immediately required for the defence of the Atlantic frontier will require, it is estimated, about \$3,000,000.

By these statements the sum of \$200,000, inserted in this estimate, is presumed to be small; yet, for want of officers, a greater sum could not be advantageously expended during the year 1838. \$50,000 of this sum are intended for gun-carriages.

(c) The sum of \$98,000 has been inserted for the current expenses of the ordnance service. There is yet to be repaired, under this head, a large quantity of small arms, gun-carriages, and accoutrements, which have sustained injury in the Indian campaigns.

To provide the various models, patterns, &c., directed by the sixth, seventh, and eighth paragraphs of the ordnance regulations, approved by the President of the United States on May 1, 1834, at least two able mechanics are required to be constantly engaged in that work. For that peculiar business the most skilful and, indeed, scientific mechanics are required. The sum of \$1,950 inserted, it is thought, would be sufficient to command their services.

(d) These swords have been asked for by the proper authority of the Military Academy for the use of the cadets in the practice of cavalry manœuvres.

(e) Stores are now hoisted in the arsenal through trap-doors in each floor in the centre of the building. These, in consequence of the narrow dimensions of the rooms, occupy considerable space, which is entirely lost for the purpose of storage, being inconvenient and dangerous.

A tower having a communication with each story would effectually remedy these objections, and greatly facilitate the reception or delivery of stores.

The stone wall of the arsenal requires repointing for its preservation and to secure the building from dampness. The upper story should be finished immediately for the reception of a large quantity of arms now deposited in boxes, which require to be placed in racks.

Since the erection of the carriage-makers' and smiths' shops in 1832, at this arsenal, which are small buildings, an officer had been directed to inspect the establishment, and report anything that might be required to make it an efficient place of arms in that section of the country.

By his report, dated November 5, 1833, among other things, he recommends a change in the location of buildings, and their enlargement, on the supposition that the government succeed in the purchase of about twenty acres of land adjoining, which was deemed of the first importance to the successful operation of the arsenal. This land has been purchased under the act approved July 2, 1836, and now the period for the proposed change of the location has arrived. As it has been strongly recommended, both by the inspecting officer and the commander of the arsenal, there seems no doubt of its propriety, and it is therefore recommended by this office.

The stable is a very necessary building, for the accommodation of a large number of working cattle and horses now at that post.

The addition now attached to quarters No. 1 is objectionable on account of its being of wood, and therefore liable to danger from fire. It was originally erected as a cheap and temporary structure, (at the time very much needed,) with the intention of replacing it, at some future period, with a stone building, when it could be removed and converted into quarters for mechanics.

There are neither guard nor engine houses at the post, and both are very much needed. The engine should occupy a convenient building, accessible at a moment's warning; and accommodations are required for a guard to protect the public property at the post.

In consequence of the river wall being located at some distance beyond the line of low-water mark, the dimensions of the wharf will be much diminished; and it is so narrow as to render it difficult and even unsafe for a vessel to moor alongside, breasting a rapid current, whilst receiving or discharging a cargo. The wharf also received much damage from the ice last winter, which will require repair.

Culverts are necessary in these ravines, for draining the upper lot and in filling them up. Good roads, with a regular ascent from the river to the magazine, can be easily constructed.

(f) The accumulation of arms and every kind of stores pertaining to the business of the ordnance department at this post absolutely demands additional provision for storing and safe-keeping. A vast amount of property is now of necessity crowded into temporary and unsuitable buildings, without regard to distribution for examination, clanking, &c., and affording unsafe and inadequate protection.

The old brick arsenal, east side of the canal, is dilapidated, and, from its situation on a street greatly travelled, it is found almost impossible to keep the property in order. Being subjected to the overflow of the river, from which it is situated twenty-five yards, the first floor has of necessity to be abandoned, and is besides, from dampness, an unfit place of deposit at all times. It is proposed to place the new

buildings now estimated for on the rising ground in the rear and west side of the canal; to which point, in a very short period, from the rapidly increasing density of population, and consequent exposure of the vast amount of property, it will doubtless be found expedient to remove all the buildings, except the water shops and their appendages.

The estimate of last year has not been found quite sufficient for grading the grounds; and the proposed buildings will render the additional sum necessary.

(g) This amount (\$4,000) is required to complete the wall commenced in 1837. The greater part of what remained to be built will be more expensive than what has been done, on account of the difficulty of making a secure foundation on the marshy ground over which it passes. The estimate for repairs has reference especially to reslating one of the buildings occupied as officers' quarters, which was originally covered with very bad slate, now become still more unsound.

(h) The increased quantity of timber, and the increasing number of carriages, render more timber sheds necessary; and in mounting carriages, loading caissons, &c., which are now exposed frequently to storms, an open shed is required for their temporary shelter.

Cast iron skids for cannon, having been found both convenient and economical at places where they are used, are recommended to be adopted at this arsenal, and accordingly the estimate is made for the purpose of purchasing and setting a limited quantity.

At this arsenal, where so many hired men are employed, a clock is required, by which the hours for labor may be regulated in a certain and uniform manner.

(i) The erection of a laboratory at this post is deemed necessary in consequence of there being no suitable building for the preparation of ammunition.

The new flooring of the cellars under the barrack, and repairs to the quarters, are considered necessary for the preservation of the buildings.

(k) There are nearly 2,000 barrels of gunpowder recently manufactured and destined for that post; but, in consequence of the magazine being unfitted to receive them, and that it has been stated from the Engineer department that it cannot effect the necessary repairs or alterations, the sum (\$2,000) is embraced in the estimate of this department to accomplish the object of repairs.

The sum of \$1,500 has been inserted for procuring new machinery for conducting the operations at the post, it being found that work can be performed more economically by machinery than by hand.

The sum of \$1,900, embraced in this estimate, is for repairing several buildings, and making new fences to the yard in which the heavy cannon at this post are placed.

There are no buildings belonging to the ordnance department at this post suitable for storing finished work. The officer in charge states that it would be economy to erect one shed for the storing of finished gun-carriages, where they could remain in good order until wanted. For the want of this shed a number of carriages have to be left out of doors, exposed to the weather.

(l) The sum of \$10,500 has been inserted for completing the filling up of the marsh at this arsenal. The filling up of this marsh will be the means of reclaiming about four acres of land, which will be invaluable, both on account of the limited space belonging to the United States and the health of the place. The expense, however, is trifling, in comparison to the benefit that will arise from effecting this desirable object.

The present finishing and smiths' shop is very old and in a partially ruined state; it is also contracted, and inconvenient in many other respects; and its location, in case of fire, is considered dangerous, being in the midst of valuable buildings. In consequence of these disadvantages, a new shop must be built, in any event, in a very short time, but is now recommended.

The erection of a gun shed is deemed essentially necessary, as many gun-carriages have to be exposed to the open air for want of covering.

The fences are much decayed, and require to be renewed.

The erection of a model office is required to carry into execution the sixth, seventh, and eighth paragraphs of the ordnance regulations adopted by the President of the United States on the 1st of May, 1834; this office being intended for the preservation (and constant reference to) of models, draughts, and patterns of every species of ordnance and ordnance stores used in the land service.

(m) The position of Baton Rouge, on the Mississippi, as a depot for munitions of war, is one of the first importance for the security of that section of country; and it is from this view of the subject that the government determined to erect the magazine referred to under this head. The sum appropriated for this purpose, in consequence of the exorbitant prices of everything in that country, has, however, been found inadequate by the sum of \$5,700, which is, accordingly, now asked for. As regards the stable, the timber shed, and the repairs and new flooring of the artillery shed, these are all objects of indispensable necessity, and the sums asked for to effect them are considered quite moderate.

The same may be remarked of the proposed road, gates, pumps, enclosures, &c.

(n) The sum of \$1,031 seems to be necessary to complete the surrounding wall. The sum of \$380 is yet deficient for the object of finishing the magazine fence. The filling in of the low ground, the completion and fitting up of the tilt-hammer machinery, are all necessary objects to be accomplished in progressing with the completion of that arsenal.

(o) The sum of \$30,000, herein estimated, in addition to the amount on hand, can be advantageously expended during the year 1838 towards the completion of the works authorized under the act of June 14, 1836, to establish an arsenal of construction in the State of North Carolina.

(p) The sum of \$25,000, herein referred to, is considered sufficient for the operations of this arsenal for the year 1838, to carry into effect the intentions of the act approved April 5, 1832.

(q) For completing the quarters, grading the grounds, and enclosing them, the sum of \$10,000, herein asked for, is considered very reasonable.

(r) The act of July 2, 1836, appropriated only \$14,000 for building an arsenal in Arkansas; yet the report from this office, in answer to inquiries on this subject, stated that about \$43,000 was the minimum sum for such an object. The officer superintending the work reports \$30,000 to be necessary, in addition to the appropriation of 1836, and this sum is, accordingly, asked for, for the year 1838; but, owing to the high price of everything in that section of country, it is obvious that a still greater sum will be required to complete that arsenal, especially as its location on the frontier of a large body of Indians and of Texas gives it a character of importance which it could not otherwise assume.

(s) With regard to the additional sum of \$10,173, herein asked for, nearly the same remarks apply as to the addition to the Little Rock arsenal. It requires much more than was authorized under the act of July 2, 1836—viz: \$14,000—though it may not be necessary to make it so large, in consequence of its

vicinity to the St. Louis arsenal, and the facilities of approaching it by the Missouri river; yet, as a depot, without the means of repair or construction, it should be large enough to meet any emergency which might arise on the frontier of a large body of Indians.

(*l*) With regard to Memphis, Tennessee, it is found, in order to make it a place of sufficient capacity as a place of depot, this additional sum of \$13,315 is necessary.

(*u*) The painting and repairs herein referred to are considered very necessary for the preservation of the buildings.

(*v*) With regard to the six-pounder guns and twelve-pounder howitzers referred to, when all the issues have been made which are now directed, there will remain but a small number of these in depot. As they are pieces the most in use of all others, it is necessary to have a constant supply. The carriages are also required for these pieces.

(*w*) The elevating machines are necessary in the gradual armament of the forts.

(*x*) With regard to the grape shot, none have been procured since the war with Great Britain. The supply on hand is small, and of very inferior quality; and, as a measure of caution and preparation, the above quantity is asked for.

(*y*) At the time of the late purchase of gunpowder, no musket powder was obtained, as it was supposed there was a sufficient quantity on hand of old manufacture. Since, however, great quantities of this, as well as of rifle powder, have been used in the Indian campaign, and the supply herein asked for is, in consequence, necessary.

GEO. BOMFORD, *Colonel of Ordnance.*

ORDNANCE OFFICE, *Washington, November 8, 1837.*

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 750.

[2D SESSION.]

STATEMENT OF THE BALANCE DUE ON THE CLAIMS OF MASSACHUSETTS FOR MILITIA SERVICES AND EXPENDITURES DURING THE WAR OF 1812.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DECEMBER 27, 1837.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *December 23, 1837.*

SIR: In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of March, 1836, I have examined the claims of the State of Massachusetts for militia services and expenditures during the late war with Great Britain, and have now the honor to report:

The original amount of these claims was \$843,349 60, which, by a payment of \$11,000 in 1817, and one of \$419,748 26 in 1831, was reduced to \$412,601 34, which is still claimed. Of this sum it appears, upon applying the same principles which have governed this department in the settlement of similar claims made by other States, there will be due \$272,716 14, of which \$45,539 66, being for arms and accoutrements purchased by the State, arms, &c., to the value of that amount, must be charged to the State and be withheld from its quota, under the act of 1808, for arming and equipping the militia; and all warlike stores remaining in the State which are paid for by the general government must be delivered up to the possession and use of the United States.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

HON. JAMES K. POLK, *Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 751.

[2D SESSION.]

ON CLAIM OF A COMPANY OF VERMONT MILITIA, NOT MUSTERED INTO THE SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES, FOR COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES AT THE BATTLE OF PLATTSBURG, IN 1814.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DECEMBER 28, 1837.

Mr. KEMBLE, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred the petition of Captain Othniel Jewett, of the State of Vermont, in behalf of himself and others, submitted the following report:

The petitioner states that he commanded a company of militia in the State of Vermont, which, on the proclamation of General Macomb for volunteers, repaired to Plattsburg in September, 1814, and were there mustered in a regiment commanded by Colonel Jesse Lyman; that they served nine days, took some prisoners, and had an action with the enemy at a place called Pipe's Cantonment, three or four miles from Plattsburg; that from the urgency of the occasion no muster-rolls were made out, and he is, therefore,

unable to offer any other evidence of the service than his own and the depositions of some of the men who served under him. He further states that the service was a very hard one during the time that it lasted, and it is therefore that he considers himself and his men entitled to compensation. Although the committee have no reason to question the veracity of the petitioner, they are of opinion that, no enrolment having taken place, the allowance of this claim would sanction a principle which might lead hereafter to the most exorbitant frauds upon the government, and they would, therefore, recommend the adoption of the following resolution:

Resolved, That the prayer of the petitioner should not be granted.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 752.

[2D SESSION.]

ON CLAIM OF JAMES RIGDEN, PREDICATED ON PROMISES MADE BY HIS COMMANDING OFFICER, FOR COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES AS A SPY DURING THE WAR OF 1812, WHICH SUBJECTED HIM TO GREAT PERIL AND SUFFERINGS IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DECEMBER 28, 1837.

Mr. MASON, of Ohio, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred the petition of James Rigden, reported:

That the petitioner, in his statement, says that in September, 1813, then being a sergeant in Colonel Winfield Scott's regiment of artillery, stationed at Fort George, Upper Canada, he was told by his colonel that the commanding general wanted a confidential and capable man to pass into the enemy's camp, then four miles off, on a service of great importance and difficulty, which, if successfully performed, the commanding general would cause to be amply rewarded in money and by a commission; that the petitioner accepted the employment on the terms proposed, and was the same night passed beyond the chain of American sentinels by his colonel, and the next morning denounced as a deserter. In this assumed character the petitioner states that in the dark, at infinite hazard, he approached the British outposts, was received, and sent up to headquarters. At first he had every prospect of being sent to the rear as a deserter, and thence succeeding in his perilous mission; but a real deserter from the American army came in, and threw a suspicion on the petitioner by stating that he had long been one of Colonel Scott's most confidential sergeants; that the petitioner was immediately seized as a spy, and ironed and sent to a dungeon in Quebec. After nine months of confinement, and the daily apprehension of being tried and executed as a spy, the British governor sent petitioner in a transport ship, called the *Bostock*, for England; but the ship had to touch at Halifax, in order to join the grand convoy bound to England. Arriving at Halifax, petitioner found there the American cartel called the *Perseverance*, which had brought a number of British prisoners to be exchanged for Americans. The petitioner, just before the sailing of the two vessels, at the imminent hazard of his life, eluded the vigilance of his guard, and got on board the *Perseverance*. Thus by this successful hazard the petitioner, just six weeks from the time he left Quebec, was enabled to report himself in person for duty with his company in Upper Canada.

The petitioner further states that he has served four enlistments in the army, and has entered on the fifth; he has grown old, and has a family to support. Having received no pecuniary compensation for the dangers and the sufferings he has described, he prays to have such reward as may be just and reasonable.

Annexed to this petition is a certificate of Major General Scott, who states that the material facts in the petition are true; that the story of petitioner's sufferings and adventures whilst in captivity as a spy are believed to be true. A letter from General N. Towson to the Hon. Thomas Corwin, dated December 15, 1837, has been laid before the committee. It corroborates some of the statements of the petition.

The committee, through one of its members, have received a letter from the Third Auditor, dated December 22, 1837, in reply to one asking information on the subject-matter of the petition. To this letter the committee refer, and ask that it may be considered as part of this report. The committee, having considered the whole case, recommend the adoption of the following resolution:

Resolved, That the petitioner is not entitled to relief.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, *Third Auditor's Office*, December 22, 1837.

SIR: I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th instant, with the petition of James Rigden and papers in support thereof, for the purpose of ascertaining from me whether any application has been made at this office by the petitioner, or any other person in his behalf, for compensation for the services specified in the petition; and if so, what was the result of such application. And you further ask me to favor you with any suggestion or information I can communicate touching this case which may assist the committee in coming to a proper decision on the application. I have accordingly to state that no specific application appears to have been made by the petitioner, or any other person in his behalf, for compensation for the services specified in the petition, except so far as may be inferred from the following statement: An application in his behalf was made in 1830 by Lieutenant J. F. Lane, of the

United States army, accompanied by a letter from General Scott, on the subject of his secret service, and one from himself, (copies of which are enclosed,) in which he stated the fact of his secret service, and claimed his pay, rations, and clothing, from September 1, 1813, to June, 1814. An examination was accordingly made, and he was found to have enlisted May 1, 1812, for the period of five years, and was discharged September 9, 1814, "in consequence of extraordinary services rendered his country." He was mustered and paid as a sergeant on the rolls of Captain Archer's company by Paymaster Rees to June 30, 1813, after which he could not be found on the rolls of the 2d artillery. He was paid by Paymaster Merchant, on separate account, from June 30, 1813, to September 9, 1814, the date of his discharge, with three months' gratuitous pay, and an allowance for travelling from the place of discharge to Georgetown, District of Columbia, the place of his residence. His clothing he also received, as appears from an indorsement by the deputy commissary on the certificate of his discharge. It was also found, from the accounts of D. Chever, contractor, that he drew, in September, 1814, at Albany, his subsistence for the whole period that he was absent and beyond the date of his discharge, say from September 17, 1813, to September 16, 1814. He had, therefore, received everything that he was entitled to. But it was further found that in 1816 he came to the seat of government, and on his deposition that he had not received pay beyond June 30, 1813, and that he had been employed, he obtained a settlement, as sergeant, from Paymaster Clark, for his pay from the above date to July 31, 1814, being thirteen months, at \$11 per month, amounting to \$143, thereby claiming and receiving that whole sum over and above his due. In obtaining that settlement, he must have withheld his discharge, (on which is his receipt in full, as appears in the Bounty Land office, where his warrant for land issued in December, 1821,) in lieu of which he produced to the paymaster a certificate as to the payment made to him June 30, 1813, by Paymaster Rees, and a certificate given to him by Major Hindman, August 22, 1814, previous to his discharge, which he must also have retained when he got his discharge, which was predicated on a new certificate from Major Hindman. With the papers there is also a certificate from Major Kearsley, vouching for his faithfulness, and identifying him as a soldier and non-commissioned officer. On these papers a settlement was made by the paymaster. His claim, as preferred in 1830, was accordingly rejected in this office.

He is found to have again enlisted October 5, 1814, in the corps of artillery, for five years; and from the adjutant general's certificate, on file in this office, he appears to have deserted from the late Captain Riddle's company August 25, 1815.

The petition and papers are herewith returned.

With great respect, &c.,

PETER HAGNER, *Auditor.*

Hon. S. MASON, of the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Reps.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 753.

[2D SESSION.]

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, WITH PLANS FOR THE DEFENCE AND PROTECTION OF THE WESTERN FRONTIERS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND STATEMENTS OF THE NUMBER OF INDIANS AND WARRIORS ON THOSE FRONTIERS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE JANUARY 3, 1838.

IN SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, October 11, 1837.

On motion by Mr. Linn,

Resolved, That the Secretary of War be directed to submit to the Senate, as soon after the meeting of the next Congress as practicable, a plan for the protection of the western frontier of the United States against Indian aggression; designating the points to be permanently occupied by garrisons; the auxiliary stations for reserves and deposits of munitions, arms, and other supplies; the routes to be established for the purpose of maintaining a safe and prompt intercourse between the several stations, and from these with the depots in the interior; and, finally, the minimum force which, in his opinion, will be required to maintain peace among the several tribes, and cause our border settlements to be respected. Also, to report, as far as the same can be ascertained, the number of Indians who will be in the occupancy of the country west and north of the States of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri, and the number of warriors they may, collectively, be able to bring into the field, or such other plans as he may think proper; and what progress has been made in the location of the military road.

Attest:

ASBURY DICKINS, *Secretary.*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, December 30, 1837.

SIR: In answer to the resolution of the Senate, in relation to the protection of the western frontiers of the United States, I have the honor to transmit the accompanying reports of the Chief Engineer and the Acting Quartermaster General, together with a report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. That expected from General Gaines will be sent as soon as it is received.

In presenting these documents, which are ably drawn up, and contain full and satisfactory information on all the topics embraced by the resolution, I might have considered my duty fully discharged, had not other plans been previously recommended, which I regard as entirely inefficient, but which have received, in some measure, the sanction of Congress. A survey has been directed to determine the line

of a road which it is contemplated shall extend from some point upon the Upper Mississippi to Red river, passing west of Missouri and Arkansas; and it is proposed to place a cordon of temporary posts of ordinary construction along it, as a sufficient measure for the defence of that part of the country. In pursuance of the orders of Congress, officers have been appointed to perform that duty, and upon their report being received measures will be taken to carry into effect the intentions of Congress, unless, upon a deliberate review of the whole matter, some more eligible plan of defence shall be adopted. My own opinion has been, from the time I first considered the subject, that such a chain of posts strung along the best road that can be constructed, furnished with all the means to operate, and with competent garrisons to occupy them, is not calculated to afford that protection which the border States have a right to expect from the government, nor to redeem its pledge to protect the emigrant tribes from the savage and warlike people that surround them. The only possible use of such a road would be to facilitate occasional communications between the posts in time of peace. Supplies would not be transported along it, for they must be brought from the interior. Succors could not reach the posts by that direction, for they would be furnished by the militia within the line; and any attempt to concentrate the forces composing the garrisons in the event of an outbreak would probably be attended with disastrous consequences, for the troops, whose route must be well known, would be exposed to be attacked and destroyed in detail. The enemy, having nothing to dread on their flanks or rear, might approach this road without risk, and attack the detachments on their line of march before they could concentrate their forces so as to offer an effectual resistance.

After mature reflection, I am of opinion that military posts ought to be established and kept up within the Indian Territory in such positions as to maintain peace among the Indians and protect the emigrant and feebler tribes against the stronger and more warlike nations that surround them—which the United States are bound to do by treaty stipulations. To withdraw those which now exist there would be to violate our faith, as there is reason to apprehend that it would be the signal of war. Persons well acquainted with that country assure us that war would break out among the Indians “just so soon as the troops are removed from those posts,” and all accounts from that quarter confirm that impression.

Independently of the military protection which the existence of these posts in the interior of the Indian country afford to the emigrating tribes, and the good they are calculated to effect by the beneficial influence the officers are enabled to exert over the surrounding Indians, they more effectually cover and protect the frontier than ten times the number of fortresses strung along in one line could do.

With the very limited knowledge of that country as yet in possession of this department, it appears to me that six or seven permanent exterior posts would be sufficient to preserve the peace of that frontier. It will be necessary at the same time to establish at convenient points an interior line of posts, to serve as places of refuge for the inhabitants in periods of danger and alarm, until the militia can march to their succor from the interior and the troops be put in motion upon the rear of the invaders. Eight of these would be amply sufficient, from which patrols might be kept up along the frontier to enforce the intercourse laws. Both descriptions of forts should be so constructed as to be defended by a small garrison, and in a manner that each part may be successfully maintained against a very superior force, both during the time the whole is being completed, and in the event of any portion of it being burnt or destroyed. This arrangement would require the establishment of a few depots of arms and supplies, from which communications should be opened to the posts. The accompanying skeleton map (marked No. 1) presents a view of the relative positions of the posts and depots, and of the communications from them to the line of defence for the speedy transportation of succors and supplies. A regular force of five thousand men would be sufficient to garrison these posts, and with a competent reserve at Jefferson Barracks, and an effective force at Baton Rouge, would, I think, both insure the safety of the western frontier, and enable the government to fulfil all its treaty stipulations, and preserve its faith with the Indians. I would recommend, as an important auxiliary to this system of defence, the organization of an efficient volunteer force to be raised in each of the frontier States; the men to be mustered into service for a certain term of time, the officers to be appointed according to their State laws, and to be instructed a certain number of days in each year by the regular officers of the United States army at the posts within the States, and to receive pay during that period. In this manner an efficient corps of officers may be created, and a body of volunteers be at hand to march to the succor of the border settlers and repel the invaders, whenever they are called upon by the proper authority.

I venture to hope, if these measures are adopted by Congress, and carried into effect at an early day, so as to anticipate any hostile movement of the Indians, peace will be preserved on our western borders; but if they should, unfortunately, be delayed until the discontent which exists among many of the tribes breaks out into open hostility, and the first movements of that wild and warlike people prove successful, as they infallibly would do in our present unprepared state, it might require double the force and quadruple the means I have here indicated to restore and preserve peace along that extended frontier.

All which is respectfully submitted.

J. R. POINSETT.

Hon. R. M. JOHNSON, *President of the Senate.*

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, *October 31, 1837.*

SIR: In compliance with your instructions, I have the honor to submit herewith a project for the defence of the western frontier of the United States, prepared in conformity with the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 11th instant on that subject.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,

C. GRATIOT.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

Project for the defence of the western frontier of the United States, bounded as follows, viz:

Beginning at the mouth of the Sabine river, on the Gulf of Mexico, and running up said river to its intersection with the meridional territorial line; thence along this line by Texas to its junction with the Red river; thence along the western boundary of Arkansas and Missouri to the mouth of the Kansas; thence up the Missouri river to its union with the north boundary of the State of Missouri; and thence following the external line of the territory over which the Indian title has been extinguished to Lake Superior, by the country to which the tribes east of the Mississippi have been removed, and which is in part still occupied by aborigines.

This line, the development of which cannot be precisely stated, but which is not short of 2,000 miles, will, on account of the physical nature of the country it crosses, and the relations to be entertained with the people beyond it, be divided into three sections, for each of which a particular system of defence ought to be considered, viz: the southern, embracing Texas on two sides; the middle, from Red river to the Great Platte; and the northern, passing through the regions east of the Missouri river and north of the Platte.

First section.—Texas is in the occupancy of a people with whom the United States entertain the closest relations of friendship, which it is believed can never be interrupted, and but for the peculiarity of her position in reference to another neighbor, and the fact that the northern frontier of her territory is but sparsely settled, and consequently unable to resist or prevent the passage of an Indian war party on its way to strike at our people, the presence of a military force near her eastern frontier, other than what is required to enforce the revenue laws, would hardly be needed. Circumstanced as she is, however, both as regards her political relations, and having a large numeral force of Indians to the north, whose disposition to aggression is well understood, the occupancy of some convenient positions within striking distance of the lines of communication and from her northern frontier is rendered of primary necessity. The positions to be occupied, and the force at each, must be regulated by circumstances to be developed by time, and the knowledge yet to be acquired of the country as regards the facilities it may be made to afford for prompt movements and easy transportation of supplies. For the present, the force should be limited to what seems to be absolutely wanted to maintain the neutrality of our territory on one side, and on the other restrain the rising disposition of the Indian hordes further north from breaking out into open hostilities; and be so posted as to be able to concentrate at, or afford relief to, any given point in the shortest time. Before, however, a system of positions and communications can be adopted with any certainty of attaining those indispensable conditions, the country on both sides of the territorial line should be carefully examined by skilful topographers, with a view to ascertain the points of easiest access and the best location for the establishment of posts and routes of communication, either by water or overland. In the meantime the navigable streams tributary to the Mississippi, from which the principle supplies are to be drawn, should be freed of their obstructions to the head of navigation; the Sabine, which is known to furnish a good navigation, should in like manner be cleared; the posts of Jesup and Towson put in a state of defence, and the roads leading from the interior of Louisiana to the crossings of the Sabine be also put in order. These preliminaries being accomplished, it is believed the frontier along this section could be kept quiet by the presence of a moderate force, not to exceed three regiments of infantry, three companies of light artillery, and eight troops of light cavalry, which might safely be reduced one regiment of infantry and one company of artillery on the return of better times to Texas. This force should be posted, one regiment of infantry and one company of artillery at Jesup; one regiment of infantry, four troops of cavalry, and one company of artillery at Towson, which post will constitute the extreme left of defence for the middle division, and will accordingly be again adverted to; and the remainder, as a reserve, at Baton Rouge, from which point it could, as the necessity of the moment required, be transported in steamers, at any season of the year, in two days to Natchitoches, on its way to Jesup, in four to Towson, and in about the same time to the crossing of the road from Natchitoches to Nacogdoches, on the Sabine.

And if at any time the service of this reserve should be required in Arkansas, it could be landed opposite Memphis, in Tennessee, where the national road towards Little Rock begins, in four days, at most. It could also relieve Mobile and Pensacola in less than three.

From the foregoing statement, the importance of a strong reserve at Baton Rouge for the purposes of prompt relief is made manifest. The advantages of this position should not, therefore, be overlooked in maturing a system of frontier protection.

Second or middle section.—The country beyond this line is mostly elevated and free from marshy ground; is abundantly watered, thinly wooded, healthy, and has been assigned for the permanent residence of the tribes which have been or are to be removed from the States and Territories east of the Mississippi, and is still occupied by the aborigines originally found within its limits. In numbers they count, according to some estimates, one hundred and thirty-one thousand, and can send to the field twenty-six thousand two hundred warriors. As yet no community of feeling, except of deep and lasting hatred to the white man, and more particularly to the Anglo-Americans, exists among them; and, unless they coalesce, no serious difficulty need be apprehended from them. Not so, however, should they be induced to unite for purposes offensive and defensive; their strength would then become apparent, create confidence, and, in all probability, induce them to give vent to their long-suppressed desire to revenge past wrongs, which is restrained, as they openly and freely declare, by fear alone. That such a union will be formed at no distant day we have every reason to believe, and the period may be accelerated by their growing wants and the policy of Mexico to annoy Texas and raise an impenetrable barrier in the direction of her frontier.

In consideration, then, of the number of these people, the nature of the country they possess to operate in, the extent of our border settlements and their defenceless condition, it behooves the United States to take timely measures to give permanent security to that frontier.

This desirable object can, it is apprehended, alone be effected by the intervention of a strong restraining military force, judiciously posted both in and near the territory of the Indian, or by his ultimate civilization, and its attendant division and tenure of real property in his individual right. Until, however, the latter is accomplished, the first must be applied as the only immediate conservative. Having arrived at this conclusion, the next questions are: What shall this force be, how posted, and what auxiliary lines of communication should be established to secure to it the means of supply, relief, and rapid movement? To each of these answers will briefly be attempted.

1. The left of the line of principal positions to be occupied on this division of the frontier will, as

before stated, rest on the Red river, at Towson, the stationary and auxiliary force for which is put down at two regiments of infantry, two companies of artillery, and eight troops of dragoons. The next and most important position to be occupied is on the Arkansas, below the Canadian, and this is selected because of its commanding influence over the country in front, and the ease with which lines of communication to it may be established by roads from the interior of Arkansas and Missouri, and by improving the navigation of the main river and its principal tributaries above. This position is central, or nearly so, to the front that will be presented by the most numerous and warlike tribes, which have been and are to be removed, and who are known to entertain enmity to our people, and consequently require the presence of an imposing force to hold them in check. This force, it is thought, should not be less than two regiments of infantry, one regiment of dragoons, and two companies of light artillery, supported by two reserves: one posted at Little Rock, and consisting of one regiment of infantry and one company of artillery; and the other at Jefferson Barracks, consisting of two regiments of infantry and two companies of artillery. The first might, as occasion required, be pushed either up the Arkansas, across the country to Towson, or to any other point on the frontier; and the second, in like manner, overland towards the central position on the Arkansas, or to any other point north, as far as the Missouri river; and by water, during the navigable seasons, to any part of the country bordered by that river. This latter reserve could also, in seven days, by steamers, be landed at Natchitoches, and in five at St. Peter's. The next position in point of prominence and importance to be occupied, and which will be the extreme right of this section, is on the Missouri, as near the Great Platte, but north of it, as circumstances will admit. The object to be fulfilled by the presence of a force at this point is mainly to restrain within proper bounds the aborigines residing on the waters of the latter river and those occupying the country to the north, and prevent their disturbing the quiet secured by treaty to the tribes further south, and also, in connexion with the force planted at St. Peter's, to hold in check the stationary and roving tribes that occupy the unceded territory between the Missouri and Mississippi rivers. The force for this place should not be less than one regiment of infantry, two troops of cavalry, and one company of artillery; making, in the aggregate, for the middle division, a necessary force of eight regiments of infantry, two regiments of dragoons, and eight companies of artillery. This force includes the reserve at Baton Rouge and the garrison at Towson.

2. In addition to three positions already designated, there should be established subsidiary stations, to be garrisoned by detachments from the former, where should be deposited such supplies as may be necessary for the troops that may have occasion to visit them while on reconnoitring excursions or any other service. The selection of their locality should have reference to the facilities with which they can be relieved or reached from the interior, as well as from the posts on either side. Two of these stations ought to be established in the chain of mountains lying between the Red river and the Arkansas, two others between the latter river and the Kansas, another near the mouth of the latter river, and another between it and the Platte; and, for the purpose of deterring incursions south of Towson through the Texan territory, an additional one, to be garrisoned from the reserve at Baton Rouge, might advantageously be established in the neighborhood of the Caddo agency or Coats's bluff, on the Red river, which is represented as a good site for the object—making altogether three principal stations and six lesser ones, on the first and second sections, to guard against Indian aggression. Each of these should be provided with the requisite number of quarters for officers and men, store-rooms, shops, stables, &c., arranged in a quadrangular or any other form required by the nature of the ground, to satisfy the conditions of good defence, proper ventilation, and easy intercommunication, the whole to be covered by lines of defence, which must be determined by the locality and the arms employed; a bastioned square or higher polygon, according to circumstances, with advanced works, is recommended. For the manner of distributing the quarters, &c., within the lines of defence, the plan prepared and submitted to the Secretary of War in March last is referred to. To this the preference is given over a cantonment in the form of a hollow square, recommended by some officers, both on account of the greater compactness it admits of in the distribution of the accommodation and the comparative ease with which such an arrangement may be defended.

When it can be done, due economy and a sense of greater security would seem to require that all buildings planted in an Indian territory should be constructed of imperishable and incombustible materials.

3. Lines of communication.—These will be by water and overland. Those by water will be up the Red, Arkansas, Maramec, Missouri, and Osage rivers, and those overland will be found traced in carmine on the accompanying map, to which reference is made for their number and direction, as well as for the points they are intended to connect, viz:

First. From the auxiliary station at Little Rock, where an arsenal is now under construction, southeast along the right bank of the Arkansas, to the town of Napoleon, at its mouth; northeast to Memphis, opposite which a landing in Arkansas is established by the United States road, which begins at that point; northeastwardly, by Jackson, St. Genevieve, and Herculaneum, to Jefferson Barracks, with a branch west of Big river to the same point; north of the Arkansas river to the mouth of the Canadian; west to the headwaters of Poteau river, and thence, on both sides of this stream, to the subsidiary posts planted between Red and Arkansas rivers; and southwest to Washington, and thence to Towson to the west, and Coats's bluff to the south.

Second. From Cape Girardeau, Missouri, through the populous counties of Girardeau and Madison, in that State, and those of Carroll and Washington, in Arkansas, *via* Talbot, &c., to the mouth of the Canadian.

Third. From Jefferson Barracks, north of the Missouri, *via* St. Charles, Chariton, and the mouth of Grand river, to the Platte; south of the Missouri, *via* Jefferson City, mouth of the Kansas, or arsenal in its vicinity, subsidiary post on the great Nemahaw, to the Platte, having two branches at Jefferson City, one running north, to intersect the road north of the Missouri, and the other to the subsidiary post on the Osage river; and southwest, *via* Rogerstown, *alias* Bentonville, (at which place commences the Missouri State road to the southwest corner of the State,) to the mouth of the Canadian, having, from Delaware village, a branch to first subsidiary post north of the Arkansas. Most of the routes for the two latter States are already established, either by the United States or the State within which they are found.

Fourth. From Coats's bluff, in Louisiana, *via* the point where the boundary line strikes the Red river, across said river, to intersect the road from Washington; thence to Towson, and from the latter to the Platte, through the chain of posts recommended. It is firmly believed that these lines of communication, together with those indicated for the first division, which are also traced in carmine, will afford, in conjunction with the water routes, when perfected, all the facilities the utmost wants of the service can require for the maintenance of constant, prompt, and easy intercourse with the frontier. Through them will be for-

warded the supplies of men, provisions, &c., drawn not only from the States within which they lie, but also from the States further to the eastward. And it may not be improper to remark, also, that by these routes despatch will be given to the transportation of the mails from each of the stations, which is an important consideration in a military sense, and one which should not be overlooked when the propriety of establishing these or other military routes is discussed.

The first step to be taken in this matter should be to free the rivers of their obstructions to the points colored in blue on the map. The improvement of the Red and Arkansas rivers is already authorized, and the work is in progress of execution, and for the other rivers provision should be made the moment it is determined to use them as channels of relief; and, in the meantime, a minute examination of the country through which the roads, or such of them as may be adopted, are to pass, should, as a preliminary, be required of the officers to be charged with their construction. The examination, as recommended for the first section, should be intrusted to none but skilful topographers, and should embrace a wide range of country. The roads ought to be opened eighty feet wide, have a grade of not more than $2\frac{1}{2}^\circ$, be well drained, raised in the middle at least six inches, and bridged across the minor streams. The opening, grading, and bridging of these roads should be made a military duty. And, in conclusion, it may be well to state that their construction is the more necessary for the reason that the communications cannot be kept up at all times by the Arkansas or Missouri, in consequence of the want of sufficient water in the first for most part of the year and the interruption in the latter by ice during the cold months; and as regards the Maramec, its improvement to Big Spring will lessen the land carriage towards the Canadian more than one hundred miles; hence its introduction as one of the avenues of communication.

Third, or northern section.—The country north of the territory over which the Indian title is extinguished is occupied from Lake Superior to the Mississippi by the Chippewas, Menomonees, and Winnebagoes; west of this river to the Missouri by the Sacs and Foxes, Ioways, and Pottawatomies; and north of these tribes by the powerful and warlike Sioux; and west of the Missouri, but north of the Platte, by the Pawnees, Ottoes, Sioux, Blackfeet, &c.; numbering, in the aggregate, not far from 201,000, and being able to muster 40,200 warriors. But, owing to the remote position of most of these tribes from our settlements, they could not reach them without passing through the lands of those who have been removed west. No serious cause of apprehension, then, can exist of an outbreak from any of these tribes, singly or collectively. Should it, however, prove otherwise, the United States will, whenever they choose, be able to bring the whole Sioux force (the hereditary and irreconcilable enemy to every other Indian) to bear against the hostiles, or *vice versa*, should our difficulties be with the latter; and the suggestion is made whether prudence does not require that those hereditary feelings should not rather be maintained than destroyed by efforts to cultivate a closer union between those people.

The only important station for this section is at Fort Snelling, near the mouth of the St. Peter's; and it is believed no other point need be occupied to enforce peace between the tribes and cause our borders to be respected. A subsidiary post might, however, be established at Longue Pointe, or Fond du Lac, on Lake Superior, for the purpose of protection to our traders in that quarter; and a second one could also advantageously be established between the St. Peter's and the Platte as a point of rest and supply to detachments passing from one river to the other.

The communication from St. Peter's to the lake would be by the St. Croix and Bois Brulé; and that with the Platte can be kept up overland without the construction of roads, as the country is highly favorable in its natural state for the passage of troops.

The force to be planted at Snelling ought to consist of one regiment of infantry and one company of artillery; thus making an aggregate force required for the protection of the frontier against Indian aggression and for the maintenance of the neutrality of our territory on the Texan frontier of—

	Regiments of infantry.	Troops of dragoons.	Companies of artillery.
For the southern section, or Texan frontier.....	1	0	1
For the middle section.....	8	20	8
For the northern section.....	1	0	1
	10	20	10

or 12,940 men, computing the regiments of infantry and dragoons at 1,000 each, and the artillery at 940—a small force compared with the one it is intended to restrain. This force, as before stated, may be reduced on the return of quiet to Texas to nine regiments of infantry, twenty troops of cavalry, and nine companies of artillery, or 11,846 men.

A plan of the forts to be constructed, an approximate estimate of their cost, as also that of the roads proposed as lines of communication, would be submitted but for the press of other occupations and the want of sufficient data upon which to base these estimates.

For the proximate distances between each point and the marches, computed at fifteen miles for the least and twenty miles for the longest, reference is made to the map on which they are written in carmine.

Respectfully submitted by

C. GRATIOT.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE DEFENCE OF THE WESTERN FRONTIER.

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, November 7, 1837.*

SIR: I have had the honor to receive a copy of the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 11th of October, and one of the Senate of the 14th of the same month, both calling for a plan of defence for the western frontier, which were referred to this office from the War Department for reports.

Although my attention is so engrossed with the constant press of current business as to leave but little time for those researches which are necessarily involved in such an inquiry, I will endeavor to comply with your call, but without the hope or expectation of doing anything like justice to so important a subject.

As those resolutions are in terms the same, they may, in order to avoid repetition, be treated jointly in a single report; and I will proceed to notice the several points in the very judicious order in which they are presented in the resolutions themselves.

1st. "The positions to be permanently occupied by garrisons."

The western frontier may be deemed to comprehend the region lying between Red river to the south and the Upper Mississippi to the north. In a military sense, the left flank of this extended line now rests on Fort Towson, near the junction of the Kiamechi with the Red river, and the right upon Fort Snelling, at the junction of the St. Peter's with the Mississippi—a distance of one thousand miles. The intermediate positions are Fort Gibson, at the junction of the Arkansas and Grand rivers, and Fort Leavenworth, on the Missouri.

In my humble judgment, those positions are all well chosen and deserve to be permanently maintained. Without stopping to discuss objections founded upon the mere topography of the sites which have been selected for some of these forts, it appears to me that the geographical features of the country clearly indicate them as strongholds which cannot be left unoccupied with impunity. The three first named, being at the head of navigation, can scarcely ever be advanced, and will therefore, it is believed, continue to form a part of what may be termed our *exterior* line of defence. The fourth, being now directly on the boundary of the State of Missouri, is destined soon to be superseded by a more advanced position up the Missouri river, and will thenceforth become an important member of the *interior* line which I shall suggest.

By the exterior line, I mean that which may be called for by great military and national considerations, and which must often be advanced into the Indian country far *beyond* our boundary; and by the interior line, that which is required for the special protection of the settlements, and which, in order to effect its object, must necessarily be *within* our boundary. It occurs to me that, under existing circumstances, no plan for the protection of the western frontier can be effectual which looks to a single line of defence to accomplish objects so different in their character, and that any attempt to unite those objects must necessarily defeat one of them, and possibly both. I would, therefore, retain Fort Snelling, Fort Leavenworth, (for the present,) Fort Gibson, and Fort Towson, as constituting the exterior line, with the addition of a post at the "upper forks" of the Des Moines river, to fill up the wide gap in that part of the frontier. These forts occupy the great avenues leading into the Indian country, on which alone the advanced positions should be taken, and I do not perceive the necessity for any other intermediate post on this line. It would, however, in my opinion, be highly expedient to reoccupy the position at Council Bluffs, on the Missouri, at an early day, leaving Fort Leavenworth on the inner line of defence, as previously suggested.

2d. "The auxiliary stations for reserves and depots of supplies."

The auxiliary stations would constitute the interior line, as already indicated, and should be located with reference to the protection of the settlements, rather than to the military features of the frontier or any very nice relation to the primary positions forming the advanced line. They would be *posts of refuge* for the inhabitants in times of alarm, and for that reason should be constructed on a large scale as to their area, with light defences, and ordinarily garrisoned by a small, regular force, just sufficient to protect them from seizure by the enemy. In times of need the refugees themselves would carry reinforcements to the garrisons of those posts, whose chief object would be to form rallying points of safety and protection to the people when driven from their homes by the sudden incursions of the enemy.

The positions of these posts of refuge must necessarily be governed by the course and extent of the settlements. It would be impossible to indicate them without more information on that point than is at present possessed here. All that can be said is, that they should be a little within our boundary line, so that the people may rally upon them conveniently. While the great positions forming the advanced line may readily be determined, upon military principles, by an inspection of the map, the minor ones, destined to form the interior line for the protection of the settlements, can be properly determined only by a careful inspection of the course and extent of those settlements, which will also determine the number of those posts. I should think, however, that two between the Red and Arkansas rivers, four between the Arkansas and the Missouri, and two between the Missouri and the Mississippi, would be quite sufficient in the present state of our settlements.

The depots for supplies cannot be exactly indicated until this interior line of posts shall have been established. They have a necessary connexion with and dependence on each other. The principal ones must, of course, be on the great rivers which penetrate the frontier, and considerably within the line of posts, so that roads may be opened *diverging* from the depots in the direction of the several posts which are dependent upon them. Both the Arkansas and Missouri rivers are very eligibly situated for this purpose. They flow through the centre of their respective sections of the frontier, and the line of posts will necessarily extend across them nearly at right angles. The Red river, the Osage, and the Des Moines, will also afford eligible sites for depots, by which the land transportation may be reduced and the communications facilitated. Assuming that the posts will be located some eight or ten miles within the boundary line, the following places would seem to stand in a proper relation to them for depots of supplies, namely: Fulton, on Red river; Morrison's Bluff, on the Arkansas; the junction of the Osage with Grand river; and Lexington, on the Missouri.

The stations for the reserves may be indicated with more precision. I should, however, deem but one reserve necessary. There is no equal extent of our frontier that I am acquainted with which can be so readily reinforced from a single position. Jefferson Barracks, near St. Louis, is, in my humble judgment, above all other places, the station for the corps reserve. The line of the frontier, especially if it be extended to include Council Bluffs, describes an arc of a circle, whose chord would pass nearly through

that point. From its central position, and its proximity to the mouths of the great rivers leading to the frontier, reinforcements may, by means of steam transports, be thrown, with great rapidity and nearly equal facility, up the Missouri, the Arkansas, and the Mississippi, as circumstances shall require. A reserve posted there would, in fact, be an available force for the whole line of the frontier, and it would, I think, be difficult to find a more eligible position. It might, however, be a just precaution, as the Arkansas river is not navigable at all seasons of the year, to station a minor reserve at some position on that river above Little Rock.

3d. "The routes of communication between the several stations on the frontier, and from these to the depots in the interior."

Nothing is more important, in a military view, than the communications from the posts on the frontier to the depots in the interior; but those *between* the several stations on the line of the frontier are not, in my opinion, entitled to the consequence which has been ascribed to them. The great "military road," as it is called, now in progress from the Upper Mississippi to Red river, running beyond our boundary line, through the Indian country, and intended to connect our frontier posts with each other, originated, I think, in a very erroneous estimate of its importance for purposes of defence. As a route of communication, it violates a fundamental principle of military science. The lines of communication should be diverging or *perpendicular* to the frontier, not *parallel* with it. The resources of an army are always presumed to be in its rear, from whence it can draw its supplies and reinforcements under cover of its own protection and by lines of communication which are secured from interruption by the enemy. It is clear that no army can maintain its position long under any other circumstances. Roads between the posts on the frontier might be found convenient for occasional passing and repassing in time of peace; but as routes of communication they would be wholly useless in time of war. Exposed as they would be to constant interruption by the enemy, it is evident that nothing short of a force competent to take the field for offensive operations could expect to march upon them with safety.

But I do not perceive the necessity of keeping open these communications between the posts on the line of the frontier at so much hazard. It could only result from the error of making posts occupying a very extended front dependent on each other for support, which would be inverting a plain military principle. If reinforcements are required, they should be drawn from a corps of reserve posted in the rear, by means of rapid water conveyance and by roads leading to the frontier, not by flank marches through the enemy's country, on a line parallel with the frontier. This would be not only violating a rule, but disregarding experience, and repeating a recent military blunder in another quarter, which ended in a mournful catastrophe.* Besides, it is well known that the whole region south of the Missouri river may be traversed by troops without the aid of artificial roads. In no other way can we ever expect to conduct a war there, since it is certain that the Indians will never meet us on our roads, except when they are strong enough to overwhelm our detachments. I therefore make no suggestion in relation to routes of communication *between* the posts on the frontier; but those which are to lead from these posts to the depots in the interior are entitled to the gravest consideration.

As the posts forming the exterior line of defence are all situated on navigable rivers, these, of course, will be the proper channels of communication from those posts to the great sources of supply in the interior; and, with the abundant means of transportation which are at all times available in the west, there will be no difficulty in relation to supplies for any force that will ever be stationed on that line, especially if the flood season be availed of to replenish the stock at the posts on the streams liable to be much affected by droughts. It is the supply of the posts on the inner line which will occasion the chief difficulty, in consequence of the *land* transportation it will necessarily involve. I should not, however, regard this difficulty as very formidable. If the depots be established on the rivers, at or near the points indicated, with roads diverging from thence to the several posts, it would be an easy task to organize wagon trains to transport all the necessary supplies. The distance could not be more than midway between the depots, which in no case would exceed one hundred miles. The garrisons of those posts would be habitually small, and the country around them being partially settled would furnish forage for the trains and a portion of the subsistence for the troops, which would lighten the operations by diminishing the transportation from the depots.

4th. "The minimum force which will be required to maintain peace among the several Indian tribes and protect the border settlements."

As the solution of this question involves high military qualifications and a more intimate acquaintance with the strength and disposition of the tribes along the frontier than I possess, I should not presume to attempt it but for your call upon me, which I am not at liberty to disregard. I beg, therefore, that my opinions, humble as they are, may be taken with due allowance.

The obligations of the government in reference to the western frontier are of a very peculiar character. It is first bound by a common duty to protect its own border settlements, extending along a line of one thousand miles, against the incursions of numerous savage tribes separated from those settlements by mere imaginary lines; and it is next bound by solemn treaty stipulations, with such of those tribes as have emigrated to that frontier, "to protect them at their new residences against all interruptions or disturbances from any other tribes or nations of Indians, or from any other person or persons whatsoever."

If these obligations are to be scrupulously fulfilled in good faith, which would seem to be due to our character as a nation professing a paternal care over these people, a military force of thirty thousand men on the western frontier would scarcely be adequate to enable the government to discharge its duties to its own citizens, and redeem these pledges of protection to the Indians.

It is not my intention, however, to propose such a force. Political expediency, I presume, would not tolerate it, however it might be justified by military considerations. It is merely adverted to here in connexion with the heavy obligations which rest upon the government, and which have probably been contracted from time to time without any very nice calculation of the means that would be necessary to a faithful discharge of them. I will therefore, without enlarging upon this point, proceed to state the *minimum* force that is deemed necessary to give protection to the border settlements, and assist in preserving peace among them and their Indian neighbors along the line of the frontier. These are great and important objects of themselves, without superadding the yet more difficult task of protecting the emigrant tribes, whom our policy has placed beyond the frontier, from the wild and warlike Indians of the far west.

* It was in the attempt to reinforce the army of General Clinch, by a march through the enemy's country, that Major Dade's command was sacrificed. If that devoted band had, by chance, reached its destination, it would have presented the anomaly of a small reinforcement coming in through the enemy's lines upon the *front* of the main army instead of its rear.

I have already suggested a plan of defence, and indicated the positions to be permanently occupied. It remains to estimate the necessary force and dispose of it in such way as will best effect the objects in view. Beginning, then, on the right flank of the frontier, I would assign to—

Fort Snelling	300 men.
Fort Crawford.....	300 "
Upper forks of the Des Moines.....	400 "
Fort Leavenworth.....	1,200 "
Fort Gibson.....	1,500 "
Fort Towson.....	800 "
The eight posts of refuge proposed.....	800 "
The protection of the four depots	200 "
Jefferson Barracks, as a corps of reserve.....	1,500 "
Total.....	<u>7,000</u> "

The garrisons assigned to the posts on the Upper Mississippi, and the Des Moines would give but a very small disposable force for field service; but, as the jealousy which exists at present among some of the tribes who inhabit that region will prevent their uniting for hostile purposes against our settlements, it may be deemed sufficient.

Of the force assigned to Fort Leavenworth, 200 would be required for its permanent garrison; the remaining 1,000 would be disposable for that section of the frontier, and should be held ready to march in any direction that circumstances might require. At Fort Gibson 300 would form the permanent garrison, leaving a disposable force of 1,200 that might take the field at a moment's warning, and march in the direction of the alarm. The permanent garrison of Fort Towson would be 200, and the disposable force at that point 600. The small garrisons on the interior line would furnish no disposable force for the field, being designed merely as guards of protection for the posts of refuge.

These active corps, though really very small in comparison with the extent of the frontier and the numerous tribes which they may have to encounter, would, it is believed, if skilfully directed, hold the Indians in check, and afford protection to the border settlements until the neighboring militia could be embodied and reinforcements drawn from the reserve. Their positions in advance of our boundary line would enable them to move with great effect upon the flanks and rear of the enemy, should he menace the settlements. No people look better to the security of their retreat than Indians; they are not even brave when at all hemmed in. They would, therefore, be backward in making war on the settlements, with the certainty of being promptly attacked in the rear by our disposable columns.

And this forcibly illustrates the advantages of the exterior line of defence which has been suggested, as well as the absolute necessity of having a strong force at the advanced positions indicated—not as mere garrisons, but for active service in the field. In my humble judgment, posts on the frontier, without a disposable force that may be detached in rapid pursuit when occasions require, are of very little utility. It is impossible that they can inspire the neighboring Indian tribes with a respect for our power. Accustomed themselves to roam the boundless prairies free as air, they can neither dread nor respect a garrison whose weakness confines it to its own narrow defences.

5th. "The number of Indians who will be in the occupancy of the country west and north of the States of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri, and the number of warriors they may collectively be able to bring into the field."

On these points our information is necessarily limited and vague. I have not myself been able to make any researches in relation to the number, but have gathered the following results from a recent report of a high functionary, supposed to be intimately acquainted with all matters relating to Indian affairs. According to that report, the number of Indians who had actually emigrated and settled on our frontier west of the Mississippi, up to February of last year, was 31,348. The indigenous tribes between them and the Rocky mountains were estimated to number 150,341; making an Indian population of 181,689 then on our western border. In addition to these, there were computed to be 62,181 east of the Mississippi, who were still to emigrate; which will make an aggregate Indian population of 243,870 on the western frontier when the scheme of emigration shall have been accomplished.

The report referred to does not state the probable number of warriors these assembled nations may be able to bring into the field. I have, therefore, endeavored to estimate it on data furnished by our own population. Our militia force, computed between the ages of 18 and 45 years, stands to the whole number of inhabitants in the ratio of 1 to 8.33; but the young men among the Indians take part in war much earlier than ours are required to bear arms, and the old men continue to act long after ours become exempt. I have, therefore, taken the male classes comprehended between the ages of 15 and 50 for the comparison. This gives a ratio of 1 to 4.23; but put it at 1 to 5, and the Indian tribes which are and soon will be on our western frontier would furnish 48,774 warriors.

This inquiry, however, is rather curious than practically useful, since a combination so extensive as would be necessary to bring their whole force into the field is neither probable nor possible. But the emigrant tribes alone, located directly on our boundary line, without the aid of the powerful indigenous tribes—Comanches, Osages, and Pawnees, who are close at hand—would furnish, on the above data, *twenty thousand warriors*, one-half of whom are probably armed with rifles provided by our bounty. If even such a combination among the emigrant tribes as would be necessary to bring their united force into the field against us were deemed probable, instead of an army of 7,000 men, as I have estimated as the minimum force to guard and protect the western frontier, *twice or thrice* that number might reasonably be required. But it will always be in our power to control a portion of these tribes, and make them auxiliaries in our cause; still, the savage force that might readily be arrayed against us on that frontier is sufficient to awaken our deep solicitude, and call for increased means of defence.

6th and last. "What progress has been made in the location of the military road."

The commissioners to whom that duty was assigned were prevented by causes beyond their control from entering upon the examination of the frontier until the beginning of September last, when they commenced the survey of the route from the Missouri to Red river. They are still engaged on it, and will, it is believed, complete the location of that section of the road during the present season. Nothing has been done on the section lying between the Missouri river and the Mississippi, in consequence of the

undefined state of the boundary lines of Missouri and the Wisconsin Territory, to which the road is intended to conform. Entertaining the opinions I do, however, in relation to this road, I do not think the delay that has occurred in its survey and location is to be regretted, as it will afford an opportunity of reviewing the subject in connexion with a general plan of defence.

In conclusion, I beg to observe that, after all, the great element in an efficient plan of defence for the western frontier consists of *men*. Fixed positions have far less influence in Indian warfare than in that of civilized nations. They are valuable auxiliaries as points of rest and outfit for the active corps; but it is on these the chief reliance must be placed for the protection of the border settlements.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. CROSS, *Acting Quartermaster General*.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War*.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Office of Indian Affairs*, November 22, 1837.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the extract from the resolution of the Senate of the 14th ultimo, respecting "the number of Indians who will be in the occupancy of the country west and north of the States of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri, and the number of warriors they may collectively be able to bring into the field," which you have referred to this office for a report; and, in obedience to your directions, beg leave to state that, from the best information I can procure, and after a comparison of the views of gentlemen well acquainted with the Indians of the west and northwest, I have arrived at the conclusion that the number of Indians on the frontier in question will, when the tribes now east of the Mississippi shall have been placed to the west of that river, in fulfilment of the settled policy of the government, be about 332,000; and that the number of warriors they may collectively be able to bring into the field will be about 66,000, or about one out of five of the whole number.

For particulars I respectfully refer you to the statement herewith laid before you, which is believed to be as nearly complete and accurate as circumstances will permit.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. A. HARRIS, *Commissioner*.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War*.

Statement showing the number of Indians now east of the Mississippi, of those that have emigrated from the east to the west of that river, and those within striking distance of the western frontier.

I.—NAME AND NUMBER OF THE TRIBES NOW EAST OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

1.—*Under treaty stipulations to remove west of the Mississippi.*

Winnebagoes.....	4, 500	
Ottawas of Ohio.....	100	
Pottawatomes of Indiana.....	2, 950	
Chippewas, Ottawas, and Pottawatomes.....	1, 500	
Cherokees.....	14, 000	
Creeks.....	1, 000	
Chickasaws.....	1, 000	
Seminoles.....	5, 000	
Apalachicolas.....	400	
Ottawas and Chippewas in the peninsula of Michigan.....	6, 500	
		36, 950

2.—*Not under treaty stipulations to remove.*

New York Indians.....	4, 176	
Wyandots.....	575	
Miamies.....	1, 100	
Menomonees.....	4, 000	
Ottawas and Chippewas of the lakes.....	2, 564	
		12, 415
Total.....		49, 365

II.—NUMBER OF INDIANS WHO HAVE EMIGRATED FROM THE EAST TO THE WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

Chickasaws.....	549
Chippewas, Ottawas, and Pottawatomes.....	2, 191
Choctaws.....	15, 000
Quapaws.....	476
Creeks.....	20, 437
Seminoles.....	407
Apalachicolas.....	265
Cherokees.....	7, 911
Kickapoos.....	588
Delawares.....	826
Shawnees.....	1, 272

Ottawas	374
Weas.....	222
Piankeshaws	162
Peorias and Kaskaskias	132
Pottawatomies of Indiana	53
Senecas.....	251
Senecas and Shawnees.....	211
Total	51, 327

III.—NUMBER OF THE INDIGENOUS TRIBES WITHIN STRIKING DISTANCE OF THE WESTERN FRONTIER.

Sioux	21, 600
Ioways	1, 500
Sacs.....	4, 800
Foxes	1, 600
Sacs of the Missouri.....	500
Osages	5, 120
Kansas.....	1, 606
Omahas	1, 605
Ottoes and Missouriias	1, 000
Pawnees	12, 500
Comanches	19, 200
Kioways.....	1, 800
Mandans	3, 200
Quapaws.....	450
Minatarees	2, 000
Pagans	30, 000
Assinaboines	15, 000
Apaches	20, 280
Crees	3, 000
Arapahoes	3, 000
Gros Ventres	16, 800
Eutaws	19, 200
Crows	7, 200
Caddoes	2, 000
Poncas.....	900
Arickarees	2, 750
Cheyennes	3, 200
Blackfeet.....	30, 000
Total.....	231, 806

RECAPITULATION.

Number of Indians now east of the Mississippi.....	49, 365
Number of Indians who have emigrated from east to west side.....	51, 327
Number of indigenous tribes.....	231, 806
Aggregate	332, 498

Estimated number of warriors.

Whole number of Indians	332, 498
Assuming that every fifth one may be considered a warrior, (and this is believed to be a reasonable supposition,) the number of warriors will be.....	66, 499

C. A. HARRIS, *Commissioner.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Office of Indian Affairs, November 22, 1837.*

15TH CONGRESS.]

No. 754.

[2D SESSION.]

APPLICATION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL ARMORY AT THE FALLS OF BIG BEAVER RIVER, IN PENNSYLVANIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JANUARY 3, 1838.

To the Senate and House of Representatives in Congress assembled:

Your memorialists, citizens of Beaver county, Pennsylvania, perceiving that the President of the United States has called the attention of Congress to the subject of the establishment of a national armory west of the Alleghany mountains, would respectfully refer you to the very able report made on that subject by Colonel McCrea, from which it will appear that the commissioners, after a careful and minute examination and survey of all the prominent sites west of the mountains, gave a decided preference to the Falls of Beaver; and not only over other water powers, but over steam-power in Pittsburg.

Your memorialists would also represent, respectfully, that, since the report of Colonel McCrea was made, many changes and improvements have been made, which render this situation much more desirable for such a work. Since then the Pennsylvania canals have been completed from Philadelphia to Pittsburg, from the Ohio river to Newcastle, (passing by and improving this site,) and now rapidly extending to Erie, on the lake. The Ohio and Pennsylvania canal is also about being completed, and will, without fail, in less than two years, furnish a water communication to the lakes at Cleveland. In a little more time it is almost equally certain we shall have one or more railroad communications to the same point; and it is conceived that much more time cannot elapse ere we shall have a railroad communication to both Philadelphia and Baltimore, thus affording us, over all others, at the same time the shortest, cheapest, and speediest communication with, and transportation to, both the frontier on the lakes and our seaboard. The contiguity of this site to steamboat navigation (being a little more than three miles from the Ohio river) is another strong argument in its favor. Since Colonel McCrea's report numerous discoveries have been made in this vicinity of bituminous coal of the very best kind for smelting purposes. The manufacture of iron has very much increased and improved in the State, and in this vicinity the number and abilities of all kinds of artisans and mechanics have very much increased; and, as the situation is surpassed by none in the Union for health, no difficulty is or will be found in the way of procuring any increase to the number of the best workmen at low wages; the more so as provisions of all kinds are abundant and comparatively cheap.

It will be perceived, therefore, that this site has advantages over all others for speedily and cheaply transporting the arms, when made, to all points in the Union, and affords in the immediate neighborhood more of the requisites for the economical manufacture of arms upon a large scale than any other, not even excepting Pittsburg, as water power has, in point of economy, great advantages over steam power; and since the time of Colonel McCrea's report, the comparative advantages of water power over steam power have very much increased. Steam-engines are, perhaps, one hundred per cent. higher than they were then; coal has increased in Pittsburg fully fifty per cent., if not more, and will, no doubt, yet more increase; while the water continues, and will for ages continue, to flow as cheaply as when the report was made.

Your memorialists would, therefore, most respectfully urge upon you the selection of the west side of Beaver river, at dam No. 4, (being the head of the Falls of Big Beaver,) as the site for the contemplated western national armory; and your petitioners, &c.

Signed by Sherlock Stone, and one hundred and twenty-eight others.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 755.

[2D SESSION.]

MEMORIAL OF JOHN ELY, A SURVIVING SOLDIER OF THE REVOLUTION, FOR THE
ERECTION OF A MONUMENT TO THE MEMORY OF WASHINGTON AT MOUNT
VERNON.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JANUARY 3, 1838.

To the honorable the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled :

The petition of the undersigned, a surviving soldier of the revolution, most respectfully sheweth: That some years past the remains of our great benefactor were taken from the vault where first interred, and placed in a new sepulchre not far distant from the mansion-house where he had lived and where he died; and your petitioner, prompted by patriotic motives, now implores the honorable counsellors of the nation to consider and decide on the propriety of raising a monument to the memory of WASHINGTON; and that Congress, in their wisdom, will cause it to be erected at Mount Vernon, on the spot where his ashes are now at rest.

In taking the liberty of thus addressing the guardians of national honor, your petitioner, with all becoming deference, would observe that he was an early soldier of the revolution, and "has done the State some service;" and now, near the close of a long life, he has a strong desire of seeing *due homage* paid to the memory of his GREAT COMMANDER, under whom, more than sixty years ago, he served his country in the war of independence, and to whom the *whole nation* still acknowledges a vast debt of gratitude.

As this is a subject of much importance connected with the fair fame and dignity of a great, intelligent, and high-minded people, your petitioner begs the indulgence of a hearing more at large than he would presume to ask were the occasion less momentous.

Millions of our most active fellow-citizens, born since the days of the revolution, have been accustomed from the cradle to hear their fathers speak in glowing terms of our illustrious Washington, and with much concern they now look about and inquire, "Where is his monument?" And thousands of worthy foreigners who visit this land of liberty come here with Washington in their hearts, and feel disappointed when they find no monument of adequate proportions to show the place of his interment.

Civilized people of every clime under heaven have not been slow in rendering homage to their illustrious dead. Patriots, warriors, benefactors of their country, and men of renown, have in all ages of the world received vast funeral rites, while our own beloved *Washington*, greatly superior to them all, lies there! Yes, he who was "first in the hearts of his countrymen" lies there in humble obscurity, unshrouded with national reverence, and most unaccountably, not to say ungratefully, neglected! Yet nations *far off*, with noble generosity, revere the name of WASHINGTON.

If, while his glorious achievements live fresh in our memory; if, while some few of his surviving compatriots of the revolution yet hover about the Capitol; if, while a few silver-headed veterans, who were *eye-witnesses* of his godlike deeds, still linger among us; if, while thus circumstanced, Congress should still neglect or delay this filial act of duty, the fear is that it never will be done. For we know not what

changes may take place; degenerate souls may become "lords of the ascendant," reckless ambition may overturn the whole order of government, and a "new king rise up that knew not *Joseph*." Already the death-blow is aimed at our dearest rights; therefore, no opportunity should be neglected for drawing closer the connecting cords of *union*. United, we *stand* against the world; but *divided*, we fall like the God-forsaken suicide! And a monument placed at Mount Vernon, for which your petitioner most devoutly prays, would be a strong *tie* between the north and the south: all eyes would be directed there, and at the shrine of Washington all hearts would unite; and nothing is wanted but *perfect* union to render us perfectly *invincible*.

If the tomb of Mohammed could, for a thousand years, attract multitudes of warlike devotees, offering themselves a willing sacrifice to the false prophet, how much more irresistibly powerful would be the tomb of *Washington* to draw together millions of enlightened freemen devoted to the welfare of their own beloved country! If anything heretofore was wanting to urge the necessity of this undertaking, the political turmoils and pecuniary embarrassments of the present times afford strong arguments for its immediate prosecution.

Your petitioner is aware that it has been long in contemplation to raise, by individual munificence, a monument of vast height and splendor on some chosen ground near the Capitol. This would certainly be a noble demonstration of individual generosity, but it would be a partial expression only; and any expression thus *partially* made could not be well suited to the occasion, for the *whole* people are alive to this subject—rich and poor, high and low—all, ALL alike wish to contribute their rightful proportion of the expense; and this can be done in no other way than by the action of Congress. Then every man, woman, and child must necessarily pay, and each one be entitled to a rightful share of the honor; and each member of Congress will receive the eternal gratitude of countless millions, and also thereby *redeem* the long-neglected PLEDGE of their predecessors.

If we wait for *individuals* to do this holy work for us, it requires no inspiration to foretell that it never will be done; but should Congress order it, the great work would be readily accomplished. And who does not say, *with all due respect*, that Congress is bound by all that is sacred, filial, and *patriotic*, to give the order? We may talk of raising millions by *subscription*, but it will end in talk.

Though the soil of Mount Vernon does not belong to the United States, yet Congress can purchase it. Congress alone, if your petitioner be rightly informed, has that privilege by consent of the owner. If the whole tract comprising the Mount Vernon estate should be deemed too extensive, a hundred acres or two hundred would be sufficient, and afford also ground enough for the site of a noble *asylum* for military invalids.

A monument of suitable magnitude erected in the federal city would be greatly ornamental and praiseworthy; but standing alone on Mount Vernon, where the foremost man of all this world stood, it could not fail of commanding the undivided attention of all beholders. Patriot citizens, statesmen, and philosophers, of various *creeds*, would thither resort, and, laying aside the bitterness of party spirit, unite as brothers of the same national family; and all persons afflicted with the *king's evil*, or any other visionary evil more deplorable, might there contemplate the paternal advice and farewell admonitions of our national father, look up to his monument, and be restored to their senses.

When the chosen people of God had passed through the Red sea, journeying towards the promised land, fiery serpents beset them on their way, whose bite was deadly; but on looking up to the brazen pillar that Moses erected they were made whole. In like manner, thousands of well-meaning citizens, who have received venomous bites from *creeping things* more baneful than fiery serpents, may look up to the monument and be healed.

Unprincipled demagogues, with serpent-like subtlety, are now abroad in the land, going to and fro "seeking whom they may devour;" and whether these disorganizers breed in the hot-beds of the south or hatch in the cold regions of the north, it matters not, they are ALL shapes of ill omen—all *alike* our deadly enemies. And should these dark spirits of anarchy succeed in their wicked purpose of destroying useful establishments, removing ancient landmarks, and annulling contracts—thereby *severing the Union*—these proud United States would soon be degraded to a level with the petty kingdoms of Barbary, and some one of our beautiful sister cities might become the imperial ALGIERS of America. *Like causes produce like effects*; and we should inevitably become no better than the *feeble empires* of South America, with a tattered remnant of power sufficient only for self-destruction, or (more deplorable) sink down to a condition for becoming fit allies to assist piebald *rebels* in re-enacting the tragedies of San Domingo! and thus, from a rich and powerful nation, we should break *ourselves* into fragments and be transformed into mere hordes of *Ishmaelites*!

These are not the visionary forebodings of a distempered mind; no, they are prophetic *truths* of serious import, as we have seen all but verified in our recent partisan warfare. And your petitioner is fully persuaded that a monument thus erected on the ground where Washington lived and died in meridian glory would have great influence in softening political asperities and correcting *unintentional* errors; it would stand there at all times a strong TOWER OF DEFENCE, pointing up to heaven, more potent in its bearing among *freemen* than ships of war and legions of warriors.

The exterior splendor of the edifice should be made to correspond with the character of the sacred relics deposited within; its form, its dimensions, its *altitude*, and embellishments, should be such as the best artist in the world can design, men of liberal science approve, and such as the President of the United States and all intelligent travellers will pronounce the most superb, lofty, and magnificent MAUSOLEUM in existence.

Your petitioner is not authorized to speak in behalf of others, yet he presumes to believe that all the surviving soldiers and the venerable patriots of the revolution, together with millions of the *present generation*, do unite cordially in the wishes and sentiments here expressed in this the earnest supplication and prayer of your devoted fellow-citizen and humble servant,

JOHN ELY.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 756.

[2D SESSION.]

ON CLAIM OF JOHN H. HALL FOR COMPENSATION FOR HIS INVENTIONS AND PATENT RIGHTS FOR IMPROVEMENTS OF FIRE-ARMS FOR THE USE OF THE UNITED STATES.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JANUARY 4, 1838.

Mr. KEMBLE, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred the petition of John H. Hall, of Harper's Ferry, in the State of Virginia, reported:

That this is a petition for compensation for the invention of a new arm, known in the service as Hall's patent rifle, and for certain improvements in the manufacture of fire-arms, whereby the separate parts of a piece are made exactly to one model, thus affording the double advantage of easy repair in case of accident, and that the uninjured parts of arms worn out in the service may be used for the repair or reconstruction of new pieces.

The committee, with every desire to encourage the genius and mechanical talents of the country, consider the latter improvements having been made while the petitioner was in the employment of the government, and paid not only for his time and services, but for the cost of his experiments; that therefore the justice or propriety of the claim on account of them was at least questionable; but the invention of a new arm, as Hall's patent rifle certainly is, and the application of the same principle to the musket and carbine, stand upon a different footing, having been made by the petitioner himself, at his own expense, and before he appears to have been introduced into the service of the United States; and presuming, from the certificates which accompany the memorial, as well as from the fact of its introduction into the service, that it is a valuable improvement, the committee would recommend that a liberal remuneration be made to the petitioner for his inventions and patent rights, and that the same be purchased for the use of the United States; and they accordingly submit a bill to that effect.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 757.

[2D SESSION.]

ON THE CLAIM OF THE WIDOW OF AN OFFICER OF THE ARMY FOR THE PAY CORRESPONDING WITH HIS BREVET RANK, HE HAVING A COMMAND CORRESPONDING WITH SUCH RANK.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE JANUARY 5, 1838.

Mr. WALL, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred the petition of Mary A. Patrick, widow of Captain Matthew Alexander Patrick, late captain 1st regiment United States artillery, reported:

That the petitioner states that her deceased husband was commissioned first lieutenant in the 1st regiment of artillery, in the United States army, on the 11th August, 1820, and faithfully served in that grade for ten years, and, under the law and according to usage, became entitled to the brevet of captain on the 11th August, 1830. That he, together with others similarly entitled, was duly nominated by the President to the Senate for brevet rank at the proper time, and for successive years; but, the Senate declining to act on such nominations for successive years, he died before the final action of that body on the like claims and nominations, which did not take place until the 30th June, 1834, otherwise he would have received his brevet promotion. She further states that her deceased husband commanded a military post and a company, as captain, from the 11th August, 1830—the time he became entitled to his brevet promotion, and for a long time before—until the 4th of February, 1833, when he was promoted to the rank of captain, in the place of Captain Dana, deceased; that her husband died in the service of the United States, on the 6th March, 1834, after a short illness, at Williamsport, in Maryland, where he had gone with his command to quell a riot on the canal.

The petitioner prays for an act of Congress authorizing the payment to her of the difference between the pay and emoluments of a first lieutenant and a captain, from the 11th August, 1830, to 4th February, 1833, to which he would have been entitled had he lived until the Senate confirmed his nomination, which had been duly made for three successive years, and not acted on by the Senate.

The facts stated by the petitioner are confirmed by the records of the War Department.

It appears that the Attorney General has given an opinion that to entitle an officer to brevet pay, under the law of 1812, the officer must be "brevetted," and under the law of 1818 he must have "a brevet commission;" in other words, that he was not entitled to the pay and emoluments of his brevet rank for the period that he exercised a command equal to his brevet rank, between the time he became entitled to that rank and the date of his confirmation. This opinion conflicted with that of the Secretary of War, and appears also to be contrary to former military usage, and does not now govern the action of the War Department; and the Attorney General, while he feels himself bound to adhere to the opinion before expressed, thinks it just that Congress should allow the increased pay in all cases where the officer had a command agreeably to the higher grade, after the brevet rank was actually due.

The committee are of opinion that, according to military usage, the commission confers rank, pay, and emoluments from the time of its date, without reference to the period of its confirmation. During

the continuance of the law conferring brevet rank, when the length of an officer's service brought him within its provisions, he was subject to perform all the duties, and to incur all the responsibilities and expenses of his advanced grade, and took brevet rank from the date of his commission, which, in all cases, corresponded with the time when he became entitled to such rank, without regard to its confirmation. Had Captain Patrick lived until the Senate acted upon his nomination, which had been duly made by the President from time to time, there is no reason to doubt that it would have been confirmed. The President, on his part, executed the law by making the nomination according to its provisions, and had the Senate acted, his right would have been perfected by the confirmation of the nomination. The non-action of the Senate ought not, in the opinion of the committee, to deprive a meritorious officer of the right vested in him by law, and deprive him of his *brevet* pay and emoluments.

The committee, therefore, think that the petitioner is entitled to relief, and submit a bill accordingly.

[25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 758.

[2D SESSION.]

ADDITIONAL ESTIMATES OF APPROPRIATIONS NECESSARY FOR PREVENTING AND SUPPRESSING INDIAN HOSTILITIES IN FLORIDA AND THE CHEROKEE COUNTRY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JANUARY 5, 1838.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *December 21, 1837.*

SIR: As the appropriation for "preventing and suppressing Indian hostilities" is nearly exhausted, it becomes my duty to ask the consideration of the Committee of Ways and Means to the necessity of a further appropriation being made at an early period for this object, in order that the department may be enabled to carry on the military operations now in progress. I have the honor, therefore, to enclose you communications from the acting quartermaster general and the paymaster general, showing the amount that will be needed.

There is another subject now before me, with which I beg leave to trouble the committee.

This is the error noticed in the annual report of this department, which was made in the instructions for raising a body of Indians for service in Florida, in respect to the amount of pay which was to be given them: for the period between the time when those who entered the service enrolled themselves, and that when the error was explained to them, the difference between what was erroneously offered them, and what the existing laws allow to volunteers serving on foot, amounts to \$7,775 53. By recent intelligence from Florida the department has been advised that these Indians are rendering highly important and valuable services by their efforts to influence the Seminoles to submit to a peaceful termination of hostilities; and in order that the faith of the government may be preserved with these valuable allies, I beg leave respectfully to suggest that the committee will take the proper measures to have the sum specified appropriated at an early day.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Hon. C. C. CAMBRELENG, *Chairman Committee of Ways and Means, House of Representatives.*

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, December 19, 1837.*

SIR: The appropriation which was granted at the late extra session for the suppression of Indian hostilities was based upon estimates prepared in conformity to your direction, to meet the calls of the service "until the usual period of assembling Congress."

As that period has passed by, and the appropriation is now nearly exhausted, it is my duty to represent to you the necessity of a further provision of funds to enable the Quartermaster's department to comply with the heavy requisitions which continue to be made upon it for supplies for the army operating in Florida, as well as for that stationed in the Cherokee country.

For the reasons heretofore stated, it is impossible to present, with anything like accuracy, a detailed estimate of the amount required under the various heads of expenditure; but, considering the large force in the field, consisting chiefly of mounted men, whose horses, as well as themselves, are to be provided for, I would suggest an additional appropriation of one million of dollars for the service of the quartermaster's department, to enable it to furnish the necessary supply of forage, the means of transportation, and the various other objects due from it, and to meet the contingent demands of the service.

Whether any further appropriation will hereafter be needed to carry on the war in Florida depends upon the result of the campaign now in progress there. But as it is believed that the necessity for the force stationed in the Cherokee country will continue to exist during the ensuing year, it is probable that a further provision will be required for that service before the adjournment of Congress.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

T. CROSS, *Acting Quartermaster General.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

PAYMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, December 20, 1837.*

Sir: In compliance with your verbal instructions, I have the honor to submit an estimate of the funds required by this department to pay the volunteers now in service.

From returns in the Adjutant General's office, it appears that there are in Florida, exclusive of General Nelson's command, 4,428 volunteers and Indians: of these, 3,377 are mounted; and it would require an appropriation of \$910,000 to pay the whole for six months, the time generally volunteered for. But I understand that you have given instructions to reduce the mounted force to 2,000; it is therefore presumed that 1,377 mounted volunteers will be entitled only to three months' pay, and six months' allowance for clothing, which will reduce the sum required to \$790,000.

The paymasters in Florida state that General Nelson's command is 1,400 strong; if that is correct, and the department is authorized to pay them, it will require an appropriation of \$306,000.

Governor Call informs the paymaster at Tallahassee that there are a number of companies and officers in different parts of the Territory that have performed service, and are entitled to pay; but, owing to the difficulty of procuring an officer of the United States army to muster them in and out of service at the proper time, it had not been done. The paymaster states that Lieutenant Vinton is now performing the duty; and that if their services are sanctioned, it will require about \$92,000, in addition to the funds he now has, to make the payment.

There are, according to the last returns, 773 mounted volunteers, under the command of Colonel Lindsay, in the Cherokee nation; these, it is believed, have all received the allowance of clothing. Their pay, and other allowances for six months, amounts to \$146,000; for which an appropriation is also required.

RECAPITULATION

For volunteers and Indians, reported by the adjutant general	\$790,000
For General Nelson's command	306,000
For volunteers, reported by Governor Call.....	92,000
For Colonel Lindsay's command	146,000
	1,334,000

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

N. TOWSON, *Paymaster General.*

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 759.

[2D SESSION.]

ON CLAIM OF DANIEL PARKER FOR THE PAY AND EMOLUMENTS OF A BRIGADIER GENERAL, WHILE ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE ARMY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JANUARY 5, 1838.

Mr. COLES, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred the memorial of General Daniel Parker, reported:

That the memorialist sets forth that, under the act entitled "An act for the better organization of the general staff of the army of the United States," passed March 3, 1813, he was appointed adjutant and inspector general, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of a brigadier general; that he was the only incumbent of that office from the passage of that law to the reduction of the army by the "Act to reduce and fix the military peace establishment of the United States," passed March 2, 1821; that in the settlement of his accounts he has not received all the emoluments allowed to other brigadier generals of the army; that, while the accounting officers of the treasury have acknowledged the justice and equity of his claim, they have not felt themselves authorized to make such further allowance for forage, fuel, quarters, and rations, as has been made to others. He further states that, when his services as adjutant and inspector general ceased, under the provisions of the last-recited act, he was assigned to the office of paymaster general of the army, and discharged the duties of the same until the completion of the organization of the army under that act, when his public services terminated, leaving him justly and equitably entitled to such pay and allowances for fuel and quarters as have been allowed and paid to his successor in that office. He also claims the three months' pay provided by the thirteenth section of the act of March 2, 1821. He asks that an act may be passed directing his pay accounts to be settled upon just and equitable principles, and that he may receive whatever may have been paid to other officers of his rank.

1st. The petitioner claims pay for double rations from September 30, 1818, to May 31, 1821.

2d. Pay for fuel and quarters while he acted as adjutant and inspector general, from March 6, 1816, to September 30, 1818.

3d. An allowance for fuel and quarters while he acted as paymaster general.

4th. Three months' extra pay, under the act of 1821, as a disbanded officer.

In regard to the first claim, it appears that General Parker charged, and received of Paymaster Leslie, a commutation of double rations from September 30, 1818, to May 31, 1821, amounting to \$2,337 60. This sum was allowed to Paymaster Leslie by the accounting officers, but disallowed to General Parker, and charged to his personal account. Some time after, General Parker's account was reported for suit.

An action was brought against him, and judgment was rendered against him, both in the circuit and Supreme Courts. The presiding judge of the Supreme Court says, "that there can be no controversy about double rations, if the President makes the allowance. He may issue the order himself, or it may be done by the Secretary of War, with his approbation." The opinion of the court appears to have been founded upon the considerations that no law imperatively required the allowance; that the President had not specially granted it; and that this case did not come within the regulations of the War Department.

After the suit terminated against General Parker, he applied to the Secretary of War, who, in 1831, with the opinion of the Supreme Court before him, made the following order, to wit:

"General Parker was appointed adjutant and inspector general, in both of which capacities he acted. The law gave to this officer the pay and emoluments of a brigadier general. The profits of the office were, of course, contingent. If a brigadier general received fuel, and quarters, and double rations, so too should General Parker. Every brigadier in the service did receive this allowance. Major Nourse and Colonel Jones, who performed the duties of the office since the reduction in 1821, also received double rations. Upon principles of equal justice, then, they should not and ought not to be denied to General Parker.

"J. H. EATON."

In pursuance of the above order, the Second Auditor passed the suspended item for double rations from September 30, 1818, to May 31, 1821, \$2,337 60; but the Second Comptroller refused to sanction it, on the ground that it was retrospective in its operation.

The allowance of double rations rests upon the construction of the fifth section of the act of March 16, 1802, and of the regulations and orders of the executive departments, issued in pursuance of that section. This construction has been a subject of much diversity of opinion with the different executive officers, as well as others; and its progress has received, as it deserves, the careful examination of your committee.

The fifth section of the act of March 16, 1802, authorized the President to allow "to the commanding officers of each separate post such additional number of rations as he might from time to time direct, having respect to the special circumstances of each post."

On August 25, 1812, the President directed that generals commanding separate armies should be allowed double rations. The *headquarters of a separate army* was, by this order, decided to be a *separate post*.

In February, 1814, the President directed that generals and other officers commanding districts should be allowed double rations; and the *headquarters of districts* were thus decided to be *separate posts*.

In March, 1816, Mr. Crawford, then Secretary of War, issued a regulation allowing double rations to generals and other officers commanding military departments, and to all officers commanding permanent posts and garrisons, separate from the stations of commanding officers of departments, and which involved the expense of separate commands. The *headquarters of military departments* were then construed to be *separate posts*.

In May, 1818, Mr. Calhoun, Secretary of War, with the approbation of the President, allowed double rations to the chief engineer stationed at Washington; and on July 27, 1821, the same allowance was made, to commence with that day, to the quartermaster general, the commissary general of subsistence, and the chief of the Ordnance department, each exercising a separate military jurisdiction. These regulations have been sanctioned by the decisions of the accounting officers; and the *headquarters of each branch of the staff, exercising separate and independent jurisdiction*, have been thus decided by the Executive to be a *separate post*, within the meaning of the law.

The present revised regulations, approved by the President and published by the Secretary of War in 1835, extend this allowance to the officers in charge of the military bureaus at the city of Washington, including the inspectors general. Up to August 27, 1831, it had been usual to give these regulations and orders a retrospective operation. On that day the regulation made in Major Belton's case, confining allowances to a prospective effect, was issued in general orders on August 31, 1831, and has continued in force to this time.

Your committee deem it unnecessary to go into the argument as to the intention and legal construction of the fifth section of the law of March, 1802, which could only be required on the question of repealing the present regulations of the War Department upon this subject. Certain it is, that if the practical construction which has since obtained had prevailed during the period of General Parker's service, he would have been allowed that which he now claims.

The order of Secretary Eaton, in June, 1831, directing the claim to be allowed, it was supposed would supply the want of Executive direction, which was the original objection to its allowance; but the claim was still disallowed, on account of the retrospective effect of that order. The committee, without intending to sanction the propriety or legality of making such orders, consider it sufficient in this case that, to a date subsequent to this order, it had been, with few exceptions, the practice of the Executive to make such retrospective allowances.

The committee are of the opinion that this claim of General Parker comes within the reason of the law, as it has been construed, if not within its letter, and cannot see the justice or policy of excluding the petitioner from an allowance which has been granted to the other brigadiers of the army.

2d. General Parker claims pay for fuel and quarters while he acted as adjutant general, from March 6, 1816, to September 30, 1818.

The right of the adjutant general to fuel and quarters is derived from the regulations of the War Department, approved by the President, and sanctioned and authorized by the ninth section of the act of April 24, 1816. This act declares that "the regulations in force before the reduction of the army (which was on March 3, 1815) shall be recognized as far as the same shall be found applicable to the service, subject, however, to such alterations as the Secretary of War may adopt, with the approbation of the President." Quarters and fuel were allowed the adjutant and inspector general by regulation before the passage of this act, and were subsequently continued to that officer by general regulations of the army. There can, therefore, be no doubt of the legal right of the adjutant and inspector general to fuel and quarters.

The claim of the petitioner was presented to the accounting officers April 30, 1825, and disallowed on the ground that he had received, under Mr. Crawford's order, a commutation of double rations, in lieu of fuel and quarters, for the whole period embraced in his claim.

The petitioner urges that the above order of Mr. Crawford was indorsed on his account, which was

settled up to March 6, 1816, and had only a retrospective operation; that on that day the general regulations of March 6, 1816, were issued, extending the allowance of double rations to the other brigadiers of the army; after which he was paid double rations under those regulations until the allowance to him was stopped in 1818 by Mr. Calhoun; that furnishing fuel and quarters belonged to the quartermaster's department; and, there being no quartermaster at Washington, he could not receive them in kind until September 30, 1818, after which he did receive them from the quartermaster general.

On February 9, 1829, General Parker again presented his claim to the accounting officers, with the following indorsement on the voucher, by General Porter, Secretary of War: "This account being for personal allowances to General Parker, as an officer of the army in the regular course of service, it should be settled upon the principles observed in the settlement of other parallel cases at the time."

The claim was again disallowed by the Auditor, upon the ground that there were no parallel cases to warrant its allowance.

The Second Comptroller, R. Cutts, was of a different opinion, inasmuch as the above order of General Porter referred to the order of Mr. Calhoun of May 12, 1818, which is as follows: "Until otherwise ordered, the chief engineer, while resident at Washington, will be allowed at the rate of nine hundred and twelve dollars a year, in lieu of fuel and quarters. He will also receive double rations."

The Second Comptroller accordingly made the following decision on the account:

"In conversation with the President and Secretary of War, with regard to the within claim of fuel and quarters, it was understood to be their opinion that, inasmuch as a similar claim had been allowed and paid, the basis of the present claim, it ought to be allowed. It is therefore admitted."

This account, with the indorsement, remained in the Second Comptroller's office until after the then Comptroller (Cutts) had retired from it. Mr. Hill, who succeeded him October 12, 1829, addressed a letter to the Third Auditor, stating that a decision once had in this office was binding, unless founded on error in fact, and requesting the amount of General Parker's account for fuel and quarters to be passed to his credit. No answer was given to this letter.

The Attorney General (Berrien) gave an opinion in the case, that the decision of Second Comptroller Cutts was not final, inasmuch as the account remained in the office after he had retired from it.

The case was subsequently referred to the War Department, and on October 8, 1830, the following indorsement was made on the account by Mr. Randolph, the Acting Secretary of War: "The principle of allowing a commutation for double rations, as well as for fuel and quarters, was established by regulation of May 12, 1818, issued by Mr. Calhoun, the Secretary of War. This regulation was made applicable to General Parker's case by a decision of General Porter, in January, 1829; and the late Second Comptroller admitted the amount in the case of \$2,416, which was confirmed by his successor, Mr. Hill. There is now no disposition to arrest these decisions, and the item which is allowed will pass to the credit of General Parker."

On the 14th of the following December Mr. Eaton, the Secretary of War, indorsed on the account as follows: "General Parker's case having been decided by the acting Secretary of War, no further action appears necessary than for the Comptroller to pass the item to the credit of General Parker."

On the 31st of the same month a portion of the account (the rest referring itself to the Third Auditor) was reported by the Second Auditor to the Second Comptroller, and was disallowed by the Comptroller.

On the 17th of May, 1834, the opinion of Mr. Butler, the present Attorney General, was taken in the case. He gave it as his opinion, "that the acts and decisions of the former Secretaries of War are sufficient, until reversed and countermanded, to authorize and require the accounting officers to settle and audit the claim of General Parker for an allowance to the amount of \$2,416 in lieu of fuel and quarters."

On the 22d of May the account was again reported by the Second Auditor, in favor of General Parker.

On the 5th of June the account was referred by the Second Comptroller to Mr. Cass, Secretary of War, and Mr. Cass returned it with the following answer: "It is not necessary to examine the case of General Parker, further than the action of my predecessors on it in October and December, 1830. By the opinion of the Attorney General, given in this case, on the 17th of May last, that action of my predecessors is perfect, as it respects this department, and constitutes the voucher for the accounting officers in settling General Parker's claim, unless reversed and countermanded by the Secretary of War. Such reversal I consider it wrong to make; and as the allowance to General Parker was made before the general order in the case of Major Belton, it is, therefore, not affected by it. General Parker's case is returned, that he may be credited according to former decisions and the opinion of the law officer of the government."

The only difficulty in the merits of this question has been, whether General Parker did not receive, in lieu of fuel and quarters, a commutation of double rations? This was the case, by the special order of Mr. Crawford, up to the general regulations of the same date, (March 6, 1816,) which gave the allowance of double rations to other brigadier generals of the army; after which time, he conceived himself entitled to the allowance of double rations, not in lieu of fuel and quarters, but on its own account. Now, if the committee are right in the opinion that they have expressed in a preceding part of this report, that General Parker ought to have the allowance of double rations, it follows, of course, that he should receive fuel and quarters.

The committee, without touching the question of the relative jurisdiction of the accounting officers and other branches of the executive; without regard to the distinctions and legal exceptions which, on some occasions, prevented the allowance; and giving full credit to the officers who favored, and to those who persisted in opposing, this claim, are of opinion that it should be allowed by Congress.

3d. The petitioner claims an allowance for fuel and quarters while he acted as paymaster general.

The committee are of opinion that this claim is founded both in law and equity. The regulations of the army gave fuel and quarters to the paymaster general, which regulations were sanctioned by the 9th section of the act of the 24th of April, 1816, as is shown in a preceding part of this report. Doubts, however, were entertained in regard to paymaster general Towson; and to remove those doubts, Congress, on the 13th of March, 1832, passed an act authorizing and directing the quartermaster general to pay Nathan Towson, paymaster general of the United States, his accounts for fuel and quarters for such time as he has not received the allowance since his appointment to that office. By virtue of this act the allowance was paid to Colonel Towson, for periods of time both before and after that for which General Parker acted in that capacity.

There can be no distinction in the two cases; and your committee can see no propriety in withholding from one the compensation granted to the other.

4th. He claims three months' extra pay, under the act of 1821, as a disbanded officer.

By the 13th section of the act of the 2d of March, 1821, "to reduce and fix the peace establishment of the United States," it is provided that there shall be allowed and paid to each commissioned officer, who shall be discharged from the service of the United States in pursuance of this act, three months' pay, in addition to the pay and emoluments to which he may be entitled at the time of his discharge.

The petitioner was not *discharged from the service of the United States* when he ceased to do the duties of adjutant and inspector general; but, under the expectation of being appointed paymaster general, he performed the duties of that office until the close of the next session of Congress, when, not being nominated to the Senate, his services expired. It may not be critically true that he was discharged from the service of the United States in pursuance of the act of March 2, 1821; yet his discharge certainly happened in consequence of that act. His temporary continuance in the service as paymaster general may have taken him out of the letter of the law; but his just expectation of being permanently appointed to that office, and his sudden disappointment and discharge from service, bring him fully within the spirit of the law. Other officers who were discharged had time to prepare for entering on civil employments. General Parker was suddenly left without employment; and the reason for the allowance, in his case, has double strength.

To enable the accounting officers of the treasury to carry into effect the intentions of this report, the committee report a bill.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 760.

[2D SESSION.]

ORDERS WITHDRAWING MAJOR GENERAL SCOTT AND APPOINTING MAJOR GENERAL JESUP TO THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY IN FLORIDA, AND CORRESPONDENCE SHOWING ITS OPERATIONS DURING THE SEMINOLE WAR UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE LATTER.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JANUARY 8, 1838.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *January 6, 1838.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith "a copy of the record of the proceedings of the court of inquiry, convened at Fredericktown, in relation to the operations against the Seminole and Creek Indians," which contains what is called for in the first three paragraphs of the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 4th of October last; and to enclose a report and documents from the commanding general in answer to the fourth and last paragraph of that resolution.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

HON. JAMES K. POLK, *Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, *October 4, 1860.*

Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to transmit to this House—

1st. A copy of all the documents and correspondence in his department relative to the recall of Major General Scott from the command against the Seminole and Creek Indians.

2d. A copy of the record of the proceedings of the court of inquiry,* convened at Fredericktown, in relation to the operations against the Seminole and Creek Indians, together with the decisions thereon of the late and present executive.

3d. A copy of the orders to Major General Scott relative to the conduct of his command and the terms he might offer to the enemy.

4th. A copy of the orders of Major General Jesup on assigning to him the same command; and all other orders and correspondence with General Jesup subsequent thereto, which he may deem not injurious to the public service to communicate.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, January 2, 1838.*

SIR: I have the honor, herewith, to transmit a copy of the correspondence with Major General Jesup, and all other information which can be furnished by this office, in relation to the Creek and Seminole campaigns, as required by the resolution of the House of Representatives of October 4, 1837.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

ALEX. MACOMB, *Major General, Commanding-in-chief.*

The SECRETARY OF WAR, *War Department, Washington, D. C.*

*For the proceedings of the military court of inquiry, held at Fredericktown, in the case of Major General Scott and Major General Gaines, in answer to the first, second, and third paragraphs of the resolution of the House of Representatives, (see Senate Doc. No. 224, 2d session 24th Congress.) (See also American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. 7, No. 738.)

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, June 28, 1836.*

SIR: I have received, through the Secretary of War, the order of the President to call you to the seat of government. You will therefore, on the receipt of this letter, turn over to Brigadier General Jesup the command of the troops serving against the hostile Creeks, and repair to the city of Washington.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALEX. MACOMB, *Major General, Commanding-in-chief.*

Major General W. Scott, *Fort Mitchell, Alabama.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, June 28, 1836.*

SIR: Major General Scott having been ordered to the seat of government, the command of the troops serving against the hostile Creeks is, by direction of the President, hereby vested in you. The instructions which you received from the War Department, on leaving Washington for the Creek nation, will be your guide in executing the important duties which are hereby again devolved on you.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

ALEX. MACOMB, *Major General, Commanding-in-chief.*

Major General JESUP, *Fort Mitchell, Alabama.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 7, 1837.*

SIR: From the favorable reports you have made of the state of affairs in Florida, and the recent conduct of the Indians, we are led to the belief that you will soon terminate matters with the Seminoles. If such should be the case, it is desirable that the troops should be sent to their respective stations, as indicated in the late general order concerning the artillery and the other troops—the dragoons and infantry—to repair, by the way of New Orleans, to the following points, viz: the dragoons to Jefferson Barracks, where the whole regiment is to be assembled for instruction; and the sixth infantry to Jesup; the fourth to New Orleans and Baton Rouge—say five companies at New Orleans and five at Baton Rouge. As the public property will require, in all probability, some protection, and the country itself the countenance of some military force, you will retain such as you may deem necessary for the purpose; but the dragoons you will forward to New Orleans as soon as possible, with a view to their joining at Jefferson Barracks. All this presumes the war to be ended.

In a letter addressed by you to the colonel of ordnance, you ask for an additional officer to assist Captain d'Lagnel. Cannot you supply the necessary assistants from the officers of the artillery? There is Lieutenant Thornton, a first-rate ordnance officer, and I dare say many others very competent. I will, therefore, request that you use your discretion in ordering officers of the artillery under your command on ordnance service, with the view of securing all the property belonging to that department in Florida, or elsewhere, belonging to the army, which has been operating in the Seminole and Creek countries.

General Armistead has expressed a wish that he might be indulged with leave of absence after the close of the war in Florida. I leave it to your discretion to grant him such leave of absence as you may approve, within the extent of the regulations, when his services may not be longer required in Florida.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

ALEX. MACOMB, *Major General, Commanding-in-chief.*

Major General THOS. S. JESUP, *Commanding the Forces U. S. in Florida.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 18, 1837.*

SIR: Since I last addressed you on the subject of the disposition of the troops at the close of the war in Florida, circumstances connected with the southwestern frontier have induced a change from that communicated to you in my letter of the 7th of April. It is now determined by the Secretary of War to station two regiments of artillery at Camp Sabine, on the Sabine river, near where the Nacogdoches road crosses; one regiment and six companies of the remaining regiment of artillery on the Sabine river, where the Opelousas road crosses; two of the remaining companies to be stationed at some healthy position as near the mouth of the Sabine as practicable, and one at Key West; the two companies of the second regiment of infantry to be stationed at the Upper Withlacoochee, Georgia; fourth regiment of infantry, five companies to remain in Florida, two to garrison Baton Rouge, and two New Orleans, one company to remain in the Cherokee country; sixth regiment, seven companies to be sent to the Sabine, near the Opelousas road, three companies to Camp Sabine; the whole of the second regiment of dragoons to be concentrated at Jefferson Barracks. You will, therefore, as soon as the circumstances of your command will permit, order the whole of the first and fourth regiments of artillery to Camp Sabine; the whole of the second regiment of artillery and six companies of the third to Opelousas road, to take up the most eligible position near where it crosses the Sabine; one company to Key West, (Captain Childs's,) and two companies to some eligible position near the mouth of the Sabine, which will be selected after the arrival of the regiment at the Sabine. You will understand distinctly that this arrangement of the troops is not to go into effect if it will interfere with your arrangements in reference to Florida; but as far as it will not interfere, you will order the troops to their respective stations, as herein indicated.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALEX. MACOMB, *Major General, Commanding-in-chief.*

Major General JESUP, *Fort Dade, Florida.*

P. S.—With the regiments of artillery, I wish you to send such howitzers and field-pieces as may be deemed necessary and fit for service on the southwestern frontier, with the carriages, harness, and other equipments. I wish, especially, that the mountain howitzers be sent to New Orleans, to be one half sent to Fort Gibson, and the other half to Camp Sabine.

A. M., *Major General, Commanding-in-chief.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 24, 1837.*

GENERAL: A letter has been received here, from the governor of Georgia, in relation to Colonel Nelson, of the Georgia volunteers, stating that Colonel Nelson was authorized by you to organize a staff consisting of one adjutant, one surgeon, and one quartermaster, for his battalion.

You are requested to send to the headquarters of the army a copy of your order authorizing those appointments, that the Secretary of War may see the propriety of paying those officers.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

A. MACOMB, *Major General, Commanding-in-chief.*

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, April 29, 1837.*

SIR: From documents received from his excellency the governor of Alabama, and from other quarters, it appears that there are many of the Creek Indians still in the swamps and fastnesses of the country occupied by them before the emigration; and, with a view of preventing further calls being made on the militia of the adjacent States, it is thought best to send to Fort Mitchell some of the regular troops under your command, whenever you think you can safely spare them. You will, therefore, order the 4th regiment of infantry thither, or such parts of it as you can spare.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALEX. MACOMB, *Major General, Commanding-in-chief.*

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Commanding the Army in Florida, Tampa Bay.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, June 10, 1837.*

SIR: I have duly received your several letters acknowledging the receipt of several from me, and stating the slowness of the movements of the Seminoles towards embarking for the west, and your desire to be relieved from the duty of superintending the sending of them off, with permission to leave the command and attend to your private concerns. These letters have been all shown to the Secretary of War. With regard to your leaving Florida until the Indians are sent off, the Secretary could not consent to it, as it would be difficult to supply your place by one so conversant with all the arrangements; and if the war should be rekindled, the experience you have had in conducting the operations in Florida is considered as too valuable to be lost by your removal from the command.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

ALEX. MACOMB, *Major General, Commanding-in-chief.*

Major General JESUP, *Commanding the Troops in Florida.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, June 22, 1837.*

SIR: Your communication dated Tampa Bay, June 5, 1837, addressed to the adjutant general, has been received and submitted to the Secretary of War. The Secretary of War, after duly considering the contents of your communication, has requested me to inform you that after posting the troops in such stations as to cover the frontier from hostile attacks, as far as this can be done consistently with a due regard to their health, you will be at liberty to return to the performance of the duties of your office, as quartermaster general, at the seat of government, provided that on the receipt of this letter you still desire to be relieved from the command of the army of Florida. The Department of War waits anxiously for your views as to the preparation which you consider necessary for a renewal of hostilities in October and the successful prosecution of the war, and is desirous to know what course you would advise to be pursued with the Creek warriors, as it is deemed important to remove their families as early as practicable to their homes.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

ALEX. MACOMB, *Major General, Commanding-in-chief.*

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Tampa Bay, Florida.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, June 30, 1837.*

SIR: If you can possibly dispense with the services of the marines, you will order them to their headquarters at Washington. Lieutenant Colonel Miller you will order to Washington on the receipt of this.

I am, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

ALEX. MACOMB, *Major General, Commanding-in-chief.*

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Commanding the Troops in Florida.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, July 6, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th ultimo, addressed to the adjutant general—among other things, expressing a desire to visit Kentucky for a few weeks. You no doubt ere this will have received my letter authorizing you to leave the command of the army in Florida, and directing you to repair to this city to resume your functions as quartermaster general. In proceeding to Washington, there is no objection to your taking Kentucky in your route, and spending the time you require in that State.

Wishing you health and prosperity, I remain, with great consideration, yours, &c.,

ALEX. MACOMB, *Major General, Commanding-in-chief.*

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Commanding the Army in Florida, Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, August 15, 1837.*

GENERAL: Agreeably to instructions from the War Department, I am directed by the general-in-chief to request that you will detail suitable officers to take charge of the clothing depots to be established at Jacksonville and Tampa Bay.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

JOHN N. MACOMB, *Aide-de-camp.*

Major General JESUP, *Commanding the Army in Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, November 8, 1836.*

SIR: Your communications of the 16th and 17th of October, from Tampa Bay, have been received and submitted to the general-in-chief and Secretary of War.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding, &c., St. Mark's, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, November 10, 1836.*

SIR: The following named officers of the army, serving in Florida, have been summoned by Captain Cooper, the special judge advocate of the court of inquiry now in session at Fredericktown, as witnesses in the case ordered to be investigated by that tribunal, pursuant to "General Order" No. 65, dated October 3. The summonses were transmitted to the several officers named, through this office, at the request of the judge advocate:

Captain Drane, 2d artillery; Lieutenant McCrabb, 4th infantry; Lieutenant Betts, 1st artillery.

At the verbal request of Captain Cooper, summonses for Major Lomax, 3d artillery, and Lieutenant G. Morris, 4th infantry, were also forwarded through this office. In addition to the above-named officers, the following, not at the time serving with, but belonging to, the Florida troops, have been required to attend, viz:

Brigadier General Eustis, Lieutenant Colonel Bankhead, Colonel Lindsay, Lieutenant J. E. Johnston, Captain Canfield, Captain Waite, assistant quartermaster, and Captain Morrison.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Brevet Major General T. S. JESUP, *St. Mark's, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, December 5, 1836.*

SIR: Your communications from Tampa Bay, dated the 3d and 6th of November, respectively, enclosing copies of your correspondence with the governors of Georgia and Alabama respecting a call for an additional volunteer force for the service in Florida, were received on the 29th ultimo and submitted to the Secretary of War, the general-in-chief being absent at Fredericktown. The transit of these letters appears to have been delayed, as Dr. Elwes informs me that, having been charged with their transmission, they were unintentionally retained in his possession a week or more after his arrival at the north, or before he committed them to the post office at Elizabethtown.

With regard to the supply of recruits to which you advert in your letter of the 3d, it may be proper to remark, for your information, that the recruiting service has never been less successful than in the last twelve months, and especially during the past summer. The whole number of infantry and artillery recruits enlisted for the general service in the eastern department, inclusive of the 1st of October, is but 585; of which number only 85 have been sent to any northern station, and they have gone to the Upper Mississippi for the first regiment of infantry; 252 recruits have been assigned to companies ordered to Florida and the Creek nation, inclusive of the month of June, and 34 to the company of the 4th infantry serving in the Cherokee country, at Camp Cass.

On the 19th of November Lieutenant Colonel Foster reported that he should leave New Orleans with about 90 recruits for the 4th infantry; and on the 15th of that month Colonel Cutler was instructed, as you have already been apprised, to detach 119 recruits for the same regiment in Florida, as soon as they could be collected, which will complete its establishment.

Of the 173 infantry recruits enlisted in the western department, inclusive of October 1, 149 have been sent to the 4th regiment of infantry serving in Florida, and 45 were assigned to the 6th infantry when ordered from Jefferson Barracks to the frontiers of Louisiana.

It will be seen by "General Order" No. 80 that 550 recruits have been called for, for the artillery companies now serving in Florida; but I regret to add it is impossible to say how soon this reinforcement may reach its destination; for notwithstanding the continued efforts of all the recruiting officers engaged in the service, the accession of numbers for the foot is yet slow.

The superintendent has been instructed to send off detachments in small parties of 50 or 60 to Florida without detaining them for greater numbers.

I acknowledge the receipt of your field report of the troops at Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay, on the 3d of November. With reference to the subject of field returns, I respectfully require your attention to my letter dated the 3d of June, and would now ask that you may forward such monthly returns, if it be practicable, of the *Tennessee volunteers*, and of the *volunteers or militia* from other States who may have been under your command during your service in the Creek nation. And I also respectfully request that monthly returns of the volunteer force now *servng* in all Florida, distinguishing the States and Territories to which they severally belong, may be forwarded for the information of the general-in-chief and War Department, with as little delay as practicable. These returns are now the more necessary as full returns never have been furnished by either of your predecessors commanding the army either in the Creek or Florida campaigns.

The printed blank returns furnished you in June appear not to have been used; I nevertheless send a few more of the same description for field use.

I do not speak of the regular force; its situation and condition have been generally regularly reported. In meeting the inquiries of the Secretary of War as to the volunteer force serving in Florida, I have had resort to such data as I have been able to obtain, relying chiefly on the muster-rolls forwarded by the mustering officer; but I have no assurance that the rolls of all companies mustered into service have been forwarded to the Adjutant General's office. The certainty as to *all* the force operating in the field is only to be obtained from returns forwarded by authority of the commanding general.

A consolidated general field return of *all* the force, army, marines, volunteers, and Indians serving in Florida, say on the 30th of *November*, is called for by the Secretary of War, which it is hoped it may be in your power to furnish, although I am well aware, for want of a proper staff, commanders in the field have it not in their power always to comply with the regulations touching reports, returns, &c.; and it is owing to this circumstance, no doubt, that general headquarters have not been regularly furnished with copies of the "Orders" and "Special Orders" issued by you (as is the case with other commanders) while in command in the Creek nation.

Nos. 49 to 57, inclusive, and No. 59, are all that have been received at this office; the omitted numbers of the series of the Creek campaign are now requested to be forwarded as soon as convenient for the information of the general-in-chief.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General THOS. S. JESUP, *Commanding the Army in Florida, Tampa Bay, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, December 31, 1836.*

SIR: I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of the following communications from your headquarters since the date of my last letter of December 5. I enumerate them in the order of their receipt, viz:

1. Your letter, dated Tampa Bay, November 20, referring to the arrival of the second detachment of the Alabama battalion, &c.; received *December 17.*
2. Letter dated November 21, transmitting copies of your correspondence with the late Colonel Walker, relative to a mistake in a report of Major General Scott, &c., which, agreeably to your request, are placed upon the files of the office; received *December 17.* As in a former like case, respecting mistakes in one of his official communications from Florida, I have on this occasion forwarded copies of these papers to Major General Scott.
3. Letter dated November 18, reporting your readiness to take the field, but delayed for want of transportation, and reporting the arrival of the last detachment of the Alabama volunteers, &c.; received *December 21.*
4. Letter of November 27, from Tampa Bay, transmitting papers in relation to the election of Charles Irvine to be captain of Washington volunteers.
5. Letter of November 28, from Tampa Bay, reporting the embarkation of the troops for the Withlacoochee, &c.
6. Letter dated December 12, from Volusia, suggesting the ordering the 6th infantry to Florida, reporting the near approach of the expiration of the period of service of the Tennessee brigade,* &c. These last three letters were, respectively, received on the 24th of *December.*
7. Letter dated December 5 from Volusia, reporting the progress of your operations, and your having joined General Call on the night of the 4th instant, &c.; received *December 30, (yesterday.)*

*The Secretary of War having understood that the time of the Tennessee brigade would not expire until the 1st of January, when making out his annual report inquired of me if this was so. To which, after directing the examination to be made, I answered in the affirmative. This, however, may not have been exactly correct; for, although the official *brigade return*, including twenty companies, forwarded by Captain Kingsley, the mustering and inspecting officer, specified the "1st of *July, 1836,*" as the time of the commencement of the service of the brigade; yet it would appear, on further examination, by the muster-rolls, that only *twelve* companies would continue to the 1st and 2d of January, 1837, *four* to the 25th of December, *one* to the 18th, *one* to the 17th, and *two* to the 16th of the same month.

These several communications have all been submitted to the Secretary of War, and subsequently to the general-in-chief on his recent return to headquarters.

Copies of orders and instructions directing the 2d regiment of dragoons and the two companies of artillery, recently organized at Forts Hamilton and Monroe, first instructing this force to be held in readiness to proceed to Florida at the shortest notice, and subsequently directing it to proceed to join the army in Florida without delay, have been duly forwarded from this office for your information, by which you will perceive that your suggestions, touching the reinforcement of your command by the new regiment of dragoons, had been anticipated by the Secretary of War.

This auxiliary regular force will consist of six companies of dragoons of sixty men each, and two full companies of artillery—say 450 men. Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Fanning has been ordered to conduct this detachment to the seat of war, and, having left Washington on the 21st instant for Fort Monroe, is now, it is supposed, in Charleston with instructions to push forward the companies with all despatch. Those from New York sailed on the 28th. Lieutenant Colonel Harney, of the second dragoons, arrived yesterday from the west, and departs this day for Florida, as will also Major Fauntleroy.

On the 23d instant I received a letter from the governor of South Carolina, transmitting a copy of your communication to his excellency, dated Volusia, Florida, December 9, in which you make a requisition for a battalion of infantry of five companies. The despatch was promptly laid before the Secretary of War, who having approved of the measure, all necessary orders were immediately communicated to the proper departments to expedite and facilitate the mustering into the service of this force, and its movement to Florida in the direction of your headquarters.

I herewith respectfully transmit a copy of my communication of the 27th instant, addressed to Brevet Brigadier General Arbuckle, the officer in command of the frontiers of Louisiana and Arkansas, by which you will perceive that the state of the service in that quarter does not justify the withdrawal of the 6th regiment for the proposed service in Florida; and, accordingly, the Secretary of War has directed the countermarch of that regiment, should it have been put in motion for the east by orders from any quarter; of which circumstance, however, no official intelligence has as yet been communicated to this office or to the War Department.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding Army in Florida, Fort Drane.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, January 25, 1837.*

SIR: In reply to your letter of the 27th of December, relative to the term of service of the Washington city volunteers, I have to state that it was understood at the time of muster into service that they were to serve for *twelve* months unless sooner discharged.

The muster-roll of the company, tendering its services, was sent by the officers direct to the President for his acceptance, and afterwards to the War Department, upon which the men were mustered into service; but the roll does not specify the time, although there is no doubt, as before mentioned, that it was for *twelve* months.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding, &c., Tampa Bay, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, February 9, 1837.*

SIR: I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of the following communications from your headquarters since the date of my letter of the 31st December. I enumerate them in the order of their receipt, viz:

1. "General Orders," from No. 20 to 30, inclusive, respectively dated the 8th, 10th, 10th, 11th, 19th, 21st, 23d, 24th, 27th, 28th, and 30th December, received January 19.

2. Your letter from Tampa Bay, of January 1, reporting your intention to join the troops in the interior, &c., received January 23.

3. "General Orders" Nos. 31, 32, and 33, dated, respectively, the 1st, 2d, and 5th of January, received 2d February.

4. Letter from Fort Armstrong, Florida, of January 10, reporting the capture of sixteen Indian negroes, &c., received February 4.

5. Letter from "Withlacoochee," of January 12, reporting the capture of thirty-six more negroes and your intended movements, &c., received February 4; and also "General Orders" No. 34, 35, and 36, dated, respectively, the 8th, 9th, and 10th of January, received on the same day.

Forty recruits sailed on the 6th instant for the two companies of the second infantry, under Major Dearborn. It was not known that his command had been ordered from Irwinton, Georgia, to Florida, until the receipt of your Order No. 23, of the 11th of December, on the 19th of January. On the 23d of January one hundred and thirteen recruits for the artillery sailed for Tampa Bay, under Captain Mallory, of the second regiment of artillery, and now one hundred more are reported by Colonel Cutler to be ready. This detachment will be commanded by First Lieutenant Johnson, of the artillery, who will enter Florida *via* the St. John's.

The Secretary of War entirely approves of your detaining the sixth infantry in Florida, and authorizes you to hold it under your command as long as you may deem it necessary.

Your letters from the scene of your operations, respectively dated the 17th, 20th, and 21st of January, with "Orders" Nos. 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, and 42, dated 16th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th, have this day been received and submitted to the Secretary of War. I also acknowledge the receipt of a letter from

Colonel Stanton, from Fort Armstrong, dated January 20, enclosing "Orders" Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively dated the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th June, 1836, in which is acknowledged the receipt of my letter of the 5th December.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Brevet Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding the Army in Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, February 28, 1837.*

SIR: I have the pleasure to acknowledge your communication of the 7th instant, reporting the recent operations of the army in Florida, together with Colonel Henderson's report of the 23th of January, which have been duly submitted to the Secretary of War and general-in-chief.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding the Army in Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, May 9, 1837.*

SIR: I herewith, by direction of the general-in-chief, forward a copy of my letter of this date to Lieutenant Colonel Harney, of the second dragoons, on the subject of his order to Captain Gordon, an officer serving with his company at the time in Florida, to leave the field and repair to Washington, and there report to his colonel. The general desires that you examine into this procedure of Lieutenant Colonel Harney touching the matter, and that you will be pleased to take such measures in the case as due regard to the discipline of the army may demand.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding, &c., Tampa Bay, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, March 14, 1837.*

SIR: I have the pleasure to acknowledge your communications of the 13th and 27th February, enclosing "Orders" numbered from 42 to 57 inclusive, and No. 59, and "Special Orders" from No. 1 to 18. I have received your letter of the 17th February, reporting your operations since the 7th, together with an extract of Lieutenant Colonel Fanning's report of the affair on Lake Monroe, which have been duly submitted to the general-in-chief and Secretary of War.

Lieutenant Colonel Fanning's report of the affair of the morning of the 8th of February was received direct from him on the 23th of February.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding the Army, &c., Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, March 14, 1837.*

SIR: The chief engineer has reported to the Secretary of War that the dredge-boat belonging to the Engineer department, and intended to be used in the improvement of the inland pass between the St Mary's and St. John's rivers, has been removed for the purpose of deepening the channel near Lake George. The Secretary now directs that said boat, after effecting the latter object, be returned to its proper position, in good order, without expense to the appropriation for the above-mentioned improvement.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding at Fort Dade, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, March 18, 1837.*

SIR: Your communication of the 25th of February, detailing your recent conference with the Indians and your contemplated operations, has this day been received and submitted to the general-in-chief.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding at Fort Dade, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, March 22, 1837.*

SIR: I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your Orders, numbered from 5 to 70, of the series issued during the campaign against the Creek Indians in 1836, under cover of Lieutenant Chambers's letter of the 25th of February; and, with the exception of Order No. 62, your Orders Nos. 60 and 61, and

Special Orders from 19 to 39, inclusive, of the series of the Seminole campaign; and also your communication of the 1st of March, enclosing the letter of Colonel Henderson in favor of Captain Howle, &c. All of which have been duly submitted to the general-in-chief.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding the Army in Florida, Fort Dade*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, March 23, 1837.*

SIR: I have the satisfaction to acknowledge the receipt of your official despatch of the 6th instant, from Fort Dade, announcing the successful termination of the Seminole campaign, together with a copy of the articles of capitulation, by which it is seen that the Indians are immediately to emigrate to the country assigned to them west of the Mississippi by the treaty of Payne's Landing. The documents have been laid before the general-in-chief; and I congratulate you and the gallant army under your command on the termination of Indian hostilities in Florida. I hope that matters there will soon be settled, and that your companions may speedily return, in health and happiness, to their families and stations.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding the Army in Florida, Fort Dade.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, March 24, 1837.*

SIR: I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your "Orders," numbered from 71 to 90, of the series issued during the campaign against the Creek Indians in 1836, under cover of Lieutenant Chambers's letter of the 5th instant.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding in Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, April 5, 1837.*

SIR: I acknowledge the receipt of your "Orders," numbered from 91 to 101, of the series issued during the campaign against the Creek Indians in 1836, under cover of Lieutenant Chambers's letter of the 10th of March; and also your letter of the 11th of the same month, transmitting the proceedings of a board of officers in relation to the death of Sergeant Edward Silk, late of company H, 6th infantry, which have been duly submitted to the general-in-chief.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding the Army in Florida, Fort Dade.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, April 6, 1837.*

SIR: Your despatch of the 18th of March, from Fort Dade, with the document therewith signed by the chief, Micanopy, assenting to the articles of the treaty entered into with the chief of the Seminoles, and in relation to other Indian matters, has been received and submitted to the Secretary of War and general-in-chief. As soon as I am authorized to give a specific answer to your suggestions respecting the officers named for Indian service, &c., it shall be despatched.

I acknowledge also the receipt of your letter of the 16th of March, enclosing copies of your official letters from the 10th of September to the 6th of October, which shall be placed on the files of the Adjutant General's office.

Two letters from your aide, Lieutenant Chambers, dated 12th and 19th March, respectively, transmitting your Special Orders from 1 to 71, inclusive, issued in the Creek nation in 1836, and copies of your official letters from the 6th of October to the 7th of November, 1836, were also received by the last mail.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding, &c., Fort Dade, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, April 10, 1837.*

SIR: The general-in-chief having examined the proceedings of the board of officers ordered to inquire into and ascertain the causes which led to the death of Sergeant Edward Silk, of the sixth infantry, considers it proper to deliver the soldier who caused the death of the sergeant to the civil authority for trial.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

General JESUP, *Commanding, &c., Tampa Bay, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, April 15, 1837.*

SIR: The commissary general of subsistence having called for an officer for duty in his department at Key West, should the company which has been designated (Brevet Major Childs's, third artillery) as a garrison for that station, at the close of the campaign, be not soon ordered thither, you will in that event please direct one of the subalterns to repair to the station for duty there, as requested by General Gibson.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding, &c., Tampa Bay, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, April 17, 1837.*

SIR: I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 26th March, reporting the arrival of many of the Seminoles at Tampa Bay, &c., which was duly submitted to the general-in-chief.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding the Army in Florida, Tampa Bay.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, April 24, 1837.*

SIR: I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt, on the 22d instant, of the returns of the regular and militia forces, respectively, under your command in Florida, according to the strength exhibited on the 28th of February, and copies of your official letters from the 15th January to 6th March, inclusive, under cover of Lieutenant Chambers's letters of the 28th and 31st March. I have also received your letter of the 28th of the same month, reporting an omission in your report of the affair of the 27th January at the Halchee Lustee, and that of the 29th, with Colonel Henderson's letter of the 29th of March, correcting his report of the 28th January; all of which have been duly submitted to the general-in-chief, and will be placed on the files of this office.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding the Army, Fort Dade, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, April 26, 1837.*

SIR: On referring to the records, I find that I have omitted to acknowledge the receipt of "Orders" from 62 to 71, inclusive, and "Special Orders" from 40 to 51, inclusive, issued from your headquarters. These were duly received on the 12th instant and submitted to the general-in-chief.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General JESUP, *Commanding, &c., Tampa Bay, Florida.*

NOTE.—I have also to acknowledge the receipt of copies of "Orders" from your headquarters from 72 to 80, inclusive, and also copies of your official letters between the 6th and 19th March, 1837, under cover of Lieutenant Chambers's letter of the 1st instant.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, May 10, 1837.*

SIR: Your letter of the 23d April, transmitting a paper concerning the refusal of the Florida volunteers to obey their commander, with a request that it be placed on file in this office, has been received. This has been done, and the letter on Indian affairs submitted to the general-in-chief.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Tampa Bay, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, May 30, 1837.*

SIR: I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt from your headquarters of "Orders" No. 81 to 99, inclusive; also "Special Orders" from 52 to 62; copies of letters from the 3d to the 24th of April, inclusive, and sundry courts-martial proceedings in cases of soldiers in Alabama and Florida.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding the Army, &c., Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, May 31, 1837.*

Sir: I acknowledge your communication of the 8th instant, (received at the office during a temporary absence,) which reports that Powell and other Seminole chiefs had surrendered at Fort Mellon and were soon expected to arrive at Tampa Bay. With reference to your very just remarks relative to absent officers, I may here repeat what I had occasion to say to Governor Call in my letter of the 25th of July, 1836, which in substance is: that it would be seen the subject had not been overlooked in this office; that I had frequently taken special care to well inform the proper authorities of the great deficiency of officers for duty in the field, &c.; and that other public interests besides the army being, it was said, entitled also to consideration, I did not see that the evil was likely soon to be remedied, severely as it was felt and as often as it had been complained of, by the comparatively few officers serving with the troops and the commanders in the field, &c. No officer, not serving in the field, more sensibly feels, in the execution of his official duties, the inconvenience, and no one more deeply regrets the continuance, of a system which abstracts so large a portion of officers from *duty with their companions* than I do; and the records abundantly show the reiterated efforts and measures which have been attempted at this office to afford service in the *line* the requisite relief. But I have recently been forced to come to the conclusion that these efforts are of little or no avail, and that it would be even more agreeable to my superiors that I should desist from a repetition of them. I have, therefore, considered it most proper on my part to say nothing more touching the subject of *absent officers*, or as respects the *mode* of applying for and making the *selections*, (I cannot call it details,) when called for and ordered on detached service. All that the adjutant general can now do, as to your request touching the subject of absent officers, is to repeat to you what, on a like occasion, I informed Colonel Lindsay in my letter of the 22d May, 1835, to wit: "and all I can do in this instance is to lay your letter before the general-in-chief," &c. On this occasion I would respectfully refer you to my communication on the same subject dated August 10, 1836.

As respects the short leave of absence (three months) granted to Captain Mallory on the tender of his resignation, when he solicited a much greater period of indulgence, there was no knowledge at general headquarters that he had given any assurance of his immediate exit from the service; and it being seen that he withdrew from the army on the surgeon's certificate of disability, and, moreover, as he had long and faithfully served in the army, the three months' leave granted him was deemed to be only reasonable. Should he not proceed to join his company at its expiration, of course his resignation must take effect.

I respectfully request your attention to the condition of Captain Van Ness's company (H) of the first artillery. The colonel (General Eustis) reports that in consequence of the failure of the company commander (if any there be) to forward the *company monthly returns*, he has been unable to complete the monthly regimental returns; and this is the case with all his returns received since, and inclusive of, December last. I will, therefore, thank you to take the proper measures which may insure the transmittal to this office, and to the headquarters of the regiment, proper returns of the company for each month respectively, inclusive of December, 1836, to supply the present deficiencies in the records.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding the Army in Florida, Fort Dade.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, June 2, 1837.*

Sir: I acknowledge the receipt of the continuation of the series of your "*Orders*" and "*Special Orders*," from No. 100 to 106 of the former, and from 69 to 72, inclusive, of the latter.

Also copies of your official letters, inclusive, of the 13th and 15th of May; also sundry letters and papers setting forth the reasons for granting leaves of absence to the following-named officers, to wit: Lieutenant Colonel Crane, Lieutenant Colonel Foster, Lieutenant Colonel Fanning; Captains Lyon, Hutter, Mallory, Demick; Lieutenants Dusenbury, Kennedy, Rose, Allen, Donaldson; Doctor Martin, and Lieutenant Maddox, of the Washington volunteers; all of which have been laid before the general-in-chief.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding the Army, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, June 8, 1837.*

GENERAL: The resignation of Lieutenant R. C. Smead, fourth artillery, dated Fort Call, Florida, May 6, having been forwarded by your direction, under cover of Aide-de-camp Chambers's communication of May 12, and the same having been accepted and subsequently revoked, I enclose herewith, for your information, copies of the official letters written upon the subject.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Brevet Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding, &c., Tampa Bay, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, June 8, 1837.*

GENERAL: Your communications, under date of the 5th and 17th ultimo, in relation to the scarcity of field and medical officers under your command, and the tardy movements of the Indians, were both received on the 5th instant, and have been submitted to the general-in-chief.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Brevet Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding Army, &c., Tampa Bay, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, June 10, 1837.*

SIR: I have the pleasure to acknowledge copies of sundry official letters, dated from the 5th to the 28th of June, 1836, inclusive, (relating to your late Creek operations in Georgia and Alabama,) which were received on the 7th, under cover of your communications of the 20th and 21st ultimo, and have been placed on file.

I am, sir, &c.,

Major General JESUP, *Commanding, &c., Tampa Bay, Florida.*

R. JONES.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, June 17, 1837.*

SIR: I have the pleasure to acknowledge copies of sundry official letters, dated from the 30th of June to 9th of July, 1836, inclusive, (Creek campaign;) and also copies of your correspondence, dated from the 15th to the 25th of May, 1837, inclusive, with copies of Orders, from No. 107 to 112, inclusive, received on the 15th instant. All of which have been laid before the general-in-chief.

I am, sir, &c.,

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding, &c., Tampa Bay, Florida.*

R. JONES.

P. S.—Your communication of the 23d of May, enclosing the report of Major Wilson, has this day been received and submitted.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, June 19, 1837.*

SIR: Your communication of the 5th instant, reporting that the Seminole Indians had failed to emigrate to the west, and that the campaign has terminated for the season, has been submitted to the Secretary of War and general-in-chief. In expressing the regret which is felt by us all, on receiving this intelligence of the bad faith of the Seminoles, I feel assured, general, that your indefatigable exertions, the proper measures adopted and zealously pursued by you, deserved the successful issue heretofore expected and hoped for.

I shall, agreeably to your request, remind the Secretary and general-in-chief of your desire to be relieved from the command.

I am, general, &c.,

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding the Army in Florida, Fort Brooke.*

R. JONES.

P. S.—Please send me consolidated returns of the army.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, July 1, 1837.*

SIR: I have the pleasure to acknowledge copies of sundry of your official letters, dated from the 10th of July to the 17th of August, 1836, inclusive, (Creek campaign;) copies of "Orders" from No. 113 to 115; "Special Orders" from No. 73 to 78, present series, inclusive, and your communication of the 5th of June, transmitting the application of Major Thompson for leave of absence. All of which have been laid before the general-in-chief.

I am, sir, &c.,

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding the Army, Florida, Tampa Bay.*

R. JONES.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, July 11, 1837.*

SIR: Your letter of the 17th of June, reporting your intended movements, and suggesting the needful preparations for the service in Florida, &c., was received on the 5th of July, during my temporary absence from the office. On laying the same before the general-in-chief, and conversing with him upon the various topics mentioned, I perceived that it had already been before him, and been answered in his own proper name on the 6th instant.

I am, sir, &c.,

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding, &c., Black Creek, Florida.*

R. JONES.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, July 14, 1837.*

SIR: I have the pleasure to acknowledge, under cover of your letter of the 22d ultimo, copies of your official correspondence during the Creek campaign, dated from the 17th to the 29th of August, 1836, inclusive, which have been placed on the files of the office.

I am, sir, &c.,

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding, &c., Tampa Bay, Florida.*

R. JONES.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, July 15, 1837.*

SIR: Captain Crossman this morning informed me that you had not received a copy of the Revised Regulations for the army. The object of this is to state that at the time they were issued a supply sufficient for the several officers of the quartermaster general's department was furnished to the acting quartermaster general, with a view to their direction and distribution; but it seems, on inquiry, that the copy designed for you was not forwarded. You will please to keep the copy which Captain Crossman says he left in your possession, he having been supplied with another from this office.

Copies of the Regulations for many officers in Florida are yet retained in this office, lest they may not reach their destination. They are only forwarded from time to time as I am assured of the officers' posts.

I am, sir, &c.,

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

R. JONES.

NOTE.—I, however, had been under the impression that you had been furnished *direct* from this office, as a commanding general in the field, and knew not to the contrary until this morning.

R. J.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, July 21, 1837.*

SIR: Your communication of the 10th instant, on the subject of the reduced strength of the companies serving in Florida, and of the want of recruits to fill them, has this day been received; and I am happy to inform you that efficient measures have some time since been adopted, which it is believed will insure an adequate supply for the several regiments that may take the field in October, should hostilities against the Seminoles be then renewed. The concentration and instruction of recruits at Fort Monroe, as you will have seen by "General Order" No. 43, dated June 24, 1837, has direct reference to the Florida service. Already there are near 500 men assembled, and in a few weeks more there will not be less than 1,000, and probably by the middle of September more than 1,500. At the date of "General Order" No. 39, (June 13, the order countermanded by No. 43,) there was every reason to believe that the war in Florida was certainly at an end; and hence it was then deemed inexpedient to order recruits thither at such a season when most of the regiments there were expected soon to be withdrawn and remanded to their permanent stations.

Should you deem it necessary to fill the ranks of any particular companies quartered at comparatively salubrious stations, earlier than October, your wishes, on being communicated, would doubtless be complied with. I mention this that you may be apprised of the intention of the department not to order the recruits to Florida at an earlier day than would be necessary to resume your military operations in the autumn, and which may also supersede the necessity of consolidating companies, as suggested in your communication; which measure the general-in-chief would prefer should not be adopted whenever avoidable.

I am, sir, &c.,

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding, &c., St. Augustine, Florida.*

R. JONES.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, August 12, 1837.*

SIR: I acknowledge the receipt at this office, on the 24th ultimo, of copies of your official correspondence from the 27th of May to the 15th of June, and from the 15th to the 25th of June; and on the 2d instant, further copies of the same, from the 20th of June to the 24th of July; also, on the 2d instant, copies of "Orders" No. 126 to No. 141; and on the 5th instant, Orders from No. 142 to No. 153, and special No. 87 to 97.

With respect to the transmittal of copies of your orders and special orders, I respectfully request that, whenever practicable, these may be forwarded within a day or two after their respective dates; as the official information thus communicated, touching the disposition of troops, and the movement and change of station of the officers is often very useful, and sometimes important to be known at general headquarters at the shortest interval after the issuing of such orders.

I am, sir, &c.,

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding, &c., Tampa Bay, Florida.*

R. JONES.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, August 19, 1837.*

SIR: Your communications, respectively dated the 24th, 25th, and 26th of July, have been received, and duly submitted to the Secretary of War, and will be laid before the general-in-chief on his return to headquarters. Your suggestions relative to the recruiting service have been attended to, by giving the necessary instructions to establish additional rendezvous in the country, including two or three to be opened in the upper part of the States of North and South Carolina. The pressure of the times, to which you advert, is but little felt, if any, in the interior; and we find that our success in obtaining recruits is, for the most part, confined to the large cities, and parts of the country thickly populated in manufacturing districts. The selections you propose, to fill up Captain Ringgold's company, I think can be best made

on the arrival of any body of recruits in that section of Florida in which the captain, with his company, may be serving.

You will please to give the necessary orders. We have about one thousand recruits under instructions at Fort Monroe.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding, &c., Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, August 21, 1837.*

SIR: I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2d instant, enclosing the copy of a report from Lieutenant Colonel Cawfield, of the Alabama volunteers, dated July 15, 1837, and copy of a letter from Captain L. H. Galt, dated July 24, 1837, all of which have been submitted to the general-in-chief.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding, &c., Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, August 24, 1837.*

SIR: Your several communications from Garey's Ferry, respectively dated the 6th, (two,) 7th, and 13th instant, with the accompanying documents, have been duly received and submitted to the general-in-chief. With regard to the establishment of clothing depots in Florida, I have the pleasure to say that the subject has been anticipated, and your wishes fully met, as you will see by General Orders No. 52, dated 16th instant, a duplicate of which is herewith respectfully transmitted.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding, &c., Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, September 1, 1837.*

SIR: Your letter of the 28th July, in relation to the accounts of Lieutenant George Watson, 1st artillery, acting commissary of subsistence, with his accompanying explanatory communication, has been received, and referred to the commissary general of subsistence, who states that the explanations are perfectly satisfactory. The order of July 5, directing him to be relieved, is accordingly considered as revoked.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding, &c., Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, September 6, 1837.*

GENERAL: The proceedings of the general court-martial in the case of private *Robert Hayland*, 2d regiment dragoons, received under cover of your communication of the 31st July, have been submitted to the general-in-chief and Secretary of War.

The proceedings are herewith, by direction of the Secretary of War, respectfully returned, who recommends that the court may be reconvened, and its findings and sentence be reconsidered, as these are deemed to be inconsistent with the law. If the court were of the opinion that the prisoner ought to suffer death, it would seem that he should have been convicted of the crime as specified in the charge, since the sentence pronounced in the case does not appear to be sanctioned by the 7th article of the Rules and Articles of War, in which are not to be found the words "*mutinous conduct*"—the modified crime substituted by the court in its findings for the charge of "*mutiny*." But if the court persist in its findings, then the punishment to be awarded in the case should only equal the measure of the crime so modified.

The case appears to be an aggravated one, and the discipline and the good of the service require that such an offender should not escape the just punishment his high demerit would seem to demand. It is not a little surprising that the court should have awarded the highest punishment known to our military code, while it would not admit that the prisoner had been guilty of a crime of the highest order.

I am, sir, &c.,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding the Army in Florida, Garey's Ferry.*

Copies of letters from the Secretary of War to Major General Thomas S. Jesup, in relation to the Florida war, from November 4, 1836, to October 4, 1837, inclusive.

WAR DEPARTMENT, November 4, 1836.

SIR: Before this communication reaches you, you will have become fully acquainted with the retrograde movements of Governor Call, and the other events connected therewith, which have recently occurred in Florida. These circumstances have, for a time, suspended offensive operations; and from the feeble state of Governor Call's health, it is to be feared that he will not be able to prosecute the campaign, when resumed, with that promptitude and energy which the crisis demands. The President has therefore determined to commit to you the command of the army serving in Florida, and the general direction of the war against the Seminoles.

You will, accordingly, on the receipt of this communication, should you then be at Governor Call's headquarters, (and if not, so soon as you can reach there, or can communicate with him,) assume the command of all the forces in the Territory.

The hostile Indians having been discovered in considerable force on the banks of the Withlacoochee, and it having been also ascertained that their principal camps and settlements are situated on the south side of that river, you will immediately make all suitable arrangements for a vigorous attack upon their strongholds, and for penetrating and occupying the whole country between the Withlacoochee and Tampa Bay. With a view to this end, you will first establish posts at or near the mouth of the Withlacoochee, at Fort King, and at Volusia; and you will take the proper measures for securing, through them, the safety of the frontier. You will, also, through the same posts, and by such means of transportation as may be most certain and economical, make permanent arrangements for procuring sufficient and regular supplies. So soon as those dispositions shall be completed, you will concentrate all your disposable forces, and proceed without delay to cross the Withlacoochee, and to possess yourself of the positions now occupied by the Indians, attacking and routing them in their strongholds, and scouring the whole country between the Withlacoochee and Tampa Bay.

Should you succeed in bringing the Indians to a general engagement, and in defeating them therein, the ready submission of the tribe may probably be expected. If, however, they should abandon their present position on the Withlacoochee before you reach it, or you should drive them from it without entirely subduing them, you will then take such advanced positions to the south of Volusia, and to the east and south of Tampa Bay, as the nature of the country may admit, and push from them such further operations as may be necessary to the most speedy and effectual subjugation of the enemy.

The above direction to attack the enemy in his strongholds, and to possess yourself of the country between the Withlacoochee and Tampa Bay, you will regard as a positive order, to be executed at the earliest practicable moment. In other respects you will exercise a sound discretion, and will adopt such measures as you may deem best calculated to protect the frontiers and to effect the subjugation and removal of the Indians.

Great confidence being reposed in your prudence, energy, and skill, it is deemed unnecessary to urge you to promptitude or activity, or to impress on you the importance of early and frequent communications.

B. F. BUTLER.

P. S.—Since preparing the foregoing despatch, your letters to the adjutant general of the 16th and 17th ultimo, announcing your arrival at Tampa Bay and your intended departure on the 18th, with three companies of artillery, to the mouth of the Withlacoochee, in order to join the Indian warriors at that place, have reached here. These despatches, though they excite some apprehensions as to the safety of your detachment, do not make it necessary to alter the above. I have also just received, and enclose for your perusal and consideration, a memorandum from the acting quartermaster general, prepared in reply to certain inquiries made by me in respect to the best mode of transporting supplies, &c., in Florida. The President concurs, in general, in the views stated in this paper, and it may, perhaps, furnish some suggestions which may be of service to you hereafter.

B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War ad interim.*

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *United States Army, Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, November 5, 1836.

SIR: I have the honor to enclose duplicates of a despatch and accompanying paper transmitted to you yesterday *via* Charleston, Black creek, and the headquarters of General Call.

Learning, by a communication this day received by the acting quartermaster general, that, in consequence of the state of affairs referred to in the enclosed, you had repaired to St. Mark's, Captain Canfield, the bearer hereof, has been directed to proceed express to that post, for the purpose of giving you the earliest information of the duties assigned to you.

All needful measures in regard to supplies, officers, and surgeons, within the control of this department have already been taken, in compliance with, or in anticipation of, your various suggestions on those subjects.

B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War ad interim.*

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *St. Mark's, Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, January 4, 1837.

SIR: I have the honor herewith to transmit to you a printed copy of the documents accompanying the President's message, among which you will find the annual report from this department. In that document you will perceive that I have recommended an increase of the pay of all officers below the grade of colonel. My attention had been called to the subject before I had the honor to receive your communi-

tion of the 31st of October, enclosing the letter from the officers of the army under your command; but the representations in those papers had justly much influence in determining me to bring the matter before the President and the legislature.

The suggestion as to the justice of granting a land bounty to all the officers and men who shall have served in Florida meets my entire concurrence; but as such a proposal will be much more likely to pass after the conclusion of the war than at the present session, I deem it most useful to all concerned not to propose it now.

The request for a modification of General Order No. 58 will receive due consideration, and the result will be communicated to yourself.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Volusia, Florida.*

B. F. BUTLER.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *January 4, 1837.*

SIR: Your letter of the 5th ultimo, announcing your arrival at Volusia, and your receipt of a copy of the instructions of this department of the 4th of November last, was not received until the 30th ultimo. I had, however, previously received your letters of the 9th and 12th ultimo, and by them had been informed of your arrival at Volusia, and your assumption of the command of the army.

As an act of justice to Governor Call, as well as to yourself, I have caused several extracts from those parts of your letters in which you speak of the great difficulties encountered by him, and of those with which you are obliged to contend, to be inserted in the *Globe* newspaper.

I have also the honor, on the present occasion, to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of October 23 and November 6—the first received on the 11th and the last on the 29th of November.

The instructions of this department of the 4th of November, and the measures subsequently taken, and of which the adjutant general has kept you advised, will probably have met, so far as was necessary, the various points embraced in these and in your subsequent communications.

The instructions of the 4th of November were prepared on the supposition that they might reach you, and that you might assume the command before the resumption of the campaign, and whilst the enemy might be yet entrenched in the cove of the Withlacoochee. In that state of things, it was believed that the establishment of posts at Fort King and Volusia, as well as at the mouth of the Withlacoochee, would be found indispensable to operations on that river; but it was not intended to make the order, in respect to those posts, a positive one, nor to require their continuance after they should cease to be required by the necessities of the service. You will, therefore, hereafter exercise your own judgment in relation to these and to other posts; and whilst you will adhere, in general, to the plan of operations indicated in the letter of the 4th of November, you will consider yourself at liberty to adopt such measures, and to pursue such course in the execution of them, as the means at your disposal may allow, and as you may deem most likely to accomplish the objects of the campaign.

B. F. BUTLER.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Volusia, Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 11, 1837.*

SIR: I had the honor on the 8th instant to receive your letters of the 19th and 21st ultimo. Those of the 23d of December were received on the 16th ultimo, and published for the information of Congress and the nation. This has also been done with several letters, or parts of letters, since received; and, with proper limitations, this course seemed necessary to meet the public solicitude.

Your determination in respect to those companies of the 6th infantry which have arrived in Florida is entirely approved; and you will retain them, and any others of the same regiment who may reach Florida, so long as you shall desire their services in that quarter.

The cutting off and capturing of so many small parties of the Indians and negroes must have the effect immediately to weaken, and ultimately to subdue them, and in that view your recent operations are regarded as highly important.

B. F. BUTLER.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Tampa Bay, Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 22, 1837.*

SIR: Your letter of the 7th instant, announcing the success of your expedition to the head of the Coloosahatchie, was this day received, and I hasten to express to you the gratification which its contents have given to the President and the department.

I had the honor, in my letter of the 11th instant, to give the assent of the department to your retaining those companies of the 6th infantry which have reached or may reach Florida so long as you may desire them, and I believe the adjutant general had made the like communication a day or two before.

B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War ad interim.*

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Tampa Bay, Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *March 11, 1837.*

SIR: Your several letters of the 17th, 20th, and 22d ultimo were received on the 9th instant.

Should the arrangements in progress with the hostile Seminoles fail of being carried into effect, the attention of the department will, of course, be given promptly to the measures which shall then be necessary, and which you may suggest, for the further prosecution of the war.

On Monday next I shall retire from the temporary care of the department; but before my connexion with it terminates, I desire to make known to you the high sense entertained by the late President and myself of the indefatigable zeal and the great promptitude and skill with which you have devoted yourself to the arduous duties of your command. Having, as one of my first official acts, directed you to assume that responsibility, and having since, from time to time, given much of my attention to your movements, and repeatedly conferred with the Executive thereon, I feel it my duty to place this testimonial on the records of the department.

I take pleasure in communicating with it my best wishes for your success as a commander, and for your personal happiness and renown.

B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War ad interim.*

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Tampa Bay, Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *March 20, 1837.*

SIR: It is of great importance that this department should have as accurate a knowledge as possible of the topography of Florida, and particularly of the seat of war in that Territory; and I have therefore to request that you will furnish me, at as early a day as your other important duties will permit, all the information on this subject in your possession, and which you can conveniently obtain.

J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Fort Dade, Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *March 20, 1837.*

SIR: Your letter of the 25th of February has been received, and I am gratified to learn that you entertain hopes of soon terminating by negotiation this protracted and distressing war. I am glad, however, to find that you have not relaxed your exertions to prepare for a renewal of hostilities, provided negotiations should unfortunately fail. If you have to move your forces once more against the Indians, I should recommend that you take early measures to select positions where the troops may be posted during the rainy and summer months. In this selection you will have due regard to the health of the posts, the facility of receiving regular supplies, and the means of restraining the Indians within the limits to which they have been driven. If hostilities are renewed, I have no doubt you will use every exertion to bring the war to a successful termination; but prudence dictates that every measure of prevention should be taken to place the troops in advantageous and healthy situations for the summer in the event of the war being prolonged beyond that period.

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Fort Dade, Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *March 27, 1837.*

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 7th instant, respecting the further continuance of the regiment of Creek warriors in the service of the United States. The reasons given by you for adopting this measure are entirely satisfactory, and the department therefore approves it, and will carry into effect the assurances which you have given those Indians respecting their subsistence after their arrival at their new homes in the west.

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Fort Dade, Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *May 6, 1837.*

SIR: I had the honor to receive your letter of the 9th of April, conveying the pleasing intelligence that the war in Florida is over, unless renewed by the imprudence and violence of the white inhabitants of that Territory. From such a danger it is believed that your prudence and firmness will preserve the country.

Your distribution of the forces which are judged necessary to be retained in Florida for the purpose of protecting the frontier inhabitants, and your intention to withdraw others from posts deemed unhealthy early in the month of June, are approved.

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Tampa Bay, Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *May 17, 1837.*

SIR: Paymaster Andrews has reported himself at this department, and given important information concerning the state of the troops in Florida. From the severe duty which has been imposed on the troops in Florida, and their sufferings under circumstances of peculiar privation in a climate little congenial to the health of most of them, I feel much concerned in their behalf, with a disposition to afford

them every relief consistent with a just regard to the service; as I feel assured that every portion of the army serving in that quarter has done its duty most faithfully, and is deserving of the kindest treatment.

Instead, therefore, of ordering the regiments of artillery to the Sabine, as directed, you will, as soon as circumstances will permit, allow the 1st, 2d, and 4th regiments to repair to the posts assigned them in General Order No. 58 of last year, where, it is hoped, they will find repose and be able to recruit their strength. The 3d regiment of artillery, which is destined to garrison the posts from Savannah to the Mississippi, you will order to Fort Mitchell, it being a healthy place; or should the whole of the regiment not be required for duty at that place during the unhealthy season, it may be distributed among the healthy stations assigned it in General Order No. 58, to wit: St. Augustine and Forts Pickens and Morgan.

In communicating to you this mode of relief to the troops it is not intended to interfere with any arrangements you may have made, or may think of making, for the security of the country or the property belonging to the government; but it is intended to convey to you an expression of my satisfaction with the conduct of the troops, and to evince to them, through you, the disposition which the department feels to relieve them as early as possible from the hardships and sufferings which they have so nobly sustained in the prosecution of the war against the Seminoles.

With a view of alleviating, as far as in my power, the burdens imposed on commandants of posts in Florida, I have directed that double rations be allowed to the commanding officers of Fort Harlee, Fort Crane, Fort Clinch, Fort King, Fort Armstrong, Fort Dade, Fort Foster, Fort Hillsboro', Fort Volusia, and Fort Mellon; this allowance to take effect from the time those posts were established, and to be continued until their evacuation. The other posts have been provided for by the order of the 21st of June last.

In sending the troops to their stations, as herein indicated, a due regard should be had to their present positions, in order to relieve them as much as possible from marching through an unhealthy country at this season of the year.

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Tampa Bay, Florida.*

P. S.—I have to request that the brigade of militia under General Hernandez, and such of the volunteers in the Territory of Florida as are not, in your opinion, necessary to insure the peace and safety of the Territory, be forthwith discharged.

J. R. POINSETT.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *May 17, 1837.*

SIR: I have to request that you will instruct the officers of the subsistence department in Florida to continue, until the 1st of October next, the issue of rations to such of the suffering inhabitants of that Territory as may, in their opinion, and in that of the commanding officers of the different posts, be fit objects of the bounty of the government.

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Tampa Bay, Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *May 25, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th instant, with its enclosures.

I concur entirely in the opinion you have expressed, that the claim presented by Mr. Gould, as the attorney of Josiah Dupont's heirs, is embraced by the provisions of the sixth article of the treaty with the Seminoles of May 9, 1832. The parties must be aware of this, as it appears from a report received from General Thompson, in 1835, that they presented to him evidence in support of it, which he transmitted to this department. This report will be soon acted upon; and when the department is in possession of all the claims, and necessary information, the sums stipulated to be paid will be paid in such manner as the aggregate amount of them may render necessary.

You can communicate these views to the persons interested, with an assurance that no measure taken now, in relation to their slaves or negroes, will affect injuriously any just claim against the Seminoles. But, at the same time, the government cannot permit a discussion of individual rights to interfere with a prompt and peaceable removal of these Indians.

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Tampa Bay, Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *May 25, 1837.*

SIR: I have received your letter of the 8th instant, and have read with interest the copy of Colonel Harney's despatch enclosed by you.

In order that the present gratifying prospect of a speedy termination of the difficulties in Florida may not be marred, the department advises that you continue to exercise great vigilance in protecting the Indians from all violence, both from the troops and citizens; and that you take all proper measures to prevent any officious interference from any quarter with your operations.

The attacks upon your course of conduct, to which you allude, are not worthy of your notice; and it is hoped that you will steadily proceed in the execution of your important duties, without regard to them, and rely upon the support of the people, and the approbation of the department, to sustain you in your efforts to put an end to the war, and to send the Indians speedily and peaceably to their new homes.

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Tampa Bay, Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *July 25, 1837.*

SIR: As you have, in several of your letters, expressed an opinion of the impossibility of removing the Seminoles, and a doubt of the policy and propriety of persevering in that measure, it becomes necessary to explain to you the views of the Executive on that subject. It is true that the Seminoles dwell in an inhospitable and deadly climate, and occupy inaccessible swamps and morasses, which are not susceptible of cultivation or improvement by the whites. Still, their further continuance there was found to be incompatible with the peace and security of the citizens of the United States who inhabit Florida, as well as with their own preservation and independence; it became, therefore, the duty of the government to carry out the same policy with regard to the Seminoles which it had adopted in its treatment of the other Indian tribes east of the Mississippi—remove them to the abundant and fertile country beyond that river; or to withdraw the settlers from East Florida, and protect the western part of that Territory by a cordon of posts and troops. Every consideration of sound policy required them to adopt the former alternative, and, in pursuance of this decision, the treaty of Payne's Landing was concluded. Three years were allowed the Indians to prepare for their removal, and this term was further extended, and every indulgence that they asked promptly and kindly granted, until it was made manifest that they did not intend to fulfil their treaty obligations, and it became the imperative duty of the Executive to compel them to do so. As soon as this determination of the government was made known to them, they broke out into open hostility; and taking advantage of the unprotected state of the frontier, carried fire and sword into the white settlements, committing the most horrible cruelties and excesses. It is true that in the contest which ensued they have displayed, in an eminent degree, the savage virtues of constancy and courage; and that, aided by the climate and the nature of the country, they have so far successfully defended themselves against superior forces, directed by brave and skillful officers; but the conduct and courage of the enemy do not alter the nature of the war, nor diminish our obligation to subdue them and to compel them to fulfil their engagements. To abandon the settled policy of the government because the Seminoles have proved themselves to be good warriors, and rely for the protection of our frontiers upon the faith of treaties with a people who have given such repeated proofs of treachery, would be unwise and impolitic. We cannot desist from prosecuting this war until the Seminoles consent to remove from Florida, without an abandonment of the only measures which can preserve the independence, and even existence, of the Indian tribes, and inviting the resistance of all those who now remain east of the Mississippi. To withdraw our forces now would betray great weakness, and not only tarnish the honor of our arms, but violate the sacred obligations of the government of the United States to protect the persons and property of the citizens of Florida from the savage aggressions of the Indians. I am persuaded that this obligation can be fulfilled without seeking to exterminate the Seminoles, and am gratified to find that, after having had time for further examination and reflection, you coincide in this opinion. In consequence of the earnest desire expressed in your letter to the adjutant general of the 5th of June last to be relieved from the command of the army of Florida, this department assented to your wishes, and you were informed that you might withdraw from the army and return to your appropriate duties at Washington, provided, on the receipt of that permission, you still desired to do so. The uncertainty of your retaining the command rendered it unnecessary to correspond with you on the subject of the preparations for the next campaign; but finding, from your letter of the 8th of July, to the commanding general of the army of the United States, that you are now desirous to remain and conduct the next campaign, which you believe may be done in a manner to insure success, I will enter into the subject fully, and inform you of the measures which have been taken here already, and of those which it is deemed advisable to adopt, as well in the prosecution of the preparations for opening the campaign as for the conduct of the war. In giving the views of the department on this subject, it is not meant to confine your operations in the field, but merely to point out the general principles on which those ought to be conducted, leaving all the details to your own sound discretion, which, aided by the knowledge you have lately acquired of the country, will lead, no doubt, to the realization of your hopes, and the successful termination of this disastrous war.

The recruiting service has been very successful, and the regiments serving and to serve in Florida will have their full complement; and it is intended to ask authority of Congress, in September, to increase the companies to one hundred men, so that there will be sufficient time to carry out that measure before the period arrives for opening the campaign. With the present establishment, by sending the whole of the first infantry, four companies of the second infantry, three companies of the second regiment of dragoons, and a sufficient number of recruits to fill the companies to their establishment, there will then be thirty-six companies of artillery of fifty each, making one thousand eight hundred; thirty-two companies of infantry of fifty each, one thousand six hundred; and ten companies of dragoons of seventy each, seven hundred; making in all four thousand one hundred men, which will be in Florida by October next; and if the contemplated measure of augmenting the army meets with the approbation of Congress, the companies can be increased, and the army of Florida carried up to seven thousand five hundred men. Measures have been taken to obtain the Indian force you have recommended, and it is hoped that one thousand warriors will be at Tampa in time to co-operate with the regulars at the commencement of the campaign: say two hundred Delawares, four hundred Shawnees, one hundred Sacs and Foxes, one hundred Kickapoos, and two hundred Choctaws, making in all one thousand warriors. With respect to the militia, it would appear preferable to have them brought into the field from different sections of the country, in companies, and not to organize them into separate regiments, but attach them as light infantry companies to those already organized. The staff of the militia is exceedingly expensive and cumbrous, and might very well be dispensed with. It is thought totally inexpedient to employ mounted militia on this service. Experience has proved that description of force to be more expensive than efficient, and I will place under your command as many companies of the 2d regiment of cavalry as you may deem requisite.

Your suggestion with regard to the usefulness of spy companies meets the approbation of the department, and has been already acted upon. Measures have been taken to engage the class of people designated, and, on your part, you may adopt such as you think proper to increase this description of force.

Measures are being adopted for establishing rapid and certain communications between this department and the seat of war. A line of steam packets is already in successful operation between Washington and Charleston, leaving this place on Friday and reaching Charleston on the following Monday, when a sea steamer may be despatched to the St. John's, and return in time for the departure of the packet on the following Friday. This vessel reaches Washington again on Monday, so that ten days will suffice to communicate with the forces under your command. It is proposed to make Jacksonville the principal depot for the operations on the eastern side of the peninsula, and you will give immediate orders for the erection

of sufficient storehouses for that purpose, sending a competent officer to make a judicious selection of the site, which ought, if possible, to be on the river bank, so as to avoid the expense and delay of land transportation. From this point forage, provisions, and all things required for the use of the army, can be conveyed by steamers to any place on the St. John's where they may be wanted, to the nearest and most commodious point whence to commence land-carriage. In order to insure the success of these operations, it will be necessary to engage the requisite number of steamboats for this service, and the department desires to be fully informed on that subject, in order that it may decide whether to continue the contract or to purchase boats. And here it may be well to remark that sea vessels ought to be employed for transportation between New Orleans and Tampa, and between the eastern ports and Jacksonville, and the use of steamers confined to the rivers. It will be well to have on the eastern and western rivers, in addition to the barges which you already have, a number of flat-bottomed boats to push up the shallow streams, and to serve for lighters in the event of the steamers grounding.

Whatever land transportation you may require will be furnished by the proper department. Light two-horse wagons, drawn by mules, are the best. And here let me advise you not to burden yourself with too many horses, either for cavalry or transportation; it is extremely difficult to subsist them in the country you are to operate in, and when too numerous, instead of facilitating, they retard the movements of an army. I observe in the plan of campaign submitted to the department in your letter of June 15, you call for nine hundred and fifty cavalry; this appears to be too great a number to subsist in Florida, but if they are deemed essentially necessary they shall be furnished of regulars. The immense loss of horses by the militia, and the enormous expense incurred by the employment of that description of troops, have determined the department rather to bring into the field the whole disposable force of regular cavalry than to make any drafts for mounted volunteers.

In the entire absence of topographical knowledge of the country which is the theatre of your operations, I cannot give an opinion of the plan of campaign you propose to follow. It has appeared to me that hitherto the base of your operations has been confined too much to a line parallel to the coast, and that, if the nature of the country would permit, it might be better to establish it across the peninsula; but of this I will defer a positive opinion until I receive copies of the results of the several *reconnoissances* you have caused lately to be made. I beg that you will communicate frequently with the department, and as much as possible in detail, so that there may be no defect nor tardiness in sending forward the supplies you may require, or otherwise co-operating with you in making the necessary arrangements and preparations for a vigorous prosecution of the campaign as soon as the season will permit it to be commenced without risk to the troops.

The period ought to be determined by experience of the climate. In all our southern countries with which I am acquainted, the fall of the year is the most sickly; and to commence active operations in the lower parts of Carolina or Georgia before the 1st of November, unless there should be a frost earlier in the season, would be attended with certain disease, and occasion the destruction of one-half of the army. If the troops are assembled in October, it appears to me time enough; but I will be glad to hear further from you on that subject.

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Commanding in Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *August 1, 1837.*

SIR: I enclose for your information copies of instructions that have been issued in reference to the employment of an Indian force during the next campaign in Florida.

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *August 3, 1837.*

SIR: The attention of the department has been called to the subject of the aid afforded by government to suffering inhabitants of Florida, by a late letter received by the quartermaster general from Lieutenant Vinton, informing him that another steamboat has been employed to transport subsistence on the requisition of Governor Call, who alleges that the one now on that service (the *Izard*) is not sufficient to supply the suffering inhabitants assembled at St. Mark's. You were informed by a letter of May 17 that the President had resolved to continue the distribution of rations to the inhabitants who were unable to maintain themselves until the 1st of October next, and by that intimation it was intended to convey his intention that these supplies should cease at that time. The object of Congress would appear to have been to succor the immediate wants of a people who had been suddenly driven from their homes and deprived of the means of supporting themselves; not to continue during the whole war to maintain them gratuitously, thereby withdrawing all motive for exertion on the part of those who might otherwise find means to maintain themselves. Cases may present themselves of the aged and infirm, the widow and the orphan, wherein you may be called upon to exercise a sound discretion, as you are hereby authorized to do; but on the 1st of October the present system of dealing out rations to the suffering inhabitants of Florida generally, as now practiced, must cease, and as early notice as possible ought to be given of this determination of the President.

That none may suffer under this decision, you will give employment to those who are in want of it; and it is supposed that the various branches of the service, especially the establishment of stores, posts, and good communications throughout the country, will enable you to do so. Apart from the pernicious moral influence of an indefinite continuance of such a system, the success of the campaign will be jeopardized by it. If the steamboats and wagon train, and other transportation intended for the service of the army, may be called off at any time from their legitimate and necessary uses to convey these supplies, the commanding general cannot be certain of receiving with punctuality and despatch those intended for the troops. And if the subsistence destined for the army is to be consumed irregularly by the requisitions

from officers whose duty it has been to obtain the rations heretofore distributed to the inhabitants, the commissary's department cannot answer for the result. The supply must, either way, far exceed the regular demand, which is attended, as experience proves, with great waste of the public stores; or there may be a deficiency of supplies for the troops to the utter destruction of the best combined operations. Even those rations which, in the use of a sound discretion, you may find it absolutely necessary to distribute, ought to be taken from other sources than those intended for the use of the army, and transported by other means than those at the disposition of the quartermaster's department for the transportation of the baggage and stores of the army.

You will therefore cause all such persons to be assembled in the neighborhood of Jacksonville, on the St. John's, and at Tampa Bay, or Charlotte harbor—points which can be approached by sailing vessels; and on information being received here of the number so to be supplied, measures will be taken, before the commencement of active operations, to detach this service from the army altogether, and employ agents to attend to it.

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *August 3, 1837.*

SIR: It appears to me advisable to establish a post in Charlotte harbor, on some convenient and healthy site, as soon as the means in your power will permit it to be done; and from thence to push reconnoitring parties up the rivers which fall into that bay, in order to obtain a knowledge of the country which is soon to be the theatre of your operations. I am sorry to find that you have been under the necessity of calling out so many men of the militia of Florida. It has always appeared to me a sound policy to leave as many of the Floridians as possible on their plantations, and not to compel them to abandon their homes. The militia had better be drawn, as far as practicable, from the neighboring States, and the people of the country left to guard their own hearths and protect their own slaves. I have no doubt the exigency of the case required you so to act, but I am desirous you should know the views of the department on this subject.

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *August 16, 1837.*

SIR: I have to request that you will observe and note the operation of the existing rules and regulations of the militia service in the field, with a view to their future revision.

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *August 18, 1837.*

SIR: I have watched the progress of the recruiting service with great anxiety; and, although new rendezvous have been opened, and I believe proper exertions used by the officers charged with this department, still I am afraid the number of recruits will fall short of the complement of men required to fill up, within the limited time, the regiments destined to Florida. Under this apprehension, I deem it expedient that you should make prompt use of the authority heretofore vested in you, to call for such militia or volunteer force as you may think necessary to complete the number of men required to carry out the plan of campaign you have proposed; the latter to serve six or twelve months, unless sooner discharged. The adjutant general has been instructed to furnish you with a return of the recruiting service. There are not quite a thousand men at Old Point Comfort, and the return from all the recruiting stations will not, I fear, exceed five hundred men a month.

It may be well to endeavor to re-enlist, for a short time, the men now in Florida, whose term of service is about to expire; say, to the end of the campaign. You may assure them of the punctual fulfilment of any arrangement you may find it beneficial to make with them, on the part of the department, within its legal powers.

Every exertion is being made by the quartermaster and commissary generals to complete the supplies necessary to the success of your operations, from their respective departments. A return of them will be furnished to you; and I beg you will advise me of any further requirements you may deem essential to the health and comfort of the troops, and to the efficiency of the forces under your command.

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *August 25, 1837.*

SIR: Your letters of the 10th and 14th instant have been received.

In accepting the services of the brigade of volunteers which has been offered for service in Florida from Kentucky, which you are hereby authorized to do, you will designate the description of force, number of men and officers you require, and the organization you propose to give it, agreeably to that adopted by the late President, when the volunteers for the last campaign were mustered into service.

In communicating to you my own convictions, it was not intended to do anything more than bring

them to your notice—not to make them the guide of your conduct, in any case in which your knowledge and experience, acquired on the theatre of operations, led you to differ from them. I had no wish to break up the depot at Garey's Ferry, and only desired to have established the general depot at Jacksonville, in order that the supplies might be transported by sailing vessels, and, being discharged there, supplies of every description could be transported there by steamers to Black creek, or whatever other part they may be required. Your impressions, however, appear to be so strong as to the inexpediency of making the depot at Jacksonville, and so decidedly in favor of the Pilatka, that you are authorized to make the proposed alteration in the orders which have been given upon this subject; or if, in your opinion, sailing vessels can be brought up to the depot at Garey's Ferry, by being towed from the mouth of the creek, you may make that the chief depot for supplies on that line of your operations, and suppress the others.

The acting quartermaster general will take the most prompt and active measures to send all the articles you require from his department.

If the Engineer department can furnish the dredge-boat, and sufficient force to work it, in time to deepen the bar and remove the obstructions to navigation at the head of the lakes, it shall be done. In the meantime I would suggest that flat-bottomed boats be used as lighters for the steamers. The operation of unloading and loading is, I acknowledge, somewhat tedious, but attended with less labor than land-carriage. Every effort is making to obtain for the army under your command the description of force you require. The 2d regiment of dragoons, now on their march from Jefferson Barracks, it is hoped, from their having had some time to drill, will furnish you a few companies of good cavalry; and rendezvous have been opened in the interior districts with the hope of obtaining men acquainted with the use and management of horses.

If the plan suggested by me cannot be carried out, you will designate the description of forcé you require in the requisitions upon the States; not merely asking for regiments, brigades, or companies, but stating in every instance the number of men and officers required, and mustering none other into service. You may call for whatever number of volunteer cavalry you require; but I would suggest whether it would not be advisable to bring the men chiefly by water, and have the horses driven by careful persons, so that they may be fresh on their arrival. If mounted men march from Kentucky or Tennessee on horseback, the horses will be galled and used up before they reach the Territory.

The map was very acceptable, and, as soon as the one you intend to forward from Tampa reaches the department, it shall be lithographed, and copies furnished to the officers in service in Florida, in order that while they use it they may fill it up with such information as they can derive from actual observation. On a cursory examination of it, the plan of campaign you propose appears judicious.

The Navy Department will furnish the vessels required; and I have asked for the officers you designate to command the steamers. One word as to the season of commencing active operations. The first of October is too soon. I have no objections to the force you require being in Florida early in that month, that you may organize it, and, if you desire, place the columns in position; but October is too soon to begin active operations in the field, without exposing the troops to the deadly effects of the autumnal diseases prevalent in the latitude and climate of East Florida.

I regard the risk to the health of the men to be so great at that season, putting to hazard the success of the campaign, that I am compelled to instruct you not to commence active operations of attack before the commencement of November.

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *August 26, 1837.*

SIR: I enclose you a letter of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and will thank you to furnish him with the information he desires respecting the Creek warriors in Florida.

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *August 30, 1837.*

SIR: Since the letter from this department was written, asking you to report what disposition you intended to make of the Creek warriors whose families are at Pass Christian, I am informed by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that it is desirable they should be sent to that station as soon as can conveniently be done, in order that they may be ready to remove early in the month of October. From the measures taken by the department to supply their places, it is hoped that you will be able to dispense with their services in time so as not to interfere with the measures adopted here for their speedy emigration.

Your letter of the 15th instant has been received, and your wishes with regard to the gun-carriages shall be complied with as early as practicable.

It is stated by some persons that the Shawnee, Delaware, and Kickapoo tribes of Indians, which you recommended to be employed, are too few and too civilized to furnish the number of warriors we have required from them. Orders were given to the officers, in the event of their not succeeding in engaging the number of Indians required from these tribes, to seek them elsewhere; and I inform you thus early of all the obstacles likely to arise, that, in aid of the department, you may take such measures as are in your power to obviate them.

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *September 2, 1837.*

SIR: Since my letter to you of the 25th ultimo, authorizing you to accept a brigade of volunteers from Kentucky, I have been informed by General Smith, of Louisiana, that the same number of efficient men can be raised in that State without delay. These being accustomed to a climate similar to that of Florida, and so near the scene of operations that they would be able to reach there at an earlier period than those would from Kentucky, I have determined to accept the services of the former, and to countermand the authority given you to receive the latter.

The governor of Kentucky will be this day informed of this change of the views of the department.
J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *September 6, 1837.*

SIR: The department having made arrangements for procuring a sufficient volunteer force from Tennessee, with that which will be raised in Louisiana and South Carolina, for the next campaign in Florida, it will be unnecessary that you should call upon the governors of Georgia and Alabama for the troops you were authorized to request, in letters from this department, some time since. Nor is it necessary that you should communicate with the governor of Tennessee respecting the force to be procured in that State, as the department will take the necessary measures respecting it.

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

P. S.—The number of volunteers from South Carolina, it is believed, will be five hundred.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *September 6, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter communicating the result of your interview at Fort King with certain sub-chiefs of the Seminoles, and hasten to say that the intelligence given by you is of a pleasing character, and to express to you the approbation of the department of the course you have pursued, and of the language you have made use of in your talk with the Indians.

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *September 9, 1837.*

SIR: In reply to that part of your letter of the 10th ultimo which refers to the necessity of having a small naval force to aid you in preventing the Indians from obtaining powder from certain points, I transmit you copies of letters from the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Treasury in answer to requests made to them by this department for both species of force.

The Secretary of the Treasury has been requested to place the cutters under your orders, and cause them to repair to Tampa Bay at as early a period as practicable.

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *September 13, 1837.*

SIR: I have had the pleasure to receive your letters of the 28th and the 30th of August.

In reply to the first, relating to General P. F. Smith, of Louisiana, I am happy to inform you that the department has anticipated your wishes, and accepted the services of that officer to raise a regiment in Louisiana for the service of the Florida war. He has already the necessary authority, and measures are in operation to render his levies effective. You can communicate to him the point where you desire him to direct his force. As you indicate Charlotte harbor, I have this day given orders to send the battalion of second infantry, (say, two hundred and fifty men,) now at New York, to that post, which will supply the place of the marines. I regret that force has not been retained in Florida, but suppose it is too late so to direct it.

The department is satisfied with the reasons given in your communication of the 30th for the employment of the Florida militia.

As you appear to apprehend that the force will not be in position in time for active operations, which ought not to commence before the first week in November, I recapitulate what has been ordered on the subject. Measures have been taken to raise six hundred volunteers in Tennessee, six hundred in Louisiana, six hundred in Missouri, with three hundred additional riflemen organized as spy companies. Active officers are engaged in procuring the Indian force of one thousand men. These troops, we confidently expect, will be in Florida in the month of October. Five hundred regulars will take their departure from Old Point Comfort for Tampa from the 20th to the 25th of this month; two hundred and fifty for Charlotte harbor as soon as practicable, but before that period; and from the 1st to the 10th of October the remaining force, now at Fortress Monroe, (say, about one thousand men,) will be despatched to the St. John's.

The steamer *New Brighton* will shortly take her station between Charleston and *Garey's Ferry*, and our communications will then be regular and frequent. I await the promised map to have it lithographed.

I send the instructions prepared for the commission intended to be sent to attend to the subject of

distributing rations to the indigent and suffering inhabitants of Florida. As some days may elapse before the gentlemen will be able to reach Florida, I beg you will cause these regulations to be carried out immediately after the first of October by the officers now charged with that duty.

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 4, 1837.*

SIR: The Cherokee chiefs who are charged with this communication, having expressed a desire to be allowed to counsel with the Seminoles, in order to save that people from the consequences of the impending war, you will permit them to do so.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 4, 1837.*

SIR: It having been signified to the department that certain Cherokee chiefs have expressed a desire to counsel the Seminoles to submit to the government of the United States, I have thought it advisable to permit them to do so; but you will take the precaution to have them accompanied by such agents and interpreters as you can rely upon, in order to insure the faithful execution of their proffered services.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *St. Augustine, Florida.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, November 3, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a return of the troops at this post. Not having returns of the three companies of regular troops, and one of mounted volunteers, in the Creek country; of the two companies of infantry in the southern counties of Georgia; nor of the battalion of mounted Alabama volunteers on their way to join me, I could not include them on the return.

Supplies are rapidly coming in; and if I had the means of transportation, I should be able to move forward the moment the Alabama volunteers arrive.

I enclose, for the information of the general-in-chief and the Secretary of War, a copy of a letter to his excellency Governor Schley, dated the 17th ultimo; and a copy of a letter to his excellency Governor Clay, of the 20th ultimo, on the subject of volunteers for twelve months, which will certainly be required for service here, as there seems to be no prospect of recruits being sent to fill up the companies in this Territory. I would have forwarded copies of those letters sooner, but was not able to have them made out.

I also enclose a letter to Commodore Dallas.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, October 19, 1836.*

SIR: Previous to my departure from the Creek country, that excellent officer, Major Nelson, stationed near the Cherokee line, proposed to raise a regiment of volunteers for twelve months. I did not then feel authorized to accept the services of so large a corps; but information received since my arrival here induces the belief that the war in this country, from the confidence with which the Indians have been inspired by their successes during the summer, will be protracted, and that the services of the regiment offered by Major Nelson will be required. I must, therefore, request your excellency to give the necessary orders for the organization of the regiment, and its march to Tallahassee.

As I have no officer disposable, I beg you to appoint an officer to muster them into service. Arms, ammunition, camp equipage, &c., can be obtained at Columbus or Fort Mitchell.

I am your excellency's most obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

His Excellency WM. SCHLEY, *Governor of Georgia, Milledgeville, Ga.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Steamboat Merchant, near the Withlacoochee, October 20, 1836.*

DEAR SIR: From the dispersed condition of the hostile Indians at this time in Florida, the war will be tedious, and more troops will be required than are now in the field. I desire that the fine battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Cawfield should be extended to a regiment. I beg you to consider this letter as a requisition for five additional companies of volunteers for twelve months. Arms and every necessary equipment can be had at Fort Mitchell. I will thank you to organize the companies into a battalion, with a major to command it, and let the colonel be elected when it shall have joined the battalion now in the field.

I am, dear sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General.*

His Excellency C. C. CLAY, *Governor of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.*

HEADQUARTERS, *Apalachicola, October 25, 1836.*

SIR: Pursuant to instructions from the Secretary of War, I have entered Florida with the disposable force under my command, to co-operate with his excellency Governor Call in the prosecution of the war against the Seminole Indians. To strike the enemy in his stronghold, the command of the Withlacoochee is necessary; to take and retain command of that river, small steamboats are required. The Iazard, which was intended for that service, has been lost on the bar at the mouth of that river; and our operations will be greatly retarded, if not entirely suspended, if she be not replaced.

Two public boats, the American and Dade, have, I understand, been sent to Pensacola for repairs. If they could be made fit for service, and one of them be sent to the Withlacoochee, and the other to the Suwanee, active operations might be commenced in a few days, and the war, perhaps, brought to a close before the expiration of the term of service of the Tennessee volunteers. May I ask the favor of you to cause them to be repaired at the navy yard, and furnished with crews from your command?

The efficient co-operation afforded by the navy, and particularly by yourself, in the Creek campaign, induces me to make this request; and I make it with the more confidence, from the belief that, with your enlarged and liberal views, you are always willing to promote the interest of the whole service by every means in your power.

Colonel Stanton, quartermaster and adjutant general of this army, whom I take great pleasure in introducing to your acquaintance, is the bearer of this letter. He goes to Pensacola, Mobile, and perhaps to New Orleans, on public duty. I have requested him to see you in relation to the steamboat before referred to.

With high consideration and respect, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Commodore ALEXANDER J. DALLAS,

Commanding United States Naval Force on the Gulf of Mexico, Pensacola, Florida.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, November 6, 1836.*

SIR: I have received, this evening, your letters of the 6th and 8th October.

The marines and about five hundred regular troops are here. A detachment of Alabama volunteers arrived to-day—about a hundred and twenty. The remainder of the battalion, about a hundred and eighty, will be here probably by the 12th, at which time I expect mules and horses from New Orleans and St. Mark's for packing. On my arrival, I found no means of transportation, or I should ere this have been on the Withlacoochee. The moment the pack-horses arrive I shall take the field.

I have despatches to-day from Governor Call and General Reed. The governor, with the Tennesseans and Floridians, and the Indian warriors, will move on the Withlacoochee. If the Indians fight, the war will soon be ended. If they disperse, we shall have a tedious and arduous service; but they must be pursued to their most hidden recesses. Should they go to the Everglades, I shall follow them, and for that purpose I have required boats of a suitable construction to be prepared at New Orleans.

I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding*

Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, November 6, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 8th and 11th of October. They were forwarded to me from Columbus, Georgia, and were received this evening.

The marines, under Colonel Henderson, are here. I have also about 500 regular troops. About 120 of the Alabama volunteers arrived to-day, and the remainder (say 180) will be here by the 12th; and I expect by that time to receive horses or mules from New Orleans for packing. The moment they arrive I shall take the field.

Governor Call, from whom I have received despatches this afternoon, will meet me on the Withlacoochee with the Tennesseans, Floridians, and Indian warriors.

If the Indians return to fight us, we shall terminate the war during this month; but should they disperse, they will give us employment the greater part of the winter.

I have received Order No. 69, and hope it may be carried out.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, November 9, 1836.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to send herewith a muster-roll of Captain W. L. Fry's company of mounted Alabama volunteers, which was mustered into the service of the United States by General Andrew Moore, of Alabama, under authority from Major General Jesup.

I am instructed by General Jesup to say, that when the company was called into service, it was necessary to facilitate the emigration of the Creek Indians. That service having been accomplished, the company will be ordered to report for duty to General Wool, in the Cherokee nation; who, should he not require their services, will have them discharged.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. N. CHAMBERS, *Lieutenant and Aide-de-camp.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General U. S. A., Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS, *Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay, November 18, 1836.*

SIR: The last detachment of the Alabama volunteer battalion arrived here yesterday. The mules ordered from New Orleans for packing have not yet arrived. The moment they arrive I shall take the field. I have been ready for two weeks, except transportation. The time, however, has not been lost, as I have employed the mounted volunteers in scouring the country; and every arrangement has been made for the most vigorous prosecution of the war, so soon as the means of transporting a few days' subsistence and forage shall be obtained. I hope to move by the 20th.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay, November 20, 1836.*

SIR: Except the means of transportation, I have been ready for the field for two weeks past. A vessel with one hundred and twelve mules arrived evening before last. We are getting them on shore, and will march the moment they can be broken to the packs, for they are now entirely wild. Mules properly broken could not, I am told, be obtained.

The delay here, I am apprehensive, will derange General Call's plan; but we must make up by energy and activity when we get into the field for the unavoidable delay which has taken place. Among the numerous disadvantages to the service incident to the detention here, we have one advantage at least, which is, the arrival of the last detachment of the Alabama battalion.

I have not heard from General Call since the 27th of last month. There is no communication by land, and a very precarious one by water, consequently it is impossible to combine the movement of separate columns with any degree of certainty; and the friendly Seminoles who acted as guides last winter having been all sent off during the summer, not a single guide or pilot can be obtained.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, November 21, 1836.*

SIR: I desire that the enclosed copy of a letter to the late Colonel Walker, with the copy of his letter in reply, referring to a mistake in a report, as well as an order of General Scott, and a misrepresentation which has been circulated widely in the newspapers, be placed, with this letter, on the files of the Adjutant General's office; and

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

APALACHICOLA, *Florida, October 14, 1836.*

DEAR SIR: A writer in one of the Virginia papers, who represents himself as an officer of the army under the command of General Scott, has charged me with injustice to General Moore, in not reporting several hundred prisoners which his brigade is represented as having taken and sent to me. The same writer says that of the three hundred prisoners sent in by me to Fort Mitchell, two hundred and fifty were taken by General Moore.

As I am not aware of any prisoners having been taken by General Moore's command, and as it has been asserted, and the assertion has found its way into the papers, that the prisoners taken by him were delivered to you on my order, I beg the favor of you to answer the following questions: 1st. Were any prisoners delivered to you by any part of General Moore's command; and if so, of what towns were they, and what disposition was made of them? 2d. Were any of the prisoners taken to Fort Mitchell captured by General Moore's command? 3d. Did not Captain Henderson, of General Moore's command, disarm and take into custody Jim Boy and his warriors of the Thloblocco town, and Yelka-Hadjo and his warriors of the lower Enfula town, who were at the time preparing to accompany me on the campaign? 4th. Were these chiefs or their warriors at any time hostile? 5th. Did they not accompany me on the campaign under the command of yourself and General Woodward, and perform their duty faithfully and efficiently? 6th. Were there any other Indians than those of Jim Boy and Yelka-Hadjo taken and delivered to you by Captain Henderson or any other officer of General Moore's command? 7th. Were there, to your knowledge, any hostile Indians captured at any time by General Moore's command and sent to me?

Respectfully, I am, dear sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Colonel WILLIAM WALKER, *of Tuskegee, now at Apalachicola.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, November 21, 1836.*

I certify that the above is a true copy of the original as recorded on the books of this office.

HENRY STANTON,

Brevet Lieutenant Colonel and Adjutant General of the Army of the South.

APALACHICOLA, *Florida*, October 14, 1836.

SIR: Your letter of the present date has just been handed to me, and I hasten to reply to the questions therein proposed, which I am obliged to do in the simplest form, as my indisposition has rendered me so weak as to compel me to make use of the hand of another to commit to paper all I have to communicate.

First question. In answer to your first question, I reply that no prisoners were delivered to me by any part of General Moore's command.

Second question. Answer; no, not one.

Third question. Captain Henderson, of General Moore's command, took and disarmed Jim Boy and Yelka-Hadjo and their warriors when they were actually in the service of the United States and preparing to join you in the campaign.

Fourth question. No, never.

Fifth question. Yes, all of them.

Sixth question. No other Indians, besides those above mentioned, were delivered to me by Captain Henderson or by any officer of General Moore's command.

Seventh question. Never, to my knowledge.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. WALKER.

Major General JESUP.

We, the undersigned, hereby certify that the interrogatories to which the foregoing are answers were put and answered in our presence.

W. S. McCLINTOCK, *Major United States Army.*

J. A. CHAMBERS, *Lieutenant United States Artillery.*

I certify that the foregoing letter and certificate are true copies from the originals.

J. A. CHAMBERS, *Lieutenant United States Artillery.*

TAMPA BAY, *November 21, 1836.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, November 28, 1836.*

SIR: Sufficient transportation having been prepared, I put the troops in march yesterday for the Withlacoochee; but having received information, by the arrival of a steamboat with several officers, that Governor Call had scoured the cove of that river without finding an Indian, and that trails in a southerly direction had been discovered by him, and also that he had moved to Volusia, I directed the troops to fall back and resume their position here.

My last communication from the governor was dated the 27th of last month. It is utterly impossible to combine the movements of separate columns in a country like this, where communications cannot be kept up. The whole force should be united, and depots pushed into the immediate vicinity of the strongholds of the enemy. To be able to do so, I shall put myself at the head of the mounted men of this command to-morrow morning, and dash directly through to Governor Call's headquarters. If I should get through, I will report to you immediately from the other side.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS, *Volusia, December 5, 1836.*

SIR: After a rapid march of between five and six days, I arrived here last night from Tampa Bay, where I found Governor Call with the Tennessee brigade, the Indian regiment, and a few regular troops and Florida volunteers, amounting, altogether, to about two thousand men.

Your instructions to me of the 4th ultimo, to take the command of the troops in Florida and the direction of the war against the Seminoles, have not yet been received; but Governor Call has given me a copy of them, and will turn over the command to me the moment the necessary returns can be prepared. I shall enter upon the duties assigned me without the confidence of success entertained by the members of the government, or the hope of fulfilling the expectations of the President or the country. All that man can do shall be done; but I can promise nothing more than to do my duty faithfully. Other troops will be required, and that immediately; otherwise a failure is inevitable.

The term of service of at least two hundred of the regular troops will, I am told, expire in the course of this and the next month, and not a man will re-enlist. The term of service of the Tennessee brigade will expire, of a part on the 18th, and of the remainder on the 31st of the present month, and they will insist on going home. I shall then be left with troops barely sufficient to defend the necessary depots, without any for active service in the field.

I requested the governor of Alabama some time ago to detach a force of five companies, either volunteers or drafted militia, for service in this Territory, and also to complete Lieutenant Colonel Cawfield's battalion of twelve months' volunteers to a regiment. I also requested Governor Schley, of Georgia, to detach a regiment of twelve months' volunteers, the services of which had been offered to me last fall, but which I did not then feel myself authorized to accept. I have not heard from either of the governors, probably from the difficulty of communications reaching me. If the force asked from them should be sent to me, it will supply the place of the Tennesseans ordered to Tampa Bay; it would supply the place of the discharges, and enable me to end the war this winter. This post I find entirely out of position, but as supplies are already collected here, I must use it as a depot. Fort King is also out of position, but as you have directed that it be occupied, I shall re-establish it if I can spare troops to garrison it. I have already established a depot twenty-five miles in advance of Tampa Bay, on the road to Fort King,

and propose to establish another on the same road, at the point where it crosses the Withlacoochee. I shall also establish a post at Punta-Rassa, near the mouth of the Langbell river, which falls into Charlotte harbor; but to effect these important and absolutely necessary objects, force is required.

A post has been established by Governor Call on the Withlacoochee twenty miles above its mouth. If the Indians should remain on that river, another post must be placed near the cove. With these posts established and supplied, the war may be carried on successfully by light detachments, operating without baggage, and striking the enemy promptly and unexpectedly wherever he may be found.

As an act of justice to Governor Call, I take the occasion to remark (and I stake my professional reputation on the correctness of the remark) that no man could, under the circumstances in which he has been placed, have accomplished more than he has done. He had the summer, it is said in the public prints, to make his arrangements for a winter campaign, but he could not establish depots without force to defend them. And it is to be observed that he entered upon his command under circumstances of embarrassment which did not exist when the campaign of last year commenced. He found the country exhausted, and not only all the positions occupied during the campaign abandoned, but the whole country, from the Suwanee to the Atlantic, except Tampa Bay and St. Augustine, occupied by the enemy. His plan of campaign was admirable, but there were circumstances which he could not control that prevented its execution. If I should fail, (and unless I have more force I certainly shall,) the country can be completely defended by mounted rangers only, in connexion with the depots which I propose to establish. The rangers should be raised during the present winter, and should have a rate of pay to command the services of the best men. The pay of the regular troops, including the officers, should be doubled, to secure them the ordinary comforts during their service in Florida. Let me entreat you, as you regard the best interests of the service, to impress upon Congress the necessity of putting the army upon a better footing. I wish nothing myself, and if justice can be done to my brave companions, I will cheerfully serve out the campaign without pay or emoluments. I shall commence operations immediately with the utmost vigor which the means at my command will permit, and shall keep you constantly advised of my progress.

With high consideration and respect, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

VOLUSIA, *Florida, December 5, 1836.*

SIR: I was not able to obtain the means of transportation for even ten days' supply of subsistence and forage for the troops under my command at Tampa Bay until the 17th of last month; the mules sent for that purpose from New Orleans were entirely unbroken, and it was not until the 27th that I was able to commence the march on the Withlacoochee. When the troops had been put in motion, I received intelligence that Governor Call had reached that river on the 13th, had swept the cove, and had, after driving the Indians, marched across the country to this post.

I immediately countermanded the march of the troops, and, putting myself at the head of four hundred mounted men, on the 27th ultimo pushed through the country and joined the governor last night.

On the 3d instant my spy company succeeded in capturing an Indian near the Ocklawaha river, from whom I received information of the situation of a village, inhabited by negroes, on the lake in which the river has its source. I detached Lieutenant Colonel Cawfield, of the Alabama twelve months' volunteers, with orders to burn the village and capture or destroy its inhabitants.

The result of the expedition was the destruction of the village and the capture of forty-one negroes. The service was performed in the most prompt and handsome manner.

I have not yet received a return of the troops at this post, nor of the supplies; but I hope to have both to-day. After which, I shall be able to form some idea of the operations proper to be undertaken.

I have not yet received the instructions from the War Department to assume the command in Florida. They were forwarded, *via* Fort Clinch, to Tampa Bay; and the messenger had not arrived there when I took my departure for this place. Governor Call, however, has given me a copy of them, and will turn over the command to me as soon as the necessary returns can be prepared.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding Army of the South.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Volusia, Florida, December 9, 1836.*

SIR: The command of the forces in Florida was transferred to me yesterday. I would greatly have preferred that Governor Call had been permitted to close the campaign. He has had difficulties to encounter, of which no man can form an adequate idea who has not been here. I have examined carefully the state of the service, and have looked into every matter connected with the recent operations; and I am sure that no man could have done more, under the circumstances. He established this post, and took every preliminary step to supply it.

Supplies and means of transportation are rapidly arriving, and, had he retained the command, he would soon have struck an important blow.

The term of service of the Tennessee volunteers will expire in a few days. To avail myself of their services in the attack I propose to make, I shall move sooner than in my own judgment I ought to move, and may have to fall back; but I am so arranging my depots, that if compelled to relinquish one object, I shall readily strike another. If I should not succeed in dislodging Powell, I can, on returning to this place, strike Micanopy, Philip, and Cooper, who are about a day's march from each other, each with from one hundred and twenty to two hundred Indian and negro warriors—the latter, perhaps, the more numerous. My object will be to strike them in succession, and prevent them from concentrating.

By all means let me have the sixth regiment; and if any companies of the second regiment of dragoons have been raised, let me have them.

This, you may be assured, is a negro, not an Indian war; and if it be not speedily put down, the south will feel the effects of it on their slave population before the end of the next season.

Unless the army be placed upon a better footing, it will disband; discharges are numerous, and no old soldiers re-enlist. The officers cannot subsist on the miserable pittance now allowed them; they should, upon principles of common justice, be placed on a footing with corresponding grades in the navy. You, sir, will command their gratitude, and render an important service to the country, by taking the lead in this matter.

Assure the President that whatsoever promptness and energy can accomplish shall be done.

With high consideration and respect, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. B. F. BUTLER, *Acting Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Volusia, Florida, December 12, 1836.*

SIR: A sufficient supply of subsistence having been received yesterday to enable me to move within twenty days' rations, the army will march to-day. The advance is now moving. At the Ocklawaha I shall have the choice of two objects—Micanopy, who is about thirty miles south of the point where I shall cross that river; and Powell, who is about fifty miles southwest of it.

I propose, after placing the train safely across the Ocklawaha, to have a sufficient force to protect it; and, with the remainder, make a forced march, and strike either Micanopy or Powell; and if successful with the first, immediately attack the other.

My movements are not in accordance with my own judgment; they are controlled by the necessity of availing myself of the few days that yet remain of the term of service of the Tennessee brigade; and I am therefore compelled to march on their route to the mouth of the Withlacoochee, where they expect to embark for New Orleans, on their way home. This movement will enable me to strike at the two chiefs mentioned above, and to cover the frontier; but had I the control of my measures, I could employ the force to march to more advantage, in a succession of attacks along the Ocklawaha, and thence down the Withlacoochee.

Without a strong corps of wagon-drivers, muleteers, and laborers, it is almost impossible to act efficiently in this country. The southern militia do not labor for themselves, and consequently cannot or will not labor for the public. The regular troops are on constant fatigue duty, and a road leading from camp, and on which we are to march to-day, requiring repair, I sent instructions to General Armstrong last night to move forward with his brigade and cause the necessary repairs to be made. He replied that it would be impossible, as his men would not work. I shall, therefore, be compelled to put this labor also upon the regular troops. At the same time that I consider southern volunteers inefficient for many purposes, it is due to them to say that they are efficient whenever rapid marches are to be made or an enemy to be fought. Add to them such a corps as I propose, and you make them efficient for every purpose.

Cannot the sixth regiment of infantry and the companies of the second regiment of dragoons already raised be sent to Florida? Volunteers can be more readily obtained for service on the southwestern frontier than for Florida.

I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. B. F. BUTLER, *Acting Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Volusia, Florida, December 12, 1836.*

SIR: The term of service of the Tennessee volunteers will expire in a few days; I shall then have force barely sufficient to protect the necessary depots and the trains that supply them. Cannot the sixth regiment be sent to me? It is now at Natchitoches, and could reach Tampa Bay in three weeks from the receipt of the order. If the companies of the second regiment of dragoons already raised were here, they would be sufficient to protect the train from Black creek to the Withlacoochee and to cover the frontier, and would leave the remainder of the force disposable.

Cannot something be done for the army? The officers should be placed on a footing with those of the navy; and all officers or soldiers who are serving, or have served, in Florida, below the rank of major general, should have grants of land.

It is impossible to obtain an accurate return of the troops; of course, no return can be made.

If I had one thousand volunteers or militia to take the place of the Tennesseans immediately, I should be able to terminate the war in sixty days. The prospects are flattering even now, but I am not sanguine of success. The country is not so difficult as it has been represented, but the difficulties which we find arise from the entire destitution of every kind of supply.

To pursue the Indians in the swamps, I must have good double-barrelled guns; and to enable me to keep the field a sufficient length of time to render any service, I must have portable soup. I shall order both.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Camp Dade, December 17, 1836.*

SIR: The army under my command, consisting of the Tennessee brigade and Alabama battalion, with about three hundred regular troops and five hundred Indian warriors, arrived in this vicinity last night. To-day I have had the Wahoo swamp completely examined: not an Indian is to be found; and the friendly warriors are of opinion that they have all gone south. From the appearance of their trails, they are supposed to have retreated soon after their last battle with the troops under the command of Governor Call.

I propose to establish a post on the Withlacoochee at the point where the Fort King road crosses it, and, after supplying it, to endeavor to cut off the several detachments into which the hostile Indians are divided. The service will be arduous and difficult; but if a small force be sent to me sufficient to hold the necessary posts, and the sixth regiment and the companies of the second dragoons already raised be added to my active force in the field, I shall not despair of terminating the war this winter. Should I fail, the country can be secured during the next summer only by a cordon of posts, with mounted rangers constantly patrolling between them. The rangers should be raised for twelve months, but be liable to serve during the war; and their pay should be such as to secure the services of the best men.

The regular troops who serve here, from brigadier down, should have grants of land, and increased pay should be allowed them.

The cove of the Withlacoochee shall be examined to-morrow and the day after; but from present appearances, I have no expectation of finding an Indian.

I have subsistence with me for twenty days, which, when the Tennesseans leave me, (and the term of service of several of the companies has already expired,) will serve my diminished force for a month.

The horses will be sent to Tampa Bay for forage, and Colonel Henderson and Lieutenant Colonel Foster will be ordered to join me with their disposable force and twenty-five days' subsistence.

To carry on the war in the swamps, I have directed Captain d'Lagnel to purchase two hundred double-barrelled guns, and to require a small piece of ordnance from the arsenal at Washington, which, I am told, may be transported on mules.

Neither artificers nor laborers can be employed here; and I have found it necessary to require Captain d'Lagnel to bring into the field a travelling forge, with a number of ordnance artificers.

To obtain wagon-drivers, the quartermaster has been obliged to allow the volunteers two dollars a day. They could not be obtained for less.

I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. B. F. BUTLER, *Acting Secretary of War, Washington.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Camp Dade, Florida, December 18, 1836.*

SIR: Since I wrote to you yesterday I have resolved, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances of the country and the army, to place a depot at this place, leave a garrison of one hundred and fifty men to defend it, and, with the remainder of the force under my command, to proceed down the Withlacoochee, scouring the country on both banks, to its mouth.

By the movement proposed I shall be able to drive out all the Indians who may remain on or near the river, to cover the frontier, and ascertain the practicability of pushing steamers or other boats up to the forks. If boats can be brought up to that point, or within a day's march of it, the Indians must forever abandon their settlements in the cove and the swamps of the river.

The Tennessee volunteers will continue with me until this movement be performed, though the term of service of many of them has expired, and that of all will probably have expired before it be accomplished.

The prisoners whom I have taken inform me that it is the purpose of Micanopy, Jumper, and Abraham, to fly before the army and avoid a battle. They will hide themselves in the dense swamps and hammocks of the Everglades. Ocoela has declared his intention to maintain himself as long as possible on the Withlacoochee, and then fly to the south; but the prisoners say he will never surrender.

On my arrival at the mouth of the river the Tennesseans will embark for New Orleans, on their return homeward. I have not yet been apprised of any force having been ordered to replace them. My last despatches from the department, however, are dated more than a month ago; and I have not yet received the original of my instructions of the 4th ultimo, to take the command of the army; but I have a copy of the copy sent to Governor Call, under which I am acting.

With the force mentioned in my letter of yesterday I shall be able to keep the field, and if the enemy can be found, probably bring him to terms.

I hope at the mouth of the Withlacoochee to receive any despatch that may have been sent to me from the department during the last month or six weeks; and have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. B. F. BUTLER, *Acting Secretary of War, Washington City.*

FORT BROOKE, *December 23, 1836.*

SIR: After writing to you on the 18th instant, I ascertained from my Indian scouts and spies, whom I had kept constantly employed in scouring the country, that not a sign of hostile Indians could be discovered at or near any of their strongholds on the Withlacoochee. All the trails are in a southeasterly direction; and Powell, if he has not been deserted by his followers, has probably determined to draw the war into the neighborhood of Micanopy, Jumper, and Philip, to compel them to adhere to him with their warriors. As the enemy could not be found where we expected him, and the term of service of the Tennessee volunteers having expired, I determined to avail myself of the movement of that corps to send the wagon train to Tampa Bay for supplies for the depots which I had found it necessary to establish.

I left Brigadier General Armistead in command of the forces on the Withlacoochee, with orders to scour the country from Fort King to that river, and to take the most active measures to find the enemy; and I came through, with a small escort, to Fort Foster, for the purpose of designating the points to be occupied as depots in addition to those already established. I have ordered Lieutenant Colonel Foster to erect a work on the Withlacoochee, at the place where the Fort King road crosses it. It will be completed in a few days, and a wagon train will leave here to-morrow to supply it with subsistence, forage, tools, &c.

Learning, by express from Colonel Henderson, of the arrival of Commodore Dallas, I came hither to arrange with him a plan of combined operations for the campaign. He is several miles below; but I expect him here to-day. I have established an abundant depot at Fort Foster, twenty-five miles in advance of this place. The fort which Lieutenant Colonel Foster is erecting on the Withlacoochee is twenty-nine miles in advance of Fort Foster. Fort Armstrong is fifteen miles further north, near the point where the road from Volusia unites with the road to Fort King. The two latter posts command the principal retreats of the enemy on the Withlacoochee. These posts, with that near the mouth of the Withlacoochee and that at Volusia, will be sufficient for the present.

Should it become necessary to re-establish Fort King, I will cause a strong work to be erected, which may be held by a few men, and supply it from Fort Drane. The moment my depot shall be filled, which will be in a few days, small as my force is, I shall commence active operations in the field, and shall prosecute them with the utmost vigor until I either beat the enemy or be beaten by him.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

HON. B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay, December 23, 1836.*

SIR: Since I wrote you this morning Commodore Dallas has arrived, and has offered to furnish me from the ships-of-war under his command to defend my depots, and to perform any other service at the posts or in water expeditions which the public interest may render necessary.

The commodore has acted on this occasion with the same disinterested and magnanimous zeal which distinguished his conduct during the Creek campaign. His co-operation, which I most readily accept, will relieve me from many embarrassments, and will enable me to take the field several days sooner than I had hoped. He will send an officer with a party of sailors to ascertain the practicability of navigating the Withlacoochee, and will furnish the force to garrison Fort Clinch on that river.

I have just received the original of your letter of instructions of the 4th ultimo. You shall not be disappointed in my efforts, though you may be in their results. The country is so extensive, and contains so many hiding places for large as well as small parties, that the enemy may escape me.

Major Nelson, with a battalion of four companies of mounted volunteers from Georgia, arrived and reported this evening. He came through direct from Fort Clinch to this place. Two companies of his battalion were retained by Brigadier General Wool in the Cherokee country. The four companies here amount to about two hundred men. These, with the Alabama volunteers, will make my mounted force near five hundred men.

I am greatly embarrassed by the difficulty of obtaining laborers, drivers, and artificers. If the war should not be brought to a close in a few weeks, I shall send to Cuba for mule-drivers, and to New Jersey for artificers and laborers.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

HON. B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, December 27, 1836.*

GENERAL: Your letter of the 12th ultimo, in relation to depredations committed on the plantation of the Hon. John Forsyth, I have the honor to state has been received. I am instructed to enclose two letters on the subject, presented by Colonel Henderson, commandant of the marine corps, in answer to inquiries made by General Jesup, and to state that these contain all the information that the general has been able to collect. Personally he knows nothing, as he was not in the neighborhood, nor even in command of the army at the period at which the depredations are said to have been committed.

I am, general, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. CHAMBERS, *Lieutenant and Aide-de-camp.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington.*

FORT BROOKE, *December 24, 1836.*

GENERAL: Your letter of the 12th November, covering an affidavit of Abraham Collins, has been received. I enclose a communication from Lieutenant Lindsay in relation to it; he was then acting as quartermaster.

On the evening of the 24th of June last, five companies of the marine corps under my command, with a train of wagons, encamped on the plantation of Mr. Forsyth. On the 25th the troops, with most of the wagons, crossed to Chattahoochee and occupied a position near the bank of the river opposite the said plantation.

At this time the cotton was almost entirely overgrown with weeds and grass, from not having been worked in proper season. It is not in my power to state why this cotton field was not worked. The field was directly on the river and within rifle range of the opposite bank. The river was so narrow, immediately at the place where the ferry was established, that the captain of a steamboat fired a pistol three times at a tree on the opposite side, and hit it each time.

The opposite side of the river, for many miles above and below, was in possession of the band of Creek Indians most actively engaged at that time in hostilities against the whites. This was the case at the most critical period for the cotton crops. This may have prevented Mr. Collins from working this field.

I recollect Mr. Collins informing me that the horses of Captain Love's company were turned into the field, and that he had protested against it. That officer may have supposed that all intention of working the field had been abandoned, and therefore concluded that there could be no impropriety in turning the horses into it.

The arrival of the marines, so far from being injurious to the operations on the place, at once gave security to everything on it. Two wagons were employed in hauling timber through it to construct a field-work on the opposite bank. I presume they made but one track through the field, and the injury sustained from this was certainly required by the entire security to the slaves employed in working it.

Jim Henry, with the only party of hostile Indians of any consequence then in arms, occupied the swamps within a few miles of the position taken by the troops under my command. If Mr. Collins believed that the field could be worked with any advantage at this time, the security given to the negroes by the troops should have been considered by him as a full offset for the small injury sustained from the passage of the men and wagons through the field.

Under these circumstances, I am led to the belief that Mr. Forsyth's interests were rather promoted by the presence of the marines on and near his plantation than injured.

I remain, general, with great respect, your obedient servant,

ARCH. HENDERSON, *Colonel Commandant.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General U. S. Army, Headquarters, Washington.*

FORT BROOKE, *Tampa Bay, December 24, 1836.*

SIR: I have carefully read the deposition you handed me of Abraham Collins, of Muscogee county, Georgia, on the subject of depredations committed on the plantation of the Hon. J. Forsyth. As the acting quartermaster of marines, I am enabled to state that, so far as the corps of marines are concerned, no injury was done by them to the cotton crop during the one night that we were encamped there. In selecting the ground of encampment, as was my duty, I was particularly careful to place the corps immediately on the river bank, (the main road leading directly to it,) where we could not possibly interfere with the growing cotton. Indeed, so particular was I upon the location of the encampment, that I expressed my solicitude to the overseer, Mr. Collins, about the crop, and observed that every effort should be made not to injure it. He replied to my observation by saying that it was then too late to preserve the cotton, the rank growth of grass having obtained the ascendancy, and that I need not be particular, but encamp where I pleased. Subsequently, I frequently heard Mr. Collins observe that Captain Love, with his lawless company, had ruined his cotton field, and that he had often threatened to shoot the horses they had turned in there. The overseer is doubtless conscientious in his deposition; but abundance of proof can be given that he has asserted very little fact in the second page. The wagons and horses, as it is well known to you, sir, were, with the exception of two, all on the west bank of the Chattahoochee during the three weeks he alludes to. But it is useless to remark on the remainder of the letter. The Hon. J. Forsyth would have been sufficiently served, if his overseer had not touched upon the depredations committed on his property after it had been destroyed by the Georgia volunteers. I will simply add, that I conscientiously believe that the crop was destroyed by their wantonness.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. S. LINDSAY.

Colonel A. HENDERSON, *Commander of Marines.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, December 27, 1836.*

GENERAL: When the Washington city volunteers joined the army, they were reported by their captain as having been mustered into service for twelve months. Many of the men, however, state that they entered only for six months, and, if they were mustered for a longer period, they were deceived, and it was contrary to their intentions. I am commanded by the general to ask an official statement of the facts in the case, and to suggest, that if the company have been deceived, and were mustered for a longer period than they intended, whether it would not be advisable to have them discharged. The company has performed its duty faithfully, and in every case met the approbation of the officers under whose immediate command it has served.

I am, general, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. CHAMBERS, *Lieutenant and Aide-de-camp.*

General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, January 1, 1837.*

SIR: The principal Indian chief of the regiment of Indian warriors in the service of the United States came in yesterday, and brought me reports from Brigadier General Armistead, commanding on the Withlacoochee, and Major Morris, commanding the Indian force. Occupied, as every one about me is, in active preparation for the field, I cannot send copies of the reports; but no Indians were found in that part of the country, and all the information which I have been able to obtain leads me to the belief that the body of the nation are south and southeast.

The troops in the interior are actively engaged, and I shall join them immediately. Commodore Dallas has sent sixty sailors to garrison Fort Foster, twenty-five miles east of this place. He despatched a garrison yesterday to Fort Clinch, and has promised a garrison for this place; this will increase the active force for the field. There is so much sickness, however, among the volunteers and regular troops, that I shall not have more than nine hundred or a thousand of them altogether for active service, and at

least a hundred of them will be required for convoys. The Indians are entirely broken down, most of them are sick, and I expect no further service from them. They will go home the last of this month. Such of them as are fit for service I will prevail upon to accompany me, if possible, on an expedition against the principal chief of the Seminoles, Micanopy. He is said to be within four days' march of me.

General Gaines has ordered the 6th regiment to join me.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Armstrong, Florida, January 10, 1837.*

SIR: I have only time to say that a detachment from this army surprised a camp of Indian negroes, and made sixteen prisoners. They are of Powell's band, and the mounted men are now in full pursuit of that chief. The enemy is nowhere found in great force. The great body of the Seminoles are said to be south. The moment the regular troops come up, which will probably be to-morrow, I shall either send or take a heavy detachment in that direction.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS, *near the cove of the Withlacoochee, January 12, 1837.*

SIR: In my last letter I informed you that the mounted men of my command were in pursuit of Powell. Thirty-six negroes, in addition to those already reported, (16,) have been captured by Lieutenant Colonel Cawfield's battalion and the Indian warriors; from them we learn that the Indians have entirely dispersed, and that Powell has with him only three warriors and his family. One of the negroes, Primus, who was sent as a messenger to the Indians by General Scott or Clinch during the last winter, and remained with them, says that he is on the Withlacoochee, sick, and that he can collect about a hundred warriors. Learning from the prisoners that the Tallahassee chief is on the Withlacoochee with his warriors, I despatched Lieutenant Colonel Foster down the south side of the river with a small battalion of infantry, a company of artillery, and Major Nelson's battalion of mounted Georgians, altogether about three hundred men, and moved down the north side of the river with the marines, a detachment of artillery, a battalion of Alabama volunteers, and a detachment of Indian warriors—in all about seven hundred men—for the purpose of clearing the country on both sides of every hostile band.

The Tallahassee Indians are said to be in the neighborhood, Powell also. Two days will be employed in examining the swamps, when, if the enemy should not be found, I shall proceed down the river, unite with Lieutenant Colonel Foster, and then be governed by circumstances. If I should not hear of the enemy below, I shall return to Fort Armstrong, and immediately proceed against Micanopy and Jumper, who, I have good reasons to believe, are on the headwaters of the Ocklawaha. The campaign will be tedious, but I hope successful in the end. I am not, however, very sanguine; the difficulty is, not to fight the enemy, but to find him. I am unable to furnish returns at present of the force under my command. The difficulties in regard to transportation are such that every officer is obliged to carry several days' rations in his haversack. I often carry subsistence sufficient for six days. The means of making correct returns are not, therefore, within the reach of any officer of this army. The blank returns to which you refer have not been received.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Camp Izard, January 17, 1837.*

SIR: The army under my command has swept the swamp of the Withlacoochee, on the north side, from Fort Armstrong, at Dade's battle-ground, to this place; and a detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Foster moved down the south side to Fort Clinch. The result of our operations has been the capture of fifty-two negroes and three Indians, and the positive knowledge that there are no Indians on the river, except small parties who are flying through and hiding in the swamps, with no other means of subsistence than roots, palmetto cabbage, and occasionally indifferent beef.

I moved down to Fort Clinch with the mounted men on the 15th, where I met Lieutenant Colonel Foster, and learning from a prisoner that the women and children with the aged and sick of the Tallahassee and Ogechee Indians occupy a position in a swamp about thirty miles south of Fort Clinch, I detached Lieutenant Colonel Foster yesterday with about four hundred regular troops and Georgia volunteers and a hundred Indian warriors to attack and, if possible, capture them.

I have to-day ordered Major McClintock to Fort Drane, with about eighty regular troops, to take the command of that post, and endeavor to drive off the small bands of Indians who infest that neighborhood. Powell is flying, it appears, with his family and a band of not more than three warriors. The prisoners now say that he has gone to Ocklawaha.

I shall return immediately to Fort Armstrong, where I shall send expeditions into the country between that post and Volusia; and I shall conduct an expedition myself against Micanopy, the principal chief of the Seminoles, on the head of the Ocklawaha.

A part of this army has been on the river actively engaged in examining its swamps and hammocks since the 17th of last month. They have constructed two forts, and erected bridges over both branches of the Withlacoochee.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Armstrong, January 19, 1837.*

SIR: I have this moment arrived at this post in advance of the troops, having completely swept the swamps and hammocks of the Withlacoochee from the Fort King road to Fort Clinch; and I am positive that there are no parties of Indians exceeding ten warriors on the river or in its neighborhood.

The prisoners represent Powell as flying from one hiding-place to another, with only three warriors. I returned thither with a small escort to make arrangements, in anticipation of the arrival of the troops, to carry on an expedition against the Indians on the headwaters of the Ocklawaha. In that expedition I had calculated on the co-operation of the 6th regiment of infantry, and its aid will be necessary. Seven companies of the regiment have arrived; but Major Thompson, who commands, has received orders to-day to return to the Texas frontier. If he returns immediately, I must abandon the proposed expedition.

I consider it of too much importance in its bearing upon the successful result of the campaign to be given up; and I, therefore, feel it to be my duty to retain the regiment until its place be supplied by other troops.

I detached Lieutenant Colonel Foster, from Fort Clinch, with five hundred regular troops, Georgia volunteers, and Indian warriors, against the Tallahassee and Ogechee Indians, who had fled from the Withlacoochee, and have established themselves in the swamps south of the mouth of the Withlacoochee; and, in consequence of information from Fort Drane, I was compelled to detach Major McClintock with the third artillery of that post.

A small battalion of Alabama drafts have arrived at Tampa Bay, but I cannot use them for any military purpose in consequence of the measles prevailing among them.

The dragoons, promised in a communication from the adjutant general, had not arrived when I last heard from the officer commanding at Garey's Ferry, nor had the South Carolina drafts.

The Indian warriors are sickly, and will leave the service on the last of this month, in order to make arrangements to arrive in Arkansas in time to plant corn for the next season.

I have some reason to complain that orders should be published directing recruits in large numbers to join, when the men have not been enlisted. A wrong impression is thus produced upon the public mind; and where error has got the start, it is difficult for truth to overtake it.

The service is a most arduous one in Florida, so much so that not a man whose term of service expires will re-enlist.

I am happy to find that you have recommended a bounty in land to the soldiers; it should, in strict justice, be extended to the regimental and junior staff officers.

With high consideration and respect, I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH,
Fort Armstrong, (near Dade's battle-ground,) January 20, 1837.

SIR: I arrived here yesterday, with a small mounted corps and a few Indian warriors, from Fort Clinch; the marines and regular troops came in to-day.

All the swamps and hammocks as far down as General Gaines's battle-ground have been examined, with no other results than the breaking up of a negro settlement in the Pano Saufkee swamp, and the capture of fifty-two negroes and three Indians.

Powell was in the swamp with the negroes, but escaped, (the prisoners say,) attended by only three warriors. The Indians are represented as flying in small parties from swamp to swamp, almost naked. A part of them were represented by a prisoner to have taken refuge in a large swamp south of the mouth of the Withlacoochee. I have detached Lieutenant Colonel Foster to attack or capture them.

I came to this place to prepare for an expedition against the Indians on the head of the Ocklawaha, but on my arrival I found that Major Thompson had been ordered to return with the 6th regiment to Louisiana. I was reduced to the disagreeable alternative of giving up the expedition or retaining the 6th for a few days. The interests of the service, in my judgment, required the latter course.

I think the service will not occupy more than ten or fifteen days, when I shall direct Major Thompson to proceed to his former station.

From the small force under my command, I have to hold the interior of this country, protect the trains on long routes, and furnish garrisons for numerous posts. The service has been so severe that the sick are increasing in an alarming manner.

I send you a morning report of the Alabama mounted battalion, by which you will observe that nearly a third of the whole force are sick, and the regular force is rapidly diminishing by discharges and sickness. About one-half of the warriors of the Indian regiment are sick or convalescent, and that corps is so completely broken down by the severe service it has performed as to be entirely inefficient.

The chiefs insist on returning to Alabama at the end of this month to make arrangements for the removal of themselves and people to Arkansas.

They will have barely time to reach their new homes in time to plant their corn.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH,
Fort Armstrong, January 21, 1837, half-past 9 o'clock p. m.

SIR: An Indian runner has this moment come in from Lieutenant Colonel Foster's command with intelligence of the troops having overtaken a party of hostile Indians and negroes, of which they killed two and captured eleven Indians and nine negroes; the remainder escaped. The Indians are represented as desirous of peace, and I have directed Lieutenant Colonel Foster to send one of the prisoners to invite them to come in.

I march to-morrow morning at sunrise to the head of the Ocklawaha*

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Armstrong, January 21, 1837.*

SIR: I have this moment received, by express from Fort Drane, your letter of the 4th instant. I shall find Volusia a valuable depot in my operations on the St. John's and the Ocklawaha, to the swamps of which rivers all accounts concur that the enemy have retired. The troops have been actively employed, but we have accomplished little, except obtaining a knowledge of the country and establishing a line of posts to command it.

I march at sunrise to-morrow morning for Hapapka, near the head of the Ocklawaha, where Micanopy, Jumper, Alligator, and other chiefs, are said to have concentrated their forces. If we can bring them to action, the war may be soon terminated; but the danger is they will disperse, as the Indians on the Withlacoochee have done.

The prisoners say that some division exists in the councils of the chiefs, and that many of them are tired of the war. After showing them that we are able to follow them to their most secure retreats, I will endeavor to open a communication with them and offer them peace.

I have ordered Lieutenant Colonel Fanning to move up the St. John's to Topekaliga with the forces under his command, and as large supplies of subsistence and forage as he can transport, to attack the chief Philip and to co-operate with me.

Lieutenant Colonel Foster is in pursuit of the Tallahassee and Ogechees, south of the Withlacoochee, and Major McClintock has been ordered to Fort Drane, to secure that depot and drive the Indians from the adjacent country.

Two companies of dragoons will be employed in clearing the country between the St. John's and the Suwanee, and General Hernandez is charged with the defence of the country east of the St. John's.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Armstrong, February 7, 1837.*

SIR: I returned last night from an expedition to the head of the Coloosahatchee, about seventy miles southeast of this place, having left the army about thirty miles back.

The expedition has been so far successful that we came up with the enemy on the 27th ultimo, and the advance, under Colonel Henderson, attacked and beat them near the Hacheeluskee. This led to a conference with the hostile chiefs, Jumper, Alligator, and Abraham, who have agreed to meet me, with the other chiefs of the nation, on the 18th instant, to discuss the terms of a peace, or rather to inform me whether they will accept the terms which I have offered.

I have required a strict observance of the terms of the treaty, and have demanded immediate emigration as an indispensable condition.

There would be no difficulty in making peace and giving immediate security to the country if it were not for that condition; but the chiefs say that their people cannot live in the country assigned to them in consequence of the coldness of the climate. They are here below the 28th degree of north latitude, and will there be above the 34th. The negroes, too, who rule the Indians, are all averse to removing to so cold a climate.

Seven companies of the 6th infantry having arrived, I assumed the responsibility of taking them into the field; without them I could not have executed my plan, which has resulted so favorably. To send any troops out of the country at the present crisis would jeopardize all we have gained. I therefore feel it to be my imperious duty to retain them till the result of the conference with the hostile chiefs, to take place on the 18th, shall be known.

Should that conference result as we hope it may, all the troops in Florida will then be disposable for service elsewhere.

I hope that you and the President may approve the measure; and I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Armstrong, February 7, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to report, for the information of the Secretary of War and the general-in-chief, that the main body of the army under my command was put in motion on the 22d ultimo, to attack the Indians and negroes in the strongholds which they were said to occupy on the headwaters of the Ocklawaha.

On the 23d Lieutenant Colonel Cawfield was detached with his battalion of mounted Alabama volunteers, Captain Harris's company of marines, and Major Morris's Indian warriors, accompanied by my aid, Lieutenant Chambers, to attack Osuchee, (Cooper,) a chief of some note, who was reported to have a large Indian force under his command in a swamp on the borders of Hapapka lake. The chief was surprised, himself and three warriors killed, and nine Indians (women and children) and eight negroes captured. One of our Indian warriors was mortally wounded, and died on the 26th.

It was ascertained from the prisoners that the principal Indian and negro force had retired from the Ocklawaha, in a southeasterly direction, towards the head of the Coloosahatchee. Pursuit was immediately commenced, with no other guide than the track of their ponies and cattle.

The Thlawhatkee, (White mountains,) an elevated range of hills not mentioned by any geographer, nor described in any account of Florida which I have seen, was passed on the 24th. The ascent in many places was so difficult as to render drag-ropes and heavy details of men necessary to take the baggage-wagons over the heights.

On approaching the Thla-pace-hatchee, on the morning of the 27th, the herds of cattle feeding on the prairies and the numerous recent trails in various directions indicated the presence of the enemy. The army was halted, and scouts sent out on different trails to obtain information.

Colonel Henderson, with Lieutenant Colonel Cawfield's battalion, Captain Harris's mounted marines, and Major Morris's Indian warriors, accompanied by my aid, Lieutenant Chambers, was detached to make a reconnaissance of the country in advance, with orders to attack the enemy if he should find them and deem his command sufficient, and report by express their force and position.

The enemy was found on the Hatcheeluskee, in and near the "Great Cypress swamp," and promptly and gallantly attacked. Lieutenant Chambers, with Price's company of Alabama volunteers, by a rapid charge, succeeded in capturing the horses and baggage of the enemy, with twenty-five Indians and negroes, principally women and children; the men having all fled into the swamp.

Colonel Henderson, leaving one company with the prisoners and horses, entered the swamp with the remainder of his command, drove the enemy across the Hatcheeluskee, passed that river under their fire, and drove them into a more dense and difficult swamp, where they dispersed.

The messenger first sent to report to me was killed; a second was more fortunate. The parties detached on other trails were called in; and Lieutenant Colonel Freeman, with a small force of pioneers and artillery, being charged with the defence of the camp, the disposable force of Brigadier General Armistead's brigade, and Major Graham's infantry, and Tustenuggee Hajo's Indian warriors, was moved forward to support Colonel Henderson. When the troops reached the point where the colonel had entered the swamp it was ascertained that he was in rapid pursuit of the enemy, and was believed to be fully able to manage the force opposed to him.

The Indian scouts at this moment reported a large hostile force about two miles to our right. Major Whiting's battalion was left as a reserve, and the 6th infantry, with Major Graham's company of the 4th and a small party of Indian warriors, was moved to the point indicated. The swamps and hammocks were entered and passed by the troops in perfect order; and the advance, under Major Graham, found a large Indian encampment, with fires burning and provisions cooking; the enemy having fled to the surrounding swamps.

As night was approaching, pursuit was impossible, and the troops returned to camp, where they arrived about nine o'clock. Colonel Henderson's returned after ten.

On the morning of the 28th a prisoner was sent to Jumper and the other hostile chiefs with an offer of peace, on a strict fulfilment by them of the terms of the treaty; and the army moved forward and occupied a strong position on the Toho-peeka-liga lake, within a few miles of the point at which the Cypress swamp approaches it, where several hundred head of cattle were obtained.

The prisoners returned on the night of the 29th, with pacific messages from Alligator and Abraham.

Abraham visited me on the 31st. He returned and brought Jumper and Alligator, with two sub-chiefs, (one a nephew of Micanopy,) on the 3d instant. These chiefs entered into an arrangement to meet me at Fort Dade, with the other chiefs of the nation, on the 18th instant, and promised to send out runners and cause hostilities to be suspended until the conference shall have taken place.

I shall employ the intermediate time in preparations for the most vigorous prosecution of the war; and, from the information I have from prisoners, I shall probably be able to follow the enemy into their most hidden retreats, should they reject the terms offered to them.

The army commenced its return march on the morning of the 4th. I left it yesterday about thirty miles back, and came in last evening. It arrived to-day in good health and fine spirits. Colonel Henderson's report, a copy of which is enclosed, will give you more detailed information of the battle of the Hatcheeluskee than I have been able to embody in this report. I unite with the colonel in the request that the officers whom he has named may be rewarded by the distinguished approbation of the government; and I ask, as an act of justice, that the same distinguished approbation be extended to the gallant colonel himself.

Though but a small part of the force had the good fortune to engage the enemy in battle, all, without a single exception, have performed their duties in the most satisfactory manner. They have opened a road near seventy miles into the interior of the enemy's country, and to the immediate vicinity of his strongest holds, where the white man had perhaps never been before; and by their patient, cheerful, and persevering labors, have contributed as much probably to their discomfiture as would have been effected by a general and decisive battle.

To Brigadier General Armistead, Lieutenant Colonel Cawfield, Major Thompson, Major Whiting, and Major Morris, and to Colonel Henderson, Lieutenant Colonel Freeman, Major Kirby, and Major Graham, as well as to the officers and soldiers of their respective commands, I am under the greatest obligations for the prompt and efficient support which they have, on all occasions, given to me during the expedition.

Lieutenant Colonels Stanton and Brown, of the Adjutant General's department; Captain Crossman, quartermaster; Lieutenant Searle, principal commissary; Doctor Kearney, medical director; Captain Tompkins, ordnance officer, and my aides, Lieutenants Chambers and Linnard, merit my warmest commendation for the efficiency, ability, and zeal with which they have performed their duties.

Every department and every individual has fulfilled my utmost expectations, and nothing necessary to be done has been left undone.

As an act of justice to all my predecessors in command, I consider it my duty to say that the difficulties attending military operations in this country can be properly appreciated only by those acquainted with them. I have had advantages which neither of them possessed, in better preparations and more

abundant supplies, and I found it impossible to operate with any prospect of success until I had established a line of depots across the country.

This is a service that no man would seek with any other view than the mere performance of his duty. Distinction or increase of reputation is out of the question; and the difficulties are such that the best concerted plans may result in absolute failure, and the best established reputation be lost without a fault.

If I have at any time said aught in disparagement of the operations of others in Florida, either verbally or in writing, officially or unofficially, knowing the country as I now know it, I consider myself bound, as a man of honor, solemnly to retract it.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Hatcheeeluskee, January 28, 1837.*

GENERAL: Under your directions, I left the main army on the morning of the 27th, with the mounted Alabama volunteers, under Lieutenant Colonel Cawfield, and the company of mounted marines, under Captain Harris, and proceeded, accompanied by your aide, Lieutenant Chambers, on a southerly trail. Orders were left for Major Morris, with his command, to follow as rapidly as possible.

Soon after we left your position, a large number of cattle were collected and sent in under charge of portions of two companies of the Alabama volunteers. You were present, however, when this detachment was made.

The troops under my command then pursued the trail for about a mile, when we came to two diverging trails—one taking a southeasterly course, and the other more to the eastward. On these two trails the signs were the most recent, and Lieutenant Chambers, with a few men, proceeded to trace out one of them, while the rest of the troops, joined here by Major Morris, pursued the other. We had proceeded but a small distance when a volunteer, sent by Lieutenant Chambers, brought information that fresh signs of women's and children's tracks were discovered, and requested a company to be sent to him. Captain Price's company of volunteers was ordered accordingly.

About a mile in advance a negro man was captured at a fire. He informed us that a large number of negroes were in advance, and from forty to fifty Indians, with Abraham, were in our rear. He stated that he had left the latter body since sunrise in the morning.

The determination was promptly made to retrace our steps and attack the Indians. Just as we were about to march, one of the volunteers came up and gave information that Lieutenant Chambers had overtaken a considerable force of Indians and negroes.

An order was given to proceed to his support, and a rapid movement made for that purpose. When we came up with him he was in possession of two Indian women and three children, besides a body of negroes taken by the volunteers in the adjoining pine woods. He had also in his possession over a hundred ponies, a large quantity of plunder packed on them, as well as several stand of arms. The main body of the enemy escaped in the swamp, and Major Morris was ordered with his command to pursue and bring them in. He entered the swamp in accordance with the order.

The remaining troops were then ordered to form to pursue the Indian force in our rear, and were ready to march when a firing commenced in the swamp.

Lieutenant Searle reached us here, under your orders, to obtain information of our position and movements. When the firing commenced, and the order was given to move in support of Major Morris, he sent a messenger to you, and bravely joined the troops in entering the swamp.

About half-past eleven the marines, preceded by the officers, entered the swamp, and were immediately followed by the Alabama volunteers. Four or five hundred yards after entering the swamp we arrived at a deep stream, from twenty to twenty-five yards wide, and found Major Morris's battalion engaged with the enemy across it. A tree had been felled from each side, and formed the only way of passing it.

The troops, as they came up, were ordered to extend to the right and left, and by a cross fire to dislodge the enemy. Their fire soon slackened, and an order was given to cross the stream; when Captain Morris (major of the first Indian battalion) gallantly advanced on the log, followed by Lieutenant Chambers, Lieutenant Searle, and Captain Harris, Lieutenant Lec (captain of the Indian battalion) swam the stream at this time, and joined the officers on the other side. I attempted to cross in this way, but had to return to the log, and crossed there. At this stream Private Wright, of the marines, was killed, and Sergeant Cunningham and Privates Sullivan and Foley wounded, but not dangerously.

Just as I was crossing, an officer was sent from Lieutenant Colonel Cawfield, on our right, for orders. He was directed to cross as rapidly as he could with his men, after the regulars and Indians had passed over.

We were promptly joined by the marines, Morris's artillery, and some friendly Indians, and pursued the enemy as rapidly as the deep swamp and their mode of warfare admitted.

Another fire from them was received further in advance, and their trail from the swamp was followed through an open pine woods, and traced till it again entered the swamp, three-quarters of a mile from the place it came out. We were here joined by Lieutenant Colonel Cawfield with his men, who had been delayed in crossing the stream. The swamp was again entered, deeper and more difficult to pass than it had been. The friendly Indians were directed to enter on each flank, while the regulars and volunteers advanced in the centre. The regulars were ordered to lead the march.

After advancing about half a mile the enemy again fired on us, but retreated on the advance of the troops. At this place Private Peterson, of the marines, was killed, and Corporal Stevens severely but not dangerously wounded. On a further advance into the swamp a few more guns were fired by the enemy, who retreated as the troops followed them.

Soon after this last fire a negro man and woman, with a child, were taken, and an order was given for the return of the troops after 4 o'clock.

The wife and child of the negro man were kept, and he was sent to the enemy to induce them to come in, as they had lost all their clothing, blankets, and other property.

The troops then returned to the position occupied by Major Whiting, and remained there till joined

by Lieutenant Colonel Cawfield, who had remained in the open woods for one of his companies which had not come out of the swamp. He joined, some time after dark, with another negro prisoner, taken by his company. The troops then took up the line of march, and reached the camp of the main army at 10 o'clock at night.

Captain Howle, acting assistant adjutant general, was reported by the surgeon too unwell to accompany the troops on this expedition, and was not informed of my intention to take command. He and Captain Crossman, however, entered the swamp with an expectation of taking part in the operations, but were not fortunate enough to join till the attacks were over. Such an effort is a sufficient evidence of what their conduct would have been had they succeeded in reaching us sooner.

The loss on the part of the enemy in the several attacks could not be ascertained, as the troops made no halt in the pursuit, and returned after dark. One Indian, however, and two negroes, were seen by the troops dead.

The result of this day's operations was the capture of two Indian women and three children, and twenty-three negroes, (young and old,) over a hundred ponies, with packs on about fifty of them. All their clothing, blankets, and other baggage, was abandoned by the enemy, and either taken or destroyed by us.

In concluding this report, it gives me pleasure to state that Lieutenant Colonel Cawfield's command executed every duty assigned it with great promptness and firmness.

A portion of the friendly Indians, also, who came under my eye, conducted themselves with great bravery.

The regular troops, both artillery and marines, displayed great bravery, and the most untiring and determined perseverance. The marines, however, I cannot refrain from mentioning in a particular manner. The killed and wounded show where they were, and render any further comment from me unnecessary.

Lieutenant Whitney, of Captain Harris's company, and Lieutenant Brent, of Captain Morris's, were with their companies, and shared in the dangers and fatigues of the day in such a manner as to reflect credit on them.

I would recommend to the particular notice of yourself and the government the five officers who first crossed the stream, and who, in the pursuit, constantly led the van. It would be as gratifying to me as it would be just to them that some marks of distinction be bestowed where such gallantry has been displayed.

I remain, general, with great respect, your obedient servant,

ARCH'D HENDERSON, *Colonel, Commanding 2d Brigade Army of the South.*

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Commanding Army of the South, Hatcheeluskee, Florida.*

Fort Dade, February 17, 1837.

SIR: Since my report by Lieutenant Colonel Stanton, on the 7th instant, detailing the operations of the division of the army under my immediate command, in the expedition to the head of the Coloosahatchee, I have received a report from Lieutenant Colonel Fanning, with a copy of one made direct to you, of a handsome affair between the force under his command and the hostile Indians, on the 8th instant, at the head of Lake Monroe. The conduct of both officers and soldiers deserves the highest praise, and I hope both may receive the reward due to gallantry and good conduct.

I send an extract from the report to me.

The enemy were evidently in great force, and as the battle took place not more than fifty or sixty miles from the point on the Hatcheeluskee, where the advance of my division fought, I am apprehensive they were re-enforced by a part of the warriors opposed to me. If so, the Indians may not meet me tomorrow, agreeably to their promise. I shall not, however, regret having afforded them the opportunity to come in, as every claim of humanity will thus have been satisfied; and if we have to recommence the war, we shall have nothing with which to reproach ourselves with regard to these unfortunate but ferocious people. I had, previously to marching to the Coloosahatchee, directed Lieutenant Colonel Foster to resume offensive operations against the Indians on the Gulf south of the Withlacoochee. Commodore Dallas detached a small force, under Lieutenant Johnson, to co-operate with him. The combined force ascended and descended several rivers not previously known to us, and explored several extensive swamps and hammocks. They destroyed eight Indian villages and a quantity of Indian property; and on the 9th instant Captain Allen, of the 4th infantry, fell in with a superior force of the enemy on the Wee-wa-ki-e-wa, attacked, routed, and dispersed them in the most gallant manner. Captain Allen, as well as the officers and soldiers under his command, behaved with great gallantry and deserve every commendation. Allow me to claim for them the attention of the government. Lieutenant Johnson, of the navy, with the officers and men of his command, are entitled to great credit for their persevering and prompt attention to the duties with which they were charged. That excellent officer was ready to support Captain Allen, and would have joined him had the action continued.

Lieutenant Colonel Foster conducted the operations confided to him in the best manner; and Major Nelson, with his battalion of Georgia volunteers, executed with energy and promptitude every duty assigned to him. They, with the officers and soldiers under their command, are entitled to all praise.

I enclose a copy of Lieutenant Colonel Foster's last report, with a copy of Captain Allen's report to him.

Lieutenant Hunter, of the navy, with his characteristic energy and enterprise, succeeded in ascending the Withlacoochee about ninety miles; more than seventy in a small steamboat, and the remainder of the distance in a barge constructed for the purpose.

His voyage has demonstrated that the river cannot be used for any valuable purpose in our operations in this country. The difficulties of navigation are such as could be removed only in time of peace, and the expense of much time and great labor.

So arduous and unremitted have been the labors of this army, and so rapid and constant its marches, that men and horses are broken down. The mounted men, to perform efficient service, should be remounted, and great additions must be made to the train if hostilities should recommence.

The entire absence of all means, except those brought into the country, renders it difficult to remain many days in succession in the field. The Indians cannot be pursued without mounted men, and to support their horses in the interior is almost impossible.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

[Extract.]

FORT CALL, *February 12, 1837.*

GENERAL: On the 29th ultimo I was at the head of Lake Monroe, with ample supplies for your army. On the 8th instant the enemy attacked us in great force.

He was repulsed, and did not show himself afterwards. On the 9th instant I received your orders to retire upon this place. I could have been here on the 10th, but deferred the retrograde motion until this morning, not willing the enemy should think we retired in consequence of the contest with him.

I herewith forward a copy of my official report to the adjutant general; also a copy of an order read at the grave of the late Captain Mellon, and which I trust you will approve. * * *

I have the honor to be, general, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

A. C. W. FANNING, *Major 4th Artillery, Brev. Lieut. Colonel.*

Maj. Gen. THOMAS S. JESUP, *Commanding Army in Florida, Fort Armstrong.*

FORT DADE, *February 15, 1837.*

SIR: Upon my reception of your letter of the 8th instant, I wrote you that operations should cease in the left wing of the army of the south, and that Nelson's horse should be sent to Fort Drane. Neither of these things has occurred at the time as I then intended.

I send you Orders Nos 9 and 10. The movements directed in these orders took place on the 8th instant. I immediately countermanded them, and ordered the troops to camp, on the reception of your letter of the 8th instant; but their return could not be effected until, in the case of Nelson, two o'clock in the afternoon of the 10th instant; and in the case of Captain Allen, at eight o'clock in the evening of the same day.

The combined operations directed in the orders referred to, although not perfectly successful, yet produced a greater knowledge of the country, and brought about, between three and four o'clock of the afternoon of the 9th instant, a very gallant little affair at the extremity of an Indian village on the Wiwakiakki, or Clear river, between Captain Allen and 40 men of the 4th infantry, and about 50 warriors; in which the Indians were beaten, and driven from a mile to a mile and a half upon the run, the officers and men constantly pressing on them, cheering and firing as they advanced, stopped by nothing. Rivers, creeks, lagoons, and swamps were rapidly waded by these brave men, who neither counted the numbers of the enemy, the depth of the streams, nor halted an instant in their determined purpose until night came on, when they were obliged to desist.

Towards the close of the affair, Sergeant Clendenning, a soldier of twenty years' standing in the 4th infantry, fell. His comrades bore his body to the boats, and rowed them to the steambot American, a distance of ten miles. A coffin was made at Fort Clinch, and he was buried on an island at the mouth of the Withlacoochee. Such is often the death, and such should always be the funeral, of a soldier.

Lieutenant Johnson, of the navy, (who was placed under my orders by the soldierly feeling and correct judgment of Commodore Dallas, at my first suggestion,) and his command, who were on the river in boats, the moment they heard the first firing hastened up to the scene of action, with all that promptitude which ever characterizes brave and tried soldiers. The commanding officer takes a pride in naming to you, general, the gentlemen who compose this entire command: Captain Allen, of the 4th infantry, commanded; he was assisted in the battle by Dr. Parsons, of the navy, Midshipman Watkins, and Mr. Bayly, a gallant and disinterested volunteer from the State of Maine. With Lieutenant Johnson were Passed Midshipman Borden and Midshipman Boudinot.

Lieutenant Hunter, of the navy, who deserves great credit for his late persevering and arduous trip up the Withlacoochee, in the steamer Crowell, also remained, at my request, at the mouth of the river (anxious and willing to participate in my operations) until the cessation of hostilities took place, when he passed into Tampa Bay. To all these brave soldiers, both officers and men, I have given all I have in my power to offer—my sincere and hearty thanks.

I regret to say, general, that Nelson's horse are unfit for immediate service. I was compelled to leave with Major Wilson, at the position selected by me for artillery and infantry of my command, 19 horses and 21 men; 13 more men are dismounted. One hundred and nine mounted men compose Major Nelson's command. With hay and oats, they would soon be able to take the field. By easy marches, and without injury to them, I have brought them here, where they can go to Fort Drane, should things take an unfavorable turn, after the 18th instant, or immediately, as you may wish. They are now a few miles further from Fort Drane than when at my camp in the vicinity of Fort Clinch; but the fine corn here will more than compensate this, (the corn at Fort Clinch being bad,) and if hostilities recommence, I can return as soon as an express would reach the position of my command from this place.

Hoping that all my acts may meet your approval, I am, general, with the highest consideration and respect, your obedient servant,

W. S. FOSTER, *Lieut. Colonel, Com'g south wing of Army of the South.*

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Commanding, &c.*

P. S.—Thirty-two cattle captured on our last march.

MOUTH OF THE WITHLACOOCHEE, *February 10, 1837.*

COLONEL: In obedience to your instructions, I proceeded with my company on board of the United States steamer America, commanded by Lieutenant Johnson, of the navy. The boat got under way early yesterday morning, and grounded. After using every exertion to get her off, we found it impracticable, and accordingly embarked in Mackinac boats, and proceeded about twelve miles down the coast, whence we entered the Crystal river, and ascended it to a point about ten miles, where we discovered a fresh trail, and oysters which had been recently taken out of the river by the Indians. This point, or shell-bank, was surmounted by an oak tree, which was worn smooth by the Indians in ascending for the purpose of reconnoitring.

I left the boats at this point, taking with me forty men. Lieutenant Johnson proceeded up the river with the boats. After a short distance, I entered an Indian camp which had been hastily and recently abandoned. All their cooking utensils, camp equipage, &c., were left in the camp. Large quantities of the compta root, cabbage tree, and its berries, were found here, besides skins of cattle, deer, and bears. The bayous and rivers afford oysters and fish in abundance; and I hesitate not to assert that man may here subsist from resources that are inexhaustible. Leaving this camp, about one-quarter of a mile distant we entered upon another, the most extensive I have seen in Florida, and, from the number of huts, I think it must have contained two or three hundred. Whilst we were examining this camp, Indians were discovered at the upper end. We immediately attacked them, and drove them about two miles through several small hammocks and across two or three bayous or estuaries of the sea, where we were arrested by deep water and a dense hammock upon the opposite side. I here ordered a halt, to bring up my rear.

Having found a narrow strip of land over which we could pass, a charge was again sounded, and rapidly executed under a heavy fire from the enemy, who forthwith retreated and dispersed; and I regret to state that Sergeant Olenning was killed at this juncture.

Lieutenant Johnson, of the navy, upon hearing the firing, promptly joined me near this hammock with all the force that could be spared from the boats. Night coming on, the Indians could not be pursued any further. We retired to our boats with the body of the sergeant, and, descending the river some distance, encamped for the night.

Midshipman Watkins and Mr. Bayly, who volunteered his services, fought bravely throughout the whole affair.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. W. ALLEN, *Captain Fourth Infantry.*

Colonel W. S. FOSTER, *Commanding Fourth Infantry.*

HEADQUARTERS, *Fort Dade, February 17, 1837.*

SIR: I had the honor to receive last night your letter of the 4th ultimo, with a copy of the President's message and the documents accompanying it, for which accept my acknowledgments.

I am waiting most anxiously the movements of the hostile chiefs. The attack on Lieutenant Colonel Fanning has caused me to doubt their sincerity even more than before; for, although I consider myself bound to allow them an opportunity to come in, I place but little reliance on their professions. There would be no difficulty in making peace if they were allowed to remain in the country even as citizens, or individuals subjected to our laws; but many of them prefer death to removal. In all the numerous battles and skirmishes that have taken place, not a single first-rate warrior has been captured, and only two Indian men have surrendered.

The warriors have fought as long as they had life, and such seems to me to be the determination of those who influence their councils—I mean the leading negroes. To-morrow, however, will determine the question as to their sincerity. Should they refuse the terms which I have offered, the war must recommence, and there will be little prospect of closing it during the present season.

If I were as well acquainted with the country as the hostile chiefs are, I would undertake to defend it with five hundred men against as many thousand. My last march, as well as the operations of Lieutenant Colonels Foster and Fanning, has demonstrated that we can pursue the enemy into their strongest holds, but we cannot remain there a sufficient length of time to produce any lasting effect upon them.

We may conquer them in time, and may destroy them, it is true; but the war will be a most harassing one, and will retard the settlement and improvement of this country for many years to come. I am not disposed to overrate the difficulties which surround me; but, in communicating with you, it would be criminal to underrate them. The force I have is as large as could well be supplied, and as large, perhaps, as is necessary to carry on operations in any part of this country. I consider it amply sufficient to beat the whole force of the enemy if they were concentrated; but the enemy will not concentrate.

To enable you to judge of the difficulties of carrying on operations here, I beg of you to examine the map, and observe the dispersed state of the troops and the enemy. On the 27th ultimo the advance of my division fought on the Hatcheluskee, seventy miles southeast of this place, at the head of the Coloo-sahatchee. On the 8th instant Colonel Fanning fought at the head of Lake Monroe, perhaps sixty miles northeast of my battle-ground. On the 9th, Captain Allen fought a party of the enemy near the Gulf, at least seventy miles west of this place; and I have been compelled to detach a part of the dragoons to Newnansville, a hundred miles to the northwest, and another portion of that corps to operate against the Indians on Orange lake, fifty or sixty miles northeast of us. General Hernandez is to operate on the eastern side of the peninsula, from St. Augustine south. Thus it will be seen that the forces composing this army are divided into six different corps, covering an extent of country at least a hundred and fifty miles square.

The posts necessary to be kept up are Fort Brooke, Fort Foster, Fort Dade, Fort Armstrong, Fort Drane, Fort Winder, Fort Harlee, and Fort Heileman, on a line or road from the former to the latter inclusive, a distance of one hundred and eighty miles; another post is necessarily kept up near the mouth of the Withlacoochee, one at Volusia, one at St. Augustine, and one at Picolata; besides numerous other small posts which are absolutely necessary to cover the country and protect the inhabitants.

With such numerous posts and detachments, it will readily be seen that a large force cannot be employed in any single operation.

If the war should recommence, I shall break up some of the posts, in order to take their garrisons into the field.

February 18.—Abraham has just come in with a flag, accompanied by a nephew of the Indian chief Cloud, and a negro chief.

He repeats that Jumper, Holatuchee, Alligator, and others, are on the way, and will probably arrive to-morrow. I am yet doubtful of the result.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Dade, February 20, 1837.*

Sir: The Indian chiefs were to have met me on the 18th, but they have not yet arrived. They have sent two of the sub-chiefs, with several Indians and Indian negroes, to inform me of the cause of their delay. The message is not satisfactory, but the Indians are slowly coming in. To be able to take the field promptly, if they should deceive me, I shall require at least four hundred horses. I have had scarcely any, except the broken-down horses of the Tennesseans and the broken-down teams of Governor Call's army; and the consumption of horses by this service exceeds anything I have ever witnessed before.

To reach Micanopy, I must have mounted men; and so severe has been the service which I have exacted of the mounted volunteers, that they have not among them a hundred horses fit for immediate service. I shall be under the necessity of ordering a purchase; and for that purpose must send an officer to Savannah. If peace should be made, the horses will probably sell for nearly their original cost; if it should not be made, I shall gain time by making the purchase immediately.

By the most extraordinary and unremitting exertions of the quartermaster's and commissary's departments I have kept this army in the interior of the country, engaged in the most active operations, since December 17, and I shall keep it in the interior so long as there is a hostile warrior in the field.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

FORT DADE, *February 22, 1837, 4 p. m.*

Sir: Alligator and Cloud (who commanded at Wahoo) have just arrived, and report that Holah-Touchee, second chief of the nation, will be here to-night. Jumper and Micanopy have not come. I am not yet sanguine as to the result, but hope that all may go as we desire.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Dade, February 25, 1837.*

Sir: I have the honor to report that a portion of the hostile Indian chiefs, with a number of warriors, red and black, visited me at this place, in accordance with an arrangement made with Jumper, Alligator, and Abraham, on the 4th instant, at the head of the Coloosahatchee.

Neither Jumper nor Micanopy came in; but Ho-lo-ah Toochee, second chief of the nation, and brother of Micanopy, attended as the representative of his brother and of the nation.

Ho-lo-ah Toochee informed me that runners had been sent to call in all the chiefs and warriors to meet me on the 18th instant, but that the Indians were so widely dispersed that the information could not be sent to all in time. He declared that the Indians were all desirous of peace, but he could not say whether they would consent to emigrate. Micanopy requested him to say that the troops had driven him into a "bad swamp," from the good land on which he had formerly lived, and he desired to be allowed to remain there. I informed Ho-lo-ah Toochee that emigration was an indispensable condition of peace. He said Micanopy had not instructed him on that point. I informed him that I could enter into arrangements for peace with no one but Micanopy himself; that I expected him here, and, if he desired peace, he must come; but he, as well as all the other chiefs and warriors, must distinctly understand that there could be no peace without emigration. Ho-lo-ah Toochee undertook to communicate with his brother, and Alligator with Jumper, and they engaged that both those chiefs should visit me on the 4th of March.

Twelve hostages have been left with me, one of them a nephew of Micanopy. All hostile Indians north of the Withlacoochee and the road to Volusia are to withdraw south of that line, and are not to return north of it without a written permission from headquarters; and those east of St. John's are also to withdraw to the west of that river, as soon as information can be communicated to them by runners. In the meantime, I reserve the right of establishing a post near the mouth of the Coloosahatchee, and one near the head of the St. John's; and also of re-establishing Fort King, should I think proper to do so. I am also to continue the troops in active employment on the frontier north of me, should circumstances require it. Peace may be the result of my conference with Micanopy, should he come in; but I am not sanguine that he will come, or, if he come, that he will consent to make peace unless emigration is abandoned. I therefore consider it to be necessary to continue the most vigorous preparations for an immediate and active campaign; and, if the chiefs should not come in, or should refuse peace on the terms offered, I shall be able to recommence operations the moment they disperse.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Dade, March 6, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to report, for the information of the Secretary of War and the general-in-chief, that I have this day entered into a convention with the Seminole Indians by their second, third, and fourth chiefs, representing the principal chief, Micanopy, and the nation, for the suspension of hostilities and the immediate removal of the whole nation west of the Mississippi. I enclose a copy of the convention or capitulation, from which it will be seen that I have granted to the Indians the most liberal terms. This I considered the dictate of policy, as well as of sound economy. To have attempted the exaction of severe terms, might have led to a renewal of hostilities, by which millions might have been expended, and many valuable lives lost by exposure to the climate as well as by the arms of the enemy.

As the Indians respect nothing but force, I shall be compelled to retain the troops, in readiness for active service, until a considerable portion of them, at least, take their departure for the west, which I hope will have been done before the 1st of May.

The wagon trains were, in a great measure, broken down; in consequence of which, I ordered a hundred mules from New Orleans; and the horses of the mounted men being rendered, by the severe service they have performed, entirely unfit for service, and mounted men being absolutely necessary to pursue the scattered bands of Indians, should any of them determine not to come in, I ordered an officer to Savannah to purchase four hundred horses. On them I shall mount the dragoons, and a portion of the other regular troops, and shall thus be able to compel a full execution of the treaty; my depots being so arranged that I can operate at any time—being not more than from thirty to forty miles from supplies.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington.*

Capitulation of the Seminole nation of Indians and their allies, by Jumper, Hohahtoochee, or Davy, and Yaholoochee, representing the principal chief Micanopy, and fully empowered by him, entered into with Major General Thomas S. Jesup, commanding the United States forces in Florida, this sixth day of March, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven.

ARTICLE 1. The chiefs above named, in behalf of themselves and the nation, agree that hostilities shall cease immediately, and shall not be resumed.

ARTICLE 2. They agree and bind themselves that the entire nation shall immediately emigrate to the country assigned to them by the President of the United States west of the Mississippi.

ARTICLE 3. Until they emigrate, they will place in the possession of the general commanding the troops hostages for the faithful performance of their engagements.

ARTICLE 4. The Indians shall immediately withdraw to the south of the Hillsborough. Those found north of that river, and a line drawn from Fort Foster due east from it to the ocean, without permission of the general commanding, after the 1st of April, will be considered hostile.

ARTICLE 5. Major General Jesup, in behalf of the United States, agrees that the Seminoles and their allies who come in and emigrate to the west, shall be secure in their lives and property; that their negroes, their *bona fide* property, shall accompany them to the west; and that their cattle and ponies shall be paid for by the United States, at a fair valuation.

ARTICLE 6. That the expenses of the movement west shall be paid for by the United States.

ARTICLE 7. That the chiefs, warriors, and their families and negroes, shall be subsisted from the time they assemble in camp near Tampa Bay, until they arrive at their homes west of the Mississippi, and twelve months thereafter, at the expense of the United States.

ARTICLE 8. The chiefs and warriors, with their families, will assemble in the camp to be designated by the commanding general, as soon as they can; and at all events by the 10th of April. Yaholoochee will come in at once with his people, and the other towns will follow as fast as possible.

ARTICLE 9. Transports will be ready to take the Indians, with their negroes, off to their western homes.

ARTICLE 10. Micanopy will be one of the hostages; he is to visit the commanding general, and will remain near him until his people are ready to move.

ARTICLE 11. All the advantages secured to the Indians by the treaty of Payne's Landing, and not enumerated in the preceding articles, are hereby recognized, and are secured to them.

Signed at Camp Dade, this sixth day of March, one thousand, eight hundred and thirty seven.

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

[Signers.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Dade, Florida, March 8, 1837.*

GENERAL: Under instructions, I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of yours of the 9th ultimo, addressed to Major General Jesup, wherein you acknowledge the receipt of sundry letters, orders, &c., from these headquarters.

One paragraph of your letter states, "It was not known that his (Major Dearborn's) command had been ordered from Irwinton, Georgia, to Florida, until the receipt of your order of No. 23, of the 11th of December, on the 19th of January." In answer to this paragraph, the general desires me to inform you that the removal of Major Dearborn's command from Irwinton to the lower part of Georgia was reported to your office as far back as the 20th of September, 1836, as shown by the accompanying letter, (copy,) which is now forwarded under supposition that the original must have miscarried.

I am, general, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. CHAMBERS, *Lieutenant, Aide-de-camp, and Assistant Adjutant General.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Dade, Florida, March 26, 1837.*

SIR: I have the satisfaction to be able to report that the Seminole chief Yahlooochee, (Cloud,) who commanded at the Wahoo, is at Tampa Bay with his family; and he has about two hundred of his people in a camp near that post.

The principal chiefs on the St. John's, Tuskinia and Emathla, (Philip,) have sent messages to me; they will obey the order of Micanopy to emigrate. Philip sent his son, who informed me that his father had required Abiaca, (Sam Jones,) chief of the Micasukies, to join him and accompany him on his visit to Micanopy.

The war is no doubt ended if a firm and prudent course be pursued; but a trifling impropriety on the part of the white population of the frontier might light it up again. The negroes rule the Indians, and it is important that they should feel themselves secure; if they should become alarmed and hold out, the war will be renewed.

I shall send one battalion of the Indian warriors serving in Florida to Mobile so soon as it can be mustered and paid, and transports be obtained.

The Alabama drafts will be sent off as soon as they can be paid; transports have been provisioned for them. The naval garrison, furnished by Commodore Dallas for Fort Foster, has been relieved and ordered to join the ship whence it was detached.

I shall discharge the volunteers and militia force as rapidly as the circumstances of the service will permit; and shall take measures to have the ordnance and other stores, not required in Florida, taken to the most convenient arsenals and storehouses.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Dade, March 28, 1837.*

GENERAL: In my report of the affair of the 27th of January at the Hacheeluskee, I omitted to mention that Major Thompson commanded the 6th regiment of infantry. That excellent officer moved on that occasion at the head of his corps, under General Armistead, to support Colonel Henderson, who commanded the advance of the army, and afterwards to attack the Indians concentrated in the "Cabbage Hammock," to the right of the colonel's position. It is due to justice that the omission be noticed, and I respectfully ask that this note be published as a part of my report.

I have the honor to be, general, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Dade, Florida, March 29, 1837.*

GENERAL: I enclose a letter from Colonel Henderson of this day's date, which I will thank you to file with my report of the expedition to the head of the Coloosahatchee. Captain Price, as well as the other officers of the corps to which he is attached, was most efficient and useful throughout the whole of the operations in the field. On the occasion referred to, Lieutenant Chambers was detached from headquarters, and directed movements as a staff officer, but was not in command of the troops.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS, 2D BRIGADE, ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Dade, March 29, 1837.*

GENERAL: In the report made to you on the 28th of January last of the operations of the previous day, two mistakes were made inadvertently, and which are now corrected.

The first mistake is in not stating that the negroes taken in the pine woods were captured by a detachment of Captain Will's company of Alabama volunteers, sent with orders to Captain Price. The second error is in mentioning Lieutenant Chambers as commanding the force that captured the Indian women and children, the ponies, and other property of the enemy. Captain Price was in command.

I remain, general, with great respect, your obedient servant,

ARCHIBALD HENDERSON, *Colonel, Commanding 2d Brigade, Army of the South.*

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Commanding Army of the South, Headquarters, Fort Dade.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Brooke, Florida, April 3, 1837.*

SIR: I have this moment received your letter of the 14th ultimo.

When I directed the dredge-boat to be taken to Lake George and Lake Monroe, I was not aware that it was in the service of the Engineer department; I had been informed that it belonged to the custom-house. It was, I believed then, and believe now, entirely idle, and I thought it would be more useful to the public in deepening a channel, through which supplies might be taken to the vicinity of the enemy's

strongest retreats, than lying idle near the mouth of the St. John's. The instant I was apprised that the boat was in the service of the Engineer department, though the object for which it had been taken remained unaccomplished, I ordered it to be returned. The order, a copy of which is enclosed, was dated on the 1st of March.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Dade, March 1, 1837.*

COLONEL: When I directed that the dredge-boat should be employed and sent to Lake George, I was not aware that it was in the service of the Engineer department. I supposed that it was kept in service by the Treasury Department, or the Territory, for the purpose of keeping the navigation of the St. John's open. Had I been aware of the service on which it was employed, I would not have ordered it. You will cause it to be immediately returned to the Engineer department, and will instruct Lieutenant Colonel Harney accordingly.

I am, colonel, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Lieutenant Colonel J. B. CRANE,

Commanding district between St. John's and Suwanee, Fort Heileman.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, April 23, 1837.*

GENERAL: I will thank you to cause the enclosed paper to be placed on file in your office. I shall, perhaps, have occasion to refer to it hereafter, in connexion with the attempt of the legislative council of Florida to repeal their militia laws, in order to prevent the draft of four companies of men which I had required, not for service in the field, but to aid in defence of the settlements when the small force under my command was operating in the field, and was necessarily spread in detachments over a surface of more than a hundred and fifty miles square.

Many of the principal Seminole chiefs are with me, but their people come in slowly. The majority of the Indians doubt the sincerity of our promises; and those whose interest it is to renew the war—I mean unprincipled white men—spread reports that all who come in are to be executed. Both Micanopy and Jumper have complained to me that, when they had their people collected, and in march to this place, they have been alarmed by such reports and have disappeared.

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, general, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

ORDER.

CAMP NEAR FORT DRANE, *January 17, 1837.*

The detachment will move to-morrow morning at 7 o'clock for the Ocklawaha and the surrounding country. Five days' provision and forage for the detachment will be carried in the wagons. Those captains who refuse to march will state on the bottom of this order.

JOHN WARREN, *Colonel, Commanding.*

I refuse to obey the above order, because my company was raised and mustered into service for the protection of Fort Heileman, and to scour the country from the south branch of St. Mary's, thence to New river, thence to the head of Santa Fé and Picolata. I have, as I conceive, transcended my authority in having my men to escort a train so far as Fort Drane; though, according to the colonel's orders, they have not murmured, but escorted the train to Fort Drane. They, contrary to expectation, are ordered into the nation; which order they refuse to obey, believing that I am not clothed with power to order them further. I have called for volunteers; out of twenty-three who were present, there were ten volunteers. I tendered those, who, with my own service, are accepted. I am ready, together with my command, to obey the orders of my colonel, to scour the country to a certain extent, east or north of Fort Drane. The articles which I have reference to have the muster of Major B. K. Pierce, subject to the approval of Governor Call, commander-in-chief of the troops in Florida. The articles were presented to and recognized by the governor, and we were regularly mustered, which my pay-rolls, which I have now in my possession, will show.

JOHN G. SMITH, *Captain, Commanding Whitesville Rangers.*

Having called on my company to obey the above order, they refuse, as they volunteered for the protection of the frontier of Drane and Nassau counties. They are at this time drawn from their homes, leaving their families exposed to the enemy, and wholly unprotected. They are now ordered to the Indian nation, and I feel myself in duty bound to disobey.

JOHN PILES, *Captain.*

My reason for disobeying the above order is, my men were summoned to go on a scout in pursuit of the enemy, who attacked Dell's negroes near the Santa Fé, and pursue them as far as Orange lake, if required. Contrary to their expectations, they were ordered to guard baggage-wagons as far as Fort

Drane, which they complied with without murmuring. They are now ordered to the Indian nation; they were mustered for the protection of Jacksonville and its vicinity. The present order they consider illegal and unjust, and therefore refuse to obey.

A. WAHOMAN, *Lieut. Com'g detachment Jacksonville Black Hawk Rangers.*

I refuse to obey the above order for many reasons: First, because my company is unwilling to go; believing that the enemy is in the rear, they are willing to scour the country north of Fort Drane before they return. Secondly, because my orders from Colonel Crane were, that as soon as the pursuit of the Indians that captured Mr. Dell's negroes was given up, I was to return to my post at Mandarin. My company was mustered into service for the protection of the east bank of the St. John's river, although we have a contract with Governor Call that they shall not cross the river without their own consent; yet have they ever been ready and prompt to obey all orders at a moment's warning. They crossed the river to guard the baggage train, or scour the western banks of the St. John's, to the frontiers of the enemy; they are now, in violation of Governor Call's agreement, ordered to the Indian nation, which they simultaneously refuse to obey.

MOSES CURRY, *Commanding Company.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, May 5, 1837.*

GENERAL: Many of the field officers of the regiments serving in Florida, as well as the company officers, have been absent during the whole campaign, greatly to the injury of the service, and to the inconvenience of those who have been constantly at their posts. The state of Lieutenant Colonel Crane's health, as well as Lieutenant Colonel Fanning's and Major Fauntleroy's, renders temporary absence from duty in Florida necessary. Those officers have performed their duties most faithfully and efficiently; and I most urgently request that other field officers be ordered to join, in order to afford them some respite from their labors.

Dr. Stinnecke, who had joined but a short time before, was taken away to attend a medical board at *New York!* Could not some of the idle members of the medical department, at the posts from which the troops had been withdrawn, have been placed upon that board? The doctor certainly had no claims from service, and it was with some surprise that the order for his withdrawal was received. When any other consideration than that of services is allowed to govern, either in regard to stations or indulgences, discontent is the inevitable consequence, and justly so; the general-in-chief, I am sure, could not have been aware of the little claim the doctor had from services performed when he consented that he should be taken from this army, where his services were necessary, and employed on a duty which many who are entirely or comparatively idle could have performed.

I am anxiously awaiting the tardy movements of the Indians. There is no danger of a renewal of hostilities, but the chiefs find great difficulty in collecting their people. Several bands have been assembled, but they have been dispersed by reports that they were to be punished so soon as they should place themselves within our power.

I am, general, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding Army of the South.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, May 8, 1837.*

SIR: By reports from every part of my command, I am induced to believe that the Indians will all come in and emigrate in the course of the summer.

Powell and other chiefs, with their people, are at Fort Mellon, and will depart thence to this post in a few days. All the chiefs of the nation have now expressed their readiness to obey the commands of Micanopy, and remove to the west.

Whilst waiting the tardy movements of the Indians, I have detachments of the troops and Indian warriors employed in exploring the country and surveying routes through it. The Withlacoochee has been examined from its mouth to its source; the Fort King road surveyed hence to Fort Armstrong; and a party is now exploring the country from this place to Camp Izard. I have directed the survey of several routes north of the Withlacoochee, and the exploration of the St. John's above Fort Mellon. These surveys will enable me to have a good topographical map of the theatre of operations in Florida prepared.

I have directed the withdrawal of the garrisons of Forts Armstrong and Drane. The garrison of the former goes to Fort King, and the latter to Micanopy. The garrison of Fort Clinch will be withdrawn so soon as the stores at that post can be disposed of.

Officers are much wanted; many of those serving with this army are worn out by the effects of the climate, and the severe duties they have performed. They require a respite from duty; and I respectfully suggest the justice to them of ordering those who have been absent from the field to take their places.

Captain Mallory, without a single claim to indulgence from the services he had performed, was permitted to leave the army on the solemn assurance that he had made his arrangements to retire from the army, and would go out of it immediately, and that he would be put to serious inconvenience by being detained in Florida. As he was not efficient, I permitted him to go. I now, however, learn that he remains in service; if so, I request, as an act of justice to others, that he be ordered to join his company without delay.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, May 17, 1837.*

GENERAL: I have this moment received General Order No. 28, dated the 1st instant. Dr. Heiskell, in consequence of severe domestic affliction, was permitted a few days ago to proceed to the north; and the services of Dr. Tripler cannot possibly be dispensed with. There is not an army surgeon or assistant at this post, and I propose ordering him hither so soon as his services can be dispensed with at his present post. The movements of the Indians are so tardy, that no calculation can, with certainty, be made as to the time of their emigration. Their women and children were to be collected from a surface of from fifteen to twenty thousand square miles. Many of them are sick; and I find that without the application of force, many months may elapse before they can be assembled. I do not consider it my duty to recommence the war, believing that if I were to do so, beat the Indians, and make another peace, similar delays to those which we now experience would then occur in collecting and removing them. I have, it is true, but little acquaintance with them myself; but those best acquainted with them, and among them Major Graham and Captain Page, believe they will all come in so soon as their families can be collected. We committed an error in regard to these Indians in the attempt to remove them before the country was required for white settlers. In all other cases of removal, a white population has been pressing upon and crowding out the Indians before they were required to leave the homes of their fathers; here there was no population pressing upon them, and they have never felt the necessity to go. Besides, the negroes rule them; and the arrival of several Floridians in camp for the purpose of looking after and apprehending negroes spreads general consternation among them. Those that were in camp fled, and carried the panic with them, and we cannot now induce them to return.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, May 23, 1837.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that I have withdrawn the garrison and stores from Fort Clinch, at the mouth of the Withlacoochee. The naval force under Lieutenant Bell has gone to Pensacola, and the military part of the garrison has gone as an escort to a wagon train to Fort King, whence it will join its regiment at Fort Dade. The ordnance stores were sent to Mount Vernon, Alabama, and the subsistence and quartermaster's stores, except ten thousand rations sent to Fort King, have been removed to this place.

I enclose an extract from a report of Major Wilson, whom I detached some weeks past to Pensacola and Mobile Point, from which it will be seen that he has succeeded in causing the whole party of Indians, who had for some time frightened the good people of that part of the country out of their wits, to join the Creeks at Mobile Point. The same prudent course would bring all the Indians in Alabama and West Florida into camp.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

[Extract]

MOBILE POINT, *Alabama, May 18, 1837.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the return of Lieutenant Reynolds, a few days since, from up the bay of Pensacola, where I had despatched him, with three or four Indians from the Point, for the purpose of bringing in, if possible by persuasion, a small party of Euchees who had wandered off from the nation, evidently with the design of escaping emigration to the west. He fell in with them at their camp, about thirty miles from Pensacola, and having a conference with them through his interpreters, he represented their helpless condition and the probability, if they persisted in strolling through the settlements, of their all being destroyed by the whites, who they knew had already fired on their party and killed one or two of their warriors; he would therefore advise them to come in and join their friends at the Point, where they would, preparatory to emigrating, be both fed and protected by the government; to which they assented, and came in, together with a few Creek families that had been living on the bay for years past.

The lieutenant had them transported by water to this place, amounting in all to seventy—men, women, and children.

HY. WILSON, *United States Army.*

Major General THOS. S. JESUP, *Com'g Army of the South, Tampa Bay, Florida.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, June 5, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that this campaign, so far as relates to Indian emigration, has entirely failed.

The Seminole chiefs were, I believe, sincere in their intentions of fulfilling the provisions of the treaty, but they have no influence over their people, except for purposes of mischief. The warriors, I understand, have degraded Micanopy, and placed Sam Jones, the Mickasuky chief, at the head of the nation. Micanopy, Jumper, and Cloud, met me in council on the 1st instant; they were to have come in

again on the 2d, but failed, and on the night of that day they were seized by a force of armed warriors and removed to the interior. I succeeded in securing a number of their negroes, and have sent them to New Orleans.

The season is too far advanced for the renewal of offensive operations. All, therefore, that can be done, is to place the troops in such positions as shall at the same time cover the frontier and give reasonable assurance of health. The garrisons of Forts Mellon and Call, on the St. John's, and Foster, on the Hillsborough, must be withdrawn in consequence of the unhealthiness of the sites; and Fort Dade, on the Withlacoochee, must also be withdrawn, from the difficulty of supplying it during the wet season.

The negroes whom I seized say the Indians will not renew the war unless attacked. This may be true, but we cannot trust them. The best security for the frontier will be complete preparations to repel attack.

Emigration I consider impracticable. The Indians, generally, would prefer death to removal from the country, and nothing short of extermination will free us from them. Not a single first-rate warrior has surrendered since the commencement of the war, nor has a single instance occurred of a Seminole having proved false to his country.

The difficulties presented by the country are great, but those presented by the climate are greater. Many of the posts necessary to success during the season of operations must be abandoned early in the summer, to preserve the lives of their garrisons; and the consequence is, that at the commencement of every campaign nearly all the interior depots have to be re-established.

If operations are to be renewed in the fall, it is important that early preparations be made; and that the officer who is to conduct them have everything in readiness to take the field by the first of October. I will write to you again in detail on this subject. In the meantime, I desire you to present my most earnest requests to the Secretary of War and the general-in-chief that I be immediately relieved from the command of this army. It is known to the members of the late administration that I was placed in command not only without solicitation, but contrary to my known and expressed wishes.

I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, June 17, 1837.*

SIR: If I should not be relieved from the command of this army, I desire to be permitted to visit Kentucky for a few weeks. I will thank you to lay my request before the general-in-chief and the Secretary of War. All is quiet in this quarter. I shall leave the 4th and 6th infantry at Fort Dade, on the Withlacoochee, and break up the posts of Hillsborough, Thlonotosossa, and Fort Foster. This accomplished, I shall proceed to Micanopy and Black creek, at one of which posts communications will reach me.

I have permitted about one-third of the Indian warriors to visit their families at Mobile Point. They will return in four or five weeks, when another party will be allowed to go. The term of service of the regiment will expire on the 31st of August. Should the war be renewed, a regiment of northern Indians should be engaged to take their place. The general who is to command, in the event of another campaign being necessary, should be immediately required to organize the force and means to take the field by the first of October; and he should be unrestricted as to both. The nature of the country is such, that difficulties increase at every step; and the commander should have unlimited control, both of measures and means, and the entire support of every department. A large regular force will be required, no matter who may command; and immediate measures should be taken to raise it. The corps now in Florida are reduced to mere skeletons; a considerable portion of the men remaining will be discharged in the course of this summer and autumn, and not one will re-enlist. Many of the officers and men have been more than a year constantly in the field, and have been completely broken down by the labors and privations of two arduous campaigns; something should be done for them, and that speedily, or we shall have no force by the end of the year. It would be a great relief to the officers who have been long absent from their families, if those who have avoided the perils and fatigues of the field should be required to relieve them for at least two or three months. And the families of such soldiers as remain in Florida should be brought to their posts here at the public expense, and have rations allowed them by the government.

I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, June 24, 1837.*

SIR: Disease is developing itself rapidly among the troops; all except the recruits have gone through two arduous and harassing campaigns, and are, in a great measure, broken down. The tendency to scorbutic affections is becoming general. I am making every effort to increase the comforts of the men, as far as the means in my power will enable me; among other measures, I have directed that a convalescent hospital be established on one of the keys at the entrance of this harbor. This, I think, will restore many men to the service who would otherwise be lost to it.

The garrison has been withdrawn from Fort Foster; also from Fort Mellon; and I shall proceed through the country to-morrow to Fort Dade, and thence to Fort King and other posts on the north frontier of the Territory, to make final arrangements for the protection of that frontier during the sickly season. No operations should be attempted before October; if the enemy, however, attack, he must be repelled, and driven from the frontier at any sacrifice.

If I should not be relieved from the command of the army, I request permission to visit Kentucky for a few weeks, after I shall have provided for the defence of the frontier.

I have directed Lieutenant Chambers, my aide-de-camp, to proceed to Washington with a duplicate of my despatch for the Secretary of War. From the position he has occupied, he will be able to give accurate

information on all matters relating to the campaign. Should new corps be raised, I strongly and earnestly recommend him for an appointment. He is qualified for the command of a regiment, and I recommend that as high rank as possible be conferred on him.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *St. Augustine, June [July] 8, 1837.*

GENERAL: I enclose two reports, received last night by express: one from Lieutenant Colonel Miller, commanding at Tampa Bay, and the other from Major Childs, commanding at Fort King. I also enclose a copy of a report from Captain Bradley, of the Florida volunteers, to Lieutenant Colonel Mills, of an affair with a party of Indians west of the Suwanee. The Indians were evidently endeavoring to escape. From every information I can obtain, I believe the body of the nation mean to wait our movements. The frontier will be rendered secure, even should they recommence hostilities; and such information has already been gained of their country, that operations may be carried on in the autumn with far less difficulty than heretofore. I have in my possession, or have sent to New Orleans, all the prominent Indian negro leaders. I have fifteen or twenty negroes and four Indians, who may be used as guides to all the fastnesses of the country. So soon as a list of the prisoners can be prepared, I shall forward it to you.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE TROOPS SOUTH OF THE HILLSBORO', *Tampa Bay, July 8, 1837.*

GENERAL: Captains Allen and Morrison arrived with the train from Fort Foster on the 29th ultimo; the latter officer brought with him "Bow Legs," brother to Alligator, who was found at the fort with his rifle and ammunition; he most unwillingly came to this post. Upon examination, he states that he was on his way from his former residence, at the "Round Pond," on the road to Fort Dade, where he had been collecting peaches for the "corn-dance;" and that he expected to find cattle and some corn left at Fort Foster by the train. He says that Micanopy, Jumper, and his party, were at Casseeme creek, about three days' march from Tampa, and that Micanopy was expecting to hear from you by the messenger he sent in, and that he expressed a great desire to see Abraham. He also informed me that Powell had said that the Seminoles would remain quiet until they should see what the whites intended to do. Powell and his party, he says, are in the neighborhood of Volusia, and south of that place.

In consequence of the near connexion of this Indian with Alligator, I have deemed it advisable to secure him in the picket with the other prisoners, and to forbid any intercourse with him whatever until further orders.

Major Churchill left here yesterday for St. Mark's, his wound having improved essentially for the last four or five days.

The sheds for the marines, and those for the artillery and infantry, will be completed early the next week.

I have not heard from Mullet Key since the return of the Star, but presume the Spaniards have made considerable progress in preparing for the reception of the convalescents.

A party of Creek volunteers are now out scouring the country in a north and northeasterly direction.

I am, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

SAMUEL MILLER, *Lieutenant Colonel, Commanding.*

Major General JESUP, *Commanding Army of the South, &c.*

FORT KING, *July 7, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 6th instant, in relation to the hostile Indians. On the 5th I sent word for them to come in; about 11 o'clock five made their appearance, with melons and fresh beef.

They stated that one hundred were on the St. John's, and one hundred in this part of the country; that they had orders not to molest white people or their property, but to hunt game and cattle for their support; and at a certain time in the moon, which I judge to be about the 12th, they are to return and go over the line established by the treaty; in the meantime, the chiefs were to go to St. Augustine to see the commanding officer, and make arrangements for a store for them to trade at until the time arrived for them to go off.

At this camp there are seven of them, and at another, ten miles from them, seventeen. None of the latter have been here; their corn will not amount to much, they say, in consequence of not having been hoed in season. To-day three of them were in; one had his squaw with him; he says that seventeen Indians were on the road, nine miles from this, the day Lieutenant Ross returned from Fort Armstrong, and the day the general arrived; that the horsemen came within twenty paces of them; that they were lying in the pine barren, and were afraid to run or show themselves for fear of being fired upon before they could make known their peaceable disposition; the appearance of a squaw with them would indicate this.

They represent the cattle as very scarce, and what few they find are in swamps, and so wild that it is difficult to approach near enough to shoot them.

Respectfully, your most obedient servant,

THOMAS CHILDS, *Major U. S. Army, Commanding.*

Lieutenant T. B. LINNARD,

Aide-de-camp and Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters, Army of the South.

NOTE.—Since writing the above, one other of the seven has been in; he says that a council was to have been held at Powell's camp, near Philip's town, and that Alligator, Hola-toochee, Yahooochee, Coahago, and Coacoochee, (Philip's son,) were to go to St. Augustine, and that they are to be there in four days from this; but Cardjo says, as he understands the "broken days," they are not to be there until eight days from this. They were under the impression that Paddy Car was at St. Augustine. This Indian appeared much pleased when informed that General Jesup was there.

T. S. CHILDS, *Major United States Army.*

CHARLES FERRY, *July 6, 1837.*

Sir: Being under the impression that it is my duty to keep you, as the commanding officer, advised of whatever transpires in my vicinity of a military nature, I report to you, for the information of General Jesup, that Captain Bradley went on a scout, *via* this place, on the 30th ultimo, from San Pedro to Suwanee Oldtown, to examine about the fires and Indian signs reported in that quarter.

Ten miles from this place, south, he discovered signs of a large quantity of cattle having been driven from this neighborhood southerly, and very recently, by the Indians. Pursuing his march, he arrived at Suwanee Oldtown, where he encamped on the night of the 1st instant. Next morning, having discovered fresh Indian signs leading west from Oldtown, he immediately marched, and at nine miles distant discovered an Indian warrior with a pack—fired on, and wounded him. He made his escape by plunging into a swamp and abandoning his pack, filled with beef. Pursuing his march, he came upon four others; killed one, and scalped him; wounded another, who was well dressed, and mounted on a mule; he made his escape by abandoning his mule and pack, leaving much blood on said mule; the other two having carried him into the swamp. After which, in passing through a small swamp or hammock, came on others; killed and scalped one, and wounded another badly, having seen a great deal of blood where he made his escape.

The whole number of warriors seen was ten; and, from the number of packs, and a large quantity of beef, (about 200 pounds,) dried and fresh, captured, and these preparations for drying beef, Captain Bradley is of opinion that there is a considerable number about fifteen or twenty miles west of Oldtown, or at Cook's hammock, about forty miles from Oldtown. There were women and children's signs seen, as well as some of their apparel taken, together with a large quantity of cooking utensils and some jewelry. Captured from the Indians, in addition, three mules, three ponies, and one horse, all with good saddles and bridles on, and three Indian rifles. The most of the articles were brought here, and all that could not be brought were destroyed.

The whole of the day (July 2) being consumed in this affair, and Captain Bradley's men being exhausted, (having 30 men,) he deemed it proper to return for more men. He informs me that he shall, in ten or fifteen days, make another scout, when he would like to have some assistance at Suwanee Oldtown.

The whites lost one horse, killed by the Indians. The Indians lost two men killed and scalped, and two wounded, with a great deal of baggage, &c.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. L. JONES, *Lieutenant U. S. Army.*

Lieutenant Colonel MILLS.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *St. Augustine, July 10, 1837.*

Sir: Many of the companies serving in Florida are mere skeletons. Some of them will be without non-commissioned officers, and will be reduced to from eight to fifteen men in the course of a few weeks. Were the companies thus reduced united and formed into full companies, the service would be greatly benefited; its moral would be improved, because every company would then, at all times, be under the direction of officers, which, with the small number of officers fit for duty in Florida, is not always possible now; besides, the officers would feel more pride of profession, and be more active and attentive, when commanding full companies, than when commanding corporals' squads.

I must ask the favor of you to bring this matter to the consideration of the general-in-chief; and if he has no objection to the course proposed, I respectfully ask for authority to organize complete companies out of the skeletons serving here.

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, general, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *St. Augustine, July 19, 1837.*

GENERAL: I enclose an extract from a report of Lieutenant Colonel Miller, commanding at Fort Brooke, by which it will be seen that the Creek volunteers are entirely broken down. I had ordered fifty warriors to join Major Birch as an escort for the stores which I had directed to be removed from Fort Dade to Fort King, and the regiment can furnish only thirty men.

I shall send the whole corps off as soon after my return to Tampa as transports can be obtained.

I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

[Extract.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE TROOPS SOUTH OF THE HILLSBORO', *Tampa Bay, July 16, 1837.*

GENERAL: I duly received by this day's mail your Orders No. 146.

Major Freeman can furnish but thirty men from the Creek volunteers, out of the whole number here; the rest are sick, or claim to be so. I fear that but little service will be obtained from this force. They complain that they have been deceived by their chiefs; that their time will expire in a few days, when they are anxious of joining their families and friends in the west.

The number of sick in Major Birch's command compels him to leave a portion of his men to take care of them until his return, or we can provide for them here and at the Rancio.

Our sick list this morning, independent of the Creek volunteers, numbered upwards of one hundred and twenty.

I am, sir, with high respect, your obedient servant,

SAMUEL MILLER, *Lieutenant Colonel, Commanding.*

Major General JESUP, *Commanding Army of the South, &c.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *St. Augustine, July 20, 1837.*

GENERAL: I enclose a list of the Indian negroes captured during the campaign. Among the prisoners are nearly all the leaders of influence. The negro portion of the hostile force of the Seminole nation not taken is entirely without a head. About eighty of the Indian negroes are at Fort Pike, Louisiana; six have died, and seventeen remain at Tampa Bay. Ninety-three negroes, the property of citizens, have been captured, and eighty-eight of them returned to their owners or placed subject to their orders. One was sent into the Indian country on a message to other negroes, but was not permitted to return. Two who are well acquainted with the country are retained as guides, and two are retained at Tampa by the request of their owners.

Of the Indian prisoners who have been taken and secured I shall not be able to furnish a list until my return to Tampa. They amount to between eighty and ninety. Twenty-three of them are at Fort Pike, fifteen have died, three are confined here; about fifteen, women and children, relations of the Creeks, were allowed to accompany their relatives to Mobile Point, and to Conchaptimicco's town, on the Apalachicola. The remainder are at Tampa—all except three of them with the Creek Indians.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Garey's Ferry, July 24, 1837.*

GENERAL: In the present state of the business of the country, recruits could no doubt be obtained in the agricultural districts of the country, and particularly in the interior regions of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North Carolina. The men of that region are all horsemen and woodsmen, and they not only know how to take care of their horses and their arms, but to use them in the most effective manner. Twenty of those men are, on an average, worth for the service in this country as much as thirty of the best men raised in cities. I respectfully recommend that as many recruits as possible be obtained from the country, and from parts of it above referred to.

The recruits for the dragoons should all be taken from the country, and should be men accustomed to horses. The period of enlistment is now too short to enable a man not accustomed to ride and to manage and take care of horses to become an efficient dragoon, and render more than one year's service before his discharge. Captain Ringgold has command of a mounted company, which has rendered most efficient service. He would make a most able cavalry officer. His company, with the exception of eight or ten men, will be discharged, I am informed, by the 1st of October. Could not recruits be selected for that company, of men who can ride? A few companies of mounted regular troops, under experienced officers, are necessary as rallying points for the volunteers. But few of the men of the dragoon corps can ride, and there is no time to instruct them here. The recruits sent to fill the companies of that corps should all be able to ride and take care of horses, so as to be ready for service immediately on their arrival. By giving your attention to these matters, general, you will add much to the efficiency of the service.

I have not been able to mount my horse since the sixth; but I hope in a day or two to be out, when I shall proceed to the Suwanee.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Heileman, Garey's Ferry, July 25, 1837.*

GENERAL: I have received your letter of the 11th instant. On the 5th of June, in closing my official report to you, I asked to be relieved from the command of this army. I made this request to disembarass the government, supposing that public opinion, when all had not been successfully accomplished that had been expected, might demand my recall; and I was unwilling that any considerations personal to myself should for a moment embarrass the service or interrupt or influence the plans of the government.

On the 8th of this month I received a letter from the general-in-chief, in which, referring to my request to be relieved, he informs me that the Secretary of War had decided that, after posting the troops in such

stations as to cover the frontier from hostile attacks, as far as possible, consistently with a due regard to their health, I should be at liberty to resume my duties as quartermaster general at the seat of government, provided, on the receipt of that letter, I still desired to be relieved. In the meantime, it appeared to me, from the opinion of both military men and citizens, as far as they were made known to me, that I was expected to remain. The press, either mistaking or misrepresenting my motives, had attacked me for asking to be relieved; and I informed the general, in reply, that I would retain the command of the army, unless the government should otherwise determine. That is my intention now; and I shall continue with this army until regularly relieved or positively ordered to relinquish the command.

I desire you to lay this letter before the Secretary of War and the general-in-chief, and at the same time assure them, that never having solicited the command, and having no other objects in view than the best interests of the service, I do not wish to be considered in the way of any plans or arrangements which they may believe will best promote those interests.

I have the honor to be, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Garey's Ferry, July 26, 1837.*

GENERAL: A convalescent hospital has been established at the entrance of Tampa Bay, on one of the keys, where the invalids will have the most salubrious atmosphere, with every comfort which our means can command. The tendency to scorbutic affections, which generally prevailed when I left Tampa, causes me to apprehend most injurious consequences from a sea voyage so long as that from Fort Brooke to Fort Monroe. I therefore respectfully submit for the consideration of the general-in-chief whether it would not be better that the invalids at Fort Brooke, particularly of the infantry regiments, remain at the convalescent hospital already established.

Let me hear from you on this subject as soon as you conveniently can.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Garey's Ferry, August 2, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter received from Lieutenant Colonel Cawfield, commanding the remnant of the Alabama battalion of volunteers that served with me last winter. Lieutenant Colonel Cawfield is a man entirely to be relied on; he is one of the best volunteer soldiers I have ever seen in the field, and is a man of perfect truth. I hope that his corps may be discharged. I sent Major Churchill to Fort Mitchell to perform that duty, but the corps had moved into Florida, I understand, before his arrival. I have not heard from the major, owing, I presume, to the difficulty of communication; letters are often more than a month on the way from one post of this Territory to another.

Of the five battalions from Alabama and Georgia, under Cawfield and Nelson, there are less than one hundred men able to do duty, and there are not half that number of efficient horses. I have never been engaged in any service before where all the physical energies of men were so soon and so entirely prostrated, and the mental energies seem to be equally affected by the baleful influence of the climate.

I have received your letter of the 15th ultimo. I had not received a copy of the revised regulations, but I had attributed it to the irregularity of the mails. Very few of the orders issued from your office have reached me; I have attributed that to the same cause, for I have not received more than half the letters written to me by my family, and public communications are equally uncertain.

I am, respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

P. S.—I enclose a copy of a letter from Captain Galt, commanding at Fort King. I place no reliance on the statement of the Indians; but it is good policy to treat them kindly until the mounted volunteers be ready to act, and the posts for the protection of the frontier be established.

T. S. J.

HEADQUARTERS BATTALION ALABAMA VOLUNTEERS, *Lagrange, West Florida, July 15, 1837.*

SIR: I arrived at this place on yesterday, having bent my course somewhat further south than I had intended, and perhaps further than was contemplated in the instructions of the Secretary of War of the 13th ultimo; but having understood there was a depot established at this place, and that I would be able to get what forage and subsistence I might want, I thought it best to take it in my course; also, having understood that it was the headquarters of Colonel Brown, who is operating in this country, I concluded I might be able to learn something satisfactory as to the movements and situation of the enemy. But I have been disappointed; I have not seen Colonel Brown, and find the place without stores of any kind.

A company returned to this place from Colonel Brown on yesterday, and by them I learned he was scouring the country around towards Pensacola. He has been operating for some considerable time, but has made little discovery. Indeed, to be candid, and use a vulgar phrase, my own opinion is that the whole matter of Indian hostilities in this country is pretty much a story of moonshine, the object of which I leave others to conjecture for the present.

I will move immediately towards the line of Alabama again, but whether I will be able to find the

point indicated in the Secretary's letter, where I may "hold the Indians in check," I doubt, as I am now fully persuaded they need no checking. That there are a few miserably wretched Indians secreted somewhere in this country I will not deny; but, on the other hand, I do not believe they have any disposition to be hostile, further than their own preservation is concerned. You must be aware that they have but little reason to feel safe in surrendering themselves prisoners to the troops who have been operating in this part of the country, and perhaps even what few there may be in this part of the Territory may make a desperate resistance when found, if they cannot escape.

I have looked in vain for orders, but have not received those alluded to in the Secretary's letter to me. I have written to every point where I thought it probable communications for me might be sent, but have received none.

The health of my command is not good; and I am sorry to say that the spirits of many have become pretty much worn down from the belief that they are performing a laborious service in an unhealthy climate which promises no advantage to the country.

I am, sir, your very obedient servant,

DAVID CAWLFIELD,

Lieutenant Colonel, Commanding Battalion Alabama Volunteers.

Major Gen. THOS. S. JESUP, *Commanding Army of the South.*

Fort King, July 24, 1837.

SIR: In consequence of the continued severe indisposition of Major Childs, I write, at his request, to say that the Indian runner whom he reported on the 18th instant as having gone to the chiefs in the vicinity of Fort Mellon returned and made his report yesterday. He met Co-a-co-chee (Wild Cat) beyond Fort Mellon, who said, on the subject of the message from Major Childs, that he was very glad of it; that the principal chiefs were some distance beyond him, and that he would immediately communicate the message to them; that they would be very much rejoiced to hear from you, as they had long been anxious to do; that himself, Co-a-hajo, Holatoochee, Tuskenaha, and Alligator, had some time ago been appointed to go into St. Augustine; but that, as they were about starting, one of four hunters, who had been started ahead of them, returned, giving the account of the capture of the other three by the whites; that even then he wished to go on, but the other chiefs objected; that since, they have been confused, and know not what to expect, or what to do in order to have a talk with the whites; that the whites simply captured the three men, without firing on them.

Co-a-co-chee sent in word to Major Childs, also, that the chiefs would consult, and that about Wednesday morning the runners would be sent to this post, and he doubted not that a deputation of the chiefs would be on the trail hither at the same time. These latter may then reasonably be expected here about Friday morning, when, Major Childs requests me to say, he will despatch a special messenger to you.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

P. H. GALT, *Captain Fourth Artillery.*

Major General THOS. S. JESUP, *United States Army, Commanding, &c., &c.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Garey's Ferry, August 6, 1837.*

GENERAL: You have been in the field, and know how entirely impossible it is that company officers should be able to have the necessary supplies of clothing to replace articles lost or worn out in active service. That those officers may be relieved from an onerous responsibility, and the soldiers be promptly supplied with whatsoever may be necessary to enable them to perform their duties efficiently, I respectfully submit for the consideration of the general-in-chief whether it would not be advisable to establish a depot of clothing at this place and another at Tampa Bay, from which any and every company may be supplied when necessary. By such establishments the service would be rendered more efficient, because the soldiers would be certain of a supply, and the officer would be relieved from the anxiety attending the accountability for property necessarily not within his personal control, and would have no further care than to account for that which he would actually receive for use in the field.

It would not be necessary to encumber the depot with any articles of parade uniform. Blankets, shoes, stockings, round jackets, flannel and cotton shirts, pantaloons, forage caps, and other articles required in the field should alone be kept in store.

I beg of you to ask the attention of the general to the subject as soon as you conveniently can.

And I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Garey's Ferry, Florida, August 7, 1837.*

SIR: I have this moment received your letter of the 21st ultimo.

It was not my intention, in my communication of the 10th ultimo, to ask for recruits to fill the companies in Florida; I know it would be extremely unwise to send them hither during the sickly season. To save the troops already here, I am compelled to adopt the expensive measure of calling into service a body of Florida volunteers to keep up the scouts required to protect the scattered settlements of this extensive Territory. In my letter of the 10th of July I merely submitted for the decision of the general-in-chief the proposition to form out of the skeleton companies here full companies, because the discipline of the service would be promoted by it, particularly when companies are reduced to eight or ten men.

It was not my purpose to propose the measure as one to be carried out in regard to companies not greatly reduced. I shall not attempt it unless it becomes a matter of necessity.

I enclose a copy of a report from Major Childs. I place no reliance on the statement that Indians are coming in; but I do believe that, so far as Micanopy and Jumper can influence their people, no other depredations than robberies will be committed; still, there would be but little security for the frontier without force to repel any attempt that might be made upon it.

In the course of to-morrow or next day I propose to depart for the interior.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

P. S.—Order No. 43 has not yet been received.

T. S. J.

Fort King, August 3, 1837.

Sir: To-day I have received a visit from Tuckabatcha-hajo, *alias* John Hicks, a noble looking Indian. The following is the substance of his communication in answer to my questions:

Left Powell's camp, near Fort Mellon, ten days since, having hunted much on the way, and came to the Indian camp, on the left side of the Ocklawaha, with two others, day before yesterday; would have been in sooner but for the storm. The chiefs and all the Indians were greatly pleased to hear the message from me, and the former, that were present, agreed at once to come in as invited; he would not have left if he did not know that they were coming, and is disappointed not to find the chiefs here; he supposes the delay to be on account of Holatoochee, who is a great distance off towards Charlotte harbor, and his family understood to be very sick; there is much suffering for provision, and a great deal of sickness (fever) amongst the Indians. The chiefs have been very particular in their instructions to the warriors on no account whatever to fire another gun in hostility, and that he does not believe there was one Indian who had a thought of such a thing. Powell was near Fort Mellon, and Coahadjo was on the banks of the lake fishing, and lived in the pickets. Being asked if Powell was coming with the chiefs, said he did not doubt but he would; explained how he was captured by Captain Beall in the Suwanee country; said he had just heard of the provisions of the treaty that all Indians were to go to Tampa, and, having collected his party, was on his route thither when taken. When told that my orders were not to issue them any provisions, he said he was in hopes to have got one or two days' provisions on first coming, but as it was contrary to orders, he could not expect it. Asked permission to encamp by a pond four miles from this, and at the agency, for the purpose of hunting until the chiefs come in. If his father had been alive this war would not have broken out; a plenty of men, women, and children were on their way. I have thought proper to give you this information, believing that the chiefs will be here in a day or two; and, whether their object is peace or war, to suggest the propriety of immediately increasing the force at this post. The present strength is only one hundred and thirty-two, not including the Creeks, and this force constantly diminishing by discharges.

Respectfully, your most obedient servant,

THOMAS CHILDS, *Major United States Army, Commanding.*

Major General T. S. JESUP.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Garey's Ferry, Florida, August 10, 1837.*

Sir: A brigade of volunteers has been offered for service in this Territory, from Kentucky; if there should be any doubt of obtaining recruits of the proper class to fill the regiments serving here in time to open the campaign in the autumn, I would respectfully recommend that the services of that brigade be accepted. I know not what the Kentuckians are now as soldiers, but there were nowhere better soldiers than they furnished during the last war with Great Britain. If it should become advisable to take them into service, they could be brought to the scene of action in a few weeks by the way of the Ohio and Mississippi.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Garey's Ferry, August 13, 1837.*

Sir: I enclose copies of several reports from the interior, by which it will be seen that the Indians continue to visit Fort King in the most friendly manner. Those people are evidently in doubt what course to adopt. They are represented as having been greatly divided in their councils. From present appearances, I would infer that Micanopy and Jumper, who I believe to be sincerely desirous of fulfilling the treaty, have exercised in some degree their influence. Not a single depredation, with the exception of the stealing of three or four horses, and the driving off of forty or fifty head of cattle, has occurred since those chiefs were carried off from Tampa Bay, except the murders at the cape.

The reports enclosed, particularly those of Lieutenant Colonel Gates and Captain Galt, exhibit the necessity of either sending company officers to Florida, or allowing the skeleton companies to be consolidated. Several companies are without an officer, and your detail for West Point places two others in the same situation. It may be truly said the spirit of the service is gone, or fast going, when officers of respectable standing can be found ready to abandon the high and honorable duties of their profession to become *schoolmasters* at West Point. This circumstance augurs worse for the army than anything I had

before witnessed. By the way, I cannot perceive how, under the laws as they exist, you can take any but engineer officers for service as teachers. While the government encourages or even permits officers to be so employed, it is impossible that the army can improve.

I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

Fort King, *East Florida, August 8, 1837.*

SIR: Since my last communication to you on the subject of Indians, I have to report the arrival of two sub-chiefs from Fort Mellon—Tuskamakkey and Chictoahocor—men that are sent on all occasions by Coahagge and others when they have business to do, as I am informed by Paddy Carr.

They say the cattle which you mentioned as driven across the St. John's were *twenty* in number; that the chiefs, as soon as they knew it, sent *them* off with orders to drive back every Indian, and to see that no depredations were committed; that they have been engaged in hunting up and sending back Indians for ten or twelve days; that the cattle were driven off by Indians who had left camp without the knowledge of the chiefs.

I take Tuskamakkey as far as Micanopy with me to-day, for the purpose of going out with some Creeks from that post, to hunt up some Indians reported as doing mischief in that vicinity, if Colonel Gates wishes. He says he left before my message to the chiefs was known; that he has no doubt they will be in, but the rains and distance they are from each other must have delayed them; talks as if they were going off in the fall; that Powell says he shall not say a word, but agree to whatever may be determined. I sent Paddy Carr to their camp, on the opposite side of the Ocklawaha, accompanied by Lieutenant Ross, two days since, to see who and what was there. Lieutenant Ross reports the crossing as very intricate and difficult, and easily defended, and a camp of seven or eight families about three miles from the bank. Eight hostiles are encamped, by my permission, four miles south of this, by a pond, and Hicks, with two others, between this and the agency. These are all the camps and all the Indians that we know of.

I have directed Captain Galt to send an express to you immediately, should the chiefs come in; and, as the time approaches for a renewal of my attack, I am anxious to see if a change of air and travel will not relieve me in some measure.

Respectfully, your most obedient servant,

THOMAS CHILDS, *Major United States Army, Commanding.*

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding Army of the South, Fort Heileman, East Florida.*

Extract of the report of Captain Galt, dated August 8, 1837.

"Since writing the above, a party of six Micasukys, from Powell's camp, have arrived; they started in company with the chiefs Coahadjo, Youhadjo, the brother-in-law of Powell, and Honase Tuskenuggee. They will be at the camp across the Ocklawaha probably this evening, and come in to-morrow, or, as the streams on the trail are very high, their arrival may be delayed twenty-four hours beyond this calculation. They are a deputation, and after seeing them I shall send a special express."

Fort King, *August 11, 1837, 3 p. m.*

GENERAL: Somewhere about thirty Indians, (men,) principally Micasukys, have reported themselves during the past three days, all telling the same story, as to the orders of the chiefs to do no mischief to the whites, and two of the men of parties spoken to have added that they were to do what the white chief at the first told them to do. Coahadjo's brother was of the party the evening before the last. The council, composed of all the chiefs, on the reception of the first message from Major Childs, was held at Appiacca's camp, and the subsequent proceedings are the result of a unanimous vote of the chiefs. Coahadjo had turned back on seeing the state of the streams on the trail, but it is said to-day that Tuskina was on the other side of the Ocklawaha yesterday, waiting for him. They all say that a great many Indians are on the way here.

A party of twenty Micasukys arrived this morning, and are in camp, about two miles off. Cudjo told me that his eldest son was among them. He sent his other son (Ned) out, and the oldest has just come in. I anxiously hope to obtain some news through this source, as to *real* intentions, &c., which, in the present state of relations with the Indians, will be very valuable.

About sixty men altogether *have reported*; perhaps thirty may be added for women and children; the parties are increasing in numbers.

I have told them all not to hunt *above this*, to which they willingly seemed to assent, as a matter anticipated by them. They all say that the chiefs are very anxious to have a talk with you, to have an understanding about everything.

7 p. m.—The Tampa express is in unusually early. I have had a talk with Cudjo on the result of his conversation with his son. I suppose Cudjo, as I have always, to be perfectly honest, and as zealous in our favor as honest. He has, I am assured, in great sincerity expressed his conviction of the proper feelings towards us, and good faith of his son. The latter confirms entirely every account of the orders from the chiefs to their young men, as to their conduct towards the whites; that they will not, or any part of them, commit depredations or hostility, or permit it. The Micasukys, he says, are very much distrustful of coming in or remaining long, being fearful, under the consciousness of having done so much massacring to us, that we are deceiving them to seize them. They have, to his knowledge, said nothing about

going west. On one occasion he heard some of this party say they supposed that at last they would have to do what the white people wished. He wished to go back with this party, after the chiefs have their talk, and bring in his family.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

P. H. GALT, *Captain 4th Artillery, Commanding.*

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding General, &c.*

Extract from Captain Galt's report of same date.

"There are now only myself, Lieutenants Ross, Warner, Sing, and Mock, for duty, with six companies. The resignation of Mr. Sing has been accepted, and that of Mr. Mock may very soon be expected. I need scarcely add the suggestion of the urgent necessity for other officers."

FORT MICANOPY, *August 8, 1837.*

SIR: Be pleased to inform the major general that I have received an order (No. 48) from the Adjutant General's office, detailing Lieutenant Roberts, 4th artillery, for duty at West Point. Lieutenant Roberts is in charge of Captain Brown's company, 4th artillery. There is no other officer with this company, nor have I any officer to relieve him. In fact, I have now five companies under my command, and only three officers to take charge of them. Captain Ringgold does no other duty but scouting. Frequently the quartermaster, commissary, and adjutant commands two companies, and the duty of officer of the day is done by him also and Lieutenant Roberts.

I utter no complaints, but simply remark this to show how illy Lieutenant Roberts can be spared at this time.

Be pleased to obtain the general's instructions upon this order.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM GATES, *Lieutenant Colonel, Commanding.*

Lieutenant T. B. SINNARD, *Aide-de-camp and Acting Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Garey's Ferry, Florida, August 14, 1837.*

SIR: On further examination, I am decidedly of the opinion that Jacksonville is not the most eligible place for a principal depot. The facility with which the troops and laborers obtain whiskey at that place, and the utter impossibility of enforcing any salutary regulations for the police or discipline of the establishment, renders it the last place in Florida that should be occupied. The river, too, for forty miles above is very wide, and often agitated by the winds to such a degree as to render it extremely dangerous to tow the barge on board of which the supplies are taken to Volusia and Fort Mellon. Any vessel that can be brought up the river to Jacksonville can be taken to Pilatka, sixty miles above, whence barges can be towed with comparatively little danger. The latter place is preferable to any other on the river; it has fourteen feet water, has abundance of timber in the neighborhood, is an open, dry, and healthy site, and it has the advantage of being sixty miles nearer to the theatre of operations, which, in going and returning, will make a difference in each voyage of a hundred and twenty miles. But the greatest advantage will consist in the ability to control the establishment, and to prevent the introduction of ardent spirits. It will, besides, be near to and command a narrow and sinuous part of the river, where, should any parties of Indians be out, boats are liable to be attacked. In every view in which I have been able to consider it, I think it the very best position that could be occupied, and Jacksonville one of the worst.

The quartermaster at the latter place will go on collecting materials, which may be used at Jacksonville, or, if Pilatka be preferred, may be removed thither.

I am, sir, with great consideration, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, August 31, 1837.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to report, for the information of the general-in-chief and the Secretary of War, that I have established a post, garrisoned by regular troops, at Moultrie creek, south of St. Augustine; another on the Moccasin branch of the St. John's, east of that river, about twenty miles southwest of St. Augustine, garrisoned by Florida volunteers; one at the point where the trail from the Ocklawaha to the Okenoka swamp crosses the road from Garey's Ferry to Micanopy, garrisoned by two companies of Florida volunteers; one at the head of navigation on the Santa Fé, a tributary of the Suwanee, near where the trail from the Withlacoochee to the Okefenoke swamp crosses the Santa Fé, garrisoned by one company of Florida volunteers; another at Clay Landing on the Suwanee, the great crossing place of the Indians from the eastern to the western side of that river, also garrisoned by Florida volunteers; and I have ordered that a post, to be occupied by two companies of volunteers, be established on the northwest of Micanopy, the site to be designated by Colonel Mills. These, with the posts previously established, it is believed, will afford complete protection to the frontier during the sickly season. Volunteers occupy the posts at Charles and Livingston's Ferries, on the Suwanee; at Jacksonville and Mandarin, on the St. John's; at Weedmaris, between Picolata and St. Augustine; at Lowther's, between Jacksonville and

Okefenokee swamp; and there is one company at Garey's Ferry, to protect the train, and a detachment at Fort Crane, to protect the settlement and the cornfields in that neighborhood. If an army were operating in the field, all these posts would not be necessary; but they are all now required to hold the Indians in check and keep them out of the country. I came hither by way of the Suwanee, for the purpose of completing arrangements for the campaign, and of discharging the detachment of Creek warriors, about two hundred and twenty, remaining in Florida.

I shall send several invalid officers and about one hundred and fifty men to Fort Monroe. The surgeons report that if sent thither the lives of many of them may be saved, and the greater part of them may be so recovered as to be available for the service in December, if not sooner. The troops are not so comfortable here as I intended they should be; near two months ago I directed that lumber should be provided to make sheds for all the tents; but the acting quartermaster at Mobile, on whom the requisition was made, has neither sent the lumber nor assigned a reason why it has not been furnished.

I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, September 2, 1837.*

SIR: I have received your letter of the 18th ultimo, and will take immediate measures to call into service the requisite volunteer force. I wrote to General Smith, of Louisiana, yesterday, and authorized him to raise a regiment.

It will be a work of time to raise and bring into the field a volunteer force sufficient to produce any decisive effect on the enemy; and I greatly fear that the season best adapted to efficient operations will have passed before an adequate force be obtained.

As to re-enlisting the soldiers discharged in Florida, it is out of the question; not a man who has served in this country, and who is worth retaining, will engage again; and, unless the condition of the soldier be greatly ameliorated, or a different mode of filling the ranks be adopted, we cannot hope to keep up even our small army. There is no inducement to any man to enter our service as a private soldier; in any other employment he has a better opportunity of supporting himself, and of making provision for old age; for no matter what his merits, or how faithfully he may serve, he has nothing to look forward to but to be turned out and starve when he shall no longer be capable of performing the duties of a soldier.

If the term of enlistment were extended to five years, and a small bounty were allowed on the first engagement, double bounty on the second, and a pension for life to those who should serve faithfully during three entire enlistments, the ranks could be filled with the best materials, and the establishment be kept complete and efficient. I know many eloquent objections will be urged against the pension system; but it is time that we disregard idle declamations, and take common sense views of the subject. If the army is worth anything, it is worth being made efficient; without good soldiers it cannot be efficient; to retain it as it is at present is an imposition upon the people; and the question, it seems to me, should be, whether we shall dispense with it entirely, or introduce such modifications into its constitution and administration as shall render it what it purports to be—a safe defence against sudden aggression, and a sure rallying point for the militia.

I have the honor to be, with high consideration and respect, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *St. Augustine, September 27, 1837.*

SIR: General Hernandez returned to this post yesterday with his command, having with him Wild Cat and Blue Snake, two of the most warlike chiefs of the Tolofa Indians, and two other warriors: these make fifty-one prisoners, and two Indians killed, being an aggregate of fifty-three.

I hope a portion of the recruits may be pushed on immediately, to enable me to occupy the positions south which are necessary.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

Officers are much wanted. I have not been able to detail a single one for the service of the clothing depots.

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *St. Augustine, October 2, 1837.*

SIR: The Seminole chief Coacoochee (Wild Cat) having, as General Hernandez informs me, come in as the bearer of a flag, I have, on full consideration of all the circumstances of the case, considered it due to the sanctity of the flag to permit him to return. He promises to detach all his warriors, and perhaps the great body of the Seminoles, from the hostile party. This is the possible advantage from permitting him to go out; the security of his good faith is, that his father and two other of his relations are our prisoners. The loss, should he prove faithless, would be considerable, were it not for the circumstance alluded to, as he is unquestionably the best warrior and the ablest chief in the nation. He is more talented and enterprising than Powell, and has the important advantage over him, in the estimation of the Indians, of hereditary rank.

If he should not return, he will hardly venture to take an active part against us, as he has been assured that his father, as well as all the other prisoners of his town, will be held accountable for his

conduct. His influence will rather be employed to restrain his warriors and prevent them from taking part against us. Two weeks will determine whether he will redeem the pledge he has given. In the meantime our preparations are not interrupted, but go on most vigorously. The body of the Indians are not within from one to three days' march of the St. John's, and the return of Coacoochee will rather have the effect to prevent their dispersing.

The frontier is tranquil, and the health of the troops who have been stationary is improving; those at the advanced posts, who have been actively employed as scouts during the sickly season, are beginning to suffer from attacks of intermittent fever; the cases, I understand, however, are of a mild character.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *St. Augustine, September 16, 1837.*

GENERAL: My communication of the 12th instant will have informed you of my having captured, at Mosquito, on the mornings of the 9th and 10th instant, the Indian chiefs Philip, Euchee Billy, Euchee Jack, and a number of their men, women, and children; and I now proceed to report to you, in detail, all the circumstances which led to or are connected with this capture. Four negroes, who had been with the Indians, came into Fort Peyton, about seven miles south of this, on the morning of the 4th instant. From them I learned that there were certain other negroes left by them at their master's plantation, on the Halifax river, some few days before, and that many of the plantation negroes who had been taken off had also been there, who, though they designed to have left that place, might yet have been detained by the bad weather which prevailed about that period. These negroes also gave me reason to believe that some Indians might be fallen in with in that section of country.

With the view of availing myself of the disposition thus partially manifested by the negroes, to abandon the Indians if they could find an opportunity of doing so with safety, I deemed it proper to collect such force as could be spared from this and the neighboring posts, and with it to proceed as speedily as possible to the south. Although the different companies and detachments ordered on this service displayed more than ordinary despatch and alacrity in concentrating at Fort Peyton, yet, in consequence of the difficulty of procuring transportation, I was not able to move from that place till the 7th instant. This I did on the morning of that day; the whole force having been formed into one battalion and placed under the command of Lieutenant Peyton, he having volunteered his services. The battalion consisted of parts of companies F, second dragoons, under Lieutenant McNeill; E and H, 2d dragoons, under Lieutenant May; part of Captain Hanson's mounted company, under Lieutenants Pellicee and Feneira; part of Lieutenant Whitehurst's command, and of Captain Carey's command of mounted Florida volunteers, under Lieutenant Whitehurst, and company D, 3d artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Frazer; Lieutenant J. Graham, of the dragoons, acting as my aide-de-camp, and Assistant Surgeon Motte was designated to attend the expedition as surgeon. Lieutenant Frazer's company of artillery, forming the escort of the small baggage train, was directed to take post at the plantation of Mrs. Anderson, on the Tomoka. On the evening of the 7th the main body had reached Bulow's plantation, which is about thirty-three miles from Fort Peyton.

On the morning of the 8th, at daylight, four negroes, belonging also to Major Heriott, with an Indian negro named John, and belonging to the Indian chief Philip, came into the camp and surrendered themselves, expressing their previous anxiety to do so and receive our protection. On examining the Indian negro John, and finding that he would be very useful, I ordered him to join the other guides.

Among other information obtained from these negroes, I learned that there was, or had been a short time before, an Indian encampment at Dunlawton, a plantation also belonging to the Anderson family, on the Halifax; and the march of the troops was accordingly directed to that point. Ignorant of the precise position of the encampment, great caution was necessary in advancing on the point supposed to be occupied by it. On its becoming perfectly dark, Lieutenant Pellicee, with Sergeant Paul Masters, who had previously resided in the neighborhood and was well acquainted with its localities, were directed to take the negroes Abraham and George, who acted as interpreters, with the Indian negro John, belonging to Philip, and discover and examine the position of the Indian camp and report to me. This duty was executed with great fidelity, and the report was that the Indian camp, which Abraham had left on the north side of a large canal, south of the road leading from the dwelling-house to the sugar-works, had been removed, as nearly as could be discovered, to the south side of the canal, a little to the eastward of a bridge which crossed it; the position of the Indians having also been first examined by Lieutenant Peyton, and the previous report confirmed, my plan of attack was formed, and, in conformity therewith, the volunteers under Lieutenant Whitehurst's command, and Lieutenant Feneira, with Sergeant Masters, were formed in the rear of the Indian camp, and between it and a swamp on the south, and in its immediate vicinity, with directions to extend themselves in such a manner as to surround it, except on the front, which was left open for the charge of the cavalry; the volunteers having been directed, on that charge being made, to close in. These preparations being completed, and fearing that the Indians might be aroused by the neighing and trampling of some loose horses, and that they would attempt an escape, a charge by the cavalry, under Lieutenant Peyton, was directed somewhat sooner than was designed, which was executed with great rapidity and effect. The Indians immediately fled, when they were arrested by the fire of Lieutenant Whitehurst's command from its extreme flank, which so confounded them that they were all taken without having fired a gun, with the exception of a son of Philip, a lad of about eighteen years old, who escaped. My satisfaction at the capture of these Indians without the effusion of blood was greatly increased on discovering that among them was the influential chief Philip. It unfortunately happened that three of the warriors of this party were absent hunting, or they also would probably have fallen into our hands.

After this affair, I proceeded to the next plantation north of us, with the design, if possible, to discover and surprise the Indians, who, I had reason to believe, were in the neighborhood. For the purpose of ascertaining the truth of the reports which had reached me on this head, I had the Indian warrior, Tomoka John, who was taken with Philip, brought before me, and by him I was informed that there was another

encampment of a party of eight warriors, at the head of whom was Euchee Billy, with a number of women and children, in a swamp about five or six miles north of us. This Tomoka John stated that he had been at their encampment the day before, and offered to lead me to the spot, alleging, at the same time, that it was necessary to proceed with great caution, as they were always on the alert. On this information I interrogated Philip, who, in substance, confirmed the statement of Tomoka John, saying that he had known me from my infancy, had perfect confidence in my promise of protection, and would readily give me all the information in his power, assuring me, at the same time, that I might entirely trust to Tomoka John. Proceeding under the direction of this Indian, as far as he thought it advisable to do so, on horseback, the horses, with the prisoners, were left under the charge of Lieutenants Pellicee and Whitehurst, (who could not walk, in consequence of a sprain his ankle received the night before,) with a guard of forty men. The remainder of the force proceeded, under the guidance of Indian John, for about three-quarters of a mile, through a pine barren, and thence through a very thick and heavily timbered swamp, following a trail opened by the Eucheas a few days previous. Having proceeded through this swamp for about two miles, to nearly its opposite side, the army was halted and remained there till it became dark. On again moving, the march continuing through a thicket of shrub and a considerable space of low palmettoes, we at last reached high pine barren land, and proceeded on it till we came in sight of the Indian fires situated in the pine barren, bounded on three sides by swamp and an impervious thicket on the other. Here the troops were halted; and Lieutenant Peyton, with Sergeant Masters and the negroes who had acted as guides, accompanied by Tomoka John, proceeded to reconnoitre the enemy's camp. Soon after a request was sent to me from this party to have troops advance, which was accordingly done, sufficiently near to the enemy to discover them about their fires.

At this time Lieutenant Peyton, with the company commanded by Lieutenant May and part of Lieutenant McNeill's, was directed to lead the right, with the Indian, and Philip's John as a guide, with orders to endeavor to surround the enemy on that side, and to post his men as near to each other as the object in view would permit. Lieutenants McNeill and Feneira, with the detachment of Lieutenants Pellicee and Whitehurst's command of East Florida volunteers, with Sergeant Paul Masters, and negro Abraham as guide, were ordered to lead the left, and to surround the enemy on that side. Orders were given that these positions should be occupied, the men lying flat on the ground till the appointed signal should be made at daylight. At daylight the signal was given, and the charge made with great promptness; but so watchful were the Indians that they succeeded in discharging two rifles, by one of which, I greatly lament to say, (as I have already stated to you before,) Lieutenant McNeill, while gallantly advancing at the head of his men, was mortally wounded. The affair was soon over; one Indian was killed and three wounded, one of whom afterwards died. The party consisted of twenty-one, of whom none escaped, except one man, who fled in the night. The encampment of this party was exceedingly well chosen, it being almost impossible that it could be discovered by those not previously acquainted with its position.

Though both the officers and men of this expedition had to endure great fatigue and privations of every description, they were all borne with the utmost cheerfulness; and the only circumstance calculated to detract from my satisfaction with the result of this expedition is the death of Lieutenant McNeill, who appeared to be a most promising young officer.

In conclusion, I cannot omit calling your attention to the good conduct of the officers and men of this small command. The alacrity with which every duty was performed does them all great credit. Lieutenant Peyton is an officer of great worth, as are Lieutenants Frazer, May, and Graham, and Dr. Motte, of the regular army. And I would take leave to suggest for your consideration the propriety of recommending to the government that brevet rank be conferred on these officers; and Lieutenants Whitehurst, Pellicee, and Feneira, of the mounted East Florida volunteers, are also equally entitled to the consideration of the government. I have likewise strongly and particularly to recommend to you Sergeant Paul Masters. His knowledge of the country placed it within his power to render great services to the expedition, and the readiness with which it was furnished is truly creditable to him. The guides and the Indian, Tomoka John, discharged their duty with great fidelity.

An inventory of the articles captured will be annexed to this report.

I have to regret the length which I have permitted to myself in this report; but it is hoped it may be excused from my anxiety to present before you all the facts and circumstances connected with the expedition.

I have the honor to be, general, with much respect, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH M. HERNÁNDEZ, *Brigadier General, Commanding.*

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Commanding Army of the South.*

Registry of negro prisoners captured by the troops commanded by Major General Thomas S. Jesup, in 1836 and 1837, and owned by Indians, or who claim to be free.

No.	Names.	Sex.	Tribe, town, or owner.	Estimated age.	Remarks.
				<i>Years. Mths.</i>	
1	Jacob	Male	Toonahika	25 0	Wounded in right knee.
2	Rina	Female	Micapotoka	18 0	Wife and children to Jacob. Clanda died May 27, 1837.
3	Venice	do	do	2 0	
4	Clanda	do	do	2	
5	Jane	do	do	40 0	
6	Molly	do	do	23 0	Mother to Rina and Molly.
7	Billy	Male	do	12 0	Mother and son.
8	Chloe	Female	do	19 0	
9	Sarah	do	do	2 0	Sister to Jacob, mother and children.
10	Denis	Male	do	1 0	
11	Pompey	do	do	70 0	
12	Dolly	Female	do	50 0	Husband and wife.
13	Silla	do	do	20 0	
14	Tom	Male	do	11 0	Mother and children.
15	Bella	Female	do	9 0	
16	Hagar	do	do	30 0	
17	Ned	Male	do	3 0	
18	Fanny	Female	do	27 0	Mother and children.
19	Charles	Male	do	6 0	
20	Margaret	Female	do	4 0	
21	Sylvia	do	do	4 0	
22	Buno	Male	do	19 0	Daughter to Pompey and Dolly, mother to Hagar.
23	Peggy	Female	do	45 0	
24	Bob	Male	do	30 0	
25	Margaret	Female	do	21 0	
26	Cyrus	Male	do	13 0	Grandmother to Jacob and Chloe; sold by Mr. Forrester, of Six-mile creek, to Bowlegs, several years since; Juba cousin to Jacob.
27	Rose	Female	Harriett Bowlegs	70 0	
28	Juba	do	do	20 0	
29	Ned	Male	do	19 0	Jacob's uncle's wife, mother, and children.
30	Noble	do	do	23 0	
31	Phebe	Female	Naascholy Katte	33 0	
32	Toney	Male	do	11 0	
33	Argus	do	do	7 0	Mother and children.
34	Nelly	Female	Micapotoka	20 0	
35	Scipio	Male	do	3 0	
36	Sandy	do	do	1 0	
37	Elsey	Female	do	25 0	Mother and child.
38	Katy	do	do	3 0	
39	Dick	Male	John Hicks	55 0	Said to be the property of Colonel Humphrey.
40	Tena	Female	Micanopy	50 0	Mother and children, raised with the Indians.
41	Susa	do	do	14 0	
42	Nancy	do	do	9 0	
43	Linda	do	do	8 0	
44	Mary	do	do	24 0	
45	Pussy	do	do	10 0	
46	Ishmael	do	do	6 0	
47	Cyrus	do	do	5 0	Daughter to Tena, and mother to the children.
48	Tamar	do	do	3 0	
49	Scipio	Male	do	1 0	Mother and children, daughter to Tena.
50	Patty	Female	do	33 0	
51	Lucy	do	do	7 0	
52	Pompey	Male	do	4 0	
53	Matilda	Female	do	3 0	Daughter to Tena.
54	Katy	do	do	25 0	
55	Eliza	do	do	20 0	One of the most important and influential characters among the Indian negroes. Father, mother, and children, never had a white master.
56	Ben	Male	do	40 0	
57	Jane	Female	do	35 0	
58	Flora	do	do	13 0	
59	Patty	do	do	12 0	
60	Charles	Male	do	11 0	
61	Polly	Female	do	9 0	
62	Joe	Male	do	7 0	
63	Betty	Female	do	4 0	
64	Elsey	do	do	3 0	
65	Robert	Male	do	6	
66	Betsey	Female	do	45 0	
67	Washington	Male	do	11 0	
68	Rachel	Female	do	25 0	
69	Hatty	do	do		
70	Fanny	do	do		
71	Joseph	Male	do		
72	Inos	do	do	45 0	Husband, wife, and children. The commander of the negro forces on the Withlacoochee, the chief counsellor among the negroes, and the most important character.
73	Eliza	Female	do	35 0	
74	Toby	Male	do	20 0	
75	Catherine	Female	do	12 0	
76	Nancy	do	do	1 0	Rachel's child.
77	Katy	do	Jumper	25 0	Mother and child cousin to Murray; defect in Katy's right eye; said to be the property of Colonel Humphreys.
78	Fanny	do	do	2 0	
79	Susan	do	Micanopy	30 0	

Registry of negro prisoners captured, &c.—Continued.

No.	Names.	Sex.	Tribe, town, or owner.	Estimated age.		Remarks.
				Years	Mths.	
80	Ben	Male	Holatoochee	22	0	Most intrepid and hostile warriors.
81	Jacob	do	do	24	0	
82	Muredy	do	Micapotoka	20	0	
83	Murray	do	do	35	0	
84	Prince	do	do	35	0	Hostile; either qualified to take the lead in an insurrection.
85	Toney	do	do	25	0	
86	Toby	do	do	32	0	
87	Peter	do	do	15	0	
88	Pompey	do	do	60	0	
89	Jacob, 2d	do	Sanathithka	20	0	
90	Dally	do	do	22	0	
91	Mundy	do	Micapotoka	1	0	Died May 11, 1837.
92	George	do	do	1	0	Died May 23, 1837.
93	Phillips	do	do	4	0	Died May 17, 1837.
94	Morris	do	do	1	0	Died May 31, 1837.
95	Lydia	Female	Nusalocco	80	0	Died May 11, 1837.
96	Abram	Male	Claims to be free	50	0	The principal negro chief, supposed to be friendly to the whites; said to be a good soldier and an intrepid leader; he is the most cunning and intelligent negro we have seen; he is married to the widow of the former chief of the nation.
97	Tony Barnet	do	do	36	0	
98	Polly Barnet	Female	do	36	0	
99	Beckey	do	do	2	0	
100	Grace	do	do	6	0	
101	Lydia	do	do	5	0	
102	Mary Ann	do	do	3	0	
103	Martinas	Male	do	1	0	

NOTE.—In addition to the above, ninety-three negroes, the property of citizens, were taken and secured by the troops.

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *February 26, 1838.*

SIR: Since the answer of this department, dated the 6th ultimo, to the resolution of the House of Representatives of October 4, 1837, has been printed, it has been found, on examining it, that copies of a considerable portion of the correspondence with General Jesup, called for by the resolution, were accidentally omitted to be furnished. These copies have since been prepared, and I have now the honor herewith to transmit them.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

HON. JAMES K. POLK, *Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *October 7, 1837.*

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 22d ultimo, in reference to your redemption from the Creek warriors, of the slaves captured by him.

This measure is sanctioned, and the terms will be complied with by the department.

With respect to the final disposition of the slaves, great care must be taken that, as far as practicable, such of them as are runaways should be restored to their owners. The remainder must be kept in safe custody, and, if possible, in such a manner as will enable them to earn the value of their subsistence till the close of the war, when, if deemed expedient, those belonging to the Indians can be restored to them, the residue remaining for such disposition as may be deemed proper. There does not seem to me to be any authority with the Executive to send them to Africa, but that measure can be recommended to Congress for its sanction.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *October 7, 1837.*

SIR: Your letter of the 25th ultimo has been received. The governor of Alabama has been written to respecting the battalion of volunteers offered by General Moore. Should that gentleman succeed in raising them, the department leaves it to you to take the necessary measures to have them mustered into the service.

Measures have been taken to raise about five hundred men in Philadelphia, to be attached to General Smith's regiment from Louisiana, and it is expected that that number will soon be obtained and take passage for Tampa Bay. All the other troops for the campaign will be sent forward as soon as the transports are ready to convey them.

Brigadier General Wallace, of the Virginia militia, who is represented to be a good officer, has expressed an earnest desire to serve in Florida. He has been told that if he will raise a battalion of volunteers he can accompany them, and that, if practicable, you will give him employment suited to his rank.

Great care should be taken to secure the prisoners captured by General Hernandez. Would it not be well to send them at once out of Florida—to Charleston, for instance, where they could be safely confined till the close of the war?

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *October 12, 1837.*

SIR: In compliance with your wishes, the acting governor of Alabama has been requested to comply with the suggestions contained in your letter of the 2d instant, in respect to the troops, which you say have been raised in north Alabama for service in Florida.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *October 13, 1837.*

SIR: The Cherokee deputation mentioned in my letter of the 4th instant as being likely to proceed to Florida, I request that you will afford such aid as will enable them to proceed on their mission of peace, taking care, however, to send some trusty person and interpreter with them, as to insure a faithful report of all their interviews and proceedings. It is not intended that these negotiations, whatever may be the result of them, should affect or delay your military operations; and the whole matter is confidently committed to your discretion.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *October 14, 1837.*

SIR: The department has confided to Lieutenant Powell, of the navy, the charge of an expedition planned by him to explore, by boats, the everglades, and co-operate with the column destined to move near that part of the peninsula.

He will be furnished with a detachment of one hundred seamen, and the proper officers to command them; and I have to request that you will provide him with one hundred men, to be detached from the army in such manner as to be commanded by officers that will not rank him. He will take with him boats, arms, and all things necessary to prosecute his enterprise; and it is the intention of the department to furnish the detachment with an officer of the topographical corps, in order to give the results of this reconnaissance.

I cannot but believe that this expedition, under the command of an active, enterprising officer, if the materials are well selected, will be attended with important consequences; and I hope that you will extend to Lieutenant Powell all the aid in your power to enable him to prosecute it with advantage.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *October 16, 1837.*

SIR: The bearer, Lieutenant McLean, of the marine corps, has been authorized to raise, in Georgia, a battalion of volunteers for service in Florida. Should he not succeed in accomplishing this object, I have to request that you will give him some command that may be proper, and which he is willing to accept; or, if this be not in your power, that you will attach him to your staff, in some capacity where he may display the desire he entertains of rendering himself useful.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *October 23, 1837.*

SIR: Your letters of the 10th and 15th instant have been received.

It is hoped that the regular troops will be in Florida before this reply reaches you.

If the pilots conduct themselves improperly, their branch or license must be taken from them, and others found and placed in their stead.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *October 27, 1837.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to enclose, for your information, a letter of the Secretary of the Navy in reference to the reporting of two cutters to you.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

S. COOPER, *Acting Secretary of War.*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *October 30, 1837.*

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 17th instant, in reference to the mission of peace from the Cherokees to the Seminoles.

It is not intended that this mission shall delay for an instant the military operations against the Seminoles; and, if you deem it expedient, you may delay sending the Cherokee chiefs to them till you shall have struck a blow. In this, as in all other such matters, you must use your own discretion, in which the department reposes entire confidence.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

J. R. POINSETT.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *October 31, 1837.*

SIR: It gives me great pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22d instant, containing the gratifying intelligence of the capture of Powell, and other important personages of the Seminoles; and I trust that a sufficient number of troops have, by this time, reached Florida, to enable you to act with energy, and to compel the rest of the nation to sue for peace.

I have to request that you will write weekly, at least, to the department, by the opportunity now offered by the steamer Poinsett.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

J. R. POINSETT.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *November 10, 1837.*

SIR: Your letters, dated the 4th of this month, were received yesterday afternoon, but too late to be answered by that day's mail. I hope that the repeated assurances, contained in my former letters, that the acceptance by the department of the proffered mediation of the Cherokees must not in any manner delay your operations, will relieve you from any embarrassment on that account. The object on our part was, if possible, to induce the Florida Indians peaceably to submit to the terms proposed to them by the government, and to fulfil their treaty stipulations, and remove west. Any talk that does not tend to effect that object promptly is idle, and you are at liberty not only to suppress Ross's talk, but to send the Cherokee chiefs home, if they hesitate to urge those terms upon the Seminoles. If they agree to address the Seminoles in language that you approve, you can send your talk with theirs, promising the kindest treatment if they will deliver themselves up. I agree with you entirely that this last effort to spare the further effusion of blood should not be made until the troops are in position. It is our duty to neglect no means of saving this deluded people from the destruction which awaits them if they persist in their obstinacy; but my only hope is an active and vigorous prosecution of the war.

I received, at the same time with your letters of the 4th instant, one of the 29th ultimo.

I should much regret if the expedition confided to Lieutenant Powell cause you any embarrassment, or deprive you of any material part of your force. The service you wish him to perform is at variance with the views of the department in sending him to the Everglades. He shall be again instructed to co-operate with you as far as the two objects are compatible, and, of course, be placed under your orders; but it is expected that he will be permitted to carry out the views of the department, which he will impart to you on his arrival in Florida.

Unwilling, at this distance, to interfere with your plan of campaign, I will confine myself to calling your attention to the importance of capturing the women and children of the hostile Indians.

I hope, by this time, that more officers have joined the army. They shall be sent in as fast as they can be gathered in from the duties in which they were engaged.

I send you a statement of the number of tents sent and on their way to Florida. It is to be hoped they will prove sufficient; but I regret that the army should be without them at the commencement of the campaign.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Number of tents ordered to Florida since August 10, 1837.

Destination.	When ordered.	Hospital tents.	Wall tents.	Common tents.	When turned over to the quartermaster at Philadelphia for shipment.	Hospital tents.	Wall tents.	Common tents.
Garey's Ferry	August 16, 1837.....		20	88	August 31, 1837.....	12	
Do	August 24, 1837.....	12	100	400	Sept. 10, 1837.....		20	*88
Do	Sept. 21, 1837.....	6	50	300	Sept. 27, 1837.....		64	180
Do					Oct. 23, 1837.....		38	†20
Do					Oct. 25, 1837.....	6		†
Tampa Bay.....	August 10, 1837.....		22	67	August 15 and 17, 1837 ..		22	67
Do	August 30, 1837.....	10			Sept. 4, 1837.....	10		
Do	Sept. 21, 1837.....	8	150	900	Oct. 3, 1837.....	8		
Do					Oct. 25, 1837.....		32	

* On board the Hunter; lost on the bar of St. John's.

† Now on their way.

This statement shows the number of tents sent to Florida since the 15th of August last, and is in addition to the number sent there at different times prior to that date.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *December 1, 1837.*

SIR: I received your letter of the 22d ultimo yesterday afternoon, and hasten to say that the great amount of force expected from Georgia was uncalled for, and cannot be retained in the service. Such an additional number of mounted men will break down your army, destroy all the resources of the country, and consume the forage and provisions collected for the supply of the troops calculated for. I consented to receive a larger amount of this description of force than I thought essential to your success, because I did not wish to cripple your operations; but this great and unexpected accession of them will place us here in the unenviable situation of knowing you to be deficient in supplies, without the power of relieving your wants. The estimates were based upon less force, and if an act of appropriation should be delayed the supplies must stop, and the whole army be made to suffer. The number of irregular cavalry which you called for to compose the four columns did not exceed seven hundred men, and the estimates, although made for a much greater number, were not intended to meet so great an increase as you will have in the field at this time.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *December 2, 1837.*

SIR: Alarmed at the immense accumulation of volunteer mounted men in Florida, and seriously apprehensive that we might not have the means of maintaining them in the field, I wrote you a hurried letter yesterday, directing the Georgia militia to be discharged. If, however, you find that you can better spare the Alabama or any other troops, you can select the best. I do not think your operations would be at all retarded, or your army less efficient, by limiting the number of mounted men to two thousand, including the regular cavalry, or, if absolutely necessary for escorts, the number may be carried up to two thousand mounted volunteers. The amount of that description of troops now in the field, if the Georgia volunteers be still there, is more than double that number, which appears to be disproportionate to that of the troops of all other arms, and likely to be productive of great inconvenience and expense. I am not disposed, as you know, to jeopard the success of the campaign by the exercise of an ill-judged economy, but the attention of the public has been called to the immense expenditures occasioned by this war, and they have become a matter of investigation by Congress, and we are called upon by our sense of duty and regard for the reputation of the service to avoid the appearance of lavish or unnecessary expense. I am aware that the most rigid investigation which can be instituted will prove only the faithful and honorable manner in which every branch of the army has discharged its duties in the cabinet and in the field; but if we retain an unreasonable amount of the most expensive description of troops longer than their services are required, we shall be liable to the accusation of disregarding the public interests intrusted to our charge. The manner in which the volunteers have everywhere obeyed the call of their country, and by their eagerness to serve in this war have led their officers to exceed the call made upon the States, is highly creditable to them, and is fully appreciated by this department; and, in declining their services at this moment, it is governed only by a sense of its paramount duty to the country. It has been represented that the volunteers, on entering the service, have had their horses appraised, some at the exorbitant price of three hundred dollars; thus attempting to establish a claim for this unreasonable rate of compensation for any loss they may hereafter sustain. It may be proper to inform all such persons that it is the determination of this department, unless otherwise directed by the laws that may be passed for indemnity against such losses, not to allow more than one hundred and twenty dollars for any cavalry horse that may die in the service. General Jackson, from whom I received a letter this morning, speaks in high terms of the character of the men and officers composing Major Lauderdale's battalion; I have no doubt you will find them highly serviceable, and it may be well to keep this force entire.

Having understood that the irregular cavalry were marching through the country with an extraordinary quantity of baggage, requiring an immense amount of transportation, I have directed the acting

quartermaster general to extend some fixed regulation on that subject, which is not to be departed from by those charged with the administration of that branch of the service.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *December 16, 1837.*

SIR: I had the honor to receive in due season your letter of October 3, stating certain particulars connected with the organizing of the regiment of friendly Creek warriors, and with the appointment of the officers who commanded them, and asking a reconsideration of the decision against paying them according to the ranks they severally held. Press of business has till now prevented me from giving you a reply.

In the cases of these officers the question is not whether they perform well and faithfully the duties of the ranks in which they served, and are in equity entitled to the pay and emoluments of those ranks; on these points there is no doubt. The difficulty arises from the want of legal authority for directing such payments to be made; indeed, such a direction would be directly opposed to the positive injunctions of existing laws; and if the surgeon general, or any other officer, has been paid under similar circumstances, it has been without the knowledge of, or an expression of an opinion by, the department.

The power of the President to organize the Creek regiment as he thought proper in the Territory of Florida is not doubted; but I can find no authority for taking officers of the line from their appropriate commands, and placing them, with increased rank and emoluments, in volunteer corps.

At as early a period as practicable, your request that the subject be referred to Congress shall be complied with.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *January 4, 1838.*

GENERAL: A correspondence has taken place between this department and the governor of Florida, in reference to the payment of certain Florida militia, which you will find designated in the enclosed documents.

I have to request that you will inform me by what authority these troops were called into the service, when the call was made, and what was the necessity for it.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *February 3, 1838.*

SIR: Advices have been received of devastations having been committed by small parties of marauding Indians upon the property of the inhabitants of Middle Florida. You will, therefore, as soon as practicable, direct the commander of the division nearest that part of the Territory to detach a sufficient force for its protection; and give instructions that the troops assembled by Colonel J. Gadsden, for the defence of his neighborhood, be received into the service.

It will be well to give the necessary instructions to the governor of Florida to call out a specified and limited number of men, whenever the occasion may require a resort to such a measure for the protection of West or Middle Florida, unless you are able to detach sufficient force for that purpose from the division in your rear. It is believed that the troops now in Florida are sufficient to enable you to provide for the defence of the entire Territory.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *via Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, October 4, 1836.*

SIR: Your communication of the 21st ultimo, with a copy of Lieutenant Colonel S. Miller's report of his recent movements, has been received, and was submitted to the general-in-chief before my return to the office.

Very respectfully, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

Brevet Major General JESUP, *United States Army, Tallahassee, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, October 8, 1836.*

SIR: If the marine corps shall be required for duty in Florida, the general-in-chief directs that, in conformity with the views of the War Department, you will order it thither; but if otherwise, you will give orders to the commanding officer to march with the whole corps into the Cherokee country, and there report to General Wool, and receive his instructions.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding, &c., Columbus, Georgia.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, October 11, 1836.*

SIR: A copy of your letter to Brigadier General Armstrong, of the Tennessee volunteers, dated 25th August, directing the movement of his brigade to Florida, forwarded under cover of your letter of the 27th September, has been received, and, agreeably to your request, placed upon the files of the office.

Your report of 1st October, in compliance with instructions from the Secretary of War, communicated in my letter of the 27th August, on the subject of Governor Schley's letter to the President, has been submitted to the Acting Secretary of War, and I have no doubt will be entirely satisfactory to all concerned, of which, I presume, you will be duly notified by the proper authority.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding at Fort Mitchell, Alabama.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, October 13, 1836.*

SIR: I have laid before the general-in-chief your communication of the 2d instant, from Fort Mitchell, stating the distribution and assignment of the troops recently operating in Alabama and Georgia under your command. With regard to the absent officers, I am happy to inform you that the President has, within the last week, given positive orders to all absentees to join their regiments, and that the general order on the subject will be immediately issued.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

Brevet Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding, &c., Tallahassee, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, October 7, 1837.*

SIR: I have the pleasure to acknowledge your communications of the 11th September and that of the 31st of August, both of which have been laid before the general-in-chief.

On the subject of *recruits*, it may be satisfactory to inform you what measures have been taken, and what may be the prospect of supplying the army in Florida by the 1st of November.

Instead of the three hundred recruits you desire may be sent to Tampa Bay, five hundred have already embarked at Fort Monroe (on the 27th of September) for that post, being forty less than the number actually required, on the 1st day of September, for the eleven companies of artillery and the fourteen companies of the 4th and 6th regiments of infantry then present on that station, and probably two hundred less than may be required to fill these *twenty-five companies*, say on the 1st of November.

Some days since I understood orders were despatched by Major General Macomb direct to General Eustis to send, probably, all the recruits (say seven hundred and fifty) now at Fort Monroe to *St. Augustine*.

On the 25th of September Lieutenant Colonel Cummings, of the 2d infantry, embarked at Fort Hamilton for *Tampa Bay*, with four full companies and forty-seven recruits, as supernumeraries, intended to supply the vacancies which are anticipated may occur in his battalion during this and all the next month. These supernumeraries, however, you can otherwise dispose of, as you may judge most expedient.

By the 10th or 12th instant Brevet Major Dearborn will proceed to Garey's Ferry, with sixty recruits, to re-enforce his own and Brevet Major Staniford's company, 2d infantry, being sixteen more than those companies actually required to complete the establishment on the 1st of September. He will take also seventeen artillery recruits enlisted by Lieutenant Colonel Crane for one of the companies of his regiment, (the 2d.) Seeing that company A, 2d artillery, has been recently ordered from Tampa Bay to Fort Pike, Louisiana, I have taken measures to fill that company with the recruits enlisted on the Ohio, which have been ordered thither *via* New Orleans.

On the 1st of September forty-eight recruits were present at Baton Rouge, and I have reason to believe that Lieutenant Colonel Foster will, pursuant to instructions he has received, be able to re-organize company A, 4th artillery, (which has been broken up some time since,) and that it will arrive at Tampa Bay by the 20th of October.

From this statement it will be seen that one thousand four hundred and twenty-four recruits have been put in motion for Florida, without counting the number that may be collected on the Ohio for company A, 2d artillery, now at Fort Pike, which, I apprehend, will not exceed thirty or forty recruits.

The 1st regiment of infantry will, on its arrival at Tampa Bay, require not less than two hundred and fifty recruits, the vacancies on the 1st of September being known to be two hundred and eighteen; but, as the largest number of recruits have been ordered to *St. Augustine*, I suppose it will now devolve on you to distribute and assign that body, as it was decided not to adopt the arrangement here suggested and recommended.

I shall continue to look to the wants of the service in Florida, and from time to time hope to despatch the recruits that may be required to keep up the establishment.

I send you a copy of an official memorandum* of the estimate of the regular force calculated to be in Florida by the 1st of November. There is one error, at least, which I have recently discovered. You will have no marines; the order for their withdrawal from Florida was unknown to me, nor is it on the files of the Adjutant General's office.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. JONES

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding Army in Florida, St. Augustine.*

Memoranda accounting for the one thousand four hundred and twenty-four recruits mentioned in the above letter.

Embarked at New York, under Lieutenant Colonel Cummings, 2d infantry.....	47
To sail under Major Dearborn.....	60
	107
For 2d infantry.....	107
Under Lieutenant Duncan, for 2d artillery.....	17
Sailed from Fort Monroe, September 27.....	500
Soon to sail from Fort Monroe.....	750
Ordered from Baton Rouge.....	50
	1,424
Total recruits.....	1,424

Besides the above, forty-four may be collected on the Ohio for company A, 2d artillery, now at Fort Pike.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, October 12, 1837.*

SIR: In acknowledging your communication of the 2d instant, reporting the course pursued with regard to the Seminole chief "Wild Cat," I am desired by the general-in-chief to inform you that it is approved by the Secretary of War.

I have also the pleasure to acknowledge, in due course of mail, your letter of the 23d September, transmitting General Hernandez's report of his affair with the Indians, at the Mosquito, of the 9th and 10th September, and of the capture of Philip and Billy, and other Indians, which has been submitted to the general-in-chief.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding Southern Army, St. Augustine, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, October 13, 1837.*

SIR: Instead of concentrating recruits at Fort Monroe during this month, the superintendent has been ordered to despatch direct all his disposable men to Garey's Ferry, as you will see by my letter to Colonel Cutter of this date, of which an extract is herewith transmitted.

As remarked in my letter of the 7th, of the recruits ordered to St. Augustine, those now to be sent to Garey's Ferry must necessarily be assigned to companies by the orders of the general commanding in Florida, except, perhaps, the detachment of about one hundred and seventy, which I have directed to be assigned to the seven companies of artillery now at Garey's Ferry, and which, on the 1st of September, required one hundred and sixty-seven recruits. This first detachment of about one hundred and seventy will sail from New York on the 16th, and will be commanded by Major Dearborn. The sixty recruits for the two companies of the 2d infantry, with seventeen artillery recruits, were to have sailed yesterday, in charge of Lieutenants Casey and Albertis, who belong to the companies.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

Major General T. S. JESUP, *St. Augustine, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, October 14, 1837.*

SIR: The general-in-chief directs me to inform you that, should you deem it expedient, the company of artillery (E of the 2d) now at Fort Mitchell, Alabama, may be ordered to Florida, or relieved by one of the companies now in the Territory. Should you see fit to do so, you will please to give the necessary orders.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. JONES

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding in Florida, St. Augustine, Florida.*

* Dated August 29.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, October 16, 1837.*

SIR: Your report of the 27th ultimo, from St. Augustine, is this day received and submitted to the general-in-chief.

With respect to the recruits you wished pushed on immediately, I have the pleasure to refer you to my letters of the 7th and 13th instant, by which you are informed that several detachments were put in motion, and it is hoped that some of them will have arrived in Florida before this reaches you.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding, &c., St. Augustine, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, November 3, 1837.*

SIR: I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your several letters, respectively, dated the 19th, 21st, and 23d of October, communicating the highly satisfactory intelligence of the seizure of Powell, Wild Cat, and other influential chiefs, with many Indian warriors of the hostiles, all of which have been laid before the major general.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. JONES.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding, &c., Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, November 10, 1837.*

SIR: In your letter of the 23d ultimo you remark: "If the force were only here now, [the recruits,] the war, I am sure, might be closed in two weeks, but I fear it will not arrive until the time of action shall have passed;" and, in your previous letter, (of the 21st,) you regret that a portion of the expected force had not arrived early in October, so as to have enabled you to re-establish the posts of Volusia and Fort Mellon. As regards *the time* of the arrival of the fresh troops intended for the service in Florida, I have been directed by Major General Macomb to inform you that the Secretary of War, being well acquainted with the southern climate, after mature deliberation, deemed it most prudent to defer the departure of the re-enforcement drawn from the seaboard to the latest period consistent with its timely arrival for the campaign, which, you are aware, he had decided should not be opened (designedly on our side) sooner than in the first week of November. The health of the troops, deemed by all of the first importance in a vigorous prosecution of the campaign, as well as to justify the hope of a successful issue, dictated the policy of the delay to which you have referred.

An earlier concentration of fresh troops during the sickly season, in unhealthy parts of Florida, the Secretary considers to be extremely hazardous, and, therefore, it has not been permitted.

I am gratified to be able to say that more than 1,000 recruits, the greater part well instructed, will have reached Garey's Ferry probably by the first day of this month; and, save the dangers of the sea, about 1,100 good infantry of the line, part instructed recruits, will have arrived at Tampa Bay in all October. Colonel Twiggs, with 230 well-mounted dragoons of the 2d regiment, ought to reach Jacksonville, Florida, by the 31st of October, and another detachment, perhaps equal to a company, not mounted, which proceeded from Jefferson Barracks to Tampa Bay, *via* New Orleans, ought now to be there.

Herewith I respectfully annex a copy of the official statement A, of the regular force in Florida on the *1st day of October*, taken from the September returns, and also the additional regular force which has joined and been ordered to re-enforce the Florida army. You will see I make your effective force, army and marine corps, 3,787, but say 3,500, which exceeds your estimate mentioned in your communication of the 21st ultimo by 1,500. Should the statement prove more correct than your estimate, I am sure no one will be more gratified than yourself, as your force would exceed your expectation.

On the 28th of October, 54 recruits sailed from Fort Monroe, and on the 3d instant 151 recruits embarked at New York for Garey's Ferry, and I hope 250 more may sail before the close of the month. Brevet Major McClintock and several subalterns, with about 100 soldiers of the Florida army, who are restored to health and now at Fort Hamilton, are under orders for Garey's Ferry.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

Brevet Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding Army in Florida, Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

A.

Memoranda of the regular troops and marines serving in Florida on the 30th of September, 1837, agreeably to returns received at the Adjutant General's office, and also of the recruits and other regular force ordered to re-enforce the Florida army.

Regiment.	Number of companies.	Present for duty.	Present on extra duty.	Present in arrest.	Present sick.	Total present.	Absent on service and leave.	Total present and absent.	No. of recruits required.
Second dragoons.....	7	180	7	6	60	253	87	340	157
First artillery.....	9	108	31	4	23	166	42	208	287
Second artillery.....	7	135	34	9	27	205	38	243	142
Third artillery.....	9	160	23	10	37	230	33	263	232
Fourth artillery.....	9	132	49	8	40	229	44	273	222
Second infantry.....	2	41	2	3	10	56	4	60	42
Fourth infantry.....	8	156	56	6	77	265	84	349	63
Sixth infantry.....	7	65	13	1	13	92	37	129	232
Marines.....		105	46	4	15	170	15	185
Total in Florida.....	58	1,082	231	51	302	1,666	384	2,050	1,377
RE-ENFORCEMENT SENT TO FLORIDA.									
Second dragoons.....	*	235	235	105	340	†
First infantry.....	10	177	13	36	66	292	6	298	217
Second infantry.....	4	204	204	204
Total.....	14	616	13	36	66	731	111	842	217
Recruits.....		1,693	1,693	205	1,898	1,472
Aggregate regular force.....	72	3,391	244	87	368	4,090	700	4,790

* Three companies and detachment.

† Surplus, 122.

REMARKS.

1. Of the total regular force in Florida, reported "present and absent," on the 30th September, to wit: 2,050, 300 discharges on account of expiration of service, will take place, inclusive of the 31st of December; but an equal or greater number of recruits will be forwarded during the next forty days, and it is calculated they will join faster than discharges will take place. [Of this number of discharges, (300,) those of the 1st regiment of infantry are included.]

2. Of the 384 absentees of the veteran part of the Florida army, as stated on the 30th of September, more than one hundred will have left Fort Hamilton and Fort Monroe before the 13th instant. Of the 111 absentees of the fresh troops, of which 105 are of the 2d dragoons under Colonel Twiggs, it is probable more than one-half may join. Of the 205 recruits reported "absent," all may reach Florida by the 15th or 20th instant, 54 of that number having sailed from Fort Monroe on the 26th and 27th of October, and 151 on the 3d instant embarked from New York.

3. The fresh troops which may be considered "present" on the 31st October, should the transports have reached their destination in safety, may then be computed as follows:

Mounted detachment of 2d dragoons from Jefferson Barracks (3 companies) under Colonel Tompkins	235
First regiment of infantry, say.....	250
Four companies of the 2d infantry, under Lieutenant Colonel Cummings.....	204

Total.....	689
Recruits.....	1,693

Fresh troops and recruits present in Florida, November 1.....	2,382
Add 205 recruits now at sea.....	205

Total number of the additional regular force sent to Florida..... 2,587

4. To this fresh regular force (2,587) add, of the veteran force in Florida, for service in the field or garrison, say..... 1,200

Total regular effective force for the Florida campaign..... 3,787

It is hoped the above available force may be realized; the data seem to justify it.

[Note.—To be under rather than over the computed efficient force, call it 3,500 instead of 3,787.]

R. JONES, Adjutant General.

NOVEMBER 9, 1837.

Memoranda of the number of recruits ordered to re-enforce the army serving under the orders of Major General Jesup in Florida.

FROM NEW YORK HARBOR.

47 under Colonel Cummings, sailed September 25 for Tampa Bay.
 60 under Lieutenant Casey, for second infantry, (F and K,) sailed October 12 for Garey's Ferry.
 17 artillery recruits sailed October 17 for Garey's Ferry.
 235 under Major Dearborn, sailed October 17 for Garey's Ferry.
 151 under Lieutenant Allen, second artillery, sailed November 3 for Garey's Ferry.

Total, 510 recruits from New York.

FROM FORT MONROE.

500 for Tampa Bay, September 27.
 20 under Lieutenant Mackall, October 2.
 704 for Garey's Ferry, October 15 and 16.
 54 for Garey's Ferry, October 28.

Total, 1,278 recruits sailed from Fort Monroe in September and October.

RECRUITS DESPATCHED BY WAY OF THE OHIO AND MISSISSIPPI.

*60 from Newport, Kentucky, under Lieutenant Ruggles, to Fort Pike, October 19.
 50 from Baton Rouge, under Colonel Foster, at New Orleans.

Total, 110 on the 19th, on the way to Tampa for company A, fourth infantry.

RECAPITULATION.

From New York.....	510
From Fort Monroe.....	1, 278
From Newport, Kentucky.....	60
From Baton Rouge, Louisiana.....	50
Whole number of recruits sent to Florida from September 25 to November 3.....	1, 889
Deduct 41 recruits which joined company A, second artillery, at Fort Pike.....	41
	<u>1, 857</u>
	340
	<u>2, 197</u>

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *November 9, 1837.*

Memoranda of recruits sent to Florida since the above statement.

80 recruits from New York, under Lieutenant Duncan, sailed for Garey's Ferry November 27, 1837.
 170 recruits from New York, under Captain Backus, sailed for Garey's Ferry (*via Savannah*) December 9, 1837.
 (25 invalids from Fort Hamilton November 27, and 80, under Major McClintock, November 23.)
 90 recruits for the first infantry, under command of Lieutenant William Hoffman, sixth infantry, and Lieutenant Wooster, fourth artillery, sailed from Fort Monroe on the 20th of December for Tampa Bay, Florida, (schooner *Empire*.)

Total, 340

R. JONES.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, December 7, 1837.*

SIR: The enclosed letter of November 28, to the Secretary of War, from Britton Evans, captain United States volunteers, is respectfully referred to Major General Jesup by direction of the general-in-chief.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

Major General JESUP, *Commanding Army of the South, Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

* Company A, second artillery, recently ordered from Tampa Bay, and now temporarily stationed at Fort Pike, Louisiana, will be filled up from this detachment of recruits, and the rest sent to Florida.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, December 13, 1837.*

SIR: From the tenor of your recent communications, relative to the sufficiency of your present force, the general-in-chief considers that it will be unnecessary at this time to send more recruits for the army in Florida. Since my letter of November 10, 250 recruits have been despatched, (170 for Tampa Bay, *via* Garey's Ferry,) and about 70 more will in a few days sail direct from Fort Monroe for that post with instructions that they be assigned to the first regiment of infantry, which is greatly reduced. The artillery and infantry being pretty well re-enforced, unless you should think it expedient to request more recruits, our efforts will now be directed to filling the ranks of the other regiments.

Your letter of the 27th ultimo, relative to the remarks contained in your letter of *October 23*, (answered November 10,) has been submitted to the general-in-chief; and if your remarks were misapprehended at the time, the letter just received satisfactorily explains your intention; and, agreeably to your request, it has been filed away with your prior letter dated *October 23*.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

Major General JESUP, *Commanding the Army in Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, December 22, 1837.*

SIR: Your communication of the 2d instant, covering the proceedings of a general court-martial in the case of Lieutenant George Forsyth, second dragoons, which sentences him to be dismissed the service of the United States, has been received and submitted to the Secretary of War, by whom they have been duly considered and approved.

I am directed by the general-in-chief to say that, at the instance of his friends, the Secretary of War has thought proper to offer Mr. Forsyth the alternative of resigning his commission instead of promulgating the sentence of the court. You are accordingly desired to inform Mr. Forsyth that you are authorized to accept and forward his resignation.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

Major General JESUP, *Commanding Army of the South, Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, January 4, 1838.*

SIR: The Secretary of War directs that *Henry Edwards*, a recruit of the army, who was one of the detachment conducted to Garey's Ferry by Major Dearborn, be discharged from the service. You will please to give the necessary orders accordingly.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

Major General JESUP, *Commanding Army of the South, Fort Mellon, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, January 4, 1838.*

SIR: The Secretary of War directs that officers who have the superintendance of clothing depots in Florida be each allowed a non-commissioned officer or soldier of the army to assist them in the performance of their clerical duties. You will please to give the necessary orders in the case.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

Major General JESUP, *Fort Mellon, Florida.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, January 23, 1838.*

SIR: I herewith respectfully enclose a copy of my letter of this date to Brevet Major McClintock, by which you will see that the general-in-chief considers it unnecessary to take further action in the case, as heretofore indicated might be proper by my communication of the 27th of November.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Commanding the Army in Florida, Fort Mellon.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, January 25, 1838.*

SIR: Mrs. Thompson, the widow of the lamented Colonel Thompson, is very desirous to obtain, if practicable, the remains of her husband, who has recently fallen in Florida, for the purpose of having them removed to the city of New York; and so far as the army can, consistently with the practice of the service, lend its aid for the accomplishment of this object, the general-in-chief would be gratified to see it exerted. Any assistance, therefore, which the commanding officer most convenient to the place of interment of the remains of Colonel Thompson can render upon this occasion, it is not doubted, will be promptly accorded whenever the friends of the deceased may take the initiatory measures necessary for

the purpose. I will send a copy of this letter to General Armistead, or the commanding officer at Tampa Bay, for his information, &c.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding Southern Army, Fort Mellon, Florida.*

HEADQUARTERS, *Apalachicola, October 13, 1836.*

SIR: I arrived here yesterday evening, in nine days from Fort Mitchell, and shall depart to-day for Tampa Bay with about three hundred regular troops and Washington volunteers. The marines and other troops, amounting to between three and four hundred, will follow as soon as they can get down the river. The operations in Florida will be greatly retarded for want of supplies. Colonel Lane writes me that there are barely sufficient at Tampa Bay for its present garrison. The rapid fall of the Chattahoochee prevented me from getting down as many supplies as I expected to send or take from Columbus and Fort Mitchell; but I have ordered from New Orleans all that may be necessary. They cannot arrive, however, before the 1st of November. In the meantime, the most that can be accomplished with the means at our disposal shall be effected. I can hardly express to you the embarrassment I have felt and still experience for want of officers in every branch of service—in the medical department particularly. I have often to send off detachments without any medical attendance whatsoever. Not one of the medical officers promised by the surgeon general has joined me. I shall consider it my duty to bring them to trial for their delay the moment they join.

Letters addressed to me at St. Mark's will reach me sooner than if directed to any other post, as I shall establish a communication by steamboats between that place and Tampa Bay.

Lane has had a handsome affair with the Indians, and he reports that the country about Tampa Bay is clear of them for twenty miles around.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. C. A. HARRIS, *Acting Secretary of War, Washington City.*

ST. MARK'S, *Florida, October 23, 1836.*

SIR: I arrived here to-day, on my way to Apalachicola, to hasten forward the troops and supplies. A large steambot, loaded with forage and subsistence, has been recently sunk at Pensacola; the supplies must be replaced, which will cause delay. Governor Call, I am informed, is at Fort Drane, actively engaged in forming a depot of forage and subsistence, preparatory to a forward movement. I shall concentrate at the mouth of the Withlacoochee, if practicable, the regular troops from the Creek country with the Alabama volunteers; if the measure be found impracticable, from the inaccessibility of that river, I shall concentrate them at Tampa Bay, and the moment the necessary pack-horses can be obtained I shall move forward to co-operate with the governor.

I have this moment received the disressing intelligence of the death of Colonel Lane, of the Indian regiment. In a moment of temporary derangement of mind he put a period to his existence. I never met a man of more professional promise; his loss will be severely felt on the campaign; I have not been able to learn the particulars of his death.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General.*

Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS, *Volusia, December 5, 1836.*

SIR: After a rapid march of between five and six days I arrived here last night from Tampa Bay, where I found Governor Call, with the Tennessee brigade, the Indian regiment, and a few regular troops and Florida volunteers, amounting, all together, to about two thousand men.

Your instructions to me of the 4th ultimo, to take the command of the troops in Florida and the direction of the war against the Seminoles, have not yet been received, but Governor Call has given me a copy of them, and will turn over the command to me the moment the necessary returns can be prepared. I shall enter upon the duties assigned me without the confidence of success entertained by the members of the government, or the hope of fulfilling the expectations of the President or the country. All that man can do shall be done, but I can promise nothing more than to do my duty faithfully; other troops will be required, and that immediately, otherwise a failure is inevitable. The term of service of at least two hundred of the regular troops will, I am told, expire in the course of this and the next month, and not a man will re-enlist. The term of service of the Tennessee brigade will expire, a part on the 18th and the remainder on the 31st of the present month, and they will insist on going home. I shall then be left with troops barely sufficient to defend the necessary depots, without any for active service in the field.

I requested the governor of Alabama, some time ago, to detach a force of five companies, either volunteers or drafted militia, for service in this Territory; and also to complete Lieutenant Colonel Cawfield's battalion of twelve months' volunteers to a regiment. I also requested Governor Schley, of Georgia, to detach a regiment of twelve months' volunteers, the services of which had been offered me last fall, but which I did not then feel myself authorized to accept. I have not heard from either of the governors, probably from the difficulty of communications reaching me. If the force asked from them should be sent me, it will supply the place of the Tennesseans; and if the sixth regiment, now on Red river, could be ordered to Tampa Bay, it would supply the place of the discharges, and enable me,

perhaps, to end the war this winter. This post I find entirely out of position, but as supplies are already collected here I must use it as a depot. Fort King is also out of position; but as you have directed that it be occupied, I shall re-establish it if I can spare troops to garrison it. I have already established a depot twenty-five miles in advance of Tampa Bay, on the road to Fort King, and propose to establish another on the same road at the point which crosses the Withlacoochee. I shall also establish a post at Punta Rassa, near the mouth of the Sangbell river, which falls into Charlotte harbor; but to effect these important and absolutely necessary objects, force is required. A post has been established by Governor Call on the Withlacoochee, twenty miles above its mouth. If the Indians should remain on that river, another post must be placed near the cove. With these posts established and supplied, the war may be carried on successfully by light detachments, operating without baggage, and striking the enemy promptly and unexpectedly wherever he may be found.

As an act of justice to Governor Call, I take the occasion to remark, and I stake my professional reputation on the correctness of the remark, that no man could, under the circumstances in which he has been placed, have accomplished more than he has done. He had the summer, it is said in the public prints, to make his arrangements for a winter campaign; but he could not establish depots without force to defend them, and it is to be observed that he entered upon the command under circumstances of embarrassment which did not exist when the campaign of last year commenced. He found the country exhausted, not only all the positions occupied during the campaign abandoned, but the whole country, from the Suwanee to the Atlantic, except Tampa Bay and St. Augustine, occupied by the enemy. His plan of campaign was admirable, but there were circumstances which he could not control that prevented its execution. If I should fail, (and unless I have more force I certainly shall,) the country can be completely defended by mounted rangers only, in connexion with the depots which I propose to establish. The rangers should be raised during the present winter, and should have a rate of pay to command the services of the best men. The pay of the regular troops, including the officers, should be doubled, to secure them the ordinary comforts during their service in Florida. Let me entreat you, as you regard the best interests of the service, to impress upon Congress the necessity of putting the army upon a better footing. I wish nothing myself, and if justice can be done to my brave companions I will cheerfully serve out the campaign without pay or emoluments. I shall commence operations immediately with the utmost vigor which the means at my command will permit, and shall keep you constantly advised of my progress.

With high consideration and respect, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. B. F. BUTLER, *Acting Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Volusia, Florida, December 12, 1836.*

SIR: A sufficient supply of subsistence having been received yesterday to enable me to move with twenty days' rations, the army will march to-day. The advance is now moving. At the Ocklawaha I shall have the choice of two objects: Micanopy, who is about thirty miles south of the point where I shall cross that river, and Powell, who is fifty miles southwest of it.

I propose, after placing the train safely across the Ocklawaha, to leave a sufficient force to protect it, and with the remainder make a forced march and strike either Micanopy or Powell; and if successful with the first, immediately attack the other.

My movements are not in accordance with my own judgment; they are controlled by the necessity of availing myself of the few days that yet remain of the term of service of the Tennessee brigade, and I am therefore compelled to march on their route to the mouth of the Withlacoochee, where they expect to embark for New Orleans on their way home. This movement will enable me to strike at the two chiefs mentioned above, and to cover the frontier; but had I the control of my measures, I could employ the force to much more advantage in a succession of attacks along the Ocklawaha, and thence down the Withlacoochee.

Without a strong corps of wagon-drivers, muleteers, and laborers, it is almost impossible to act efficiently in this country. The southern militia do no labor for themselves, and consequently cannot, or will not, labor for the public. The regular troops are on constant fatigue duty; and a road leading from camp, and on which we are to march to-day, requiring repair, I sent instructions to General Armstrong last night to move forward with his brigade, and cause the necessary repairs to be made. He replied that it would be impossible, as his men would not work. I shall therefore be compelled to put this labor upon the regular troops; at the same time that I consider southern volunteers inefficient for many purposes, it is due to them to say that they are efficient whenever rapid marches are to be made or an enemy to be fought. Add to them such a corps as I propose, and you make them efficient for every purpose.

Cannot the 6th regiment of infantry, and the companies of the 2d regiment of dragoons already raised, be sent to Florida? Volunteers can be more readily obtained for service on the southwestern frontier than for Florida.

I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. B. F. BUTLER, *Acting Secretary of War, Washington City.*

FORT BROOKE, *December 23, 1836.*

SIR: After writing to you on the 18th instant, I ascertained from my Indian scouts and spies, whom I had kept constantly employed in scouring the country, that not a sign of hostile Indians could be discovered at or near any of their strongholds on the Withlacoochee. All the trails are in a southeasterly direction, and Powell, if he has not been deserted by his followers, has probably determined to draw the war into the neighborhood of Micanopy, Jumper, and Philip, to compel them to adhere to him with their warriors.

As the enemy could not be found where we expected him, and the term of service of the Tennessee volunteers having expired, I determined to avail myself of the movement of that corps to send the wagon train to Tampa Bay for supplies for the depots which I had found it necessary to establish.

I left Brigadier General Armistead in command of the forces on the Withlacoochee, with orders to scour the country from Fort King to that river, and to take the most active measures to find the enemy; and I came through with a small escort to Fort Foster, for the purpose of designating the points to be occupied as depots, in addition to those already established. I have ordered Lieutenant Colonel Foster to erect a work on the Withlacoochee, at the place where the Fort King road crosses it. It will be completed in a few days, and a wagon train will leave here to-morrow to supply it with subsistence, forage, tools, &c. Learning by express from Colonel Henderson of the arrival of Commodore Dallas, I came hither to arrange with him a plan of combined operations for the campaign; he is several miles below, but I expect him here to-day.

I have established an abundant depot at Fort Foster, twenty-five miles in advance of this place; the fort which Lieutenant Colonel Foster is erecting on the Withlacoochee is twenty-nine miles in advance of Fort Foster. Fort Armstrong is fifteen miles further north, near the point where the road from Volusia unites with the road to Fort King; the two latter posts command the principal retreats of the enemy on the Withlacoochee; and that at Volusia will be sufficient for the present.

Should it become necessary to re-establish Fort King, I will cause a strong work to be erected, which may be built by a few men, and supply it from Fort Drane. The moment my depots shall be filled, which will be in a few days, small as my force is I shall commence active operations in the field, and shall prosecute them with the utmost vigor until I either beat the enemy or be beaten by him.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Armstrong, January 19, 1837.*

SIR: I have this moment arrived at this post in advance of the troops, having completely swept the swamps and hammocks of the Withlacoochee from the Fort King road to Fort Clinch, and I am positive that there are no parties of Indians exceeding ten warriors on the river or in its neighborhood.

The prisoners represent Powell as flying from one hiding-place to another with only three warriors. I returned hither with a small escort to make arrangements, in anticipation of the arrival of the troops, to carry on an expedition against the Indians on the headwaters of the Ocklawaha; in that expedition I had calculated on the co-operation of the 6th regiment of infantry, and its aid will be necessary. Seven companies of the regiment have arrived, but Major Thompson, who commands, has received orders to-day to return to the Texas frontier; if he return immediately, I must abandon the proposed expedition. I consider it of too much importance in its bearing upon the successful result of the campaign to be given up, and I therefore feel it to be my duty to retain the regiment until its place be supplied by other troops.

I detached Lieutenant Colonel Foster from Fort Clinch, with five hundred regular troops, Georgia volunteers, and Indian warriors, against the Tallahassee and Ogechee Indians, who had fled from the Withlacoochee and have established themselves in the swamps south of the mouth of the Withlacoochee; and, in consequence of information from Fort Drane, I was compelled to detach Major McClintock with the 3d artillery to that post.

A small battalion of Alabama drafts have arrived at Tampa Bay, but I cannot use them for any military purpose in consequence of the measles prevailing among them.

The dragoons promised in a communication from the adjutant general had not arrived when I last heard from the officer commanding at Garey's Ferry, nor had the South Carolina drafts.

The Indian warriors are sickly, and will leave the service on the last of this month, in order to make arrangements to arrive in Arkansas in time to plant corn for the next season.

I have some reason to complain that orders should be published directing recruits in large numbers to join, when the men have not been enlisted. A wrong impression is thus produced upon the public mind; and where error has gotten the start, it is difficult for truth to overtake it.

The service is a most arduous one in Florida, so much so that not a man whose term of service expires will re-enlist.

I am happy to find that you have recommended a bounty in land to the soldiers; it should, in strict justice, be extended to the regimental and junior staff officers.

With high consideration and respect, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Dade, Florida, February 25, 1837.*

SIR: Since my letter of the 20th instant, several principal chiefs of the Seminole tribe of Indians have been here. I spent the greater part of the 23d and 24th either in conferences with them individually, or in council with them collectively. Hohahtoochee, the second chief of the nation, brother and heir of Micanopy, represented the nation. He declared that the Indians were tired of war, and were anxious to be upon terms of peace and friendship with their white brothers; but they were at present so much dispersed that he had not been able to collect all the chiefs, and could give me no answer as to their determination in regard to emigration. Micanopy desired him to say to me that the army had driven him into a *bad swamp*, distant from the good land on which he had formerly lived, and he hoped to be permitted to remain there. I replied that I was ready to give him and his people peace, and that the United States would execute the treaty in good faith which had been made with them, and that they would be secured in their lives and property; but that he and his chiefs and warriors must distinctly understand that emigration was an indispensable condition; that I would not discuss any proposition which was not based upon that

condition. He replied that he was not instructed by Micanopy on that point, but that he, as well as the whole nation, was desirous of peace. I informed him that I could treat only with Micanopy; that I had expected that chief on the 18th, and had been disappointed; that I expected him still, and would not make peace unless he would come in. Hohahtoochee promised that Micanopy would come in, and appointed next Saturday, 4th of March, as the day on which he should appear.

In the meantime the hostile Indians north of the Withlacoochee and the road to Volusia are to be withdrawn to the south of that line, and are not to pass to the north of it until peace shall have taken place or hostilities be recommenced; nor are they to go to the east of the St. John's.

Twelve hostages, one of them a nephew of Micanopy, have been left with me, and the chiefs started to-day on their return to Micanopy.

As I am sure that force alone will compel the Indians to emigrate, I consider it my duty to continue the most active preparations for immediate operations; and, if negotiation should fail, I shall be able to take the field with every means and equipment complete on the 5th of March.

At least five hundred warriors were represented by the chiefs present, and as I have twenty-seven negro prisoners, the property of Micanopy, I entertain strong hopes that he will come in, and this perplexing and harassing war be brought to a close.

I promise nothing, however, but unremitting exertions; and I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Dade, March 7, 1837.*

SIR: When the Indian regiment was raised in the Creek country for service in Florida, it was distinctly understood by *them*, as well as by *me*, that they were to be allowed to return to Alabama in time to remove to the country assigned to them west of the Mississippi before the season for planting their corn. I have found it necessary to retain them in the service up to this time, and it is important that they remain until the Seminoles remove. Had they left me on the 1st of February, according to the assurances given to them, I must have called into service at least two regiments of militia or volunteers to have taken their places, at a heavy expense; besides, there would have been much loss of time in discharging the Indians and bringing into service the militia. From a careful consideration of all the circumstances in which I found myself, as well as from the situation of the enemy, and the nature of the country in which we were operating, I was decidedly of opinion that sound policy, as well as considerations of economy, made it proper to retain the Indian force. To induce them to remain, I assured them that if they should be detained beyond the planting season, the United States would not only subsist them for twelve months after their arrival west, but, in addition to that period, until the time of gathering their crops next year. By the arrangement which I have made with them a considerable sum will be saved to the treasury in the end; and I respectfully ask that it be approved by the department.

I have put under cover to the adjutant general the articles of capitulation of the Seminole nation.

I have allowed them liberal terms, in which I have consulted good policy as well as humanity. To have permanent peace, the conquered should be satisfied that we intend to deal justly by them. To prevent any bad faith on their part, or to punish it if attempted, I consider it to be my duty to be prepared to strike at once, and with decisive effect. I therefore continue active preparations for the field.

Captain Harris, of the marine corps, is the bearer of this communication, as well as of that to the adjutant general. He is one of the most deserving officers in the service, and I earnestly recommend him to the favorable notice of the government.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Dade, Florida, March 15, 1837.*

SIR: I had the honor to receive, on the evening of the 13th instant, your letter of the 11th ultimo. It came by the way of St. Mark's, thence by ship to Fort Brooke, and by express to this place.

The Indians are entirely quiet; about a hundred and twenty have come into this place and Fort Brooke, and I expect others daily. By prudence and firmness on the part of the military, further hostilities may be prevented, unless the citizens of the country should act with imprudent violence; but it is doubtful whether a large body of them can be induced to emigrate. The chiefs, I believe, intend to act in good faith; but it is doubtful whether they will have influence sufficient to control the young warriors. If I should find that the emigration of the whole body cannot be effected, rather than risk the renewal of hostilities on the approach of the sickly season, I shall endeavor to send off those who may be willing to go, and perhaps permit the remainder to plant corn and remain until autumn. With the knowledge we have acquired of the country, if it were now the first of October, we could force the whole nation to emigrate; but it is doubtful whether it can be effected now. If any be permitted to remain, they will be required to take a position south of Pease creek, and not be allowed to go to the north of the prescribed line, on the penalty of being considered hostile. I have directed Lieutenant Colonel Harney to reoccupy Fort Mellon, on Lake Monroe, and build storehouses and collect supplies, so that in the event of the renewal of hostilities, I shall be able to move into the heart of the enemy's country, and remain there.

The depots of Fort Foster, Fort Dade, Fort Armstrong, and Fort Drane, are well supplied; so is the depot at Fort Clinch, near the mouth of the Withlacoochee, and of Fort Call, at Volusia. There should be a depot in advance of Tampa Bay, on the route to Pease creek, and another at the mouth of the Coloosahatchee; but I cannot spare force to occupy them. I hope they will not be necessary.

With high consideration, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. B. F. BUTLER, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, April 9, 1837.*

SIR: I had the honor to receive, yesterday, your two letters of the 20th ultimo.

The war, I hope, is over; at all events, there is but little danger of a renewal of hostilities, if the troops be held in readiness for immediate action, and the inhabitants of Florida act with ordinary prudence. Should, however, any attempt be made to seize the Indian negroes, or to arrest any of the chiefs or warriors, either as criminals or debtors, an immediate resort to arms would be the consequence.

Several of the principal chiefs are in this neighborhood, with detachments of their people. Micanopy, Holatoochee, Yaholoochee, (Cloud,) Coacochee, (Wildcat,) John Cawiga, and several sub-chiefs and warriors, left me yesterday for the emigrating camp. Coacochee is the son of Philip, the principal chief on the St. John's river; his influence is greater than that of his father; he is decidedly the most talented man I have seen among the Seminoles, and should, and no doubt will, be the principal chief of the nation. He promises that Abiaca, the chief of the Mickasukies, with his people, shall come in. He returns to the St. John's to collect his cattle, and will start his father and all his people immediately to the emigrating camp.

The chiefs entered into an engagement yesterday to surrender the negroes taken during the war. They will deliver them to the commanding officer of the posts on the St. John's.

The Indians, generally, will emigrate; but the measure will be tedious, and, in all its preliminary steps, expensive. A few thousand dollars judiciously applied, as a compensation to the chiefs of energy and influence, would save, in the end, I am persuaded, fifty times the amount thus expended.

When the emigration of the greater part of the nation shall have been effected, strolling vagabonds will remain, probably, and annoy the frontier inhabitants. To restrain them, I propose to re-establish Fort King, and establish a post between Fort Drane and the Suwanee. Fort Drane being in a very unhealthy section of the country, its garrison must be withdrawn early in June.

One or two posts, with small garrisons, may probably be required on the Atlantic coast south of St. Augustine.

The garrisons of Forts Mellon and Call must be withdrawn by the 1st of June, in consequence of the unhealthiness of the sites of those forts.

In regard to the topographical information which you require of me, it becomes my duty to report to you that although two officers of the topographical corps had been assigned to my command by orders published to the army, and both actually reported to me, one was withdrawn without entering upon duty, and the other a few days after he joined me. I have, therefore, but few materials for a topographical sketch and memoir of the country which has been the scene of my operations.

I came hither without any knowledge of the country, and there were no guides to be obtained on whose information any reliance could be placed. The only guides from whom correct information has been obtained are Indians and negroes whom I captured.

We have possessed Florida sixteen years; during the whole of that period we have had a topographical corps on the register, and borne on the army returns; but the officers have been taken from their appropriate duties and employed upon those purely civil; the consequence is that we have, perhaps, as little knowledge of the interior of Florida as of the interior of China.

I have directed my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Linnard, to collect and arrange such data as are accessible, with a view of making as complete a report on the subject as practicable.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS, *Tampa Bay, Florida, April 11, 1837.*

SIR: I had the honor to receive this morning your letter of the 27th of March, approving the arrangement made with the Creek chiefs for the subsistence of themselves and families after their arrival at their new homes in the west.

I received yesterday evening official information of the removal of the families of the Creek warriors to Mobile Point. I had been previously informed of the excitement in the Creek country, and had seen an account in the newspapers of the removal of the Creek families, but was not aware of the brutal treatment which those families had been compelled to submit to until I received the reports of Lieutenants Reynolds and Sloan to Major Wilson, whom I had sent to Mobile Point to inquire into the circumstances preceding and attending the removal, copies of which are enclosed.

I have explained to the chiefs that the measure adopted was the only one by which their families, and those of their warriors, could be secured from insult. Some are satisfied, but others are not; and what effect their dissatisfaction may have on the Seminoles, I am not prepared to say.

The Creek families were plundered of the greater part of their property, and it is no more than justice that they be remunerated. I will endeavor to satisfy them, if possible, and send them off by detachments, as I get the Seminoles off.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

FORT MORGAN, *Mobile Point, March 31, 1837.*

MAJOR: In obedience to your call for information respecting the causes which led to the removal of the families of the Indian warriors now in Florida from the Creek nation, and the losses sustained by them in consequence of such removal, I have to state, in answer to the first, that I am entirely ignorant as to any just cause for such a measure. My Indians were perfectly friendly and obedient—were ever ready to carry into effect any measure or requirement I might deem necessary to make—with the exception

of a few residing near to the late chief Tuskeneha's residence, and they were not at all times otherwise disposed; but at periods, when Tuskeneha put forth his influence, under the guidance of *some few designing white men*, I have had trouble. When the settlers became agitated by the depredations committed on the plantation of Dr. Battle, on Cowiga creek, I deemed it prudent and proper to allay their fears by calling in their rifles. I appointed a day for that purpose, and attended in person for the reception of those of Jim Boy's and Elkabajo's warriors: all were forthcoming. The day subsequent was allotted for the handing in of Tuskeneha's people. From the previous conduct of Tuskeneha, I was apprehensive my requirements would not be complied with, in which event Mr. Felton, my principal assistant, was directed to repair to Tuskegee, and report the result. My anticipations being realized, I arrested Tuskeneha that night, and brought him to Tuskegee, where he was detained three days, during which period twenty-one rifles were handed in, and he made perfectly sensible of his situation. He was permitted to return to his house, since when I have experienced not the slightest difficulty; he has done much towards bringing his people into camp. These facts were duly reported to Captain Page, the emigrating Creek agent and commanding officer of the nation.

On the evening of the 9th of February, after the warriors of Lieutenant Sloan's camp had been placed on the pickets at Tuskegee, a company, under Captain Harrold, returning by the old Federal road, halted at the house of Anne Cornell, a half-breed Indian, secured and carried away two free negroes and an Indian boy, besides setting fire to and wholly destroying all her houses, fodder stacks, and movable property generally, including three hundred dollars in bank bills. This, sir, I have from the suffering woman herself, and who is now on the Point, subject to interrogation by yourself. The stolen Indian, I am happy to say, subsequently made his escape, and is also with me.

On the 19th ultimo I was informed a body of troops, under the command of Captain Welbourn, usually styled general, were within two miles of my camp, whither it was their intention to repair for the purpose of scouring it, and making prisoners of all the warriors. Captain Brodman was the bearer of Captain Welbourn's intention, and also a request for me to meet him at Durant's stage stands, on the edge of Calleby swamp. Fearful some depredations might be committed upon the Indians, I repaired without loss of time to the place appointed, and, much to my chagrin and mortification, found some six or eight of my warriors already prisoners.

I demanded of Captain Welbourn his authority for thus invading my camp. His reply was, **THE PEOPLE**. I solemnly protested against the measure, that it was unnecessary and impolitic; the faith of the government was pledged to the warriors in Florida, that those remaining behind should be wholly unmolested by the citizens, and placed under the protection of the government; that I was the agent sent them by the government, and felt bound, and was determined, to protect the Indians. I was then given to understand the object of their march would be accomplished, notwithstanding my protest. I then begged Captain Welbourn to appoint a committee to wait on me at the issuing-house at three o'clock p. m., when I would pledge myself to present all the warriors of my camp. To this they also objected, and were still determined to drive the camps. Finding such to be their purpose, I deemed it prudent to co-operate with them, in order to prevent alarm, and save the Indians from being driven into the swamps, but not from any good will to my unwelcome visitors. Captain Welbourn was willing to adhere to any course that I would suggest. Stratagem and deception were my only resort to carry into effect the object in view, to wit, a continuance of good faith on my part to the Indians. I therefore advised the immediate release of the warriors in custody, and the continuance of the forces beyond the Cabebee swamp, there to remain until the arrival of a messenger from me. I had an understanding with Captain Welbourn that we should take a formal parting, and when he should again make his appearance I would positively insist upon his retiring, without molesting the Indians that he might find assembled for the purpose of being mustered, (an every-other day's practice.) This I considered the only course of preserving my standing. At two o'clock the temporary chiefs reported their people ready for roll-call, when I despatched a messenger to Captain Welbourn, who, in a short time, with four companies, three of which were mustered into the service, viz: Captain Welbourn's, Captain Harrold's, and Captain Young's, and a Mr. Park, with a company of citizens from Russell county, surrounded my issuing-houses, much to the amusement of the Indians; for, instead of being alarmed, they were delighted at what they considered an unnecessary movement towards making them prisoners. I had stationed my interpreter near, in order that everything that transpired might be communicated to the Indians; which being done, they appeared perfectly satisfied with the course that I had pursued. I then assured them their being made prisoners was not the act of the government; on the contrary, General Jesup would not countenance such proceedings; to remain perfectly quiet, and everything would end satisfactorily. Their reply was, they looked to me for protection; that thus far it had been afforded, and they knew the government would not now desert them. I reassured them all that General Jesup had promised their chiefs would be rigidly adhered to. They appeared, and, I have every reason to believe, were, satisfied.

I stated to Captain Welbourn that inasmuch as the warriors were in bondage, and taken away from their wives and children, protection should be afforded the latter; that I, as also the Indians, were apprehensive the soldiers would annoy them. He gave me positive assurance that they should not be molested. In order to satisfy Captain Welbourn, (who appears more anxious to gain the applause of his disorganized soldiery than the public good,) I called the roll, and found, of two hundred and fifty-three warriors, fourteen absent, some of whom had been excused from attending muster in consequence of sickness, old age, &c. He was satisfied with the order of the camp, or rather so expressed himself to me. A little after dark I heard the report of a musket in the direction of Thlobthocco town, (Jim Boy's.) I stated to Captain Welbourn it was unusual to hear a musket or rifle fired in the camps at that hour; I was apprehensive some mischief was being done by his troops, and begged a party might be despatched to ascertain the cause. Few moments had elapsed after making this requisition, when a second report of muskets was heard in another direction. I then told Captain Welbourn he afforded me no protection. The warriors were restless, telling me my tongue was forked, and, for the first time, I was holding bad talk. Captain Welbourn headed a party in person, and set out in the direction of the firing. About eleven o'clock he returned, and informed me an old man was killed and a little girl wounded; that the marauders belonged to a Mr. Park's company of citizens, of Russell county, Alabama. I demanded of Captain Welbourn the arrest of the whole of the company, as it was the only course to pursue in order to satisfy my warriors; that unless it was adopted, a stigma would rest upon him; and, further, it would be the means of re-establishing me in their confidence. He assented, and said positively my wishes should be carried forthwith into effect; but such was not the case. On the following morning Mr. Park, together with his denominated officers, attempted to make an apology for the offence of their company. I told them the matter now

rested with the government; nothing could be done by me but to pacify my aggrieved Indians; which was partially done by taking Mr. Park and his associates before the Indians, and pointing them out as the persons having authority over the men who committed the murder. I told the warriors notice had already been taken of the offence, and of their misfortunes; that an express had been sent to Fort Mitchell with all the facts connected with their sufferings; that these men, Mr. Park and his associates, now regretted the occurrences of the night, and were willing to make any atonement for the losses sustained. The acting chief of Jim Boy's town (Hillishajo) replied it was out of their power to bring life back; he therefore would leave it to me to say what was best to be done. I told them the old man was dead—died violently, it was true—but life could not be restored; we therefore must submit. The reply was, if I was satisfied, they were; I told them no, far from it; but we were obliged to submit in this case, but justice should be rendered. General Jesup would not suffer them to be imposed upon.

Previous to this, in company with Captain Welbourn and Hillishajo, I visited the house of the aged murdered man, who proved to be Loch-chi-Yahola, about ninety years of age, who had been excused, owing to the infirmities of age and deafness, from attending muster at the issuing-house; found him lying in one corner, shot in the breast, and his head literally stove in with, as I supposed, butts of muskets. With some difficulty I obtained permission for the son of Loch-chi-Yahola to leave the chain of sentinels. I afterwards found the little girl, who had been slightly wounded in the leg by a musket ball. She is the daughter of Cock or Texico, of the Ufalla town, about fifteen years old. She stated the men wished to ravish her; she refused, and ran towards a thicket which was near by, when she was fired at. I am happy, however, to say she has entirely recovered. There are two warriors by the name of Catcho Texico belonging to the Ufalla town; the father of the girl is with me, the other is in Florida. Upon prosecuting my inquiries further, I learned the same men had in several instances accomplished their diabolical views upon the frightened women, and in many cases deprived them by force of finger-rings, ear-rings, and blankets. Many of their women and whole families, under a state of alarm, ran to the swamp, where the major part of them are still, and no doubt viewed as hostile. I have used every possible means to draw them out without success. The most prominent measure adopted was causing staves, with white muslin attached, to be carried through the camps as a token of friendship. The question, (with the officers of the several companies,) what was to be done with the warriors? now presented itself; nine of twelve were in favor of removing them to Tuskegee. I formally protested against it, and proffered to leave the nation with my whole party rather than consent to a separation of my people. It was some time before they assented to my proposition; as soon as informed of their assent, I repaired to Montgomery county and consulted the citizens residing in the vicinity of Mount Meigs, who readily acceded to my wishes, and aided in the selection of an eligible situation for encamping. On my return I communicated with the Indians, gave them the choice either of going to Tuskegee as prisoners, and separating from their families, or leave the nation with them. There was no hesitation; they preferred the latter; and in thirty-six hours afterwards, with but four five-horse teams, my party, of upwards of 1,900 strong, were on the march. On the 22d instant I arrived at and encamped near Mount Meigs, without any murmuring or discontent, except regrets for loss of property and suffering for the acts of the guilty.

The excitement of the settlers in the immediate vicinity of Polecat Springs, Captain Young's company, and a portion of Captain Welbourn's, against the Russell county men, was so great that, so soon as it was ascertained my camp would be removed, they deemed it prudent to leave at the earliest period, taking with them some eight or ten ponies stolen from the Indians. Of this fact I was informed by persons who met them on the road with the ponies in their possession. Indeed, the conduct of this party was of the most outrageous and disgraceful kind; even persons in the public employ, and the stores, were wholly disregarded. One of the former was most violently beaten and otherwise maltreated, and stores for the subsistence of Indians were taken by force.

As to the main inquiry, to wit: the probable loss sustained by the sudden and forced removal of my Indians, I answer, it is impossible to form a correct estimate within the time required, but can do so in a few days, as it will be necessary to call upon the heads of families under the superintendence of their respective chiefs. I am convinced their losses were heavy in ponies, cattle, corn, furniture, and farming utensils, &c.

GEORGE G. REYNOLDS,

First Lieutenant United States Marine Corps and Military Agent.

FORT MORGAN, *Mobile Point, March 31, 1837.*

SIR: In answer to your inquiries in relation to the outrages that have been committed on the families of the Indian warriors serving in Florida, and the loss of property incident thereto, I submit the following report:

In consequence of a disturbance that occurred at the plantation of Dr. Battle, on the Cowiga creek, about the latter part of December last, thirty miles distant from the camp under my control, (Echo Harjo's,) I ordered the warriors forthwith to surrender their arms and remove within a smaller compass, so that they might be more immediately under my observation. This movement was made, not from a belief that the depredations were committed by my Indians, (for I have no doubt it was the remnant of the old hostile party that had never surrendered,) but to appease the citizens, and prevent any intercourse with my camp, some of whom had previously been hostile, and sixty-three guns were deposited in my quarters.

This order was promptly obeyed, and all of the old camp of Echo Harjo's Indians and a few of those that had surrendered were encamped in less than half a mile square; the rest precipitately left the camp. They remained in this situation till the 5th of February, when I found my camp suddenly surrounded by an armed populace, headed by a Mr. Garmigan, and a party of citizens from Georgia; a Mr. Park at the head of the citizens from Russell county, Alabama, and a Captain Morris, of Franklin county, Georgia, that had recently been mustered into the service of the United States. The Indians, indiscriminately, were immediately driven up around my quarters, and there guarded until twelve o'clock the next day, without provisions, and in most instances without a blanket to shelter them from the inclemency of the weather.

I protested against their conduct as inhuman, uncalled for, and contrary to the solemn pledges of the

government; and that it would be more honorable and soldierlike to punish the aggressors, than to harass a few unarmed friendly men, women, and children. After pillaging several of the Indian houses of property, and in one instance of *money*, they determined to remove the Indian men and boys to Tuskegee, and place them within the stockade under a strong guard, and permit the women and children to remain immediately around my quarters. The guns belonging to the Indians were also carried away by them, and have not been returned. I have since understood they selected the best for their own private use. On the same evening my camp was again visited by two companies of citizens from Pike and Barbour counties, Alabama, headed by a Mr. Curry and a Mr. Harrold; the latter company was that day mustered into service. After some conversation I succeeded in satisfying them that no great danger was to be apprehended from a parcel of women and children; and after remaining until about midnight, and plundering the houses of the Indians that had been abandoned, they left to join their associates in arms about five miles distant, where they that night had encamped with the Indian men and boys. We had a respite from this time till the 20th of February, when Park and his mob returned, and, after parading through the camp, took six men that had been frightened off on his previous visit; and if the statement of some of his own men can be credited, stole two mules and a horse, and perhaps some ponies, and left the camp on the 21st. A Lieutenant Ash, with a detachment from Captain Morris's company, arrived at the camp and surrounded it, and, after searching it thoroughly, left for Tuskegee without making any discoveries of a very *alarming* character. On the next evening I received a note from Captain George (whose company was also in the United States service) and Lieutenant Ash, informing me that on the next morning they had determined to remove the women and children of my camp to Tuskegee. As I was that day making an issue of provisions for five days, I begged them to defer it for four days, until they could consume their provisions; as no wagons were furnished for their transportation, it would be impossible for them to carry it. I requested to hear from them that night by express. No intelligence was received, and I was convinced they adhered to their determination, and on the morning of the 23d ordered the Indians to prepare to remove to Tuskegee, and in half an hour the whole camp was on the march. In consequence of having no means of transportation, I directed them to deposit their effects in my quarters, &c., until wagons could be procured to remove them to Tuskegee; but in the meantime the house was broken open and plundered of most articles of any value.

We had proceeded alone within four miles of Tuskegee, before we met the companies that were to *guard us*. They escorted us to Tuskegee and encamped the women and children around the pickets under a guard, where they remained until the 7th of March, when they were marched off by the same company to Montgomery, Alabama.

The following is the description and value of the property that has been lost, as far as can be ascertained in so short a period:

145 Indian ponies, (average value \$30).....	\$4, 350 00
60 head of cattle, (average value \$12)	720 00
200 hogs, (average value \$3).....	600 00
100 bushels of corn, at \$2 per bushel.....	200 00
100 bee-hives, at \$2 per hive.....	200 00
Cooking and farming utensils, and crockery ware.....	200 00
63 guns, (average value \$10).....	630 00
Sacrifice in hurried sales of property.....	1, 200 00
Money stolen from Tallow-war-harjo.....	250 00
Total.....	<u>8, 350 00</u>

Very respectfully, &c.,

T. P. SLOAN, *Lieutenant and Military Agent.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, May 8, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a copy of a despatch just received from Lieutenant Colonel Harney, who commands at Fort Mellon, on Lake Monroe. The great body of the Seminole nation are concentrated in that part of the country. Powell will be highly useful in bringing the Indians in, and in hastening their embarkation. Nothing is now to be apprehended, unless it be the imprudence of citizens of Florida. The officious interference of some of them has already embarrassed the service, and from the public papers I discover that certain citizens of Florida, who, I presume, were unwilling to trust their persons nearer to the Seminoles than Charleston, are denouncing me and my measures.

I have only to say, in reply to them, that I can have no agency in converting the army into negro-catchers, particularly for the benefit of those who are evidently afraid to undertake the recapture of their property themselves.

Micanopy, Jumper, and Cloud, are here with a part of their people. Holatochee is collecting his people, and will be in by the 20th. Alligator's people were assembled, but dispersed in consequence of a report that they were to be executed so soon as they should place themselves in our power. They are re-assembling.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

FORT MELLON, *East Florida, May, 1837.*

SIR: The chiefs Coehahjo, Tuskeneha, Ossinyahholoh, (Powell,) and the Wildcat, (Philip's son,) arrived yesterday, with a great many of their warriors and women. Philip is too sick to go about, and of course did not attend here; but his son represents him, (a smart fellow.) Sam Jones has not yet come in, but was expected last night. I will not close this letter till I know whether he has arrived or not. The

council which they held terminated well; there was not a man present who made any objections to the talk which Micanopy sent them; *his word is law*, and none dare to deviate from it.

Coe Hajo begs me to say to you that he has the same talk now that he had when he was with you, and begs you to give them time; they were hurrying all they could, and if you do not push them, everything will go on without any trouble. I had a private talk with them last night, and they are all anxious to get off as soon as possible; they dislike to start for Tampa before the people all assemble.

I have this moment learned that Sam Jones was at council; (they told me last night, but I did not know the name.) Coe Hajo expects his brothers in every hour, and I will pledge my life that all will go well if indulged a little longer. Coe Hajo and Powell are now with me. Powell slept in my tent last night with me, and they both say that they are almost sure that it will not be more than a week before they are all on the road to Tampa Bay. He says that he told you that he would be at Tampa Bay by this time, but it was *impossible*; and he begs you not to think that he is not an honest man, for he has done all he can, and has succeeded in getting them all together, except a few who are scattered, and that they (the main body) will not wait for them if not here before a week. Some of the scattered people will go immediately to Tampa, and not come by this place.

Coe Hajo is encamped about twenty miles from this place. Powell is about 15 miles from this; he will join Coe Hajo, where they will all remain till they start for Tampa; they encamp right on the road to Tampa. Coe Hajo wishes me to say to you that he has got strong men to help him—meaning Tuskeheha, Powell, and Wildcat—and that they all put their heads together to do business.

In your last letter you say you do not wish me to let them deal with the sutler. This placed me in a very awkward situation. I told them some time since that I would send the boat for goods for them; they begged me to do so, as they are literally naked, many of them; of course, they all expected to be allowed to purchase some clothing. I directed the sutler not to trade with them; but from the representations and importunities from the chiefs, and the opinion of the officers, I thought it advisable to permit them to trade, inasmuch as there is hardly a shirt apiece for those that want them. The sutler has hardly anything in his store, compared with their (the Indians') wants. If they had anything like a full supply, I would have sent them off. I *know* that if you were here you would not have persisted, and I beg and hope that you will approve the course I have pursued.

Your idea is, that it may be the means of some delay; but I know that it will not be the means of one moment's delay. They will be in the neighborhood at least five or six days, and they will buy everything the sutler has before to-morrow night. One of the parties expected has this moment shaken hands with me. They arrived at Coehahjo's camp last night. Some of his band are yet behind; but as he has not all the chiefs here, he will return immediately for the balance. The chief who has just arrived is Tuckelochahajo, with 73 warriors. I have been trying to learn from those now present the number of warriors in this part of the country; and, to my great surprise, I find that there are not less than *twenty-five hundred red warriors—good warriors*—and not including lads, &c., or negroes, who fight as well as the best of them.

P. S.—More news: The chief just arrived is *Hicks*; he has about 70 warriors still out, and he states that he was on his way to Tampa, with his whole party or band, when he was met by Captain Bell. He asked Captain Bell to go with him to his camp, where he had a paper from you. When going there, the officers were talking among themselves, and saying how they intended to secure him; that they would tie him, put him in chains, &c. He understood what they said, and concluded that they intended to kill him in some way, and, of course, he determined to escape from them if he could; and that he would rather be shot by them than to be in irons, when he was trying to do the best he could; and that he had received the talk from Micanopy, and as soon as he could get his people together he started for Tampa, and would have been there long since if he had not met that foolish man.

Everything is going on as well as can be expected, considering the nature of the country and their numbers. You can form an idea of the numbers of the women and children. The chiefs cannot tell me how many negroes they have belonging to them; they do not wish to turn over the negroes belonging to the whites till they are about to set off for Tampa, as many of them would run away before they could be brought in.

I hope you will be able to make out the sense of this letter. I have a great deal to say, and they communicate in such a manner to me, and so many different subjects, that I am a good deal confused, and am compelled to stop, though I have told you everything of importance.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding in Florida.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, June 7, 1837.*

SIR: The military operations of this campaign were attended with complete success. The Indians were driven from all their strongholds north of this place and Hopopka lake, and hostilities had entirely ceased. Individuals travelled unarmed in all directions in perfect security, and Seminoles were employed as guides to surveying parties, and as expresses. But the measure of emigration has entirely failed. Soon after the Indians had begun to settle in this neighborhood, the measles, which had prevailed in the army during the winter, broke out among them, after which very few came in. The Indian negroes had been alarmed by the arrival in camp of individuals who had lost their slaves during the war; most of them fled, and but few could be prevailed upon to return. This was the state of things when, as I have already reported to the adjutant general, a party of armed warriors seized the chiefs Micanopy, Jumper, and Cloud, in their camp about eight miles from this place, on the evening of the 2d instant, and hurried them off to the swamps of the interior. I had received, through the principal Creek chief, on the morning of the 1st instant, intimation that the attempt would probably be made in a few days, by a party of Mickasukies and a small band of Seminoles, to kill or abduct those chiefs. I ordered Major Graham, who was stationed with a mounted company and 120 Creek warriors, four miles from Micanopy's camp, to send out spies at night to observe the movements of the Indians. The major sent two Indians into the Seminole camp on the night of the 1st instant, and though he ordered them to go out again on the night of the 2d, they disobeyed the order or failed to report. The mounted force here and at Major Graham's camp was held in readiness to move at a moment's warning; but it was not until the morning of the 3d that the flight of the Indians was known. They had had 12 hours start, and in the state of the country and the extreme heat of the weather pursuit would have been useless.

The principal Seminole chiefs met me in council on the 1st instant, and I might have seized them and captured their camp; but such an act would have been an infraction of the treaty, and the capture of two or three hundred Indians would have been a poor compensation for the violation of the national faith; the Indians now have no confidence in our promises, and I, as the representative of the country here, was unwilling to teach a lesson of barbarism to a band of savages. Besides, Micanopy and Jumper will be worth more to us where they are than if they had been seized. The Mickasukies and the war party among the Seminoles have appointed Sam Jones principal chief of the nation. Were Micanopy confined, all the warriors might be induced to acquiesce in the appointment; but he has a powerful party, who will exert themselves to support his tottering authority, now he is with them; and should he not be able to control the Mickasukies, he will, at least, detach a large portion of the Seminoles from them.

To have made a durable peace would have been an easy matter. The Indians felt themselves beaten, and were tired of the war. One month ago I could have made a treaty with them as permanent as that with Great Britain, and have restricted them to any limits I might have assigned them. But the scheme of emigration I consider impracticable. This is the first instance in our history in which we have attempted to transfer Indians from one wilderness to another. On all other occasions the white population has been pressing and crowding them out before we have attempted to remove them. To rid the country of them you must exterminate them. Is the government prepared for such a measure? Will public opinion sustain it? If so, resort must be had to the bloodhound and the northern Indian.

It is probable the war will be renewed by the Mickasukies; but I am making such a disposition of the forces under my command as I hope will, at the same time, secure the frontier and preserve the health of the men during the sickly season.

If operations were to recommence in the fall, every preparation should be made to take the field by the 1st of October. The depots necessary to the most vigorous prosecution of the war may all be established and filled by the 1st of September. The officer who is to be charged with the operations of the next campaign should be at once placed in command of the army, in order to make timely arrangements for the service.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, June 10, 1837.*

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your letters of the 6th and 17th of last month. Brigadier General Armistead had been instructed to discharge all the Florida militia and volunteers east of the Suwanee, except three or four mounted companies; but in consequence of our altered Indian relations, I have called on the governor of Florida to place at my disposal a mounted force of from two hundred and fifty to three hundred men, to protect the settlements east of the Suwanee, and four hundred men to protect the country west of that river. The regular troops and Indians are broken down; the former must be kept as quiet as possible during the summer, so as to be able to take the field with effect in the autumn; and the Florida militia, accustomed to the climate, can perform the duty required to protect the settlements during the months of July, August, and September.

If operations are to be resumed in the autumn, all the arrangements should be promptly made, and the means organized. The regiments should be placed upon the war establishment of at least a hundred men to a company, and the ranks be filled as soon as possible; in addition to which, there should be an auxiliary Indian force employed, to be here by the 1st of September; Shawnees, Miamies, and Delawares would be preferable to Creeks. The troops and all officers below the rank of major general should receive double pay while serving in Florida. And the general who is to command should be immediately required to make his arrangements to take the field by the 1st of October, and should be unrestricted as to means. If the war be carried on, it must necessarily be one of extermination. We have at no former period of our history had to contend with so formidable an enemy. No Seminole proves false to his country, nor has a single instance ever occurred of a first-rate warrior having surrendered. Governor Coppinger is said to have expressed the opinion many years ago, that the captain general of Cuba had not force enough to control the Seminoles. I do not consider them quite so formidable as the governor believed them to be, but I am very sure they may, if they choose, give us employment for two campaigns. They are now generally south of this place and Fort Mellon; but when the garrisons of the interior posts shall be withdrawn, they will no doubt reoccupy a portion of the country whence they have been driven. I shall continue preparations for another campaign until I hear from you; and, in the interim, I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, June 15, 1837.*

SIR: Since my letter of the 10th instant, one of my spies, a friendly Creek chief, who has relations among the Seminoles, and who had gone out under pretence of inviting them to join the Creeks, but in fact to gain information as to the design of the Seminoles and Mickasukies, has returned, and, from the facts which he has communicated, I do not entertain a doubt of the determination of many of the Indians to recommence hostilities whenever an opportunity may present of striking a decisive blow, either against the settlements, or at our trains or interior posts. I enclose the substance of his statement, marked A. I also enclose the substance of information received through the principal Creek chief, from some Creek Indians who left Alabama during the last summer, and had been with the Mickasukies during the winter; this statement (marked B) is corroborated by information received through other channels, but, as it comes through Indians and negroes, there is no testimony that would convict a white man. If the war should recommence, I am clearly of opinion that the individual whose name is mentioned in the statement should be removed from the country.

If the government persevere in the attempt to remove the Indians, war will certainly ensue, and there is no time to lose in making the arrangements necessary to a vigorous prosecution of the next campaign. The general who is to command should be instructed as to means, and both force and supplies should be ready, to enable him to open the campaign on the 1st of October. The regular regiments here should be completed with as little delay as possible, and at least a thousand northern Indians should be immediately engaged, to serve during the campaign or to the termination of the war; and as this country furnishes no materials from which spy companies can be formed, and as that description of force will be absolutely necessary, whether an Indian force be raised or not, I would respectfully recommend that six or eight spy companies be raised on the frontiers of Missouri and in the mountainous parts of Georgia and Alabama, to serve during the war.

This country is so extensive, and so entirely destitute of means for the subsistence of white men, that extensive lines of depots are required.

The following posts have been established, and must be kept up during the season of operations. They will require, at all times, the force indicated for their garrisons, viz:

Tampa Bay.....	200	Fort St. Augustine.....	50
Fort Foster.....	50	Fort Picolata.....	40
Fort Dade.....	100	Fort Volusia.....	40
Fort Clinch.....	60	Fort Mellon.....	160
Fort Armstrong.....	50	Fort Jacksonville.....	50
Fort King.....	50	Fort Newnansville.....	50
Fort Micanopy.....	100		
Fort Harler.....	40		
Fort Heileman.....	100		
			1, 140

In addition to which, the following posts will be required, viz:

A block-house at Little Hillsborough, to protect the bridge.....	20		
A block-house on the Alifeu, for the same purpose.....	30		
A post on Pease creek.....	50		
A post at Punta Rassa, near Charlotte harbor.....	100		
A post on the Suwanee.....	40		
			240
A post in advance of Fort Mellon, on the St. John's.....	100		
Two posts south of St. Augustine, on the Atlantic, each 100.....	200		
			200
Posts required in addition.....			540
For garrisons of posts.....			1, 680
For escorts to protect the necessary trains, and for scouts.....			750
			2, 430

Should the Indians generally remain south, the St. John's and Indian rivers will afford the readiest means of access into their country on the eastern side of the peninsula, and Kissimmee, Caloosahatchee, and Pease creek, with a road to be opened to the latter on this side. In a country like this it is impossible to combine the movements of different columns or armies with any degree of accuracy; but to prevent the enemy from concentrating his whole force at any one point, all his settlements or strongholds should be menaced at the same time, and each separate column should be able to beat, or at least to hold in check, his whole force, if united.

The army should operate in four columns, and each column should be perfect in itself.

The principal column should ascend the St. John's, with all its supplies, and with steamboats and barges of light draught, and with the necessary land transportation to enable it to keep the field for ten or fifteen days together. The second column should proceed to Mosquito or Indian river, prepared to penetrate the country either by land or water, and to establish depots in the interior, if necessary.

The third column should move from this post, open a road into the interior, cross Pease creek and the Kissimmee, establishing depots on the route, and penetrate into the heart of the enemy's country.

The fourth column should move up the Caloosahatchee or Kissimmee, destroying the settlements of the Indians, and, if unable to come up with them, drive them in the direction of the line of march of one of the other columns.

The columns should be composed as follows:

1st column—Regular infantry.....	600		
Regular artillery.....	100		
Cavalry, regular.....	50		
Cavalry, volunteers.....	250		
			300
Indian warriors.....			300
Total 1st column.....			1, 300
2d column—Regular infantry.....	200		
Regular cavalry.....	50		
Volunteers.....	100		
			150
Regular artillery.....			50
Indian warriors.....			200
Total 2d column.....			600

3d column—Regular infantry	500
Regular cavalry	100
Volunteers	200
	300
Regular artillery	50
Indians	250
	500
Total 3d column	1,100
4th column—Regular infantry	300
Regular cavalry	50
Volunteers	150
	200
Regular artillery	50
Indians	200
	200
Total 4th column	750
	3,750

The force required will be as follows, viz:

For garrisons to protect the country and the supplies	1,680
For escorts for trains and for scouts	750
And for the field	3,750
	6,180

Thus the effective force required for a successful campaign will amount to..... 6,180

This does not include drivers, muleteers, mechanics, laborers, &c., all of whom must be hired and brought from the northern or western States, for they cannot be obtained here.

There are lighters and other boats on the Gulf nearly sufficient for the service during another campaign, and, with a few additional wagons and mules, the land transportation will be complete; but it will not be possible to supply, by means of the military trains, the inhabitants of Florida, as has been the case for several months past. If those inhabitants are to be supplied, the commissary's department should organize a system of supply for them, independent of the army; and officers of that department, unconnected with the army, should direct the details, under the orders of the chief of the department. Such drudgery should not be imposed upon the army, certainly not upon the general commanding.

If hostilities recommence, the war must necessarily be one of extermination. The Seminoles pay no regard to treaties. The chiefs cannot control their people in any matter which deeply affects their feelings or interests. The body of the nation have no confidence in us. The Spanish governor, Coppinger, assured the chiefs that his government sold no part of the country to us except where "*the white man had cultivated with the plough and the hoe*;" that all not thus cultivated had been reserved for the Indians; they therefore look upon us as robbers and oppressors, and have determined, as I have been informed, almost to a man, to die on the ground rather than leave it. The women, to encourage the warriors in their determination—those who have lost their husbands in battle—*sell* their powder and lead to those who desire it for hunting, but *distribute it gratis* to those who promise to expend it only in war. Such a people you may destroy, but cannot readily conquer. It is their interest to be at peace; they desire peace; but they will not leave the country.

I consider it my duty to urge upon the government the necessity of placing the regiments upon the war establishment. The companies should consist of, at least, a hundred men, and each company of infantry should have an additional officer. If the army be not placed upon a more respectable footing, it would be better to disband it entirely, and become tributary at once to the Indians on our borders. As at present constituted, though composed of the best materials, it is a mere apology for defence, and can never fulfil the expectations of the country. To attempt to carry on the war here with militia and volunteers would be attended with naught but disappointment. Those who have once served in this country will not return. Of course, the experience and knowledge of the country acquired in one campaign is not available in the next. Our countrymen possess patriotism and courage, and our militia and volunteers, if employed in their own neighborhood, or to strike a sudden blow, may be used with effect; but for the continued, laborious, and varied duties necessary in the prosecution of an obstinate and distant war, they are unsuited, from habits as well as interests, and consequently are not so efficient as regular troops. I repeat, if the government persevere in its policy in regard to the Seminole Indians, we must have regular troops, and immediate arrangements should be made for the most vigorous prosecution of the war.

And I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. JOEL R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

A.

Yahola Hajo and five men left John Hopahnee's camp fourteen days since, to visit some of his people among the Seminoles. "We left camp about 12 m. on foot, and travelled in an east-northeast course, on a new trail, till night, when we camped. The third day, about noon, we came to a bad boggy place, where a horse cannot pass, and were several hours crossing it; the next day we reached, early in the morning, a 'big cypress,' and crossed it; beyond were about seven miles of good ground, having passed which, we came to a stream waist-deep, across which was the opening on a lake where the whites had a camp when they turned back last winter, (Tohokpaliga.) After we cleared the opening we came to a piece of low cypress, the bottom very soft and about a mile over; beyond was an extent of open low palmetto of about three miles. Here we had to wind round some lakes. After passing this open place

we reached an oak hammock, (a bad place,) and slept there. The fifth day continued over a bad country of hammocks, cypress swamps, and boggy places, without crossing any streams until night, when we reached a party of Coe Hajo's people, living in palmetto camps. When we arrived we saw very few men, as they had gone to take Micanopy. On the evening of the second day Nocose Yahola came to us, and we had a talk with him. He said that his chiefs had given him good advice, which he had not followed, and he had suffered for his conduct; that he had been glad to hear of peace; and that he had resolved to surrender himself at once, but the Seminoles told him that he must wait until their chiefs had arranged everything before he went in; that he still wished to give himself up, but that the hostiles told him if he went against their orders he must suffer for the consequences."

When they proposed to kill us, (Yahola, Hajo, &c.,) Nocose Yahola told the chiefs that we were his friends, who had come to visit him, and that they must not hurt us. He told us he knew we came to get him out of difficulty, and his wishes were to accompany us, but that he could not get away. Powell had raised his people to kill us, but Nocose Yahola represented that we were his town's people, and interceded for us; Coe Hajo agreed with Nocose Yahola, but Powell still persisted that we should die. Apiakee then ordered them not to injure us, when Powell was obliged to submit. Coe Hajo sent us word by Nocose Yahola that, ever since his visit to the general, the Indians had threatened his life; that he did not know to-day whether he would see to-morrow; but what he told the general he still adhered to. Coe Hajo's men (some of those who took Micanopy) told us that the sub-chiefs had assembled the 200 men who seized Micanopy; that they were resolved to die upon their lands; that they intended to retire to the "bad place," (Everglades,) where they would lose their lives in defending it.

Holatoochee had said, for this summer and the fall and winter, they would have plenty of ammunition, but that the next winter they would probably be in want. Holatoochee had 500 men with him. Jumper and Micanopy had sent word to the people that they must keep quiet and commit no murders; that their land was poor, yet the whites might think they loved it, and let them remain on the little point they occupied; if, however, they came to molest them they must defend themselves.

Jumper, when they were carrying him off, told his captors that formerly when he wanted them to fight he could not persuade them to come; they were cowards; they had got very bold now; that he and Micanopy loved them, and had come to make peace and save them; that, by carrying them away, they made them appear like liars, and disgraced their chiefs.

The camp reached by us was so near the sea that the Indians said the surf could be heard at times. The people intended having a frolic, and then they were to join Holatoochee. Apiakee and Powell had their camp about west-northwest from the camp we visited, and about a day's march distant.

On the way out one of the men left the party and took a trail which led to where his brother lived, whom he wished to see. Some Indians met him on the road and told him he was a spy come to betray them, and that he must remain with them. He asked them to suffer him to join Yahola Hajo to tell him he had been stopped. They refused until one of his townsmen offered to accompany him, when they permitted him to go. He came to us and said that they had taken away his blankets and some of his shirts; that he could not get away from them, but would do the best he could; we were obliged to leave him behind. The Indians told us that if we attempted to take any women with us we were dead men; that if we reached home safely ourselves it was as much as we ought to expect, and we might be disappointed in that.

One man left John Hopahnee's camp shortly after us to overtake us; this man did not reach us, and has not yet returned.

The journey back was over the same road, without incidents of interest.

B.

The following is the substance of information gathered by the friendly chief, Jim Boy, or Tustemuggy Emurthla, from a party of Creek Indians which had been out all last winter with the Seminoles, but which had lately come in and joined the people of the friendly chief, John Hopahnee:

After considerable preliminary conversation, Jim Boy made a remark to this effect: "Either the white people, the Indians, or somebody has been making mischief, which has caused the Seminoles to run off as they have just done."

To this remark one of the party above referred to, and whose name is "Athlugee," spoke, and asked if it was Captain Bunce.

Jim Boy said "may be you have heard something about Bunce?"

Athlugee. Yes, I have.

Jim Boy. Who did you hear it from?

Athlugee. George, old Cloud's nephew, and Antonio.

Jim Boy. What did they say?

Athlugee. "Bunce told George and Antonio you Indians are all fools and have no sense; the whites only want to get you all in here, when they will send you away off to a very bad country, where all of your old people and children will die. You Indians don't know anything about reading and writing, but I look into the papers and see it all. If you wait a little while you will have a plenty of people to come here and assist you. The reason the white people want to get you off from here as quick as they can is, because they know if you remain that you will have people to come and assist you." Athlugee further stated that, "after George and Antonio returned from Tampa Bay, (where they had gone soon after the treaty was signed at Fort Dade,) they told Bunce's 'talk' to Holatoochee, Alligator, Cloud, and the other chiefs and sub-chiefs present; and that they immediately sent runners to Apiakee, the chief of the Mickasukies, to tell him that they had received a talk from a white man at Tampa Bay, who says that if we (the hostile Indians) all assemble, the whites intend us mischief; so that you, Apiakee, must send out runners to all the people not to come in; but that they must commit no murders, nor steal any horses, &c., and remain quiet; but if the whites come out against us we must fight them. If the whites do not interfere with us, we will go about and go to the stores, &c., and trade as we used to do." Athlugee stated that "he was present with Apiakee when the above 'talk' was delivered to him; and that it was stated that Bunce had enjoined that his name should be kept secret."

The foregoing was taken down as related by Jim Boy to me, by direction of General Jesup, through the interpreter, usually called "Cow Toms," on the 11th of June, 1837; and the information was stated by Jim Boy to have been collected from "Athlugee" the night before the 10th of June, stating at the same time that, though "Athlugee" had come in some time before, he had never conversed with him until the period above stated.

J. A. CHAMBERS, *Lieut. Aide-de-camp and Asst. Adj. Gen., Army of the South.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, June 16, 1837.*

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your two letters of the 25th of last month; and, in reply, I have to remark that my measures for the protection of the Indians were not adopted until after the mischief had been done. The Indians have been tampered with by interested white men; but, from facts which are daily coming to my knowledge, I doubt whether the chiefs could exercise sufficient influence over their people to induce any considerable portion of them to leave the country; and if they determine to remain, it will depend upon themselves how long they will remain; they cannot be driven out so long as they can obtain ammunition, unless we use northern Indians and Spanish bloodhounds.

We may harass them, and ultimately destroy them, but it will cost as much time and treasure as the war carried on by the British government against the Maroons. I have no books to refer to; but that war, if I remember right, was terminated by the bloodhounds; and resulted not in unconditional submission, but in a treaty which secured both liberty and property to the conquered. How far such a policy would be proper in the present case I am hardly prepared to give an opinion. The question is surrounded by difficulties, view it as you will. The two races, the negro and the Indian, are rapidly approximating; they are identified in interests and feelings; and I have ascertained that, at the battle of the Wahoo, a negro, the property of a Florida planter, was one of the most distinguished of the leaders; and I have learned that the depredations committed on the plantations east of the St. John's were perpetrated by the plantation negroes, headed by an Indian negro, John Cæsar, since killed, and aided by some six or seven vagabond Indians, who had no character among their people as warriors.

Should the Indians remain in this Territory, the negroes among them will form a rallying point for runaway negroes from the adjacent States; and should they remove, the fastnesses of the country would be immediately occupied by negroes. I am very sure they could be confined to a small district near Florida Point, and would accept peace and the small district referred to as the condition for the surrender of all runaway negroes. I throw out these hints for the consideration of my official superiors, without pretending to offer an opinion as to the propriety of adopting them; and

I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Garey's Ferry, Florida, August 10, 1837.*

SIR: I had the honor to receive your letter of the 25th ultimo on the night of the 7th instant, when ready to take my departure for the Suwanee frontier. I deferred my journey, and proceeded on the 8th instant to Jacksonville, to select a site for the depot which you direct me to establish there.

A tornado, which occurred on the 6th instant, had destroyed the public storehouses and wharf erected at Jacksonville last year. The site of those buildings, immediately on the bank of the river, being preferable, in my opinion, to any other in the vicinity of the town, I ordered the acting quartermaster, Lieutenant Watson, to remove the ruins, and take immediate measures to construct storehouses for two hundred thousand rations of subsistence, and sixty thousand rations of forage.

He will be compelled to bring materials and workmen from St. Mary's and Savannah; this country will supply neither.

The ordnance depot has been already established here, and cannot be removed without great labor, expense, and danger of injuring both arms and ammunition; it must necessarily be continued here. The site is a few miles out of position, but it has advantages which obviate entirely that inconvenience; it has extensive ranges of storehouses for subsistence and other stores; sheds for hogs, and stables for horses; besides, it has a secure harbor in all storms, and steamers and other vessels lie alongside of the storehouses and discharge their cargoes, or take them in, without the necessity of wharves. The principal wood-yards, too, are on Black creek, and less than half the time is required for steamers to take in their wood here than would require on the St. John's. This place is necessarily the depot for the ports on this frontier as far as Micanopy and Fort King, as it is the point where the mode of transportation changes from water to land transports; I therefore consider it advisable to continue it as a principal depot, in addition to that at Jacksonville.

St. Augustine, or a post south of it, must be the depot for the force that may operate from the Atlantic coast of the peninsula to the interior.

The principal depot on the western side of the peninsula will be at Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay; and should the troops on that side operate in two columns, a depot for the southern column must be established on Charlotte harbor.

The experience of the last year has demonstrated the superiority of sea or sail vessels over the best steamers, as transports between New Orleans and Tampa Bay. The use of steamers on that side of the peninsula should be limited to the communication between the posts on the coast, and to the towing of vessels on the rivers and in the bays.

For the supply of this depot and that at St. Augustine both steamers and sail vessels are used; and if the supplies be drawn from Charleston and Savannah, it would be difficult to determine which should be preferred; the former are more expensive, but are considered by the quartermaster here, Lieutenant Clark, more certain, and are therefore preferred by him. If the supplies be drawn from New York, Philadelphia, or Baltimore, sail vessels would be preferable, but they should not draw over eight feet water.

One or two good steamers of light draught will be required between St. Augustine and the stations of the troops south of that place on the Atlantic; four on the St. John's, below Fort Mellon, and two above that post, if any of sufficiently light draught can be obtained.

A good sea steamer will be required to communicate between Tampa Bay and the posts north and south; there is one chartered and now in the service which is every way suitable. There are four small steamers owned by the public on the Gulf; two are in the possession of the navy, and are believed to be at Pensacola. The others are in the possession of the quartermaster's department. These five boats are amply sufficient for every purpose for which steamboats may be required on that side of the peninsula.

If the war should be protracted beyond the approaching campaign, it would be preferable to purchase all the steamers required for the service. When, however, the loss on the sale of them be considered, it would be less expensive to hire them, if a single campaign should end the war.

Previous to receiving your letter I had given directions for the repair of all the barges and flatboats in the possession of the quartermaster's department, and for the purchase and construction of such additional number as may be necessary; they will be ready by the 1st of October.

As to land transportation, I have already written to the acting quartermaster general apprising him of the means necessary in addition to those on hand; mules for packing and light two-horse wagons drawn by mules, the bodies of the wagons to be water-tight, are preferable for operations in the field. Light four-horse wagons, also drawn by mules, should be used to supply the interior depots. A corps of industrious, sober, and experienced wagon-drivers, also pack-horsemen, boatmen, mechanics, and laborers, are necessary to the efficient operations of the army.

A dredge-boat is required to remove the bars at the head of Lake George and Lake Monroe. If the boat in the possession of the engineer department on this coast could be employed under the direction of the officer who has charge of it, those obstructions might be readily removed, and the St. John's made an avenue for the transportation of troops and supplies near two hundred miles.

In relation to the force which it is proposed to employ in Florida, it is my duty to remark that the recruits should, as far as possible, be raised in the agricultural districts of the country; those for cavalry, particularly, should be selected with great care from the mountainous regions of Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and North Carolina, where every one is accustomed to horses and fire-arms from his infancy. In the more populous districts of the country our people are fast losing those military characteristics which formerly distinguished them. Where all were once good riders and good marksmen, few are now to be found who either understand the horse or the gun, and the term of enlistment is too short to acquire with any degree of perfection the use of either.

The Indians, if they can be obtained, and should arrive in time, will be a most important acquisition; without them, success will be doubtful, no matter what our numbers may be; with their aid and that of the spy companies proposed, the war may be ended in a single campaign. The hostile Indians are represented to be greatly divided in their councils, and it is probable, when we shall have actually taken the field, the party under Micanopy may yield. This probability, however, should not induce us to relax in our preparations.

As to any militia force which may be necessary, it would be impossible to obtain it in companies; if drafts, they must necessarily have the organization prescribed by law; if volunteers, they will insist on that organization which will give the most rank to the officers through whose influence they are raised. I consider the efficiency of militia in such a warfare as this entirely depending upon their horses; and it would be better to dispense with them entirely than to receive them as infantry, except such as may be employed to garrison posts and protect trains. If men who understand the care and management of horses and the use of arms can be obtained for the dragoon regiment in sufficient numbers for the wants of the service, mounted volunteers may safely be dispensed with; but if such men as now compose the companies serving here be sent, that description of troops will absolutely be necessary.

When I presented my project for the next campaign, I did not suppose that I should direct the operations. I presented the results of a careful investigation of all the data which I had been able to collect, and recommended that plan which I honestly thought would best insure success, no matter who might command the army. I have obtained much additional information since, yet I find no reason to change the views taken at that time. The mounted men which I then recommended I believed to be necessary; I still believe them to be necessary. That it is difficult to support them in Florida, I am fully aware; but this is a service surrounded by difficulties, and it must be our business to surmount them. I owed my success in the Creek country to my mounted men; without them I should have failed; and if I had had in March last six hundred men on fresh horses, I would have sent the Indians off before the middle of April. My horses as well as my men were broken down, and I had no means of controlling the Indians; they saw my situation, and governed themselves accordingly. Were I to recommend a change, it would be to increase, not diminish, the mounted force.

I enclose a sketch of the country which has been the theatre of my operations, hastily prepared by Captain Searle, from such data as we happened to have at hand. It will give a good general idea of the courses of rivers and trails, and the relative positions of posts and places. The posts marked in red ink are now occupied; those in black have been abandoned, in consequence of their unhealthiness.

When I was placed in command of this army the hostile Indians occupied the whole country between the Atlantic and the Suwanee, from St. Augustine and the Santa Fe, to the southern extremity of the peninsula, and small bands were scattered along the Georgia line, and thence down the western side of the Suwanee, and across towards the Oseilla.

Powell, with a party of Mickasukies and negroes, and Echo Emathla, with the Tallahassers, were in the Paniesufekkee and Wahoo swamps, on the Withlacoochee. Yaholoochee, (Cloud,) with the Isocot-sattei Indians, was in the cove. Osoochee, (Cooper,) with a few warriors and a number of Indians and runaway negroes, was on the western side of Ahapopka lake. Big Alligator and John Hicks, with a band of Mickasukies, Uchees, and Seminoles, traversed the frontier from Fort Heileman to Deadman's bay, west of the Suwanee. Nocosse Yahola was near the Georgia line. Sam Jones was between Ahapopka and the St. John's. Philip and Coe Hajo, with their people, occupied the country on both sides of the St. John's around Lake Monroe. Chekika was on the Atlantic, below Indian river. Micanopy, Jumper, Little Alligator, with their people, and a large band of Indians and captured negroes, were on the Tohopkaliga and Kissimmee. Holatochee occupied the country south of the Kissimmee and east of the Caloosahatchee, and Holati Micco, with the Tallassees, was on Pease creek.

Fort Clinch, Drane, Gilliland, Heileman, and Call had been established. My division was at Tampa Bay, and General Call's at Volusia. I had passed through the country, from the former to the latter

post, with a small mounted force, and had succeeded in making forty-two prisoners, from some of whom I obtained valuable information. I determined at once on the line of posts from Volusia to Tampa, to serve as a base, whence I could operate in every direction. That line is not, as you seem to suppose, parallel to the coast, which, under ordinary circumstances, would have been in accordance with correct military principles, but extends diagonally across the country, and commands every principal route by which the enemy was accustomed to pass from one side of the peninsula to the other. It was adapted to the circumstances in which I found myself at the time, and it had the effect of a series of bases, each interior post serving as a new base, from which my lines of operations could be pushed in any direction where an enemy was to be found. With all the additional information I have since obtained in regard to the Indians and the country, I would, if similarly situated, adopt precisely the same line.

With the exception of several small roving bands, the Indians are now south of Fort Mellon, on the St. John's and Kissimmee. The captured and runaway negroes are between St. John's and Indian rivers, and the Indian negroes on the Kissimmee, Caloosahatchee, and Pease creek.

I propose to make Fort Mellon a principal depot, and establish ports south of it on the river, and south west of it, Tohopkaliga, should circumstances require them.

The column operating from Tampa Bay will open a road on the route indicated by the dotted line, throw a bridge across Pease creek, and erect a stockade to defend it, in which will be placed fifteen or twenty days' rations of subsistence and forage. It will then proceed to the Kissimmee, construct a bridge, with a single block-house to defend it, and then be governed by circumstances.

The southern column, operating on the western side of the peninsula, will ascend the Caloosahatchee about forty miles, to the falls, and then either proceed by land or in small boats to the Indian settlements in the interior of that part of the country.

Before I determine either the point of departure or the route of the Atlantic column, further information in regard to the country must be obtained. Lieutenant Colonel Harney will proceed in a few days to Indian river, and perhaps south of it, to ascertain the nature of the country, and to select a proper site for a post and depot.

I am apprehensive of the Indians obtaining powder from Havana on the one side, and New Providence on the other; and if a small naval force, or even the cutters which were under the direction of the navy last winter, could be spared, much advantage would result to the service.

I desire that the steamers in the possession of the navy be placed subject to my control; and if the officers who commanded them during the last campaign—Lieutenants Hunter and Johnson—could be assigned to the command of them during the approaching campaign, they would be able to render most efficient service.

As far as depends upon me, everything shall be done to insure success.

And I have the honor to be, with high consideration and respect, sir, your obedient servant,
THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

P. S.—On my return to Tampa Bay I shall forward a more correct map of the country, which was being prepared when I left that post.
T. S. J.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Garey's Ferry, August 15, 1837.*

SIR: In December last I requested the ordnance officer attached to the army, Captain D'Lagnel, to order several light mountain howitzers for service here, the model of which, I was informed, had been introduced from France by the Ordnance department.

Greatly to my surprise, when the guns arrived, I found that they were mounted on carriages, the wheels of which were not over thirty-six inches in diameter, and the axles not more than forty-eight inches in length. They were an exact copy of the French carriage, without any regard to the difference of situation and circumstances of our country, when compared with France.

That country, you know, has the Pyrenees on one frontier and the Alps on another. The mountain guns are intended for those frontiers. In consequence of the short axles, they are readily moved on the mule paths through the mountain passes, either on the backs of mules, or by soldiers with drag ropes. The United States have no mountain frontiers; their armies operate through wide forests and marshes, and over extensive sandy plains, either on the trails of Indians or on roads hastily opened by the troops; numerous deep and rapid streams have to be crossed without bridges in almost every day's march.

The mountain carriages are so low that they would in this country be often entirely under water, and the axles being but a few inches from the ground, the movement of the guns would be impeded at every step by stumps, and even by the large tufts of grass in the sand plains and wet prairies. The track of the carriages not being so wide as that of other carriages, they would on the sandy and muddy roads of Florida be constantly sliding from one side to the other, and would upset whenever the wheels on either side should fall into the carriage or wagon track. I think the present carriage, on such roads as we have here, would be overturned from twenty to fifty times a day.

If the four pieces here were mounted on suitable carriages I would have them equipped as light artillery, have the men who serve them mounted, and let them accompany the dragoons and mounted volunteers in their rapid movements against the enemy. They would then be a most formidable addition to our offensive means; now they are entirely useless, and with their present carriages they never can be otherwise until our population shall have spread over the plains west of the Mississippi to the Rocky mountains, and our operations be carried on in the passes of these mountains.

In nothing is our blind devotion to Europe more strikingly exemplified than in adopting into our service the mountain gun as used in France. It seems to have been adopted, with all the details of its equipment, merely because it was French, without any inquiry as to the uses to which it was applied there, or the objects to be effected by it here. I am not opposed to European improvements, but I would adopt their general principles, and arrange the details to suit our peculiar circumstances and the nature of our country.

The gun itself is precisely what we want; but we require for it a carriage that will run in the same

track with other carriages, with wheels of sufficient diameter to raise it above the ordinary streams, and to pass over our frontier roads without obstruction or difficulty. The iron howitzers sent hither, and even the iron six-pounders, are too heavy for this service. There are neither workmen nor materials here to construct carriages for the mountain guns, and I am apprehensive that we shall have to dispense with them entirely. Unwilling to complain without cause, I have given them a fair trial; and to attempt to use them in their present carriages would be anything but an evidence of wisdom—it would be the extreme of folly. If a suitable carriage for a single one of them could be made at Watervliet or Washington arsenal, and sent out, it would be of great importance to the service.

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Micanopy, August 21, 1837.*

SIR: In my report of the 15th of June I referred to certain conduct ascribed to Captain William Bunce, of Tampa Bay; and I appended a statement of the principal Creek chief, Tustenuggee Emathlo, of information obtained by him on the subject from a Creek Indian who had spent the last winter and spring with the Mickasukies. I considered it my duty to forward the statement of the chief; and the circumstances were of such a nature, taken in connexion with events that had then but recently occurred, that I could not with propriety have withheld it. As the publication of the statement, however, without the explanations or defence of Captain Bunce, might inflict a serious injury on him, when he may be entirely innocent or only have talked imprudently, I desire that all that relates to him be considered confidential, and be withheld from publication, should it be thought proper to publish the military part of the report.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. JOEL R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Micanopy, August 22, 1837.*

SIR: In consequence of a despatch from the commanding officer at Fort King, informing me of the arrival of several Seminole chiefs in that vicinity, and of their desire to see me, I proceeded thither on the 18th, when I found Coe Hajo, a principal chief, Tuskaenaha, a sub-chief of Philip's, and Hicks, a sub-chief of the Mickasukies. I had a long conference with Coe Hajo on the 19th; and at his request I met him, Tuskaenaha, and Hicks, on the 20th. The conference occupied more than four hours; and every topic connected with the treaties, the commencement of the war, and the present condition and future prospects of the Indians, was discussed.

Coe Hajo stated, in general terms, the desire of the whole people to be at peace with us. He said that even the body of the Mickasukies were tired of the war, and were beginning to consider the contest, and talk of it as hopeless; but, he added, they had an old man among them, Appiacca, (Sam Jones,) who gave them bad advice, and who had caused most of the recent difficulty. He intimated that the Indians would prefer to remain in the country, but even the Mickasukies were convinced they could not contend successfully against us, and all, except Jones, expressed their anxiety for peace; that to show the sincerity of their intentions, they had sent out runners to order all the hunting parties to leave the frontiers, and that all had received orders not to disturb white men or their property; that the cattle and horses recently taken were stolen by a small party of Hitchitees, who had within a few days arrived from the Creek country; and the cattle taken east of the St. John's had been stolen by a party who had left camp without the knowledge of the chiefs. He declared that no further depredations should be committed, and he was, as all the Indians were, anxious that a trading-house should be established, where they could dispose of the proceeds of the chase, and receive, in return, clothing and other necessaries.

I informed them that the government, as well as the people of the United States, desired to save them—not to destroy them; that our whole people would rather load them with favors than inflict a single injury upon them, but that we required all people to fulfil their engagements with us; that they must understand distinctly that they would not be permitted to remain in the country; that they must make up their minds to leave it, and I desired them to say this to the chiefs and communicate it to the people; that they have destroyed so many lives, and so vast an amount of property, that it would be impossible for them and the citizens of Florida to remain together in the same country; that, having violated all their engagements, we could not trust them again. We knew that the chiefs had been averse to the war from the beginning, but that they had not been able to control their warriors, and we could not trust our women, children, and old men in the neighborhood of people who had so often deceived us.

I stated to them that we were prepared either for peace or war—the choice was with them; that we would rather save than destroy them; that if they desired any favors from our government or people they must prove themselves worthy of them, by fulfilling with scrupulous fidelity all their engagements; that if they have any complaints to make or favors to ask, the President would receive a deputation from them after they have established themselves in their new homes west of the Mississippi.

I intimated to them as Appiacca (Sam Jones) had proved himself a bad man, and had caused, as they acknowledged, many of the difficulties with which they were surrounded, they owed it to themselves and their families to displace him; and I declared to them, at the same time, that I would not recognize him as a chief, nor under any circumstances receive a message from him or transact any business with him. There was a young man with them, whom they stated to be the representative of Jones; I refused to see him, and charged Hicks with all I had to say to the Mickasukies. I urged upon them the necessity of removing Jones and appointing a sensible man as chief, who would be capable of understanding their true

interests and giving them good advice. I advised them to have their chiefs assembled, to let them know our determination to require the fulfilment of the treaty and the surrender of all the property which they had taken. I advised them to take time and consider their situation in all its bearings, and their recent and present conduct in all its consequences, and determine like sensible men, and not like boys. As for the trading establishment, I informed them that I must be satisfied of the sincerity of their intentions before such an advantage could be conceded to them; that they must surrender the captured negroes first, and then I would answer them on that point.

They declared that all hostilities and depredations should cease and not be resumed, and that the negroes should be restored. All the parties now on the frontier are to be withdrawn; the chiefs of the nation will be assembled, and Coe Hajo is to visit Fort King again, for the purpose of communicating the result of the council of chiefs and making further arrangements in regard to future intercourse.

Of the prisoners in my possession there are eighteen Mickasukies. Among them are the wife and children of Hicks, the sub-chief. I assured him and Coe Hajo that I would hold the prisoners accountable for the conduct of the Indians; that if parties of the latter continued to plunder, I would confine the prisoners in irons; and if any murders were committed I would execute them.

I place but little reliance on the professions of the Indians, but my object is to gain time and save the frontier during the sickly season; and the result of the conference is at least four weeks' work for them in council and in communicating with us.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, August 28, 1837.*

SIR: I enclose a copy of a letter received to-day from General P. F. Smith, of Louisiana. The general commanded a regiment under General Scott and General Gaines in the first campaign, not only with credit, but with distinction. If he could bring a regiment of infantry into the field—and I have no doubt of his ability to do so—the service would be greatly benefited. By adding to his regiment a small body of regular troops he would be able, with naval co-operation, to commence his operations at Charlotte harbor, or further south, and destroy or drive out the parties of Indians in the southern portion of the peninsula.

I greatly fear that the regular force expected to be in the field cannot be obtained in time for an early campaign; and if we permit the months of November and December to pass without the most active and vigorous operations, we may expect another year of war at least.

Of the regular troops now in Florida, but few can be relied on in any event; most of them have gone through two severe campaigns, and both officers and men are entirely broken down. Volunteers cannot be obtained from Georgia or Alabama, and I consider it of the utmost importance that a regiment should be obtained from Louisiana, and of equal importance that General Smith should command it.

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

NEW ORLEANS, *July 30, 1837.*

GENERAL: On my arrival here, about the beginning of this month, Lieutenant Cross communicated to me a letter from you on the subject of raising a corps for the next campaign. There is nothing I desire more than to assist in finishing the war in Florida; and if, at the time the campaign is about to open, you still desire any volunteers from this place, I shall be ready to do all I can to raise them. The obstacles in the way of any earlier efforts are several; some of them, which are personal to myself, are, that I should like to be assured that command in chief is to remain with an officer who has learned the country and the enemy. If a new chief is to be substituted, the next campaign will end in acquiring the knowledge you have now, and teaching the Indians our modes of warfare instead of learning theirs. I have no desire to fall into the hands of a new doctor, who has some new nostrum to try; I wish to be under the old practitioner who has made all his experiments and is now about to derive the benefit of them.

My absence on a former campaign and at Frederick this last winter have entirely interrupted my professional labors at the bar, and it is essential to my interest that I should recommence them with the opening of the courts in November. I should, if I undertook to raise a corps of volunteers, have to resign the office of adjutant general of the State, the salary of which is now of importance to me. These are reasons why I would now avoid any attempt to enrol a corps, while I am uncertain whether it would be desirable, when the campaign opens, to join in it or not. I do not balance the advantages of my profession or office against the command of a corps in service; I prefer the latter by all odds. But I am loth to abandon the former until the latter is assured. As to the probability of raising either a regiment or brigade, it is one of the most uncertain things that can be imagined; it would fail if proposed now, for the period at which the service is to be commenced is too far off, and every one would postpone joining until the last moment, and by that time the excitement of the first moment would be worn out. The regiment I commanded in 1836 left the service of the United States highly and justly discontented with it. They had served the whole time faithfully; indeed, had passed it nearly two weeks, had been the whole time in constant activity, and when they arrived here, in rags and poverty, found not the slightest preparation on the part of the government to pay them off, notwithstanding the most positive orders on the part of General Scott. The governor of the State was obliged to borrow money and pay them, and the paymaster who was sent here afterwards, under General Scott's orders, was immediately remanded to Alabama; so that the whole regiment left the service under feelings not well calculated to induce them to enter it again. But as more than a year has already passed, I believe that those feelings have, in a great measure, dissipated, and the hope of an active and vigorous campaign would bring them again into the field. I do not think that this State could furnish any horsemen. The prairies, you know, where

all are horsemen, are not inhabited by a population that would furnish many volunteers in the service; nor are their horses fit for the purpose, being mostly small ponies.

Having laid before you, general, all the obstacles in our way, let me conclude with the other side of the question: That if you are to continue in command, and just at the moment that the troops are wanted will make a call of volunteers from this State to join you, I will, for one, answer to it, and will leave nothing undone to bring at least a regiment to you.

I am obliged to leave this to-morrow for the north, and will leave Philadelphia, on my return, about the 20th of September, but nothing shall detain me on hearing from you. I will prepare the gentlemen who are to accompany me as officers to act in my absence. And if you will direct any communication intended for me to Lieutenant Cross, that he, if I am not here, may make it known to my associates, I will answer that everything that can be done will be done. I shall be highly honored, also, to receive any communication from you directed to me at Philadelphia. Permit me to suggest, general, that more latitude be allowed in mustering men into service. For instance, that individuals who enroll themselves may be received and furnished with quarters and subsistence until they can be organized into a company, and so on, as if they were a detachment of recruits. A regiment could be raised in a week in New Orleans if this were permitted.

It appears, from the murders committed about Florida light, that the Indians frequent those parts. How would it answer to throw the troops from New Orleans on to the cape? There are harbors there known to the wreckers; and let them push northward through the terrible but unknown Everglades. One great advantage would be, that the further they advanced the nearer they would approach supplies, which might be sent from Tampa Bay to the headwaters of the Sannebel, (or Saw Noel,) emptying into Carlos harbor. I should be glad to undertake the expedition, if you thought it advantageous, and I succeed in raising men. The Spaniards who were brought from the rancho at Charlotte harbor, especially one called Rubio, knows the Sannebel well.

Whatever may be your determination, I hope to have the pleasure of hearing from you at Philadelphia, upon which I will be prepared to act immediately.

With sincere respect, your obedient servant,

P. F. SMITH.

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding Army of Florida.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, August 30, 1837.*

SIR: I received, on my way to this place, your letter of the 3d instant. The post which you direct at Charlotte harbor I consider of so much importance that I would have established it a month ago but for the crippled condition of the troops. Force cannot now be spared for that object, unless the marines be returned; and in consequence of the orders I received in July from the general-in-chief in relation to them, I do not feel myself at liberty to retain them.

In regard to calling the Florida volunteers into service, I had no choice; disease was increasing among the regular troops in so alarming a degree that additional force became necessary for the protection of the frontier. To give confidence to the people, and prevent the settlements from breaking up, the most prompt measures were necessary. The Floridians, unless taken into service, could not, deprived as they had been, by the events of the war, of their accustomed avocations, have remained in the country; they must have sought elsewhere security for their families and employment for themselves. Had it been possible to obtain volunteers from the neighboring States, they could not have arrived in time to save the frontier. My only alternative was the immediate military organization of the inhabitants. The least delay on my part would have exposed the frontier to attack and devastation; it is now secure, and we have gained the great moral and military advantage of impressing the people with a confidence in their own ability to protect themselves. Had I relied on troops from the adjoining States, the Floridians must have embodied for the protection of their families until they could have removed them from the country; in that event, the public must have fed and ultimately paid them. But the experience of last year proved that troops could not be obtained from the adjoining States during the sickly season, and there was no probability of obtaining them during the present season. The Floridians were on the frontier; they were acclimated, and, in every aspect in which the subject can be viewed, are better qualified for the duty now assigned to them than any other troops that could be employed. Had you been on the spot, I am confident you would have ordered what I have done.

With high consideration and respect, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Tampa Bay, September 2, 1837.*

SIR: I have received your letter of the 18th ultimo, and will take immediate measures to call into service the requisite volunteer force. I wrote to General Smith, of Louisiana, yesterday, and authorized him to raise a regiment.

It will be a work of time to raise and bring into the field a volunteer force sufficient to produce any decisive effect on the enemy; and I greatly fear that the season best adapted to efficient operations will have passed before an adequate force be obtained.

As to re-enlisting the soldiers discharged in Florida, it is out of the question; not a man who has served in this country, and who is worth retaining, will engage again; and unless the condition of the soldier be greatly ameliorated, or a different mode of filling the ranks be adopted, we cannot hope to keep up even our small army. There is no inducement to any man to enter our service as a private soldier; in any other employment he has a better opportunity of supporting himself, and of making provision for old age; for, no matter what his merits, or how faithfully he may serve, he has nothing to look forward to but to be turned out and starve when he shall be no longer capable of performing the duties of a soldier.

If the term of enlistment were extended to five years, and a small bounty were allowed on the first engagement, double bounty on the second, and a pension for life to those who should serve faithfully during three entire enlistments, the ranks could be filled with the best materials, and the establishment be kept complete and efficient. I know many eloquent objections will be urged against the pension system; but it is time that we disregard idle declamation, and take common-sense views of the subject. If the army is worth anything, it is worth being made efficient; without good soldiers it cannot be efficient; to retain it as it is at present is an imposition upon the people; and the question, it seems to me, should be, whether we shall dispense with it entirely, or introduce such modifications into its constitution and administration as shall render it what it professes to be—a safe defence against sudden aggression, and a sure rallying point for the militia.

I have the honor to be, with high consideration and respect, your obedient servant,
THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *St. Augustine, September 22, 1837.*

SIR: I received on the 15th instant, on my way to this frontier, your letters of the 25th and 30th of August and the 2d of September, and on the 18th your letters of the 6th. The last detachment of the Creek warriors left Tampa for the Pass Christian on the 11th instant, and I gave orders at the same time that, on their arrival there, they should be mustered, discharged, and immediately moved westward.

The Creek Indians had been promised a reward for the captures they should make of negroes belonging to citizens of the United States; had compensation not been promised they would have taken no prisoners, but would have put all to death. I compromised with them by allowing them twenty dollars for each slave captured. They were entitled, agreeably to the promises made to them before they entered the service, to all Indian negroes and other Indian property captured by them. To end all difficulty on that subject, I have purchased the negroes from them, on account of the public, for eight thousand dollars. There are about eighty of the negroes, besides Abram's family, and those who are free; some of them, perhaps, may be found on investigation to be the property of citizens. I respectfully ask that this purchase be sanctioned. The Seminole annuity, it seems to me, might be charged with the amount paid to the Indians for these negroes, as well as with the reward for securing those who belonged to citizens.

It is highly important to the slaveholding States that these negroes be sent out of the country, and I would strongly recommend that they be sent to one of our colonies in Africa.

The sum paid to the Indians is entirely satisfactory to them, though it is far less than the value of the negroes.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *St. Augustine, September 25, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 9th and 13th instant.

I omitted to inform you in my letter of the 22d instant that I have accepted a battalion of volunteers offered by the acting governor of Alabama, to be raised by General Andrew Moore, a gentleman well known to Governor Clay. General Moore sent me one of the best battalions last fall I have ever seen; that which he proposes to raise this fall he expects to command himself. If he succeeds in raising the battalion we shall find it most useful and efficient.

Under the authority of the last paragraph of your letter of the 30th ultimo I have called on the superintendent, or agent, of the Choctaws to increase the force from that nation from two to five hundred warriors, and to send them on with as little delay as practicable.

General Hernandez's operations, though upon a small scale, have resulted most fortunately. The Indians and negroes killed and taken amount to forty-nine. Among the prisoners are three important chiefs, King Philip, (Emathla,) and Euchee Billy, and his brother Euchee Jack; also John Philip, the only negro chief who had not been previously secured.

I shall send a detachment, in a few days, with the dredge-boat, which has been already reported to me to remove the bar at the head of Lake George; and as soon as a re-enforcement of two hundred men join I shall reoccupy Fort Mellon. I may be deceived in my expectations, but I believe we shall not fail of success. I am taking my measures so as to hold all the ground we shall occupy, and not recede after having moved forward.

Communications directed to me at Garey's Ferry will reach me more readily than if directed to any other point.

In consequence of the prevalence of yellow fever in New Orleans General Smith may be delayed in getting his regiment into the field, and it is reported here that we shall have drafts from South Carolina, and not volunteers. The drafts we had from that State last winter behaved admirably; the objection to that description of force is the shortness of the period which they can be required to serve.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,
THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *St. Augustine, October 2, 1837.*

SIR: A regiment of volunteers has been raised in North Alabama for service in Florida. The people of that region are excellent gunmen; they will serve as spies or as troops of the line with equal efficiency; and that which will add greatly to the value of the corps which has been offered is, that many of the officers and men of Lieutenant Colonel Cawfield's fine battalion will join it. If the northern Indians should not arrive, and I learn by letters from St. Louis that they will not probably be raised, this regiment will be invaluable. I have written to the acting governor, requesting that it be sent on with as little delay as possible. Major Churchill, of the army, who has recently been in North Alabama, informs me that the regiment may be marched into Florida during the present month; if so, it could be brought into action with the regular troops before the volunteers from any other quarter arrive. If the whole force required from Alabama has been countermanded, I respectfully ask that this regiment be excepted and permitted to join me.

I have obtained by the captures made by General Hernandez most valuable guides; and from some of them I have already obtained valuable information, as well in regard to the disposition and intention of the Indians, as to their present position. If I had a thousand men on fresh horses I could, in less than three weeks, destroy the Mickasukies. My object will be to pursue such a policy as shall induce them to remain in their present positions until the army be ready for the field.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *St. Augustine, October 3, 1837.*

SIR: When the government determined to raise a regiment of volunteer Creek warriors for service in Florida, instructions were given to me by the President, then at the Hermitage, to organize it and appoint the officers. I desired to appoint gentlemen who had served with me in the Creek war, and who had passed many years among the Indians; but as those whom I desired to appoint, Colonel Walker, General Woodward, and Major Collins, had been engaged in purchasing Indian lands, the chiefs objected to them; and insisted that I should appoint my ("*your*") "*own men*," meaning officers of the regular army. The principal chief, Hopothley Yahola, stated that all the white men in the country, except those who wore uniforms, were combined to cheat them. The President had designated Colonel Lane, then a captain of dragoons, to command the corps. I wished Colonel Walker to accept the lieutenant colonelcy, and General Woodward the majority. Colonel Walker agreed to accompany the corps to Florida, but, in consequence of the infirm state of his health, he refused to take an appointment in the regiment. The opposition to General Woodward among the chiefs was so great, even among those whom I relied on to support him, that I found it would not be possible to give him the second place. I was so occupied that I could not, as the President had directed, organize the regiment; and, besides, desertions from it were taking place daily. I therefore directed Colonel Lane to proceed with it to Florida and organize it there; and I urged upon him the importance of prevailing upon Colonel Walker to take the lieutenant colonelcy, and of giving to General Woodward the majority. It was understood, however, that Captain Brown should be a lieutenant colonel if Colonel Walker should still decline. This gentleman died at Apalachicola, and Captain Brown was appointed. The difficulties continued in regard to General Woodward, and he left the regiment at Apalachicola; Captain Morris was appointed major.

It was understood between me and the principal chiefs that if more than twelve companies should be raised then two majors should be appointed.

Captain Brown has informed me that pay has been refused to the officers in consequence of the alleged illegality of their appointments. The regiment was organized within the Territory of Florida, and I considered it, in regard to the law, upon a footing with any other volunteer regiment. If it had been composed of white men the governor of Florida would have commissioned the officers under the law. All those officers occupied precisely the same relation to the service that the present surgeon general did when he served as lieutenant colonel of a regiment of volunteers from Louisiana. The services have been performed, and well performed, and the officers have earned, by the most arduous exertion and gallant conduct, the pay attached to their several grades. If Lieutenant Colonel Lawson was paid for his services with the Louisiana regiment, I respectfully ask that the case of the officers of the Creek regiment be reconsidered; and if the Executive has not the power to direct their payment, I beg that the matter be referred to Congress.

Separated from my papers, I have to write entirely from recollection; but copies of the President's letters to me will be found on file in the War Office.

With high consideration and respect, I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

A.

Extract from Major General Thomas S. Jesup's "Orders," No. 50.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Mitchell, July 25, 1836.*

A band of friendly Indian warriors will be raised immediately and organized for special service, under instructions from the commanding general. They will be mustered into service, mounted, equipped, supplied, and paid as mounted volunteers for twelve months, unless sooner discharged. Captain J. F. Lane is appointed to raise, organize, and command them. He will be mustered in for the same period as colonel, subject to the approval of the President of the United States.

B

HEADQUARTERS, *Fort Drane, October 29, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to enclose to you two General Orders providing for the appointment of the officers of the regiment of Creek volunteers, subject, however, to your approval. Those announced in the order of the 28th instant had previously, with one exception, received the sanction of Colonel Lane and of General Jesup, and were only confirmed by me, but with entire satisfaction.

Those announced in the order of the 29th, are officers of well-known and approved merit. I feel the utmost confidence that they will all do justice to the trust reposed in them, and respectfully recommend them all to your favorable consideration and approval.

I shall soon have the honor to write to you more fully of my movements, which shall be rapid and consecutive from this point.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

R. K. GALL, *Commanding Army of Florida.*

C.

GENERAL ORDERS.

HEADQUARTERS, *Fort Drane, October 28, 1836.*

The following appointments in the regiment of Creek volunteers, to take effect from their dates, respectively, and until the pleasure of the President of the United States be known, are hereby announced to the army by the general commanding-in-chief in Florida:

Lieutenant colonel . .	Harvey Brown, September 1, 1836.
Major	William Morris, September 1, 1836.
Captains	1. William B. Moniac, August 17, 1836.
	2. William B. Piercy, September 1, 1836.
	3. Frederick Searle, September 1, 1836.
	4. William G. Freeman, September 1, 1836.
	5. Joseph Roberts, September 1, 1836.
	6. John H. Watson, September 1, 1836.
	7. Simón A. Drum, September 1, 1836.
	8. Thomas H. Bradley, September 1, 1836.
	9. Andrew Ross, October 22, 1836.
Lieutenants	1. George Boyd, September 1, 1836.
	2. John Collins, September 1, 1836.

They will be obeyed and respected accordingly. By order of the commanding general of the army in Florida.

THOMAS RANDALL, *Adjutant and Inspector General.*

D.

GENERAL ORDER.

HEADQUARTERS, *Fort Drane, October 29, 1836.*

The commander-in-chief announces to the army under his command the following additional appointments in the regiment of Creek volunteers, to take effect from this day, and until the pleasure of the President of the United States be known:

Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Pierce, of the army of the United States, to be colonel of the regiment, vice Lane, deceased. Lieutenants Herbert and Betts, of the 1st artillery, and Lieutenant Johnson, of the Florida volunteers, to be captains. They will be obeyed and respected accordingly.

By order of the general commanding-in-chief in Florida:

THOMAS RANDALL, *Adjutant and Inspector General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Garey's Ferry, October 10, 1837.*

SIR: I wrote to the adjutant general yesterday, and enclosed a copy of a report from Captain H. Brown of the examination of several negroes who surrendered at Fort Peyton on the 7th instant. On a further examination, it is ascertained that there is a large party of the Seminoles for peace and emigration, but they are overawed by the Mickasukies. That tribe, with such of the Seminoles as are under the influence of Powell, will resist to the utmost. The Tallahassees, Hitchitees, Enchees, with all who have left the Creek country within the last three or four years, will either fight or fly to fastnesses further south.

The principal Indian force is now concentrated within two days' rapid march from Fort Mellon. If the troops were here, I could find them in less than a week. With the information I now have, I will not wait for volunteers from the States, but, relying upon those of the country, shall press forward the moment the regular troops arrive. A severe blow struck at once at the Mickasukies would, perhaps, end the war.

Every measure will be taken to have the transports and supplies in perfect readiness, so as not to delay the troops a moment after their arrival.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Garey's Ferry, October 15, 1837.*

SIR: Many of the vessels propelled by sails employed in transporting stores for the army have grounded on the bar at the mouth of the St. John's, and in two instances the property of the public has been seized by persons who are reported to be pilots, and who profess to be wreckers. In the first case, Captain D'Lagnol, the ordnance officer at this post, proceeded at once to the spot and took charge of the property. The other case occurred yesterday, and I have directed Major Whiting to take the property, no matter in whose hands he may find it; and if the wreckers have really any just claim, let them apply to the government for redress. Should suits be instituted against the officers who perform the duty of securing the public property, I respectfully request that the district attorney be instructed by the proper department to defend them.

I have neither books nor legal advisers to refer to here; and, to enable me to protect the public interests, I desire the opinion of the Attorney General as to the right of persons calling themselves wreckers to seize and hold the public property and expose it to public sale. If they possess that right, the best concerted plans may be deranged by the exercise of it.

The anomaly, I understood, exists at the entrance of this river of the same persons acting as pilots and wreckers. There is, therefore, every inducement to run the vessels which they undertake to bring into the river on shore, in order to obtain salvage.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Garey's Ferry, October 15, 1837.*

SIR: In carrying out your instructions to the commissioners in regard to the issue of rations to the suffering inhabitants, I ascertained that there were several classes of sufferers not provided for, and which I had not enumerated in any of my letters on the subject, such as aged and infirm persons who were supported by their relations before the war, but who, in consequence of the losses sustained by these relations, are rendered entirely destitute. 2d. Indigent widows, with large families, who formerly lived on small farms, and relied principally on their cattle and other stock for the support of their families. 3d. Indigent persons who, though their domicils were within the limits of the towns, depended upon the cultivation of small farms in the country and fishing for the support of their families, and who by the events of the war have been prevented from cultivating their farms, or from resorting to their usual fishing grounds. In all these cases, I have directed that the rations be continued until I can receive instructions, or until the commissioners who are to superintend that branch of service shall have entered upon their duties. The officers charged with the issue of subsistence to the inhabitants are vigilant, but, occupied as they are, many persons who ought to be excluded, no doubt, receive rations; and there are, perhaps, cases where persons who come within the laws, and the most rigid rules established under them, are excluded. There is, I believe, from the attention I have been occasionally enabled to bestow on the subject, no great abuse of the bounty of the public; but I have no time to devote to the details of the business, and am every day more convinced that it is only by separating it entirely from the business of the army that strict justice can be done to the public and to the individuals dependent upon its bounty.

The whole country is quiet, and, with the exception of the stealing of a few cattle, no depredations are attempted by the Indians; their principal force is south of Lake Monroe.

I hear nothing of the movement of volunteers from any quarter; only twenty recruits have arrived, but I hope those ordered from Fort Monroe will be in time to enable me to occupy the advanced posts on the St. John's during the present month.

To make Indian river available in the approaching campaign, I propose to connect it with the Atlantic immediately south of Cape Canaveral, by which about seventy or eighty miles will be saved in every voyage; the labor and expense will be trifling, compared with the facilities which will thus be secured in the prosecution of the war.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Garey's Ferry, Florida, October 17, 1837.*

SIR: I have received your letter dated the 4th instant. Should the Cherokee chiefs arrive, I will endeavor to carry out your views fully; but I take it for granted these proceedings are not to interrupt the military operations. In matters of council Indians move slowly; and I should regret to lose the month of November, decidedly the best month in the year for operations in this country.

The councils of the Cherokee chiefs may have a favorable influence on the Seminoles, but I doubt it. At the request, or rather by the direction of the late President of the United States, I sent, with Colonel Lane, from the Creek country, three talented and influential chiefs, all of whom had relations among the Seminoles, and one of whom had resided several years among them; Yahola Hajo, nephew of Jumper,

John Hopahnee, nephew of the late Charley Emathla, and Echo Hajo, a relation of Powell, and Holati Micco, for the purpose of conferring with the Seminoles, and, if possible, treating with them; and they could effect nothing. Yahola Hajo declared to me, the day he set out from Tampa for the west, that no reliance should be placed upon the promises of any of the Seminole chiefs; that, unable to control their sub-chiefs and warriors, they promised only to deceive. He informed me that the Seminoles acknowledged no authority in their chiefs to make any treaty without the consent of all the heads of families of the nation. That even when a large portion of the heads of families should assent to a measure, those who dissented did not consider themselves bound to submit to or adopt it. He added, they would not tell the truth, and if I believed them they would deceive me. He said his uncle (Jumper) was desirous of emigrating, as were all the chiefs who were aware of our power; but the majority of the nation being opposed to it, their lives were in danger whenever they advocated the measure; that more than half the nation preferred war, on any terms, to emigration. If anything could induce them to emigrate without the application of force, it would be to send some of their young men of rank and standing, as warriors, to Washington: Having an opportunity to witness the numbers and power of the nation, they might probably return satisfied that their best policy would be to remove.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *St. Augustine, October 22, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your two letters of the 7th instant, and I have the satisfaction to inform you that Assun Yahola (Powell) is my prisoner, with nearly all the war spirits of the nation.

That chief came into the vicinity of Fort Peyton on the 20th, and sent a messenger to General Hernandez, desiring to see and converse with him. The sickly season being over, and there being no further necessity to temporize, I sent a party of mounted men and seized the entire body, and now have them securely lodged in the fort.

I have Emathla, (Philip,) Coe Hajo, Miccopotokee, and Euchee Billy, all principal chiefs, Caccocoochee, (Wildcat,) Assun Yahola, (Powell,) Chietto Yahola, Tustenukkee, and several important personages, sub-chiefs, with more than eighty first-rate warriors; and I have guides who can lead the army into every fastness in the country.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *St. Augustine, October 29, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th instant.

General Eustis has arrived, and the recruits are coming in. I hope to have everything in readiness to commence the campaign this day week. Forage and all other supplies are abundant; but I apprehend the troops will suffer for want of tents; those ordered have not arrived, and it is feared they have been lost; this, however, shall not delay me a moment; if tents should not arrive, I will take the field without one myself, and others must do the same.

As to the expedition planned by Lieutenant Powell, I should like it better if it did not abstract so much from my force; if he were ready to move with me, and could carry out that part of my plan embracing St. Lucie and Indian rivers, his co-operation would be most effective, but I shall move at least fifteen days before he can be in readiness, and with a hundred men less than I would otherwise have. Mr. Powell is a most valuable and enterprising officer, and will perform the duties confided to him with ability and zeal, and I shall afford him every facility in my power; but I would respectfully suggest that he be placed subject to my orders. For effective military operations his force will be too small; for mere reconnaissance or exploration it will be too large, unless he propose to divide it into several parties. It is a matter of much importance that the communication be cut off immediately between the Indians about Florida Point and those on the head of the St. John's. I had intended to establish a post on the St. Lucie for that purpose; if Lieutenant Powell could ascend that river, he would be able to close that communication, and perhaps prevent supplies of ammunition from reaching the Indians on the St. John's.

The principal chief of the Indians here, Coe Hajo, stated to me in convention, on the 27th instant, that Micanopy, the principal Seminole chief, was anxious to surrender, and would do so whenever the troops should arrive in his neighborhood. I have never, for a moment, doubted his sincerity; how many of his people would follow him is uncertain.

I have the honor to be, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Garey's Ferry, Florida, November 4, 1837.*

SIR: Since my letter of this morning, I have had an opportunity of perusing the communication of John Ross, principal chief of the Cherokees, to the chief, headmen, and warriors of the Seminole nation. Not a word is said in that paper about emigration, but the idea is held out that a treaty is to be made, and compensation allowed for injuries sustained by the Seminoles from white men. The Cherokee chief could not have been aware of the decided policy of the government in regard to the Indians, or he has misapprehended the nature of the question at issue. This war, as I understand it, is carried on as it was begun, to enforce the fulfilment of the stipulations of our existing treaty, not to make a new treaty; if

peace were all that were required that could be accomplished in a week, and without any mediation; but we require more than peace, we require emigration. If the government adhere to the policy of emigration, the talk of the Cherokee chief ought not to be communicated to the Seminoles, because, to say the least of it, expectation will be created which cannot be realized; if that policy is to be abandoned, a peace as permanent as that with Great Britain can be made with the Seminoles without placing the administration under any obligations to the Cherokees—a matter of some importance in our existing relations with that nation of Indians, and particularly with the Ross party. Jumper, one of the most sensible men I have ever met, of any color, declared to me that the Seminoles would gladly accept peace on the condition of withdrawing to the same palmetto lands south of the Caloosahatchee, and abandoning the remainder of the country; and there has not been a moment since my first interview with that chief in February last that I could not have made peace on those terms.

Considering the talk of the Cherokee chief as in direct conflict with all my instructions from the government, I deem it to be my duty to prevent its communication to the Seminoles until I can receive your further instructions.

And I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Garey's Ferry, November 4, 1837.*

SIR: A member of the Cherokee delegation, a Mr. Fields, arrived yesterday. I am much embarrassed by his presence. The Seminoles talk only to deceive, and any attempt to negotiate will cause delay. Arguments composed of words have been exhausted, only those composed of powder and lead will be effective. I was compelled to temporize during the sickly season to save the frontier, but that season is past, and the greatest vigor and activity should characterize our measures now. Besides, from what I learn from Colonel Twiggs and other officers who have been in the Cherokee country recently, I feel well assured we shall have the Cherokees to fight before May next, and the interview sought with the Seminoles by the delegation may be to strengthen themselves, not to serve us. If I should permit any intercourse, it will not be until the troops shall have taken their positions in the interior, so as to enable me to strike the moment the negotiation fails.

I have sent forward two companies to reoccupy Volusia, and have ordered General Eustis to-day to send five companies forward to reoccupy Fort Mellon, and prepare storehouses for the supplies for the campaign.

By a despatch received this morning from Tampa Bay, I learn that Holati Micco, principal chief of the Pease creek Tallassees has been captured, with a sub-chief and a warrior. This is a chief of great influence, and one of the most hostile and most opposed to emigration of any in the nation; he assisted in carrying off my hostages in time. He is chief of the band of which Powell is a sub-chief.

The prospect is now flattering for a speedy termination of the war, and I entertain the most sanguine hopes that it may be terminated during the present year. At all events, no efforts shall be spared to accomplish that object. The service suffers for want of officers. Most of those who *have* joined are young second lieutenants.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Picolata, November 10, 1837.*

SIR: On the 4th instant I had the honor to report the arrival of one of the members of the Cherokee delegation. He accompanied me to St. Augustine, and on the 7th instant, after I had called his attention to the fact of his chief having omitted in his talk to the Seminoles to urge the necessity of emigration, and had informed him that that talk would not be allowed to go to the Seminoles without further instructions from the War Department, I afforded him an interview with the Seminole chiefs confined at the fort. He informed them that the object of the delegation was to counsel them to submit, and throw themselves on the magnanimity of the American government and people. He observed that the Cherokees and Seminoles were the only aboriginal people remaining east of the Mississippi; that the Cherokees expected to go to the west, and desired the Seminoles to accompany them. He alluded to the talk from his chief, but repeated no part of it.

The principal chief, Coe Hajo, replied that he desired peace; that he was ready to emigrate, and that Micanopy and many of the Seminoles were willing to go. But he added, that until he came in to me, his life was constantly in danger—that the Mickasukies, but for Powell, would have killed him on his return from Fort King.

Colonel Sherburne and the other members of the delegation arrived here last night, and departed for St. Augustine to-day. I have directed the commanding officer of that post to afford them every facility for communicating with the Seminole chiefs. But I have required that in all their talks emigration be insisted on as an indispensable condition of peace.

The Cherokee chief, in the fourth paragraph of his talk, assures the Seminoles that if they lay aside their warlike attitude and come in, a treaty of peace will be negotiated with them under the authority of the President of the United States. Again, he says: "As to the terms upon which your treaty of peace shall be negotiated, I have nothing to say. That is a matter to be argued upon between you and the government of the United States."

Now, in place of a treaty to be negotiated, my instructions require me to enforce compliance with the provisions of an existing treaty, and the terms of that treaty are already known to both parties, and are not yet to be agreed upon.

The chief adds the assurance that the Seminoles are to be liberally compensated for any losses or

injuries which they may have sustained by the injustice of white men; and that, after peace and friendship shall have been restored, they will be permitted to send a delegation to visit the President, in company with the agent and Cherokee delegation. Neither of those latter propositions is embraced in my instructions. Indeed, I cannot comprehend the communication of the Cherokee chief, unless the government have abandoned emigration; for all the propositions it contains and the assurances it gives are incompatible with that policy.

My last campaign has driven the Indians entirely out of a tract of country embracing more than two degrees of latitude, and at least nine millions of acres of land. If emigration is to be abandoned, I can, without any mediation, place the whole body of Indians so far south as to secure to the country nine additional millions of acres. But if my instructions are to be adhered to, and the settled policy of the country is to be carried out, the talk of the Cherokee chief is calculated to do no good, but a great deal of mischief, and should not, under any circumstances, be allowed to go to the Seminoles.

I find myself so much embarrassed by the position in which this document has placed me that I have decided to send an officer to Washington, as the bearer of this despatch, who, from his long service here, his knowledge of the Indians and of the country, and his general intelligence, will be able to give full information on all matters connected with the subject of the war, and the views and condition of the Indians. Captain Vinton, of the artillery, is the officer to whom I allude, and whom I respectfully recommend to the notice of the department.

I have the honor to be, with high consideration and respect, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Picolata, November 10, 1837.*

SIR: An error in regard to the compensation to be allowed to the Shawnee and Delaware warriors has been reported to me, and I have also been furnished with a copy of an order for their discharge, unless they consent to receive the sum authorized by law. One hundred and seventy-seven of them had arrived at Tampa Bay before the order of their discharge had been received by the officer who conducted them thither, and I had ordered a portion of them to join me on the St. John's.

To discharge them now, or to pursue any course towards them which would dissatisfy them, might, and no doubt would, have a most injurious effect on our relations with the Seminoles. The moral effect produced upon the Seminoles by their arrival will be most advantageous; and if they were to be removed, particularly under circumstances which would be likely to give dissatisfaction to them, it might cost us another campaign. I enclose a copy of a letter addressed to Lieutenant Colonel Davenport on the subject of the Indians; part of them will probably have marched to the interior before that letter be received at Tampa, and to order them to return might cause the Seminoles, who are inclined to surrender, to hold out with the Mickasukies. Until I have your instructions on the subject, I consider it to be my duty to retain them.

In relation to the campaign, everything is ready; and I only wait the return of the steamers which took forward the advance to Fort Mellon, to move at once into the Indian country with the whole force on this side of the peninsula.

I shall take the principal Seminole chief, Coe Hajo, with me. He is desirous of sending for his family and the remainder of his people. These secured, he proposes to enter our service, and conduct the troops to all the hiding-places of the enemy.

I have the honor to be, &c., &c.,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *St. Augustine, November 7, 1837.*

COLONEL: I have received your letter of the 31st ultimo, with the reports from the various branches of the service. The captures in this quarter must not only have weakened the enemy greatly, for we have sixteen chiefs and sub-chiefs and ninety-eight first-rate warriors, but the loss of so many of their leaders must distract their councils. The principal chief here assures me that a large portion of the Seminoles would come in were they not overawed by the Mickasukies.

I have also received your letter of the 1st instant. I regret the circumstance to which you refer. The importance of fulfilling all our engagements with the Indians, with most scrupulous good faith, is unquestionable. To dismiss them now might not only cost us an additional campaign here, but cause difficulties on our western border. We must therefore return them at all hazards. I wish you to assure them that our laws do not authorize the payment of the sum stipulated, but that the enemy has a large property, consisting of ponies, cattle, and negroes, and that I will pay them for all the cattle they take, and they will also be paid fifty dollars for every negro they take, and they will be allowed to keep the ponies, or to sell them, as they may think proper. Represent to them, also, that our country is just, and that, if they serve well, I will take their chiefs to Washington, and represent their case to our great council, (Congress,) and I have no doubt of obtaining for them all that has been promised.

I am, colonel, most respectfully, your most obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Lieutenant Colonel WM. DAVENPORT, *1st Infantry, Tampa Bay, Florida.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Volusia, November 21, 1837.*

SIR: I have had the honor of receiving, to-day, your letter of the 16th of October, by Lieutenant McLean, of the marine corps. Unable to place him in command of troops, consistently with the claims of the officers of the army who are now serving with their companies, I have attached him to the staff, as

assistant commissary and assistant quartermaster. In either of these capacities he will be able to render useful service.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Volusia, November 21, 1837.*

SIR: I have had the honor to receive, to-day, your letters of the 27th, 30th, and 31st of the last month, and of the 10th of the present month.

The authority contained in those of the 30th ultimo and the 10th instant is all I wanted. I could not comprehend either the talk of Ross or his instructions to the delegation, unless the government had changed its policy; and as not a word has been said to that effect in any of your communications, I could not believe that any change had taken place. The delegation informed me that you had read and approved the talk; but I was apprehensive there was something which they had not communicated. Had I received your letter of the 20th ultimo before Captain Vinton's departure I would not have sent him to Washington.

I shall furnish Lieutenant Powell with the force which he may require. He will co-operate with me, without abandoning the original objects of his expedition; and I shall probably find it necessary to increase the force to be sent in the direction of the Everglades, to prevent the retreat of the Indians thither.

I have a sufficient force for every purpose, either in the field or coming on. Supplies are abundant for all immediate purposes; and all required for future operations can be obtained as they may be wanted.

The Indians are already driven from more than fifteen millions of acres of land, worth twenty millions of dollars; and in less than a month we shall drive them off from five to ten millions of acres more. The St. John's is navigable for steamboats fifty miles above Fort Mellon; and the country, I understand, is more valuable the further we go south.

Colonel Mills has joined, from Fort King, with three hundred volunteers; and Colonel Twiggs, with four hundred dragoons, has just returned from a reconnoissance of the country between the St. John's and the Ocklawaha, north of the road from Volusia to Fort Armstrong. I shall proceed, on the 23d or 24th, at the head of this force, south of the road, and sweep the whole country between the St. John's and the Ocklawaha to Fort Mellon.

General Eustis is at Fort Mellon, and Lieutenant Colonel Bankhead has been sent forward to establish a post forty or fifty miles above.

Congress, I perceive, are alarmed at the expenses of the war; they have gotten the country into it, and they will find that they must make three or four such appropriations, at the least, before they get clear of it. They broke the army down in 1821, and are responsible for all the Indian difficulties which have since taken place. Had they left it as it was in 1818, it would have been competent, with the two regiments of dragoons since added, for every purpose of defence, as well as for the suppression of every hostile movement on the part of the Indians.

I hope that the huckstering views of certain prominent members will not be allowed to influence the policy of the country, or prevent the appropriations necessary to carry it out.

As to the removal of the Seminoles, I believe now it can be effected, so far as the main body are concerned, though I have no doubt the present generation will have passed away before the whole be driven from the country. But the Cherokees will give trouble, if prompt measures be not adopted in regard to them before the 1st of May. A war with them, however, cannot last a month, if proper dispositions be made in time. All the difficulties of our Indian wars have resulted from delaying preparations too long.

I will write at least every week.

And I am, sir, with high consideration and respect, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Volusia, November 22, 1837.*

SIR: By Lieutenant McLean, who arrived yesterday, I was informed that a force of twelve or thirteen hundred Georgia volunteers were on their march to Florida. I had requested the governor to send Colonel Nelson with a battalion, or even a regiment, if he could raise the force; but, in reply, he informed me that you had countermanded the requisition on that State; and I had learned from Major Churchill, as well as from other sources, that the colonel was employed on the Cherokee frontier, and would not be in Florida. I had, therefore, not calculated upon him.

On the 5th instant I received information that the colonel was on his march with a regiment. That force I believed I could employ usefully, if it should arrive, and determined to accept it; but I shall be rather embarrassed by the force now arriving. To refuse to accept it, however, might produce difficulty with the volunteers, which would probably be injurious to the service in any future occasion where such a force might be required. As it is near at hand, I believe the better course will be to accept it, and give it active employment at once. I shall, therefore, take it into service; and it will enable me to cover every foot of the country where an enemy could find refuge. The greatest difficulty will be to supply this force; but the quartermaster's and commissary's departments will only have to redouble their energies.

No force will, of course, be required from the northern cities.

I have the honor to be, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Mellon, November 28, 1837.*

SIR: As I have already reported to the adjutant general, I arrived at this post on the 26th instant, and found the Cherokee delegation here. The messengers whom I had permitted the captive chiefs to send out with messages to their people and to Micanopy had returned. They brought a message from Micanopy to me, stating that he was ready to fulfil the treaty of Fort Dade, and that he would collect the chiefs in council to-morrow, and he had no doubt of inducing them and the greater number of their people to surrender. He desired that the Cherokee chiefs might be permitted to attend the council. I conversed with those chiefs in relation to their instructions, and to the talk of their principal chief. I pointed out to them the omission on the part of Mr. Ross, in both the talk to the Seminoles and the instructions to them, to refer to emigration as an indispensable condition of peace. They replied that, acting as mediators, they could do no act that might be construed into dictation; that they could only act as advisers; but that they considered themselves authorized by their instructions to advise the Seminoles to fulfil all their treaties with scrupulous fidelity; and it was their instructions to do so, if permitted to confer with the Seminoles. Believing that no injury could attend their conference with the Seminoles, posted as the troops now are, I consented, after consulting General Eustis, who concurred with me in opinion, to allow them to proceed to Micanopy's camp, about forty miles south of this post. They departed this morning, accompanied by Coe Hajo, and are to return in six days.

The messengers report that Micanopy was on his way to Tampa Bay to surrender, and that Alligator had gone into that place for the same purpose.

If the council have no other effect, it will cause the Indians, who are now much dispersed, to reassemble, when they can be more readily attacked.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Mellon, November 29, 1837.*

SIR: In my letter of the 21st I stated, on the information then in my possession, that the St. John's might be navigated by steamboats fifty miles above this post; but more accurate information convinces me that, except at extraordinary stages of the water, we cannot calculate with certainty on steamboat navigation more than thirty-five miles above, unless boats of less draught can be obtained. Barges, however, can be used as far as exploring parties have advanced, which has been twenty or twenty-five miles above Lake Harney.

General Hernandez will turn Indian river with his mounted men, and pass the foot and supplies across. I shall not allow his operations, nor those of Colonel Taylor or General Smith, to be checked for a moment by the Seminole councils; and the delay of this column will be more than counterbalanced by the increased efficiency of its means.

Should the council result favorably, a large portion of the Indians may be assembled at St. Augustine by the 1st of January; should it result unfavorably, the winter, I hope, will suffice to close the war, as the force is more than ample; and from the energy of the quartermaster's and commissary's departments, I have no fear of supplies being furnished whenever required.

With high consideration and respect, I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Mellon, November 30, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that thirteen Indians and thirty-six negroes (among the former are Powell's family) have this moment come into camp and surrendered, which, with five who came in a few days ago, make fifty-four, who have come in since the troops have been at this post.

I am sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Steamboat on Lake George, December 6, 1837.*

SIR: On the evening of the 3d instant Micanopy, Cloud, Tukeegee, and Nocose Yahola, came into camp and surrendered themselves. They were accompanied by the Cherokee delegation and by the chief Coe Hajo, whom I had sent out to assure the Seminole Indians that all who would surrender should receive kind treatment. The Cherokee delegation have acted in accordance with the views of the government; in explaining to the Seminole chiefs the talk of Mr. Ross, they have urged the importance and necessity of fulfilling all their treaty stipulations. They manifest every disposition to co-operate with me, and thus far I approve entirely of their course. On the 5th instant I met the Seminole chiefs in council. The principal officers of the army and the Cherokee delegation attended.

I opened the council by remarking on the bad faith with which the Seminoles had acted, and desired to know from them what were their views and expectations in coming to camp. Micanopy replied, that he desired peace, and would fulfil the treaty which he had made with us; but that his people were dispersed, and that several of the principal chiefs were absent, and could not join him for many days; but he and the other chiefs observed, that give them time and all would "go right."

I replied that our object was to save, not to destroy them; that it was the desire of the government

and people of the United States to treat them with the utmost liberality; but we had been so often deceived by their promises that I hardly knew how to rely on their professions; that it was my intention not to be deceived by them again; and I required the immediate surrender of the families of the chiefs and warriors confined at St. Augustine. Micanopy promised to surrender them. I then required that Sam Jones should surrender with his people, and that all the Seminoles and Mickasukies within four days' march of us should come in immediately and surrender their arms. This was assented to; seven days were allowed for the families of the prisoners at St. Augustine and for Jones's people to surrender, and ten for those of Micanopy and Cloud. Messengers were immediately despatched to carry the orders of the chiefs into effect. Though I believe the chiefs to be sincere, I have but little reliance on their promises; I doubt their influence over their people. I shall, however, hold them as hostages, and compel them to act as guides if their people should not come in; ten days will settle the matter.

Having a few days disposable, I determined to go to Garey's Ferry to make arrangements in relation to the volunteer force lately arrived, and I am now on my way down for that purpose.

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

P. S.—I propose to discharge the Florida volunteers immediately.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Mellon, December 13, 1837.*

SIR: From information received from Indians who have come in of the proximity of St. Lucie river to the hunting grounds of the Seminoles, I desired to have an examination of that river. Lieutenant Powell offered to perform that service, and I have directed Captain Brown, of the army, to accompany him. A steamboat capable of going to sea being required to accompany the expedition to that river, I have been compelled to take the Poinsett off her ordinary route, and place her temporarily under the direction of Lieutenant Powell and Captain Brown. The quartermaster will make such arrangements as to prevent the delay of despatches to and from the army.

Should the Indians not come in and surrender we shall be compelled to pursue a large portion of them to the south, and in that event a post must be established on St. Lucie, and another on New river or at Florida Point.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Mellon, December 14, 1837.*

SIR: The Cherokee delegation returned this morning and reported that their mission had entirely failed. I have lost by their meditation two weeks' valuable time, but I do not regret it, as the whole American people must now be sensible that no reliance can be placed on the promises of the Indians, and that it is useless to enter into any treaty stipulations with them.

I shall press forward with the utmost energy possible, and endeavor to bring the Indians to battle if they be concentrated, but I apprehend they are entirely dispersed. Living, as they do, for the most part, on roots, they cannot remain concentrated over three or four days at a time.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Mellon, December 15, 1837.*

SIR: The Cherokee delegation will leave in the first steamer that goes down to Garey's Ferry on their return to their homes. It is due to justice that I should express to you the high sense which I entertain of their character and conduct. Their mission was terminated, as I believed it would from the beginning, unsuccessfully; but they have acted with the most untiring zeal and earnestness in endeavoring to convince the misguided chiefs of the Seminoles and Mickasukies, as well as their people, of the advantages of peace and the necessity of fulfilling their treaty engagements.

Having entertained some doubts as to the true objects of the mission, which I expressed to you before I became acquainted with the members of the delegation, I consider it due to them, as well as to myself, to assure you of my belief that they have acted throughout in perfect good faith and with a sincere desire to serve you and our country, and to benefit the Indians by enlightening them in regard to their true interests.

Immediately on the failure of the mediation becoming certain, I sent to St. Augustine seventy-two Indians who were at and near the camp; among them are Micanopy, the principal chief of the nation; Cloud, the war chief who commanded at the Wahoo; and Nocose Yahola, the Creek chief of highest rank who came down from Alabama in 1836.

We have now no prospect of terminating the war except by battle; but it is extremely doubtful whether the Indians will fight; their policy is to fly, knowing, as they do, that on the approach of summer the climate will fight their battles for them, and drive us from the country.

I have the honor to be, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP,

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Mellon, December 18, 1837.*

SIR: I received on the 9th instant your letter of the 25th ultimo.

Having issued the order placing Dr. Russell on duty in the field on the assignment of the medical director of this army, I called on that officer for a report in the case immediately on the receipt of the letter referred to. I have received his report to-day, and I herewith enclose a copy of it; I hope you will find in it sufficient reasons for the measure.

There can be no doubt of Dr. Russell's merit as a medical man, but there is not another medical officer in Florida who has been as long in the Territory as he has, whose claims are not superior to his; he has not, that I am aware, been in the field at any previous time since the war commenced.

I have considered all the officers in Florida disposable for service wherever the interests of the public might render it proper to place them; and while I shall ever be ready to carry out the views of my official superiors when communicated to me, I cannot permit what Dr. Russell, in his letter, a copy of which you enclosed to me, calls "*a semi-official understanding*" with any department, to control measures which I deem essential to the good of the service.

As Dr. Turner is efficient in the hospital and is considered unable to take the field, and as Dr. Russell, to high professional character and attainments unites the physical ability required in active operations, I shall retain him with the command of General Eustis until the present expedition terminate.

As regards Dr. Peck, he was employed by contract, and in strict accordance with the regulations; it will be impossible to discharge him immediately, unless other army surgeons be sent into the country.

I do not suppose that Dr. Russell intended to make the impression that Dr. Peck was employed in consequence of my ordering him to the field; the truth is the very reverse. The authority would have been given to the commanding officer to employ a citizen if he or Dr. Weightman had been retained at St. Augustine; Dr. Russell himself considered two medical gentlemen necessary, and desired Dr. Turner as his assistant. I could spare but one from the field, and ordered Dr. Russell to that service, because he was physically capable of performing the duties required of him there.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

FORT MELLON, *December 18, 1837.*

SIR: Agreeably to your instructions, I will state the grounds on which the assignment of Assistant Surgeon Russell to duty in the field was made, and I will premise my statement with the remark that it now enters my imagination that an officer of any department could be placed within the limits of your command in such a situation as would prevent you from having the complete control of his services. At the time Dr. Russell was ordered to join General Eustis's command, the major part of that command was at Black creek, without any medical officer to accompany it. Assistant Surgeon Jarvis was with the command at Volusia, Assistant Surgeon Laub was relieved by a citizen physician, to accompany that portion of General Eustis's brigade which moved to Fort Mellon; Assistant Surgeon King, as soon as he arrived at Black creek, was ordered to relieve Assistant Surgeon Moffit, who was directed to report to Colonel Gates, and join his command at St. Augustine; Assistant Surgeons Russell and Turner were doing duty. It became necessary either to employ a citizen physician to accompany the brigade into the field, or detail one of the two latter-named gentlemen. I knew of no citizen practitioner whose services could be obtained, and who would have been competent to the duties of the station. Dr. Russell had himself informed me that Dr. Turner's health was so variable as to render him unfit for the duties of the field. At the same time he expressed a strong desire to have him stationed at St. Augustine, and spoke in the highest terms of his efficiency in hospital practice. Dr. Russell was then the only available officer of the department, and was possessed of all the physical and professional qualities requisite for the situation. I took the opportunity of a private conversation with Dr. Russell to lay the above circumstances before him, and appealed to him to admit the necessity that existed for the detail. He did not deny it, but stipulated for his return to St. Augustine as soon as his services could be dispensed with in the field.

I cannot think that Dr. Russell has any cause for complaint. It appears, by the Army Register, that he has been more than nineteen years in service, and, if I mistake not, this is the first tour of armed service in the field that he has performed. With regard to the employment of a private physician to assist Assistant Surgeon Turner, there can be no doubt of the propriety or necessity of the act. On the 21st of September, when I arrived at St. Augustine, the number of sick was 23 in hospital and 6 in quarters. Assistant Surgeons Russell, Jarvis, and Turner, were all on duty there at that time, and, I supposed, were considered necessary there by the director of the general hospital, as Assistant Surgeon Mote, the only medical officer at Fort Peyton, had been taken into the field with General Hernandez's command, leaving that post without medical attendance, further than an occasional visit by Dr. Turner. At the time Dr. Jarvis was ordered from St. Augustine, leaving no assistant to Dr. Russell, there were 31 sick in hospital and 5 in quarters, with some sick Indians. The duties were then considered onerous by Dr. Russell, and the arrival of Dr. Turner, who had been ordered to St. Augustine, expected with some impatience. It was on the 23d of October that Dr. Jarvis was ordered from St. Augustine, and on the 4th of November Dr. Russell was ordered into the field, being relieved by Assistant Surgeon Turner, who was at that time assisting him in the duties of the station; and as the number of medical officers at that post was thus reduced from two to one, and the number of sick increasing, the commanding officer was authorized to employ an assistant for Dr. Turner, when it was found necessary. The number sick, on the day Dr. Peck was employed, was 55 in hospital and 11 in quarters, which is the lowest number since his employment. The average number of sick for November is, in hospital about 65, in quarters about 30, daily. Speaking of the sick Indians, Dr. Turner says, in the letter accompanying his last report, "at present the number of sick may be safely estimated at 75."

Dr. Peck is a gentleman of high standing in his profession, and as he furnishes his own fuel and quarters, the terms cannot be considered immoderate; they are considerably within the pay and emolument of an assistant surgeon of two years' standing.

With the highest respect, your obedient servant,

C. A. FINLEY, *Surgeon and Medical Director.*

Major General T. S. JESUP, *Commanding Army of the South.*

Official: A. B. LEONARD, *Lieutenant and Aide-de-camp.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Mellon, December 19, 1837.*

SIR: I received yesterday your letters of the 1st and 2d of this month, and I immediately wrote to Brigadier General Nelson, directing him to reduce his mounted force to eight hundred men. I shall reduce the Alabama force to six hundred, and I have taken measures to discharge the whole Florida force except two companies, which I wish to retain as spies. As the horses break down, the men retained will be discharged.

The advance of General Eustis's brigade moved on the 15th, the general moved on the 17th, and the dragoons this morning, except a single company, with which I shall proceed in the morning. So difficult is the route that the general will not encamp more than fourteen or fifteen miles from this post to-night. I expect to overtake him to-morrow or early next morning.

I remained to-day to ascertain whether a steamboat can be passed over the bar of Lake Monroe. I doubt the practicability of getting it over; but, until it be demonstrated to be impossible, I am not willing to abandon a measure so important to the service.

We now know positively that the Seminole chiefs can exercise no influence over any portion of their people on the subject of emigration. These people are like no other Indians; they do not live in large bands, but are dispersed in families over the whole territory south of Lake Harney. There are seldom more than from ten to twenty women and children in a body; it is therefore impossible to capture any large portion of their women and children.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS, *Fort Lane, Head of Lake Harney, December 20, 1837.*

SIR: The difficulties of the country are such that General Eustis is less than thirty miles in advance of Fort Mellon. I left that post yesterday after 10 o'clock a. m., and this morning came up with him. Leaving his command south of the Ecowlak Hatchee, I came to this post for the purpose of reconnoitring the country, and determining the site of a bridge over that creek, and a route for a road to a depot which I propose to establish in advance.

My aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Linnard, succeeded yesterday in getting a steamboat over the bar at the head of Lake Monroe; but I apprehend some accident has occurred, as she has not arrived. Lieutenant Searle, of my staff, is now in advance for the purpose of ascertaining whether supplies can be gotten to shore above this post from the transport boats. The guides report that the river cannot be approached above, in consequence of the extensive impassable swamps on both sides of it.

The enemy, who were concentrated within from twenty to forty miles of this place a month ago, have dispersed and moved south. They cannot be approached from this quarter in less than a month, unless the river can be made available for the transportation of supplies. With the utmost that can be done, General Eustis will not be able to average more than twelve miles a day with his train. I propose, after establishing a depot in advance, to employ the train, under proper escorts, in pushing supplies forward, and operating in advance of the depot without wagons.

I perceive in the papers a great deal of censure cast upon the department for employing Indians in the service of the United States. As I permit no one to be lashed over my shoulders, it is proper that I set that matter right. I am responsible for bringing Indian warriors into the service. I raised and employed a brigade of them in Alabama, and a regiment in the last campaign in Florida; and I not only recommended, but urged, as a reference to my correspondence will show, the employment of northern Indians in this campaign; and, to save American blood, I would employ the dogs of Cuba, if I could obtain them, regardless alike of the cant of hypocrites or the bluster of demagogues. There are men, I perceive, and those occupying high stations, too, who seem to consider Indian atrocities, when exercised upon the people of the frontier, as so much matters of course as not to excite the slightest emotion. Their constant theme is the wrongs of the poor Indians, without a thought for the slaughtered wives and children, and conflagrated dwellings, of their own countrymen. I envy not that man his feelings whose sympathies are all reserved for the ruthless savage.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

P. S.—21st. The steamboat has just entered the lake.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Lane, Head of Lake Harney, December 22, 1837.*

SIR: In the orders establishing double ration posts in Florida, Jacksonville was omitted. The expenses of living in Florida exceed those of any other portion of our country in which I have served; and I urgently recommend that double rations be allowed to the commanders of all posts established, and that the allowance be made to the officers who have heretofore commanded at Jacksonville.

The dragoons are employed to-day in packing forage forward. The Tennesseans, and the few Floridians still in service, are opening a road from this post to General Eustis's camp, south; and the artillery, under the immediate command of the general, are erecting a bridge over Ecowlak Hatchee.

Lieutenant Searle went forward this morning, with a Mackinac boat loaded with forage, to ascertain whether the navigation be practicable above.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Christmas, December 30, 1837.*

SIR: In a postscript to my letter of yesterday I mentioned the report of the capture of thirty Indians and negroes, and that the enemy was represented to be in force about fifty miles in advance. Colonel Twiggs, who has closely examined the prisoners, is of opinion that they have gone far beyond the point where they were expected to make a stand. He reports that it will take him two days to make a swamp in his front practicable.

I came to this post last night, and, but for the report from the colonel, would have gone forward to-day.

I am, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *Fort Christmas, Powell's Camp, January 2, 1838.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit a copy of a report this moment received from Brigadier General Armistead.

We have now the evidence of Jumper as to the bad faith of the Cherokees. If John Ross be allowed to get into his own hands and that of his council the amount to be paid for the Cherokee lands, he will have the means, as he will perhaps have the inclination, to rally the Indian force west of the Mississippi, as well as the black force within the southern States and the Territory of Florida, against the United States.

The assurance given by the Cherokee delegation that the Seminoles would be allowed to remain "on certain conditions" in Florida, leaves us no other means of ridding the country of them than the application of force. Whether they can be overtaken, finding, as they do, subsistence in every prairie, hammock, and pine barren, is extremely doubtful.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

FORT BROOKE, *December 25, 1837.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that I received a communication from Colonel Taylor, dated fourteen miles down the Kissimmee, December 21. The colonel says: I left Fort Gardiner yesterday at sunrise; in the evening I met Jumper at this place, with about fifteen warriors, including a brother of Holatoochee's, with their families and some negroes, amounting in all to sixty-three, accompanied by the party of friendly Indians sent out to accompany them; that he had directed Jumper to proceed with his people to Fort Gardiner; that Jumper had sent a runner to Alligator, advising him to meet Colonel Taylor and come in; that Jumper and his party would remain four days at Fort Gardiner, awaiting the arrival of more of their people, before going into Pease creek. Jumper expressed considerable doubt as to Alligator's coming in, as well as a large portion of the Seminoles, who he thought would join the Mickasukies; this movement on their part he attributes to the escape at St. Augustine of the prisoners, in addition to the statement made by the Cherokee delegation that they could remain in the country upon certain conditions. This is all the information I received from Colonel Taylor. I have also to inform you that Doctor Lawson arrived at this post on the 23d with 270 of the Pennsylvania volunteers; they will leave to-day or to-morrow under orders to join Colonel Smith. On the event of the Indians coming in at Pease creek, I should be glad to know if they are to be ordered to this post, and what disposition I am to make of them after their arrival here.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. K. ARMISTEAD, *Brig. Gen., Commanding First Division Army of the South.*

Lieut. J. A. CHAMBERS, *Aide-de-camp, Assist. Adj. Gen., Army of the South, Fort Mellon.*

A true copy: W. G. FREEMAN, *Lieutenant Fourth Artillery.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTH, *six miles north of Fort McNeil, January 5, 1838.*

SIR: It will be seen by my report to the adjutant general to-day that Colonel Taylor brought the enemy to battle, on Okeecholer, on the 25th ultimo, and that General Nelson met a portion of them in the Waccassassa on the 26th ultimo.

I had, previously to receiving their reports, ordered the discharge of all the Florida volunteers, except two small companies of a battalion of Alabama volunteers, and of about five hundred Georgia volunteers. The information from General Nelson and Colonel Taylor has induced me to countermand so much of the orders as relates to the discharge of the Georgia and Alabama volunteers and one company of the Florida volunteers.

The war can be closed only by the most vigorous efforts, not only of the army but of the government. Whilst a warrior lives, we shall have him to fight.

The difficulties presented by the country are such that the expenses of the war will be greatly increased as we proceed south.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. JESUP, *Major General, Commanding.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 761.

[2D SESSION.]

A PLAN FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE NORTH AND EASTERN BOUNDARY OF THE UNITED STATES.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE JANUARY 10, 1838.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *January 9, 1838.*

SIR: In reply to the resolution of the Senate of the 14th October last, asking for a "plan for the protection of the north and eastern frontiers of the United States," &c., I have the honor to transmit, herewith, extracts of a letter from Major General Scott, to the commanding general. In this communication, that officer does not suggest any new plan of defence, but confines himself to a statement of the minimum force required at the several posts and stations for the protection of the northern and eastern frontiers of the United States. Indeed, the very thorough examination given to this subject by a board of engineers appointed after the close of the last war, and the general system of defence laid down by them, render it unnecessary to submit new plans for that purpose. All that can be done is, to reiterate their recommendations, and to state the actual condition of those frontiers. They are exposed to insult and attack along their whole line; the inland borders for want of proper garrisons for the several posts, and the maritime frontier from all the fortifications being incomplete, unfinished, and unarmed.

Admonished by the difficulties which had been encountered, and the incredible expenses incurred at the commencement of the last war from want of preparation, the nation, immediately on the return of peace, adopted measures for the defence of the seaboard. The circumstances attending that contest had shown that the whole extent of the coast was vulnerable, and that an active and enterprising enemy, with comparatively small means, might keep the country in a state of alarm, by threatening the entire line, and selecting the unguarded points for attack—a mode of warfare which obliged the government to incur great and disproportionate expense, and to employ an immense force in ineffectual attempts to protect its defenceless and extensive maritime frontier.

The coast was reconnoitered by a board of engineers, and a system of defence adopted, intended to cover our great naval establishments and principal cities; to close important harbors to the enemy, and secure them to our own navy; to deprive the enemy of strong positions, where, protected by his naval superiority, he might fix permanent quarters in our territory, maintain himself during the war, and keep the frontier in a state of perpetual alarm; to prevent, as much as possible, the great avenues of interior navigation from being blockaded by a naval force, at their entrance into the ocean; and to cover the coastwise and interior navigation, and give our navy the means necessary for protecting this navigation.

For these purposes, sites were selected, and works projected and commenced, upon a scale commensurate with the magnitude of the interests they were intended to protect. The whole system was adapted to the principles of modern warfare; and if the plan had been prosecuted with the same vigor with which it was commenced, the fortifications on our maritime frontier might have been, if not completed, in a state to be defended, and to afford some protection to the points of attack.

Unfortunately the efforts to carry on these necessary works have been relaxed. Whether lulled into security by a long peace, or influenced by other causes, the nation has ceased to feel respecting them that interest their importance ought to inspire. Appropriations have been denied altogether, or made with a sparing hand; the fortifications have been left in an unfinished state, exposed to the action of the elements, requiring costly and extensive repairs before they were half finished; and after a period of more than twenty years, and the expenditure of many millions of dollars, there is not a fortress on our long line of sea defences capable of resisting an armed brig; not one that may not be taken by a small force, and some of them, from their *quasi* insular position, if captured, may be occupied permanently during the continuance of a war, or only to be retaken at the cost of much blood and treasure.

The chief cause of this neglect in one of our most important interests is the opinion, which has so generally prevailed, that our navy is the first and best fortification, and that all the resources and energies of the country ought to be directed to the improvement of that arm of the service. No one has a higher opinion of the navy of our country than I have; but I believe that even when carried to the fullest extent to which it can reach for many years to come, it will, alone, prove entirely inadequate to defend the extensive maritime frontier of the United States.

The board of navy commissioners in a late report state that, "having due regard to the number of seamen employed in our foreign and coasting trade, and in the fisheries, the force to be prepared ready for use, when circumstances may require it, ought to consist of fifteen ships-of-the-line, twenty-five frigates, twenty-five sloops-of-war, twenty-five steamers, and twenty-five smaller vessels; and that the frames and other timber, the copper, ordnance, tanks, and chain cables should, also, be prepared for ten ships-of-the-line and ten frigates." These will probably be required to supply losses from decay and casualties.

The French navy now consists of forty ships-of-the-line, fifty frigates, and two hundred and twenty smaller vessels. That of Great Britain of one hundred and thirty ships-of-the-line, one hundred and twenty frigates, seventy-five sloops-of-war, forty-five steamers, and ninety-eight smaller vessels of war. Of these there are in commission twenty-six ships-of-the-line, eighteen frigates, fifty-three sloops, and fifty smaller vessels of war, and six steamers; and yet the coasts of both these nations are lined with fortifications, and possess a complete system of permanent defences along their maritime frontiers. Without such a system, the navy will have no place of refuge when driven into harbor by stress of weather or a superior force; and instead of protecting our own commerce, and harassing that of the enemy, will be confined altogether to defensive operations, always distressing and expensive, and too often humiliating. The extent to which our navy can be carried ought, in my opinion, to be fixed; for it is erroneous to suppose that it has no other limit than what a due regard for the revenue of the country imposes; to build more ships than we have seamen to man them would be to incur a useless expense; and the force proposed by the commissioners ought not, for many years to come, to be exceeded. Anxious, as I am, to see the defences of the country established upon a permanent basis, and equally desirous to see every arm of the service rendered as perfect and useful as possible, I may be pardoned for travelling out of my own department, and urging the usefulness of fixing this or some other determined limit to our naval forces.

This principle once established, the number and size of the naval establishments, storehouses, magazines, and preparations of every kind, would be ordered in conformity to it. The number of officers would likewise be limited to a due proportion, and the young, and the ardent, and enterprising officer, might aspire to command. The best interests of the country require that this system should be adopted, and the preparations be made to carry the navy to this limit as promptly as possible; but this measure will not enable us to dispense with permanent fortifications. Without them, the commencement of a war will always be disastrous. Our laws do not allow the use of the summary means resorted to by other maritime powers to man their fleets. Our ships-of-war are to be manned by volunteer seamen, and the coast might be laid waste, and important points occupied, before our naval force could be put in motion. Indeed, without fortifications, and strong ones, too, ships-of-war are exposed to be captured or destroyed before they can be fitted for sea. At Copenhagen the whole Danish fleet was captured, the batteries silenced, and humiliating terms imposed upon a nation by the sudden attack of an overwhelming force.

With respect to the magnitude of the works, to which objections have been urged, they will be worse than useless if they be not of a description to stop an enemy's squadron, and if assailable by land, and in a position not promptly to be succored, strong enough to resist a *coup de main*; not such an assault as the common acceptance of the term implies, but to offer an effectual resistance for five or six days, against an attacking force of 10,000 men, furnished with all the means and appliances to conduct a siege. Not to provide against such expeditions would be to neglect the lessons of experience, and to act in opposition to the principles of modern warfare. It has been said that we are too strong to dread such assaults, and need not provide against them; that the enemy could never hope to keep permanent possession of any part of our territory, and, therefore, we are safe from attack. An active and enterprising enemy will make war upon the resources of its adversary, and by the temporary occupation of any one of our naval depots, principal cities, or harbors, they might drive this country to expend an amount of blood and treasure to recover it ten times greater than the cost of the expedition. There is always danger of the attempt being made; and without due precaution, we are disposed to suffer the degradation of having our soil occupied by a foreign foe. From these dangers neither ships-of-war nor steam batteries can protect the nation; the former cannot be rendered effective to the full amount of their force at the commencement of a war, nor until commerce receives such a check as to throw out of employment a sufficient number of seamen to man the fleet; nor then ought it to be relied upon to watch over our long line of coast. To resist the navies of England or France it must be concentrated, and either the Atlantic frontier or that of the Gulf of Mexico be abandoned. With regard to steam batteries, they ought only to be regarded in the light of auxiliaries to the permanent defences of the coast; important, it is true, but, for reasons which it would be tedious to detail here, entirely inadequate, of themselves, to afford sufficient protection to the great interests we are called upon to guard on our Atlantic frontier, and on that of the Gulf of Mexico.

As it may be objected to the completion of all the works projected, that if ever we should be involved in a war with either of the great maritime powers, they are too far off to assail our coast with success, or to send formidable expeditions against the United States, and therefore it is unnecessary to incur this great expense, I will simply observe that the events of the past wars prove this assertion to be erroneous, and that such stations as Halifax and Bermuda on our Atlantic frontier, and the West India islands on that of the Gulf of Mexico, are near enough to bring those powers within striking distance of all the vulnerable points upon our seaboard. And with regard to the expense to be incurred, I beg to refer to the very able and luminous exposition of the board of engineers, laid before Congress in February, 1821, where it is conclusively shown that the cost of protecting the sea-coast of the United States, when menaced by an assailing expedition of 20,000 men, by means of a competent force of militia for the limited period of six months, would exceed the amount required to establish a permanent system of defence.

Having laid before you the exposed state of our sea-coast, and stated the dangers to which the country would be exposed in the event of war, I most earnestly recommend the early completion of the fortifications intended to cover our principal cities and naval establishments, and to protect the entrances of our great harbors. Without entering into the controversy respecting the proper selection of the sites for these works, which would demand a profound knowledge of engineering, and great military skill and science, to determine, I am disposed to yield implicit confidence to the very able engineers who planned them. I have considered all their reports, with an earnest desire to arrive at the truth, and my judgment is satisfied. No doubt rests upon my mind of the wisdom of their choice, and of the vast importance of proceeding, without delay, to complete all those fortifications considered by the board as of the first class; nor of the extreme probability that our enemy will, in the event of a war, avail himself of our negligence to attack, and probably to occupy, some of the most exposed points of our coast. Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston, are all uncovered, and exposed to attack. In the same condition are Narragansett bay and Hampton roads. The defences of the first are of the last importance, whether it be regarded as a refuge to our own fleets in the tremendous northwest storms which so often desolate our coast in the winter season, and from which this bay affords the only entrance and protection during their continuance, or as a position from which, when once occupied by an enemy in time of war, it would be both extremely difficult and immensely expensive to dislodge him. Hampton roads is of equal importance, and equally exposed. And here let me observe that fortifications such as those projected and in progress at the entrance of this roadstead serve not only to defend the country and navigation behind them, but to protect the waters within reach of the auxiliary force which ought to be within their walls and under their guns. What enemy would dare to occupy Lynn Haven bay, if steam batteries were anchored under the fires of Fort Monroe; or attempt to march against Norfolk, if a *corps de reserve* were within that fortress? So of the works to defend Boston. The fortification at George's island not only covers that city, but protects Nantasket roads, and will prevent an enemy from occupying that position.

There is no part of our maritime frontier more exposed, and that calls more immediately for the attention of Congress, than that of the Gulf of Mexico. The rest of our coast, by a proper system, may be so united as to lend each other mutual succor; but this portion of it is insulated, and, as it were, abandoned to its own resources. It requires for its defence a great naval depot and a considerable naval force; and it demands a complete and distinct system of defence. It must not be considered merely as the frontier of Louisiana, Alabama, and West Florida, but likewise that of Kentucky, Ohio, Tennessee, Mississippi, Missouri, and Arkansas. The whole of the rich and fertile portion of the Union whose waters find their outlet in the Gulf of Mexico is interested that the defences of this frontier should not only be strong and respectable, when they are completed, but that the fortifications, intended for that purpose, should be carried on vigorously, and finished without unnecessary delay.

It is not only necessary that the forts should be built: they must be armed and garrisoned before they will constitute fortifications for the defence of the coast. Without these necessary requisites, they are fitted only for the use of an invading enemy. Not only the appropriation for fortifications, but that for ordnance, ought, in my opinion, to be increased, and the cannon applied altogether to the armament of the forts, until that be completed; the army be so far augmented that the artillery regiments may occupy these posts; and such an organization adopted of the militia or volunteer forces as will render the neighboring population available in cases of alarm or sudden war.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Hon. R. M. JOHNSON, *President of the Senate.*

Extracts from a letter of General Winfield Scott.

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DIVISION, *Elizabethtown, N. J., November 19, 1837.*

In compliance with the *spirit* of your two letters, of the 18th ultimo and the 8th instant, I have the honor to report:

That, in my opinion, five regiments of artillery and three of infantry, distributed as below, is the *minimum* force required for the protection of the northern and eastern frontiers of the United States against sudden, but, at all times, very possible insults and aggressions on the part of unexpected enemies, and to preserve the permanent posts from the gradual waste of time.

	COMPANIES.		
	Artillery.	Infantry.	
Baton Rouge.....	2	2	} Say, the 3d artillery and the 4th infantry.
New Orleans.....	1	3	
Fort Pike, (Petite Coquille).....	1	0	
Fort Wood, (Chef Menteur).....	1	0	
*Fort Jackson, (below New Orleans).....	1	0	
Fort Morgan, (Mobile bay).....	1	0	
Fort Pickens, (Pensacola harbor).....	1	3	
Fort Brooke, (Tampa Bay).....	1	1	
Key West.....	1	1	
Ten companies of artillery and ten of infantry.....	10	10	
Fort Marion, (St. Augustine).....	1	0	} Say, the 4th artillery.
Savannah river.....	2	0	
Charleston harbor.....	2	0	
Coast of North Carolina.....	3	0	
Castle Calhoun, (Hampton Roads).....	2	0	
Ten companies of artillery.....	11	0	
Fort Monroe.....	7	0	} Say, the 1st artillery.
Fort Washington, (Potomac).....	1	0	
Fort Severn, (Annapolis).....	1	0	
Fort McHenry, (Baltimore).....	1	0	
Ten companies of artillery.....	10	0	
Delaware river.....	2	0	} Say, the 2d artillery.
Fort Columbus, (New York harbor).....	2	0	
Forts Hamilton and Lafayette, (New York harbor).....	2	0	
Throg's Point, (Long Island sound).....	2	0	
Fort Trumbull, (New London).....	1	0	
Fort Niagara.....	1	0	
Ten companies of artillery.....	10	0	
Newport harbor.....	3	0	} Say, the 5th artillery and the 9th infantry.
Boston harbor.....	2	0	
Fort Constitution, (Portsmouth).....	1	0	
Fort Preble, (Portland).....	1	0	
Penobscot river.....	1	1	
Fort Sullivan, (Eastport).....	1	1	
Hancock barracks.....	1	8	
Ten compaines of artillery and ten of infantry.....	10	10	

^cOn the right bank of the Mississippi, and consequently in the western division.

	COMPANIES.		
	Artillery.	Infantry.	
Fort Brady, (foot of Lake Superior).....	0	2	} Say, the 2d infantry.
Fort Mackinaw	0	2	
Fort Howard, (Green Bay)	0	1	
Fort Winnebago	0	5	
Ten companies of infantry.....	0	10	

I have been desirous of assigning two companies to the Champlain frontier; but with only eight regiments, or eighty companies, I could not well spare them. Perhaps one might be taken from the North Carolina coast, or the two from the unfinished work at Throg's Point.

My estimate and distribution are made on the supposition that every company consists of at least eighty privates, with the proper number of officers, &c., &c., &c. With less than sixty rank and file men to the unit I have employed, (company,) eleven regiments would be indispensable for the limited objects stated in this division of the army.

It will be perceived that the force allotted to the frontiers of Maine is merely sufficient for observation and national police.

Putting aside a near contingency of hostilities, it may be important, for the mere purposes of observation and national police, to distribute along the disputed territory of Maine the nine companies allotted to Hancock barracks, between that and two other posts advanced higher up the country. These, from my want of minute topographical knowledge of that region, I cannot now designate with precision; but on the return of the season for surveys and reconnoissances, and, at least, as soon as the additional troops can be raised, it will be in my power to give posts, routes, and distances.

I shall, to meet what may be the true inquiry you have made of me, proceed to give an estimate of a *provisional army*.

For this geographical division, taking the peace establishment numbers as before, *additional companies*, as follows, will be required:

At Fort Brady, 1; Fort Mackinaw, 1; Fort Gratiot, (foot of Lake Huron,) 2; Detroit, 6; Fort Niagara, 2; Sackett's Harbor and Oswego, 8; on Lake Champlain, 10; the frontiers of Maine, 10; in the vicinity of Albany, 100; at Fort Monroe, 10; at Baton Rouge, 10; in all, say sixteen additional regiments of infantry; which, added to the five of artillery and three of infantry, give twenty-four regiments.

I have said nothing, as yet, of an *establishment* for the western division. In a state of peace with the Indian tribes, but prepared for the first moments of hostilities on their part, I suppose two regiments of dragoons and six of infantry would be sufficient.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 762.

[2D SESSION.]

ON CLAIM OF JACOB H. HOLT, FOR PAY AS CLERK TO THE QUARTERMASTER OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY AT WEST POINT, NEW YORK.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JANUARY 11, 1838.

Mr. McKAY, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred the petition of Jacob H. Holt, reported:

That, from the papers accompanying the petition, it appears that the petitioner was employed by Æneas Mackay, while quartermaster of the Military Academy, as clerk from the 1st of May, 1829, to the 31st of May, 1829; at that time, "by the appropriation for the Military Academy," but three hundred dollars per annum were allowed for the hire of a clerk in the office of the quartermaster there, and that sum, it is supposed, was paid to the petitioner. But he alleges that while thus employed in the office of the quartermaster of the Military Academy, he also performed the duties of clerk in the quartermaster general's department of the post, and it is for the latter service that he claims compensation. Of the rendition of the service, satisfactory evidence is furnished, yet the committee are not satisfied, under the circumstances of the case, that the government is bound to pay him for it. On the 25th of June, 1827, Æneas Mackay, the assistant quartermaster at West Point, writes to the quartermaster general: "By the appropriation for the Military Academy, but \$300 are allowed for the hire of a clerk for my office, and this sum will not command the services of such a person as is required to perform the duties expected of him. I therefore have the honor to request that I may be permitted to apply, in addition to this sum, say, \$300 more, for the same purpose, and charge the said additional allowance to the expenditures in the quartermaster general's department, and pay both sums to the same individual, or, otherwise, as the case may be." On the 18th of August, 1827, the quartermaster general makes the following answer: "Your letter, dated June 25, was laid before me on my return to the city a few days ago. *No allowance can be*

made for clerk hire at your post from the funds of the quartermaster general's department. There are no duties there unconnected with the academy which would render the services of a clerk necessary; that place was, consequently, not provided for in the estimate, and, of course, not in the appropriation." In addition to this, it will be seen, on reference to the "act making appropriation for the military service for the year 1828," approved March 21, 1828, that an item for "quartermaster's clerk" at West Point, which had been probably submitted in the estimate, was expressly excluded. Under these circumstances, when there were no duties there unconnected with the academy which required the services of a clerk, and when the assistant quartermaster was told by his superior that no allowance could be made for one, the committee are of opinion that the claim cannot be allowed. They therefore recommend that the prayer of the petitioner be rejected.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 763.

[2D SESSION.]

SUPPLEMENTAL ESTIMATES FOR FORT CASWELL, NORTH CAROLINA, AND FORTIFICATIONS IN THE HARBOR OF PENSACOLA, IN FLORIDA, AND OTHER OBJECTS IN CHARGE OF THE ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, FOR 1838.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JANUARY 12, 1838.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *January 10, 1838.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit you a communication from the chief engineer, accompanied by a supplemental estimate of money required for objects in his charge during the present year, which I have the honor to request may be provided in the proper appropriation bill.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Hon. C. C. CAMBRELENG, *Chairman of Committee of Ways and Means, House of Reps.*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *January 10, 1838.*

SIR: The accompanying letter of the chief engineer, and explanations of the supplemental estimate of funds for 1838, for objects in his charge, have been received since my letter of this morning laying that estimate before the Committee of Ways and Means.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Hon. C. C. CAMBRELENG, *Chairman of Committee of Ways and Means, House of Reps.*

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, *Washington, January 10, 1838.*

SIR: In explanation of the items relative to the site of Fort Caswell, in the supplemental estimate of funds for 1838, I have the honor to submit herewith copies of the report of the officer in charge, together with his project and estimate for securing said site.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. GRATIOT.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, *January 8, 1838.*

SIR: In addition to the annual estimates of funds necessary for public improvements under the direction of this department during the year 1838, already furnished, I have the honor to submit additional ones for several works, the information for which could not be obtained at an earlier date.

The site of Fort Caswell, Oak island, North Carolina, is now exposed to destruction from the storm-waves and tides that are abrading the beach. The effects of a late gale were so perceptible as to cause considerable apprehension, unless timely measures were taken for its preservation. The means proposed for this by the officer of engineers in charge, consist of jetties and embankments, the total cost of which he estimates at \$8,500.

No appropriation was asked for the Cumberland river above Nashville, as the detailed estimates of the superintendent had not been received. He was requested to forward them as soon as possible; but the letter having probably miscarried, I have thought proper, as I understand the harbor and river bill is about to be presented, to submit an estimate founded on my own knowledge of the improvement.

I have the honor, therefore, to submit the accompanying "supplementary estimate of funds required for the service of the year 1838." The explanations of the additional sums asked for the Cumberland road and for the Military Academy have already been made.

I also have the honor to call your attention to the state of the fortifications in Pensacola harbor,

The forts at St. Rosa and Foster's Bank being now completed, as will be seen from the report of Captain Chase, herewith submitted, the prosecution of the system can best be continued at the present time. The views of Captain Chase are entirely concurred in with respect to the work at the Barrancas, and, in accordance therewith, an estimate of \$75,000 is submitted to commence the repairs of that work.

I am, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

G. GRATIOT.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

SMITHVILLE, August 27, 1837.

SIR: On the 18th instant I reached Wilmington, on my return from Ocracoke inlet. Within a few hours after my arrival commenced a violent gale from the northeast. This gale continued, with alarming and unremitting violence, for thirty-six hours, the wind towards the latter part shifting to the north and northwest. Occurring at the season of spring tides, it raised the water at the mouth of the river to a very great height, three feet above the level of spring tides. The oldest inhabitants about this place concur in saying that they had never known the tide to be so high, and, considering the duration and violence of the gale, think it surpassed any gale which has been felt here for the last forty or fifty years.

Knowing the low land about Fort Caswell, it will be perceived that such a tide and wind would very much expose some parts of the work, which before might have been considered perfectly secure. We have suffered, but not to any great extent. About 100 yards of the southeastern point of Oak island has been washed away, and where, the day before the gale, one might have walked dry-shod, there is now from fourteen to fifteen feet of water.

This gale has proved beyond all doubt that immediate steps should be taken for securing the site of Fort Caswell; and, if agreeable to the department, I will make, during the next quarter, an estimate of the cost of securing the site.

On the river some of the jetties are much shattered, proving what I had become convinced of before, that the jetties, *as constructed*, are too weak. On the 18th I forwarded a letter to the department, requesting a requisition to be made for \$5,550 for Ocracoke, and \$20,000 for Core sound and New river, the whole payable at Baltimore.

I mention the above for fear lest the state of the roads may have caused a miscarriage of the mail.

I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,

ALEX. J. SWIFT, *Lieutenant of Engineers.*

General C. GRATIOT, *Chief Engineer.*

SMITHVILLE, December 12, 1837.

SIR: I am at length enabled to forward my report relating to the site of Fort Caswell, accompanied by drawings showing its present condition, and an estimate of the cost of securing it. The heights of the embankments, &c., considered necessary, were determined from the height to which the *swell* reached during the gale of August last, when the tide was said to be higher here than it had ever before been known to be. On the seabeach the height of the embankments, &c., is four feet, and elsewhere three feet, above the highest level attained by the *swell* at that time.

Where jetties are recommended, it is proposed to use stone of great specific gravity; and where the stone will be much exposed to the effect of the waves, to place no block weighing less than one ton. As the beach to be protected is within the bar, it is supposed that such stones would be sufficiently heavy. The jetties at Fort Macon were much less expensive than those will be which I recommend, but they are not permanent; their present condition shows that ere many years it will be necessary to replace them.

From the point A, which should be secured to the wharf, the shore is abraded only by the waves, the tide having no effect on it, owing to the action of the wharf and the Elizabeth river. The drawing shows that this is the case, for while the high-water mark is further *in* than in 1821, the low-water mark is further out. The sand-hills have been degraded by the waves; but as there was little or no current, the debris was deposited between high and low-water marks.

On this part of the shore I think that jetties would be unnecessary, and therefore recommend merely a glacis with a slope of twelve to one, covering its top and interior slope with mud. To the south of the wharf the beach is acted on by the *tide* as well as the waves. This part of the beach I propose to secure by two jetties, of which the one marked D will be connected with the glacis of the fort with an embankment of sand, covered on top with a layer of mud.

I proceed now to the estimate:

Jetty A, 120 tons of stone, at \$4 50.....	\$540 00
Embankment B.....	60 00
Glacis C, 2,427 cubic yards of sand, at 10 cents.....	242 70
Glacis C, 560 cubic yards of mud, at 50 cents.....	280 00
Jetty D, 578 tons of stone, at \$4 50.....	2,601 00
Jetty D, 1,917 yards of sand, at 12 cents.....	230 04
Jetty D, 118 yards of mud, at 50 cents.....	59 00
Jetty E, 646 tons of stone, at \$4 50.....	2,907 00
Glacis and embankment F, 3,466 cubic yards of sand, at 15 cents.....	519 90
Glacis and embankment F, 316 cubic yards of mud, at 50 cents.....	158 00
Embankment G, 2,445 cubic yards of sand, at 15 cents.....	366 75
Embankment G, 115 cubic yards of mud, at 50 cents.....	57 50
Casualties, &c., say.....	478 11
	<u>8,500 00</u>

Respectfully submitted,

General C. GRATIOT, *Chief Engineer.*

A. J. SWIFT, *Lieutenant of Engineers.*

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1838.

SIR: I have the honor to suggest that an appropriation of \$75,000 be asked of Congress for the prosecution of the system of defence for the harbor of Pensacola.

The forts at St. Rosa island and Foster's Bank being completed, it only remains to restore and repair the old fort at the Barrancas, when the channel and land approach to the important naval arsenal at Pensacola will be effectually guarded.

The repairs of the old fort at the Barrancas can be effected at this time with greater facility and economy than if the period of their commencement be protracted. The completion of the works on Foster's Bank will enable us to transfer at once to the Barrancas men and machinery, and some surplus materials, by which we will save time in the immediate commencement of the operations and avoid the usual expenditure in making preparations for new works.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. H. CHASE.

General CHARLES GRATIOT, *Chief Engineer of the United States.*

Supplemental estimate of funds required for works under direction of the Engineer department during the year 1838.

FORTIFICATIONS.

For securing the site of Fort Caswell, Oak island, North Carolina	\$8, 500 00
For repairs of the old fort at the Barrancas, Pensacola harbor	75, 000 00
	83, 500 00

MISCELLANEOUS.

For the improvement of the Cumberland river above Nashville, Tennessee.....	20, 000 00
For the Cumberland road east of the Ohio river, \$2,000 in addition to the \$7,000 already asked, making.....	9, 000 00
For printing and binding the Regulations of the Military Academy	360 00
	112, 860 00

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 764.

[2D SESSION.]

ESTIMATES OF THE PAY, SUBSISTENCE, AND TRAVELLING EXPENSES OF THE MILITIA FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE NIAGARA FRONTIER, AND TO ENFORCE THE NEUTRALITY LAWS IN 1838.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JANUARY 12, 1838.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, January 10, 1838.

SIR: In compliance with the request contained in your letter of yesterday, I have the honor to transmit herewith estimates from several of the bureaus of this department, of the amount which will probably be required by each to meet expenditures incident to the measures taken for the defence of the Canada frontier. The aggregate amount of these estimates, you will perceive, is \$625,500.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Hon. C. C. CAMBRELENG, *Chairman of Committee of Ways and Means, House of Reps.*

PAYMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, Washington, January 10, 1838.

SIR: In compliance with your instructions, I have the honor to state that it will require \$197,000 to pay the 3,000 militia called into service on the Canada frontier for three months, and \$30,000 for travelling from and returning to their homes; making the appropriation required for the pay department \$227,000.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. TOWSON, *Paymaster General.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT.

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, January 9, 1838.*

SIR: I have no means of forming a detailed estimate of the expenditures that will probably be incurred in the quartermaster's department by the force to be embodied on the northern frontier to preserve our neutrality; but as the operations in the midst of winter in that region must necessarily be very expensive, I would suggest an appropriation of \$300,000 for the various objects of supply, the means of transportation, and the incidental expenses coming under the jurisdiction of the department.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

T. CROSS, *Acting Quartermaster General.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

ORDNANCE OFFICE, *Washington, January 9, 1838.*

SIR: In obedience to your instructions, I hasten to report that it will probably require about \$15,000 for the purchase of additional accoutrements for arming the troops intended for the service of the Niagara frontier.

I have the honor to be, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE BOMFORD, *Colonel of Ordnance.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

SURGEON GENERAL'S OFFICE, *January 10, 1838.*

SIR: In compliance with your request, I have the honor to report that about \$7,500 will be required to meet the expenses of this department, caused by the employment of the militia on the Niagara frontier. This estimate is \$2 50 for each man, based on the supposition that three thousand will be called into service.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

BENJAMIN KING, *Acting Surgeon General.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington City.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Clothing Bureau, Washington, January 9, 1838.*

SIR: In obedience to your instructions of this date, I have the honor to report that \$16,000 will be required for the purchasing department, to furnish camp equipage, &c., for 3,000 men.

It may be proper to add that I have made this estimate without a knowledge of the organization of the troops to be supplied.

With great respect, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

L. WHITING, *Major United States Army.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

OFFICE OF COMMISSARY GENERAL OF SUBSISTENCE, *Washington, January 9, 1838.*

SIR: In obedience to your verbal instructions, I have the honor to report that it will require the sum of \$60,000 to subsist three thousand men on the Niagara frontier for three months.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

GEORGE GIBSON, *Commissary General of Subsistence.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 765.

[2D SESSION.]

ADDITIONAL ESTIMATE FOR THE SUBSISTENCE OF MILITIA AND VOLUNTEERS FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF INDIAN HOSTILITIES IN FLORIDA IN 1838.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JANUARY 17, 1838.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *January 13, 1838.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit, for the consideration of the Committee of Ways and Means, a communication from the commissary general of subsistence, representing the pressing necessity for the appropriation, at an early day, of an amount, in addition to what has already been asked for, for that branch of the service intrusted to him.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Hon. C. C. CAMBRELENG, *Chairman Committee of Ways and Means, House of Representatives.*

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSARY GENERAL OF SUBSISTENCE, *Washington, January 12, 1838.*

SIR: I have the honor to request that \$150,000 may be asked from Congress, to be immediately appropriated on account of subsistence, in addition to the \$60,000 required by the letter of the 9th instant; making together \$210,000.

This sum of \$150,000 is absolutely necessary to subsist the additional number of militia and volunteers called into service in Florida, and will be required independently of the annual estimate already presented.

Drafts for these expenditures are daily presented, and the funds in the treasury to the credit of subsistence on December 31, 1837, are very nearly exhausted; and in the present state of affairs, both to the north and south, it is highly important that every bill of exchange drawn by agents of the department be promptly honored.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

GEO. GIBSON, *Commissary General of Subsistence.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

Estimate of the probable amount required to subsist the militia and volunteers called into the service of the United States for three months, independently of the annual estimate already presented.

Amount asked for by letter of January 9, 1838, for the Niagara frontier	\$60, 000
Required in addition to the above, for additional militia and volunteers called into the service of the United States in Florida.....	150, 000
	<hr/>
Total amount required.....	210, 000
	<hr/> <hr/>

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSARY GENERAL OF SUBSISTENCE, *Washington, January 12, 1838.*

GEO. GIBSON, *Commissary General of Subsistence.*

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 766.

[2D SESSION.]

ON CLAIM OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL ALEXANDER CUMMINGS FOR THE PAY OF COLONEL WHILE IN COMMAND OF THE SECOND REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JANUARY 18, 1838.

Mr. MCKAY, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred the petition of Alexander Cummings, reported:

That the petitioner states that he was appointed lieutenant colonel on the 20th August, 1828, and is now the senior officer of that grade in the army; that on the 1st of May, 1829, he was placed in command of the 2d regiment of infantry, and has continued in the command of it since, performing the duties and incurring the responsibilities of colonel—Brevet Brigadier General Brady, who is colonel of the regiment, having been at the same time assigned to the command of the left wing of the eastern department—and he asks the difference of pay, &c., between a lieutenant colonel and colonel during the period that he has performed the duties of the latter.

No evidence was produced to the committee in support of this statement, though it is presumed to be true. In this case the petitioner did nothing more than his duty; for it is a well-settled rule in our army that in the absence of a superior officer his duties devolve on the next in rank. Lieutenant Colonel Cummings held his commission with the knowledge that the colonel of the regiment to which he was attached might be occasionally absent, and that then he must take the command; and that for the increased labor and responsibility thus imposed no additional compensation would be paid, as none was promised. Had Lieutenant Colonel Cummings a brevet commission of colonel during the time he exercised the command of the 2d regiment, he would, under the act of April 16, 1818, be entitled to receive the pay and emoluments of his brevet rank. As that law expressly provides that *at no other time than when on duty, and having a command equal to the brevet rank*, shall brevet commissions confer additional pay and emoluments, it is clear that *command and duty* alone will not give them; and in conformity to this "has been the practice of the government," not to allow to officers in the line of the army the difference between the pay and emoluments of their own rank and that of a higher grade, for performing the duties of the latter, unless they held brevet rank corresponding with those duties. The cases cited in the petition are of staff officers, and may be distinguished from this; but admitting it to be analogous to them, the committee are satisfied that the principle upon which they were decided was wrong, and ought not longer to be followed. And such appears to have been the opinion of Congress; for, by the "act to authorize the appointment of additional paymasters, and for other purposes," approved July 4, 1836, it is enacted: "That during the absence of the quartermaster general, or the chief of any other military bureau of the War Department, the President be authorized to empower some officer of the department or corps whose chief is absent to take charge thereof, and to perform the duties of quartermaster general or chief of the department or corps, as the case may be, during such absence: *Provided, That no additional compensation be allowed therefor.*" Now this provision completely covers the cases referred to by the petitioner, being all cases arising in the military bureaus of the War Department. The committee, therefore, recommend that the prayer of the petitioner be rejected.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 767.

[2D SESSION.]

ON CLAIM OF LIEUTENANT WILLIAM B. PARKER FOR PAY OF CAPTAIN WHILE IN COMMAND OF A COMPANY IN 1814-15.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JANUARY 18, 1838.

Mr. McKAY, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred the petition of William B. Parker, reported:

That the petitioner alleges that he was the first lieutenant of the fortieth regiment of United States infantry during the last war with Great Britain; that about the first of May, 1814, he was assigned to the command of Captain Mathew N. Sanborn's company in said regiment, and continued in the command of it until the 15th of June, 1815, a period of thirteen months and a half; that during that time Captain Sanborn was absent, engaged in the recruiting service, and that he had the sole command of the company; and for this increased labor and responsibility he asks to be paid the difference between the pay and emoluments of a lieutenant and captain for the period he served as aforesaid. The committee have not inquired into the truth of this statement; for, assuming it to be true, the petitioner would not be entitled to anything. Waiving any objection on account of the time that has elapsed since the rendition of the service, he did nothing more than his duty required of him. In all services it is an established principle, that, in the absence of a superior officer, his duties devolve on the next in rank; and the general regulations for our army provide, "in the absence of a captain, the command of his company shall devolve on the officer next in rank serving with it," &c. The petitioner held his commission with a knowledge of its contingent duty, and that, should it be performed, no additional compensation was promised by law. The committee, from this, understand "that it never has been the practice in the line of the army to allow officers the difference between the pay and emoluments of their own rank and that of a higher grade for performing the duties of the latter, unless they held brevet rank corresponding with the duties." The committee recommend that the prayer of the petitioner be rejected.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 768.

[2D SESSION.]

ON THE PROPRIETY OF ERECTING A MONUMENT OVER THE GRAVE OF DAVID WILLIAMS, ONE OF THE CAPTORS OF THE SPY, MAJOR ANDRE, DURING THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JANUARY 18, 1838.

Mr. McCLELLAN, of New York, from the select committee to whom was referred the petition of Robert W. Murphy, praying the Congress of the United States to cause a monument to be raised to the memory of David Williams, one of the captors of Major Andre, reported:

That John Paulding, Isaac Van Wert, and David Williams, have, for more than half a century, been ranked among the greatest benefactors of their country. That immortal act of fidelity and devotion to their country which distinguishes the names and the character of these otherwise humble individuals from the great mass of citizens who engaged in our revolutionary struggle, is too familiar to all those who have attended to the history of our revolution to require at the hands of your committee much either of detail or eulogy. They were three obscure and humble peasants; but, humble as they were, they proved their love of country stronger than that love of gain which too often actuates the hearts and controls the actions of men. They captured a spy whose liberation and whose enterprise, if successful, would most probably have been fatal to the hopes and liberties of their country. He tempted them with gold, and with all that would have prevailed over men of their rank in life less devoted to the cause in which they were humble but most faithful actors. Their inflexible integrity and lofty patriotism are most forcibly expressed by General Alexander Hamilton, in his memorable letter to his friend, Colonel Laurens, shortly after the capture and execution of the ill-fated Andre.

"Arnold," said Hamilton, "practiced every art of peculation, and even stooped to connexion with the suters of the garrison to defraud the public.

"To his conduct, that of the captors of Andre formed a striking contrast. He tempted them with the offer of his watch, his horse, and any sum of money they should name. They rejected his offers with indignation, and the gold that could seduce a man high in the esteem and confidence of his country, who had the remembrance of past exploits, the motives of present reputation and future glory, to prop his integrity, had no charms for three simple peasants, leaning only on their virtue and an honest sense of duty. While Arnold is handed down with execration to future times, posterity will repeat with reverence the names of Van Wert, Paulding, and Williams."

It is, perhaps, proper that your committee should add that monuments have been erected to John Paulding and Isaac Van Wert, the associates of Williams in the capture of Andre. The one was erected either by the corporation of New York or by citizens of the city of New York, and the other by citizens of the county of Westchester, and State of New York, which is the county in which Andre was captured. David Williams survived for many years his immortal comrades, and has lately died in a sequestered part of the State, far from the place of his nativity and the scene where he rendered such invaluable service to his country. Your committee deem it due to the national character, and to the memory of one whose name stands so high in the annals of patriotism, that Congress should pay some little respect to his memory; and therefore beg leave to report a bill to authorize the erection of a monument over his grave.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 769.

[2D SESSION.]

DESCRIPTION AND ESTIMATE OF A COMPLETE LINE OF DEFENCE, BY MILITARY WORKS,
ON THE WESTERN FRONTIER, AND A STATEMENT OF THE PRESENT AND A PROPOSED
ORGANIZATION OF THE STAFF OF THE ARMY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JANUARY 18, 1838.

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, January 12, 1838.*

SIR: In compliance with your direction, I submit herewith an estimate of the probable expense of establishing the necessary posts for the defence of the western frontier, according to the plan recommended to the consideration of Congress:

For completing the works at Fort Crawford, by adding two bastions at opposite angles of the square, say	\$10, 000
For quarters for 400 men, and stables for, say, 100 dragoon horses, at the new post suggested at the upper forks of the Des Moines river, to be constructed chiefly by the labor of the troops, of hewn logs, protected by block-houses, after the fashion of ordinary frontier works	30, 000
For quarters for, say, 800 men at the proposed post at or near Council Bluffs, to supersede Fort Leavenworth on the exterior line of defence, to be constructed chiefly by the labor of the troops, of stone or brick material, protected by two bastions, including stables for dragoons, which arm should constitute a large portion of the force assigned to that position	120, 000
For the completion of Fort Leavenworth on a modified plan, to suit it to the objects of a post of refuge on the interior line of defence, thus superseding the estimate for \$80,000 now before Congress	30, 000
For permanent barracks and quarters at Fort Gibson for 1,500 men, (the force contemplated for that position,) including stables for dragoon horses, and combining with the quarters the necessary works of defence, like those indicated for Council Bluffs and Fort Crawford; the troops to aid in the operations, and do the labor chiefly; the material to be stone, and the buildings constructed in a plain but very substantial manner, as this is one of the positions that will probably never be advanced	150, 000
For permanent barracks and quarters at Fort Towson, on Red river, for 800 men, combining the necessary works of defence; the material to be stone or brick, and the buildings constructed in a substantial manner, for the reason suggested in reference to Fort Gibson; the labor to be performed, as far as practicable, by the troops	120, 000
For the eight posts of refuge suggested, as forming the inner line of defence, to be constructed on a large scale as to their area, so as to afford shelter for the largest practicable number of refugees; the plan, an extensive square, high exterior walls, with grated windows and loop-holes, deep roofs sloping to the interior of the square, so as to enlarge the accommodations as much as possible; the material to be brick, or stone if convenient, in order to render the destruction of the posts by fire, in case of attack, as difficult as practicable; the whole to be constructed in the plainest manner, with reference merely to the temporary accommodation of the inhabitants who may take shelter in them in times of alarm; say, for each, \$30,000, and for all	240, 000
° Total	700, 000

The above result may appear large at first glance; but it is a *minimum* estimate, and the objects enumerated could only be accomplished with the means suggested by the most efficient co-operation of the troops, whose increased strength would enable them to afford important aid without seriously interrupting their military instruction, which should always be carefully attended to at the frontier stations:

But if the estimate should be deemed large, I would observe that the object is also large—even a *great* one. The defence and protection of one thousand miles of our inland frontier, along which there are at least fifty thousand savage warriors, would, I think, be cheaply purchased at such a price.

On looking to the maritime frontier, it will be found that many of the fortifications have exceeded in cost the whole amount of this estimate; and it will be seen that among the works projected by the board of engineers, and yet necessary to complete the defence of the seaboard, there are several whose cost will nearly equal the amount required for the western frontier, and some which will more than double that amount.—(See printed documents accompanying the President's Message to Congress, pages 368 and 369.) Besides, the estimate is less than the cost of one line-of-battle ship and a frigate of the first class, (equal to \$780,000,) which is but a tithe of the naval force devoted to the protection of our external commerce. In every aspect, therefore, that the case is viewed, the estimate submitted would appear to be reasonable.

I would add that building operations beyond the settlements, when carried on by contract or hired labor, are exceedingly expensive. The mechanics and laborers must necessarily be drawn from the interior, at increased wages, to induce them to encounter the privations, and enable them to meet the greater expense of living at the advanced stations; and a portion of the materials must always be purchased remote, and transported thither. It is only when the heavy materials are provided on the spot by the troops, and the labor chiefly performed by them, that works beyond the frontier, where competition in private enterprise cannot be availed of, may be constructed at the reduced rates assumed in this estimate.

You are aware that there are already two appropriations for opening a road beyond the frontier, with posts on it, and for removing the troops from Fort Gibson, amounting to \$150,000, which would be superseded by your plan of defence, should it be adopted. These might be diverted from their original objects, and applied to those recommended. In that case new appropriations would be ultimately required only to the extent of \$550,000, which might be divided into two or three annual instalments, as it will require some time to raise and organize the force after it is authorized, and to complete so extensive a system of defence as that contemplated.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

T. CROSS, *Acting Quartermaster General.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington.*

Table showing the present and proposed organization (according to grades) of the staff of the army.

	Major general.	Brigadier general.	Colonels.	Lieutenant colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	First lieutenants.	Second lieutenants.	Surgeon general.	Surgeons.	Assistant surgeons.	Paymaster general.	Paymasters.	Commissary general of purchases.	Storekeepers.
Present organization.....	1	3	4	11	5	1	15	60	1	17	1	2
Increase by the bill in the Senate.....	3	3	2	18	10	10
Present and proposed organization.....	1	3	7	3	13	23	10	10	1	15	60	1	17	1	2
Organization proposed by the Secretary of War.....	1	3	*6	5	12	24	20	1	15	60	1	17	1	2

* Two colonels to be merged in the line if the new regiments are raised, leaving four colonels instead of six.

The increase proposed by the Secretary of War (leaving out the inspectors general) will be five lieutenant colonels, one major, nineteen captains, and twenty first lieutenants. The increase proposed by the bill in the Senate will be three colonels, three lieutenant colonels, two majors, eighteen captains, ten first lieutenants, and ten second lieutenants.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 770.

[2D SESSION.]

ON THE EXPEDIENCY OF CARRYING INTO EFFECT THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATION FOR ERECTING MONUMENTS TO THE GENERAL OFFICERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY, AND A MARBLE COLUMN AT YORKTOWN, VIRGINIA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JANUARY 20, 1838.

Mr. COLES, from the Committee on Military Affairs, in obedience to a resolution of the 5th instant, instructing them to inquire into the expediency of carrying into effect the resolutions of the Continental Congress, granting monuments to the memory of general officers of the revolutionary army, and the resolution to erect a marble column at Yorktown, in Virginia, reported:

That resolutions to be found in the old journals of Congress grant monuments to the memory of the following general officers :

	Vol.	Page.
January 25, 1776.—To General Montgomery, of New York	1	247
April 8, 1777.—To General Warren, of Massachusetts	2	82
April 8, 1777.—To General Mercer, of Virginia.....	2	83
June 17, 1777.—To General Wooster, of Connecticut.....	2	168
October 4, 1777.—To General Herkimer, of New York.....	2	276
November 4, 1777.—To General Nash, of North Carolina.....	2	312
October 14, 1780.—To Baron De Kalb, at Annapolis.....	3	536
September 20, 1781.—To General Davidson, of North Carolina.....	3	669
September 20, 1781.—To General Scriven, of Georgia.....	3	669
August 8, 1786.—To General Greene, of Virginia.....	4	679

The first resolution appropriates the sum of three hundred pounds sterling; five others appropriate the sum of five hundred dollars each; and the remaining four make no specific appropriation. Some of these resolutions assign to the board of treasury the duty of their execution, but most of them request the legislatures or governors of the respective States to carry them into effect.

The committee are satisfied that the resolutions have not been executed, and that no money has been paid from the treasury for that purpose.

Although, had this been a new question, it might not be expedient to erect the monuments, yet the resolutions awarding them were, doubtless, proper at the time, and may have contributed to stimulate the exertions of those who achieved our independence.

The descendants of the general officers who were thus distinguished have an interest in the fame as well as the property of their ancestors, and awards of the one may be considered as binding as of the other.

Your committee are of opinion that the resolutions referred to have pledged the national faith, and that it is due to the character of the nation that they be carried into effect.

It also appears that by a resolution adopted on the 7th of August, 1783, an equestrian statue was directed to be erected in honor of General Washington; but as Congress has taken measures upon the subject at several periods since, and as by an act of July 14, 1832, a statue of General Washington is now under execution, we deem it inexpedient to take further steps on the subject of this resolution.

In regard to the resolution to erect a marble column at Yorktown, in Virginia, your committee ask leave

to adopt the views contained in the report made to the House of Representatives on the 5th of January, 1836, by a select committee, to whom a memorial on that subject was referred; which report is hereto annexed.

The committee report a bill.

JANUARY 5, 1836.

Mr. WISE, from the select committee to whom was referred the memorial of the citizens of Yorktown, Virginia, and its vicinity, praying Congress to carry into effect a resolution passed the 29th of October, 1781, to erect a monument at that place, reported:

That the said resolution, to be found in the journals of Congress, (vol. 3, page 682,) is in these words: "Resolved, That the United States in Congress assembled will cause to be erected at Yorktown, in Virginia, a marble column, adorned with emblems of the alliance between the United States and his most Christian Majesty, and inscribed with a succinct narrative of the surrender of Earl Cornwallis to his excellency General Washington, commander-in-chief of the combined forces of America and France, to his excellency Count de Rochambeau, commanding the auxiliary troops of his most Christian Majesty in America, and his excellency the Count de Grasse, commanding-in-chief the naval army of France in the Chesapeake."

Your committee are of opinion that this resolution should be carried into effect from respect to that Congress which well knew how to appreciate the importance of an event that terminated the struggle of our fathers for liberty and independence, and because no event in our history is more worthy of commemoration than that which crowned the American revolution with success and triumph. And your committee, thinking that this monument should be erected by the government, respectfully report that it should be done in a style corresponding with the importance of the event, the benefits derived from it, with the characters of the principal actors in the achievement, and comporting with the pride, patriotism, and dignity of this nation.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 771.

[2D SESSION.]

ON CLAIM OF A PRIVATE SOLDIER OF THE ARMY TO PAY FOR THE TERM OF HIS ENLISTMENT ON THE ALLEGATION THAT, ON A CAMPAIGN, HE WAS LEFT BEHIND ON THE MARCH ON ACCOUNT OF SICKNESS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JANUARY 20, 1838.

Mr. MCKAY, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred the petition of John Foster, reported:

That this case is very fully stated in the petition, and, if true, the petitioner would certainly be entitled to the relief he asks. The committee, however, are not satisfied of its truth. Independent of his own statement on oath there is no direct positive evidence of the manner in which he quit the service. He alleges that whilst, in the spring of 1816, he was proceeding with his company from Fort Johnston, on the Mississippi, to Natchitoches, on the Red river, he was taken extremely sick, and was left behind by the orders of the commanding officer. He further says that, when thus left, he was in the care of a family living near the Mississippi river, and some fifty miles or more above Natchez, where he remained upwards of a year. In support of this material allegation, the testimony of some one of the officers and soldiers of the company, or of some member of the family with whom he stayed, should have been produced, or its absence explained, neither of which has been done. The rolls in the Adjutant General's office have been examined, and they afford no information on this point; indeed, his name cannot be found on them after June 30, 1815. Joseph Shelmonds, whose affidavit is among the papers, says that in the fall of the year 1817 he met with the petitioner in the neighborhood of Natchez sick and in desperate health; that he inquired for a military post, where he might report himself; but his condition was such at the time that the deponent thinks he could not have reached any one known to him before the expiration of his term of enlistment. Now, all this may be true, but still it does not prove the petitioner's allegation. The affidavit of John Dixon is not stronger, for his statements on this point are hearsay, and not made on his personal knowledge. It is a little singular that whilst Dixon says that he has been informed that the petitioner had a severe spell of sickness and was left behind by the order of his officer, that Shelmonds, who had better means of information, is silent upon the subject. He (Shelmonds) knew Foster had been stationed with him at Fort Johnston until the spring of 1816, when he was removed to Natchitoches, where he remained until his discharge in 1817; yet he does not pretend to have heard from the officers and men of Foster's company, or any one else, the circumstances detailed by him.

The committee recommend that the prayer of the petitioner be rejected.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 772.

[2D SESSION.]

ON CLAIM OF A COMPANY OF VOLUNTEERS OF MISSISSIPPI FOR PAY FROM THE DAY THEY WERE MUSTERED INTO SERVICE UNTIL THE TIME OF THEIR RENDEZVOUS FOR DUTY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JANUARY 25, 1838.

Mr. WHITTLESEY, from the Committee of Claims, to whom was referred the petition of George G. Henry, administrator of William Henry, reported:

William Henry and a number of men, in the summer of 1812, volunteered their services in the Mississippi Territory, and were organized thereafter into a company of mounted cavalry, under the acts of February 6, 1812, and July 6, 1812, and the said Henry was commissioned as captain. The company was mustered on the 12th day of October, 1812, by R. Chamberlain, a lieutenant in the second regiment of infantry, and it then consisted of one captain, one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, one cornet, one sergeant, and twenty privates. The certificate of Lieutenant Chamberlain is as follows: "I certify that this muster-roll exhibits a true statement of Captain William Henry's company of volunteers, dragoons, as mustered by me at St. Steven's, Mississippi Territory, this 12th day of October, 1812. Signed, R. Chamberlain, lieutenant second regiment of infantry." Monthly muster-rolls were made out until the following February, inclusive; and, as appears by a roll furnished the committee by the Third Auditor, and on which the company was finally paid, other volunteers joined the company during the fall of 1812 and the winter of 1813. It is said the company held itself in readiness to perform active service from October 12, 1812, until March 2, 1813. On the 2d of March, 1813, the company was ordered to rendezvous at Mount Vernon, and from that period was in active service.

General Claiborne ordered the company to St. Steven's on the 7th and 12th of October, 1812, to be discharged when the men were entitled to a discharge.

General Flournoy, who had command of the first military district, refused to discharge them, because he thought the service commenced on the 2d of March, 1813, and not on the 12th of October, 1812. One of the men absented himself on the 12th of October, 1812, and most of the rest of them are reported on the last roll to be absent on leave on the 3d and 6th days of December, 1813. Four of the men were discharged under a writ of habeas corpus.

The record of the proceedings against these men is before the committee. Colonel Carson, who caused the men to be arrested, prosecuted them for desertion, because they left service before the expiration of twelve months from the 2d of March, 1813, when they rendezvoused at Mount Vernon; and the accused rested their defence on this: that their term of service commenced on the 12th of October, 1812, when they were mustered by Lieutenant Chamberlain, and that they continued to serve until the expiration of twelve months from that day.

It was the opinion of Judge Sewell, before whom the writ was returned, that the persons on trial were entitled to their discharge.

This opinion was in part, if not mainly, formed from supposing the men were paid thirty dollars each, in lieu of clothing, under the act of February 6, 1812. General Wilkinson, in his letter of September 15, 1812, wrote to Captain Henry, as follows: "I shall issue commissions, call the troops into actual service, and direct thirty dollars to be paid non-commissioned officers and privates in lieu of clothing." On this sentence the judge remarks: "From these expressions it would appear that the call into service was to precede the payment of the money authorized by law; and as the payment of the money was actually made, and a national officer under the commander at Fort Stoddard had mustered them, it was fair on the part of the claimants for a discharge to consider themselves in actual service before they marched from this place to Mount Vernon; and as no deception could have possibly been contemplated by the law authorizing the acceptance of the services of the claimants for a discharge, or by the general who directed the money to be paid to them, I am of opinion they have served out the time they engaged to serve, and that they are entitled to a discharge. Colonel Carson is therefore commanded to release them from confinement."

It appears, in a letter from Mr. Hagner to the chairman, that Major Henry (formerly Captain Henry) received money for paying "balance of clothing" on the 30th day of April, 1818, and that there was then due to each sergeant \$27 16, to each trumpeter \$25 09, and to each private and corporal \$23 22. It does not appear when the first payment for clothing was made. The men have been paid for what period they served after they were ordered to rendezvous at Mount Vernon, and being reported absent without leave did not forfeit their pay. Major Henry came to Washington in the spring of 1818 to procure money to pay the balance due to his company and to a company commanded by Captain Wells. On the 30th of April, 1818, the paymaster general advanced to Major Henry \$10,000, and afterwards, in the same year, \$8,646 63, amounting, together, to the sum of \$18,646 63. These advances were made upon pay-rolls of the non-commissioned officers and privates of Captains Henry and Wells's companies from March 2, 1813, the date of the commencement of their service, according to General Flournoy's order. In disbursing this money Captain Henry paid the following accounts:

For the use and risk of his own horse prior to March 2, 1813, at 40 cents per day.....	\$170 40
Lieutenant James Bailey's pay, &c., prior to March 2, 1813.....	360 46
Cornet John Koen's pay, &c., prior to March 2, 1813.....	335 53
Cornet Thomas B. Rankin's pay, &c., prior to March 2, 1813.....	35 01
	<hr/>
	901 40
	<hr/>

Major Henry now stands charged, on the books of the treasury, with the sum of \$3,303 62, and for which a suit was instituted in 1821.

The disallowances not specifically mentioned above were made in accordance with the ordinary principles of making settlements, and it does not appear that Major Henry expressed any dissatisfaction that such (other) disallowances were made.

The claim is for the services of the non-commissioned officers and privates, from the time they were mustered, on the 12th of October, 1812, or from the time they thereafter enrolled themselves, until the 2d of March, 1813, when they rendezvoused at Mount Vernon, and also for the aforesaid sum of \$901 40.

The principal question is, when did the term of service commence?

To solve this question, resort must be had to the provisions of the act of February 6, 1812, as they regulate the rights of those who entered the service as a part of the corps of 50,000 volunteers.

By the first section of that act the President was authorized to accept the services of 50,000 volunteers, who were to be clothed, and, in the case of cavalry, were to be armed and equipped, at the expense of the United States.

By the second section, any company, battalion, regiment, brigade, or division, thus offering itself for the service, was made liable to be called upon to do military duty at any time the President should judge proper, within two years after he should accept the same, and was bound to continue in service, after having arrived at the place of rendezvous, for twelve months, unless sooner discharged; and, when so called into service and remaining therein, was to be under the same rules and regulations, and to be entitled to the same pay, rations, forage, and emoluments of every kind, bounty and clothing excepted, with the regular troops of the United States. In lieu of clothing, each person, when called into service, was to receive, in money, a sum equal to the cost of clothing, according to his grade.

By the third section the President was authorized to organize the men into companies, &c., &c.; but until called into actual service, such companies were not to be considered as exempt from the performance of military duty.

If this company was in the actual service of the United States from and after the 12th day of October, 1812, because they were then mustered, they were subject to the rules and articles of war. The act of mustering them was nothing more than examining the men, to ascertain whether they were able-bodied, sound, and healthy, and to take a list or roll of them.

They might be organized, by the President, into companies, battalions, regiments, brigades, and divisions, and yet not be in actual service, or subject to the rules or articles of war. They could not be subject to those rules and articles, and liable to do militia duty, under the laws of the State or Territory where they resided. In the opinion of the committee, the commencement of the actual service was when they arrived at the place of rendezvous, and when they became subject to martial law. They then placed themselves under the control of their officers, and were exempt from performing militia duty. From the time they volunteered and were mustered, until they rendezvoused, they held themselves in readiness to enter the service, but were not in it.

Full effect cannot be given to the said act by any other construction. If the acceptance of the service by the President is taken as the period when the service commenced, that part of the statute is nugatory that authorizes the President to call them into actual service within two years; because, when they were taken into actual service, they could not be retained therein more than twelve months. The decision of Judge Sewell, in discharging those accused of desertion, should not influence the committee in the present application. They were accused of a crime, and the judge inquired into the cause of their detention. He decided it was illegal, because they had not intentionally violated the law. He supposed the accused had received pay in lieu of clothing, and on that circumstance he placed much reliance. In that he was mistaken. Misapprehension might exonerate them from the charge of desertion, but it should not increase their compensation.

If it is said to be hard that volunteers should be required to hold themselves in readiness without compensation, the answer is, it is according to their agreement.

After a full examination of the claim, the committee come to the conclusion that the petitioner is not entitled to relief, and submit the following resolution:

Resolved, The prayer of the petitioner ought not to be granted.

ON CLAIM OF COLONEL ROGER JONES, ADJUTANT GENERAL, FOR THE PAY AND EMOLUMENTS ACCORDING TO HIS BREVET RANK OF BRIGADIER GENERAL.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JANUARY 27, 1838.

Mr. McKAY, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred the petition of Roger Jones, adjutant general of the army, reported :

That this case is very fully explained in the petition and accompanying documents, to which reference is made. The argument by which the petitioner's claim to the pay and emoluments of his brevet rank is supported will be found in his letter, marked A, addressed to the Secretary of War. Though the committee is not satisfied that the act of Congress regulating the pay and emoluments of brevet officers, approved the 16th of April, 1818, embraces cases of this sort, yet, as it has been applied to them, as is evident from the precedents cited, they can see no reason why the petitioner's case should be made an exception, and they therefore report a bill for his relief. In doing this, however, the committee will not be understood as either sanctioning the aforesaid precedents, or as being willing to extend the provisions of the act of the 16th April, 1818, to any other cases that may arise, though analogous to this.

The petition of Roger Jones, a citizen of Virginia, and colonel in the army of the United States, to the honorable the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, respectfully sheweth :

Your petitioner asks leave respectfully to state that prior to the late war with Great Britain he was a lieutenant in the service of the United States, and that immediately after war was declared he received the commission of captain of artillery.

That he actively served on the frontiers, and in the enemy's territory on the Niagara and the St. Lawrence, during the whole of the late war.

That at its close he left the lines with the rank of lieutenant colonel by brevet, for conduct and services in the field, which his superior officers and the President of the United States were then pleased to consider as "gallant and meritorious."

That in the year 1818 the President appointed him the adjutant general of the northern division of the army, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of a colonel, which appointment carried him to the frontiers of New York, where he sedulously performed his appropriate duties until the reduction of the army in 1821.

And your petitioner further states that in the year 1825 the President again appointed him adjutant general, with the rank and the like pay and emoluments of a colonel, since which time he has been stationed at the seat of government, as the adjutant general of the whole army.

That his duties, official responsibilities, and labors in the War Department, and at the headquarters of the army, have been more than quadrupled.

That besides the zealous performance of all the incumbent duties as adjutant general of the army, under the major general commanding-in-chief, other important services are, by established usage, confided to and executed by your petitioner, as a military functionary of the War Office, under the authority of the Secretary of War. And with what ability or zeal this double series of arduous duties and varied services have been rendered for so many years, the records, the honorable Secretary of War, and others conversant with the matter, can best judge and attest.

And your petitioner begs leave further to state that, in 1834, the present Chief Magistrate, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was pleased to confer on your petitioner the brevet rank of a brigadier general, in consideration of the performance of "faithful service for ten years," in the grade of colonel. And it is with regard to the bestowment of this last mentioned brevet, opening the way, as it does now, for the first time, for the application of the contingent provisions of the special law of 1818, by which your petitioner hopes, not without reason, to obtain from your honorable body that relief and consideration to which he humbly conceives his station and his vastly augmented duties and labor justly entitle him.

Your petitioner respectfully submits herewith, as the argument in the case, his letter A, of the 28th of January, to the honorable Secretary of War, in which he believes the claim to compensation according to his rank by brevet to be fairly established, as well by the precedents cited as the reasoning and the just analogies and usage in the military service. Nevertheless, the honorable Secretary of War, duly appreciating, as he does, the services of your petitioner, and the more than equitable title to the higher compensation, is of opinion* that, under the language of the law, the benefits of its provisions cannot be extended to his case. This decision, therefore, virtually concedes a monopoly of the contingent benefits of the statute to one class of brevet officers, and excludes another class, in which brevets may have been won for "gallant conduct," even in the same field. It also denies the right of your petitioner, now and forever, to any participation of these benefits, and makes an exception of his case; for the precedents cited in the argument are admitted to be directly in point, the officers being of the staff with brevets, and, like your petitioner, serving as the chiefs of military bureaus in the War Department.

In consideration of the premises, therefore, your petitioner respectfully prays that your honorable body may be pleased to adopt such measures, if to them it should seem just and reasonable, or otherwise so explain the act entitled "An act regulating the pay and emoluments of brevet officers," approved April 16, 1818, as will allow and grant to him the pay and emoluments of his brevet rank from and after the date of such commission, provided that the amount which he may have received as adjutant general, in virtue of his rank as colonel of cavalry, be deducted therefrom.

And your petitioner, as in duty bound, will ever pray

ROGER JONES, *Adjutant General of the Army.*

WASHINGTON, *February 9, 1837.*

A.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, January 28, 1837.*

SIR: I respectfully request that you will take into consideration the propriety of allowing to the adjutant general of the army his brevet pay and emoluments. Some remarks, illustrative of the subject and of the equity of the case, may be proper.

After various modifications of the general staff during the late war, the act of March 3, 1813, provided for one adjutant and inspector general of the army, with the rank, &c., of brigadier general, and eight adjutants general of division, each with the rank of colonel of cavalry. The duties of a division adjutant general were limited to the particular division in which he served, while those of the adjutant and inspector general extended to the entire army, whose station was in the War Office, being there an indispensable functionary of that department of the executive government. At the close of the war with England, the act fixing the peace establishment abolished nearly the entire general staff. But, such being the requirements of the public service, President Madison then provisionally retained such branches of the staff as were indispensably necessary for the public service. Of this provisional staff so retained was the adjutant and inspector general of the army, and two adjutants general of division, each of whom was assigned to one moiety of the army for duty with the troops under the orders of the respective commanding generals, while the principal staff officer, with the rank of brigadier, continued to discharge his important duties at the seat of government. The act of April 24, 1816, confirmed the provisional arrange-

* See the Hon. Mr. Butler's decision of February 8, 1834, herewith respectfully submitted, (B.)

ment of the President, and the staff retained by him was now incorporated in the permanent peace establishment. This organization, under the confirmatory act of 1816, was still less perfect than it should have been, and, among other improvements, as seen by the act of 14th of April, 1818, it was further completed by the addition of another important office—that of quartermaster general, with the rank of brigadier. Thus, in 1818, the office of quartermaster general of the army, like that of the adjutant and inspector general of the army, then with equal rank, was created and established in the War Department. This efficient organization of the staff, which the experience of the war with Great Britain and six years' subsequent peace had tested and matured, continued in successful operation until the reduction of the army in 1821. The adjutant and inspector general of the army, the two adjutants general of division, with their four assistants, were then all disbanded, and, in lieu of these, one adjutant general, with the rank of colonel, (one of the *division* adjutants general,) was retained by the act, who, by executive arrangement, has, ever since his appointment, discharged the duties of adjutant general for the whole army. Besides being charged with the execution of these appropriate staff duties in the central office of orders and military correspondence under the major general, other important services are rendered by the adjutant general as a functionary of the War Office under the Secretary of War.* Thus he performs a double series of duties, with the rate of compensation diminished in the ratio of the difference between an unavoidable increased expenditure in this expensive metropolis and the economy easily observed at almost any military post. This, then, is the true state of the case: higher and more arduous duties, in amount more than quadruple, now have devolved on this functionary, without the corresponding increase of compensation, which is usually allowed in cases of superadded labor and responsibility; his compensation being no more than was formerly deemed to be due to a *division* adjutant general at a cheap post in the interior. This state of the service has been the result of unavoidable circumstances, not within the control of the Executive. But recently the case has been changed. The brevet of brigadier general, for fourteen years' faithful service in the grade of colonel, being now held by the adjutant general, places it in the power of the Executive, in virtue of the provisions of the law of 1818 regulating brevet pay, to accord to him, as in other like cases, the corresponding emolument—being such as pertained to the *same office* when held by his predecessor.

The foregoing recital shows that my predecessor was a brigadier general under the law; the history of the service attests that the duties of the present adjutant general exceed those of the late "adjutant and inspector" by all the duties now performed in the Adjutant General's office which pertain to the headquarters of the army; for, prior to 1821, these were divided between the headquarters of the two majors general of *division*, each of whom had an adjutant general associated with him; but since 1821 these division staff duties have devolved on one staff officer, which, to this extent, superadds to the business in this office—i. e., the former office of the late "adjutant and inspector general."

I may, therefore, respectfully assert that the command I necessarily exercise, and the double duties performed in the capacity of adjutant general of the whole army, and as a functionary of the War Office under the Secretary of War, exceed those which devolve on any other colonel, as such; and that they are at least equal to the duties and exercise of a command appropriate to the rank of brigadier general, since they are more than equal to the measure of the duties incident to the same central office in the War Department which devolved on my predecessor, the late adjutant and inspector general of the army, who, under the law, was a *brigadier general*. This application of the contingent provisions of the law, with regard to the allowance of pay according to the brevet rank of any officer, may be compared to the axiom which declares that the things equal to the same thing are equal to one another. If, for example, the colonel of a regiment, with the brevet of brigadier, should succeed to the command of a brigadier general, he would be deemed to be on duty according to his brevet rank, and would be allowed, without dispute, the compensation corresponding to such rank. Now, my case is precisely analogous to the example stated; and the provisions of the law of 1818 which justify the paying of *four* majors general, when the organic law of 1821 provides for but one, also justify the claim of the adjutant general to his brevet pay, so far as any question arising out of any imagined restrictions of the organic law may be supposed to conflict with such claim.

I proceed now to examine some of the facts of the service from which may be deduced the practical interpretation of the law, as heretofore declared in other like cases, and which authorized the allowance of brevet pay, &c. With regard to the allowance of brevet pay to officers of the *line*, the printed rules are clear and specific, just and liberal, and many officers at this time receive their brevet pay under them, among whom are three colonels of infantry, as brigadiers by brevet. But to officers of the *staff*, officers belonging to corps *without troops*, having brevets, the regulations do not apply; nor would it be an easy task to frame a written rule which could be applicable to every case. But, in this dilemma, it surely would not be argued that therefore staff officers, officers of engineers, of ordnance, &c., who may have won brevets by gallant actions, can never receive the corresponding rates of compensation provided for by the statute. What principle, then, should test the equitable right in the cases of staff officers, cases where the written regulations do not provide any rule other than such as may be applicable to service in the *line* of the army? The only answer which can be responded is this: that the Executive must determine the right by analogy, by the estimate of the *station* of the officer, the enlarged and *elevated character of the duty performed*, and the *importance of the services rendered*; for, if the command of organized bodies of troops, if a numerical force be deemed to constitute the only possible basis on which to establish the right, then, indeed, the provisions of the special law with regard to brevet compensation *could never* apply to *staff officers* and *engineer* officers as such, and therefore the law would be partial and cruelly unjust. But Congress never meditated the monopoly of these contingent benefits by the one class of brevet officers, and their total denial to another alike meritorious; and so, in truth, has the President more than once wisely and justly decided. Hence the resort to the constructive rule of analogy, always held in reserve for cases which justify its application. The records show that this unwritten rule has been often applied, and its application to the analogous case of the adjutant general of the army of the United States cannot in equity, I humbly conceive, be now withheld.

I will now turn to the list of these precedents. The Ordnance department being disbanded by the act of 1821, to reduce the army, all the duties relative thereto were subsequently conducted by the officers of artillery. In lieu of the colonel of ordnance so disbanded, the *lieutenant colonel* of the 2d regiment of artillery was assigned to the Ordnance office as the chief of the department, and, like his predecessor, he was stationed in the War Office, being there charged with the same description of duties. In 1825 the

* Vide memoranda, page 913.

lieutenant colonel was promoted to the *brevet* rank of colonel, for "faithful service ten years in one grade," when he was immediately allowed the pay and emoluments of his *brevet* rank, being exactly the same which his predecessor had received, who, under the law, was a colonel by commission; and by what *rule*, let me respectfully ask, was this meritorious lieutenant colonel of artillery allowed the pay of a colonel by *brevet*, as an officer in charge of a military bureau in the War Office? Certainly not by the printed regulations, for these declare that a *brevet* colonel must command a *regiment* to be entitled to pay as such, and the law provides that a *regiment* shall consist of ten companies.

The colonel of the corps of engineers was promoted to the *brevet* rank of brigadier general on the 16th of March, 1829, to take rank from the 24th of May, 1828; and the present Chief Magistrate decided that this meritorious officer was performing duties according to his *brevet*, and he has been allowed the corresponding pay from the date of the commission. And by what rule? Certainly not the written rule, for this declares that to be entitled to his pay, a *brevet* brigadier must command a brigade, which, by the regulations, is composed of two regiments, &c.

The senior major of the topographical engineers is a lieutenant colonel by *brevet*, and he also is deemed to be on duty according to his *brevet* rank, and deservedly receives the corresponding pay. And by what rule? Certainly not the written one, for that would require him to be in command of a battalion of not less than four companies;—but the written rules relative to the allowance of *brevet* pay were made for, and are only applicable to, officers of the line when exercising command over regularly organized bodies of troops; nor could these, with any regard to equal justice, be considered as common to the class of *brevet* officers whose habitual duties separate them from service in the line with organized bodies of troops. Hence the resort to the rule of analogy derived from the spirit of the law, and which has been applied to the several cases of the respected officers just referred to. Accordingly, the measure of their right to the exercise of *brevet* rank with respect to pay was determined as each case arose by the President's just estimate of the station occupied, the importance of the service rendered, the elevated character of the duties performed, and the resemblance in all to the exercise of higher functions in virtue of rank by *brevet* in cases of officers of the line.

To the benefit of these just and obvious principles, which have been favorably applied to similar claims of other *brevet* officers of the army serving in the War Department, I think I have a reasonable and just claim; and this, I believe, is the sentiment of nearly all the officers of the army whose attention has been drawn to the subject. The principle, having been decided by the Executive in each of the foregoing cases, must now be considered as settled. I will not permit myself, therefore, to apprehend that an exception will be made in my case.

I may appropriately remark that, since the reduction of the army in 1821, two regiments of dragoons and the ordnance corps have been added to the army, which, to that amount, considerably increase the duties of the adjutant general.

I deem it proper respectfully to state that I submitted my claim for the decision of the Secretary of War, the honorable Mr. Cass, not long before he left the department; and the letter I now have the honor to present for your action is a revision of the one which I laid before your predecessor, and which he answered favorably, but not finally, on the 1st of October, just two days before he left the office. The great pressure of public business before the President at the time, and his subsequent indisposition, with other considerations relative to my own official engagements, have prevented me from laying this reasonable claim before you for final decision sooner than in the present month.

I am, sir, with great respect and consideration, your obedient servant,

ROGER JONES, *Adjutant General United States Army.*

Memoranda of some of the practical duties which devolve on the adjutant general of the army, "relative to military commissions," as a functionary in the War Office, under the Secretary of War.

I. The office of the adjutant general of the army, as the oldest military bureau of the War Department, is the repository of the records which refer to the *personnel* of the army, in war as well as in time of peace, and of the military history of every officer and soldier from the earliest period of the government, so far as these may have been preserved.

II. The adjutant general is responsible to the Secretary of War for the registry of all military officers; and in his office is prepared and kept the record of all executive action relative to—

1. Appointments in the army.

2. Promotions.

3. Resignations.

4. Deaths.

5. Dismissals and other casualties.

6. All military commissions issued and distributed.

7. The official Army Register annually required for Congress pursuant to resolutions of the Senate and House of Representatives.

III. In this military bureau of the War Office the names of all enlisted soldiers are entered, and their size-roll and enlistments recorded and filed.

IV. It is in this office where the monthly returns of the troops and muster-rolls of companies, required by the 13th and 19th articles of war, are received and kept.

V. Where the inventory of the effects of deceased officers and soldiers are forwarded and recorded, as required by the 94th and 95th articles of war.

VI. Where the original proceedings of general courts-martial are deposited and entered.—(See 90th article of war.)

VII. In this office all the duties connected with the recruiting service are conducted; the detail of officers, furnishing of funds, assignment of recruits to different regiments, (under the general-in-chief.)

VIII. Where all the general regulations and orders which emanate from the Executive are communicated to the army.

IX. In this office the annual returns of the militia of the several States and Territories are received and deposited for safe-keeping, as well as the returns of the arms, munitions, and accoutrements pertaining to the same, required by law to be made to the President of the United States.

X. The general returns of the militia of the United States, required for the use of Congress, pursuant to the act of March 2, 1803, are consolidated in this office.

XI. Here, also, all appointments and commissions of the officers of the militia of the District of Columbia are registered and distributed, &c.

B.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 8, 1837.*

I have carefully examined General Jones's communication of the 28th of January, and the several documents therein referred to, and have consulted the President thereon.

The laborious, extensive, and important character of the adjutant general's services justly entitle him to the pay and emoluments of his brevet rank; especially as, since his accession to the brevet rank of brigadier, the duties of the office have greatly increased, in consequence of the heavy military operations and other special matters which have demanded his attention. It is evident, also, that several of the precedents cited by him of the chiefs of bureaus who receive the pay and emoluments of their brevet rank are directly in point, particularly those of the colonel of the corps of engineers and the head of the topographical bureau.

The President, however, has always doubted whether the acts of Congress allowing brevet pay were intended to embrace cases of this sort, and, though he has not interfered with the usage which he found in force when he came into office, has not deemed it expedient to extend it to any new case. Concurring in those doubts, and being only temporarily charged with the care of the department, I could not think it proper to grant the within application without the express authority of the President, which, for the reasons above stated, is necessarily withheld.

Under these circumstances, General Jones will be obliged to appeal to Congress; and, as I think his case one of great merit, I trust it may receive the early and favorable action of that body.

B. F. BUTLER.

C.

OCTOBER 1, 1836.

I have examined with much care the claim of General Jones to be allowed his brevet pay.

So far as brevet pay is allowed to officers on account of their personal services, the claim of General Jones is a very strong one. I have found him an able, faithful, and zealous officer, and his services are of the same nature, and his liability to expense the same, as other military officers having brevet rank stationed at the seat of government. Were I free to act agreeably to my wishes, I should allow the claim without hesitation; but as the case does not appear to come within the written rules on the subject, being one of the class cited in the argument as precedents, and as it should, like these, be determined by the same unwritten rules of analogy, as to the principles of the service and the nature of military duties, the case is respectfully submitted to the President, together with General Jones's argument, which takes a full and, I think, a just view of the subject.

LEWIS CASS.

A true copy from the original letter.

E. SCHRIVER, *1st Lieutenant of the 2d Artillery.*

FEBRUARY 8, 1837.

D.

HEADQUARTERS, *Washington, August 29, 1836.*

I have examined the statement of the adjutant general, Brevet Brigadier General Jones, and taking into consideration the fact that he is obliged to perform the duties of adjutant general of the militia and volunteers in the service of the United States, and also to the militia not in the field, so far as correspondence and returns relate to them, I conceive that he has made out a strong case, and that he is entitled to a fair remuneration for his extensive and complicated duties; and it appears to me the allowance of his brevet pay as a brigadier general would be only a reasonable compensation, under a full view of his case.

ALEXANDER MACOMB, *Major General.*

A true copy from the original letter.

E. SCHRIVER, *1st Lieutenant of the 2d Artillery.*

FEBRUARY 8, 1837.

E.

WASHINGTON, *January 12, 1837.*

General Jones is adjutant general, and has the rank of colonel of dragoons, *ex officio*. He has also the brevet rank of brigadier general, conferred for ten years' service in one grade. The question is, is he entitled to his brevet pay?

I think it is a case which admits of no doubt; his duties are with the *whole army*, and coextensive

with it. If the whole army is sufficient to give operation to his brigadier rank, there is the proper force to entitle him to pay as brigadier general. It might be questionable whether an ordnance officer or an engineer officer could draw brevet pay, because their duty is performed by corps, and cannot be said to act throughout the army; but the adjutant generalship is equally felt in horse, in foot, in infantry, and in every department of the staff; it is coextensive with the commander-in-chief. His command in the staff as adjutant general gives him the requisite number of troops to entitle him to brevet rank.

The objection that his duty extends over the whole army only to certain staff duties, and not to lineal commands, has no weight in my opinion. His duty extends over the whole army, so far as the office of adjutant general extends; it reaches as far as the commander-in-chief's reaches, but confined to staff duties. The *policy* of the law places it on that ground for wise reasons. You could not have an efficient army unless you separated lineal from staff *duties*.

E. W. RIPLEY.

The within is a true copy from the original letter.

F. SCHRIVER, *1st Lieutenant of the 2d Artillery.*

FEBRUARY 8, 1837.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 774.

[2D SESSION.]

CLAIM OF PAYMASTERS OF THE ARMY FOR COMMISSIONS ON PAYMENTS MADE TO THE MILITIA AND FOR A DECLARATORY LAW ALLOWING PAYMASTERS OF THE ARMY STAFF OR CAVALRY PAY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JANUARY 29, 1838.

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled:

The undersigned, Edmund Kirby, paymaster in the army of the United States, for himself and in behalf of the other paymasters of the army, respectfully appeals to the justice of Congress to pass an act authorizing the Secretary of War to allow the paymasters of the army for payments to militia and volunteers who have been called into the service of the United States since the passage of the act of March 2, 1833, or may be hereafter called into the service, the same compensation as was allowed by that act; and also for a declaratory act construing the third section of the act of 24th April, 1816, in such manner as to allow the paymasters of the army staff or cavalry pay, as is allowed by that act to other officers of the staff.

And he respectfully asks their attention to the following considerations in support of the claim:

Previous to the 2d March, 1833, it was the practice of the government to allow the paymasters of the army a commission of two and a half per cent. upon the payments made by them to the militia.

The act of 2d March, 1833, section 2, authorized the Secretary of War, at his discretion, to allow the paymasters of the army a commission not exceeding one per centum on the sums paid by them respectively to the militia called into the service of the United States; and the act of 3d March, 1835, making appropriations for the Delaware breakwater, &c., though avowedly intended, by those who framed it, to bear on other allowances, without reference to this, has been construed by the Attorney General to cut off the allowance to paymasters for making disbursements to militia.

Previous to the present war in Florida, the militia who were called into the service of the United States were discharged and returned to their homes before they received their pay. The pay-rolls were prepared under the supervision of the paymaster general at Washington, and revised at the treasury before the paymasters were sent to make the payments. And even then cases of doubt and difficulty constantly arose, involving the paymasters in heavy responsibilities for which it was deemed just to allow extra compensation.

But latterly the system has been entirely changed, and the paymasters are now required to prepare the rolls upon the spot, and pay the militia in the field at the time of their discharge. The duty of paying the militia has thus become difficult and hazardous in the extreme; and though performed with zeal, fidelity, and efficiency, it has been undertaken with reluctance on account of the great and various risks incurred in making these payments; a reluctance only overcome by the hope that the period would be short when such services would be required, and by a confident reliance upon the justice of Congress to provide some remuneration for the losses sustained.

The following extract from the report of the paymaster general to the Secretary of War (see documents accompanying the President's message, December, 1836, page 174) will show the manner in which this subject was presented to the last Congress:

"At the commencement of the present hostilities it was considered highly important to hold out inducements to the militia to volunteer their services, and one of the inducements was prompt payment. This could not be effected if the rolls were to be first examined and the accounts audited at this place. Your predecessor, therefore, determined to supersede so much of the regulation relating to the payment of volunteers and militia as required the rolls to be transmitted to this place and audited before settlement. This removed the safeguard of the officers of the pay department, and they have since been, and now are, subject to a most hazardous, and I fear, in some cases, ruinous duty, unless some provision is made to cover disallowances in the settlement of their accounts. To form an opinion of the losses to which they are liable, it is necessary to have a knowledge of the circumstances under which the duty is performed. One great difficulty arises from the militia serving under different organizations given to them by their State laws, and all varying from that prescribed by the laws of the United States that are to govern in the settlement of paymasters' accounts. Another difficulty is caused by the irregularity of

the service, and the imperfect evidence to establish it; and a third from the pay-rolls and accounts being necessarily prepared under circumstances calculated to prevent accuracy. The troops are generally discharged by regiments, and sometimes by brigades, always impatient to return to their homes, and importunate to be paid. The paymaster cannot begin to prepare his accounts until after the discharge takes place; of course he must always perform that duty in a hurry, frequently surrounded by persons conversing with and questioning him. Under such circumstances he has to judge of and pay claims of doubtful character, and make long and perplexing calculations without time to re-examine and test their accuracy. If he differs in opinion with the accounting officers in construing the law, or in applying it, or if he errs in his calculations in favor of the claimant, the latter receives the benefit, and the paymaster loses the amount; if the error is favorable to the government, the government receives the benefit and not the paymaster."

The Secretary of War *ad interim*, (Mr. Butler,) in his report to the President, dated December 3, 1836, (same document, page 112,) says, in reference to the foregoing report of the paymaster general: "His suggestions in regard to the services and responsibilities of the paymasters employed in making payments to militia, undoubtedly demand the attention of Congress;" and, after a reference to the laws on the subject, he concludes:

"But as it would seem that justice requires that additional compensation should be allowed, I concur in recommending a special provision similar to that inserted in the act of 2d March, 1833."

Want of time and the urgency of other business prevented Congress from acting upon the foregoing suggestions.

The losses which fall upon paymasters by disallowances at the treasury for errors of calculation and alleged non-conformity to law and regulations in paying the militia, though in themselves considerable, form but a part of the losses actually sustained.

In making hurried payments, frequently in the open field or forest, without shelter or other conveniences, and in the midst of a throng, it is very difficult to be accurate, either in preparing the accounts or paying out the money. When a single paymaster, under such circumstances, pays out in a single day sixty thousand dollars to six hundred men, (as has been done, his utmost efforts being required to despatch the business rapidly,) he is very liable to commit errors, and especially to pay out bank notes double, an occurrence quite common in counting large sums.

It should be borne in mind that these hurried payments are the result of a commendable zeal for the service. Payments are frequently made where large bodies of militia are pressing for pay and impatient for discharge, and where numerous vessels are waiting under charter to convey them to their homes. In one such instance, (that of the South Carolina brigade in 1836,) where sixteen steamboats and other vessels were under pay, and where the expense to the government for pay, &c., of the men, and for demurrage, could not have been less than from fifteen hundred to two thousand dollars a day, by extraordinary exertion the paymaster made the payment several days earlier than he could have done if he had taken a reasonable time to prepare the rolls and pay the men; thus saving to the government several thousand dollars at a single operation, but at the risk of great loss to himself.

Numerous similar instances might be cited to show the zeal with which this service has been performed, and in every case it would appear that the paymasters have been regardful of the public interest rather than their own. Conscious that by their activity and exertions they have saved large sums to the government, at the expense of great sacrifices on their own parts, they now appeal to the justice of Congress, not for any new provision in their favor, but that authority, formerly granted by law, may be restored to the Secretary of War, at his discretion, having regard to the circumstances of each particular case, to allow a just remuneration for extraordinary services rendered and losses sustained.

In regard to the second branch of the subject, it is claimed by the paymasters that the existing laws establish their right to cavalry pay, and that the accounting officers of the treasury have wrongfully withheld from them that grade of pay.

The act of 24th April, 1816, entitled "An act for organizing the general staff and making further provision for the army of the United States," provides (section 3) that "paymasters shall receive the pay and emoluments of majors," and (section 9) "that the several officers of the staff shall respectively receive the pay and emoluments and retain all the privileges secured to the staff of the army by the act of March 3, 1813."

The act of 3d March, 1813, entitled "An act for the better organization of the general staff of the army of the United States," above referred to, creates and organizes several staff departments not previously existing in the army. Among other things, it provides that assistant adjutants general, assistant inspectors general, deputy quartermasters general, and topographical engineers, shall respectively "have the brevet rank, pay, and emoluments of a major of cavalry."

These are the only officers of the grade of major provided for by that act.

The paymasters, therefore, constituting, as they do, a part of the staff of the army, deem themselves entitled to the pay and emoluments of majors of cavalry, as the pay and emoluments secured to the staff by the act of 3d March, 1813.

They have accordingly, from the passage of the act of 24th April, 1816, to the present time, claimed cavalry pay; but the accounting officers of the treasury, who habitually, in cases of doubt, decide in favor of the government, persist in disallowing the claim.

The paymasters, feeling confident of the justice of their cause and of its ultimate success, have in many instances charged the amount to the government in their accounts, and invited suits to be instituted against them for its recovery. But three suits, however, have been brought, and two decisions, by two different judges of United States district courts, were in favor of the claim; and no appeal having been made, the defendant, now out of service, retains the amount. But a case was recently brought into the Supreme Court, under an adverse decision from the district court of Missouri, which was confirmed. But it is known that the opinion of the court was not unanimous, and there is strong reason to believe that if the question had been presented to the court in a different aspect, its decision would have established the claim.

It is conceived that the true and obvious construction of the law sustains this claim, and that such was the intention of its framers may be inferred from the strict military propriety there is in placing this department of the staff upon a footing of equality, in regard to emoluments, with the other branches of the staff of corresponding grade. There can be no reason for an invidious distinction where none that is unfavorable to the pay department exists in the character of the duties to be performed, or in that of the individuals performing them.

The pay and rations of a major of infantry have remained as they were fixed by the act of 5th March, 1792, without change, to the present time, although all the necessaries and comforts of life have greatly advanced in price within the same period.

While their pay is upon a scale graduated to a state of things existing forty-six years ago, so the paymasters themselves remain stationary upon the Army Register. They can look forward to no promotion. The door to military preferment is closed against them, and at the end of twenty or more years' faithful service they find themselves precisely in the position from which they started.

From the nature of their duties they run various risks of loss in the public service. Under a rigid system of accountability they are compelled to refund to the treasury all sums paid out erroneously, either from miscalculation, in the hurry of business, or from other causes. These items amount to a considerable sum every year. They are, besides, constantly liable to losses upon a larger scale. In transporting large amounts of money to the distant frontier posts, and in paying it out in small sums, serious losses are frequently sustained, for which no remuneration is made by the government.

They are the only class of officers enjoying the pay of major who do not, under any circumstances, receive the allowance of double rations; so that, in fact, from all these circumstances, their real emoluments fall considerably below those of majors of infantry, while their personal expenses are necessarily greater.

The undersigned being himself a severe sufferer by disallowances at the treasury, by an ascertained robbery of several hundred dollars in specie, by a deficiency of about one thousand dollars in his cash account, from some cause unknown, in disbursing \$400,000 to eight thousand men in Florida and the Creek nation, and having been exposed to irretrievable ruin by being robbed of vouchers at one time to the amount of \$140,000, and at another to the amount of \$8,000, (in both cases afterwards recovered,) and by running, at various times, imminent risks of being robbed of large sums of money, he feels entitled to appeal to Congress for the enactments above prayed for.

In making this enumeration of losses, he feels that he has no cause to blush. They were not the offspring of culpable negligence on his part, but of confiding devotion to the public service. Instead of taking time to prepare his rolls and accounts carefully, and to pay the men deliberately, he, on every occasion, strained every nerve, to despatch the business of payment rapidly; and thus, while he gratified the impatience of the militia and volunteers to return to their homes, he saved to the treasury many thousand dollars in the expense of maintaining them longer in the service, and of demurrage on vessels employed for their transport. He will not here make more than a passing reference to laborious services rendered and heavy disbursements made by him in other departments of the staff, and will only add that, while performing these services and sustaining these losses, the pay and emoluments which he received from the government were barely equal to his personal expenses.

What the undersigned says in reference to himself will apply generally to the other members of the pay department; and neither he nor they intrude themselves upon your notice as supplicants for favor, but they respectfully ask at your hands such enactments as are demanded by strict justice and sound policy.

The annexed letter, containing the views upon some of the matters above referred to, of the Second Comptroller and of the Second Auditor of the Treasury, in each of whose offices the accounts of the paymasters are examined in the course of settlement, carries with it the authority of those whose official duties make them most familiar with the subject, and who would not be apt to entertain undue prejudice in favor of the paymasters.

All which is respectfully submitted.

E. KIRBY.

WASHINGTON, *January 1, 1838.*

Sir: As requested, I have examined the paper left with me by you, being a memorandum of some of the reasons for the re-enactment of the 2d section of the act of March 2, 1833, chapter 60.

In the course of the examination and settlement of paymasters' accounts, I could not fail to observe the very heavy responsibilities thrown on those officers in consequence of the war in Florida. Some of the most intelligent and correct officers in the paymaster's department have been employed in that service; and yet, such is the extreme difficulty attending the payment of the militia and volunteers, that, in almost every account that has passed under my examination, disallowances have been made, many of which must ultimately fall on the disbursing officers. In the payment of the militia, the paymaster has to make himself acquainted with the various militia laws, so far as they relate to organization, all varying from each other and from the laws for the organization of the regular army. He must also rely upon rolls and other evidence, in many cases made out irregularly in consequence of the inexperience of militia officers; and if, in the pressure usually attending the discharge and payment of large bodies of troops, a mistake is made, arising either from erroneous construction of laws or regulations, or from miscalculation of amount, the paymaster must bear the loss.

Considering the very hazardous responsibility resting upon those paymasters who are required to make disbursements in Florida and the vicinity, I have been surprised that responsible officers could be found who would be willing to perform the service.

Respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

ALBION K. PARRIS.

I have read the above statement, and entirely concur in the views and opinions expressed by Mr. Parris.

W. B. LEWIS.

Major EDMUND KIRBY, *Paymaster, &c.*

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 775.

[2D SESSION.]

REPORT OF SECRETARY OF WAR RELATIVE TO ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN FLORIDA TO CALL INTO SERVICE MILITIA AND VOLUNTEERS, INCLUDING INDIANS; THE TRIBES ENGAGED; THE NUMBER OF TROOPS OF ALL CLASSES ENGAGED IN THE FLORIDA WAR, AND THE WHOLE AMOUNT OF MONEY EXPENDED IN THAT WAR.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JANUARY 30, 1838.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *January 29, 1838.*

Sir: By a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 6th ultimo this department is required to furnish "copies of all orders and instructions given to the commander-in-chief of the forces in Florida, authorizing him to raise troops, or to call into service any portion of the militia, or to accept the services of volunteers, for the purpose of suppressing Indian hostilities;" to report what measures, if any, have been adopted to enlist or procure the services of other Indian warriors to fight against the Seminoles; the number of Indians so enlisted or taken into the service of the United States; the tribes to which they respectively belong; the length of time they have been engaged to serve; and the amount of pay promised them;" to state the number of troops of all classes engaged and called into service for the purpose of prosecuting the war in Florida at the present time, and the whole number of troops employed since the commencement of the war; and to inform Congress of "the amount of money expended."

If the department had been satisfied with replying to the last of the above-named requirements, by merely stating the sum in gross that has been expended in the military operations against the Seminole Indians, the whole of the resolution could have been answered some time since; but it was desirous to make an accurate and detailed statement, showing, as far as possible, every different branch of expenditure, and the amount expended in each. To do this, it was necessary that the large and complicated mass of accounts growing out of the Florida difficulties should be classified, and that a long, tedious, and laborious examination of them should be gone into, in order to arrive at the proper results. Such an examination, even at a time when the department was not heavily pressed with business, would require at least a month; but, at a season like the present, when the press of business is overwhelming, it could not be made in less than thrice that period. Still, as a statement of the kind in question was believed to be important, and would be more acceptable to Congress than merely giving the sum in gross, measures were promptly taken to have it made out; but observing that during recent proceedings of the House of Representatives an intimation has been made that the information called for by this resolution had been withheld, and that an earlier answer to the resolution was expected, the attempt to complete the statement has been abandoned; and, in order to comply immediately with the resolution, I confine myself to giving the gross sum expended in the military operations against the Florida hostile Indians since the commencement of hostilities to the present time. This sum is \$8,358,955 70.

With the exception of the accompanying documents, marked A, B, C, and D, the instructions to the "commander-in-chief of the forces in Florida" have already been furnished to the House of Representatives, in compliance with another resolution, and will be found in the printed document of the present session of the House, No. 78.*

The measures "adopted to enlist or procure the services of other Indian warriors to fight against the Seminoles, and the amount of pay promised them," are fully disclosed in document 27, printed by order of the House during the first session of the present Congress. The number mustered into service, the tribes to which they belong, and the length of time they have been engaged to serve, are stated in the documents accompanying the enclosed report of the commanding general. These documents exhibit, likewise, "the number of troops of all classes engaged and called into service for the purpose of prosecuting the war in Florida at the present time, and the whole number employed since the commencement of the war."

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Hon. JAMES K. POLK, *Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

A.

Extract of a letter to Major General Thomas S. Jesup, at Garey's Ferry, Florida.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 7, 1837.*

Sir: Your letter of the 25th ultimo has been received.

The governor of Alabama has been written to respecting the battalion of volunteers offered by General Moore. Should that gentleman succeed in raising them, the department leaves it to you to take the necessary measures to have them mustered into the service.

B.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 12, 1837.*

Sir: In compliance with your wishes, the acting governor of Alabama has been requested to comply with the suggestions contained in your letter of the 2d instant, in respect to the troops which you say have been raised in North Alabama for service in Florida.

Very, &c.,

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

* See antecedent No. 760.

C.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *December 1, 1837.*

SIR: I received your letter of the 22d ultimo yesterday afternoon, and hasten to say that the great amount of force expected from Georgia was uncalled for, and cannot be retained in the service. Such an additional number of mounted men will break down your army, destroy all the resources of the country, and consume the forage and provisions collected for the supply of the troops calculated for. I consented to receive a larger amount of this description of force than I thought essential to your success, because I did not wish to cripple your operations; but this great and unexpected accession of them will place us here in the unenviable situation of knowing you to be deficient in supplies without the power of relieving your wants. The estimates were based upon less force, and if an act of appropriation should be delayed, the supplies must stop, and the whole army be made to suffer. The number of irregular cavalry which you called for to compose the four columns did not exceed seven hundred men; and the estimates, although made for a much greater number, were not intended to meet so great an increase as you will have in the field at this time.

Very, &c.,

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*

D.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *December 2, 1837.*

SIR: Alarmed at the immense accumulation of volunteer mounted men in Florida, and seriously apprehensive that we might not have the means of maintaining them in the field, I wrote you a hurried letter yesterday, directing the Georgia militia to be discharged. If, however, you find that you can better spare the Alabama or any other troops, you can select and retain the best. I do not think your operations would be at all retarded, or your army less efficient, by limiting the number of mounted men to two thousand, including the regular cavalry; or, if absolutely necessary for escorts, the number may be carried up to two thousand mounted volunteers. The amount of that description of troops now in the field, if the Georgia volunteers be still there, is more than double that number, which appears to be disproportionate to that of the troops of all other arms, and likely to be productive of great inconvenience and expense. I am not disposed, as you know, to jeopard the success of the campaign by the exercise of an ill-judged economy; but the attention of the public has been called to the immense expenditures occasioned by this war, and they have become a matter of investigation by Congress, and we are called upon by our sense of duty and regard for the reputation of the service to avoid the appearance of lavish or unnecessary expense. I am aware that the most rigid investigation which can be instituted will prove only the faithful and honorable manner in which every branch of the army has discharged its duties in the cabinet and in the field; but if we retain an unreasonable amount of the most expensive description of troops longer than their services are required, we shall be liable to the accusation of disregarding the public interests intrusted to your charge. The manner in which the volunteers have everywhere obeyed the call of their country, and, by their eagerness to serve in this war, have led their officers to exceed the call made upon the States, is highly creditable to them and is fully appreciated by this department; and in declining their services at this moment, it is governed only by a sense of its paramount duty to the country. It has been represented that the volunteers, on entering the service, have had their horses appraised, some at the exorbitant price of three hundred dollars, thus attempting to establish a claim for this unreasonable rate of compensation for any loss they may hereafter sustain. It may be proper to inform all such persons that it is the determination of this department, unless otherwise directed by the laws that may be passed for indemnity against such losses, not to allow more than one hundred and twenty dollars for any cavalry horse that may die in the service. General Jackson, from whom I received a letter this morning, speaks in high terms of the character of the men and officers composing Major Lauderdale's battalion. I have no doubt you will find them highly serviceable, and it may be well to keep this force entire.

Having understood that the irregular cavalry were marching through the country with an extraordinary quantity of baggage, requiring an immense amount of transportation, I have directed the acting quartermaster to extend some fixed regulations on that subject, which are not to be departed from by those charged with the administration of that branch of the service.

Very, &c.,

J. R. POINSETT.

Major General THOMAS S. JESUP, *Garey's Ferry, Florida.*HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, January 26, 1838.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith the report of the adjutant general, furnishing so much of the information called for by a resolution of the House of Representatives of December 6, 1837, as is in the possession of the headquarters of the army.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALEX. MACOMB, *Major General, Commanding-in-chief.*

HON. SECRETARY OF WAR.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, December 14, 1837.*

SIR: So much of the resolution of the House of Representatives of December 6, 1837, requiring "the number of troops of all classes engaged and called into service for the purpose of prosecuting the war in Florida at the present time," is answered as fully as the records will afford by the table marked Z,

of which the accompanying paper A is an abstract, referred to in your last annual report to the Secretary of War, which accompanied his report to the President, and now a printed document of the House. Since that paper was prepared two hundred and fifty recruits have been sent to the army; but as they may not be more than sufficient to supply the vacancies consequent upon the various casualties of the service, it is not considered as adding to the strength of the force exhibited in the return.

It is supposed that about 1,200 mounted volunteers from Georgia under General Nelson have marched to join the army in Florida; but no official accounts concerning them have been received at this office.

As to "the whole number of troops employed since the commencement of the (Florida) war," I have to state that the number of regular troops serving in Florida at the commencement of Indian hostilities in that Territory, at first but few, has been increased from time to time, and now amounts to the force exhibited in table Z of the printed documents accompanying the last message of the President to Congress.

The whole militia force mustered into the service of the United States in 1835, 1836, and 1837, to aid in the suppression of the Florida Indians, so far as the records of the Adjutant General's office show, amounts to 15,290, (fifteen thousand two hundred and ninety,) including a force of about nine hundred Indian warriors. The 1,200 Georgia mounted volunteers under General Nelson, above mentioned, are not included in this number.

Respectfully submitted.

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

Major General ALEXANDER MACOMB, *Commanding-in-chief.*

A.

Abstract of the table marked Z of the printed document No. 3, showing the strength of the Florida army.

Regiments and corps.	Number of companies.	Present and absent.	
		Total.	Aggregate.
Staff.....			28
Second regiment of dragoons.....	10	644	678
First regiment of artillery.....	9	397	493
Second regiment of artillery.....	8	312	355
Third regiment of artillery.....	9	283	327
Fourth regiment of artillery.....	9	374	422
Aggregate of artillery.....	35	1,366	1,547
First regiment of infantry.....	10	288	320
Second regiment of infantry.....	6	342	362
Fourth regiment of infantry.....	9	460	488
Sixth regiment of infantry.....	7	332	352
Aggregate of infantry.....	32	1,422	1,522
Marines.....		185	190
Recruits in Florida not assigned to companies at last returns.....		1,060	1,060
Aggregate of regular troops.....		4,677	5,025
Missouri volunteers, (mounted).....	10	436	474
Tennessee volunteers, (mounted).....	6	504	532
Alabama volunteers, (mounted).....	12	906	950
Washington city volunteers, (foot).....	1	69	72
Philadelphia volunteers, (foot).....	6	458	476
New Orleans volunteers, (foot).....	4	235	250
Florida volunteers, (mounted).....	20	1,341	1,421
Seamen, &c.....		100	101
Aggregate of volunteers.....	59	4,049	4,276
Indians.....		174	*178
Grand aggregate.....		8,900	9,479

* Of this number of Indians, eighty-seven are Delawares, and were mustered into service September 29, 1837, for six months; the residue are Shawnees, mustered for six months from October 2, 1837.

Z.—Return of the army employed in Florida against the Seminole Indians, &c.—Continued.

Regiments and corps.	Number of companies.	Letters of companies.	PRESENT.				ABSENT.								PRESENT AND ABSENT.		Number of recruits required.		
			In arrest or confinement.		Commissioned officers.	Non-commissioned officers, musicians, artificers, and privates.	On detached service.				Furloughed, or with leave.			Without leave.		Total.		Aggregate.	
			Non-commissioned officers.	Privates.			Field officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	Non-commissioned officers, &c., sick.	Non-commissioned officers, &c., confined.				Commissioned officers.
Staff.....					28												28	28
Second regiment of dragoons.....	10	A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K...	1	7	33	563			1	17				61	3		644	678	71
First regiment of artillery.....	9	A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I.....	2	2	24	363	1	2	12	11	1	6	2	18	3		397	443	100
Second regiment of artillery.....	8	B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I.....	1	9	32	279	2	1	7	9	1		6	18			312	355	130
Third regiment of artillery.....	9	A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I.....	1	2	26	253		5	10	11	1	2	1	17	1		283	327	214
Fourth regiment of artillery.....	9	A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I.....		6	31	347	1	3	11	7		2	7	11	2		374	422	123
Aggregate of artillery.....	35		4	20	113	1,242	4	11	40	38	3	10	16	64	6		1,366	1,547	567
First regiment of infantry.....	10	A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K...		6	19	282	1	2	7	2		3	1	1	2		288	320	22
Second regiment of infantry.....	6	A, B, F, G, H, K.....		2	16	332	1	1	2	3			2	4			342	362
Fourth regiment of infantry.....	9	A, B, C, D, E, G, H, I, K.....		2	8	379	2	5	10	10	1	2		71			460	488	3
Sixth regiment of infantry.....	7	A, B, F, G, H, I, K.....		3	9	294	1	3	6	2	1		6	29	1		332	352	29
Aggregate of infantry.....	32			13	52	1,287	5	11	25	17	2	5	7	103	7		1,422	1,522	54
Marines.....			1	3	4	170			1	13			1	1			185	190
Recruits in Florida, but not assigned to companies, at the dates of last returns.....						1,060											1,060	1,060
Aggregate of regular troops.....			6	43	230	4,322	9	22	67	85	5	16	24	229	16		4,677	5,025

Z.—Return of the army employed in Florida against the Seminole Indians, &c.—Continued.

Regiments and corps.	Number of companies.	Letters of companies.	PRESENT.				ABSENT.								PRESENT AND ABSENT.		Number of recruits required.					
			In arrest or confinement.		Commissioned officers.	Non-commissioned officers, musicians, artificers, and privates.	On detached service.				Furloughed, or with leave.			Without leave.		Total.		Aggregate.				
			Non-commissioned officers.	Privates.			Field officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Non-commissioned officers, &c.	Non-commissioned officers, &c., sick.	Non-commissioned officers, &c., confined.				Commissioned officers.	Non-commissioned officers, &c.		
VOLUNTEERS.																						
Missouri, mounted.....	10	38	436	436	474		
Tennessee, mounted.....	6	28	504	504	532		
Alabama, mounted.....	12	44	906	906	950		
Washington, D. C., foot.....	1	3	69	69	72		
Philadelphia, foot.....	6	18	458	458	476		
New Orleans, foot.....	4	15	235	235	250		
Florida.....	20	74	1,207	6	49	76	9	1,341	1,421		
Seamen.....		1	100	100	101		
Aggregate of volunteers.....	59	221	3,915	6	49	76	9	4,049	4,276		
Indians.....		4	174	174	178		
Grand aggregate.....		6	43	455	8,411	9	22	73	133	5	15	100	238	16	1	8,900	9,479

NOTE.—Many of the officers and men reported "absent" by their respective commanders are serving elsewhere in Florida on duty connected with the service in that quarter; and of the number reported "sick absent" about eighty have returned to the army.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, November 30, 1837.

ALEX. MACOMB, Major General, Commanding-in-chief.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, Washington, November 30, 1837.

R. JONES, Adjutant General of the Army.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 776.

[2D SESSION.]

ON CLAIM OF THE WIDOW OF AN ASSISTANT SURGEON OF THE ARMY FOR HALF PAY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JANUARY 31, 1838.

Mr. MASON, of Ohio, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred the petition of Josephine Nourse, the widow of Benjamin F. Nourse, late an assistant surgeon in the army of the United States, reported:

That the deceased was appointed an assistant surgeon in the army of the United States, and stationed at Key West. While residing at that post the war with the Seminole Indians broke out, and Doctor Nourse marched with the centre column of the army of Florida, during the campaign of 1836, in the capacity of senior medical officer and medical director. The march of the army was a continual bivouac from the 10th of March till the 25th of May, in a pestilential atmosphere, through a country rendered almost impassable by deep morasses and stagnant waters, without such provisions as are essential to the health of troops in the field.

The duties of Doctor Nourse, under these circumstances, were arduous and incessant, and his attentions to the sick and wounded faithful and unwearied. It appears to the committee, from testimony accompanying the petition, that during this campaign he contracted the disease which terminated his life at Key West on the 19th day of May, A. D. 1836, and that his death was occasioned by his exertions and exposure in field service. By the death of her husband, the petitioner has suddenly been deprived of his protection, and, with her infant children, thrown on the compassion of others for the means of present and the hopes of future support. Under these circumstances of destitution and helplessness, she asks the assistance of that country in whose service her husband fell, in the midst of a career of usefulness and devotion to the cause of humanity.

Congress has made ample provisions for the widows of officers and soldiers of the militia and volunteers who may have died from any cause while employed in the service of the United States, by granting to them half pay during the period of five years. The same principle has been extended to the widows of commissioned officers of the army of the United States who may have died of wounds received in actual service. Had Doctor Nourse belonged to the militia or volunteers, and died, as he did, of disease, his widow, beyond all question, would have been entitled to half pay. But he belonged to the army of the United States. To grant relief in the one case, and withhold it in the other, would be to recognize a principle of discrimination not only invidious, but wholly incapable of vindication. Either the law in favor of the militia and volunteers ought to be repealed, or its policy and humanity extended to the army of the United States.

Besides, in reference to the case of the petitioner, it would be difficult, on principle, to distinguish the merits of a claim founded on the death of an officer who died in consequence of wounds received in actual service, from one founded on his death occasioned by disease contracted in actual service, and in consequence of that service. On the whole, the committee agree to report a bill for the relief of the petitioner, by granting to her half of the pay to which her husband was entitled, subject to certain limitations specified in the bill.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY CHEROKEE NATION, *October 8, 1837.*

SIR: Your letter dated Washington city, September 13, 1837, is received. Your son, Doctor B. F. Nourse, marched with the centre column of the army of Florida during the campaign of 1836 in the capacity of senior medical officer and medical director; and I cannot better characterize the march of that part of the army than by saying it was a continued bivouac from the 10th of March until the 25th of May, under a pestilential climate, and through an impassable country, and without any of those provisions from the quartermaster department which are so essential to the health of a body of troops in the field. The duties of Doctor Nourse, under such circumstances, were arduous and incessant; and his attentions to the sick and wounded faithful and unwearied. It was my lot, as well as that of some four or five hundred others, to have been stricken with disease, (from which I am not even yet recovered,) to have experienced those ministrations of his medical skill and his humanity, which are remembered now with a grateful feeling. He was young, and of a robust frame, and the most temperate habits; and these advantages seemed for some time—in fact, during the whole period of the march—to sustain him under trials which were fatal to others. This security, however, appears in his case, as in that of many others, to have been delusive; for although I was not with him at the time of his death, I feel satisfied, from the representations of Doctor Reynolds, that he contracted the disease which destroyed him whilst on the campaign. Captain Green, United States army, who served with him, and is the bearer of this, will also bear testimony to his merits as a professional character and a soldier.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM LINDSAY, *Colonel of 2d Artillery.*

Mr. M. NOURSE.

WASHINGTON CITY, *August 11, 1837.*

DEAR SIR: The approaching session of Congress recalls to my mind a subject to which I have frequently directed my thoughts, and to which I respectfully ask your attention. I allude to the propriety of an application to Congress on behalf of the family of your lamented son, Doctor Benjamin F. Nourse, who perished in Florida while arduously engaged in the service of his country. It is a fact, sir, within my personal knowledge, that his death was occasioned by his untiring exertions and great exposure in active

field service. I parted with him at Tampa Bay, Florida, in the spring of 1836, when he left that post with troops bound to Key West; and when he left us he was laboring under the symptoms of that fatal fever which deprived his country of a faithful officer, and his friends of a noble companion. He had just returned from active service in the field, where he had devoted himself night and day to relieve the sufferings of his fellow-soldiers. His death, then, being occasioned by his devotion to his country, what stronger claims than those of his immediate family can be presented to a just, a generous Congress? I hope, then, that you will have this subject brought to the attention of Congress, and that you will meet with that success which the application so richly deserves, and the justice of our country certainly requires.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

JOHN C. REYNOLDS.

MICHAEL NOURSE, Esq.

At a meeting of the citizens of Key West, held on May 20, 1836, the following resolutions were unanimously adopted:

Resolved, That we deeply sympathize with the relations and friends of Doctor Benjamin F. Nourse, late of the United States army, as well as with society at large, in the afflicting dispensation of Divine Providence, which has removed him from life in the midst of his usefulness.

Resolved, That the amenity of his manners, the purity of his life, and his active usefulness, have justly entitled the memory of the deceased to our affectionate regards.

Resolved, That as a token of respect, we will this day attend the funeral obsequies of Doctor Nourse, and wear crape on the left arm for thirty days.

Resolved, That the president of this meeting convey to his friends the deep sympathies they feel in their bereavement in such terms as he shall judge proper.

WILLIAM MARVIN, *President*.

JOHN BALDWIN, *Secretary*.

KEY WEST, *May 25, 1836.*

MY DEAR SIR: Before this shall have reached you, you will have received the afflicting intelligence of the death of your son, Doctor B. F. Nourse. I shall not intrude upon the sacredness of grief by attempting to offer you any comfort or consolation in your severe bereavement. "The heart knoweth its own sorrows, and a stranger intermeddleth not therewith."

But I may be permitted to condole and sympathize with you and the family of the deceased. I knew the deceased well; I appreciated the excellency of his character; you have lost a son, and I a friend.

By the last of the foregoing resolutions I am requested to offer to the friends of the doctor, on behalf of the citizens of Key West, their sincere sympathies in this dispensation of Providence. This I now do, with every wish for the happiness of yourself, the widow, and the orphan children.

I am your obedient servant,

WILLIAM MARVIN.

M. NOURSE, Esq.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 777.

[2D SESSION.]

ON CLAIM OF THE WIDOW OF AN OFFICER OF THE ARMY FOR THE PAY CORRESPONDING WITH HIS BREVET RANK, HE HAVING A COMMAND CORRESPONDING WITH SUCH RANK.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JANUARY 31, 1838.

Mr. GRENNELL, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred the memorial of Mary A. Patrick, reported:

The memorialist is the widow of Captain Matthew A. Patrick, deceased, late of the 1st regiment of United States artillery. She states that her husband received a commission as first lieutenant on the 11th of August, 1820, and on the 11th of August, 1830, according to the then existing law, became entitled to the *brevet* rank of captain; that he, with other officers, was three years successively nominated to the Senate, by the President, for advancement to that rank, and that the nominations in all that time were not acted on by that body. She further states that her husband succeeded to the full rank of captain on the death of Captain Dana, on the 4th of February, 1833; and that from the said 11th of August, 1830, when he became entitled to his *brevet* rank, to the said 4th of February, 1833, he commanded a military post and a company. His command of a company had been during seven years previous to that time.

Captain Patrick died on the 6th day of March, 1834, after a short sickness, at Williamsport, in Maryland, where he had gone with his command to quell a riot on the canal. The nominations for *brevet* promotion, which, with his, had been made as before stated, were acted on and confirmed by the Senate in June, 1834.

The memorialist prays that an act of Congress may be passed, allowing her a sum which shall be equal to the difference between the pay and emoluments of a captain and those of a first lieutenant from

the said 11th of August, 1830, and the 4th of February, 1833, which her husband would have received had the nominations repeatedly made, year by year, as aforesaid, been confirmed before his death. She adds, "Captain Patrick had most strictly complied with all the requisitions made by law to entitle him to this sum; and, small as is the amount, *it is all* that nearly twenty years of devoted service to his country enabled him to leave his widow."

The material facts above stated are proved by evidence derived from the Department of War. Under the laws of 1812 and 1818, providing for brevet rank, as understood and administered at the department, an officer became entitled to the pay and emoluments of his *brevet* rank from the date of his commission, provided he exercised a command equal to such rank; and for the obvious reason that he became subject to all the responsibilities and expenses attached to it. It often happened that a considerable time elapsed between the accruing of this right to rank and the confirmation by the Senate of the nomination for it, by the President. Yet if, in the interval, the officer held a command corresponding to his advanced rank, he was allowed by military usage the pay and emoluments belonging to it, though he would not receive them until his rights were fully established and perfected by the action of the Senate. A brief and clear statement of the case of this deceased officer, from the Adjutant General's office, will show what were his rights, and it is annexed as a part of this report.

In the present case the President, as above stated, had, from time to time, made the nominations for *brevet* promotions, among which was that of Captain Patrick; and, but for the omission of the Senate to act until June, 1834, his right would doubtless have been secured to him. But while in the active and vigorous discharge of duty his death intervened, and left his widow to assert them before Congress, on the ground of clear equity, on her own behalf. And the committee believe her claim to be just, and report a bill for her relief.

Statement in the case of the late Captain M. A. Patrick, of the 1st artillery, whose widow advances a claim, and in answer to the Hon. Mr. Grennell's inquiry of the 4th instant.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, Washington, January 6, 1838.

It appears, from the records of the Adjutant General's office, that the late Captain M. A. Patrick, of the 1st regiment of artillery, was appointed a first lieutenant on the 11th of August, 1820; under the law, and according to usage, he was entitled to the *brevet* of captain, for "ten years'" service in one grade, on the 11th of August, 1830. It appears that he was in command of company A, of his regiment, from August 11, 1830, until the end of that year; that in 1831 he commanded the same company eight months and twelve days; in 1832, ten months; and in 1833, until the 4th of February, when he was promoted to the *full* rank of captain.

Captain Patrick, with the other officers entitled at the same time to an advanced grade by *brevet*, was duly and repeatedly nominated by the President, but the Senate declined to act upon the same; he died on the 6th of March, 1834, prior to the final action of that body, otherwise he would, on the 30th of June, 1834, with many other officers of like claims, have received the *brevet* promotion which had been due him since August 11, 1830. If, therefore, Captain Patrick had lived, he would have been entitled (prior to his promotion as a *full* captain) to the difference of pay between the grade of lieutenant and that of a captain by *brevet* while commanding a company.

Respectfully submitted.

R. JONES, *Adjutant General*.

Major General ALEXANDER MACOMB, *Commanding-in-chief, Washington*.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 778.

[2D SESSION.]

ARMY REGISTER FOR 1838.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE FEBRUARY 6, 1838.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, February 2, 1838.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit a communication from the adjutant general, with sixty copies of the official Army Register for the members of the Senate, in compliance with the resolution of February 1, 1830.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Hon. R. M. JOHNSON, *President of the Senate*.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, Washington, January 31, 1838.

SIR: I herewith respectfully present to you sixty copies of the official Army Register for 1838, required to be furnished by the Secretary of War for the use of the members of the Senate of the United States, as enjoined by a resolution of that body dated December 13, 1815.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, *Adjutant General*.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War*.

Register of the army of the United States for 1838.

GENERAL AND STAFF OFFICERS.

Names and rank.	Date of commission.	Brevet and staff appointments.	Remarks.
Alexander Macomb, maj. gen.	May 24, 1828	-----	-----
Edmund P. Gaines, brig. general	March 9, 1814	Maj. gen. bvt., Aug. 15, 1814	-----
Winfield Scott.....do	-----do	Maj. gen. bvt., July 25, 1814	-----
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.			
Roger Jones, colonel	March 7, 1825	Brig. gen. by brevet, June 7, 1832.	-----
INSPECTOR GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.			
John E. Wool, colonel	April 29, 1816	Brig. general by bvt., April 29, 1826.	-----
George Croghan.....do	Dec. 21, 1825	-----	-----
QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.			
Thomas S. Jesup, brig. general.	May 8, 1818	Major general by brevet, May 8, 1828.	-----
Henry Stanton, major	May 13, 1820	Lieut. col. by brevet, May 13, 1830.	-----
Trueman Cross.....do	May 22, 1826	-----	-----
Joshua B. Brant.....do	Dec. 28, 1832	-----	-----
Henry Whiting.....do	Sept. 23, 1835	Major bvt., March 17, 1824	-----
<i>(20 assistant quartermasters taken from the line.—See regiments.)</i>			
SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT.			
George Gibson, colonel	April 18, 1818	Brig. gen. by brevet, April 29, 1826.	-----
James H. Hook, quartermaster.	March 10, 1829	Major by bvt., May 20, 1823.	-----
Capt Jos. P. Taylor, ass. q. m.	-----do	-----	-----
<i>(Assistant commissaries. Number not limited.)</i>			

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT.

Charles Gratiot, colonel of the corps of engineers, brevet brigadier general, chief engineer.

TOPOGRAPHICAL DEPARTMENT.

John J. Abert, topographical engineer, brevet lieutenant colonel in charge of the topographical bureau.

PAY AND MEDICAL DEPARTMENTS.

No.	Names.	Rank.	Date of commission.	Brevets and former commissions.	Remarks.
PAY DEPARTMENT.					
1	Nathan Towson	Paymaster general.	May 8, 1822	Brig. gen. bvt., June 30, '34.	Washington.
1	Benjamin F. Larned	Paymaster	Nov. 24, 1815	Capt. bvt., Aug. 15, 1814	Tampa, Florida.
2	David S. Townsend	do	April 29, 1816	Maj. bvt., July 27, 1814	Boston, Massachusetts.
3	Daniel Randall	do	July 21, 1818	A. D. P., June 8, 1814	Philadelphia.
4	Charles H. Smith	do	Nov. 24, 1819	-----	Norfolk, Va.
5	A. A. Massias	do	Dec. 12, 1820	Captain, July 1, 1809	St. Louis, Missouri.
6	T. P. Andrews	do	May 22, 1822	-----	Washington.
7	Edmund Kirby	do	Aug. 5, 1824	Captain, May 1, 1824	Brownsville, N. Y.
8	L. G. De Russy	do	Sept. 21, 1826	Captain, Dec. 11, 1825	Natchitoches, La.
9	Robert A. Forsyth	do	Sept. 10, 1831	-----	Detroit.
10	Adam D. Steuart	do	Jan. 14, 1833	-----	-----
11	John S. Lytle	do	Feb. 27, 1834	-----	Charleston, S. C.
12	Charles Mapes	do	Jan. 7, 1835	-----	Tallahassee.
13	Peter Muhlenberg	do	Feb. 2, 1835	Major, May 1, 1814	Augusta, Ga.
14	Elbert Herring	do	July 4, 1836	-----	New York.
15	Wharton Rector	do	Aug. 15, 1836	-----	Little Rock, Arkansas.
16	Christopher Andrews	do	Oct. 24, 1836	-----	St. Augustine.
17	Donald Fraser	do	Oct. 29, 1836	Major bvt., Sept. 17, 1814.	Tampa, Florida.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.					
1	Thomas Lawson	Surgeon general	Nov. 30, 1836	-----	Washington.
1	Thomas G. Mower	Surgeon	June 30, 1814	-----	New York.
2	B. F. Harney	do	Aug. 17, 1814	-----	Baton Rouge.
3	W. V. Wheaton	do	Sept. 4, 1816	-----	West Point.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT—Continued.

No.	Names.	Rank.	Date of commission.	Brevets and former commissions.	Remarks.
MEDICAL DEP'T—Continued.					
4	William Beaumont.....	Surgeon.....	Nov. 26, 1827	-----	St. Louis.
5	Lyman Foot.....	do.....	March 5, 1831	-----	Fort Winnebago.
6	Clement A. Finlay.....	do.....	July 13, 1832	-----	Florida.
7	Prestley H. Craig.....	do.....	do.....	-----	Fort Jesup.
8	Richard S. Satterlee.....	do.....	do.....	-----	Florida.
9	Samuel G. I. De Camp.....	do.....	Dec. 1, 1833	-----	Do.
10	Edward Macomb.....	do.....	Nov. 1, 1834	-----	Fort Leavenworth.
11	Hamilton S. Hawkins.....	do.....	July 4, 1836	-----	New Orleans
12	Alfred W. Elwes.....	do.....	do.....	-----	Fort Crawford.
13	Robert C. Wood.....	do.....	do.....	-----	Florida.
14	Henry A. Stinnecke.....	do.....	Dec 31, 1836	-----	Do.
15	W. L. Wharton.....	do.....	July 22, 1837	-----	Fort Gibson.
1	James H. Sargent.....	Assistant surgeon.....	June 1, 1821	P. S., April 24, 1816.....	Fort Constitution.
2	T. I. C. Monroe.....	do.....	do.....	P. S., April 29, 1816.....	Fort Wood, N. Y.
3	Sylvester Day.....	do.....	do.....	P. S., April 18, 1818.....	Allegheny arsenal.
4	Joseph Eaton.....	do.....	do.....	do.....	Fort Hamilton.
5	Joseph P. Russell.....	do.....	do.....	P. S., August 10, 1818.....	Florida.
6	Richard Weightman.....	do.....	do.....	P. S., August 21, 1818.....	Do.
7	Benjamin King.....	do.....	do.....	S. M., October 14, 1818.....	Washington, D. C.
8	John A. Breton.....	do.....	July 1, 1821	-----	"
9	Lawrence Sprague.....	do.....	June 22, 1825	-----	Hancock barracks.
10	Joel Martin.....	do.....	Aug. 15, 1825	-----	Cherokee Nation.
11	Robert Archer.....	do.....	Aug 5, 1826	-----	Fort Monroe.
12	Charles S. Tripler.....	do.....	Oct 30, 1830	-----	Florida.
13	Edward Worrell.....	do.....	Feb. 24, 1832	-----	Fort Howard
14	Philip Maxwell.....	do.....	July 13, 1832	-----	Florida.
15	Henry L. Heiskell.....	do.....	do.....	-----	
16	Charles McDougall.....	do.....	do.....	-----	Fort Brady.
17	Burton Randall.....	do.....	Oct 24, 1832	-----	
18	Nathan S. Jarvis.....	do.....	March 2, 1833	-----	Florida.
19	Richard Clark.....	do.....	do.....	-----	Do
20	Adam N. McLaren.....	do.....	do.....	-----	Do.
21	Benjamin F. Fellowes.....	do.....	do.....	-----	
22	George F. Turner.....	do.....	July 23, 1833	-----	Florida
23	M. C. Leavenworth.....	do.....	Sept. 1, 1833	-----	Camp Sabine.
24	J. J. B. Wright.....	do.....	Oct. 25, 1833	-----	Fort Snelling.
25	Willison Hughey.....	do.....	do.....	-----	
26	John B. Porter.....	do.....	Dec. 1, 1833	-----	
27	John Emerson.....	do.....	do.....	-----	Fort Jesup.
28	Henry Holt.....	do.....	Dec. 31, 1833	-----	Florida
29	Thomas Henderson.....	do.....	do.....	-----	Do
30	John B. Wells.....	do.....	Feb 1, 1834	-----	Fort Towson.
31	John M. Cuyler.....	do.....	April 1, 1834	-----	Fort Pike.
32	Madison M. Mills.....	do.....	do.....	-----	Fort Gibson
33	William Hammond.....	do.....	June 1, 1834	-----	Fort Coffee.
34	George R. Clarke.....	do.....	Nov. 1, 1834	-----	Florida.
35	Joseph H. Bailey.....	do.....	Nov. 28, 1834	-----	Fort Gibson.
36	Leonard C. McPhail.....	do.....	Nov. 30, 1834	-----	Florida.
37	Lewis A. Birdsall.....	do.....	Dec. 29, 1834	-----	Fort Jesup.
38	Samuel P. Moore.....	do.....	Mar. 14, 1835	-----	Fort Gibson.
39	Alex. F. Suter.....	do.....	Mar. 27, 1835	-----	Florida.
40	John C. Reynolds.....	do.....	May 1, 1835	-----	
41	Chas. M. Hitchcock.....	do.....	Aug. 17, 1835	-----	Cherokee Nation.
42	Wm. W. Hoxton.....	do.....	Aug. 24, 1835	-----	West Point.
43	Erastus B. Wolcott.....	do.....	Jan. 1, 1836	-----	Fort Snelling.
44	Wm. Maffit.....	do.....	do.....	-----	Florida.
45	Thomas Lee.....	do.....	do.....	-----	Do.
46	Bernard M. Byrne.....	do.....	May 20, 1836	-----	Do.
47	Eugene H. Abadie.....	do.....	July 4, 1836	-----	Do.
48	I. Rhett Motte.....	do.....	do.....	-----	Do.
49	Robert Southgate.....	do.....	Aug 30, 1836	-----	Fort Towson:
50	Isaac H. Baldwin.....	do.....	do.....	-----	
51	Samuel Forry.....	do.....	do.....	-----	Florida.
52	Charles McCormick.....	do.....	do.....	-----	Do.
53	Wade Sullivan.....	do.....	Nov. 21, 1836	-----	Do.
54	Charles H. Laub.....	do.....	Nov 30, 1836	-----	Do.
55	Silas B. Arnold.....	do.....	July 1, 1837	-----	Do.
56	Josiah Simpson.....	do.....	July 11, 1837	-----	D. J.
57	William J. Sloan.....	do.....	July 12, 1837	-----	Do.
58	William S. King.....	do.....	July 29, 1837	-----	Do.
59	Francis L. Sewall.....	do.....	Oct. 13, 1837	-----	Do.
PURCHASING DEPARTMENT					
1	Callender Irvine.....	Commissary general of purchases.	Aug. 8, 1812	-----	Philadelphia.
1	Edward S. Fayssoux.....	Storekeeper	Aug. 24, 1833	-----	Philadelphia.
2	J. W. Kingsbury.....	do.....	Oct. 17, 1837	-----	St. Louis.

CORPS OF ENGINEERS.

No.	Names and rank.	Date of commission.	Brevets and former commissions.
COLONEL.			
1	Charles Gratiot	May 24, 1828	Brig. gen. bvt., May 24, 1828.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL.			
1	Joseph G. Totten	May 24, 1828	Col. brevet, September 11, 1824.
MAJORS.			
1	Sylvanus Thayer	May 24, 1828	Lieut. col. bvt., March 3, 1823.
2	R. E. De Russy	December 22, 1830	Lieut. col. bvt., June 30, 1834. Supt. Mil. Academy.
CAPTAINS.			
1	John L. Smith	August 29, 1820	Major brevet, August 29, 1830.
2	William H. Chase	January 1, 1825	
3	Richard Delafield	May 24, 1828	
4	William A. Eliason	March 5, 1832	
5	Cornelius A. Ogden	May 15, 1835	Brevet, June 30, 1834.
6	Henry Brewerton	September 21, 1836	
FIRST LIEUTENANTS			
1	Thomas J. Leslie	March 31, 1819	Paymaster, Mil. Acad.; capt. bvt., March 31, 1829.
2	George Dutton	December 22, 1830	
3	Joseph K. F. Mansfield	March 5, 1832	
4	Alexander H. Bowman	January 21, 1835	
5	Robert E. Lee	September 21, 1836	
6	Alexander J. Swift	October 31, 1836	
SECOND LIEUTENANTS.			
1	Fred. A. Smith	Jan. 21, 1835	Brevet, July 1, 1833. Engineer office.
2	Jon. G. Barnard	May 15, 1835	Brevet, July 1, 1833.
3	Geo. W. Cullum	April 20, 1836	Brevet, July 1, 1833.
4	William Smith	September 21, 1836	Brevet, July 1, 1834.
5	John Sanders	September 30, 1836	Brevet, July 1, 1834.
6	C. H. Bigelow	June 30, 1837	Brevet, July 1, 1835.
BREVET SECOND LIEUTENANTS.			
1	G. L. Welcker	July 1, 1836	
2	James L. Mason	do	
3	H. W. Benham	July 1, 1837	
4	D. Leadbetter	July 1, 1836	
5	M. C. Meigs	do	
6	D. P. Woodbury	do	

TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEERS

MAJORS, BREVET.			
1	John J. Abert	November 22, 1814	Lieutenant colonel brevet, November 22, 1824.
2	James Kearney	April 29, 1816	Lieutenant colonel brevet, April 29, 1826.
3	Stephen H. Long	do	Lieutenant colonel brevet, April 29, 1826.
4	Hartman Bache	August 1, 1832	Brevet, July 24, 1828.
5	James D. Graham	September 14, 1834	
6	Wm. Turnbull	November 23, 1837	
<i>Assistant Topographical Engineers.</i>			
CAPTAINS, BREVET.			
1	William H. Swift	August 1, 1832	
2	W. G. Williams	January 28, 1834	
3	A. Canfield	September 14, 1834	
4	C. Graham	November 23, 1837	Brevet, December 31, 1835.

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

COLONEL.			
1	George Bomford	May 30, 1832	Brevet, February 9, 1825.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL.			
1	George Talcott	do	Inspector of arsenals and armories.
MAJORS.			
1	Henry K. Craig	do	Brevet, Dec. 23, 1823; inspector of small arms.
2	William J. Worth	do	Lieut. col. bvt., July 25, 1824.
CAPTAINS.			
1	Rufus L. Baker	do	Major brevet, May 21, 1827.
2	James W. Ripley	do	Captain, August 1, 1825.
3	John Symington	do	Brevet, May 17, 1830.
4	William H. Bell	do	
5	Edward Harding	do	
6	Alfred Mordecai	do	
7	Benjamin Huger	do	
8	James A. J. Bradford	do	
9	G. D. Ramsay	Feb. 25, 1835	
10	J. A. d' Lagnel	Nov. 1, 1836	

FIRST REGIMENT OF DRAGOONS.

No.	Names and rank.	Date of commission.	Brevets and former commissions.	No.	Names and rank.	Date of commission.	Brevets and former commissions.
	COLONEL.			2	Enoch Steen.....	March 5, 1836	
1	S. W. Kearney.....	July 4, 1836		3	B. A. Terrett.....	Mar. 31, 1836	
	LIUTENANT COLONEL.			4	Wm. Eustis.....	June 15, 1836	
1	Richard B. Mason.....	do.....		5	L. B. Northrop.....	July 4, 1836	
	MAJOR.			6	James M. Bowman..	Oct. 15, 1836	
1	Clifton Wharton.....	do.....		7	Asbury Ury.....	Mar. 3, 1837	
	CAPTAINS			8	H. S. Turner.....	do.....	Adjutant.
1	Edw. V. Sumner.....	March 4, 1833		9	A. R. Johnston.....	June 15, 1837	
2	Enstace Trenor.....	do.....		10	P. R. Thompson.....	June 30, 1837	
3	Nathan Boone.....	Aug. 15, 1833		11	B. S. Roberts.....	July 31, 1837	
4	David Perkins.....	Nov. 4, 1833			SECOND LIEUTENANTS.		
5	P. St. G. Cooke.....	May 31, 1835		1	Wm. N. Grier.....	June 15, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1835.
6	I. P. Simonton.....	July 4, 1836	A. Q. M.	2	Richard West.....	Jan. 25, 1837	
7	Thomas Swords.....	March 3, 1837		3	Fayette Robinson..	do.....	
8	Benj. D. Moore.....	June 15, 1837		4	Philip Kearny.....	Mar. 8, 1837	
9	James Allen.....	June 30, 1837		5	R. G. Stockton.....	May 13, 1837	
10	J. H. K. Burgwin.....	July 31, 1837		6	L. P. Davidson.....	July 1, 1837	
	FIRST LIEUTENANTS.			7	R. H. Chilton.....	do.....	
1	J. S. Van Derveer...	Aug. 15, 1835		8	Thomas McCrate.....	Aug. 1, 1837	
				9	W. Bowman.....	do.....	
				10	D. H. Rucker.....	Oct. 13, 1837	

SECOND REGIMENT OF DRAGOONS.

No.	Names and rank.	Date of commission.	Brevets and former commissions.	No.	Names and rank.	Date of commission.	Brevets and former commissions.
	COLONEL.				FIRST LIEUTENANTS.		
1	D. E. Twiggs.....	June 8, 1836		1	E. D. Bullock.....	June 11, 1836	
	LIUTENANT COLONEL.			2	M. S. Howe.....	do.....	
1	W. S. Harney.....	Aug. 15, 1836		3	G. A. H. Blake.....	do.....	
	MAJOR.			4	A. S. Macomb.....	Oct. 6, 1836	Aide-de-camp to Maj. Gen. Macomb.
1	T. T. Fauntleroy....	June 8, 1836		5	Croghan Ker.....	do.....	
	CAPTAINS.			6	Wm. Gilpin.....	Oct. 19, 1836	
1	James A. Ashby.....	do.....	Maj. bvt., July 19, 1836.	7	J. H. P. O'Neale...	Oct. 1, 1837	
2	W. W. Tompkins.....	do.....		8	Z. M. P. Maury.....	do.....	
3	H. W. Fowler.....	do.....		9	S. B. Thornton.....	Nov. 26, 1837	
4	B. L. Beall.....	do.....		10	C. A. May.....	Dec. 15, 1837	
5	Ed. S. Winder.....	do.....			SECOND LIEUTENANTS.		
6	W. M. Fulton.....	Oct. 6, 1836		1	N. W. Hunter.....	Oct. 6, 1836	
7	L. J. Beall.....	Oct. 19, 1836		2	R. B. Lawton.....	Oct. 12, 1836	
8	T. S. Bryant.....	Sept. 26, 1837		3	N. Darling.....	Nov. 23, 1836	
9	John Graham.....	Oct. 1, 1837		4	W. Hardia.....	July 1, 1837	
10	T. Dade.....	do.....		5	F. Saunders.....	Sept. 11, 1837	Bvt., July 1, 1837.
				6	L. P. Graham.....	Oct. 13, 1837	
				7	L. S. Craig.....	Oct. 14, 1837	
				8	J. R. Parker.....	do.....	
				9	W. D. Berrien.....	Oct. 16, 1837	

FIRST REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY.

No.	Names and rank.	Date of commission.	Brevets and former commissions.	No.	Names and rank.	Date of commission.	Brevets and former commissions.
	COLONEL.			7	D. D. Tompkins.....	Dec. 31, 1835	
1	A. Eustis.....	Nov. 17, 1834	Brig. gen. bvt., June 30, 1834.	8	L. B. Webster.....	Sept. 30, 1836	
	LIUTENANT COLONEL.			9	George Nauman.....	Feb. 4, 1837	
1	J. B. Walbach.....	May 30, 1832	Col. bvt., May 1, 1825.		FIRST LIEUTENANTS.		
	MAJOR.			1	Timothy Green.....	April 20, 1818	Capt. bvt., April 20, 1828.
1	B. K. Pierce.....	June 11, 1836	Lieut. col. bvt., Aug. 21, 1836.	2	Francis Taylor.....	Jan. 31, 1833	
	CAPTAINS.			3	James R. Irwin.....	May 31, 1833	Adjutant.
1	F. Whiting.....	Sept. 10, 1819	Maj. bvt., Sept. 10, 1829.	4	John Williamson...	Sept. 30, 1833	
2	H. Saunders.....	Nov. 4, 1823	Maj. bvt., Nov. 4, 1833.	5	John H. Winder.....	Nov. 30, 1833	
3	R. M. Kirby.....	Aug. 5, 1824	Maj. bvt., Sept. 17, 1824.	6	Eben. S. Sibley.....	Mar. 6, 1834	
4	Giles Porter.....	Sept. 30, 1833	Brevet, Feb. 1, 1833.	7	William Maynadier..	May 31, 1834	Ordnance.
5	D. Van Ness.....	Oct. 23, 1834	Brevet, Nov. 4, 1833.	8	Miner Knowlton....	July 23, 1835	Mil. Academy.
6	Justin Dimick.....	April 6, 1835	Brevet, May 1, 1834.	9	James H. Prentiss...	Feb. 29, 1836	
				10	J. B. Magruder.....	Mar. 31, 1836	
				11	J. W. Bailey.....	Aug. 6, 1836	Mil. Academy.
				12	Geo. Watson.....	Sept. 30, 1836	
				13	E. A. Capron.....	Nov. 19, 1836	
				14	David E. Hale.....	Nov. 30, 1836	
				15	John F. Lee.....	Dec. 17, 1836	Ordnance.
				16	C. B. Chalmers.....	Feb. 4, 1837	
				17	L. A. B. Walbach....	May 19, 1837	Ordnance.
				18	Wm. H. Betts.....	Nov. 30, 1837	

FIRST REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY—Continued.

No.	Names and rank.	Date of commission.	Brevets and former commissions.	No.	Names and rank.	Date of commission.	Brevets and former commissions.
SECOND LIEUTENANTS.				8	J. L. Donaldson ^c	July 1, 1836	
1	G. G. Waggaman.....	Mar. 31, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1835. Mil. Academy.	9	W. W. Mackall.....	July 1, 1837	
2	F. A. Lewis.....	July 1, 1836		10	Israel Vogdes.....	do.....	Mil. Academy.
3	W. H. Warner.....	do.....		11	Bennett H. Hill.....	do.....	
4	P. V. Hagner.....	Aug. 6, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1836.	12	W. H. French.....	do.....	
5	M. J. Burke.....	Aug. 31, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1836.	13	Joseph Hooker.....	do.....	
6	J. S. Hatheway.....	do.....	Bvt., July 1, 1836.	14	Arthur M. Rutledge.....	do.....	
7	W. E. Aisquith.....	March 8, 1837		15	W. H. Fowler.....	do.....	
				16	R. M. McLane.....	do.....	

SECOND REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY.

COLONEL.				2	J. A. Chambers.....	Jan. 28, 1832	Bvt., July 1, 1830. A. Q. M.
1	Wm. Lindsay.....	April 26, 1832	Bvt., March 12, 1823.	3	C. F. Smith.....	May 30, 1832	Mil. Academy.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL.				4	M. M. Clark.....	Dec. 31, 1833	A. Q. M.
1	Ichabod B. Crane.....	Nov. 3, 1832	Bvt., Nov. 13, 1823.	5	John B. Grayson.....	April 30, 1834	
MAJOR.				6	John Mackay.....	Dec. 31, 1834	Adjutant.
1	M. M. Payne.....	Dec. 17, 1836	Bvt., March 2, 1824.	7	John C. Casey.....	April 30, 1835	
CAPTAINS.				8	Thos. B. Linnard.....	Dec. 28, 1835	
1	Frs. S. Belton.....	July 31, 1817		9	R. H. K. Whiteley.....	do.....	
2	R. A. Zantzingher.....	Dec. 12, 1818	Maj. bvt., Aug. 15, 1824.	10	R. H. Peyton.....	June 28, 1836	
3	J. Mountfort.....	Aug. 11, 1819	Maj. bvt., Sept. 11, 1824.	11	Edmund Schriver.....	Nov. 1, 1836	Adj. Gen. office.
4	Jo. P. Taylor.....	July 6, 1825	Commissary.	12	James Duncan.....	Nov. 30, 1836	
5	Gus. S. Drane.....	May 30, 1832	Bvt., Nov. 15, 1827.	13	T. P. Ridgeley.....	Dec. 31, 1836	
6	C. S. Merchant.....	Nov. 17, 1834	Bvt., April 20, 1828.	14	Horace Brooks.....	Feb. 8, 1837	Mil. Academy.
7	Allen Lowd.....	Nov. 30, 1836	Bvt., April 20, 1828.	15	James M. Morgan.....	May 31, 1837	
8	S. McKenzie.....	Feb. 8, 1837		16	Henry L. Kendrick.....	June 20, 1837	Mil. Academy.
9	James Green.....	June 20, 1837		17	Samuel J. Bransford.....	Dec. 14, 1837	
FIRST LIEUTENANTS.				18	Bars. Conkling.....	Dec. 31, 1837	
1	Wm. C. DeHart.....	Oct. 10, 1831,	Bvt., July 1, 1830. Aide-de-camp to Bvt. Major Gen- eral Scott.	SECOND LIEUTENANTS.			
				1	Roland A. Luther.....	July 1, 1836	
				2	John F. Roland.....	July 4, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1836.
				3	M. L. Shackelford.....	July 31, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1836.
				4	Robert Allen.....	Aug. 16, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1836.
				5	Chas. B. Daniels.....	Sept. 11, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1836.
				6	John W. Gunnison.....	July 1, 1837	
				7	Edwin W. Morgan.....	do.....	
				8	Wm. W. Chapman.....	do.....	
				9	Lewis G. Arnold.....	do.....	
				10	Frs. Woodbridge.....	do.....	
				11	Ed. W. Townsend.....	do.....	
				12	Henry C. Pratt.....	do.....	
				13	John Sedgwick.....	do.....	
				14	Wm. Armstrong.....	do.....	
				15	Arnold E. Jones.....	do.....	

THIRD REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY.

COLONEL.				8	R. B. Lee.....	Aug. 31, 1836	Maj. bvt., June 9, 1836. Ord.
1	W. K. Armistead.....	Nov. 12, 1818	Brig. gen. bvt., Nov. 12, 1823.	9	Samuel Ringgold.....	do.....	Bvt. May 8, 1832.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL.				FIRST LIEUTENANTS.			
1	W. Gates.....	Dec. 17, 1836		1	W. B. Davidson.....	Jan. 1, 1825	
MAJOR.				2	D. H. Vinton.....	April 7, 1825	A. Q. M.
1	Sylvester Churchill.....	April 6, 1835	Bvt., Aug. 15, 1823.	3	John L'Engle.....	Dec. 11, 1825	A. Q. M.
CAPTAINS.				4	H. Garner.....	Feb. 26, 1827	
1	M. P. Lomax.....	Nov. 17, 1814	Maj. bvt., Nov. 17, 1824.	5	Martin Burk.....	May 1, 1828	Ordnance.
2	Aeneas Mackay.....	Dec. 31, 1822	Maj. bvt., Dec. 31, 1832. A. Q. M.	6	R. D. A. Wade.....	Sept. 10, 1828	
3	W. L. McClintock.....	Aug. 11, 1823	Maj. bvt., Aug. 11, 1833.	7	Robert Anderson.....	June 30, 1833	
4	Thomas Childs.....	Oct. 1, 1826	Maj. bvt., Aug. 21, 1836.	8	Albert E. Church.....	Jan. 13, 1836	Mil. Academy.
5	Elijah Lyon.....	Feb. 20, 1827	Bvt., Jan. 1, 1827.	9	Robert E. Temple.....	June 22, 1836	Ordnance.
6	T. W. Lendrum.....	Dec. 31, 1828	C. G. S. office.	10	Benj. Poole.....	Aug. 31, 1836	
7	J. R. Vinton.....	Dec. 28, 1835	Bvt., Sept. 30, 1829.	11	Geo. H. Talcott.....	Sept. 15, 1836	Ordnance.
				12	Eras. D. Keyes.....	Sept. 16, 1836	Aide-de-camp to Bvt. Maj. Gen. Scott.
				13	William Wall.....	Mar. 16, 1837	
				14	James H. Simpson.....	April 30, 1837	
				15	R. W. Lee.....	May 18, 1837	
				16	John A. Thomas.....	June 30, 1837	Mil. Academy.
				17	M. S. Miller.....	Aug. 19, 1837	Ordnance.
				18	Augustus P. Allen.....	Nov. 23, 1837	

NOTE.—This mark * affixed to any officer's name denotes a voluntary transfer, which is the cause of his anomalous regimental position.

THIRD REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY—Continued.

No.	Names and rank.	Date of commission.	Brevets and former commissions.	No.	Names and rank.	Date of commission.	Brevets and former commissions.
SECOND LIEUTENANTS.				7	Alex. P. Dyer -----	July 1, 1837	
1	T. W. Sherman -----	July 1, 1836		8	Robert T. Jones -----	do -----	
2	C. Q. Tompkins -----	Aug. 31, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1836.	9	Jubal A. Early -----	do -----	
3	Israel C. Woodruff -----	do -----	Bvt., July 1, 1836. Mil. Academy.	10	George Taylor -----	do -----	
4	Wm. Frazer -----	do -----	Bvt., July 1, 1836.	11	George C. Rodney -----	do -----	
5	Wm. Mock -----	do -----	Bvt., July 1, 1836.	12	Ed. J. Steptoe -----	do -----	
6	Braxton Bragg -----	July 1, 1837	Adjutant.	13	R. Ridgely -----	do -----	
				14	F. O. Wise -----	July 31, 1837	Bvt., July 1, 1837.

FOURTH REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY.

COLONEL.				6	F. L. Jones -----	Jan. 31, 1832	
1	J. R. Fenwick -----	May 8, 1822	Brig. gen. bvt., Mar. 18, 1823.	7	W. P. Bainbridge -----	May 30, 1832	
LIEUTENANT COLONEL.				8	R. C. Smead -----	Sept. 30, 1832	
1	J. Bankhead -----	April 26, 1832	Bvt., Aug. 15, 1823.	9	W. A. Thornton -----	Jan. 31, 1835	Ordnance.
MAJOR.				10	D. H. Tufts -----	June 10, 1836	
1	A. C. W. Fanning -----	Nov. 3, 1832	Lt. col., Aug. 15, 1824.	11	Charles O. Collins -----	June 11, 1836	A. Q. M.
CAPTAINS.				12	Frank E. Hunt -----	Aug. 15, 1836	
1	John Erving -----	April 25, 1818	Maj. bvt., April 25, 1823.	13	Simon H. Drum -----	Aug. 31, 1836	
2	L. Whiting -----	May 21, 1822	Maj. bvt., May 21, 1832.	14	S. C. Ridgeley -----	Sept. 16, 1836	M. Academy.
3	J. L. Gardner -----	Nov. 1, 1823	Maj. bvt., Nov. 1, 1833.	15	John N. Macomb -----	Oct. 15, 1836	Aide-de-camp to Maj. Gen Ma- comb.
4	John Munroe -----	March 2, 1825	Brevet, Sept 26, 1828.	16	Edward Deas -----	Oct. 24, 1836	
5	Patrick H. Galt -----	May 15, 1829	Brevet, May 23, 1830.	17	John H. Miller -----	Dec. 17, 1836	
6	J. M. Washington -----	May 30, 1832	Brevet, Aug. 23, 1831.	18	A. E. Shiras -----	May 31, 1837	
7	Harvey Brown -----	April 10, 1835	Brevet, July 6, 1831.	SECOND LIEUTENANTS.			
8	Samuel Cooper -----	June 11, 1836		1	Wm. G. Freeman -----	June 8, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1834.
9	W. W. Morris -----	Dec. 17, 1836		2	Joseph Roberts -----	June 10, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1835. Mil. Academy.
FIRST LIEUTENANTS.				3	James H. Stokes -----	June 11, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1835.
1	S. B. Dusenbery -----	March 1, 1825	A. Q. M.	4	John P. J. O'Brien -----	July 1, 1836	
2	Edw. C. Ross -----	Nov. 27, 1826		5	John W. Phelps -----	July 28, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1836.
3	John B. Scott -----	July 31, 1827	Ordnance.	6	George O. Thomas -----	Aug. 15, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1836.
4	John Pickell -----	May 28, 1831	Adjutant.	7	R. A. Wainwright -----	Oct. 22, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1835. Mil. Academy.
5	F. Searle -----	Aug. 20, 1831		8	Thomas L. Brent -----	Nov. 1, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1835.
				9	E. P. Scammon -----	July 1, 1837	Mil. Academy.
				10	Thomas Williams -----	do -----	
				11	A. P. Gregory -----	do -----	
				12	Wm. T. Martin -----	do -----	
				13	Edmund Bradford -----	do -----	
				14	Joshua H. Bates -----	do -----	
				15	J. C. Pemberton -----	do -----	
				16	C. F. Wooster -----	do -----	
				17	J. R. Soley -----	Aug. 31, 1837	Bvt., July 1, 1837.

FIRST REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

COLONEL.				FIRST LIEUTENANTS.			
1	Z. Taylor -----	April 4, 1832	Brevet, April 20, 1829.	1	O. Cross -----	Dec. 31, 1831	A. Q. M.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL.				2	Joseph H. Lamotte -----	July 11, 1833	
1	Wm. Davenport -----	April 4, 1832		3	E. G. Mitchell -----	Oct. 25, 1835	
MAJOR.				4	J. R. B. Gardinier -----	Sept. 4, 1836	
1	John Garland -----	Oct. 30, 1836	Brevet, May 7, 1827.	5	Sid. Burbank -----	Oct. 29, 1836	M. Academy.
CAPTAINS.				6	Seth Eastman -----	Nov. 14, 1836	M. Academy.
1	G. Loomis -----	April 7, 1819	Maj. bvt., April 7, 1829.	7	E. A. Ogden -----	Dec. 17, 1836	
2	E. A. Hitchcock -----	Dec. 31, 1824		8	Tho. M. Hill -----	Oct. 3, 1837	
3	W. R. Jonett -----	May 1, 1829		9	Wm. H. Storer -----	Oct. 17, 1837	
4	Thos. Barker -----	May 31, 1829		10	John Beach -----	Dec. 31, 1837	
5	Sam. McRee -----	Dec. 31, 1831		SECOND LIEUTENANTS.			
6	Wm. Day -----	Oct. 26, 1832		1	Geo. H. Pegram -----	June 11, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1833. Adj.
7	Thos. P. Gwynne -----	Mar. 4, 1833		2	James McClure -----	Sept. 4, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1833.
8	J. J. Abercrombie -----	Sept. 4, 1836		3	P. C. Gaillard -----	Oct. 29, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1835.
9	A. S. Miller -----	Nov. 14, 1836		4	S. M. Plummer -----	Nov. 14, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1835.
10	E. Backus -----	Oct. 17, 1837		5	John M. Scott -----	Nov. 30, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1835.
				6	R. Bennett -----	Jan. 9, 1837	
				7	J. McAlister -----	Sept. 3, 1837	
				8	A. H. Steuart -----	Oct. 14, 1837	
				9	J. H. King -----	Dec. 2, 1837	

SECOND REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

No.	Names and rank.	Date of commission.	Brevets and former commissions.	No.	Names and rank.	Date of commission.	Brevets and former commissions.
	COLONEL.			9	Thompson Morris	Nov. 6, 1836	
1	Hugh Brady	July 6, 1812	Brig. gen. bvt., July 6, 1822.	10	J. J. B. Kingsbury	Feb. 13, 1837	
	LIEUTENANT COLONEL.				FIRST LIEUTENANTS.		
1	A. Cummings	Aug. 20, 1828		1	J. R. Smith	Mar. 22, 1832	Adjutant.
	MAJOR.			2	Hannibal Day	April 4, 1832	
1	N. S. Clarke	July 21, 1834	Bvt., July 25, 1824	3	S. P. Heintzelman	Mar. 4, 1833	
	CAPTAINS.			4	Amos B. Eaton	July 21, 1834	
1	W. V. Cobbs	Mar. 31, 1819	Maj. bvt., March 31, 1829.	5	Silas Casey	June 28, 1836	
2	W. Hoffman	May 1, 1819	Maj. bvt., May 1, 1829.	6	Abner R. Hetzel	do	A. Q. M.
3	G. Dearborn	Sept. 30, 1819	Maj. bvt., Sept. 30, 1829.	7	James W. Penrose	July 3, 1836.	
4	T. Staniford	Mar. 1, 1820	Maj. bvt., Mar. 1, 1830.	8	Edwin B. Long	Nov. 6, 1836	
5	E. K. Barnum	Dec. 28, 1832	Bvt., Dec. 31, 1830.	9	James M. Hill	Dec. 31, 1836	
6	John Bradley	July 21, 1834	Brevet, Oct. 2, 1832.	10	Geo. W. Patten	Feb. 13, 1837	
7	Samuel L. Russell	June 28, 1836			SECOND LIEUTENANTS.		
8	C. A. Waite	July 3, 1836	A. Q. M.	1	J. M. Clendenin	Mar. 4, 1833	Bvt., July 1, 1830.
				2	James V. Bomford	Oct. 6, 1834	Bvt., July 1, 1832.
				3	I. R. D. Burnett	June 28, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1833.
				4	H. W. Wessells	do	Bvt., July 1, 1833.
				5	J. W. Anderson	July 3, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1833.
				6	Thos. Johns	July 31, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1833.
				7	M. R. Patrick	Oct. 31, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1835.
				8	Wm. Alburdis	March 8, 1837	
				9	C. E. Woodruff	do	
				10	J. M. Harvie	July 1, 1837	

THIRD REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

No.	Names and rank.	Date of commission.	Brevets and former commissions.	No.	Names and rank.	Date of commission.	Brevets and former commissions.
	COLONEL.				FIRST LIEUTENANTS.		
1	Jas. B. Many	July 21, 1834	Brevet, June 1, 1831.	1	E. B. Alexander	Dec. 29, 1827	A. Q. M.
	LIEUTENANT COLONEL.			2	E. B. Birdsall	Feb. 17, 1829	
1	Josiah H. Vose	April 23, 1830		3	Joseph Bonnell	July 15, 1831	
	MAJOR.			4	W. R. Montgomery	Aug. 31, 1833	
1	N. Young	Dec. 25, 1837	Bvt., Jan 1, 1829	5	Edw. B. Babbitt	Mar. 31, 1834	A. Q. M.
	CAPTAINS.			6	Nath. C. Macrae	Oct. 31, 1835	
1	J. S. Nelson	Aug. 13, 1819	Maj. bvt., Aug. 13, 1829.	7	Jefferson Van Horne	April 1, 1836	Adjutant.
2	W. G. Belknap	Feb. 1, 1822	Maj. bvt., Feb. 1, 1832.	8	Thomas Cutts	June 15, 1836	
3	John B. Clark	Mar. 18, 1826		9	A. G. Blanchard	Oct. 30, 1836	
4	Andrew Lewis	June 6, 1827		10	Wm. O. Kello	Nov. 15, 1836	
5	Benj. Walker	Aug. 31, 1833			SECOND LIEUTENANTS.		
6	L. N. Morris	Oct. 31, 1833		1	Henry Swartwout	Mar. 31, 1834	Bvt., July 1, 1832. M. Academy.
7	Otis Wheeler	Oct. 31, 1835		2	Geo. P. Field	July 25, 1835	Bvt., July 1, 1834.
8	Hy. Bainbridge	June 15, 1836		3	J. L. Coburn	Oct. 31, 1835	Bvt., July 1, 1834.
9	George Wright	Oct. 30, 1836		4	P. N. Barbour	April 1, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1834.
10	J. W. Cotton	Nov. 15, 1836		5	Wm. S. Henry	June 15, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1835.
				6	Jos. H. Eaton	Oct. 30, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1835.
				7	Larkin Smith	Oct. 31, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1835.
				8	Wilnot Martin	Mar. 8, 1837	
				9	Lucius O'Brien	Sept. 3, 1837	
				10	J. H. Vose, jr.	Dec. 2, 1837	

FOURTH REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

No.	Names and rank.	Date of commission.	Brevets and former commissions.	No.	Names and rank.	Date of commission.	Brevets and former commissions.
	COLONEL.				FIRST LIEUTENANTS.		
1	Enos Cutler	Sept. 21, 1836		1	Chileab S. Howe	Jan. 31, 1836	
	LIEUTENANT COLONEL.			2	R. B. Screven	do	
1	William S. Foster	June 8, 1836	Bvt., Aug. 15, 1824.	3	Rob. C. Buchanan	Mar. 16, 1836	Adjutant.
	MAJOR.			4	Chas. H. Larned	Aug. 7, 1836	
1	B. Riley	Sept. 26, 1837	Brevet, Aug. 6, 1828.	5	Bradford R. Alden	Sept. 13, 1836	M. Academy.
	CAPTAINS.			6	Wm. W. S. Bliss	Sept. 21, 1836	M. Academy.
1	Henry Wilson	April 20, 1819	Maj. bvt., April 20, 1829.	7	Benjamin Alvord	Sept. 23, 1836	M. Academy.
2	Wm. W. Lear	May 1, 1824	Maj. bvt., May 1, 1834. Ordn'ce.	8	J. W. McCrabb	Sept. 30, 1836	A. Q. M.
3	G. W. Allen	Jan. 25, 1829	Bvt., Jan. 1, 1829.	9	John L. Hooper	Nov. 2, 1836	
4	J. Page	April 30, 1831	Bvt., Jan. 1, 1829.	10	Abram C. Myers	Sept. 6, 1837	
5	Wm. M. Graham	April 4, 1832	Maj. bvt., Dec. 31, 1835.		SECOND LIEUTENANTS.		
6	P. Morrison	Sept. 13, 1836		1	H. L. Scott	Jan. 31, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1833.
7	Geo. A. McCall	Sept. 21, 1836		2	I. V. D. Reeve	May 2, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1835.
8	L. Thomas	Sept. 23, 1836	A. Q. M.	3	Henry Prince	June 11, 1836	Bvt., Sept. 18, 1835.
9	R. D. C. Collins	Nov. 2, 1836		4	Stephen T. Tibbatts	Aug. 7, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1835.
10	G. Morris	Sept. 6, 1837		5	Chas. Hoskins	Sept. 13, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1836.
				6	Collinson R. Gates	Sept. 21, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1836.
				7	M. C. M. Hammond	Sept. 23, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1836.
				8	Chas. H. E. Spoor	Sept. 30, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1836.
				9	W. G. Grandin	July 1, 1837	
				10	George Lincoln	Sept. 14, 1837	

FIFTH REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

No.	Names and rank.	Date of commission.	Brevets and former commissions.	No.	Names and rank.	Date of commission.	Brevets and former commissions.
	COLONEL.			9	L. T. Jamison.....	Oct. 31, 1836	
1	Geo. M. Brooke ----	July 15, 1831	Brig. gen. bvt., Sept. 17, 1824.	10	Moses E. Merrill....	June 22, 1837	
	LIEUTENANT COLONEL.				FIRST LIEUTENANTS.		
1	Sul. Burbank	Sept. 21, 1836	Brevet, July 25, 1824.	1	Eph. K. Smith.....	March 4, 1833	
	MAJOR.			2	Alexander S. Hooe...	Oct. 1, 1833	
1	John Green.....	Oct. 31, 1833	Brevet, Sept. 25, 1824.	3	Edgar M. Lacy.....	Nov. 25, 1835	
	CAPTAINS.			4	Isaac Lynde	Feb. 18, 1836	
1	T. F. Hunt.....	May 20, 1820	Maj. bvt., June 16, 1828. A. Q. M.	5	Robert E. Clary.....	April 1, 1836	
2	J. Plympton.....	June 1, 1821	Maj. bvt., June 1, 1831.	6	James L. Thompson..	Oct. 31, 1836	
3	D. Wilcox.....	April 1, 1822	Maj. bvt., April 1, 1832.	7	Caleb Sibley	do.....	
4	M. Scott.....	Aug. 16, 1828		8	C. C. Daveiss	Dec. 31, 1836	
5	G. Lowe.....	Aug. 20, 1828		9	W. Chapman.....	do.....	Adjutant.
6	W. Alexander.....	Feb. 18, 1836		10	R. B. Marcy	June 22, 1837	
7	St. Clair Denny ..	April 1, 1836			SECOND LIEUTENANTS.		
8	Al. Johnston.....	Oct. 31, 1836		1	Daniel Ruggles.....	Feb. 18, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1833.
				2	J. C. Reid.....	April 1, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1833.
				3	Al. H. Tappen	July 31, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1835.
				4	W. M. D. McKissack.	Sept. 11, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1835.
				5	Jos. H. Whipple.....	Oct. 31, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1835.
				6	S. Whitehorne.....	do.....	Bvt., July 1, 1836
				7	Wm. Root.....	Mar. 8, 1837	
				8	D. H. McPhail.....	do.....	
				9	John Connor.....	do.....	
				10	J. T. Sprague.....	July 3, 1837	

SIXTH REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

	COLONEL.			9	Gustavus Dorr	Sept. 26, 1837	
1	Henry Atkinson....	April 15, 1814	Brig gen. bvt., May 13, 1820.	10	J. D. Searight	Dec. 25, 1837	
	LIEUTENANT COLONEL.				FIRST LIEUTENANTS.		
1	John Fowle.....	Dec. 25, 1837		1	William Hoffman....	Nov. 16, 1836	
	MAJOR.			2	Alber'e Cady.....	Dec. 31, 1836	
1	J. M. Glassell.....	Sept. 6, 1837	Bvt., Feb. 10, 1828.	3	T. L. Alexander.....	April 18, 1837	
	CAPTAINS.			4	John Conrad.....	July 31, 1837	
1	I. Clark, jr.....	Aug. 27, 1822	Maj. bvt., Aug. 27, 1832. A. Q. M.	5	Geo. H. Griffin.....	do.....	Aide-de-camp to Bvt. Maj. Gen. Gaines. Adj. Gen.'s office.
2	Jacob Brown.....	April 7, 1825		6	J. E. Blake.....	Sept. 6, 1837	
3	Thos. Noel.....	May 1, 1827		7	J. P. Harrison.....	Oct. 31, 1837	
4	Geo. C. Hutter.....	May 12, 1829		8	W. S. Ketchum.....	Dec. 25, 1837	
5	Levi M. Nute.....	July 31, 1836		9	Samuel Woods.....	do.....	
6	Geo. Andrews.....	Dec. 31, 1836		10	John B. S. Todd.....	do.....	
7	G. H. Crosman.....	April 30, 1837			SECOND LIEUTENANTS.		
8	Joseph S. Worth....	July 31, 1837	A. Q. M.	1	W. H. T. Walker.....	July 31, 1837	Bvt., July 1, 1837.
				2	J. Monroe, jr.....	Aug. 17, 1837	
				3	C. S. Lovell.....	Oct. 13, 1837	
				4	H. W. Wharton.....	Oct. 31, 1837	

SEVENTH REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

	COLONEL.				FIRST LIEUTENANTS.		
1	M. Arbuckle.....	Mar. 16, 1820	Brig. gen. bvt., Mar. 16, 1830.	1	S. W. Moore.....	May 31, 1834	Adjutant.
	LIEUTENANT COLONEL.			2	John P. Davis.....	do.....	A. Q. M.
1	W. Whistler.....	July 21, 1834		3	T. H. Holmes.....	Mar. 26, 1835	
	MAJOR.			4	Richard H. Ross.....	June 1, 1835	
1	J. S. McIntosh.....	Sept. 21, 1836	Brevet, Mar. 8, 1827.	5	Daniel P. Whiting...	June 8, 1836	
	CAPTAINS.			6	Roger S. Dix.....	July 31, 1836	
1	B. L. E. Bonneville.	Oct. 4, 1825		7	Richard C. Gatlin...	Aug. 31, 1836	
2	John Stuart.....	June 30, 1828		8	G. E. Paul.....	Oct. 26, 1836	
3	E. S. Hawkins.....	Nov. 10, 1829		9	S. G. Simmons.....	Jan. 19, 1837	
4	Charles Thomas....	April 30, 1833		10	H. McKavett.....	Dec. 25, 1837	
5	Francis Lee.....	May 31, 1834			SECOND LIEUTENANTS.		
6	J. R. Stephenson...	Dec. 31, 1834		1	F. Britton.....	Nov. 18, 1835	Bvt., July 1, 1834.
7	Jos. A. Phillips....	May 4, 1835		2	A. Montgomery.....	Dec. 3, 1835	Bvt., July 1, 1834.
8	D. S. Miles.....	June 8, 1836		3	W. K. Hanson.....	June 8, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1835.
9	W. Seawell.....	July 31, 1836		4	Jas. M. Wells.....	Aug. 31, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1835.
10	Gabriel J. Rains....	Dec. 25, 1837	A. Q. M.	5	Thos. B. Arden.....	Oct. 26, 1836	Bvt., July 1, 1835.
				6	Robert F. Baker.....	Jan. 19, 1837	Bvt., July 1, 1836.
				7	W. Sherwood.....	July 1, 1837	
				8	Nevil Hopson.....	do.....	
				9	W. Potter.....	Aug. 16, 1837	Aide-de-camp to Bvt. Maj. Gen. Gaines.

LINEAL RANK OF ARTILLERY OFFICERS.

No.	Names and rank.	Letter.	Date of commission.	Regiment.	Remarks.
COLONELS.					
1	W. K. Armistead		Nov. 12, 1818	3d artillery	
2	John R. Fenwick		May 8, 1822	4th artillery	
3	William Lindsay		April 26, 1832	2d artillery	
4	Abraham Eustis		Nov. 17, 1834	1st artillery	
LIEUTENANT COLONELS.					
1	James Bankhead		April 26, 1832	4th artillery	
2	John B. Walbach		May 30, 1832	1st artillery	
3	Ichabod B. Crane		Nov. 3, 1832	2d artillery	
4	William Gates		Dec. 17, 1836	3d artillery	
MAJORS.					
1	A. C. W. Fanning		Nov. 3, 1832	4th artillery	
2	Sylvester Churchill		April 6, 1835	3d artillery	
3	B. K. Pierce		June 11, 1836	1st artillery	
4	M. M. Payne		Dec. 17, 1836	2d artillery	
CAPTAINS.					
1	M. P. Lomax	G	Nov. 17, 1814	3d artillery	
2	Francis S. Belton	B	July 31, 1817	2d artillery	
3	J. Erving	I	April 25, 1818	4th artillery	
4	R. A. Zantinger	H	Dec. 12, 1818	2d artillery	
5	John Mountfort	G	Aug. 11, 1819	2d artillery	
6	F. Whiting	I	Sept. 10, 1819	1st artillery	
7	L. Whiting	F	May 21, 1822	4th artillery	
8	Eneas Mackay	H	Dec. 31, 1822	3d artillery	Assistant quartermaster.
9	W. L. McClintock	F	Aug. 11, 1823	3d artillery	
10	J. L. Gardner	A	Nov. 1, 1823	4th artillery	
11	H. Saunders	E	Nov. 4, 1823	1st artillery	
12	R. M. Kirby	G	Aug. 5, 1824	1st artillery	
13	John Munroe	G	Mar. 2, 1825	4th artillery	
14	Jos. P. Taylor	F	July 6, 1825	2d artillery	Commissary.
15	Thomas Childs	A	Oct. 1, 1826	3d artillery	
16	Elijah Lyon	E	Feb. 20, 1827	3d artillery	
17	Thomas W. Lendrum	I	Dec. 31, 1828	3d artillery	
18	Patrick H. Galt	C	May 15, 1829	4th artillery	
19	Gustavus S. Drane	D	May 30, 1832	2d artillery	
20	John M. Washington	B	May 30, 1832	4th artillery	
21	Giles Porter	A	Sept. 30, 1833	1st artillery	
22	David Van Ness	H	Oct. 23, 1834	1st artillery	
23	Charles S. Merchant	E	Nov. 17, 1834	2d artillery	
24	Justin Dimick	D	April 6, 1835	1st artillery	
25	Harvey Brown	H	April 10, 1835	4th artillery	
26	John R. Vinton	B	Dec. 28, 1835	3d artillery	
27	Daniel D. Tompkins	B	Dec. 31, 1835	1st artillery	
28	Samuel Cooper	D	June 11, 1836	4th artillery	
29	Richard B. Lee	D	Aug. 31, 1836	3d artillery	
30	Samuel Ringgold	C	do	3d artillery	
31	Lucian B. Webster	C	Sept. 30, 1836	1st artillery	
32	Allen Lowd	I	Nov. 30, 1836	2d artillery	
33	W. W. Morris	E	Dec. 17, 1836	4th artillery	
34	George Nauman	F	Feb. 4, 1837	1st artillery	
35	Samuel McKenzie	C	Feb. 8, 1837	2d artillery	
36	James Green	A	June 20, 1837	2d artillery	

LINEAL RANK OF INFANTRY OFFICERS.

No.	Names and rank.	Letter.	Date of commission.	Regiment.	Remarks.
COLONELS.					
1	Hugh Brady		July 6, 1812	2d infantry	
2	Henry Atkinson		April 15, 1814	6th infantry	
3	Matthew Arbuckle		Mar. 16, 1820	7th infantry	
4	George M. Brooke		July 15, 1831	5th infantry	
5	Zachariah Taylor		April 4, 1832	1st infantry	
6	James B. Many		July 21, 1834	3d infantry	
7	Enos Cutler		Sept. 21, 1836	4th infantry	
LIEUTENANT COLONELS.					
1	Alexander Cummings		Aug. 20, 1828	2d infantry	
2	Josiah H. Vose		April 23, 1830	3d infantry	
3	William Davenport		April 4, 1832	1st infantry	
4	William Whistler		July 21, 1834	7th infantry	
5	William S. Foster		June 8, 1836	4th infantry	
6	Sullivan Burbank		Sept. 21, 1836	5th infantry	
7	John Fowle		Dec. 25, 1837	6th infantry	Military Academy.

LINEAL RANK OF INFANTRY OFFICERS—Continued.

No.	Names and rank.	Letter.	Date of commission.	Regiment.	Remarks.
MAJORS.					
1	John Green.....		Oct. 31, 1833	5th infantry	
2	N. S. Clarke.....		July 21, 1834	2d infantry	
3	J. S. McIntosh.....		Sept. 21, 1836	7th infantry	
4	John Garland.....		Oct. 30, 1836	1st infantry	
5	James M. Glassell.....		Sept. 6, 1837	6th infantry	
6	Bennet Riley.....		Sept. 26, 1837	4th infantry	
7	Nathaniel Young.....		Dec. 25, 1837	3d infantry	
CAPTAINS.					
1	W. V. Cobbs.....	B	Mar. 31, 1819	2d infantry	
2	Gustavus Loomis.....	F	April 7, 1819	1st infantry	
3	Henry Wilson.....	I	April 20, 1819	4th infantry	
4	William Hoffman.....	D	May 1, 1819	2d infantry	
5	Joseph S. Nelson.....	H	Aug. 13, 1819	3d infantry	
6	Greenleaf Dearborn.....	K	Sept. 30, 1819	2d infantry	
7	Thomas Staniford.....	F	Mar. 1, 1820	2d infantry	
8	Thomas F. Hunt.....	H	May 20, 1820	5th infantry	A. Q. M.
9	J. Plympton.....	E	June 1, 1821	5th infantry	
10	W. G. Belknap.....	B	Feb. 1, 1822	3d infantry	
11	Delafayette Wilcox.....	B	April 1, 1822	5th infantry	
12	I. Clark, jr.....	H	Aug. 27, 1822	6th infantry	A. Q. M.
13	William W. Lear.....	E	May 1, 1824	4th infantry	
14	Ethan A. Hitchcock.....	A	Dec. 31, 1824	1st infantry	
15	Jacob Brown.....	E	April 7, 1825	6th infantry	
16	B. L. E. Bonneville.....	F	Oct. 4, 1825	7th infantry	
17	John B. Clark.....	I	Mar. 18, 1826	3d infantry	
18	Thomas Noel.....	K	May 1, 1827	6th infantry	
19	Andrew Lewis.....	E	June 6, 1827	3d infantry	
20	John Stuart.....	C	June 30, 1828	7th infantry	
21	Martin Scott.....	I	Aug. 16, 1828	5th infantry	
22	Gideon Lowe.....	D	Aug. 20, 1828	5th infantry	
23	George W. Allen.....	K	Jan. 25, 1829	4th infantry	
24	William R. Jouett.....	I	May 1, 1829	1st infantry	
25	George C. Hutter.....	G	May 12, 1829	6th infantry	
26	Thomas Barker.....	D	May 31, 1829	1st infantry	
27	Edgar S. Hawkins.....	H	Nov. 10, 1829	7th infantry	
28	John Page.....	F	April 30, 1831	4th infantry	
29	Samuel McRee.....	B	Dec. 31, 1831	1st infantry	
30	William M. Graham.....	D	April 4, 1832	4th infantry	
31	William Day.....	H	Oct. 26, 1832	1st infantry	
32	Ephraim K. Barnum.....	G	Dec. 28, 1832	2d infantry	
33	Thomas P. Gwynne.....	C	Mar. 4, 1833	1st infantry	
34	Charles Thomas.....	I	April 30, 1833	7th infantry	A. Q. M.
35	Benjamin Walker.....	D	Aug. 31, 1833	3d infantry	
36	Lewis N. Morris.....	C	Oct. 31, 1833	3d infantry	
37	Francis Lee.....	B	May 31, 1834	7th infantry	
38	John Bradley.....	C	July 21, 1834	2d infantry	
39	J. R. Stephenson.....	D	Dec. 31, 1834	7th infantry	
40	Jos. A. Phillips.....	K	May 4, 1835	7th infantry	
41	Otis Wheeler.....	K	Oct. 31, 1835	3d infantry	
42	William Alexander.....	G	Feb. 18, 1836	5th infantry	
43	St. Clair Denny.....	A	April 1, 1836	5th infantry	
44	Dixon S. Miles.....	E	June 8, 1836	7th infantry	
45	Henry Bainbridge.....	F	June 15, 1836	3d infantry	
46	Samuel L. Russell.....	I	June 28, 1836	2d infantry	
47	Carlos A. Waite.....	H	July 3, 1836	2d infantry	A. Q. M.
48	Levi M. Nute.....	D	July 31, 1836	6th infantry	
49	W. Seawell.....	G	do.....	7th infantry	
50	J. J. Abercrombie.....	K	Sept. 4, 1836	1st infantry	
51	P. Morrison.....	G	Sept. 13, 1836	4th infantry	
52	George A. McCall.....	C	Sept. 21, 1836	4th infantry	
53	Lorenzo Thomas.....	B	Sept. 23, 1836	4th infantry	A. Q. M.
54	George Wright.....	G	Oct. 30, 1836	3d infantry	
55	Alexander Johnston.....	G	Oct. 31, 1836	5th infantry	
56	Lewis T. Jamison.....	F	do.....	5th infantry	
57	R. D. C. Collins.....	A	Nov. 2, 1836	4th infantry	
58	Thompson Morris.....	A	Nov. 6, 1836	2d infantry	
59	Albert S. Miller.....	E	Nov. 14, 1836	1st infantry	
60	John W. Cotton.....	A	Nov. 15, 1836	3d infantry	
61	George Andrews.....	I	Dec. 31, 1836	6th infantry	
62	Julius J. B. Kingsbury.....	E	Feb. 13, 1837	2d infantry	
63	George H. Crozman.....	B	April 30, 1837	6th infantry	
64	Moses E. Merrill.....	K	June 22, 1837	5th infantry	
65	Joseph S. Worth.....	C	July 31, 1837	6th infantry	
66	Gouverneur Morris.....	H	Sept. 6, 1837	4th infantry	
67	Gustavus Dorr.....	A	Sept. 26, 1837	6th infantry	
68	Electus Backus.....	G	Oct. 17, 1837	1st infantry	
69	J. D. Searight.....	F	Dec. 25, 1837	6th infantry	
70	G. J. Rains.....	A	do.....	7th infantry	

RELATIVE RANK

Of the field officers and captains of the dragoons, artillery, and infantry.

No.	Names, rank, and date of commission.	Regiment and corps.	Brevets.	Remarks.
COLONELS.				
1	Hugh Brady, July 6, 1812	2d infantry	Brig. gen. bvt., July 6, 1822	
2	Henry Atkinson, April 15, 1814	6th infantry	Brig. gen. bvt., May 13, 1820	
3	W. K. Armistead, November 12, 1818	3d artillery	Brig. gen. bvt., November 12, 1828	
4	Matthew Arbuckle, March 16, 1820	7th infantry	Brig. gen. bvt., March 16, 1830	
5	John R. Fenwick, May 8, 1822	4th artillery	Brig. gen. bvt., March 18, 1823	
6	George M. Brooke, July 15, 1831	5th infantry	Brig. gen. bvt., September 17, 1824	
7	Zachariah Taylor, April 4, 1832	1st infantry	Brevet, April 20, 1829	
8	William Lindsay, April 26, 1832	2d artillery	Brevet, March 12, 1823	
9	James B. Many, July 21, 1834	3d infantry	Brevet, June 1, 1831	
10	Abram Eustis, November 17, 1834	1st artillery	Brig. gen. bvt., June 30, 1834	
11	David E. Twiggs, June 8, 1836	2d dragoons		
12	Stephen W. Kearney, July 4, 1836	1st dragoons		
13	Enos Cutler, September 21, 1836	4th infantry		
LIEUTENANT COLONELS.				
1	Alexander Cummings, August 20, 1828	2d infantry		
2	Josiah H. Vose, April 23, 1830	3d infantry		
3	William Davenport, April 4, 1832	1st infantry		
4	James Bankhead, April 26, 1832	4th artillery	Brevet, August 15, 1823	
5	John B. Walbach, May 30, 1832	1st artillery	Col. bvt., May 1, 1825	
6	Ichabod B. Crane, November 3, 1832	2d artillery	Brevet, Nov. 13, 1823	
7	William Whistler, July 21, 1834	7th infantry		
8	W. S. Foster, June 8, 1836	4th infantry	Brevet, August 15, 1824	
9	Richard B. Mason, July 4, 1836	1st dragoons		
10	William S. Harney, August 15, 1836	2d dragoons		
11	Sullivan Burbank, September 21, 1836	5th infantry	Brevet, July 25, 1824	
12	William Gates, December 17, 1836	3d artillery		
13	John Fowle, December 25, 1837	6th infantry		
MAJORS.				
1	A. C. W. Fanning, November 3, 1832	4th artillery	Lieut. col. bvt., Aug. 15, 1824	
2	John Green, October 31, 1833	5th infantry	Brevet, September 25, 1824	
3	Newman S. Clarke, July 21, 1834	2d infantry	Brevet, July 25, 1824	
4	Sylvester Churchill, April 6, 1835	3d artillery	Bvt., May 5, 1823	
5	T. T. Fauntleroy, June 8, 1836	2d dragoons		
6	Benjamin K. Pierce, June 11, 1836	1st artillery	Lieut. col. bvt., Aug. 21, 1836	
7	C. Wharton, July 4, 1836	1st dragoons		
8	J. S. McIntosh, September 21, 1836	7th infantry	Brevet, March 8, 1827	
9	John Garland, October 30, 1836	1st infantry	Brevet, May 7, 1827	
10	Matthew M. Payne, December 17, 1836	2d artillery	Bvt., March 2, 1824	
11	James M. Glassell, September 6, 1837	6th infantry	Bvt., February 10, 1828	
12	Bennet Riley, September 26, 1837	4th infantry	Bvt., August 6, 1828	
13	Nathaniel Young, December 25, 1837	3d infantry	Bvt., January 1, 1829	
CAPTAINS.				
1	M. P. Lomax, November 17, 1814	3d artillery	Maj. bvt., November 17, 1824	
2	Francis S. Bellon, July 31, 1817	2d artillery		
3	J. Erving, April 25, 1818	4th artillery	Maj. bvt., April 25, 1828	
4	R. A. Zantänger, December 12, 1818	2d artillery	Maj. bvt., August 15, 1824	
5	W. V. Cobbs, March 31, 1819	2d infantry	Maj. bvt., March 31, 1829	
6	Gustavus Loomis, April 7, 1819	1st infantry	Maj. bvt., April 7, 1829	
7	Henry Wilson, April 20, 1819	4th infantry	Maj. bvt., April 20, 1829	
8	William Hoffman, May 1, 1819	2d infantry	Maj. bvt., May 1, 1829	
9	John Mountfort, August 11, 1819	2d artillery	Maj. bvt., September 11, 1824	
10	J. S. Nelson, August 13, 1819	3d infantry	Maj. bvt., August 13, 1829	
11	F. Whiting, September 10, 1819	1st artillery	Maj. bvt., September 10, 1829	
12	Greenleaf Dearborn, September 30, 1819	2d infantry	Maj. bvt., September 30, 1829	
13	Thomas Staniford, March 1, 1820	2d infantry	Maj. bvt., March 1, 1830	
14	Thomas F. Hunt, May 20, 1820	5th infantry	Maj. bvt., June 16, 1828	
15	J. Plympton, June 1, 1821	5th infantry	Maj. bvt., June 1, 1831	
16	W. G. Belknap, February 1, 1822	3d infantry	Maj. bvt., February 1, 1832	
17	D. Wilcox, April 1, 1822	5th infantry	Maj. bvt., April 1, 1832	
18	Levi Whiting, May 21, 1822	4th artillery	Maj. bvt., May 21, 1832	
19	I. Clark, jr., August 27, 1822	6th infantry	Maj. bvt., August 27, 1832	
20	Æneas Mackay, December 31, 1822	3d artillery	Maj. bvt., December 31, 1832	
21	W. L. McClintock, August 11, 1823	3d artillery	Maj. bvt., August 11, 1833	
22	J. L. Gardner, November 1, 1823	4th artillery	Maj. bvt., November 1, 1833	
23	Henry Saunders, November 4, 1823	1st artillery	Maj. bvt., November 4, 1833	
24	W. W. Lear, May 1, 1824	4th infantry	Maj. bvt., May 1, 1834	
25	R. M. Kirby, August 5, 1824	1st artillery	Maj. bvt., September 17, 1824	
26	Ethan A. Hitchcock, December 31, 1824	1st infantry		
27	John Munroe, March 2, 1825	4th artillery		
28	Jacob Brown, April 7, 1825	6th infantry		
29	Joseph P. Taylor, July 6, 1825	2d artillery		
30	B. I. E. Bonneville, October 4, 1825	7th infantry		
31	John B. Clark, March 18, 1826	3d infantry		
32	Thomas Childs, October 1, 1826	3d artillery	Maj. bvt., August 21, 1836	
33	Elijah Lyon, February 20, 1827	3d artillery	Brevet, January 1, 1827	
34	Thomas Noel, May 1, 1827	6th infantry		

RELATIVE RANK—Continued.

No.	Names, rank, and date of commission.	Regiment and corps.	Brevets.	Remarks.
CAPTAINS—Continued.				
35	Andrew Lewis, June 6, 1827	3d infantry ..		
36	John Stuart, June 30, 1828	7th infantry ..		
37	Martin Scott, August 16, 1828	5th infantry ..		
38	Gideon Lowe, August 20, 1828	5th infantry ..		
39	Thomas W. Lendrum, December 31, 1828	3d artillery ..		
40	George W. Allen, January 25, 1829	4th infantry ..	Brevet, January 1, 1829	
41	William R. Jouett, May 1, 1829	1st infantry ..		
42	George C. Hutter, May 12, 1829	6th infantry ..		
43	Patrick H. Galt, May 15, 1829	4th artillery ..	Brevet, September 26, 1828	
44	Thomas Barker, May 31, 1829	1st infantry ..		
45	Edgar S. Hawkins, November 10, 1829	7th infantry ..		
46	John Page, April 30, 1831	4th infantry ..	Brevet, January 1, 1829	
47	Samuel McRee, December 31, 1831	1st infantry ..		
48	W. M. Graham, April 4, 1832	4th infantry ..	Maj. bvt, December 31, 1835	
49	Gustavus S. Drane, May 30, 1832	2d artillery ..	Brevet, November 15, 1827	
50	John M. Washington, May 30, 1832	4th artillery ..	Brevet, May 23, 1830	
51	Wm. Day, October 26, 1832	1st infantry ..		
52	Ephraim K. Barnum, December 28, 1832	2d infantry ..	Brevet, December 31, 1830	
53	E. V. Sumner, March 4, 1833	1st dragoons ..		
54	Thomas P. Gwynne, March 4, 1833	1st infantry ..		
55	Eustace Trenor, March 4, 1833	1st dragoons ..		
56	Charles Thomas, April 30, 1833	7th infantry ..		
57	Nathan Boone, August 15, 1833	1st dragoons ..		
58	Benjamin Walker, August 31, 1833	3d infantry ..		
59	Giles Porter, September 30, 1833	1st artillery ..	Brevet, February 1, 1833	
60	Lewis N. Morris, October 31, 1833	3d infantry ..		
61	David Perkins, November 4, 1833	1st dragoons ..		
62	Francis Lee, May 31, 1834	7th infantry ..		
63	John Bradley, July 21, 1834	2d infantry ..	Brevet, October 2, 1832	
64	David Van Ness, October 23, 1834	1st artillery ..	Brevet, November 4, 1833	
65	J. R. Stephenson, December 31, 1834	7th infantry ..		
66	C. S. Merchant, November 17, 1834	2d artillery ..	Brevet, April 20, 1828	
67	Justin Dimick, April 6, 1835	1st artillery ..	Brevet, May 1, 1834	
68	Harvey Brown, April 10, 1835	4th artillery ..	Brevet, August 23, 1831	
69	Jos. A. Phillips, May 4, 1835	7th infantry ..		
70	Philip St. George Cooke, May 31, 1835	1st dragoons ..		
71	Otis Wheeler, October 31, 1835	3d infantry ..		
72	John R. Vinton, December 28, 1835	3d artillery ..	Brevet, September 30, 1829	
73	Daniel D. Tompkins, December 31, 1835	1st artillery ..		
74	William Alexander, February 18, 1836	5th infantry ..		
75	St. Clair Denny, April 1, 1836	5th infantry ..		
76	Dixon S. Miles, June 8, 1836	7th infantry ..		
77	James A. Ashby, June 8, 1836	2d dragoons ..	Maj. bvt., July 19, 1836	
78	W. W. Tompkins, June 8, 1836	2d dragoons ..		
79	Henry W. Fowler, June 8, 1836	2d dragoons ..		
80	Benjamin L. Beall, June 8, 1836	2d dragoons ..		
81	Edward S. Winder, June 8, 1836	2d dragoons ..		
82	Samuel Cooper, June 11, 1836	4th artillery ..	Brevet, July 6, 1831	
83	Henry Bainbridge, June 15, 1836	3d infantry ..		
84	Samuel L. Russell, June 28, 1836	2d infantry ..		
85	Carlos A. Waite, July 3, 1836	2d infantry ..		
86	Isaac P. Simonton, July 4, 1836	1st dragoons ..		
87	Levi M. Nute, July 31, 1836	6th infantry ..		
88	Washington Seawell, July 31, 1836	7th infantry ..		
89	Richard B. Lee, August 31, 1836	3d artillery ..	Maj. bvt., June 9, 1836	
90	Samuel Ringgold, August 31, 1836	3d artillery ..	Brevet, May 8, 1832	
91	J. J. Abercrombie, September 4, 1836	1st infantry ..		
92	F. Morrison, September 13, 1836	4th infantry ..		
93	George A. McCall, September 21, 1836	4th infantry ..		
94	Lorenzo Thomas, September 23, 1836	4th infantry ..		
95	L. B. Webster, September 30, 1836	1st artillery ..		
96	W. M. Fulton, October 6, 1836	2d dragoons ..		
97	Lloyd J. Beall, October 19, 1836	2d dragoons ..		
98	George Wright, October 30, 1836	3d infantry ..		
99	Alexander Johnston, October 31, 1836	5th infantry ..		
100	Louis T. Jamison, October 31, 1836	5th infantry ..		
101	R. D. C. Collins, November 2, 1836	4th infantry ..		
102	Thompson Morris, November 6, 1836	2d infantry ..		
103	Albert S. Miller, November 14, 1836	1st infantry ..		
104	John W. Cotton, November 15, 1836	3d infantry ..		
105	Allen Lowd, November 30, 1836	2d artillery ..	Brevet, April 20, 1828	
106	William W. Morris, December 17, 1836	4th artillery ..		
107	George Andrews, December 31, 1836	6th infantry ..		
108	George Nauman, February 4, 1837	1st artillery ..		
109	Samuel McKenzie, February 8, 1837	2d artillery ..		
110	Julius J. B. Kingsbury, February 13, 1837	2d infantry ..		
111	Thomas Swords, March 3, 1837	1st dragoons ..		
112	George H. Crosman, April 30, 1837	6th infantry ..		
113	Benjamin D. Moore, June 15, 1837	1st dragoons ..		
114	James Green, June 20, 1837	2d artillery ..		
115	Moses E. Merrill, June 22, 1837	5th infantry ..		
116	James Allen, June 30, 1837	1st dragoons ..		
117	Joseph S. Worth, July 31, 1837	6th infantry ..		
118	J. H. K. Burgwin, July 31, 1837	1st dragoons ..		
119	Gouverneur Morris, September 6, 1837	4th infantry ..		

RELATIVE RANK—Continued.

No.	Names, rank, and date of commission.	Regiment and corps.	Brevets.	Remarks.
CAPTAINS—Continued.				
120	Gustavus Dorr, September 26, 1837 -----	6th infantry -----		
121	Thomas S Bryant, September 26, 1837 -----	2d dragoons -----		
122	John Graham, October 1, 1837 -----	2d dragoons -----		
123	Townshend Dade, October 1, 1837 -----	2d dragoons -----		
124	Electus Backus, October 17, 1837 -----	1st infantry -----		
125	J. D. Seright, December 25, 1837 -----	6th infantry -----		
126	G. J. Rains, December 25, 1837 -----	7th infantry -----		

MILITARY ACADEMY, WEST POINT, NEW YORK.

INSPECTOR.

Brevet Brigadier General Charles Gratiot, colonel of the corps of engineers, chief engineer, (*ex officio*), inspector of the Military Academy.

DEPARTMENT OF FRENCH.

First Teacher.

Claudius Berard.

Second Teacher.

Julian Molinard.

Assistant Teacher.

First Lieutenant Bradford R. Alden, fourth infantry.

ACADEMIC STAFF.

SUPERINTENDENT AND COMMANDANT.

Bvt. Lieut. Col. R. E. De Russy, major corps of engineers.

DEPARTMENT OF DRAWING.

Teacher.

DEPARTMENT OF GEOGRAPHY, HISTORY AND ETHICS.

Chaplain and Professor.

Rev. Thomas Warner.

Assistant Teacher.

First Lieutenant Seth Eastman, first infantry.

Assistant Professor.

First Lieutenant John A. Thomas, third artillery.

DEPARTMENT OF ARTILLERY.

Instructor.

First Lieutenant Minor Knowlton, first artillery.

DEPARTMENT OF ENGINEERING.

Professor.

Dennis H. Mahan, A. M.

Assistant Professors.

First Lieutenant Samuel C. Ridgeley, fourth artillery.

Second Lieutenant J. Carle Woodruff, third artillery.

DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY.

Acting Professor.

First Lieutenant Jacob W. Bailey, first artillery.

Assistant Professor.

First Lieutenant Henry L. Kendrick, second artillery.

DEPARTMENT OF TACTICS.

Instructor and Commandant of Cadets.

Lieutenant Colonel John Fowle, sixth infantry.

SWORD EXERCISE.

Sword master.

Ferdinand Dupare.

Assistant Instructors.

First Lieutenant Sidney Burbank, first infantry.

Second Lieutenant George G. Waggaman, first artillery.

Second Lieutenant R. Auchmuty Wainwright, fourth artillery.

Second Lieutenant Thomas B. Arden, seventh infantry.

MILITARY STAFF.

ADJUTANT.

First Lieutenant Charles F. Smith, second artillery.

QUARTERMASTER.

Second Lieutenant Henry Swartwout, third infantry.

PAYMASTER.

Bvt. Capt. Thomas J. Leslie, first lieut. corps of engineers.

SURGEON.

Walter V. Wheaton, M. D.

ASSISTANT SURGEON.

William W. Hoxton, M. D.

Officers of the army attached to and on duty at the Military Academy.

Engineers -----	2
Artillery -----	14
Infantry -----	8
Medical staff -----	2
Total -----	26

DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS.

Professor.

First Lieutenant Albert E. Church, third artillery.

Assistant Professors.

First Lieutenant Wm. W. S. Bliss, fourth infantry.

First Lieutenant Horace Brooks, second artillery.

Second Lieutenant Eliakim P. Scammon, fourth artillery.

Second Lieutenant Israel Vogdes, first artillery.

Resignations, deaths, &c., since the publication of the last annual Register.

RESIGNATIONS—47.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL—1.

John Bliss, 6th infantry, September 6, 1837.

CAPTAINS—13.

Lemuel Ford, 1st dragoons, July 31, 1837.
 Jesse B. Browne, 1st dragoons, June 30, 1837.
 Matthew Duncan, 1st dragoons, June 15, 1837.
 Abram Van Buren, 1st dragoons, March 3, 1837.
 William Gordon, 2d dragoons, September 26, 1837.
 Jonathan L. Bean, 2d dragoons, October 1, 1837.
 Stinson H. Anderson, 2d dragoons, October 1, 1837.
 Henry S. Mallory, 2d artillery, June 20, 1837.
 Brevet Major Thomas F. Smith, 1st infantry, October 3, 1837.
 James W. Kingsbury, 1st infantry, October 17, 1837.
 J. B. F. Russell, 5th infantry, June 22, 1837.
 W. N. Wickliffe, 6th infantry, July 31, 1837.
 George W. Waters, 6th infantry, April 30, 1837.

FIRST LIEUTENANTS—11.

Charles Spalding, 2d dragoons, December 15, 1837.
 George Forsyth, 2d dragoons, December 31, 1837.
 Jacob Ammen, 1st artillery, November 30, 1837.
 Epap. Kibby, 2d artillery, December 31, 1837.
 Charles A. Fuller, 2d artillery, May 31, 1837.
 Joseph A. Smith, 3d artillery, April 30, 1837.
 Edwin Rose, 3d artillery, June 30, 1837.
 Joseph E. Johnson, 4th artillery, May 31, 1837.
 George Wilson, 1st infantry, December 31, 1837.
 Robert Sevier, 6th infantry, October 31, 1837.
 James S. Williams, 6th infantry, September 6, 1837.

SECOND LIEUTENANTS—17.

George W. Morell, corps of engineers, June 30, 1837.
 Alfred Herbert, 1st artillery, June 30, 1837.
 Henry H. Lockwood, 2d artillery, September 12, 1837.
 Christopher A. Greene, 3d artillery, April 30, 1837.
 John Bratt, 3d artillery, August 31, 1837.
 Robert H. Archer, 4th artillery, December 31, 1837.
 Charles B. Sing, 4th artillery, August 31, 1837.
 L. D. Cabanné, 1st infantry, August 21, 1837.
 James F. Cooper, 3d infantry, August 25, 1837.
 Thomas O. Barnwell, 3d infantry, October 31, 1837.
 Alexander M. Mitchell, 4th infantry, March 25, 1837.
 Jonathan Freeman, 6th infantry, May 15, 1837.
 George H. Ringgold, 6th infantry, May 31, 1837.
 William H. De Forest, 6th infantry, September 30, 1837.
 James G. Reed, 7th infantry, June 30, 1837.
 Arnold Harris, 7th infantry, March 8, 1837.
 William H. Griffin, 7th infantry, April 30, 1837.

BREVET SECOND LIEUTENANT—1.

Joseph R. Anderson, corps of engineers, September 30, 1837.

STAFF—4.

Brevet Major William G. McNeill, topographical engineers, November 23, 1837.
 Philip Minis, surgeon, July 21, 1837.
 Charles D. Maxwell, assistant surgeon, June 30, 1837.
 David B. Spencer, military storekeeper, October 17, 1837.

DEATHS—22.

Lieut. Col. A. R. Thompson,* 6th infantry, Okee-chobee lake, December 25, 1837.
 Major George Birch, 4th infantry, Fort Brooke, Fla., September 26, 1837.
 Brevet Major Milo Mason, 1st artillery, Washington, D. C., February 4, 1837.
 Brevet Major Benjamin A. Boynton, 2d infantry, Plattsburg, N. Y., February 13, 1837.
 Captain Charles Mellon,* 2d artillery, Fort Mellon, Fla., February 8, 1837.
 Captain Mark W. Batman, 6th infantry, Mt. Vernon arsenal, Ala., July 31, 1837.
 Captain Joseph Van Swearingen,* 6th infantry, Okee-chobee lake, December 25, 1837.
 Brevet Captain William S. Newton, 3d artillery, Baton Rouge, La., March 16, 1837.
 Brevet Captain William S. Maitland, 3d artillery, Charleston, S. C., August 19, 1837.
 1st Lieut. Joseph W. Harris, 3d artillery, Portsmouth, N. H., May 18, 1837.
 1st Lieut. Lawrence F. Carter, 7th infantry, Fort Gibson, Ark., January 19, 1837.
 1st Lieut. Thomas B. Adams, 2d artillery, Fort Dade, Fla., December 14, 1837.
 1st Lieut. Francis J. Brooke,* 6th infantry, Okee-chobee lake, December 25, 1837.
 1st Lieut. John F. Kennedy, 1st artillery, Charleston, S. C., May 19, 1837.
 1st Lieut. James W. Hamilton, 2d dragoons, Fort Marion, Fla., November 26, 1837.
 1st Lieut. John P. Center,* 6th infantry, Okee-chobee lake, December 25, 1837.
 2d Lieut. J. W. S. McNeil,* 2d dragoons, near Fort Peyton, Fla., September 11, 1837.
 2d Lieut. Charles E. Kingsbury, 2d dragoons, Fort Mellon, Fla., June 9, 1837.
 2d Lieut. George W. Suggett, 1st dragoons, Fort Gibson, Ark., August 8, 1837.
 Assist. Surgeon William Turner, Newport, R. I., September 26, 1837.
 Assist. Surgeon Augustus C. Turtelot, Washington, D. C., December 8, 1837.
 Assist. Surgeon Thomas R. Johnson, Baltimore, Md., July 11, 1837.

DECLINED—1.

2d Lieut. Samuel D. J. Moore, 6th infantry.

DROPPED—1.

1st Lieut. N. J. Eaton, 6th infantry, April 18, 1837.

* Killed in action with the Indians, in Florida—6.

The following list of cadets is attached to the Army Register conformably to a regulation for the government of the Military Academy requiring the names of the most distinguished cadets, not exceeding five in each class, to be reported for this purpose at each annual examination.

REPORTED AT THE EXAMINATION IN JUNE, 1837.

Names.	Studies in which each cadet particularly excels.
FIRST CLASS.	
Henry W. Benham.....	Engineering, ethics, artillery, tactics, natural and experimental philosophy, chemistry, drawing, mathematics, and French.
John W. Gunnison.....	Engineering, ethics, artillery, tactics, natural and experimental philosophy, chemistry, mathematics, and French.
Edwin W. Morgan.....	Engineering, ethics, artillery, tactics, natural and experimental philosophy, chemistry, drawing, mathematics, and French.
John Bratt.....	Engineering, ethics, artillery, tactics, natural and experimental philosophy, chemistry, and mathematics.
Braxton Bragg.....	
SECOND CLASS.	
William H. Wright.....	Natural and experimental philosophy, chemistry, and drawing.
P. G. T. Beauregard.....	
Alexander H. Dearborn.....	Natural and experimental philosophy and chemistry.
James H. Trapier.....	Natural and experimental philosophy, chemistry, and drawing.
John T. Metcalf.....	
THIRD CLASS.	
Isaac J. Stephens.....	Mathematics, French, and drawing.
Henry J. Biddle.....	
Robert Q. Butler.....	
Jeremy F. Gilmer.....	
Henry W. Halleck.....	
FOURTH CLASS.	
Paul O. Herbert.....	Mathematics and French.
William Page Jones.....	
Bryant P. Tilden, jr.....	Mathematics.
William H. Churchill.....	
Stewart Van Vliet.....	

Officers of the line of the army employed in the staff and on other detached service, 1837.

Regiments.	General staff.				Recruiting service.				Engineer service.			Ordnance service.			Military Academy.			Special service.						Recapitulation.									
	Captains.	First lieutenants.	Second lieutenants.	Total.	Colonel.	Captains.	First lieutenants.	Second lieutenants.	Total.	Captain.	First lieutenant.	Total.	Captains.	First lieutenants.	Total.	Lieutenant colonel.	First lieutenants.	Second lieutenants.	Total.	Colonel.	Majors.	Captains.	First lieutenants.	Second lieutenants.	Total.	Colonels.	Lieutenant colonel.	Majors.	Captains.	First lieutenants.	Second lieutenants.	Aggregate.	
First dragoons	1		1		1		1	2	1		1											2			2					5	1		6
Second dragoons		1	1																											1		1	
Aggregate of dragoons	1	1	2			1	1	2	1		1											2			2				5	2		7	
First artillery						1		1					5	5		2	2	4					4		4				1	11	2	14	
Second artillery	1	4	5												3	3	1	1	1	1	1	5		8	1		1	2	12		16		
Third artillery	1	3	4			1		1				1	4	5		2	1	3				1	1	2				4	10	1	15		
Fourth artillery		3	3							1	1		2	2		1	3	4				2	4		6			2	11	3	16		
Aggregate of artillery	2	10	12			2		2		1	1	1	11	12		8	6	14		1	1	4	14		20	1		1	9	44	6	61	
First infantry		1	1				2	1	3							2		2			1	1		1	3			1	1	5	2	9	
Second infantry	1	1	2			1	2	3															1		1				2	4		6	
Third infantry		2	2			2	1	3									1	1				1	1		2			2	3	2	8		
Fourth infantry	1	1	2		1	1	1	3				1	1		3		3					4		1	5	1		7	5	1	14		
Fifth infantry		1	1			3		3															1	1					4		1	5	
Sixth infantry	2	2	4			1		1							1		1					1	2	1	4		1	4	4	1	10		
Seventh infantry	1	2	1	4		2	2	6									1	1				2		1	3			5	4	5	14		
Aggregate of infantry	6	9	1	16	1	10	7	4	23				1		1	1	5	2	8		1	9	4	5	19	1	1	1	26	25	12	66	
Grand aggregate	9	20	1	30	1	13	7	5	26	1	1	2	2	11	13	1	13	8	22	1	2	15	18	5	41*	2	1	2	40	71	18	134	

* Of this number on special service, one field officer, nine captains, and six subalterns are employed on Indian duty.

Organization of the army of the United States.

	Major general.	Brigadier general.	Adjutant general.	Inspectors general.	Quartermaster general.	Quartermasters.	Commissary general of subsistence.	Commissaries.	Surgeon general.	Surgeons.	Assistant surgeons.	Paymaster general.	Paymasters.	Commissary general of purchases.	Military storekeepers.	Colonels.	Lieutenant colonels.	Majors.	Adjutants.	Captains.	First lieutenants.	Second lieutenants.	Sergeant majors.	Quartermaster sergeants.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Principal musicians.	Chief buglers.	Buglers.	Musicians.	Farrers and blacksmiths.	Artificers.	Enlisted men for ordnance.	Privates.	Total commissioned.	Total non-commissioned officers, musicians, artificers, and privates.	Aggregate.
General staff.....	1	2	1	2	1	4	1	2																										14		14	
Medical department.....									1	15	60																								76		76
Pay department.....												1	17																						18		18
Purchasing department.....														1	2																			3		3	
Corps of engineers.....																1	1	2		6	6	6												22		22	
Topographical engineers.....																		6															10		10		
Ordnance department.....																1	1	2		10				44							250		14	294	308		
Two regiments of dragoons.....																2	2	2	2	20	20	20	2	2	80	80	2	4	40				68	1,430	1,498		
Four regiments of artillery.....																4	4	4	36	72	72	4	4	144	144								192	1,988	2,180		
Seven regiments of infantry.....																7	7	7	70	70	70	7	7	210	280	14			140			2,940	231	3,598	3,829		
Grand aggregate.....	1	2	1	2	1	4	1	2	1	15	60	1	17	1	2	15	15	23	2	146	168	168	13	13	478	504	16	4	40	212	20	108	250	5,652	648	7,310	7,958

Component parts of regiments and companies.

	Colonel.	Lieutenant colonel.	Major.	Adjutant.	Captains.	1st lieutenants.	2d lieutenants.	Sergeant major.	Quartermaster sergeant.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Principal musicians.	Chief buglers.	Buglers.	Musicians.	Farrers and blacksmiths.	Artificers.	Privates.	Total commissioned.	Total non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates.	Aggregate.
Regiment of dragoons.....	1	1	1	1	10	10	10	1	1	40	40	1	2	20		10		600	34	715	740
Company of dragoons.....					1	1	1			4	4			2		1		60	3	71	74
Regiment of artillery.....	1	1	1	1	9	18	18	1	1	36	36				18		27	378	48	497	545
Company of artillery.....					1	2	2			4	4				2		3	42	5	55	60
Regiment of infantry.....	1	1	1	1	10	10	10	1	1	30	40	2			20			420	33	514	547
Company of infantry.....					1	1	1			3	4				2			42	3	51	54

Adjutants of artillery and infantry, being taken from the subalterns of the line, are not included in the aggregates of their respective regiments.

A list of the military posts and arsenals.

No.	Posts.	State or Territory.	Post office.	Permanent commanders.	Regiment.
EASTERN DIVISION.					
1	Fort Winnebago	Wisconsin Territory	Fort Winnebago	Major Green	5th infantry.
2	Fort Brady	Michigan	Sault Ste. Marie	Brevet Major Cobbs	2d infantry.
3	Fort Mackinac	do	Michilimackinac		
4	Fort Howard	Wisconsin Territory	Green Bay	Bvt. Brig. Gen. Brooke	5th infantry.
5	Fort Dearborn	Illinois	Chicago	Captain Jamison	5th infantry.
6	Fort Gratiot	Michigan	Fort Gratiot		
7	Fort Niagara	New York	Youngstown		
8	Madison Barracks	do	Sackett's Harbor		
9	Hancock Barracks	Maine	Houlton	Major Clarke	2d infantry.
10	Fort Sullivan	do	Eastport		
11	Fort Preble	do	Portland		
12	Fort Constitution	New Hampshire	Portsmouth		
13	Fort Independence	Massachusetts	Boston		
14	Fort Wolcott	Rhode Island	Newport		
15	Fort Trumbull	Connecticut	New London		
16	West Point	New York	West Point	Bvt. Lieut. Col. De Russey	Engineers.
17	Fort Columbus	New York harbor	New York		
18	Fort Hamilton	do	Fort Hamilton		
19	Fort Lafayette	do	do		
20	Fort McHenry	Maryland	Baltimore		
21	Fort Severn	do	Annapolis	Bvt. Col. Walbach	1st artillery.
22	Fort Washington	do	Fort Washington	Brevet Major Saunders	1st artillery.
23	Fort Monroe	Virginia	Old Point Comfort	Brevet Major Erving	4th artillery.
24	Fort Johnston	North Carolina	Smithville		
25	Fort Caswell	do	do		
26	Fort Macon	do	Beaufort		
27	Fort Moultrie	Charleston harbor, S. C.	Charleston		
28	Castle Pinckney	do	do		
29	Oglethorpe Barracks	Georgia	Savannah		
30	Fort Marion	Florida	St. Augustine		
31	Key West	do	Key West		
32	Fort Brooke	do	Tampa		
33	Fort King	do	Seminole Agency		
34	Fort Mitchell	Alabama	Fort Mitchell		
35	Fort Pickens	Florida	Pensacola		
36	Fort Morgan	Alabama	Mobile		
37	New Orleans	Louisiana	New Orleans		
38	Fort Pike	do	Petite Coquille		
39	Fort Wood	do	New Orleans		
40	Baton Rouge	do	Baton Rouge		
41	Fort Cass	Tennessee	Calhoun	Lieutenant Howe	4th infantry.
WESTERN DIVISION.					
1	Fort Snelling	Upper Mississippi	Fort Snelling	Brevet Major Plympton	5th infantry.
2	Fort Crawford	Wisconsin Territory	Prairie du Chien	Captain Alexander	5th infantry.
3	Fort Armstrong	Illinois	Rock Island		
4	Fort Des Moines	Wisconsin Territory	Des Moines		
5	Fort Leavenworth	Missouri	Fort Leavenworth	Colonel Kearney	1st dragoons.
6	Jefferson Barracks	do	Jefferson Barracks	Bvt. Brig. Gen. Atkinson	6th infantry.
7	Fort Gibson	Arkansas Territory	Fort Gibson	Bvt. Brig. Gen. Arbuckle	7th infantry.
8	Fort Coffee	do	Fort Coffee	Captain Stuart	7th infantry.
9	Fort Towson	Louisiana	Fort Towson	Lieutenant Colonel Vose	3d infantry.
10	Fort Jesup	do	Fort Jesup	Colonel Many	3d infantry.
11	Fort Jackson	do	Fort Jackson		
12	Fort Sabine	do	Fort Jesup	Major Glassell	6th infantry.
ARSENALS.					
1	Kennebec	Maine	Augusta	Captain Ripley	Ordnance.
2	Watertown	Massachusetts	Watertown	Major Craig	Ordnance.
3	Champlain	Vermont	Vergennes	Lieutenant J. B. Scott	4th artillery.
4	Watervliet	New York	Watervliet	Bvt. Lieut. Col. Worth	Ordnance.
5	Rome	do	Rome		
6	Allegheny	Pennsylvania	Pittsburg	Brevet Major Baker	Ordnance.
7	Frankford	do	Frankford	Captain Mordecai	Ordnance.
8	Pikesville	Maryland	Pikesville	Lieutenant W. Maynadier	1st artillery.
9	Washington	District of Columbia	Washington	Captain Ramsay	Ordnance.
10	Bellona	Virginia	Bellona		
11	St. Louis	Missouri	St. Louis	Captain Symington	Ordnance.
12	Baton Rouge	Louisiana	Baton Rouge	Brevet Major Lear	4th infantry.
13	Mount Vernon	Alabama	Mount Vernon	Captain Harding	Ordnance.
14	Augusta	Georgia	Augusta	Lieutenant W. H. Betts	1st artillery.

The western division comprises all west of a line proceeding from the mouth of the Mississippi, up that river to Cassville in Wisconsin Territory, and thence north to the line of demarcation between the United States and Canada; and the eastern division comprises all east of such line.

The headquarters of the general-in-chief are in the District of Columbia.

The headquarters of the western division are at St. Louis, Missouri.

The headquarters of the eastern division are in Elizabethtown, New Jersey.

Those officers whose stations are changed by transfers and promotions will report for duty accordingly.

By order:

R. JONES, *Adjutant General*.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 779.

[2D SESSION.]

ANNUAL RETURNS OF THE MILITIA OF THE UNITED STATES FOR 1837.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE FEBRUARY 6, 1838.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *February 5, 1838.*

SIR: In obedience to the requirements of the act of March 2, 1803, entitled "An act in addition to an act entitled 'An act more effectually to provide for the national defence by establishing a uniform militia throughout the United States,'" I have the honor to transmit herewith abstracts of the general returns of the militia of the United States, and of their arms, accoutrements, and ammunition, for the year 1837.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Hon. R. M. JOHNSON, *President of the Senate.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, February 5, 1838.*

SIR: I respectfully submit herewith the annual general return of the militia of the United States, and of arms, accoutrements, and ammunition, in duplicate, for the year 1837, required this day to be laid before Congress, in conformity with the act of March 2, 1803, "to provide for the national defence by establishing a uniform militia."

The general return is compiled from the several returns of the latest dates received at the Adjutant General's office.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

Abstract of the general annual returns of the militia of the United States, by States and Territories, according to the act of March, 1803, for the year 1837.

States and Territories,	Returns.		Infantry.							Cavalry.							Artillery.							
	For what year received.	Date.	Number of divisions.	Number of brigades.	Number of regiments.	Number of battalions.	Number of companies.	Commissioned officers, including general, division, brigade, &c.	Non-commissioned officers, musicians, privates, &c.	Total.	Number of divisions.	Number of brigades.	Number of regiments.	Number of battalions.	Number of companies.	Commissioned officers.	Non-commissioned officers, musicians, privates, &c.	Total.	Number of divisions.	Number of brigades.	Number of regiments.	Number of battalions.	Number of companies.	
Maine	1837	Dec. 31	8	16	56	535	1,898	34,469	36,367	3	8	34	154	1,393	1,546	4	7	35	
New Hampshire	1837	June 26	3	6	40	80	440	1,256	21,156	22,412	99	1,105	1,204	
Massachusetts	1837	Dec. 30	7	16	63	3	487	1,575	42,311	43,886	1	2	9	46	383	429	4	7	39	
Vermont	1823	Mar. 20, 1824	4	10	35	1,330	21,790	23,120	123	1,303	1,425	23	
Rhode Island	1832	Dec. 31	2	4	21	101	992	1,093	1	4	58	58	2	
Connecticut	1837	Dec. 19	3	6	25	254	1,095	22,185	23,280	5	21	124	907	1,031	7	44	
New York	1837	Dec. 30	32	65	270	7	2,142	8,544	143,872	152,416	4	10	33	1	117	380	2,752	3,132	4	12	39	1	187	
New Jersey	1829	Dec. 2	4	13	49	105	437	1,681	31,983	33,664	4	8	33	137	1,617	1,754	32	
Pennsylvania	1833	Feb. 26, 1834	16	33	160	416	1,850	
Delaware	1827	1	3	10	371	7,861	8,232	32	234	266	
Maryland	1837	Dec. 20	4	14	53	106	480	1,902	40,047	41,949	14	28	60	328	2,266	2,594	1	2	3	33	
Virginia	1837	Dec. 6	5	22	140	1,055	4,432	84,443	88,875	5	118	477	7,257	7,734	5	71	
North Carolina	1836	July 1, 1837	9	19	96	192	775	3,066	59,376	62,442	6	21	117	696	813	
South Carolina	1832	Jan. 25, 1833	5	10	42	84	484	1,946	45,102	47,048	7	15	35	193	1,433	1,626	1	2	18	
Georgia	1834	Dec. 3	12	24	84	671	2,732	44,769	47,501	16	55	784	839	2	
Alabama	1829	Dec. 20	3	5	22	44	206	720	13,990	14,710	12	170	182	
Louisiana	1829	Jan. 1, 1830	3	7	23	49	163	659	12,375	13,034	14	7	149	156	1	2	
Mississippi	1830	Dec. 6	2	6	26	613	12,989	13,602
Tennessee	1830	Dec. 31	6	3,570	56,637	60,207
Kentucky	1837	Dec. 10	14	29	127	254	967	3,904	64,633	68,537	27	92	1,498	1,590	10	
Ohio	1835	Feb. 29, 1836	17	55	157	10	1,131	4,461	119,043	123,504	5	13	66	320	3,834	4,154	2	7	33	
Indiana	1832	Jan. 4, 1833	9	22	79	158	734	2,573	46,159	48,732	106	1,681	1,787	
Illinois	1830	Jan. 1, 1831	2	5	28	70	204	856	4	12	
Missouri	1834	Feb. 14, 1835	1	3	12	24	62	325	5,845	6,170	
Arkansas	1825	Dec. 16	9	145	1,740	1,885	12	131	143	
Michigan	1831	Nov. 28	8	18	64	259	4,821	5,080	3	12	134	146	146	1	3	1	
Florida Territory	1831	Nov. 8	43	784	827	
Wisconsin Territory	
District of Columbia	1832	Nov. 20	1	3	6	22	90	1,098	1,188	

Abstract of the general annual returns of the militia of the United States, &c.—Continued.

States and Territories.	Returns.		Artillery.			Riflemen.							Aggregate.	Remarks.	
	For what year received.	Date.	Commission'd officers.	Non-commission'd officers, musicians, privates, &c.	Total.	Number of divisions.	Number of brigades.	Number of regiments.	Number of battalions.	Number of companies.	Commission'd officers.	Non-commission'd officers, musicians, privates, &c.			Total.
Maine.....	1837	Dec. 31.....	132	1,873	2,005					31	89	1,508	1,597	41,515	
New Hampshire.....	1837	June 26.....	99	1,651	1,750						108	1,630	1,738	27,104	
Massachusetts.....	1837	Dec. 30.....	156	2,231	2,387									46,702	Riflemen included in the infantry.
Vermont.....	1823	Mar. 20, 1824	83	953	1,036									25,581	
Rhode Island.....	1832	Dec. 31.....	19	207	226									1,377	The adjutant general says there are in the State fifteen regiments—ninety-one companies of infantry and seventeen companies of light infantry. The whole number of militia enrolled is probably about 9,600.
Connecticut.....	1837	Dec. 19.....	214	2,213	2,427					27				26,738	The adjutant general states the aggregate to be 26,802.
New York.....	1837	Dec. 30.....	955	10,777	11,732	3	7	24	1	153	708	8,186	8,894	176,174	The adjutant general reports the aggregate to be 184,901.
New Jersey.....	1829	Dec. 2.....	89	1,836	1,925					24	81	1,747	1,828	39,171	
Pennsylvania.....	1833	Feb. 26, 1834												202,281	
Delaware.....	1827		12	176	188						32	511	543	9,229	
Maryland.....	1837	Dec. 20.....	107	1,533	1,640			2	4	75	50	628	678	46,861	
Virginia.....	1837	Dec. 6.....	288		5,002					124				101,611	Riflemen included in the infantry.
North Carolina.....	1836	July 1, 1837			81					12	36	408	444	63,780	
South Carolina.....	1832	Jan. 25, 1833	94	859	953					21	124	1,361	1,485	51,112	
Georgia.....	1834	Dec. 3.....	6	115	121					1				48,461	The adjutant general reports the aggregate to be 48,678. No returns from the second brigade, first division, and first brigade, eighth division. Reference has been had to the returns for the year 1833. An entire default in nine companies in the second brigade of the first division.
Alabama.....	1829	Dec. 20.....												14,892	The adjutant general reports the aggregate greatly below the real strength of the militia of the State.
Louisiana.....	1829	Jan. 1, 1830	55	719	774						60	784	844	14,808	
Mississippi.....	1830	Dec. 6.....									6	116	122	13,724	
Tennessee.....	1830	Dec. 31.....												60,982	The governor reports no returns from several regiments, and says, "If a complete return could be had our militia would be at least 85,000."
Kentucky.....	1837	Dec. 10.....	35	606	641					17	47	1,353	1,400	72,228	
Ohio.....	1835	Feb. 29, 1836	134	2,233	2,367			27	11	252	958	15,445	16,403	146,428	The adjutant general says the actual strength falls very little short of 200,000.
Indiana.....	1832	Jan. 4, 1833	60	620	680						122	2,592	2,714	53,913	
Illinois.....	1830	Jan. 1, 1831								11	33		33	27,386	
Missouri.....	1834	Feb. 14, 1835												6,170	The adjutant general says, "after waiting until this late period, I have been only able to receive a return from one division for the year 1834."
Arkansas.....	1825	Dec. 16.....												2,028	The governor reports the first regiment of infantry imperfect, the second only two companies returned, the fifth and ninth no returns received.
Michigan.....	1831	Nov. 28.....	3	38	41						11	198	209	5,476	
Florida Territory.....	1831	Nov. 8.....												837	The adjutant general reports the militia about 4,000 effective men.
Wisconsin Territory.....														No return.	No return.
District of Columbia.....	1832	Nov. 20.....	2	23	25						4	32	36	1,249	The first and second brigades not heard from.
														1,327,808	

Abstract of the annual returns of arms, accoutrements, and ammunition of the militia of the United States, for the year 1837.

States and Territories.	ORDNANCE AND ORDNANCE STORES.																																						
	Brass.								Iron.								Sponges and rammers.	Ladles and worms.	Ball screws and worms.	Bricoles and drag ropes.	Trail handspikes.	Lead aprons.	Ammunition boxes.	Tumbrels and powder carts.	Sets of harness.	Rounds of shot and shells.	Pounds of cannon powder.	Gun-carriages.	Ammunition wagons.										
	12-pounders.	9-pounders.	6-pounders.	4-pounders.	3-pounders.	2-pounders.	Howitzers.	Eprouvettes.	Cannon.	42-pounders.	32-pounders.	24-pounders.	18-pounders.	12-pounders.	9-pounders.	6-pounders.														4-pounders.	3-pounders.	Pounders.	Swivels.	Cannon and mortars.					
Maine	2		16	22			3	3		1	4	22	6	8	5	22	5	5			1	141	126		411	189	49	74	35	150	8,949								
New Hampshire				38							5	8			2	14	2					55	51		97	45	23	81	7	58		3,376							
Massachusetts		2	42		32																20	107	80		555	146	71	90	39	187									
Vermont																																							
Rhode Island				6													2					4																	
Connecticut			16		7									5	6	40		10				114	67	279	72	46	52	77		52									
New York			67		3										1	71						113	16,569		173	61	130	20	33				1,813						
New Jersey				4												23	6	1		3		33			29	22			24										
Pennsylvania*																						15	15		11	22													
Delaware																	1																						
Maryland †																																							
Virginia				5																		13	4	336	8	11	4	14		4									
North Carolina																																							
South Carolina				12		1											5					23	10		31	20	8	33		12				15					
Georgia																			4			4	4		16	4	4	8		8		150							
Alabama																																							
Louisiana			2	4																		6	6		12	6	6	6	2	8	100	100							
Mississippi †																																							
Tennessee																																							
Kentucky				1												5							5	6		14	10	4	4		4								
Ohio																12	1						7	15		19	8	7	3										
Indiana																8							8			18	10	4	6		3								
Illinois †																																							
Missouri																																							
Arkansas †																																							
Michigan																																							
Florida Territory †																																							
Wisconsin Territory †																																							
District of Columbia												2			2																								

* There are 75 field pieces of every description.

† Parts of sets.

‡ No return of arms, &c., received from these States.

Abstract of the annual return of arms, accoutrements, and ammunition, &c.—Continued.

States and Territories.	Muskets.	Bayonets.	Cartridge-boxes and belts.	Bayonet scabbards and belts.	Brushes and picks.	Spare flints.	Ball cartridges.	Rifles.	Powder horns.	Pouches.	Loose balls.	Pounds of rifle powder.	Horsemen's pistols.	Swords.	Sword scabbards and belts.	Knapsacks.	Haversacks.	Drums.	Fifes.	Bugles and trumpets.
Maine ..	24,527	24,158	18,376	15,604	15,503	80,269	194,736	2,748	1,742	1,258	111,600	1,501	2,260	2,298	14,850	87	610	493	29
New Hampshire	19,234	18,896	13,612	13,492	13,696	27,602	1,238	538	680	1,553	1,935	1,961	14,885	33	503	357	23
Massachusetts	20,175	20,175	21,691	20,868	22,015	44,286	243,185	2,821	2,175	2,361	31,971	427	400	1,967	1,967	2,028	112	461	310	87
Vermont.....	15,986	15,081	17,696	11,910	15,436	23,110	265	116	275	2,778	2,624	1,994	13,508	422	469	7
Rhode Island	823	818	872	821	807	2,136	51	190	190	258	36	23
Connecticut	14,397	13,947	13,307	10,331	10,278	101,464	153,258	1,527	591	94	19,109lbs.	231½	2,649	2,449	2,469	3,735	82	383	291	68
New York.....	27,038	24,078	28,706	24,953	14,505	38,272	3,477	26,696	23,131	19,816	53,053	3,027½	7,250	10,038	2,828	2,496	91	3,158	1,984	309
New Jersey.....	12,986	2,932	1,060	2,932	764	117	94	1,308	2,339	2,339	387	349	51
Pennsylvania	16,871	16,871	6,471	6,471	2,848	700	700	10 kegs.	2,183 pairs	2,448	2,448	8,312	6,700	1,063	739	128
Delaware.....	840	818	384	79	164	374
Maryland.....
Virginia.....	35,400	34,049	3,998	868	453	2 boxes.	*2,459	213	213	1,275	1,792	712	197	197	25
North Carolina.....	13,201	5,694	7,900	5,690	14,220	11,260	1,872	903	903	650	790	20
South Carolina.....	12,535	700	1,922	1,538	1,440	7,085	3,315	10,802	4,419	3,597	26,097	841	526	1,770	1,770	3,276	75	161	143	36
Georgia.....	6,431	1,088	671	691	241	535	3,912	8,054	2,512	1,327	989	341	1,210	1,066	240	132	128	5
Alabama.....	2,087	1,006	367	725	395	2,165	229	121	375	124	49	51	4
Louisiana.....	1,000	1,000	550	550	550	2,000	2,000	206	6	100	500	11	11	29
Mississippi.....
Tennessee.....	1,617	763	763	†14,741	†10,828	1,441	412	373
Kentucky.....	3,388	2,680	2,143	974	11,718	5,433	3,462	2,819	25,129	2,078	816	3,290	3,160	417	76	201	245	50
Ohio.....	13,059	6,507	3,270	2,909	1,896	179	9,280	3,461	2,755	8,206	345	2,304	3,679	3,283	194	685	677	61
Indiana.....	577	232	189	15	10,000	8,200	6,500	48,000	1,200	350	780	780	288	400	20
Illinois.....
Missouri.....	70	64	1,792	157	84	68	2,085	64	3	3
Arkansas.....
Michigan.....	98	39	13	3	89	132	60	‡732	447	534	936	38	76	112	15	29	24	2
Florida Territory.....
Wisconsin Territory.....
District of Columbia.....	144	144	144	144	66	18	76

* Carbines included.

† Shot guns included.

‡ Horns included.

§ Fuses included.

NOTE.—This return of arms, &c., is taken from the returns corresponding in date with those which furnish the strength of the militia.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 780.

[2D SESSION.]

STATEMENTS OF THE PROBABLE NUMBER OF CREEK WARRIORS ENGAGED IN HOSTILITIES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES DURING THE YEARS 1836 AND 1837.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE FEBRUARY 7, 1838.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *February 6, 1838.*

SIR: In reply to the resolution of the Senate of the 26th ultimo, I have the honor to transmit herewith reports of the commanding general of the army and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, which, with their accompanying documents, embrace the best information possessed by this department in reference to "the number of Creek Indians which at any time during the years 1836 and 1837 were engaged in hostilities against the United States."

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Hon. R. M. JOHNSON, *President of the Senate.*HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *Washington, February 3, 1838.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith the report of the adjutant general, furnishing so much of the information called for by the resolution of the Senate of the 26th January as is in the possession of the headquarters of the army.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. MACOMB, *Major General, Commander-in-chief.*Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, February 2, 1838.*

SIR: In answer to the Senate's resolution of January 26, calling on the Secretary of War for information "showing the number of Creek Indians which at any time during the years 1836 and 1837 were engaged in hostilities against the United States," I have to state that the records of this office do not furnish the precise information called for.

By reference to the correspondence of General Scott and General Jesup, officers who were charged with the suppression of Indian hostilities in Georgia and Alabama in 1836, it is seen that no precise number has been stated as the strength of the hostile Creeks; but the subjoined extracts from that correspondence will show the estimated strength of those Indians, being all the information touching the subject-matter of inquiry to be derived from the files of the Adjutant General's office.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*Major General MACOMB, *General-in-chief of the Army.**Extract of a letter from General Scott to the Adjutant General, dated Columbus, Georgia, June 2, 1836.*

"The strength of the enemy is variously estimated, by well-informed persons, from 2,500 to 5,000. Captain Page thinks that there are at least 3,000 hostile warriors."

Extract of a letter from General Scott to Governor Call, dated Headquarters, Columbus, June 17, 1836.

"It no doubt will be interesting to you to learn the preparations made and making to put down the hostile Creek Indians, who are variously estimated at from 3,000 to 5,000 warriors."

Extract of a letter from General Jesup to the Secretary of War, dated Headquarters, Tuskegee, July 17, 1836.

"This party (Neo Mico's) increases the number of prisoners to about 2,800."

Extract of a letter from General Jesup to the Secretary of War, dated Fort Mitchell, July 24, 1836.

"There are between 18,000 and 19,000 of them" (Creek Indians) "to be removed; 4,000 of them are men capable of bearing arms."

Extract of a letter from General Jesup to the Secretary of War, dated Headquarters, Montgomery, September 5, 1836.

"On my way to this place I passed Wetumpka, where there are about 3,000 Indians, who are to cross the Coosa to-day, and take up their line of march westward. Hopoethle-Yoholo, whose departure I reported a few days ago, is on his way to the west, with 2,300 of his band. About 4,000 will move in a day or two from Talladega."

True extracts.

R. JONES, *Adjutant General.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Office of Indian Affairs, February 5, 1838.*

SIR: A resolution of the Senate, of the 26th of January, 1838, requesting the Secretary of War "to communicate to the Senate such information as may be in his department, showing the number of Creek Indians which, at any time during the years 1836 and 1837, were engaged in hostilities against the United States," having been referred to this office, I have the honor to submit the following report thereon:

It is obvious that this office can have had no means of ascertaining with any precision the number of Creeks actually engaged in hostilities, or at any time committing depredations upon the persons or property of the citizens of the United States. Such information as it possesses is derived, 1st, from the reports of its agents engaged in the execution of the treaty with the Creeks for their removal during the progress of the war; and 2d, the official documents made upon the close of hostilities and subsequent removal to the west.

Of the first class, I herewith transmit copies and extracts of letters from Captain John Page, superintendent of Creek removal

The information in relation to the second class of evidence is comprised in the muster-rolls of different parties despatched to the west after the close of hostilities.

The whole number of Creek Indians emigrated in 1836 was 14,609. Of this number 2,495 were enrolled and reported to this office as hostile Indians.

The above statement, together with the extracts of correspondence, comprises all the information in this office supposed to be within the scope of the resolution of the Senate.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

C. A. HARRIS, *Commissioner.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

No. 1.

Extract from a letter of Captain John Page to the Commissary General of Subsistence, dated at Fort Mitchell, Alabama, March 27, 1836.

"I have the honor to report to you that I attended a meeting of the chiefs of this (Creek) nation on the 18th instant, and made all the inquiries about the number of Indians that have gone from this nation to the Seminoles, and from what information I can get, the number is very small. The chiefs will not admit that there are even twenty absent. I have made inquiries from different sources, and I am of the opinion that when the war is terminated it will be known that there is not one hundred Creeks among them."

No. 2.

Extract of a letter from Captain John Page to the Commissary General of Subsistence, dated at Fort Mitchell, May 8, 1836.

"I stated to you I would communicate the talk I had with the Upper Creeks. I will do so by next mail. They are disgusted with the investigation, and say they will not wait any longer than it will take to settle their debts. There are from five to eight thousand ready to be off, were it not for this investigation, which, I think, cannot be closed in six months. The Upper Creeks say they have adopted a plan of their own in regard to the disputed lands, and will be off in a month. By to-morrow's mail I will detail to you their plans. Those upper chiefs said they had rather hear any word mentioned than investigation. The Upper Creeks are determined to be off; they are at this time sufficiently friendly, but the Lower Creeks, as I have heretofore reported, are hostile, and must be treated as such; the war-whoop has been sounded among them."

No. 3.

Extract of a letter from Captain John Page to the Commissary General of Subsistence, dated at Fort Mitchell, Alabama, May 16, 1836.

"There has been one scalp taken since the war-whoop was sounded. It is a rule among them, that scalping is prohibited, unless the majority of the tribe is hostile. This will prove the hostile party are in the minority at present, and I think it will remain so, as I have sent runners in every direction with a strong talk."

No. 4.

Extracts of a letter from Captain John Page to the Commissary General of Subsistence, dated at Fort Mitchell, Alabama, May 29, 1836.

"I have endeavored to watch the movements of the Indians for the last ten days. I have sent several runners to reconnoitre; by so doing, ascertaining all their movements. There are three parties--one headed by Ne-ha-mico, one by Ne-he-Mathla, and the other by Jim Henry. The latter party have been endeavoring to cross the Chattahoochee river to get to Florida; they have got a number of stage horses, mules, and negroes. I sent two expresses to General Lowe, commanding the militia at Columbus, informing him of the intention of these people to cross and make off; he said he would keep a lookout, but I discovered he did nothing to prevent them. I then went in person myself, and requested him to start five or six hundred militia to guard the river from this to Irwinton; he said he would, but because it rained they did not start. He is not fit for an officer; and I told him it would be an everlasting disgrace upon him if he did permit them to cross. Fortunately, it has rained every day for the last eight days, and raised the river so they cannot get over at present. This is the only thing that prevented these people from crossing. General McDougald has arrived and assumed the command; he will start the troops at once.

"My object is to keep these rascals hemmed in till General Jesup arrives. If he were here at this time, I could get on my horse, and in two hours' time show the camps of all the hostile Indians and call forth by name every leader. Jim Henry is very uneasy, is the reason he wants to make off. Ne-ha-mico sent from his camp seven stage horses. This is paramount to a back-out."

* * * * *

"I sent to Ne-he-Mathla, the other day, to try and find out what his strength was; but he is too great a general for me; no information could be gained. His men are too well drilled to communicate anything."

* * * * *

"Opoth-le-yohola, the chief of the Upper Creeks, took a decisive stand against the war, as also his people. He killed one chief, and put in irons thirteen more, for showing a hostile disposition; this put a check to many other Indians who came disposed, with little encouragement, to join the hostile party."

No. 5.

Extract from a letter of Captain John Page to the Commissary General of Subsistence, dated at Fort Mitchell, June —, 1836.

"Since my last communication the hostile parties of Indians have mostly broken up and scattered. Some have come in here, say twelve or fifteen hundred men, women, and children, and many have surrendered themselves at Tallahassee and other points, and a great many are wandering about, afraid to come in. There will be no more fighting. The whoop may meet some of these wandering parties and fire on them; but the object of these Indians will be to keep out of their way."

No. 6.

Extract of a letter from Captain John Page to the Commissary General of Subsistence, dated at Fort Mitchell, July 2, 1836.

"I have the honor to report to you that about 1,600 hostile Indians, men, women, and children, have been enrolled and started this day. Jim Henry has surrendered about 20 miles from this. I have started some persons on to enrol his party. There are several hundred of them, men, women, and children, but I cannot state the number. At Tuskegee there will be probably enough more to make 3,000 or more. I shall also despatch the whole of them immediately. Others are coming in constantly. The contractors took them yesterday, and were all prepared. The balance that come in after this I shall confine and take them in the same manner. General Jesup directed them to take water at Montgomery, Alabama, which is an excellent place. It is very slow moving them in irons, chained together, and Montgomery is the nearest point we could take water. I have notified the contractors to be prepared to move off other parties as soon as they can be collected. I am anxious to close this business, and shall exert myself to do so. A great many Indians are identified and delivered over to the civil authority. Crowds of people are flocking, some to get their horses, some their negroes, and others their guns, that were taken by the Indians when their plantations were plundered."

No. 7.

Extracts of a letter from Captain John Page to the Commissary General of Subsistence, dated Fort Mitchell, July 26, 1836.

"A report came yesterday there had been another battle with the Indians about 25 miles below here, on the Georgia side of the river; three of the Georgia troops were killed and seventeen wounded. Seven Indians were killed, who were found, (says the official report.)

"This party, I am sure, was headed by Nulth-cap-Tuskenugga. After I left here with the hostile Indians for Montgomery, thirty-one of this chief's warriors gave themselves up to me on the road, and they reported to me the old chief was determined to cross the river and go to Florida. At that time he had but about 30 or 40 warriors with him, but there was a considerable number of Ufawla Indians that joined him. I presume, as I am sure, they fled to the Cowiga, where the old chief was with his people."

* * * * *

"The number of Indians I will not pretend to say."

No. 8.

Extract of a letter from Captain John Page to the Commissary General of Subsistence, dated at Wetumpka, Alabama, August 6, 1836.

"I have the honor to report that on the 30th of last month I turned over to the contractors a party of Indians, headed by Opoth-le-yoholo, and in charge of Lieutenant Batman. The muster-roll calls for 2,700 Indians, and they started on the 1st instant.

"Another party, headed by William McGilbray, turned over to the contractors on the 25th ultimo, have started this day, in charge of Lieutenant Scriveris, and consists of about 3,000 Indians.

"Lieutenant Deas has charge of the Talladega district, and from his last report about 3,800 were turned over to the contractors yesterday, and are also to be started this day."

No. 9.

Extract of a letter from Captain John Page to the Commissary General of Subsistence, dated at Tuskegee, Alabama, August 13, 1836.

"I have the honor to enclose, herewith, a muster-roll of a party of hostile Indians, shipped to their new country in charge of an agent. These Indians were taken prisoners after the party turned over to the contractors had started, and General Jesup directed me to send them off immediately."

No. 10.

FORT MITCHELL, Alabama, November 6, 1836.

SIR: I have the honor to forward this day muster-rolls, numbered from 1 to 6, of Creek Indians, removed by the Alabama and Georgia Emigrating Company, to Arkansas. These muster-rolls will not correspond with the rolls now in possession of the officers superintending the different parties. There were a great many hostile Indians joined their parties after they had been on the road several days. I directed them to add them to their rolls as they joined.

Very respectfully,

JOHN PAGE, *Captain, and Superintendent of Creek Removal.*

Brig. General GEORGE GIBSON, *Commissary General of Subsistence, Washington.*

No. 11.

FORT MITCHELL, Alabama, January 15, 1837.

SIR: I have the honor, herewith, to enclose proceedings of two meetings held by the settlers of the Creek nation. Previous to these meetings I had taken all the necessary measures in my power for their protection. I despatched part of the small force I had at this post, and located them at the spot where the depredation was committed. Since which time I have mustered into service a volunteer company of mounted men, commanded by Captain Benjamin Young, and stationed near Echo-hadja's camp. I am hourly expecting another company of mounted volunteers, if they can be raised, from Irwinton. I shall station them near the Hatchachubba swamp. All appears to be quiet, and the people satisfied with the measures I have taken for their safety; they have all returned to their plantations again. Nothing has occurred since my last communication to you on the subject of Indian hostilities.

From the best information I can obtain, I think the Indians that committed the late depredations are a small party returned from Florida; having gone there and found nothing but hard fighting and starva-

tion, returned again. A black woman, who was sick at the time at Dr. Battle's plantation, was visited by the Indians, and, not being able to make her retreat, she stated two Indians came to the hut she was lying in and took fire out to burn the dwelling-house. They looked her in the face and laughed, but did not speak. One by the name of Euche Charley, and the other Lame John. These were the names they were known by; she knew them well, having seen them almost every day for two years previous to the hostilities. I have always supposed these Indians had gone to Florida; the friendly Indians were of the same opinion; they have never been seen in the friendly camps. If this statement can be relied on, it is evident they have returned from Florida, or remained in the swamps with a determination never to surrender. A gentleman a few days since informed me he saw two Indians this side of Flint river, coming this way, with packs, and both armed; he can be relied on. He furthermore states he saw two small Indian trails coming in the direction of the Creek nation, and that it was not more than two or three days since they had passed, My object in being so minute is to do away the suspicion that rests upon the friendly Indians, and that the *guilty* may be punished.

The friendly Indians have tendered their services to the volunteer companies to scour the swamps and kill all that are found out of the friendly camps. Their services will be accepted, and every exertion used to apprehend them.

With respect, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

JOHN PAGE, *Captain, and Superintendent of Creeks.*

C. A. HARRIS, Esq., *Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington City.*

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 781.

[2D SESSION.]

ON THE CLAIM OF MISSOURI VOLUNTEERS FOR COMPENSATION FOR THEIR HORSES
LOST OR RENDERED UNFIT FOR SERVICE BY TRANSPORTATION BY SEA FROM NEW
ORLEANS TO TAMPA BAY IN FLORIDA.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE FEBRUARY 9, 1838.

A.

IN SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, *January 10, 1838.*

On motion by Mr. Benton,

Resolved, That the Committee on Military Affairs be instructed to inquire into the expediency of making provision for payment of the value of horses lost at sea by the Missouri volunteers, on their passage from New Orleans to Tampa Bay, in the month of November last.

Attest:

ASBURY DICKINS, *Secretary.*

B.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *January 15, 1838.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit, in reply to your letter of the 10th instant, a report of the acting quartermaster general, which contains all the information in this department in reference to the loss of horses belonging to the Missouri volunteers.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Hon. THOMAS H. BENTON, *Chairman Committee on Military Affairs, Senate.*

C.

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, January 13, 1838.*

SIR: In answer to the inquiry of the honorable Mr. Benton, chairman of the Military Committee of the Senate, in relation to the horses of the Missouri volunteers which were lost on the way from New Orleans to Florida, I furnish, herewith, an extract of a letter from Colonel Taylor, United States army, addressed to the commanding general, which contains all the information in this office on that subject. On the 8th of November the quartermaster at New Orleans reported, in general terms, that he had completed the shipment of the Missouri volunteers, with their horses, for Tampa Bay; but the loss of the horses, and the circumstances attending it, have not been reported to this office.

I have the honor to be, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. CROSS, *Acting Quartermaster General.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington.*

D.

Extract of a letter from Colonel Z. Taylor, first regiment of United States infantry, to Major General T. S. Jesup, dated

HEADQUARTERS ARMY SOUTH OF THE WITHLACOOCHEE, November 26, 1837.

"Out of 450 horses belonging to the Missouri mounted volunteers, shipped at New Orleans for this place, 300 of them have been cast away or lost, in consequence of the severe gales which have prevailed in the Gulf since they left the mouth of the Mississippi; and a portion of what few have arrived have been rendered unfit for service, so that a great portion of the regiment must act on foot, if they act at all, as I have this moment been informed by the colonel and lieutenant colonel commanding them that there was great discontent among them in consequence of the loss of their horses; and as the order had been given them to take the field, it was doubtful whether a portion of them would do so, alleging that they had been engaged to act as mounted men."

E.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, *Third Auditor's Office, January 17, 1838.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this morning, wherein, after mentioning that about 300 horses belonging to the Missouri volunteers, on the voyage from the mouth of the Mississippi to Tampa Bay, were cast away or lost at sea, you ask me whether any new legislation, except an appropriation, will be wanting to authorize payment to the owners?

In reply, I have to state that the law of the 18th January last, providing for the payment of lost horses, &c., contains no provision applicable to cases of this kind, and that I consider further legislation necessary before the owners of the horses in question can receive remuneration for the loss thereof.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

PETER HAGNER, *Auditor.*

Hon. T. H. BENTON, *United States Senate.*

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 782.

[2D SESSION.]

CORRESPONDENCE WITH OFFICERS OF THE ARMY RELATIVE TO THE POSTS AND MILITARY FORCES REQUIRED FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE WESTERN FRONTIER OF THE UNITED STATES.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FEBRUARY 14, 1838.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *January 8, 1838.*

SIR: At the request of the Hon. A. G. Harrison, of the House of Representatives, I have the honor to transmit the accompanying papers, for the consideration of the Committee on Military Affairs, which have reference to the subject of the defence of the western frontier, reported upon by me a few days since in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Hon. JAMES J. MCKAY, *Chairman of Committee on Military Affairs, House of Reps.*

FULTON, *Missouri, June 3, 1837.*

SIR: The great number of Indians, native and emigrant, on the frontier of Missouri, Arkansas, &c., has for a long time engaged our serious attention, and filled our minds with painful solicitude for the future and permanent safety of those most exposed to their incursions. It is the paramount duty of all governments to afford to its citizens not only that protection which is fully adequate to secure them from danger, but such also as is sufficient to allay every apprehension of it. We do not believe that our government has extended either to our exposed frontier. When we think of their immense number, which, it is officially said, will amount to 253,000 when all shall have been removed, and look upon our vast extent of frontier, we affirm it unhesitatingly as our deliberate opinion that the troops stationed upon it for its protection are altogether inadequate for such a purpose. With these opinions, being in part the representatives of a portion of those exposed to the dangers we have alluded to, we should be faithless to our trust, wanting in every impulse of patriotism and humanity, if we did not use the very utmost of our exertions, in every practicable manner whatever, to accomplish objects of such vital importance. It is these considerations that have impelled us to trouble you with this communication. We desire your views of the protection that is necessary, and respectfully request that you will give them to us at length. No man, we are well satisfied, is better qualified to give a correct opinion on this subject than yourself. Your long acquaintance with the character of the Indians of the west—their cunning, their boldness,

their treachery; your intimate knowledge, from personal experience, of their mode of warfare, and your late position as the commander of the first regiment of dragoons, connected with the additional circumstances of your being stationed on the frontier, and, whilst in that quarter, of having penetrated and scoured much the greater portion of the country lying between it and the Rocky mountains, have afforded you opportunities enjoyed by no other person in the country for forming correct opinions on the subject. You cannot but perceive, should the information we receive justify it, that it is our intention to make an effort at the next session of Congress to have that protection extended to us which will not only make us secure, but will also quiet every feeling of solicitude in relation to it.

We are the more anxious to get your views on the subject, and the views also of other gentlemen whose situation and experience have enabled them to form just and correct opinions as to the amount of force that is necessary, because, in the discussions which we have heard on the floor of Congress upon this subject, opinions have been advanced very wide from those we entertain ourselves, directly impeaching the existence of any necessity for further protection, without which, we firmly believe, our frontier citizens are doomed to be, at some future day, the helpless victims of savage ferocity. On such occasions, too, we have heard the all-sufficient argument of economy used, as if that should be esteemed true economy where the great probability is that the timely expenditure of a few thousand dollars will prevent the future necessity of appropriating millions; but it is such economy, we very much fear, as will eventually end in opening the sluices of blood and marking the fair fields of our people with the blackness of death and desolation. Such are the views and feelings with which we are impressed, and, being such, we are irresistibly impelled to do all in our power to avert such an impending calamity. We therefore again renew the request that you will furnish us with your views on the subject in as full a manner as your time and convenience will admit of.

With assurances of the highest regard, we are, very respectfully, your obedient servants,

L. F. LINN.

A. G. HARRISON.

Colonel HENRY DODGE, *Governor of Wisconsin Territory.*

St. Louis, August 14, 1837.

SIR: We have taken the liberty of addressing you, for the purpose of acquiring such information as you may be able to give relative to the force that is necessary for the complete protection of our frontier. You know that this frontier is very extensive, and, we think, not sufficiently protected. To prevent ruinous border wars, and to insure peace and safety to our fellow-citizens living in that quarter, is the great object we have in view. We hope, by the information we are endeavoring to collect on the subject, to satisfy the general government that the protection which is indispensably necessary to the peace of the frontier is but begun. We have been induced to address you, from your thorough knowledge of the condition of the frontier and the Indian and his character. We should be happy, therefore, to be favored with your views on this subject at length.

We have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servants,

L. F. LINN.

A. G. HARRISON.

General HENRY ATKINSON.

CAMP SABINE, *Louisiana, August 28, 1837*

MY DEAR FRIEND: When we last met, in St. Louis, I promised to write to you, and should have done so sooner but for the army life, that of being moved about so much. I have been moved from Jefferson Barracks to Natchitoches, in this State, from thence to Fort Jesup, from Fort Jesup to this place, and from this place back to Jesup, and from thence to the Caddo Indians, and from thence to New Orleans, and from thence back to this place, where we have remained until this time, but how much longer I am unable to say. I should as lief be here as in any other place in this country; but I would rather be in Missouri than any other State in the Union that I have been in, not excepting old Virginia, the place of my birth. I like the people better; the climate is better; in fact, everything is better, in my opinion; at least, they appear more congenial to my feelings. This country appears easier to get a living in than any other that I have ever been in, and the people are less inclined to work than any other set I have met with. We have been here nearly two years, and for what purpose I am unable to say, for there has been no invasion or threatened invasion, that I know of. There are no Indians nearer than eighty or one hundred miles of us, and we are fifty or sixty miles from those large planters who have so large a number of negroes that it would require a garrison near to prevent their negroes from rising. So you will see that we are too far from the former to protect the frontier inhabitants, as also to protect the master from the violence of his slaves, if they see cause to be discontented. We have temporary quarters built at this place, which is about two miles and a half from the river Sabine, on a straight line, and about four by the road.

It is my opinion that we could be of more use to the service if we were on the frontier of Missouri or Arkansas. There we should be a check on the Indians; for if we do not establish a line of posts around that frontier soon, the enormous body of Indians which the government is sending among you will become dissatisfied, and will rise and use you up before we can help you. You know it is the nature of an Indian to take all advantages; and when he thinks that you are not watching him, that is the time that he will make his spring. Hence, the sooner it is done, the less it will cost the government, and the less blood will be spilt. But if you build those posts, you will have to increase the army in order to garrison them. There should be at least fifteen thousand men on a peace establishment in the army of the United States. My plan would be, to have eight regiments of infantry, four of artillery, two of dragoons, and one of riflemen, each regiment to be one thousand strong; and to have the different staff corps to be increased, so as to be adequate to all the services required of them, without taking officers from the line for staff purposes. What I mean by staff corps is, the engineers, topographical engineers,

and ordnance corps. The details for those duties are so great at this time that we have not got officers sufficient to do company duty; and at one time this summer the sixth regiment had but ten officers with it for duty; out of thirty-three belonging to it, there was not at that time one captain with his company in the whole regiment, and that in the field. I knew a time it would have been considered disgraceful to be absent from your regiment or company when they were in the field. But times have changed; for now some of them bother the lives out of some of the members of Congress to get them a furlough, or to get them on some other duty, and at the time, perhaps, their companies are in front of an enemy. The War Department should put a stop to it, or else it will ruin the army. There are a great number of officers on Indian duty, which, I think, should be done by citizens; for if it is necessary to have a captain, a first and a second lieutenant, to a company, is it not equally necessary that they should be with it? I think so. Then why not employ citizens? for it would be better for the army, better for the citizens, and better for the service in general. To return to the increase of the army: it is my opinion that a rifle regiment should be added to the peace establishment, as two wars have shown us that riflemen are the most efficient troops that ever were employed in our country. Where can you find troops more efficient than Morgan's riflemen of the revolution, or Forsyth's riflemen of the last war with Great Britain? However, I contend that they are the most useful in our country. Artillery for a siege; infantry for an open country, where they can meet column to column; dragoons for scouting parties, provided they have a rallying point near at hand; but riflemen for the woods or broken ground, with which you know our country abounds at every point where fighting must be expected. The musket and cartridge-box are too clumsy to run through the woods with. I served in Forsyth's riflemen during the whole of the late war, up to the reduction of the army in 1821, and have been in the infantry since, and have had a good opportunity of judging of these two arms of the service, and am decidedly of opinion that the rifle is the best one the service can have.

If, sir, this meets your approbation, I hope you will consider me a candidate for the riflemen, and give me your assistance to obtain it; or if the army is increased, I also wish your influence for promotion. I have served my country honestly and faithfully for near twenty-five years, and have commanded detachments, companies, battalions, regiments, and brigades, and have been on some important expeditions, and have had the good fortune to have the approbation of my commanding officer and the government. I have written to Governor Miller and to Colonel R. M. Johnson, Vice-President of the United States, on the subject of brevet rank. At the close of the last war, Mr. Dallas, then Secretary of War, promised me the brevet rank of major; but unfortunately he died, or, I am convinced, I should have received it. I made repeated applications after the war for leave to visit Washington, but without effect until the fall of 1820, which was the first opportunity I had of laying my claims before the President and Secretary of War, which I did, but was told I was too late by Mr. Monroe and Mr. Calhoun; but they both, if I understood them, agreed that my claims were just. Again, in 1826, I had my claims before Mr. Adams and Mr. Barbour, and had no better success. I claimed brevets for the following actions: The battle of La Cole's mill—General Wilkinson told me, for my gallant conduct, that he would remember me. In the summer of 1814, on the day the gallant Forsyth fell, I, with fifteen riflemen, led the enemy's force, of about seven or eight hundred strong, into an ambuscade, in such a manner that, if Forsyth had obeyed his orders, not a man of them would have escaped to have told the story; for which General T. A. Smith sent for me, and offered me brevet rank, which I declined. A few weeks after I dispersed a party of the enemy of more than my number, killed their advanced guard, and wounded and took prisoner their chief, an Indian chief by the name of Malaun. He was a celebrated chief; and to show you how much the British thought of him, they asked his body of General Smith, and had it buried in splendid style; for this General Smith sent for me again, and offered me brevet rank again; which I again declined. Well, sir, for the battle of Plattsburg I respectfully refer you to Major General Macomb, and also to a letter of his that is on file at the War Department at Washington; it was written to me and placed on file by me in 1826. For these few battles I was promised the brevet rank. Since then, in 1823, at the battle of the Arickarees, General Leavenworth recommended me to be brevetted to a major.—(See his report on file at the War Department.) Again, on the Santa Fé road, August 3, 1829, when I defeated eight hundred Indians with one hundred and fifty, and killed and wounded forty of them; and again defeated them on the 10th November. Sir, if I had received brevets for all these actions only, I should have been a colonel by brevet, September 11, 1834. And now, sir, all I ask is, to be brevetted for war services, to take effect at either of the dates—September 11, 1814, August 3, 1829; to be lieutenant colonel by brevet. I had a talk with General Jackson in 1831; and if I understood him, he would have sent my name to the Senate if they would have passed the list for brevets which he had furnished them; before he told me he would not send my name to them until they had passed what he had sent them; but if they would pass them, he would send mine. If you will be so good as to see Governor Miller, he is a strong friend of mine, and can tell you more than anybody else on the subject. I am more anxious at this time than I was heretofore, for I wish my son, when he grows up, to see and hear that his father has served his country honestly and faithfully, by gallantry. My services are well known; but I wish my name to be on the records of my country for gallant services; and if you will be so kind as to use your influence with those other gentlemen, you will lay me under everlasting obligations to you; and my son, as he grows up, and can appreciate your services to his father, shall be taught to mention your name with gratitude, and to consider you one of his best friends. I am convinced that I am asking a great deal, but I know your kindness, and that you will do anything that is in your power for a soldier. If Mrs. Linn is with you, be so good as to make my kindest regards to her.

If, sir, you should want any information as it respects this country, you must let me know; I should be pleased to hear from you during the session, and after, as often as you feel at leisure to do so; I should like to know what is going on. On the 4th of March last, about twelve o'clock, we gave Matty and old Tecumseh twenty-six roarsers. Whether you succeed for me or not, you will have my eternal gratitude.

I have the honor to be, with great respect and esteem, your obedient servant,

B. RILEY, *Major United States Army.*

HON. LEWIS F. LINN, *Senator of the United States.*

St. Louis, August 14, 1837.

SIR: The exposed situation of a frontier of at least a thousand miles in extent has attracted our serious attention to the dangers which constantly threaten our border citizens, from the proximity of the Indians and the facility with which they can strike any moment they please.

We are desirous of collecting, from such sources as can throw light upon the subject, all the information that may lead to a full and complete knowledge of its exposed condition, for the purpose of inducing the general government to give it that protection which may be absolutely necessary to its safety. Your long services in the army, which to a great extent have been connected with Indians and Indian affairs, your acquaintance with their manners and habits, and your knowledge of their character, must be of a description calculated to give correct information upon a subject which has been greatly embarrassed for the want of a proper understanding of it. We would, therefore, very respectfully request the favor of you to give us your views of the force that you think is actually necessary for the complete protection of the frontier, accompanied with such remarks relative to a cordon of posts, their distance from each other, &c., &c., as you may think necessary.

With sentiments of regard, we are, very respectfully, your obedient servants,

L. F. LINN.

A. G. HARRISON.

Major General EDMUND P. GAINES.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DIVISION, St. Louis, August 14, 1837.

GENTLEMEN: I take much pleasure in complying with the request contained in your letter of this date, convinced as I am that your views of the *letter and spirit* of the Constitution and laws of the United States, regarding the *protection of the frontier*, are in accordance with those by which I have been governed; that you are in favor of a system of protection, the work of which should commence before the work of *destruction* is finished or in progress, and the exterior line of frontier inhabitants cut off, as it was in East Florida during the winter of 1835 and 1836.

To obviate a similar catastrophe upon the western frontier, bordered as it is with savages, for the most part deeply wounded, and to some extent exasperated at what they deem to be our hostility and injustice, in urging them to abandon the lands of their ancestors; savages who have profited, as every portion of the human family have profited, by the lessons they have taken from us in the school of adversity, and thus prepared for a spirited attack on the frontier; savages sufficiently numerous, when combined, to lay waste hundreds of miles of our frontier settlements in a shorter time than the news of their hostility could possibly reach the seat of the federal government, and even before the State governments of the west could possibly provide the means of defence. I am decidedly of the opinion that, in addition to the posts and garrisons already placed upon the frontier between the mouth of the Sabine and the Missouri rivers, inclusively, there should be held ready for action a disposable force of six thousand men; of which one regiment of dragoons and one of infantry should be stationed at Fort Leavenworth; an equal force at some healthy point to be selected on Grand river, near the southwest angle of the State of Missouri; an equal force on the northwestern waters of the Red river, near the mouth of the False Washita; and the residue on the waters of the Sabine.

The points to be selected for the location of all military posts, and more especially for the proposed *disposable force*, should be guarded by law from the ruinous attacks of whiskey-traders, by placing under the entire control of the commanding officers a township of public land, of which the posts should be on the centre section. If it is true that nine-tenths of the crimes committed in the army during the last thirty-seven years have been occasioned either directly or indirectly by the improper use of spirituous liquors, (and I am convinced of the truth of this opinion,) then what other argument is necessary to show the expediency of affording the commandants of posts the means of cutting off all intercourse between the traders and soldiers? And why should the proposed reservation of a township of public land for each frontier post be objected to? The land would receive no injury. On the contrary, it would be greatly benefited, inasmuch as it would, with some little attention, become more and more valuable every year, by the planting and growth on the prairie of black locust and black walnut for building ships and steamboats, and by other improvements, among which I may mention corn, pasture, and meadow lands, from which our dragoons may be supplied with forage; to which I may also add orchards and gardens, which will contribute greatly to the health and comfort of the troops.

The proposed frontier posts might be converted into military schools, for the instruction of many of the aspiring youths of the neighboring States, unable to obtain admission into the Military Academy at West Point.

Let good barracks be constructed, and place at each post the requisite professors, as at West Point, to be selected from among the graduates of that institution, and then receive from each regiment of militia of the neighboring counties a few cadets for four years; they would often be usefully employed in doing garrison duty, as a part of their instruction, particularly during a state of war, when the troops are called off upon active service. Graduates from such schools of the west would prove to be in nowise inferior to the graduates from West Point.

Promising myself the pleasure of addressing you again upon the subject of your interesting communication, (being now much occupied with other duties,)

I have the honor to be, with very great respect, your most obedient servant,

EDMUND P. GAINES.

Hons. L. F. LINN,

A. G. HARRISON,

St. Louis, Missouri.

FULTON, June 3, 1837.

SIR: The object of this communication is to solicit from you such information in relation to the military force necessary for the complete protection of the frontier of Missouri, Arkansas, &c., as you may have it in your power to give us. We are flattered, from your location on the frontier, the length of time you have been on one post or the other of it, from your knowledge of the number of Indians on our borders, of their character for the faithless observance of their promises and treaties, and of the present and past meagre military force upon our frontier, that you can give us much information that will be useful and interesting. It is our opinion that the military force usually stationed on the western and southwestern frontier is very far from being sufficient. Your opportunities have been of the most ample kind for observations on this head, and will doubtless accompany such conclusions as you have come to with great weight and influence. In the important trust which, in part, has been placed in our hands, we feel that there is no duty of a higher and more sacred character than that of trying every means and using every exertion which our situation can possibly put within our reach to have extended to our exposed and neglected frontier the protection which shall place its security for the future beyond the possibility of doubt or solicitude. Such as we have has been sparingly given; such as we want will be withheld, we fear, without proof as clear as positive demonstration. Millions have been expended for the protection of commerce; our navy has been increased avowedly for this purpose. This is right. We have ourselves lent a feeble assistance to this great object. It is but the fulfilling of one of the great purposes of government. But when protection is sought for by the people of the west—those whose boldness and daring, whose toils and sufferings, whose labor and improvements, have opened the forests and made valuable the lands of the government—those, in truth, who have been invited to our utmost western limits by the government itself, in offering its lands for sale there, how cold and indifferent the conduct of the government! How reluctant to move upon the subject! Can it be possible that such circumstances are not sufficient to entitle any civilized people on earth to the protection of their government? And if *such* be sufficient to attract the favorable notice of the government, how much more are they entitled to the fullest protection, whose misfortune it is to have settled where it is the policy of the government to place thousands of the most restless and implacable enemies the white man ever had? Such, exactly, is the condition of the settler upon the western frontier. He is innocent of the causes that have led to this necessity. If there are grounds for it, the government itself is guilty. Such are our views. To impress them favorably upon those who have the power to give us the necessary aid is the object of the information we seek. We hope, therefore, that you will do us the favor to give us at length the opinions which you have as to the force that is necessary to insure complete protection to the western frontier.

We have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servants,

L. F. LINN.
A. G. HARRISON.

Colonel STEPHEN W. KEARNEY.

FORT LEAVENWORTH, June 20, 1837.

GENTLEMEN: Your communication of the 6th instant, asking my opinion of "the military force necessary for the complete protection of the frontier of Missouri, Arkansas," &c., has been received, and, forming as you do a part of the representation in Congress of the State and people of Missouri, (so deeply interested in the subject,) I feel bound to give you my views, to be used as you may deem proper or expedient.

The preliminary measures to protecting the frontier are to have the limits of the frontier definitely settled. This is not the case with the country between the Mississippi and Missouri rivers, and I think that as early as possible the northern boundary of the State of Missouri should be marked out, and that the commissioners for laying out the "military road," as directed by an act of Congress of the 2d of July last, should be informed if the Territory of Wisconsin, (west of the Mississippi,) subject to be settled by the whites, is to continue as its present boundary, or, if to be extended by further purchase of land from the Indians, where the permanent boundary will probably be. The above boundaries being determined upon and finally fixed, (the remainder of the frontier, viz: that between the Missouri and Red rivers, is already so,) the "military road," as above alluded to, should be laid out in the Indian country, along and within a short distance of the line separating it from the Territory of Wisconsin and the States of Missouri and Arkansas. Upon this road should be erected strong and permanent military works, garrisoned by infantry or artillery, and should be such as at a glance would convince the Indians of the folly of attacking them and of the danger they would incur by passing to the rear of them. Besides the stores necessary for their own garrisons, those works should hold in depot rations and forage for the dragoons and their horses, when visited by them on their march along this road. These I would station on the flanks and in the centre, and, when the season permitted, a portion of them should be constantly moving on the road.

The strength of the force necessary to be stationed at the "works," as above recommended, though a matter of great importance and consideration, it is obvious that even military men may differ about. I would therefore suggest that there should be one regiment of infantry or artillery and one of dragoons to garrison the works and guard the frontier between the Mississippi and Missouri rivers; one regiment of infantry or artillery and one of dragoons between the Missouri and Osage, and two regiments of infantry or artillery and one of dragoons between the Osage and Red rivers; thus giving, for a frontier of about one thousand miles, four regiments of infantry or artillery and three of dragoons. As the military road is by law to stop at Red river, and as I suppose you do not ask my opinion of the country south of it, I shall say nothing about it.

I am aware that the above estimate of force to guard the frontier will to some persons appear too large and to others too small; but when we reflect that the question is not what force has hitherto been stationed along the frontier, but what force is necessary there; not how much longer will the mercy of the Indians permit our weak garrisons to continue to exist near them, but how strong should they be to command the respect and have a control upon the actions of the Indians; when we take into consideration the distance of about one thousand miles, contiguous to which the policy of the government has

settled a very large and restless body of Indians, their well known treacherous and unfriendly feelings for the white men, it will be conceded, as I think, by most persons, upon reflection, that the foregoing estimate is at least within the necessary bounds.

It is well known that the cause of most of the difficulties we have had with the Indians may be traced to the lawless acts of some white men amongst them; and that in consequence of the distance to the civil courts, and the impossibility of getting witnesses before them, such acts very often go unpunished, and therefore stimulate others to the commission of new ones. I am therefore most decidedly of the opinion that if Congress would by law authorize that offences against the act of June 30, 1834, entitled "An act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, and to preserve peace on the frontier," may be tried by military courts, should the offender be apprehended in the Indian country, such authority would do more to preserve peace on the frontier than many additional regiments.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. W. KEARNEY, *Colonel First Regiment of Dragoons.*

Hon. L. F. LINN and A. G. HARRISON, *Fulton, Missouri.*

FULTON, June 3, 1837.

GENTLEMEN: We have taken the liberty of addressing you, for the purpose of getting such information as you may be able to give, in relation to the military force that is necessary for the protection of our western and southwestern frontier. The long residence of some of you among the Indians, and the knowledge which you all, as Indian agents, doubtless possess of their numbers, their character, and habits, have enabled you to form conclusions on this subject which but very few have had the opportunity of doing. Besides, you are well acquainted with the extent of our frontier and its defenceless condition. As we are collecting information on this subject, with the view of a future operation in Congress, we respectfully request a communication from each of you, giving your views as to the military force that is necessary for the permanent peace and security of the whole line of our frontier.

Should there be other Indian agents living within reach of you, whose names we have not here included, you will please forward them a copy of this for their reply.

We have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servants,

L. F. LINN.

A. G. HARRISON.

Messrs. A. S. HUGHES, JOHN F. DOUGHERTY, JOSHUA PILCHER, M. CUMMINS, W. N. FULKERSON.

INDEPENDENCE, *Missouri, November 25, 1837.*

DEAR SIR: I have just returned from a fifteen days' campaign, which was for the purpose of removing a considerable number of Osage Indians without the limits of the State. A number of the citizens on our southern frontier, say in the neighborhood of Old Harmony Mission, petitioned the governor of our State for relief. The governor cited them to the major general, Samuel D. Lucas, of this place, and, at the same time, instructed the general to hold a certain amount of his command in readiness at the call of said citizens, which call was made on the major general, who ordered into service two brigades, one of which I had the honor to command. The major general, S. D. Lucas, for the purpose of having good order and subordination, as well as to try to remove said Indians without bloodshed, took the command in person, and, with a great deal of caution, has at the present effected the object aforesaid, though, without some immediate and prompt measures, our whole western Missouri will be overwhelmed in a general war with the different tribes of Indians. The Osage Indians have been for some time committing outrage after outrage on the stock of our frontier citizens, which, I discovered whilst out there, caused a fixed determination in our citizens to stand it no longer, and, of course, war must ensue. I consider one great evil exists out there: there are many Indians, French, &c., living near the line, who are in the habit of keeping spirituous liquors. A great portion of them have full-blooded Osage Indian squaws as pretended wives. A Mr. Jarreu, a trader for the American Fur Company, who lives some fifteen or twenty miles from the line, has an Osage squaw for a wife, though not married to her, and lives sixty or seventy miles from any place of civil or military law. He has divers French around him, who sell liquor to the Indians. They come in and remain six or eight days; then they are starved almost to death, and, of course, must fall on the first cow or hog they may meet with; and, while out there, General Lucas ordered said squaws to be put without the limits of the State, as other Osage Indians, though Captain Mitchell, while on his way with them to camp, fell in with a command of dragoons; under the command of Captain Sumner, who, with force of arms, took said squaws and ordered them back to Mr. Jarreu's. The next day after General Lucas, with his command, had put over the line some three hundred Indians, and on the march back met with Captain Sumner and his command, who informed General Lucas he would use his endeavors to keep said Indians without the State; also informed General Lucas he had left a guard at Mr. Jarreu's with said squaws, &c.; that said guard and prisoners were subject to his order. General Lucas proceeded on to the Harmony Mission-house, near said Jarreu's, and despatched Colonel Thomas Pitcher, with a small command, to receive said prisoners; but when arriving there, it seemed Captain Sumner, though a dragoon officer of the United States, had given the guard particular instruction not to let General Lucas nor any other persons have said prisoners, which was directly in contradiction to what he had told the general. He (the said general) being on his march for home, and this same twenty-five or thirty from Captain Sumner, and wishing to put the government to as little expense as possible, concluded to disband his troops, and leave the matter for the government and Captain Sumner to arrange. I am authorized, from good authority, to say to you that Captain Sumner yet has a guard to keep any person from driving said squaws without the limits of the State. Such conduct as this, you are well apprised, the citizens of Missouri will not suffer. It seems as though it has been the policy of the government to place on our immediate frontier almost all the different tribes of Indians. Be it so. No objection; but we claim from that government that protection which the laws of

our land guarantee to us free and independent citizens. The commanding officer at Fort Leavenworth was informed by one of the commissioners of Indian affairs that difficulty was likely to arrive, and was requested to send an officer to see General Lucas, or at least to inquire what was likely to be the result. He sent down Lieutenant Chilton, who got all the information which General Lucas had in his possession, which was a petition from the citizens of Bates county praying for relief, as well as an order from the commander-in-chief to hold his command in readiness. Why did not the commanding officer at Fort Leavenworth immediately despatch a portion of his command and have the matter adjusted, instead of having the militia dragged from their homes to relieve the property of their fellow-citizens from the tomahawk of the savage Osages, who are threatening the lives of the citizens of Bates county, if they molested them when they came in to kill their stock? And I have no doubt but if General Lucas had went out with a few men, he would have had them fellows to have flogged severely before they would have surrendered, as I discovered at all times, when coming across a party of them, they evinced considerable hostility. Some of them even went so far as to cock their guns for war. The citizens of Bates county complain, and say the dragoon officers do not care anything about their interests, merely march out for fine show, and to cut some fine military swells, and return, and leave them and the Indians to fight it out.

I am bound to think, without some immediate remedy, our country will be mulct in a general war with the Indians on our west, as you well know when one Indian begins all are on the move; and it seems to me it would be a very wrong time to have to spend several millions of dollars at this critical moment of money matters, when it could otherwise be done.

I have the honor to be yours, &c.,

M. G. WILSON.

A. G. HARRISON, Esq.

FORT COFFEE, WEST OF ARKANSAS, *September 10, 1837.*

SIR: As I have been for a number of years travelling along the whole extent of our frontier, and have visited most of the different tribes of Indians from our settlement as far west as the Rocky mountains, I have been requested by a number of individuals to give my views in regard to the protection of the frontier and the policy which should govern our relations with the various Indian tribes upon our border; and as there is no person who has taken a greater interest in frontier matters than yourself, I have taken the liberty of addressing this letter to you. If it contains any suggestions that may be of service, it will be a source of great gratification to me that I have afforded some information upon a subject of such great importance to the western people.

The plan of opening a military road along the whole extent of the frontier, and establishing a cordon of posts, which was introduced into the Senate by yourself, is an excellent one, and meets with the approbation of the frontier people generally; not much, however, has yet been done towards carrying it into effect. The dragoons should be constantly kept patrolling along this road, to enforce the non-intercourse law and prevent the introduction of spirituous liquors into the Indian country. There is but little doubt that most of our Indian wars have been occasioned by outlawed white people, who have fled to the frontiers, located themselves among the Indians, and married Indian wives. They introduce whiskey into the Indian country, and sell it to the Indians at an enormous price; the Indians get drunk, commence quarrelling, and in this state of excitement commit acts of depredation which in many cases lead to war.

In addition to the present force, I think there should be a regiment of riflemen raised, to be mounted in case of an Indian war. They should be armed with good rifles. This has been proved to be the most effectual weapon against Indians. The officers of the regiment should be hardy and enterprising men, possessing a knowledge of the frontier country, and acquainted with Indian character. Officers of infantry who have been stationed a long time on the frontier should have the senior appointments. The whole of these troops should be placed under the command of a general of experience, who should have his headquarters on the military road, as nearly central as possible. Detachments of troops should be sent out into the Indian country every summer. In this way the officers would acquire a knowledge of the topography of the country, and become acquainted with Indian character, both of which would be essentially requisite to combat them successfully. A few presents should be taken along to conciliate the wild Indians, and to let them know that we are friendly disposed towards them. These detachments should have directions to arrest all persons in the Indian country trading without a license, and all those who abuse their licenses by cheating and abusing the Indians; much disturbance would by this means be prevented. With regard to the government of the Indians, I think there should be either a governor and secretary, or a general superintendent of all the Indians on the frontier west of the military road. He should be located on this road, as nearly central as possible, so that he could communicate in a short time, by means of expresses on the road, with every portion of the frontier. The superintendencies and acting superintendencies now established in that portion of the country should be abolished, and all our frontier relations intrusted to this general superintendent or governor, who should make an annual report of the condition of the Indians in his superintendency. This method would insure a uniformity of action and views with regard to our Indian relations, which cannot be obtained so long as there are so many little acting superintendencies, the appointments to which are filled with men of such various and conflicting views. This governor, having the general superintendence of all Indian matters on the frontier, would be able to settle the little jarring interests of the different tribes, and reconcile their animosities, and thus prevent much bloodshed among them. This cannot be done by a commissioner so remote as Washington, who cannot be supposed to possess much knowledge of Indian character, or the various causes of these difficulties. Having one common governor to whom to refer all their difficulties, and who would establish the same rules and regulations over all, it would tend to produce a uniformity of views, and they would be induced to co-operate in measures to their mutual advantage, and which would tend to a gradual amelioration of their condition. Every two years there should be a general council or congress, to consist of a delegation of all the different tribes of Indians, to assemble at some central point in the Indian country; they could then and there communicate their various wants to the government, through the superintendent or governor, while he, at that time, could communicate the views of the government with regard to them. The wild Indian of the north and extreme west could here meet his more

civilized brethren of the south, and seeing the beneficent effects of civilization in the improved condition of these Indians, he might be induced to follow their example, and cultivate the arts of civilization himself. They could here hold their feasts and dances together, settle their little animosities with each other, and part with mutual good will. The Indians, like all other people, are fond of excitement. They have ambitious men among them who are desirous of distinction; and as they have but little opportunity to shine as statesmen and orators, their ambition leads them to excel in warlike exploits, which, no doubt, is the cause of many of the wars among themselves and with the whites. This grand council will be considered a great event in the lives of the Indians, and their principal warriors will be very desirous of being sent as delegates to it, which will lead their minds from warlike exploits, and direct their ambition to other roads of distinction. When this is acquired, one great step is taken towards their advancement in civilization, and the amelioration of their condition. In a short time, if such should be the policy of the government, they might, at this general council, elect delegates to Congress, which would open a new field of ambition for them. Many other advantages will arise from this plan, which will at once occur to you, and I will not, therefore, trouble you with an enumeration of them. The establishment of schools among the Indians is a subject of great importance in effecting their civilization, and it has been too much neglected. There ought to be good schools, and a large number of them, established among all the different Indian tribes. The only way of working a permanent and effectual civilization among them is to educate them when young. The good effect of schools has been experienced with the Cherokees and Choctaws, among whom there are many intelligent men.

I have not entered much into the detail of this plan, and it may require changes and alterations; such as it is, however, and with the faint hope of being of some service to the public, I have submitted it to your perusal.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

G. P. KINGSBURY.

Hon. LEWIS F. LANN, *Washington.*

FORT LEAVENWORTH, *June 27, 1837.*

GENTLEMEN: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication, dated Fulton, June 3, 1837, addressed to General A. S. Hughes and myself.

You wish to know my opinion as to the military force necessary for the protection of our western and southwestern frontier. This is a subject in which I feel interested, and have for several years back; and I am rejoiced to see that you, gentlemen, are about to lay your strong congressional hands, without gloves, on this all-important matter. I will therefore proceed, without delay, to give you some of my views relating to it.

I am of the opinion that six thousand troops are necessary to give the protection you allude to. The State of Missouri is, as you well know, one of the frontier States; two sides of it are unprotected, except by a small force at Fort Leavenworth. The government are still sending out tribes of red-skins, and locating them on her frontier border; this is well enough, provided the government will give the necessary protection. The tribes who emigrate to this country do so contrary to their own free will, and are, at heart, the bitter enemies of the white man.

It is the intention of the government to make and keep peace between the tribes and these wild original inhabitants of the country; this is correct, also; indeed, humanity demands it, because they would, if permitted to carry on war among themselves, not only cut to pieces and destroy each other, but the property of our own citizens would be endangered likewise. It should be well remembered, however, by the great and wise men of our nation, that so soon as peace and good will is established between what I call the tame and the wild Indians, they will form combinations together, and fall on our helpless frontier people, knife and tomahawk in hand; and, when once the fray commences, there is no knowing when or where it may end.

On the north of our State, and between the Missouri and Mississippi rivers, we have 5,000 or 6,000 Sacs and Foxes, about 20,000 Sioux, and some 1,400 or 1,500 Ioways, and it is strongly spoken of that we are to have some 6,000 or 7,000 Pottawatomies and Winnebagoes located along the same line; then, on the west, we have near 3,000 tame Kickapoos, Delawares, Shawnees, and other small bands; and we have about 1,500 Kansas, 1,600 or 2,000 Ottoes, 2,000 Omahas, 500 Piankeshaws, 2,000 Shawnees, 2,000 Sioux, 11,000 or 12,000 Pawnees of the Platte, 1,800 Kiowas, 3,000 Arrapahoes, 5,000 Osages, and then some 10,000 Pawnees, Picks, and Comanches, who roam from west of Missouri to south of Arkansas; and, besides all these tribes, we have on the Missouri river and back, running along the Rocky mountains, some 15,000 Blackfeet, 3,000 Crows, and about 2,500 Mandans and Gros Ventres, (or Minatories,) 2,500 Arickarees, and 10,000 Snakes of the Rocky mountains. Then, further south, along the State of Arkansas, we have Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws, Seminoles, &c., by the thousand; I am unable to say how many; we will suppose 20,000. Remember that all these tribes inhabit the country between the west side of the Mississippi and Red river; they are bounded on the west by the Rocky mountains, and on the east by the States of Missouri and Arkansas. The Missouri river runs through this tract of country, dividing it into two nearly equal parts, from east to west, and four-fifths of all the Indians above enumerated reside on the Missouri and its waters. The only military force, from the mouth to the head of this mighty river, swarming on both sides by thousands, yes, tens of thousands, of blood-thirsty savages, has, for the last four years, not exceeded four companies! Yes, 200 men to protect a line of frontier people, extended from Prairie du Chien to Fort Gibson, a distance of about 700 miles, against all these blood-thirsty red-skins; and they, too, goaded on one side by our whiskey merchants and fur-traders, and on the other by our trappers in the mountains. Can any man, who has been a witness to the mischief done by old Black Hawk, and 400 or 500 of his followers, in the course of one season, surrounded as he was, too, on all sides, by whites and unfriendly Sioux, doubt, for a moment, that our extensive and unprotected western frontier is in imminent danger, daily and hourly, of being attacked by some or all of these wild, revengeful, active, and daring bloodhounds?

We ought to have four companies of infantry and two of dragoons stationed at Prairie du Chien or St. Peter's; the same number on the Des Moines river, above the Missouri State line; an equal number on the Missouri river, near the mouth of Big Platte; the same at Fort Leavenworth, and on the waters of the

Osage, somewhere above Harmony Mission; also, on the Neosho, above the State line, in the Osage country; and a like number at Forts Gibson, Smith, Jesup, and Towson. These troops, strung along in this way, would give perfect security to the frontier, from the lakes in the north to Red river in the south. At each of the locations mentioned it would require a well-made, compact garrison, to be held by the infantry, while the dragoons should be kept constantly travelling from post to post, on a good road made for the purpose, with the necessary ferries and bridges. There should be a regular mail running on this road, going and coming from post to post, bringing news from the Spanish dominions in the south, and from the British in the north. The dragoons travelling on this road every day, with strict orders to prevent all whiskey smugglers from going into the Indian country, and all Indians from coming into the white settlements, would have the effect of putting a stop to a traffic which is the origin of all evil and difficulty between the white and red men.

There should be one superintendent of Indian affairs located on this road at some central point; there should be one Indian agent stationed within a few miles of each of these military posts. The superintendent and agents should have the sole control of the Indians; and, in order to prevent the demoralizing effect that military garrisons generally have on Indians, they should not be allowed to hold any intercourse whatever with the troops, except when it becomes necessary for the troops to chastise them. The moment you permit soldiers and Indians to mingle together, that moment the latter lose all fear and respect for the former. Indians should never be permitted to enter a military station, except the chiefs, and then only when business of importance required it. The United States troops should be held up before the Indian tribes, by the government, as the rod of correction; the Indians should be made to understand that agents are sent among them to advise them and make the views of the government known to them, and to offer peace and protection on certain conditions, and that, when those conditions are wilfully violated on their part, the troops will be let loose upon them.

Give superintendents and agents good salaries, repose confidence in them, clothe them with considerable discretionary powers, and then you will find men of honor and capacity seeking these offices; and when you are disappointed in your man, appoint another in his stead, and so on until you have all good ones. One agent in the vicinity of each frontier military post would be sufficient to transact all our affairs with the Indians. All offences or violations of law, of whatever kind, committed in the Indian country should be tried by a military court and promptly punished.

The expediency of organizing an Indian territory at this time, with a view to bring the wild Indians under legal restrictions, is, in my opinion, very doubtful; before this can be done they must be taught to work, read and write, and be weaned from the chase. To effect this great change, you must locate among them a number of good, honest, and industrious teachers, farmers, and mechanics, all of good moral character, and placed under the exclusive direction of the agent, so long as he conducts the affairs of his agency properly. At the same time this is going on, the government should hold out inducements calculated to urge the Indians on to labor; there should be a store or stock of the best kind of Indian goods kept at each agency, to be given out, at cost and carriage, to the Indians individually, or to heads of families, in payment of annuities due them from the United States. They should be made to understand that they would find sale for every bushel of corn, pound of beef or pork, they might have to sell to the government for supplying the troops at these several military posts. Before the government can exercise the necessary control over Indian tribes, some plan must be adopted calculated to lessen the powerful influence that large trading companies have over the Indians. These large trading companies break down all opposition in trade, get whatever price they may choose to impose upon their goods, and, of course, oppose any measure of the government relating to Indians, because every step taken to settle the Indians down and civilize them is in direct opposition to the interest of the trader; therefore, I say, something must be done to weaken the control the traders have over the minds of the ignorant Indians before anything can be done towards bettering their condition. You ask what ought to be done to effect this great object? I will tell you. Let the general government take these ignorant savages into its own hands, and furnish them with every article of trade at cost and charges; this, of course, would drive the traders from among the Indians in a short time, and leave the government alone to control them as so many children. Thus, with a line of forts, garrisoned by infantry, along the frontier settlements, from north to south, with two companies of dragoons at each, with their horses in good order, ready to pursue and chastise, or bring to justice, all violators of law, be they white, red, or black; with a good road, and a mail running from post to post, bringing all Indian news from the north and south to the superintendent and to the military officer placed in command of the whole line of posts, the frontier would be rendered secure. Both superintendent and commanding officer should be located at or near Fort Leavenworth. The Indians supplied with teachers, farmers, and mechanics of every necessary kind, and furnished with all kinds of necessary articles of merchandise at cost and carriage; the influence of the fur-traders done away with, and ardent spirits kept away, I have no hesitation in believing that everything would glide along smoothly and peaceably between us and the red-skins, and that, in a few years, many of the Indian tribes would become sufficiently civilized to make a beginning at self-government, under some simple code of laws, and in course of time become capable of furnishing a representative in the United States councils; but, until something of this kind is done, I venture to predict that all the money, time, and labor which the government may bestow on these miserable tribes for the next fifty years to come will prove unavailing.

The government has gone on and crowded these tribes upon our borders without consulting us, therefore we are entitled to protection. We should be enabled to lie down at night in our humble huts, on the most extreme frontier, with our wives and white-headed children, in perfect security.

You have now, gentlemen, the views of one who has been on the frontier for the last twenty-nine years, acting in various capacities among many different tribes of Indians. Should you deem the rough suggestions here thrown out of any consequence I shall be much gratified, and give you the liberty to see them as to you may seem best.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. DOUGHERTY, *Indian Agent.*

HON. L. F. LINN.

HON. A. G. HARRISON.

HEADQUARTERS 1ST DEPARTMENT, *Western Division of the Army, Jefferson Barracks, August 22, 1837.*

GENTLEMEN: I have had the honor of receiving your joint letter of the 14th instant, asking my opinion of the force necessary for the complete protection of our northern and southwestern frontier. Being long familiar with the extent of our frontier and the number and character of the border Indians, I can feel no hesitation in answering your inquiries, with a strong confidence in my judgment on the subject. In speaking of the northwestern and southern frontier, I embrace a line from the upper lakes of the Mississippi, including Green Bay, Forts Winnebago, Crawford, and Snelling, at the falls of St. Anthony, and from the latter post, southwest, to a point on the Missouri river, where the State line will intersect it; thence down on the southwest side of the river, to Fort Leavenworth, thence south to Fort Gibson on the Arkansas river, Fort Towson on Red river, and on the same line to Sabine river, and down that stream to its mouth. Upon this line, northeast of the Mississippi, reside the Menomonees, Winnebagoes, Chippewas, and some small tribes from the State of New York. The Menomonees number about four hundred warriors, the Winnebagoes six hundred, the Chippewas two thousand; all restless and warlike tribes, and generally well armed with the rifle and northwest smooth-bored gun. The part of the Sioux on our border reside on the Mississippi and St. Peter's rivers, and in the plains bordering our northwestern line. They may be estimated at seven hundred to eight hundred warriors, broken into many small bands; they are warlike, and armed generally with guns. The Sacs and Foxes reside on the Iowa and Des Moines rivers, midway between the Mississippi and Missouri; they number one thousand two hundred warriors, well armed with rifles, mostly; they are proud, imperious, and brave. The Pottawatomies of Chicago reside now on the Missouri river, thirty or forty miles above the State line; they have fifteen hundred warriors, they are warlike, and are armed with guns. The Omahas reside some fifty miles from Council Bluff, on the northwest side of the Missouri river; they have five hundred warriors, armed partly with guns and partly with bows and arrows; they were once brave and warlike, but are supposed to have lost some of their high character in deeds of arms. The Pawnees of the Platte reside on that river, some seventy miles above its mouth; they are accounted two thousand warriors, armed with guns and bows and arrows, and are brave and warlike. The Otoes and Missourias, now one band, reside on the Platte, four miles from its mouth; they are generally well armed with guns, and are very brave and warlike; they are estimated at two hundred warriors. The Sacs and Ioways of the Missouri reside at the mouth of Wolf river, on the southwestern bank of Missouri river, and seventy miles above Fort Leavenworth; they number three hundred warriors, well armed; next below are the Kickapoos, five miles above Fort Leavenworth, who have two hundred warriors. The Shawnees and Delawares reside on the Kansas river, near its mouth; they number six hundred brave warriors, well armed. The Kansas Indians reside some seventy miles up the Kansas river, they have four hundred warriors, armed partly with guns and partly with bows and arrows. On the Osage and Neosho rivers are the Pottawatomies of Indiana, Senecas, Weas, Piankeshaws, Peorias, and Kaskaskias and Ottawas, estimated in the whole to have three hundred warriors. The Osages on the Neosho and Verdigris rivers have eleven hundred warriors, armed with guns and bows and arrows. The Cherokees who have emigrated, and reside below Fort Gibson, are estimated at fifteen hundred warriors. The Creeks who have emigrated, and reside on the Verdigris and on the Canadian fork of Arkansas, may be estimated at eight thousand warriors. The Choctaws on the Canadian fork and on Red river have three thousand five hundred warriors. The Quapaws have one hundred and fifty warriors; they reside on the Neosho. The Caddoes reside upon the Texas frontier, below Fort Towson, and are numbered at three hundred warriors.

Remote from our border are the Sioux of the Upper Missouri, estimated variously at from four thousand to six thousand warriors. The Rickarees have joined the Mandans and Gros Ventres at their villages; the whole number not more than eight hundred warriors. The Chyans, on Chyan river, have six hundred warriors. The Crows, on the Big Horn of the Yellowstone, count eight hundred warriors. The Assinaboines are estimated at three thousand five hundred warriors, residing north of the Missouri river, towards Hudson's bay. The Arapahoos reside on the headwaters of the Arkansas river. The Comanches roam from the Rocky mountains down upon Red river; they are a numerous and warlike tribe. The Pawnee Picks reside among the mountains up Red river. All these tribes live too remote to come down upon our border settlements. I have not spoken of the Blackfeet and other mountain tribes, being little known and too distant to excite any apprehension.

I should estimate the Indians on our border, who are situated to deplete upon and annoy our frontier inhabitants along the northwestern line, from the Kansas river to the lakes, at ten thousand seven hundred warriors, and south of the Kansas to the Sabine river, at fourteen thousand six hundred and fifty warriors, besides the Chickasaws, Cherokees, and Creeks, who have not yet emigrated from Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama.

For the protection of the lake country, including Green Bay and Fort Winnebago, I should assign one infantry regiment of one thousand men. One regiment of infantry of one thousand men and two troops of dragoons for the posts on the Upper Mississippi, and one regiment of infantry of one thousand men and eight troops of dragoons for the posts on the Missouri river, and an intermediate post on the Osage or Neosho river.

For the protection of the Arkansas and Red river frontier, I would assign an infantry regiment of one thousand men and six troops of dragoons for the posts on the Arkansas river, one infantry regiment of one thousand men and four troops of dragoons for the posts on Red river, and one regiment of infantry of one thousand men for the posts on Sabine river, from Gaines's Ferry to its mouth.

The estimate for the posts on the Arkansas river is rather small, considering the vast accumulation of Indians in that quarter. The whole estimate for the posts, from the lakes to the mouth of Sabine river, may, however, be considered large, but it should be remembered that the regiments of infantry will hardly ever be kept up to eight hundred men, from the circumstance of discharges, desertion, &c.

Things, since the removal of the Pottawatomies to their own lands, appear tranquil on the frontier. There is, however, a war wampum afloat among the border tribes, and in its circulation since last fall has grown to an enormous size. I speak from undoubted information, but whether the combination is for operations against the whites or the Sioux, is not ascertained; some friendly chiefs have communicated a belief that it is against the whites. Under all circumstances, too much attention cannot be paid to the defence of the frontier.

With very great respect, gentlemen, I have the honor to be your most obedient servant,
H. ATKINSON, *Brigadier General United States Army.*

Hon. L. F. LINN, *United States Senate.*

Hon. A. G. HARRISON, *Member of the House of Representatives, Washington City.*

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 733.

[2D SESSION.]

APPLICATION OF SOUTH CAROLINA FOR AN APPROPRIATION FOR THE PRESERVATION OF SULLIVAN'S ISLAND AND THE SITE OF FORT MOULTRIE, IN CHARLESTON HARBOR, IN THAT STATE.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FEBRUARY 14, 1838.

The Charleston delegation, to whom was referred the memorial of James G. Holmes relative to the preservation of Sullivan's island, respectfully report:

That they have had the subject under consideration, and find that the constant inroads of the sea since the laying of the foundation of Fort Sumter are rapidly wearing away the western position of Sullivan's island, causing alterations in the channels and tending materially to impair the safety of Charleston harbor. They therefore recommend the adoption of the following resolutions:

Resolved, That the government of the United States be, and hereby is, requested and authorized to take all necessary measures for the prompt preservation of Sullivan's island against the inroads of the sea, and for the security of Charleston harbor.

Resolved, That the governor of this State be authorized and requested to open a correspondence with the government of the United States on this important subject, and to employ an agent or agents to make the necessary examinations, furnish the requisite information, and digest a plan to effect the object in view.

Resolved, That our senators and representatives in Congress be requested to use their best exertions to carry out these views, and that the governor be requested to transmit to them, and to the authorities at Washington, copies of these resolutions.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, *December 20, 1837.*

Resolved, That the house do agree
Ordered to the senate for concurrence.

By order:

T. W. GLOVER, *Clerk House of Representatives.*

IN SENATE, *December 20, 1837.*

Resolved, That the senate do concur.

By order:

JACOB WARLEY, *Clerk Senate.*

MEMORIAL OF JAMES G. HOLMES RELATIVE TO THE PRESERVATION OF SULLIVAN'S ISLAND.

To the honorable the senate and house of representatives of the State of South Carolina:

The memorial of the undersigned respectfully sheweth:

That from various causes, to some of which reference is here made, much injury has occurred to the bar and harbor of Charleston; that so long as the causes continue to operate with their past and present force, the injury is rapidly increasing, and that the only check will be the speedy application of means here referred to.

In order to understand fully the views here presented, reference is made to the chart of the harbor.

Schults's Folly is a marsh island, upon which Castle Pinckney is erected. Hog Island channel separates it from an extensive marsh which spreads in front of the main land between Hibben's and Milton Ferries. Before the formation of this channel Schults's Folly was no doubt the termination of the marsh referred to, and the united waters of Wando and Cooper rivers passed between that marsh and the city, uniting with Ashley river at White Point, off the battery, whence these united streams took a direct course, through north channel, across the bar to the ocean.

This course producing an eddy to the north and another to the south of the channel, caused the deposits of sand which formed Sullivan's island and Cummins's Point.

During the continuance of this state of the currents the channel between the marsh above referred to and the city was deep and wide, and was kept open by the rapidity of the stream, and north channel was the most important and fixed of all the channels on the bar.

Hog Island channel being once formed, another communication between Cooper river and the bar diverted part of the waters, which till then had flowed uninterrupted between the city and the marsh referred to.

By what means this communication was originally formed is not known or now material. It is certain that it has been greatly enlarged by being more direct than the former course, and by the great extension of city wharves, which, acting as jetties, throw the waters from the city to the opposite shore, in the very direction of this new channel.

Within a few years the width and depth of Hog Island channel have been greatly enlarged, and the western shores of Haddrell's Point and Sullivan's island most extensively destroyed.

Recently these effects are more striking, and being contemporaneous with the deposit of stone to form a foundation for Fort Sumter, leaves an impression, not easily removed, that the foundation of that fort has at least accelerated the destruction referred to.

Should the uninterrupted passage of water by the course thus formed continue, it is greatly feared that a few years, if not months, will effect a total change of the currents passing by our wharves; that Hog island will become the main channel, and the channel in front of our wharves be obstructed by large sand deposits; that the entire western portion of Sullivan's island, including Fort Moultrie, will be swept away, thus widening the entrance to our harbor, which must substitute sand-flats for the channels on the bar, and leave the harbor and the city exposed to the unchecked violence of destructive storms.

Having pointed out the difficulties to be surmounted, let us determine the proper authority and power to effect the objects proposed.

Our State has wisely refused to grant to individuals any portion of Sullivan's island, viewing it properly as an essential portion for the defence of the harbor and the protection of the channels on the bar. The owners of houses on that island are tenants at will of the State, and could claim no compensation for damages if all of their property on that island was destroyed, by order of the proper authorities, for the purpose of safety and defence. The city of Charleston has no further control within the harbor than in the regulation of vessels within its limits under an express act of the legislature. The quarantine laws are to be enforced by the governor when present, and by the city council only in his absence.

The protection of the harbor from invasion and the construction and regulation of light-houses, beacons, and buoys, to guide the mariner on the coast and in passing the bar, are all confided to the general government, for which purpose express laws of our State were required and have been enacted. The sites of not less than three forts have for appropriate purposes been ceded, under certain restrictions, to the general government; and the site of Fort Sumter, occupied without authority, will no doubt be likewise ceded, with proper limitations and conditions.

The points most material for the improvement of our harbor are those most important to its protection and to navigation—subjects committed to the general government by our own legislative enactments, independent of all power claimed by the general government.

If the passage through Hog Island channel was obstructed, it would materially increase the safe defence of our city from an invading navy. Acting upon this opinion, a temporary obstruction by sinking vessels in the channel was made during the revolutionary war, although at that time the channel was insignificant as compared with its present increased depth and width.

Sensible of the obligation to protect the property and the objects confided to their care, the general government, after the destruction of not less than three forts at the site of Fort Johnson and three at Fort Moultrie, have within a few years turned their attention to saving the site of the latter fort, and to the construction, upon a stone foundation, of Fort Sumter, as a substitute for Fort Johnson, the site of which latter is abandoned, and ought to be reclaimed to the State by the same act which grants the site of the former.

In the fact of the rapid destruction of the western part of Sullivan's island the United States engineers add their testimony to our own observation. In the effect to be produced, should it be entirely destroyed or greatly reduced in length from north to south by further encroachments of the sea, they fully concur with what is said above.

But without adverting to the causes which originally formed that island and the opposite shore, or those which have subsequently produced the rapid changes here referred to, they have limited their proposed plans for saving the site of Fort Moultrie to a local application of their means, instead of seeking to restore to their accustomed channels the waters which have been diverted, and which have produced the deplorable effects complained of. This course may, perhaps, have arisen from a conviction that, without the express authority of the State, the general government would necessarily be limited in their plans to the immediate points granted to them, especially after the embarrassment growing out of the location of Fort Sumter upon a covered sand-bar, not heretofore deemed within the operation of private grants, but which in this instance was seized upon by an individual under a grant, which effectually, for the time, stopped the progress of the work.

The United States have adopted, through the proper officers, an extensive and costly plan for saving the site of Fort Moultrie. This is as it should be, since nothing less could effect the object; but it is respectfully suggested as less efficient than the plan here proposed, and which, at least, is worthy of full examination. Unite Schultz's Folly with the marsh from which it has been separated, erect a sufficient barrier to the passage of water through Hog Island channel, restore the currents to their former course and check them from further change: we may then expect the reformation of the western part of Sullivan's island, and the channels on the bar will become fixed and deep, whilst the wharves of the city will be preserved more effectually from the operation of storms, and the channel in front remain deep enough. To effect these objects, it is respectfully suggested that an act be passed granting to the general government the necessary powers under proper restrictions; that the governor be authorized to employ a suitable agent or agents to make the necessary examinations and furnish the required information, and to prepare and digest a plan, which, when approved, shall be transmitted to Congress; and, if deemed requisite, that the agent proceed to Washington to enforce his views by such explanation as may be necessary.

As we are informed that an application will be made to the proper authorities at Washington for a sufficient appropriation to save the site of Fort Moultrie, as there are pending negotiations in relation to the site of Fort Sumter, and as the pilots of the harbor, as well as all others concerned, are now agitating this question, it is deemed that a more fit occasion will not be found for effecting the proposed plan.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 784.

[2D SESSION.]

APPLICATION OF MISSOURI FOR THE PAYMENT OF FOUR COMPANIES OF MOUNTED VOLUNTEERS EMPLOYED ON THE NORTHWESTERN FRONTIER OF THE STATE IN 1836.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FEBRUARY 14, 1838.

Memorial to the Congress of the United States.

Your memorialists, the general assembly of the State of Missouri, respectfully represent: That in the month of July, in the year 1836, there were ordered into service by the governor of this State four companies of mounted volunteers, for the purpose of protecting the northwestern frontier of this State, on which murders had been committed by the Indians. Two of these companies were raised in the county

of Ray, and consisted of one hundred men each. One of these companies was under the command of Captain William C. Pollard, and the other under the command of Captain John Sconce, and these two companies were under the command of Colonel Hiram G. Parks, colonel of the 22d regiment of Missouri militia. The other two companies were raised in the county of Clay, and consisted of one hundred men each; one company commanded by Captain David R. Atchison, the other by Captain Smith Crawford, and commanded by Colonel Shubal Allen, colonel of the 33d regiment of Missouri militia. These four companies repaired to the frontier, where they remained in active service of eighteen days, in the middle of summer. All these facts will more fully appear by reference to the returns made to the office of secretary of state of this State, and a copy of which has been heretofore forwarded to Congress and to the Secretary of War. We request your honorable body to make provision by law for the payment of these companies of volunteers thus ordered into service. No doubt can be entertained that the governor did what was his indispensable duty in ordering these companies into service. Our border was crowded with numerous Indian tribes; murder had already been commenced; the whole frontier was in commotion; families were removing daily to the interior, and the scenes of Florida were still acting before us. Under these circumstances, it became his duty to order the militia into immediate service.

It has been the policy of the general government to crowd the Indian tribes on our border, a policy we do not pretend to repudiate; but we ask that you may extend the arm of protection to guard us against evils incident to this policy, and to that end that you may make provision by law to pay these volunteers, called into service for that purpose alone. And your memorialists, as in duty, &c.

FEBRUARY 6, 1837.

OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE OF MISSOURI, *City of Jefferson, January 4, 1838.*

I, Peter G. Glover, secretary of state of the State of Missouri, do hereby certify that the foregoing is truly copied from the printed copies now on file in this office, the original rolls being destroyed.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my seal of office this 4th day of [L. s.] January, 1838.

PETER G. GLOVER.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *February 6, 1838.*

SIR: I have the honor to return you the memorial of the legislature of Missouri, enclosed in your letter of the 29th ultimo, and to transmit you a report on the subject from the paymaster general.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Hon. A. G. HARRISON, *House of Representatives.*

PAYMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, *February 2, 1838.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the reference to me for a report of the communication of the Hon. A. G. Harrison of the 29th ultimo, with the memorial of the legislature of Missouri, in relation to certain militia called out by the governor in the summer of 1836.

As the services of these troops were not called for by authority from the War Department, it will be necessary that Congress should sanction the payment before it is made; and, to enable Mr. Harrison to state to Congress the amount it will be necessary to appropriate for their payment, I herewith submit an estimate.

N. TOWSON, *Paymaster General.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

Estimate of the funds necessary to pay four companies of militia referred to in the memorial of the legislature of Missouri dated February 6, 1837.

For eighteen days' pay and allowances of four companies of one hundred men each.....	\$8, 200
For eighteen days' pay and allowances for two majors.....	150
	8, 350
For travelling allowance for five hundred miles, equal to twenty-five days, for the four companies.....	\$12, 420
For travelling allowance for five hundred miles for two majors.....	230
	12, 650
Total amount.....	21, 000

NOTE.—There are no rolls or returns in the Paymaster General's office to show the number of officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, but the memorial of the legislature that there were four companies of one hundred men each, and that they formed two distinct commands of two companies each under the orders of Colonels Parks and Atchison; that they armed on the frontier and remained in service eighteen days.

It is assumed in the estimate that the companies were mustered and fully officered, and that they are entitled to travelling allowance for five hundred miles in going and returning from the frontier. They will, however, be paid according to the facts and not according to the estimate.

The command of two companies does not authorize the payment of field officers of higher rank than that of major, and the colonels who are stated in the memorial to have commanded them will only be paid as majors, unless it is specifically provided for by Congress.

N. TOWSON, *Paymaster General*.

Estimate of the funds necessary to pay four companies of militia, referred to in the memorial of the legislature of Missouri, dated February 6, 1837.

For 18 days' pay and allowances of 4 companies of 100 men each	\$8, 200	
For 18 days' pay and allowances of 2 majors.....	150	
		8, 350
Travelling allowances for 500 miles, equal to 25 days for the 4 companies	\$12, 420	
Travelling allowance for 500 miles, of the 2 majors.....	230	
		12, 650
Amount.....		<u>21, 000</u>

NOTE.—There are no rolls or returns in the Paymaster General's office to show the number of officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, but the memorial of the legislature, that there were four companies of 100 men each, and that they formed two distinct commands of two companies each under the orders of Colonels Parks and Atchison; that they arrived on the frontier, and remained in active service eighteen days.

It is assumed in the estimate that the companies were mounted and fully officered, and that they are entitled to travelling allowance for 500 miles going to and returning from the frontier.

They will, however, be paid according to the facts, and not according to the estimate.

The command of two companies does not authorize the payment of a field officer of higher rank than that of major, and the colonels who are stated in the memorial to have commanded them will only be paid as majors, unless it is specifically provided for by Congress.

N. TOWSON, *Paymaster General*.

PAYMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, *February 2, 1838.*

PAYMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, *February 2, 1838.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the reference to me for a report of the communication of the Hon. A. G. Harrison, of the 29th ultimo, with the memorial of the legislature of Missouri, in relation to certain militia called out by the governor in the summer of 1836.

As the services of these troops were not called for by authority from the War Department, it will be necessary that Congress should sanction the payment before it is made; and to enable Mr. Harrison to state to Congress the amount it will be necessary to appropriate for their payment, I herewith submit an estimate.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. TOWSON, *Paymaster General*.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 785.

[2D SESSION.]

APPLICATION OF THE INHABITANTS OF OSWEGO COUNTY, NEW YORK, FOR AN INQUIRY INTO THE EXPEDIENCY OF REPAIRING AND ARMING THE MILITARY POSITIONS AT OSWEGO.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FEBRUARY 14, 1838.

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled :

The memorial of the undersigned, inhabitants of the village and county of Oswego, in the State of New York, respectfully represents: That the village of Oswego, situated upon the northern frontier of the United States, at the confluence of the Oswego river and Lake Ontario, is the principal port of entry upon that lake, and, from its extraordinary local advantages and rapid growth, justifies the expectation of its soon being among the most important commercial and manufacturing towns in the Union. Your memorialists represent that the trade of Lake Ontario is now mainly tributary to the port of Oswego, and that it is largely participating in the trade of the upper lakes; that more than seven thousand tons of shipping are now enrolled in the district of Oswego, the enrolled and licensed tonnage of which district but four years since was less than fifteen hundred tons; that the duties collected at the port of Oswego increased from \$1,600 in 1834, to \$36,000 in 1835, and to \$53,000 in 1836.

Your memorialists further represent that the United States are engaged in the construction of a mole and pier for the improvement of the harbor of Oswego; that large sums of money have been expended on account of the same; that great progress is made in the construction of the works, which, when completed, in the belief of your memorialists, will not be surpassed by any similar structures in the world. This improvement of the harbor of Oswego creates every facility for the prosecution of an extensive commerce, and for the accommodation of an immense amount of tonnage.

Your memorialists further represent that, embracing all the considerations connected therewith, the Oswego river furnishes to the village of Oswego the best hydraulic power for manufacturing operations existing in the United States. This power is already extensively improved. In the manufacture of flour Oswego is surpassed only by the cities of Richmond and Rochester, and great additions are about being made to the power employed in the ensuing season. Two extensive cotton manufactories are completed, a third about to be commenced, and no reasonable doubt can exist that, with the revival of trade and restoration of confidence to the business relations of the country, the commercial and manufacturing facilities of Oswego will invite large additional investments of capital.

Your memorialists further represent that by the Oswego canal and river a navigable communication is effected between the great lakes, the Erie canal, the interior lakes of the State of New York, and the Hudson river; that by the Oswego canal and river, the great Onondaga salines, the principal seat of salt manufacture in the United States, and the village of Syracuse, in the most prosperous and wealthy town in the State of New York, the great interior of the State abounding in the creations of capital and the useful arts, and redundant with the labors of agriculture, is, with facility, accessible from Lake Ontario in the short space of a few hours.

Your memorialists further represent that in the immediate vicinity of the village of Oswego, and within less than two miles of the lake, the State of New York, at great labor and expense, has constructed two great dams upon the Oswego river, upon which the navigation of the Oswego canal and the hydraulic power at the village are dependent. Within the same distance, and connected with those structures, are five locks upon the Oswego canal.

Your memorialists respectfully submit that Oswego was one of the northwestern military posts to the possession of which Great Britain adhered after the peace of 1783, and the surrender of which was not effected until after the treaty of 1794. Until the latter period a strong British garrison was in possession of Fort Ontario. The importance of this post in reference to the navigation of Lake Ontario, and the convenient access through it, the Oswego river, and Oneida lake to the new settlements of western New York, could not escape the military eye of the sagacious officer at the close of the revolution in command of the British North American provinces. Recent events in those provinces have awakened the attention of your memorialists to the defenceless state of the northern frontier, and especially to the disarmed and exposed situation of the port of Oswego. The reasons which, in the last century, induced the construction of Forts Oswego and Ontario, at the mouth of the Oswego river, would not less urgently present themselves to the consideration of the government in case of an interruption of the peaceful relations between the United States and Great Britain. The adjacent country, redeemed from the wilderness, and teeming with population and all the improvements which are the offspring of the arts of peace, presents temptations to an enemy immeasurably increased, and facilities for spoliation and havoc, which half a century since were beyond the limits of human anticipation. The access to the interior country, which in former wars was slowly effected in light batteaus, against the current of a powerful stream, occasionally interrupted by falls and rapids, is now facilitated by all the applications of science and art. Boats of forty or fifty tons burden, in the season of navigation, are constantly plying between the ports of New York and Oswego. Your memorialists need not point out to your honorable body the expediency of affording protection to an artificial navigation, which, if neglected by us, will not be neglected by our enemies; but if by ourselves protected and defended, may be regarded as among the most available and sure resources for national defence.

Your memorialists respectfully suggest to the consideration of Congress that future contests on the great lakes will be decided by conflicts between steam vessels of war, and the port of Oswego must almost necessarily become the naval station on Lake Ontario. The facilities for transportation between this port and the city of New York—the ease with which men, provisions, arms, and munitions of war can be here delivered—must confer on this port advantages as a naval station far exceeding those possessed by any other port on the Ontario frontier. Your memorialists would further observe that the British tonnage on Lake Ontario is far greater than that of the United States. The British ascendancy on Lake Ontario is about tantamount to our own superiority on Lake Erie. We have but four steamboats on Lake Ontario, while the British have about forty, and many of them of the first class. The flags of the British steamers float daily in the harbor of Oswego during the season of business. They are, of course, the principal carriers on Lake Ontario.

Immediately opposite to the port of Oswego, at about fifty miles distance, is the city of Kingston, the chief British military and naval station in Upper Canada. At this place a considerable military force is always in garrison. Here is the Ontario termination of the Rideau canal—a military work constructed at the expense of the imperial government—navigable by steamboats, and by which a communication is effected between the harbors of Montreal and Kingston, without recourse to the navigation of the St. Lawrence. The advantages possessed by Great Britain, in the navigation of the Rideau and Welland canals, (by the latter of which vessels carrying one hundred and fifty tons have access to the upper lakes,) would be deeply felt by the State of New York and the northwestern States, should a sudden interruption occur of the peaceful relations existing between our country and Great Britain. When the canal works now in active prosecution in the Canadian provinces are completed, large vessels, navigating the ocean, may be conveyed from the Atlantic to the lakes. The importance of protecting such a military work as the Rideau canal—a work, in the magnitude of its structure and the style of its execution, far transcending any similar work on the American continent—has not been overlooked by the provident policy of Great Britain. The features which present themselves at the Ontario terminations of the Oswego and Rideau canals strikingly assimilate. Immense dams and five locks on either canal are in the immediate vicinity of Kingston and Oswego. But while the forts at Oswego lie naked and defenceless, those at Kingston are among the most extraordinary monuments of British power and of military science. The fortifications at Kingston, your memorialists believe, are not surpassed by those of Quebec; and, when the great works now in progress are completed, the harbor of Kingston will be as impregnable as that of Gibraltar.

The above considerations, your memorialists respectfully submit, should induce an inquiry by Congress in relation to the importance of Oswego as a military post, and the expediency of employing some portion of the resources of the country in its protection and defence.

Your memorialists would respectfully remind your honorable body that the capture of Oswego, the seizure of vessels then lying in the port, the spoliation of much public and private property, and the forcible transportation from their homes of several of our principal citizens as prisoners of war, were among the events of the last contest with Great Britain. The post was gallantly defended by the brave Colonel Mitchell, and the attack would have been successfully resisted had the forts been properly garrisoned and armed.

Your memorialists would sincerely lament any change in the pacific relations of our country. They would especially deplore a war between the United States and Great Britain as a calamity to the world. But they cannot conceal from themselves that recent events have cast their shadows upon future history; that they are awakened to the contemplation that peace may not be perpetual, and that their dwelling is upon the frontier of a country—a frontier naked and defenceless—and under the eye of a foreign power, the most formidable of the nations of the earth.

Your memorialists respectfully pray an inquiry into the expediency of repairing and arming the military positions at Oswego, and for such other order in relation to this memorial as the wisdom of Congress may direct; and your memorialists will ever pray.

L. Jones.	R. H. Platt.	Simon Van Namee.
E. R. Bunkle.	D. Knapp.	David Jones.
Henry Fitzhugh.	William S. Fitch.	William Murray.
H. J. Hawley.	Joseph Martin.	John Garreugh.
S. B. Wells.	Sardis Allen.	Leroy Platt.
J. Ransom.	John Wees.	Abraham Miner.
R. G. Willington.	John B. Johnson.	Alexander Lusan.
George H. McWhorter.	Lyman Ferguson.	Enos Brown.
Joseph Turner.	Cheney Ames.	Solomon Fons.
William H. Wales.	George Dilworth.	B. C. Turner.
Perry Himes.	Samuel H. Titcomb.	H. Lothrop.
A. B. Merriam.	Norman B. Porter.	J. M. Turner.
Julius Bellamy.	Thomas Sullivan.	Benjamin S. Platt.
Ira Lamprantz.	J. C. Kollmyer.	Morris Lamb.
W. L. Merick.	John Prendergast.	H. G. Turner.
J. W. Turner.	George Hill.	Myron C. Dudley.
F. D. Burns.	John W. Smith.	Kosall M. Phillips.
J. L. Lake.	David Hall.	Russel Wyles.
S. Clarke.	Matthias Pennick.	Hezekiah Wann.
J. C. Hugunin.	Job Fons.	William P. Hovey.
J. B. Tilden.	Ab. Fons.	R. L. Robertson.
John Howe.	Luman Carpenter.	O. H. P. Hovey.
P. D. Hugunin.	Easton Cook.	Benjamin Clark.
A. M. Dutten.	H. Littlefield.	O. Ranger.
J. Brown.	Orlo Steele.	Hezekiah Wann.
Michael Queen.	Barent Staats.	B. F. Wilber.
A. T. Holmes.	Samuel B. Tyler.	Horace Kimberly.
Emery Matthias.	Andrew Glutt.	C. L. Bennett.
Abraham Pruyne.	John Garron.	Oliver Parker.
A. H. Simmons.	Luther Clark.	William L. Porter.
E. Baker.	Ossian Clark.	Michael Walsh.
S. G. Throop.	A. Brooker.	Thomas Yirety.
George C. Bunner.	M. F. Carpenter.	Hugh McGrath.
John Prendergast.	J. B. Fayette.	Thomas James.
Charles P. Walter.	George Ames.	B. H. Wilber.
J. Baldwin.	Charles N. Baker.	Joel Baker.
D. F. Barlett.	C. H. Salins.	Charles Bridgman.
John Carpenter.	M. L. Prindle.	J. H. Turner.
William Russell.	S. B. Gordon.	Edmund Curtis.
J. Turrill.	Joshua Thompson.	David O'Hara.
Joseph H. Blood.	John Randall.	Elbert Guyant.
William F. Tanner.	William Thompson.	Eleazar Richardson.
T. S. Morgan.	Richard Smith.	Henry Sparks.
Jesse Bennett, esq.	Samuel Hersey.	Lincoln Battrels.
Orris Hart.	William B. Coffin.	Abraham Swart.
James Cochran.	N. C. Stafford.	H. M. Harman.
Thomas Kenon.	Thomas Kyme.	Joseph H. Bagg.
Milton Harman.	Henry Burn.	Albert Spencer.
S. Luce.	William Markruin.	J. B. Hovey.
Jesse Bennett.	J. H. Perkins.	T. G. Young.
William Curtiss.	Eliph. Sleett.	M. Hotchkiss.
J. S. Shannon.	C. M. Wright.	R. M. Parker.
J. B. Edwards.	M. P. Hatch.	B. Gadfrey.
Sidney Torink.	William McKnight.	J. B. Plumb.
William Wayles.	Joseph Grant.	J. O. Dickey.
Thomas McIntosh.	G. W. Woodruff.	F. A. Stuart.
O. H. P. Hovey.	C. H. Morrison, jr.	Henry Matthews.
J. H. Bagg.	Joseph B. Lyon.	H. Ten. Jones.
James McDonald.	Amable Clarck.	H. H. Coats.
E. G. Hart.	William McCarty.	D. A. Parker.
Dennis Connoly.	O. Donlin.	

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 786.

[2D SESSION.]

MEMORIAL OF CITIZENS OF NIAGARA COUNTY, NEW YORK, COMPLAINING OF OUTRAGES AND MURDERS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN BURNING THE STEAMBOAT CAROLINE, AT SCHLOSSER, IN THAT COUNTY, BY THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES OF CANADA, AND ASKING REDRESS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE FEBRUARY 19, 1838.

At a large and numerous meeting of the citizens of the county of Niagara, held at the court-house in Lockport, on the 29th of January, 1838, on the subject of the murders and aggressions of a British armed force at Schlosser, Niagara county, Captain James McKain, of Lockport, was chosen president, and the honorable Robert Fleming, of Lewiston, and Linus Spalding, esq., of Hartland, were chosen vice-presidents, and William C. House, Alden S. Baker, Sparrow S. Sage, and Asher Torrence, were chosen secretaries. Edward I. Chase, from the committee to draught a memorial, reported the following, which was unanimously adopted:

MEMORIAL.

To the President, Senate, and House of Representatives of the United States:

The inhabitants of the county of Niagara, in the State of New York, would respectfully call upon our national Executive and upon Congress to adopt such measures in relation to the late outrage on the part of British authorities, in burning the steamboat Caroline, and murdering our citizens at Schlosser, as become a great nation, jealous of her honor and of the safety and rights of her citizens.

We would not now address you on the subject, but would patiently and confidently wait your action, were it not that the Canadian authorities attempted to connect that outrage with the operations of McKenzie, on Navy island; and, misrepresenting the conduct of American citizens, have avowed and approved of that most gross violation of our laws, and of our rights as a friendly and neutral nation, and that, in consequence of some expressions which fell from honorable members of the Senate and House of Representatives when the subject was brought before them, we are fearful that through some means the criminals should escape a trial under the laws of our State, and the blood of our citizens, and the insult offered to our territory and flag, go unrevenged.

Though we cannot conceive how the assembling of the handful of men on Navy island can by possibility be used either in justification or palliation of the attack on the Caroline, still, as the Canadian authorities have made that a pretext to justify their conduct, and for that purpose have procured and published a number of false affidavits and false letters from "honorable officers of the royal navy," and as some members of Congress (no doubt through misinformation) seem to view the matter in a somewhat similar light, we think it proper to give a short statement of facts in relation to that assemblage; and, in doing so, the committee who draught this resolution will confine themselves to what is well known in this vicinity to be true.

After the unsuccessful attempt of McKenzie upon Toronto, he and many other Canadians fled to this country to avoid prosecutions for political offences. Not having as yet given up all hopes of success, they sought and obtained aid from the citizens of Buffalo; and assembling what men they could, with a few arms, a small quantity of provisions, and little or no ammunition, they, on the 15th of December last, located themselves on Navy island, which was unoccupied except by one farmer; hoping to make that a rallying point for the disaffected Canadians, and, at the same time, to create a diversion of the royalist forces in favor of Dr. Duncombe, who was then in force in the London district. Their numbers, the first night, were only 16 or 18 men, most of whom were Canadians, and even up to the time of the burning of the Caroline they had only about 300. When McKenzie first occupied the island the royalists had several hundred men under arms along the Niagara river, and in less than two weeks were able to, and did, concentrate a force at Chippewa, opposite the island, of 2,000 or 3,000 men, together with a large number of boats. When you consider that the island is nearly level, with the highest banks only about ten feet, and was three or four miles in circumference, you may well suppose that the commander, R. Van Rensselaer, had but few men to spare from duty to erect defences. In fact, up to the burning of the Caroline, they had erected none; and they relied for their safety (and it was no vain reliance) entirely upon the fears of the loyalists, and not upon the assistance of the citizens of the United States.

We have given this statement to show that the many exaggerated accounts of recruiting in this State are without foundation, and to show that even if the Caroline had offended against the laws of nations, there was no necessity of resorting to the desperate remedy of invading our territory, much less of murdering our sleeping and unarmed citizens.

We would not pretend to deny that there was a strong feeling manifested in this part of the State in favor of the Canadian "rebels," who seemed to be placed in a position similar to our brave forefathers when the same epithet was applied to them. Nor is it strange that some of our citizens—recollecting the aid rendered by Lafayette, De Kalb, and Steuben, in our struggle for national independence; of Lords Byron and Cochran, to the Greeks; and by a gallant officer of our own navy, to the Mexican republic; and recollecting, too, that these men lost neither standing nor rank in their own country in consequence of such foreign service—should have gone to Navy island, and there enlisted under the patriot banner. Nor is it strange that with such examples they were slow to believe that they were acting against law. And we respectfully insist there was in such conduct nothing against any law of nations; nor can Britain, who permitted vessels of war to be fitted out in her ports and men to be enlisted to aid Don Pedro in his invasion of Portugal, consistently complain.

On the 29th day of December last the steamboat Caroline, belonging to a citizen of Buffalo, came from that place, and, touching at the island, went to Schlosser. During that day she passed several

times between the island and Schlosser, carrying passengers and freight either way, as a matter of private speculation. She sailed under the American flag, and was regularly cleared, as we understand, by the owner, Mr. Wells, at the custom-house in Buffalo. In this she was not, as we conceive, acting contrary to the laws of nations. She did, without doubt, carry some articles contraband of war. For this she was liable to be seized by the British authorities at any time before she came to our shores, and this, we conceive, was the extent of her liabilities. On the night of the 29th of December, 1837, while relying upon the protection of neutral territory and our nation's flag, and without arms, she was captured and burned, and a large proportion of those on board of her basely assassinated. Long before this the circumstances immediately connected with the outrage have been fully made known to you, and Canadian falsehood sufficiently refuted. We would only say that Schlosser is in plain sight of Chippewa; that the ferry immediately below was open, and persons constantly passing between Schlosser and the British army at Chippewa; and that it is next to impossible that the British officers could have been ignorant of the situation of the boat, of her being unarmed, and of her wearing American colors.

But what makes the outrage appear base beyond expression is, that while in Canada, the throne, the parliament, and the army, were teeming with abuse of America, her citizens and institutions; while our people, who had occasion to cross into that province, were insulted and imprisoned; while our boats in Canadian ports were detained, and some actually pressed into the service of the Queen; while the Canadian guard from Fort George to Chippewa were firing at citizens on this side of the river, our general and State governments were doing all they could to preserve our friendly relations with Great Britain, and orders were actually issued at Washington which have since resulted in disbanding the forces on Navy island. So far from our government being lacking in her duty to Britain, our public officers have, we believe, in some instances, overstepped the bounds of law and usurped authority in order to interfere in favor of the loyalists against the patriots.

Since the burning of the *Caroline* the grand jury of our county have been in session, and, as they were bound to do by their oaths, they inquired into the transaction, and found bills of indictment against all they could then ascertain were engaged in the murderous affair. We have no doubt but that before this the governor of this State has made requisition upon the governor of Canada for the surrender of the murderers. But we can hardly believe that since the Canadian governor has avowed and approved of the assassinations he will comply with the requisition.

What, in such an event, is to be done? Must we submit to the wrong and insult, or, what is nearly the same thing, go through a long course of negotiation, which shall end like the impressment and northern boundary questions, in being questions still lost in the intricacy of diplomacy? If so, let our government no longer use the proud motto of asking nothing but what is right, and submitting to nothing that is wrong. Or will the British government, with strong professions of friendship, offer to settle annuities on the surviving friends of their victims, and thus endeavor to pay for the blood of our citizens in gold? It has already gone forth that we love money better than honor, and British subjects have been most instrumental in giving currency to the slander. We hope that no temporising policy in relation to the blood spilt at Schlosser will hereafter be cited in proof of our national cupidity.

We, the people of the county of Niagara, whose territory and laws have been violated, and whose courts have been set at defiance, as a portion of a great nation which ought not to see its least citizen injured without full and ample atonement, call upon you to adopt such measures as will surrender the Schlosser assassins to our tribunals of justice; or, failing in this, to treat that government as an enemy, which, by protecting the criminal, shall adopt the crime. This we believe is the only course by which the federal government can retain that respect of the people which it has hitherto had, and which is the strongest chain in our confederacy.

Since draughting the foregoing, the committee have seen the communication of the governor of Upper Canada to the British minister at Washington. This communication is erroneous in most of its material statements in relation to the outrage. To notice and refute all the errors contained in his excellency's letter would occupy too much space for a memorial, yet the committee cannot forbear noticing that part of it which states "that in the inn at Schlosser there was a guard of armed men belonging to the forces on the island, or acting in their support to guard the *Caroline*;" that "on the boat there was a party of armed men and a sentinel to demand the countersign;" that "the boy (who was taken prisoner) was afraid to land from the boats in consequence of the firing kept up from the shore by the guard;" and that "the tavern was occupied by the island forces as their headquarters on the main land." In all these matters it is notorious that the governor of Canada is entirely wrong. If there is anything which should add to the indignation already felt by the American people at the outrage, it is this continual effort to conceal the truth by false statements; and we hope that Congress will not, by Canadian falsehood, be deterred from promptly and effectually vindicating our rights.

And your memorialists will ever pray.

JAMES MCKAIN, *President.*
ROBERT FLEMING,
L. SPALDING,
Vice-Presidents.

WILLIAM C. HOUSE,
ALDEN S. BAKER,
S. S. SAGE,
A. TORRENCE,
Secretaries.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 787

[2D SESSION.]

ON AN APPLICATION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL ARMORY AND
FOUNDRY AT THE GRAND RAPIDS, OR FALLS OF THE WABASH RIVER, IN
INDIANA AND ILLINOIS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE FEBRUARY 20, 1838.

Mr. TIPTON, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred the memorial of Thomas S. Hinde and Jacob Leshar, of Illinois, and other memorials, praying Congress to establish an armory in the west, a foundry, &c, reported:

That the memorialists represent themselves as being in possession of great water privileges at the Grand Rapids, or falls of the Wabash river, which, they state, are about to be improved by the States of Indiana and Illinois, and that such improvement will afford the most abundant supply of water power; and they offer to convey to the general government, on advantageous terms, the rights which they possess in said water power, and such sites as may be required for public works, with the view of establishing at that place a national armory.

Various propositions of a similar nature have been made from several of the western and southwestern States, and sites have been offered at Pittsburg and Beaver, in Pennsylvania, Zanesville, Ohio, Licking river, Kentucky, Harpeth, Tennessee, falls of the Wabash, at Logansport, Indiana, Grand Rapids of Rock river, Illinois, as well as at places favorably situated in Illinois, Missouri, and Alabama, for the establishment of such an armory; but the committee cannot undertake to decide upon the relative merits and advantages of these several points, because, to justify such an undertaking, they should be in possession of the most minute and disinterested information concerning the general and local advantages of each point which they do not possess; nor do they believe it would be expedient to designate by law at what particular point such an armory should be established, until an examination be made by a competent military and scientific commission, whose views would be wholly national, and uninfluenced by sectional predilections or aversions, and who would make such location as, under every aspect of the case, would be most productive of the general good and conducive to the general defence of the country. To the executive branch of the government, or rather to the military arm, would, in the opinion of the committee, belong the duty and the responsibility of making a selection that would combine the most national advantages in a military point of view; and, under the influence of this impression, the committee ask to be relieved from the further consideration of the memorials, having reported a bill embracing, among other objects, a provision for the establishment of an armory in the west, under the direction of the President of the United States.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 788.

[2D SESSION.]

ON THE SELECTION OF A SITE FOR THE ERECTION OF A FORT ON THE WESTERN
FRONTIER OF ARKANSAS.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE FEBRUARY 21, 1838.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *February 20, 1838.*

SIR: By a resolution of the Senate of the 7th instant this department is required to inform that body "if any site for a fort has yet been selected on or near the western frontier line of Arkansas, as was provided for by a late act of Congress; and if so, whether the title to the land has been secured or contracted for; and in that event, whether an appropriation to pay for the site has been asked for; and if not, why it has not been done."

As soon after taking charge of this department as was in my power, I gave my attention to the act of Congress alluded to, and to the measures which had been adopted by my predecessors to carry it into effect; but not finding that the information necessary to enable the department to make a judicious selection had been obtained, I gave directions for the appointment of suitable individuals of the army for the purpose of making a thorough examination of the section of country contemplated by the act, as that to which Fort Gibson was to be removed. The results of this examination will be found in the accompanying copy of the report of those gentlemen, marked A.

By this report it will be seen that it will be impossible, if the act providing for the removal of Fort Gibson be literally complied with, at the same time to afford adequate protection to the citizens of Arkansas, to prevent internal dissension among the different Indian tribes of that region, and between each other, and to secure them from the intrusions of white persons, and in the enjoyment of the rights solemnly guaranteed to them in the treaties now in force between them and the United States. It is further manifest from the report that these important objects can be accomplished only by continuing Fort Gibson at its present site, or, at least, at some point near to it, and by the erection of another post on or near the Arkansas line. Convinced of the soundness of these views of the report, I deemed it my duty to require the same commissioners to proceed upon the supposition that Fort Gibson would not be removed far from its present position, and select the best location within or near the Arkansas line for the establishment

of a post for the protection of the people of the State. Their report of their proceedings in the execution of this duty, a copy of which, marked B, I have the honor herewith to transmit, has but recently been received.

Believing that Congress would sanction the course thus pursued by the department, no selection has yet been made of such a site as that contemplated by the act referred to; and hence the reason that no appropriation has been asked for its purchase.

For such a post near the Arkansas line, as will afford proper protection to the people of that State, there are two sites possessing nearly equal advantages; these are, that at Fort Smith and that at the mouth of Lee's creek, both of which are designated and particularly spoken of in the last report of the commissioners mentioned above. Should either of these sites be selected, it would seem proper, for the reasons contained in the accompanying copies of letters from General Arbuckle, marked C and D, that a considerable tract of the adjacent land should be secured. For this purpose the department has no funds at its control, as it would not feel authorized to use the money appropriated by the act in question for the purchase of either of these tracts.

The enclosed copies of documents, marked E and F, relate to the terms on which the land alluded to can be procured.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Hon. R. M. JOHNSON, *President of the Senate.*

A No. 1.

The Pheasant bluff is on the south side of the Arkansas river, about twelve miles below Webber's falls, and about six miles below the mouth of the Canadian. The river runs for some miles, both above and below the bluff, on a course very nearly from east to west. The summit of the bluff is between eighty and ninety feet above low-water mark, as nearly as could be ascertained by imperfect instruments; the country gradually rises higher for some miles as it extends back.

At the most eligible point for a fort the timber extends about half a mile back from the river to the prairie, and a short distance both above and below the site it expands to a much greater width, and extends both ways to a distance unknown. The timber in the immediate vicinity of the site is for the most part black and post oak, with some black jack; the older trees are short and of an unthrifty appearance, being not more than one and two feet in diameter. The same space, however, is filled in with a younger growth of timber of the same kind, which would measure from six to twelve inches in diameter, and is of a very thrifty and luxuriant growth.

About six hundred yards below the site commences the river bottom or lowlands, which quickly expand to the width of about a mile, and are many miles in length. Of this space, about one-fourth of a mile in width, bordering on the river, is washed by the annual floods. The surface is clean, and clear of pools of standing or stagnant water. The timber on this space is, for the most part, large cottonwood, sycamore, ash, hackberry, box elder, &c., and the undergrowth principally poppan. The remaining portion of the river bottom is several feet higher than that just mentioned. The undergrowth is cane, briars, poppan, &c., and the timber consists of black or red oak, cup oak, black walnut, ash, picon, hackberry, &c. This timber is, for the most part, of a very large size, and is well calculated for being made into shingles or building materials of any kind, for which large timber of that kind is required. From the outer edge of this bottom the land becomes high and gently rolling, and is covered with black and post oak timber to the prairie, distant about three-fourths of a mile; the trees on that part of it most contiguous to the bottom are of a very lofty growth, and are well calculated for being made into house logs, which, being combined with the timber in the river bottom, gives an abundant supply of the best materials for building that the country affords. There is no pine or poplar within many miles of the place, and, in fact, poplar is not to be found in any part of the Arkansas country.

About half a mile from the river, at the point selected, commences a prairie which extends to the south, or directly out from the river, about eight miles, and its length parallel to the river is much greater. It is high and dry, and being generally rolling, the water that falls on it in time of hard rains is carried off in small rills, insomuch that there are no flat places in it on which water stands, as is often the case in flat and level prairies. The grass of this prairie is luxuriant and well calculated for hay. It is contended by some that prairie land produces causes of disease; that, however, is entirely owing to the kind of prairie; high, dry prairies are healthy, while flat, wet prairies are more unhealthy than wet land is under timber, the action of the sun on it being greater.

The surface for some distance around the site is gradually rolling, insomuch that the rain which falls on it is carried quickly off to the river. About a fourth of a mile above the site a large creek empties into the river, which has its source in the prairie, the water of which is clear, and pleasant to the taste, and is used at present by the inhabitants for drinking, washing, &c., the wells on the bluff, which are not more than six or eight feet deep, having gone dry. The reason of those wells not being deeper is, that the people who dug them, not being prepared with the necessary instruments for blasting stone, could not sink them any lower than to the stones. There are no lasting springs of water at or near the bluff, but the prospect of procuring water by sinking wells is as fair as it could be in any portion of the country which is as high as that is. It is probable that good water could be procured within forty or fifty feet of the surface, or, at furthest, eighty feet. The red sandstone, of a quality and form well suited for building, is to be found in great abundance within less than a fourth of a mile of the site. This stone is to be found both in detached pieces and in quarries, consisting of regular layers, of a suitable thickness for a building material. There is no limestone within some miles of the bluff; stone coal of a good quality has been found near the site, and strong indications of it are to be seen on the surface in a number of places upon the bluff.

It has been stated above that the country on the south side of the Arkansas river, around the Pheasant bluff, except the river bottom, is high and dry for many miles in extent; and the river bottom is not more wet than is usual on all parts of the river. On the outer margin of the bottom, about two miles below the site, is a flat space of some extent, on which water stands during the winter and spring months; but

it is too remote for its deleterious effects to reach the bluff, particularly as it is on an eastwardly direction from the site, and the prevailing winds of the summer being from the south. The bottom on the north side of the river opposite the bluff is said to be about one and a half mile in width, and from the best information that we could collect, it is for the most part dry, having in it but few pools of water. The undergrowth is principally cane and briers.

We found a few of the persons residing on the bluff slightly sick with intermittent fevers, but the number appeared to be proportionally small, when compared with most of the other parts of the country.

The want of good water is an objection to the Pheasant bluff as a military site, but that objection would rest against almost any other point that could be selected within the space contemplated in the "instructions." We do, therefore, believe, after taking into consideration everything in relation to its locality, that the Pheasant bluff is a good site for a large fort.

The following named persons, with Choctaw families, reside on the Pheasant bluff, and within the distance of a half mile of the site selected :

Captain Nathaniel Fulsom has a house fifteen feet square, and two small outbuildings, and has twenty acres of land under fence.

The widow Fulsom has two acres of land under fence, and has one small house. She is preparing to move off.

John Walker (a white man) has one log house, 18 feet by 20, with several other small outhouses, and has forty acres under fence. He is about a half mile from the site.

The widow Coleman has two small houses and a kitchen, and has about ten acres of land under fence. Her house is within one hundred yards of the site.

Charles Jones has one house, twelve feet square, and a small kitchen, and has four acres of land under fence.

A-pres-an-tubbee has a house, and four acres of cleared land.

John Riddle has one small house and kitchen, and has fifteen acres under fence. His house is about a half mile from the site.

Robert M. Jones has immediately on the site a double cabin, built of hewed logs, a small kitchen, and about one acre under fence. His house is occupied as a store.

A No. 2.

Fort Coffee is situated on the south side of the Arkansas river, which, for three miles above the fort, is straight, and runs from the southwest. On striking the bluff, or high point of land on which the fort stands, it turns and runs nearly north for a mile, bringing the fort directly east of it at that reach. About a mile north of the fort the river strikes a high rock bluff on the north side, and then bends off to the eastward, and runs several miles on that course. The fort is situated on a high promontory, which appears to make into the river, from there being a large circular cove or gulf in the river, immediately above it, and where the force of the current strikes the rock bluff. The first fifty-eight feet of this bluff, above low-water mark, is a perpendicular rock. The surface then rises, on a gradual slope, to the summit of the hill, on which the fort stands, which is four hundred and thirty feet from the extreme point of the bluff, and is one hundred and eight feet above low-water mark. The point of land on which the fort stands is narrow, as will be shown by the accompanying sketch. About six or seven hundred feet back from the extreme point of the rocks the highlands expand into a country which is gently rolling, and for the distance of near three-fourths of a mile out from the river is covered with a good timber, consisting of post oak, black oak, red elm, hickory, and black walnut. This description of timber extends over all of the highland for near a half mile around the fort, when the elm and walnut stop, and the other description of trees above mentioned extends for a great distance both above and below.

About three hundred yards above the fort the river bottom commences and gradually expands to the width of a half mile, and soon afterwards to the width of a mile and a half. The first two hundred yards of this bottom, bordering on the river, are washed for several miles up the river by the annual floods. This space is clean and dry, being free from standing or stagnant pools of water, and in many parts of it the soil is sandy. The timber on this space is cottonwood, hackberry, and box elder, with little or no undergrowth. From this space back to the highlands the undergrowth is a heavy cane, interwoven with vines and briers. The timber consists of large cottonwood-trees, black or red oak, cup oak, ash, walnut, picon, hackberry, elm, &c.

On the lower or north side of the fort, and about one hundred yards from it, the river bottom or lowlands commences in a very narrow point and gradually expands to the width of a mile. This bottom is, for the most part, high and dry, and is covered for the distance of a mile down the river with the heaviest kind of cane, and but a very slight portion of this bottom, for miles down the river, is even touched by the annual rise, and the soil is extremely rich. The timber in this bottom, for many miles down, consists of the black or red oak, cup oak, ash, walnut, hackberry, picon, box elder, &c.

The timber in both the bottoms above mentioned is, for the most part, of a very large size, and is well calculated for being made into shingles and every other description of building materials, for which large timber of the kind is required. The timber on the highlands is, for the most part, of a tall growth for timber of its kind, and is well calculated for house logs. It may be well to mention in this place that the most valuable timber of those two bottoms, as is usual to the Arkansas bottoms, does not stand thickly on the surface, but is rather scattering. The timber on the highland stands thick. Much of the timber immediately around the fort has been used, but there yet remains an ample supply of good timber for all necessary purposes of a military establishment.

It is therefore believed that the timber in the vicinity of the fort furnishes as suitable materials for constructing wooden buildings as is usual for any portion of this country to afford. There is no pine within several miles of the fort. Near three-fourths of a mile from the river, at the fort, commences a handsome prairie, which is about one mile wide and is upwards of two miles in length. This prairie is gradually rolling, and the rain that falls upon it is carried quickly off, leaving the surface high and dry, and it affords an abundant supply of excellent grass for hay.

There are no springs of water near the fort, but good water can be procured by sinking wells to the

depth of eighty or ninety feet. The water which is now used is principally taken from a well about four hundred yards distant from the fort, which was sunk hastily in the summer of 1834, which is twenty feet deep. Another well has since been commenced on the hill, but is not yet finished, and, under present circumstances, will not be, at least for some time. It is fifty feet deep, and furnishes the post with drinking water of an excellent quality.

The red sandstone can be procured in a considerable quantity within one and two hundred yards of the fort, and about a fourth of a mile from it there is a tolerably extensive quarry of good stone, and within the distance of about a half mile is an inexhaustible quarry of the same kind of stone, which is of a good shape and quality for building.

There is no limestone to be found on the surface for several miles from the fort.

There are strong indications of stone coal to be seen in several places near the fort, but none has been found within less than three or four miles.

On the opposite side of the river, and about a mile below this point, commences the river bottom, which extends about two miles above the fort. It is about a mile wide, and is, with a slight exception, high and dry, and is covered with cane and large timber of a good quality. There is one small lake or pond in it, but it is so distant as not to affect the healthiness of the fort.

The bottoms on the side of the river on which the fort stands are also free from stagnant water for the distance of two or three miles.

The highland is gently rolling, and the water from rains is carried quickly off in small rills to the river, leaving the surface dry, insomuch that there is no apparent cause for producing sickness.

Since the establishment of this post in the summer of 1834 three men have died of the prevailing diseases of the country. One of them died in the summer of 1835, one in the summer of 1836, and the other in the beginning of the present month. They were all recruits, and had not become acclimated. There is at this time one man in the hospital slightly sick of fever, and three or four others have been sick during the present season. This post has thus far been considered more healthy than any other point on the river, or in any part of the surrounding country.

The undersigned, after taking into consideration everything in relation to this post, are of the opinion that it is a good site for a large fort, provided it be constructed in a form to suit the ground; but if that should not be done, there is a much more extensive and level spot of land situated about five hundred yards from the river and directly back of the fort, which is sufficiently extensive to admit of the construction of a fort upon it of a very large size and of any form that may be desired, as will be seen from the enclosed sketch.

John Jones and Anderson Perry, Choctaws, have jointly three small houses, and have about twenty acres of land under fence. Charles, a colored man, has also, adjoining the same, a small house and about three acres under fence. All of the above named are within three-fourths of a mile of the fort, and there are no other settlers within four miles of the post.

A No. 3.

Fort Smith is situated on the south side of the Arkansas river, and is immediately below the mouth of the Poteau. The river at this point runs north ten degrees east for several miles. The ground which is the best calculated for a military site is about fifty or sixty feet above low-water mark. There is from this point a handsome view of the river, and the site, in a military point of view, is naturally good. The highland around Fort Smith, as well as the river bottom, contains pools of standing water. The best timber, for miles around the place, has been cut. Stone can be procured in the river banks by blasting.

This point, we presume, is too well known to the department to require a minute description. The Poteau, for several miles up it, during the summer months, has a still, sluggish current, and resembles a large mill-pond, and is very much of that character.

A No. 4.

The Mazzard bluff is on the south side of the Arkansas river. It is about thirty-five feet above low-water mark, but gradually ascends, within the distance of one hundred yards, to the height of about fifty or seventy feet, at which point is the most eligible position for a fort. It overlooks the river for many miles up and for some distance down.

The timber around the site is post oak, and red and black oak, the latter being much the most abundant, and of a very tall and luxuriant growth, and is well calculated for house logs. The post oak on the same space is also tall and of a good size for building.

About two hundred yards above the site commences the river bottom, in a narrow point, which gradually expands to the width of about a mile, the lower part of which is usually passed over by the annual floods, and was covered by the flood of 1833 to the depth of twenty feet. A small creek empties into the river the lower part of the bottom. We went about half a mile into the swamp, and for that distance we found the timber to be principally cottonwood, intermixed with maple, box elder, hackberry, &c., and no undergrowth. We were told by our guide that a short distance further than we went into the bottom commenced a heavy growth of cane, and that the black and cup oak of a large size were to be found dispersed thinly over the bottom.

About a mile below the site the river bottom commences, and extends many miles down. The timber in this bottom is said to be of the same kind as that in the upper bottom, with ash, walnut, &c.

Near the site commences a post oak flat, which extends on a southwest course to the distance of about a half mile; that flat contains many hills or lumps, which are from one to three feet high, and are from twenty feet to fifty yards across the base, and all the remaining space is flat, and covered with water in the winter and spring months. A portion of this flat even retains water during the greater portion of the summer. On those flat places there is little or no vegetation growing, except a short plant resembling

a ground moss, which covers much of the wet space. This description of land extends around the site from south to northwest.

That portion of the country being around the site from south to northeast is gently rolling, and the water being carried off in small rills, leaves that part of the country dry, and entirely free from standing water, back to a creek, which is about half a mile distant, which passes around the site in a circular form, from southwest to east, where it empties into the river, within a fourth of a mile of the site. This creek for a fourth of a mile has soft muddy banks, and is filled with still water from the river at every rise for the distance of a mile or a mile and a half up it; and while in this state it resembles an extensive mill-pond, and is precisely of that character.

The ground immediately around the site slopes towards the river, and there are several small rills which take off the water that falls on the surface during heavy rains.

The bayou, which circles around the northeast corner of the tract of land on which the site is, has a wide flat on each side of it, on which water stands during the spring and early part of the summer. This space is covered with the water oak, ash, hackberry, and other timber of a small size common to wet places, and the undergrowth is thorns, briers, &c. Pine can be procured within seven miles of this bluff.

The red sandstone can be procured in the river banks, and in a quarry about a fourth of a mile east of the site.

Stone coal has been found in great abundance about half a mile east of the site, on what is supposed to be public land.

There is a small spring of water two hundred yards west of the site, which is said to run during the greatest droughts. The stream is small, and rises in a low piece of ground near the river. This spring does not produce a sufficiency of water to supply a military post, but good water can be procured by digging wells.

The timber extends about three-fourths of a mile to the southwest, where it comes to the prairie.

The timber near the river commenced its growth about seventy years ago, and has since progressed to a width diverging above and below the site to a considerable extent.

The prairie nearest to the site commences within three-fourths of a mile of it, and extends several miles on a course from southwest to northeast, and affords a tolerable grass for hay. That part nearest to the site is low and boggy, but does not contain pools of water.

The bottom on the opposite side of the river is said to be about three miles in width. The undergrowth is cane and briers, timber, cottonwood, black and red oak, ash, &c. In this bottom are several small lakes or lagoons of stagnant water, some of which contain water through the greater part of the summer.

There is no limestone within many miles of the site.

A No 5.

Fort Coffee, September 30, 1837.

Sir: Upon entering the duty assigned us of selecting a military site to which the garrison at Fort Gibson is to be removed, we have to labor under considerable embarrassments by not knowing better than we do the views of the department in relation to the general plan of defence, or the contemplated military operations and arrangements to be made on the western frontier of Arkansas. Therefore we beg the indulgence of giving a brief sketch of our own views of the subject, hoping, at the same time, that, in the remarks we may adduce, we will not be considered as being officious or obtrusive in the matter.

In the first place, we are decidedly of the opinion that a large body of troops should be kept in the immediate vicinity of where Fort Gibson now stands, or even further west, if practicable. But owing to the difficulty of the navigation above that place, we know that it would be impracticable to place a large body of troops any further west than that point. There the troops would, if necessary, be able to keep in check the disaffected Creeks. They would also be able to prevent war between the Creeks and Osages, or the Cherokees and Osages, which will most assuredly occur just as soon as the troops are removed from Fort Gibson. Again, the troops at that point would prevent collision from arising between the resident Cherokees and that portion of the nation yet to be removed, which is strongly to be apprehended, the Cherokees now in this country claiming the land west of Arkansas as belonging to those who occupy it at this time.

The good counsel and advice which a proper commander of a military post can give, and the influence which he is enabled to exert over Indians, has a most valuable effect, and often prevents the occurrence of difficulties which otherwise might arise, and which might require millions of money to allay.

The government of the United States has guaranteed to the Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws, and other tribes, a military protection, which they confidently expect, and which should be given to them; and that protection cannot be given them so well in any way as from a military post in some central point in the Indian country. Such we consider Fort Gibson. It is in the Cherokee nation, within four miles of the Creek nation, is sufficiently near to the Osage nation to guard and protect them, and at the same time to keep them in subjection and prevent their aggressions on other tribes.

We would next place a considerable force at Fort Coffee. At that point the troops would, if necessary, give protection to the State of Arkansas, and would at the same time co-operate, when necessary, with the agent of the Indian department in the enforcement of the "intercourse law." They would at the same time command the river; and that point is the best for troops to enforce the "intercourse law," it being within the Indian country, and sufficiently removed from the line of Arkansas for the troops to be untrammelled in the exercise of their military operations by State restrictions.

Having now given a brief view of our plan of defence for the country on the Arkansas, we will confine ourselves more immediately to the "instructions" of the War Department, which seem to contemplate a removal of all the troops on the Arkansas to a point below Webber's falls; in which case we recommend the Pheasant bluff, as being a good site for a military establishment of any size which would probably ever be necessary.

One consideration which governs the board in the selection of the Pheasant bluff for the site of a new fort is, that independent of its being a point more immediately within the pale of the instructions of the War Department than any other point, it is, in the opinion of the board, as central a position as can be selected, under the instructions, to the great civilized tribes residing on the western frontier, which in their opinion is a very desirable object.

All the tribes residing most contiguous to the State of Arkansas, namely, Cherokees, Choctaws, Creeks, Chickasaws, and Senecas, have a provision in their treaties that the United States will protect them in their new country, and in future time, against all foreign invasion and domestic strife. Consequently, to give them the protection contemplated in the existing treaties, either against a foreign enemy or domestic strifes that may arise, it is necessary that a military force for that purpose should be kept at a point, or at different points within the Indian country, from which the troops could be moved in the shortest time possible to any point in either of those nations. As it would be impracticable to place troops in each one of those nations, and as it appears to be the object of the government of the United States to accomplish the object of protection and defence from one grand military depot, it is desirable that depot should be as near the centre of the country as possible, where their principal action would be required. Such is deemed by the board to be the case with the Pheasant bluff. It is forty miles within the Indian country, or rather, west of the State of Arkansas. It is immediately on the north border of the Choctaw nation, and is about thirty-five miles east of the Creek nation, forty or fifty miles northeast of the Chickasaws, and near one hundred miles from the Senecas and Osages, the Cherokee nation intervening. From this point the troops could be thrown in a very short time into either of the four first-named nations.

The presence of a large body of troops in the centre of the Indian country will have a very salutary effect on the minds of the Indians, in keeping down local feuds that might arise among them, and in giving a timely check to any hostile movements towards the whites that might possibly arise in some of the most unsettled and dissatisfied tribes. The presence of even a small military force has a powerful effect in keeping down dissatisfaction among the Indians, and to insure peace in all the tribes it is absolutely necessary that a military force be kept in some central position within the Indian country.

With regard to the Cherokees, Choctaws, and Chickasaws, the United States have no danger to apprehend from either of them. Nothing could induce either of these tribes to engage in a war with the people of the United States, short of the most outrageous oppression being practiced upon them, such as would make life even a torment. Even if they had the disposition, they have not the ability to war with the United States, and they are perfectly sensible of the fact. They know that they could not gain anything in a war with the Union, and they will not run the risk of being conquered, lest they might in that event be driven from their comfortable homes, and required from necessity to take to the wilds of the west, which result the most of the people of those tribes are just as badly prepared to bear as the whites would be. It should be remembered by those of the whites who believe or pretend to believe that the tribes in question would, in case of a war with the States, easily run their families to the western wilds, that those people are not prepared for such a manner of life; that they have now been in the habit, for generation after generation, of living in good houses; and that near one-half of their women and children are just as effeminate and as illy prepared for such a mode of life as the whites are themselves.

Furthermore, those tribes may be considered as being civilized and agricultural people. They have around them almost as many of the essential domestic comforts of life as the whites. Consequently the idea of war is to their imaginations just as appalling and horrible as it could be to any portion of the whites. Such, however, is not so much the case with a number of the Creeks. They are generally much less civilized, and many of them have had their minds soured against the people of the United States; and a portion of that nation might, no doubt, be induced to enter a war on much more slight grounds than any of the tribes above mentioned; consequently the presence of the troops is absolutely necessary to overawe and keep them in subjection. Leave them entirely to themselves, and they might, and in all probability would, become troublesome.

It is strenuously urged by some of the people of Arkansas that the troops should be located within that State in order to protect the people from Indian aggressions. There are but very few of them, however, who are sincere in the belief that they have any just grounds to apprehend danger from the Indians. If there are any who are so unfortunate as to be in dread of Indian aggressions, they should recollect that the two great and civilized tribes, the Cherokees and Choctaws, are immediately between them and those that they could only have the very least ground to fear. Those two tribes alone would afford them more protection than two or three military posts would do within their State.

Those tribes, in case of a war on the western frontier, cannot remain neutral. They would go with the United States, and of course would become involved, in common with the whites, in the war, and oppose any approaching war party to their country from the west just so soon as it would enter their dominion. Again, a war party in passing through either of those nations would have to subsist themselves by robbing the inhabitants, which would of itself be a cause of war.

Let the troops be withdrawn from the Indian country and there will be a general and serious manifestation of displeasure on the part of nearly all of the Indians on this frontier with whom the United States have been in the habit of holding treaties, or rather the emigrant tribes. They will contend that the United States have not carried out the provisions of the existing treaties between them and the States. There is scarcely anything that would tend to alienate the feelings of the Indians from our government more than the withdrawal of military protection from them. Another matter to be recollected is, that if the troops are removed from the Indian country and placed in the State of Arkansas, the Indians will suppose that they have been placed there rather to guard against them than to give them the protection required in the treaties.

If the principal military post should be established at the Pheasant bluff, the board would respectfully suggest the propriety of establishing a small post on the Arkansas river, within the State, say at Mazzard bluff, or at Fort Smith, which two points we consider to be very nearly on a par with regard to health, and the military position of the two places bear a strong resemblance to each other. The Mazzard bluff has a greater abundance of timber and stone, and has around it more public land, than there is at Fort Smith; but at that point troops could do little or nothing in the way of enforcing the "intercourse law," and consequently would be of no kind of service to the government. The troops stationed at that point would serve out enlistment after enlistment without being of the slightest benefit to the government. Therefore Fort Smith would be the best of the two points so far as regards an immediate usefulness to the government; it being immediately on the line of Arkansas, the "intercourse law" could be enforced,

which could not be done at Mazzard bluff. Yet, from the appearance of the country around both of those places, we are very clearly of the opinion that neither of them is healthy; but we know that it is sometimes necessary for the public good to place troops even at unhealthy points. They cannot, therefore, complain of being placed at whatever point the public interest may require their services. Fort Smith and the Mazzard bluff, as regards health, are much on a par; so that we are unable to determine which of the two points would be the most healthy, believing both of them to be sickly. Yet they are, in our opinion, the best points that can be selected on the river for some distance down it, particularly on the south side, our examination having been confined in that region entirely to the south side of the river. A post established at either of the last mentioned sites should be constructed with quarters for one or two companies; it should have block-houses or bastions at the diagonal corners, so that it could be defended principally with artillery, and by the inhabitants of the country in case of necessity. Its area should be unusually large for a garrison of two companies, in order to give room for the inhabitants, should any occasion arise in which it might be necessary for them to take shelter from any enemy, which, however, is very probable would never become necessary.

In this work should be stored an ample supply of arms and all kinds of munitions of war, from which the militia of the country could soon be armed and equipped for service. Such a fort, it is to be hoped, would in some measure quiet the clamor of the people of the western part of Arkansas on the subject of forts, and would stop in a great measure the unnecessary and improper interference of the people of that State with the proper and necessary arrangements of the War Department in its general plan of defence of the western frontier, which interference has already tended greatly to thwart the operations of the department on this important subject.

Should that course, however, be deemed by the department unnecessary or improper, and it be determined on to have but one military post on the Arkansas, and the Pheasant bluff be considered too remote from the State of Arkansas, the board would respectfully recommend that the main garrison be placed at Fort Coffee, which is eight and a half miles and three hundred and twenty-eight yards, on a straight line, west of the State of Arkansas. At that point the troops would be sufficiently near the State to act in it, provided any action should ever be required of them. They would also be prepared to act at any time in either the Choctaw or Cherokee nations, they being within the Choctaw nation, and only separated from the Cherokee nation by the Arkansas river. The troops at that place could be employed in the enforcement of the "intercourse law." They would be convenient to the agent of the Indian department, and would be at all times ready to co-operate with him in the enforcement of the law, which cannot be done so conveniently and so efficiently at any other point on the river. They would be within fifty-five miles of the Creek nation, and about seventy miles from the Chickasaws. The soldiery would be out of the reach of the contaminating and destructive influence of a portion of the border inhabitants of the State of Arkansas, which has invariably been felt to an injurious extreme by all the troops that have ever been stationed within the limits of that Territory or State.

One strong reason why the troops should be placed in the Indian country, and without the jurisdiction of a State is, that the government of the civil and military is so different that the two cannot well exist in the same vicinity; the military being governed in an absolute and imperative form, while the civilians are governed by a democratic form of government, or more by self-will. The influence exercised in such cases by the civilians over the soldiery often tends to produce acts of insubordination in the latter, which is destructive of military discipline. This influence, however, could only be expected to be exerted by the lower order of citizens.

Another matter which is, in the opinion of the board, worthy of the serious consideration of the department, is that if the main military post should be placed on the line of Arkansas, or even a short distance within the State, the Indians would find their way to it with articles of produce for sale, which they would be apt to sell for less money than the whites would be willing to sell the same articles for, which would induce the whites, as is too often their practice, to insult and abuse the Indians, in order to get clear of their competition in the market. This will as surely be the case as that the parties come together. The consequence will be that the worst of feeling will be engendered between the parties.

Again: the troops being placed within the State of Arkansas for the avowed purpose of giving the protection asked for, the people would consider themselves safe and secure from the Indians. The abandoned and disorderly portion of them would at once commence their lawless aggressions on the persons and property of the Indians. They would steal and kill their stock, and trespass upon them in various ways, calculated in their nature to arouse the Indians to acts of violence in self-defence, which might ultimately result in very serious consequences; whereas if the troops are kept within the Indian country, with the clear understanding that their duties are to be performed in the mutual protection and punishment of both parties, and they knowing that their future welfare would depend upon their conduct towards each other, each party would be more respectful towards the other, and consequently would use circumspection in their intercourse; without which, difficulties of a serious nature would be apt to arise between them.

The great western military road has been marked to cross the Arkansas river at Fort Coffee; but if the government should wish to establish the post at Pheasant bluff, the road can be changed to pass over ground equally as good, and possibly nearer Fort Towson, to which point it is contemplated to run it.

WILLIAM WHISTLER, *Lieutenant Colonel 7th Infantry.*

JOHN STOUT, *Captain 7th Infantry.*

Major General MACOMB, *Commander-in-chief U. S. Army, Washington D. C.*

B.

FORT COFFEE, December 15, 1837.

SIR: In obedience to your letter of the 14th of October last, we have examined the country on the Arkansas river, for several miles below the State line, for the purpose of selecting a site for a large military post within the State of Arkansas; in the course of which examination, we find but three eligible points within thirty miles of the line, the whole of the remaining part of the country on the river, for at least that distance down, having been, in the year 1833, overflowed to the depth of from one to twenty-

five feet, and in many places to a considerable distance back. Those points are as follows: the first is Fort Smith, which is immediately on the line; next is the point at the mouth of Lee's creek, which is five miles below the line by the river; and the Mazzard bluff, which is about twelve miles below the line by the river, and about seven by land.

The Mazzard bluff is a good military site, but it being intended to place the troops within the State, for the express purpose of protecting the people of the State of Arkansas from Indian aggressions, it is necessary that the military post should cover as many of them as practicable; therefore the Mazzard site, even if it was the best of the three in other respects, is too low down the river, as a large settlement on each side of the river, including two towns, those of Van Buren and Fort Smith, would be kept between it and the Indian settlement. Furthermore, the Mazzard site, as mentioned in our last report, is considered to be not more healthy than Fort Smith; and in the course of cutting down the trees, and exposing the wet places to the action of the sun, it is to be supposed that it would become still more unhealthy, while the vicinity of Fort Smith being divested of all of the heavy timber, and the surface being covered with a flourishing young growth of trees, which will not necessarily have to be cut down, will continue to improve in point of health. Under these considerations, we have thrown the Mazzard out of the question.

The point at the mouth of Lee's creek would cover a much greater portion of the people than that of the Mazzard, but it will not cover all of them, being five miles by the river below the line; and even if it did cover the whole of the settlement on the river, there are some strong objections to the site, in a military point of view: one is, the uncertainty of procuring water on a point so elevated, and so near to the brink of a great precipice. It is true that cisterns might be sunk of sufficient capacity to contain a sufficient supply of water for the use of the troops, but not for stock. Another objection to that site is, that it is too elevated and difficult of access. The trouble and inconvenience of realizing stock, such as work horses and oxen, at so great a distance, and on roads so steep as those at this place must necessarily be, would be very great; and if dragoons should be stationed there, that inconvenience would be still more seriously felt. Another serious inconvenience attending this place would be the difficulty of hauling supplies from the river to the site, owing to its great elevation. With those considerations we will drop this point, and will next take up Fort Smith, which is, however, by no means clear of objections. In the first place, we are not entirely sure that it will not be sickly, but as it has been for some years past improving in point of health, as shown in our description of the place, we are led to indulge the expectation of a continuance of its healthiness. Another slight objection to that place is, that the rise or elevation is not quite as great as might be desired, and the space on which the fort would be placed is not as level as it should be, or as could be desired; we consider it, however, after taking everything into consideration, our instructions, as well as the wishes of the people of the State, to be the best site for the establishment of the contemplated military post, and do therefore respectfully recommend that the new fort be erected within the State of Arkansas, as indicated by your instructions, and that it be placed near the site of Fort Smith, and on the premises at present owned and occupied by Captain John Rogers. It will then be immediately on the line, and within the State of Arkansas, where it will cover the settlements on both sides of the river, and will leave no portion of the people on the river in a situation to justify a complaint that they are not covered by a military post within the State.

Another matter worthy of some consideration is, that by placing the post immediately on the line and on the river, the troops will be enabled in some measure to enforce the intercourse law, which they could not do so well lower down.

We have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servants,

WILLIAM WHISTLER, *Lieutenant Colonel 7th Infantry.*

JOHN STUART, *Captain 7th Infantry.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

B No. 1.

Site at the mouth of Lee's creek.

The point of highland at the mouth of Lee's creek is on the north side of the Arkansas river, about five miles below Fort Smith, and about one and a half mile above Van Buren. It is the south end of a considerable mountain, which terminates abruptly at the river and on Lee's creek, ranging parallel and close to the river for the distance of one and a half mile, and about one mile on the creek. This ridge or mountain runs back on a northeast course for many miles, becoming higher as it leaves the river. Immediately at the point, and a little below the mouth of the creek, the summit of the hill is tolerably level, and the surface smooth, to an extent sufficiently great to give ample room for the erection of an extensive military establishment. A square of four or five hundred feet can be got by levelling about six feet—or, in other words, by taking off about that depth of clay from the highest point within that space.

The height of the bluff from the river edge at the mouth of the creek to the site is four hundred feet and six inches, according to a measurement which we had by means of a well-constructed plumb-level. The face of this rise on the side of the river, as well as on the creek, is extremely precipitous. The rocks in some places at the summit of the precipice are perpendicular, at other places there are brakes and winding ways among the crags and piles of stone, through which persons on foot can with great care, and by holding on to the rocks and shrubs, ascend and descend from the bottom to the top. We were told that horses had at some particular point ascended it; but from the appearance of the bluff, one would suppose it to be impossible for a horse to ascend it in its present condition. A cannon placed on the brink of this precipice cannot be so depressed as to rake the face of the hill. A man standing twenty yards back from the brink can barely see the edge of the water on the opposite side of the river, and cannot see the creek when he is even twenty feet back from the brink. At the site the river can only be seen at a great distance above and below—that part of the river, being immediately abreast of the site, being obscured from view at that point for near a mile both above and below.

The scenery from the extreme point of this precipice is seldom surpassed, either in extent or beauty of appearance. A birdseye view of the country from north, round by south, to northeast, can be had to the distance of twenty miles at one glance, and without changing the position more than to turn the head.

The land on this hill is poor, and the timber on it consists entirely of black jack, black oak, and post oak, which stand thickly on the surface, and is of a very short and stunted growth, and is calculated for little else than fence rails and for fuel. The timber above the mouth of Lee's creek consists of the cup oak, red oak, ash, and other timber common to the Arkansas bottom, which would have to be hauled near a mile, and that, too, across the creek, either by means of a boat or bridge, which would have to be constructed for the purpose, and would then have to be hauled up a steep and rocky road. There is no timber below the mouth of the creek of that kind within several miles of the site; and that description of timber is absolutely necessary for making shingles, &c.

There is an abundant supply of red sandstone to be found in almost every direction; but there is no limestone near the site that we could hear of.

There is one spring, about a half mile from the site, which is said to run during the whole of the summer. Another spring was pointed out to us, within a fourth of a mile of the site, which runs during the winter and spring months only. There are no creeks or large branch on the hill for the distance of some miles from the site.

No wells have been dug on the hill, and it is therefore impossible to say whether water can be procured by digging or not. The spring that was shown to us nearest to the site rises in a flat place near the top of the mountain. It is supported by rains that fall on the surface and sink.

About a fourth of a mile up the creek from the site the hill slopes off towards the creek in such a manner that a road could be made, though with much labor, that would be passable for horses, and even for teams; which road would make a communication between the site and the creek, within about the distance of a half mile, or near it. In making this road much digging would be required, and extensive masses of stone would have to be removed; and the road would even then be steep. A little further on the same direction a road might be got to the creek, on a much more gradual slope, which would strike it about a mile and a half distant from the site.

The road marked on the enclosed sketch, crossing the mountain from Van Buren to the present crossing of Lee's creek, passes within a half mile of the site. This road, on leaving Van Buren, ascends the side of the mountain, over rocks and steep points, for the distance of about six or seven hundred yards, when it reaches the summit of the mountain, and then passes over a level space for near a mile, when it begins to descend, by a long and much more gradual slope, to the creek, which it crosses about a mile and a half from the site. A road might be, with much labor and expense, cut in the side of the hill from the site to the river; and might, by taking it along the side of the hill to the distance of five or six hundred yards, be rendered passable, and suitable for all military purposes on that side of the site. It could not, however, be commanded or covered by guns from the site; and it is doubtful whether it could be covered from any other point on the hill.

There is a narrow pass of a few yards in width along the river, and at the base of the hill, extending from Van Buren round to a point on Lee's creek, north of the site, and where the point of the mountain comes directly to the creek, which can now be passed over by horses all of that distance. There is a good point on the river for a ferry, about a half mile below the site. Directly opposite the site is an extensive sand-bar, extending from above the mouth of Lee's creek some distance down the river.

Lee's creek, near the mouth, appears to be about thirty yards wide, and it is of precisely the same character and description of the Poteau. Its banks are soft and miry, as is also the bottom. It is backed up by the Arkansas, at every rise of that river, to the distance of some miles, when it has the appearance and character of a mill-pond, and when that takes place in the summer, it is said that its water is stagnant, and that it is usually covered with a scum, and when in that state it must be unhealthy; but whether its deleterious effects would reach the top of the hill or not, is beyond our ability to determine. Various accounts have been given respecting the settling of the fogs on this hill; some say that they do settle there, and are often seen there, when they cannot be discovered below. The country in the vicinity of the site, from the north round by south to northeast, is low and flat, and contains some pools of stagnant water, as is the case on all parts of the Arkansas bottom.

There is no apparent cause on the hill to produce sickness; but whether the site would be healthy or not is out of our power to determine.

There are but very few persons living on the mountain near the site, and none have been there long enough to prove the health of the place. Van Buren, situated on the river about a mile and a half below the site, and directly at the foot of the mountain is considered to be one of the most sickly places in the country.

The few families settled above the mouth of Lee's creek (it is said) have been sickly this last season.

WM. WHISTLER, *Lieutenant Colonel 7th Infantry.*
JOHN STUART, *Captain 7th Infantry.*

B No. 2.

The site at Fort Smith is on the south side of the Arkansas river, and about three hundred yards below the Poteau. It is on a rising piece of ground, about two hundred yards from the Arkansas river, and about fifty yards east of the Choctaw line, and entirely within the State of Arkansas. It is supposed to be about fifty feet above the level of the river, and commands a tolerably good view of it. At any rate, it is sufficiently so to command it. It will require about six or seven feet to be taken off to form a level of five hundred and sixty feet long and four hundred and sixty-two feet wide, which can be easily extended to a greater distance each way. The soil is soft and light, and there will be no stone to remove. The country back from the site for some distance is nearly flat, over which run some small sluggish rills. The surface is broken very much by small hillocks, which are peculiar to the prairie and flat highland of this country, having in time been prairies. Around and between those small hillocks the surface is flat, and the water from rains stands on it, until it is evaporated by the sun and atmosphere. On some of those small flats, which are usually but a few steps wide, the water stands during a good portion of the summer; and they are calculated, in their nature, to produce sickness, and will always do so when they are exposed to a direct action of the sun. But those places near Fort Smith are at this time in a great measure excluded from a strong action of the sun, by being shaded by a heavy or thick

growth of young oaks, which have grown around them within a few years. This description of country extends about a half mile back from the site, when the land becomes more rolling and dry.

The timber back from Fort Smith consists of post oak, black or red oak, and black jack. It is usually of a large size for timber of that kind on high land; there is also some black hickory. Nearly all of the suitable timber for building purposes has been cut off for the distance of more than three-fourths of a mile back from the site; there is, however, within that space, some timber yet remaining, which can be converted into building materials, and there is sufficient timber within that distance to supply a large fort with fuel for many years. The old timber, near a half mile around the site, has been nearly all consumed. It was, for the most part, cut by the troops many years ago, and the space has since become covered with young trees, which are in diameter from four to ten inches, and are from twenty-five to thirty feet high, and stand as thick on the dry places as it is possible for them to grow.

The point at Fort Smith was first occupied by the rifle corps under the command of Major Bradford, in the year 1816. He built Fort Smith, and occupied the position until in the winter of 1822, when five companies of the 7th regiment of infantry were removed to that point, where they remained about two years; during which time they cut, for the repair and increase of quarters and for fuel, nearly all of the remaining timber on the land, for near half a mile back, by which means the small pools of water above mentioned became exposed to a direct ray of the sun, and were consequently rendered sickly.

The rifle corps, during the time it was stationed at Fort Smith, lost, out of something upwards of one hundred men, only one by death, and had very little sickness among them at any time.

The five companies of the seventh infantry lost several men by death during the first year after they went there; and the second summer that they were there, the sickness and deaths among the troops was most alarming. The troops were removed from that place in April, 1824. One or two families continued to live on the point after the troops removed, and in the year 1833 there were several families living there, and in the spring of that year a company of the 7th regiment of infantry was placed there. An unusually high flood came in the river in the month of June, and after it subsided, both the troops and the citizens suffered extremely from sickness, particularly the troops; every man of the company was sick during that summer and fall, and a number of them died. The people were, however, extremely sickly that season on all parts of the Arkansas, and, in fact, all over the country. The company was removed from Fort Smith in the early part of the summer of 1834. The people that remained there, amounting to about one hundred persons, have enjoyed good health ever since the year 1833, and this last season they have enjoyed much better health than has been enjoyed by any equal portion of people in the country, living either on the river or removed from it; and the place, for the two or three years, has had the character of being healthy. The appearance of the country around the place, however, is strongly indicative of sickness; but we are of the opinion that it is about as healthy as any other point that could be selected for a military site below the line, and it may possibly prove to be as healthy as any other point on any part of the river; at any rate, we consider it freed from two causes of disease common to nearly all parts of this country, on being newly settled: first, the fallen and decayed timber has either entirely decayed or been burned up; secondly, the heavy and tall forest has been cut off it; the sun has had its full influence on the wet land, which may, in some manner, have changed its character; and the surface has become again covered with a new and thrifty growth of young trees.

The Poteau is a sluggish stream, and is backed up by almost every rise of the Arkansas to the distance of several miles, and is an unhealthy stream, having the appearance of a mill-pond. But the new site being three hundred yards from it, we are inclined to think that its deleterious effects will not reach it in such a manner as to produce any very serious evil, and we are supported in this opinion by others, in whose opinion we have much confidence.

The land that Captain Rogers offers in his first proposition to sell to the United States communicates with the 16th section of the township at about the distance of three-fourths of a mile from the site, which section has on it an abundant supply of good timber, and the land belongs to the government of the United States, having been reserved for school purposes.

Pine can be procured at some distance up the Poteau, within the Choctaw nation.

Good stone can be procured in the east bank of the Poteau at its mouth and for some distance up it. There is also a good quarry of stone on the land contained in Captain Rogers's first proposition, and not more than a mile distant from the site, and there is a good level road between the two places. There is no limestone near the site. The soil appears to be well calculated for making brick.

There are no springs of water at or near Fort Smith, but water of an excellent quality can be easily procured by digging wells.

Including one hundred yards of space, mentioned in Captain Rogers's proposition, together with the point belonging to the Choctaw nation, there will be five hundred yards of space open on the Arkansas river, and applicable to military purposes.

WILLIAM WHISTLER, *Lieutenant Colonel 7th Infantry.*
JOHN STUART, *Captain 7th Infantry.*

P. S.—Captain Rogers's first proposition, as mentioned above, is intended to mean that portion of land which he offers to sell for the sum of fifteen thousand dollars.

J. S.

B No. 3.

If the commissioners selected for the purpose of locating the garrison should select the site on the bluff below Lee's creek, they can have four hundred and sixteen acres and sixty-nine hundredths for fifty thousand dollars.

J. D. MCGEE.

C.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DEPARTMENT, *Western Division, Fort Gibson, December 29, 1837.*

SIR: I have the honor to report, for the information of the government, that it has been hinted to me that Captain John Rogers, the proprietor of the land at Fort Smith, has proceeded to Washington city of late. If he has done so, I am of the opinion it is with the object of inducing the government to pur-

chase *only* a portion of the land he holds at that place for a military establishment, and to retain the balance for a town or village. On this subject I have only to remark that no part of the limited quantity of land held by Captain Rogers at Fort Smith (being, as I understand, about seven hundred acres) can be retained by him, if Fort Smith is selected for a military establishment, without great prejudice to the public interest. Independent of the land being wanted, (as Captain Rogers only owns about four or five hundred yards on the Arkansas river,) a town or village so near a military establishment would be a great inconvenience and nuisance.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. ARBUCKLE, *Brevet Brigadier General United States Army.*

Brigadier General R. JONES, *Adjutant General, Washington City.*

D.

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH INFANTRY, *Fort Gibson, June 6, 1833.*

SIR: I had the honor on the 29th ultimo to receive your letter of the 26th April last, in which you require my opinion as relates to the utility of a military station on Red river further west than Fort Towson, with the object of giving protection to the Indians removing from the east of the Mississippi to the west of Arkansas Territory, and what posts ought to be established or held for the defence of this frontier, and to secure to the Indians the protection our government is pledged to afford them.

I would remark, in reply, that I am of the opinion that a military post ought to be established on Red river, as far west as the mouth of the False Wachitta, or as near to that point as a suitable position can be had. The navigation in the Red river is reported to be generally good for keels or light steamboats above the raft as far west as the mouth of the False Wachitta, or near to it, from about the month of February to June or July; yet, in the latter part of the summer and fall, boats of the highest class could not usually navigate the Red river, particularly above the mouth of the Kiamichi.

The garrison of Fort Towson, I am of the opinion, is too far west to be of material advantage in protecting the frontier of Arkansas Territory, and too far east to afford the best protection to the Indians settling to the west of it; and independent of the increased protection a garrison at the mouth of the False Wachitta, or near to it, would give to the Choctaws, it is believed that the Chickasaws, who are also to remove to the west, will obtain from the Choctaws, for their nation, a tract of country on the Blue Water and False Wachitta. They cannot procure other lands north of the Red river that they would live on, and without recollecting their treaty with the United States, I presume that they are to be protected in their new homes by the government.

I do not believe a position could be occupied which would be better calculated than this to preserve peace and good order between the Indian tribes settling in the country west of the Arkansas Territory and the State of Missouri, as far north as to include the waters of the Arkansas river; yet, to insure *this object*, the force at this point must at all times be respectable, and kept in a condition for active and efficient service. It is true, as the Creek country is entirely to the west of this fort, that it would give their new settlements additional protection, if a military post was established on the Arkansas river, at the mouth of the Red Fork, and another on the north fork of the Canadian, about the same distance west. I apprehend, however, that there would be much difficulty and expense in supporting garrisons at those points, as the navigation of the Arkansas river cannot be relied on, at any season of the year, above the mouth of the Verdigris; yet in the spring, and particularly between May 20 and June 8, there is almost every year a rise for ten or twelve days, which would admit of keels or small steamboats ascending as high as the Red Fork. The Canadian, it is believed, cannot be navigated above the mouth of the north fork at any season of the year, and this fork is said to have many falls in it; still it is *possible* that, in the spring or early part of summer, keel-boats, or perhaps light steamboats, could ascend it as far west as the position referred to on the Arkansas river, which is seventy or seventy-five miles west of this point. Yet this must be regarded very uncertain; and in preference to the establishment of so many small posts, under so many disadvantages, I am of the opinion that a respectable command, marching through the prairies to the west for a few months in each year, would probably be more beneficial. A great object, however, would be gained by having a post further west than this or Fort Towson, to enable the commands sent into the prairies to obtain subsistence stores.

I have no doubt a good road can be had from this post to the mouth of the False Wachitta, by crossing the Canadian at the junction of the north fork and the south fork of the Canadian, a short distance from its mouth. These are believed to be the only streams, except the Arkansas river, that will require the use of ferry-boats at any time. There are no mountains to cross, and the way generally is very favorable for a good road, which could be conveniently opened, as a great part of the way will be through prairies and open woods, and possibly the extent of the prairies will be the greatest objection to it. This road ought to be made for military purposes, provided a post is established on Red river, near to the mouth of the False Wachitta, and the road from this post to Fort Smith ought to be improved; and it is my opinion that a *strong work* is required at Fort Smith, or in that vicinity, to give security to the frontier of Arkansas Territory. This is the position in which most can be done to restrain the tribes from acts of hostility against each other, as well as to restrain them from going to war with the United States. Yet should any circumstances have the effect to unite them in acts of hostility against our citizens, a strong work at Fort Smith, or in that vicinity, furnished with a suitable supply of arms and ammunition, would greatly add to the security of Arkansas Territory.

The present site of Fort Smith is too contracted, as the lands are held by an individual within a few paces of it, where a number of stores and *dram shops* are established, much to the annoyance of the garrison; and, unless the government should think proper to purchase a suitable quantity of lands around Fort Smith, I would recommend the removal of the garrison from that position. I have the honor herewith to enclose a sketch of the reserve that I regard necessary at this post for military and public purposes. A less number of acres might answer, if the country was better timbered; and I advised the quartermaster general on the 29th of April last of what is indispensably required, provided this post is regarded permanent.

The report of Lieutenant Colonel Maury, (after his return from the west,) a copy of which I will do

myself the honor to transmit you, I doubt not will furnish much additional information connected with the subjects to which this communication relates.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. ARBUCKLE, *Commanding Seventh Infantry.*

Major General ALEXANDER MACOMB, *General-in-chief, Washington City.*

E.

FORT SMITH, *Arkansas, September —, 1837.*

GENTLEMEN: This point having been spoken of, among many others, as a suitable site for the erection of the contemplated new garrison, and having been informed that a report is in circulation that an exorbitant price would be asked for the land, in the event of the government expressing a wish to occupy it, which report I have thought might in some degree, (if at all desired,) prevent an offer being made or any attempt to purchase.

Under these circumstances, and in order to do away any further misrepresentations about it, I now beg leave, through you, to make an offer of my possessions here for that purpose, to wit:

The west fractional half of section 8; the southeast quarter of section 8; the west fractional half of section 17; the northeast quarter of section 17; the southwest quarter of section 9; the northwest quarter of the northeast quarter of section 20; the west half of the southeast quarter of section 17; the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter of section 9; the east half of the southeast quarter of section 17; and the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter of section 9. All in township 8 north, range 32 west, containing 836 acres. Which land, or any part of it that may be required for military purposes, I now tender through you to the government, and for which I am disposed to take what may be considered a fair and reasonable price, and shall be ready at any time to receive the proposals of any authorized agent appointed to make a purchase.

I will only further remark that I design laying off a town immediately at this point, preparatory to a sale of lots. The object, therefore, in making this communication, is to give the government an opportunity of securing the site before I entirely put it out of my power to accommodate them. I would here also beg leave further to apprise you that a memorial, signed by some eight or nine hundred of the inhabitants bordering on this frontier, has lately been sent on to Congress, praying for the location of the garrison to be made at this particular point.

I have the honor to be, gentlemen, with much respect, your obedient servant,

JOHN ROGERS.

Colonel WHISTLER and Captain STUART, *U. S. Commissioners to select site for garrison, &c.*

F.

WASHINGTON CITY, *February 10, 1838.*

SIR: Since my visit to you of this date I have concluded to make another offer to the government for the site at the mouth of Lee's creek for the new garrison on the Arkansas frontier. My proposition to the commissioners, as well as I now recollect, was to give four hundred acres for the sum of \$50,000. I now propose to give three hundred acres, including the site, and to select it in such way as to suit the government, for the sum of \$20,000; and, besides, I have no doubt that a quarter adjoining, one hundred and sixty acres, will be given by Colonel Dennison, or sold for a bare sum to repay him for the original price, not to exceed \$1,000.

I shall learn his determination in some four or five weeks. The balance of the township is public land, with the exception of a few sections, including the town of Vankim; and I hereby bind myself to carry and make a perfect title for the sum above mentioned if selected by the government.

J. D. MCGEE.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

FORT GIBSON, *October 11, 1837.*

GENTLEMEN: I will sell Mazzard bluff for \$10,000, or I will abide the decision of two men, one appointed by the Secretary of War, and one by myself; and should they not agree, they two to appoint a third man.

Mazzard bluff is situated on the Arkansas river, contains not less than 262 acres, or more than 270. The title is indisputable. It is owned by Doctor De Camp and myself, but I am fully authorized by him to convey it.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. BAILEY.

Lieutenant Colonel WHISTLER and Captain STUART.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 789.

[2D SESSION.]

COLONEL Z. TAYLOR'S ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE WITH THE SEMINOLE INDIANS NEAR THE KISSIMMEE RIVER, IN FLORIDA, ON DECEMBER 25, 1837.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE FEBRUARY 21, 1838.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *February 20, 1838.*

SIR: In obedience to the resolution of the Senate of the 14th instant, I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of Colonel Taylor's official report of the action of the 25th of December last between the troops under his command and the Seminole Indians.

As it has been supposed that some expressions contained in that report cast unmerited censure upon the Missouri volunteers, I avail myself of the occasion to remove so erroneous an impression. The patriotic feelings which led these brave men to volunteer their services in Florida, and to leave their homes to engage in a campaign against the Indians, were duly appreciated by the President and by this department; and, in their opinion, the pledge thus given to the country has been amply redeemed. The fact that they broke and retired in disorder under the murderous fire of an enemy as advantageously posted as if they had been behind regular entrenchments, is not stated to disparage the character or the efforts of the young soldiers. The heavy loss they sustained in killed and wounded affords sufficient proof of the firmness with which they advanced upon the enemy under a galling fire. It was not expected that their unaided efforts could drive the enemy from his stronghold; and the gallant manner in which they led the attack contributed, no doubt, to the success of the day. I may be permitted to say that no blame can rightly be attached to the gallant officer who commanded the troops on that occasion for placing the volunteers in the front rank of the action. The enemy occupied a position that could not be turned, and from which he could only be driven by the utmost efforts of the regular forces. The task of storming such defences could not be intrusted to the volunteers; nor would an experienced officer rely upon irregular troops to form the reserve, as on the steady conduct of this force the fate of the action often depends; and on all occasions it is, or ought to be, composed of the choicest and best disciplined troops of the army. If, therefore, the volunteers were to be brought into action at all, they were placed alone where they could do good service by commencing the action as skirmishers; and their conduct on that occasion was all that could be expected from undisciplined troops, who, for the first time, find themselves in so trying a situation.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Hon. R. M. JOHNSON, *President of the Senate.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,
Army south of the Withlacoochee, Florida, Fort Gardner, January 4, 1838.

SIR: On the 19th ultimo I received, at this place, a communication from Major General Jesup, informing me that all hopes of bringing the war to a close by negotiation, through the interference or mediation of the Cherokee delegation, was at an end, Sam Jones, with the Mickasukies, having determined to fight it out to the last, and directing me to proceed, with the least possible delay, against any portion of the enemy I might hear of within striking distance, and to destroy or capture him.

After leaving two officers and an adequate force for the protection of my depot, I marched the next morning, with twelve days' rations, (my means of transportation not enabling me to carry more,) with the balance of my command, consisting of Captain Munroe's company of the 4th artillery, total 35 men; the 1st infantry, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Davenport, 197 strong; the 4th infantry, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Foster, 274; the 6th infantry, under Lieutenant Colonel Thompson, 221; the Missouri volunteers, 180; and Morgan's spies, 47; pioneers, 30; pontoniers, 13, and 70 Delaware Indians, making a force, exclusive of officers, of 1,032 men. The greater part of the Shawnees having been detached, and the balance refusing to accompany me, under the pretext that a number of them were sick, and that the remainder were without moccasins.

I moved down the west side of the Kissimmee, in a southeasterly course, towards Lake Istopoga, for the following reasons: 1. Because I knew that a portion of the hostiles were to be found in that direction; 2. If General Jesup should fall in with the Mickasukies, and drive them, they might attempt to elude him by crossing the Kissimmee, from the east to the west side of the peninsula, between this and its entrance into Okeechobee, in which case I might be near at hand to intercept them; 3. To overawe and induce such of the enemy who had been making propositions to give themselves up, and who appeared very slow, if not to hesitate, in complying with their promises on that head, to surrender at once; and lastly, I deemed it advisable to erect block-houses and a small picket work on the Kissimmee for a third depot, some forty or fifty miles below this, and obtain a knowledge of the intervening country, as I had no guide who could be relied on, and by this means open a communication with Colonel Smith, who was operating up the Caloosabatchee, or Sanybel river, under my orders.

Late in the evening of the first days' march I met the Indian chief Jumper, with his family and a part of his band, consisting of fifteen men, a part of them with families, and a few negroes, in all sixty-three souls, on his way to give himself up, in conformity to a previous arrangement I had entered into with him; they were conducted by Captain Parks and a few Shawnees. He (Parks) is an active, intelligent half-breed, who is at the head of the friendly Indians, both Shawnees and Delawares, and who I had employed to arrange and bring in Jumper and as many of his people as he could prevail on to come in. We encamped that night near the same spot; and the next morning, having ordered Captain Parks to join me and take command of the Delawares, and having despatched Jumper in charge of some Shawnees to this place, and so on to Fort Frazer, I continued my march, after having sent forward three friendly Seminoles to gain intelligence as to the position of the enemy.

About noon on the same day I sent forward one battalion of Gentry's regiment, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Price, to pick up any stragglers that might fall in his way; to encamp two or three miles in advance of the main force; to act with great circumspection, and communicate promptly any occurrence that might take place in his vicinity important for me to know. About 10 o'clock p. m. I received a note from the colonel stating that the three Seminoles sent forward in the morning had returned; that they had been at or near where Alligator had encamped, twelve or fifteen miles in his advance; that he (Alligator) had left there with part of his family four days before, under the pretext of separating his relations, &c., from the Mickasukies, preparatory to his surrendering with them; that there were several families remaining at the camp referred to who wished to give themselves up, and would remain there until we took possession of them, unless they were forcibly carried off that night by the Mickasukies, who were encamped at no great distance from them.

In consequence of this intelligence, after directing Lieutenant Colonel Davenport to follow me early

in the morning with the infantry, a little after midnight I put myself at the head of the balance of the mounted men, joined Lieutenant Colonel Price, proceeded on, crossing Istopoga outlet, and soon after daylight took possession of the encampment referred to, where I found the inmates, who had not been disturbed. They consisted of an old man and two young ones, several women and children, amounting in all to twenty-two individuals. The old man informed me that Alligator was very anxious to separate his people from the Mickasukies, who were encamped on the opposite side of the Kissimmee, distant about twenty miles, where they would fight us. I sent him to Alligator, to say to him, if he was sincere in his professions, to meet me the next day at the Kissimmee, where the trail I was marching on crossed, and where I should halt.

As soon as the infantry came up, I moved on to the place designated, which I reached late that evening, and where I encamped; about 11 o'clock p. m. the old Indian returned, bringing a very equivocal message from Alligator, whom he stated he had met accidentally; also, that the Mickasukies were still encamped where they had been for some days, and where they were determined to fight us.

I determined at once on indulging them as soon as practicable. Accordingly, the next morning, after laying out a small stockade work for the protection of a future depot, in order to enable me to move with the greatest celerity, I deposited the whole of my heavy baggage, including artillery, &c.; and having provisioned the command, to include the 26th, after leaving Captain Munroe with his company, the pioneers, pontoniers, with eighty-five sick and disabled infantry, and a portion of the friendly Indians, who alleged that they were unable to march further, crossed the Kissimmee, taking the old Indian as guide, who had been captured the day before, and who accompanied us with great apparent reluctance in pursuit of the enemy, and early the next day reached Alligator's encampment, situated on the edge of a cabbage-tree hammock, in the midst of a large prairie; from the appearance of which, and other encampments in the vicinity, and the many evidences of slaughtered cattle, there must have been several hundred individuals.

At another small hammock, at no great distance from Alligator's encampment, and surrounded by a swamp, impassable for mounted men, the spies surprised an encampment, containing one old man, four young men, and some women and children. One of the party immediately raised a white flag, when the men were taken possession of and brought across the swamp to the main body. I proceeded with an interpreter to meet them. They proved to be the Seminoles, and professed to be friendly. They stated that they were preparing to come in. They had just slaughtered a number of cattle, and were employed in drying and jerking the same. They also informed me that the Mickasukies, headed by A-bi-a-ka, (Sam Jones,) were some ten or twelve miles distant, encamped in a swamp, and were prepared to fight.

Although I placed but little confidence in their professions of friendship, or their intentions of coming in, yet I had no time to look up their women and children, who had fled and concealed themselves in the swamp, or to have encumbered myself with them in the situation in which I then was.

Accordingly, I released the old man, who promised that he would collect all the women and children and take them in to Captain Munroe, at the Kissimmee, the next day. I also dismissed the old man who had acted as guide thus far, supplying his place with the four able warriors who had been captured that morning.

These arrangements having been made, I moved, under their guidance, for the camp of the Mickasukies between two and three p. m. We reached a very dense cypress swamp, through which we were compelled to pass, and in which, our guides informed us, we might be attacked. After making the necessary dispositions for battle, it was ascertained that there was no enemy to oppose us. The army crossed over and encamped for the night, it being late. During the passage of the rear, Captain Parks, who was in advance with a few friendly Indians, fell in with two of the enemy's spies between two or three miles of our camp, one on horseback, the other on foot, and succeeded in capturing the latter. He was an active young warrior, armed with an excellent rifle, fifty balls in his pouch, and an adequate proportion of powder. This Indian confirmed the information which had previously been received from the other Indians, and, in addition, stated that a large body of the Seminoles, headed by John Co-hia, Co-a-coo-chiee, and no doubt Alligator, with other chiefs, were encamped five or six miles from us, near the Mickasukies, with a cypress swamp and dense hammock between them and the latter.

The army moved forward at daylight the next morning, and after marching five or six miles reached the camp of the Seminoles on the border of another cypress swamp, which must have contained several hundreds, and bore evident traces of having been abandoned in a great hurry, as the fires were still burning, and quantities of beef lying on the ground unconsumed.

Here the troops were again disposed of in order of battle, but we found no enemy to oppose us, and the command was crossed over about 11 a. m., when we entered a large prairie in our front, on which two or three hundred head of cattle were grazing, and a number of Indian ponies. Here another young Indian warrior was captured, armed and equipped as the former. He pointed out a dense hammock on our right, about a mile distant, in which he said the hostiles were situated and waiting to give us battle.

At this place the final disposition was made to attack them, which was in two lines; the volunteers under Gentry and Morgan's spies to form the first line in extended order, who were instructed to enter the hammock, and in the event of being attacked and hard pressed, were to fall back in the rear of the regular troops, out of the reach of the enemy's fire. The second line was composed of the 4th and 6th infantry, who were instructed to sustain the volunteers, the 1st infantry being held in reserve.

Moving on in the direction of the hammock, after proceeding about a quarter of a mile, we reached the swamp which separated us from the enemy, three-fourths of a mile in breadth, being totally impassable for horse, and nearly so for foot, covered with a thick growth of saw-grass, five feet high and about knee deep in mud and water, which extended to the left as far as the eye could reach, and to the right to a part of the swamp and hammock we had just crossed, through which ran a deep creek. At the edge of the swamp all the men were dismounted, and the horses and baggage left under a suitable guard. Captain Allen was detached with the two companies of mounted infantry to examine the swamp and hammock to the right, and in case he should not find the enemy in that direction, was to return to the baggage, and in the event of hearing a heavy firing, was immediately to join me.

After making these arrangements I crossed the swamp in the order stated. On reaching the borders of the hammock the volunteers and spies received a heavy fire from the enemy, which was returned by them for a short time, when their gallant commander, Colonel Gentry, fell, mortally wounded; they mostly broke, and instead of forming in rear of the regulars, as had been directed, they retired across the swamp to their baggage and horses, nor could they be again brought into action as a body, although efforts were made repeatedly by my staff to induce them to do so.

The enemy, however, were promptly checked and driven back by the 4th and 6th infantry, which, in truth, might be said to be a moving battery; the weight of the enemy's fire was principally concentrated on five companies of the 6th infantry, which not only stood firm, but continued to advance until their gallant commander, Lieutenant Colonel Thompson, and his adjutant, Lieutenant Centre, were killed, and every officer, with one exception, as well as most of the non-commissioned officers, including the sergeant major and four of the orderly sergeants, killed and wounded of those companies; when that portion of the regiment retired a short distance and were again formed, one of the companies having but four men left untouched.

Lieutenant Colonel Foster with six companies, amounting in all to 160 men, gained the hammock in good order, where he was joined by Captain Noel, with the two remaining companies of the 6th infantry, and Captain Gillam, of Gentry's volunteers, with a few additional men, and continued to drive the enemy for a considerable time, and by a change of front separated his line, and continued to drive him until he reached the great Lake Okeechobee, which was in rear of the enemy's position, and on which their encampment extended for more than a mile. As soon as I was informed that Captain Allen was advancing, I ordered the 1st infantry to move to the left, gain the enemy's right flank and turn it, which order was executed in the promptest manner possible; and as soon as that regiment got in position, the enemy gave one fire and retreated, being pursued by the 1st, 4th, and 6th, and some of the volunteers, who had joined them, until near night, and until these troops were nearly exhausted, and the enemy driven in all directions.

The action was a severe one, and continued from half-past twelve until after 3 p. m., a part of the time very close and severe. We suffered much, having twenty-six killed, and one hundred and twelve wounded, among whom are some of our most valuable officers. The hostiles probably suffered, all things considered, equally with ourselves, they having left ten dead on the ground, besides, doubtless, carrying off many more, as is customary with them, when practicable.

As soon as the enemy were completely broken, I turned my attention to taking care of the wounded. To facilitate their removal to my baggage, where I had ordered an encampment to be formed, I directed Captain Taylor to cross over to the spot and employ every individual which he might find there in constructing a small foot-way across the swamp. This, with great exertions, was completed in a short time after dark, when all the dead and wounded were carried over in litters made for that purpose, with one exception, a private of the 4th infantry, who was killed and could not be found.

And here, I trust, I may be permitted to say that I experienced one of the most trying scenes of my life; and he who could have looked on it with indifference his nerves must have been very differently organized from my own. Besides the killed, among whom were some of my personal friends, there lay one hundred and twelve wounded officers and soldiers, who had accompanied me 145 miles, most of the way through an unexplored wilderness, without guides, who had so gallantly beat the enemy, under my orders, in his strongest position, and who had to be conveyed back, through swamps and hammocks, from whence we set out, without any apparent means of doing so. This service, however, was encountered and overcome, and they have been conveyed thus far, and proceeded on to Tampa Bay on rude litters constructed with the axe and knife alone, with poles and dry hides, the latter being found in great abundance at the encampment of the hostiles. The litters were conveyed on the backs of our weak and tottering horses, aided by the balance of the command, with more ease and comfort to the sufferers than I could have supposed, and with as much as they could have been in ambulances of the most approved and modern construction.

The day after the battle we remained at our encampment occupied in taking care of the wounded and in the sad offices of interring the dead; also in preparing litters for the removal of the wounded, and collecting, with a portion of the mounted men, the horses and cattle in the vicinity belonging to the enemy, of which we found about one hundred of the former, many of them saddled, and near three hundred of the latter.

We left our encampment on the morning of the 27th for the Kissimmee, where I had left my heavy baggage, which place we reached about noon on the 28th. After leaving two companies and a few Indians to garrison the stockade, which I found nearly completed on my return by that active and vigilant officer, Captain Munroe, 4th artillery, I left there the next morning for this place, where I arrived on the 31st, and sent forward the wounded next day to Tampa Bay with the 4th and 6th infantry; the former to halt at Fort Fraser, remaining here myself with the 1st, in order to make preparations for taking the field again as soon as my horses can be recruited, most of which have been sent to Tampa, and my supplies in a sufficient state of forwardness to justify the measure.

In speaking of the command, I can only say that, so far as the regular troops are concerned, no one could have been more efficiently sustained than I have been from the commencement of the campaign, and I am certain that they will always be willing and ready to discharge any duty that may be assigned them.

To Lieutenant Colonel Davenport, and the officers and soldiers of the 1st infantry, I feel under many obligations for the manner in which they have on all occasions discharged their duty; and, although held in reserve and not brought into battle until near its close, it evinced, by its eagerness to engage and the promptness and good order with which they entered the hammock when the order was given for them to do so, (is the best evidence,) that they would have sustained their own characters, as well as that of the regiment, had it been their fortune to have been placed in the hottest of the battle.

The 4th infantry, under their gallant leader, Lieutenant Colonel Foster, was among the first to gain the hammock and maintain this position, as well as driving a portion of the enemy before him until he arrived on the borders of Lake Okeechobee, which was in their rear, and continued the pursuit until near night. Lieutenant Colonel Foster, who was favorably noticed for his gallantry and good conduct in nearly all the engagements on the Niagara frontier during the late war with Great Britain by his several commanders, as well as in the different engagements with the Indians in this Territory, never acted a more conspicuous part than in the action of the 25th ultimo. He speaks in the highest terms of the conduct of Brevet Major Graham, his second in command, as also the officers and soldiers of the 4th infantry who were engaged in the action. Captain Allen, with his two mounted companies of the 4th infantry, sustained his usual character for promptness and efficiency. Lieutenant Hooper, of the 4th regiment, was wounded through the arm, but continued in the field, at the head of his company, until the termination of the battle.

I am not sufficiently master of words to express my admiration of the gallantry and steadiness of the officers and soldiers of the 6th regiment of infantry. It was their fortune to bear the brunt of the

battle. The report of the killed and wounded, which accompanies this, is more conclusive evidence of their merits than anything I can say. After five companies of this regiment, against which the enemy directed the most deadly fire, were nearly cut up—there being only four men left uninjured in one of them, and every officer and orderly sergeant of those companies, with one exception, were either killed or wounded—Captain Noel, with the remaining two companies, his own company, "K," and Crossmen's, "B," commanded by Second Lieutenant Woods, which was the left of the regiment, formed on the right of the 4th infantry, entered the hammock with that regiment, and continued the fight and the pursuit until its termination. It is due to Captain Andrews and Lieutenant Walker to say they commanded two of the five companies mentioned above; and they continued to direct them until they were both severely wounded and carried from the field—the latter receiving three separate balls.

The Missouri volunteers, under the command of Colonel Gentry, and Morgan spies, who formed the first line, and, of course, were the first engaged, acted as well, or even better, than troops of that description generally do; they received and returned the enemy's fire with spirit for some time, when they broke and retired, with the exception of Captain Gillam and a few of his company, and Lieutenant Blakey, also, with a few men, who joined the regulars and acted with them until after the close of the battle, but not until they had suffered severely; the commanding officer of the volunteers, Colonel Gentry, being mortally wounded while leading on his men and encouraging them to enter the hammock and come to close quarters with the enemy; his son, an interesting youth, eighteen or nineteen years of age, sergeant major of the regiment, was severely wounded at the same moment.

Captain Childes, Lieutenants Rogers and Flanagan, of Gentry's regiment, acting Major Sconce, and Lieutenants Hase and Gordon, of the spies, were wounded while encouraging their men to a discharge of their duty.

The volunteers and spies, having, as before stated, fallen back to the baggage, could not again be formed and brought up to the hammock in anything like order; but a number of them crossed over individually, and aided in conveying the wounded across the swamp to the hammock, among whom were Captain Curd, and several other officers whose names I do not now recollect.

To my personal staff, consisting of First Lieutenant Quartermaster Hill, of the 2d, and First Lieutenant George W. Griffin, 6th infantry—the latter aide-de-camp to Major General Gaines, and a volunteer in Florida from his staff—I feel under the greatest obligations for the promptness and efficiency with which they have sustained me throughout the campaign, and more particularly for their good conduct and the alacrity with which they aided me and conveyed my orders during the action of the 25th ultimo.

Captain Taylor, commissary of subsistence, was ordered to join General Jesup, at Tampa Bay, as chief of the subsistence department, and was ordered by him to remain with this column until he, General Jesup, joined it. Although no command was assigned Captain Taylor, he greatly exerted himself in trying to rally and bring back the volunteers into action, as well as discharging other important duties which were assigned him during the action.

Myself, as well as all who witnessed the attention and ability displayed by Surgeon Satterlee, medical director on this side the peninsula, assisted by Assistant Surgeons McLaren and Simpson, of the medical staff of the army, and Drs. Hannah and Cooke, of the Missouri volunteers, in ministering to the wounded, as well as their uniform kindness to them on all occasions, can never cease to be referred to by me but with the most pleasing and grateful recollections.

The quartermaster's department, under the direction of that efficient officer Major Brant, and his assistant, Lieutenant Babbitt, have done everything that could be accomplished to throw forward from Tampa Bay, and keep up, supplies of provisions, forage, &c., with the limited means at their disposal; Assistant Commissaries Lieutenants Harrison, stationed at Fort Gardner, and McClure, at Fort Fraser, have fully met my expectations in discharge of the various duties connected with their department, as well as those assigned them in the quartermaster's department.

This column in six weeks penetrated 150 miles into the enemy's country, opened roads, and constructed bridges and causeways, when necessary, on the greater portion of the route, established two depots, and the necessary defences for the same, and finally overtook and beat the enemy in his strongest position. The results of which movement and battle have been the capture of thirty of the hostiles; the coming in and surrendering of more than 150 Indians and negroes, mostly the former, including the chiefs Ou-la-too-che, Tus-ta-nug-gee, and other principal men; the capturing and driving out of the country 600 head of cattle, upwards of 100 head of horses; besides obtaining a thorough knowledge of the country through which we operated, a greater portion of which was entirely unknown, except to the enemy. Colonel Gentry died a few hours after the battle, much regretted by the army, and will be, doubtless, by all who knew him, as his State did not contain a braver man or better citizen.

It is due to his rank and talents, as well as to his long and important services, that I particularly mention Lieutenant Colonel A. R. Thompson, of the 6th infantry, who fell in the discharge of his duty, at the head of his regiment. He was in feeble health, brought on by exposure to this climate during the past summer, refusing to leave the country while his regiment continued in it. Although he received two balls from the fire of the enemy early in the action, which wounded him severely, yet he appeared to disregard them, and continued to give his orders with the same coolness that he would have done had his regiment been under review, or any other parade duty. Advancing, he received a third ball, which at once deprived him of life. His last words were, "keep steady, men, charge the hammock—remember the regiment to which you belong." I had known Colonel Thompson personally only for a short time, and the more I knew of him the more I wished to know, and had his life been spared, our acquaintance, no doubt, would have ripened into the closest friendship. Under such circumstances, there are but few, if any, other than his bereaved wife, mother, and sisters, who more deeply and sincerely lament his loss, or who will longer cherish his memory, than myself.

Captain Van Swearingen, Lieutenant Brooke, and Lieutenant and Adjutant Centre, of the same regiment, who fell on that day, had no superiors of their years in the service and in point of chivalry, and ranked among the first in the army or nation. Besides their pure and disinterested courage, they possessed other qualifications, which fitted them to fill the higher grades of their profession, which, no doubt, they would have attained and adorned had their lives been spared. The two former served with me on another arduous and trying campaign, and on every occasion, whether in the camp, on the march, or in the field of battle, discharged their various duties to my entire satisfaction.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR, Colonel, Commanding.

Brig. General R. JONES, Adjutant General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

Report of the killed and wounded of the first brigade, army south of the Withlacoochee, commanded by Colonel Z. Taylor, first infantry, in an engagement with the Indians, on December 25, 1837, near Lake Okeechobee, Florida.

Battalion or regiment.	Strength engaged.	Commanded by—	Killed.									Wounded.									Killed and wounded.				
			Lieutenant colonel.	Adjutant.	Captain.	Subaltern.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Privates.	Total.	Aggregate.	Colonel.	Lieutenant colonels.	Major, acting.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Non-commissioned staff.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Musicians.	Privates.	Total.	Aggregate.	Total.
First infantry	173	Lieut. Colonel Wm. Davenport.....														1			1	2	4	4	4	4	
Fourth infantry.....	160	Lieut. Colonel J. V. Foster.....							3	3	3				1		1			17	18	19	21	22	
Sixth infantry	175	Lieut. Colonel A. R. Thompson	1	1	1	1	1		15	16	20			1	1	1	3	4		45	53	55	60	75	
Mounted infantry.....	71	Captain G. W. Allen, 4th infantry.....																		1	1	1	1	1	
Missouri volunteers	151	Colonel R. Gentry.....							1	1	1	1		1	2	1	1	2	1	17	22	26	23	27	
Spies*.....	43	Lieut. Colonel Morgan					1		1	2	2			1		2		1		3	4	7	6	9	
Indians.....	30	Captain Parks																							
Total.....	803	1	1	1	1	2		20	22	26	1		1	2	6	3	5	7	2	85	102	112	124	138

* The rank and organization of Missouri spies have not been officially received at these headquarters.

GEO. H. GRIFFIN, First Lieutenant Sixth Infantry, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.
Z. TAYLOR, Colonel, Commanding.

Names of killed and wounded in the engagement of December 25, 1837, with the Indians at Lake Okeechobee Florida.

No.	Company.	Names and rank.	Killed.	Wounded.
<i>First regiment of infantry, commanded by Lieut. Colonel William Davenport.</i>				
1		Wood, quartermaster sergeant.....		1
1	C	Powell, musician.....		1
2	E	Phillips and Wilson, privates, of "F".....		2
Total first infantry.....				4
<i>Fourth regiment of infantry, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Foster.</i>				
1	A	J. Hooper, first lieutenant.....		1
2	A	Lutz and Stewart, privates.....	2	
3	A	Averell, Harney, and Eves, privates.....		3
5	A	Mahony and Dunning, privates.....		2
2	B	Shiple and Griffith, privates.....		2
2	E	Willis and Johnson, privates.....		2
3	G	Carr, Coleborn, and Hannah, privates.....		3
4	G	Falway, private.....		1
1	H	Shumard, private.....	1	
1	I	O'Bannon, first sergeant.....		1
2	I	Dougherty and Drager, privates.....		2
4	I	Atkins and Whitman, privates.....		2
Total fourth infantry.....			3	19
<i>Sixth regiment of infantry, commanded by Lieut. Colonel A. R. Thompson.</i>				
1		Alexander R. Thompson, lieutenant colonel.....	1	
1		John P. Center, adjutant.....	1	
1		Sleephack, sergeant major.....		1
1	A	Bell, private.....	1	
1	A	Allworth, corporal.....		1
3	A	Russell, McGillon, and Howard, privates.....		3
1		J. Van Swearingen, captain.....	1	
3	F	Banks, McDonough, and Swift, privates.....	3	
1	F	Beerman, first sergeant.....		1
2	F	Cunningham and Driske, privates.....		2
5	F	Dermody, Holmes, and Kelly, privates.....		3
8	F	Lamm, McPherson, and Snow, privates.....		3
9	F	Stanley and Dakes, privates.....		2
1	G	William Walker, second lieutenant.....		1
1	G	Wakefield, first sergeant.....		1
2	G	Allen and Cushman, privates.....	2	
4	G	Goffney and Winnecke, privates.....	2	
3	G	Barnet, Ball, and Van Buren, privates.....		3
6	G	Dun, Lushon, and Griffiths, privates.....		3
9	G	Gibson, Harley, and Kenesey, privates.....		3
11	G	Hoban and Haganier, privates.....		2
1	H	Francis J. Brooke, first lieutenant.....	1	
3	H	Daniels, Foster, and Haddock, privates.....	3	
1	H	Kipp, corporal.....		1
3	H	Keefer, Moran, and Shaw, privates.....		3
6	H	Spear, Smith, and Baynor, privates.....		3
9	H	Curtis, Mahon, and McKay, privates.....		3
11	H	Rogers and McDonald, privates.....		2
1	I	George Andrews, captain.....		1
1	I	Todd, first sergeant.....	1	
1	I	Harris, private.....	1	
3	I	Calison, Wilson, and Delaney, privates.....		3
6	I	McKown, Porter, and Connaday, privates.....		3
7	I	Fresh, private.....		
1	I	Hemmeigs, corporal.....		
1	K	Wreford, first sergeant.....		1
1	K	Lechance, corporal.....		1
3	K	Murtough, Bing, and Hodges, privates.....	3	
3	K	Kearney, Slater, and Rose, privates.....		3
Total sixth infantry.....			20	55
<i>Mounted infantry, commanded by Captain G. W. Allen, fourth infantry.</i>				
1	D	Little, private.....		1
<i>Missouri volunteers, commanded by Colonel Richard Gentry.</i>				
1		Richard Gentry, colonel.....		1
1		R. H. Gentry, sergeant major.....		1
2	I	Taylor and Drinkard, corporals.....		2
3	I	Carman, Warson, and Harker, privates.....		3
5	I	Wilkinson and Cottle, privates.....		

Names of killed and wounded in the engagement of December 25, 1837—Continued.

No.	Company.	Names and rank.	Killed.	Wounded.
<i>Missouri volunteers—Continued.</i>				
1	3	Vanlandingham, lieutenant.....		1
1	3	Martin, first sergeant.....		1
1	3	Simmons, private.....	1	
2	3	Ballinger and Wilkinson, privates.....		2
5	3	Youngblood, Halsey, and Southard, privates.....		3
1	4	Whitson, bugler.....		1
1	4	Clarke, private.....		1
1	5	James Childs, captain.....		1
3	5	Beasley, Davis, and Powers, privates.....		3
1	7	C. B. Rodgers, lieutenant.....		1
2	7	Parrot and Raphael, privates.....		2
1	9	Jacobs, private.....		1
		Total Missouri volunteers.....	1	26
<i>Battalion of spies, commanded by ———.</i>				
1		Sconce, acting major.....		1
2		Hase and Gordon, lieutenants.....		2
1		Jacobs, sergeant.....	1	
1		Stanley, corporal.....		1
1		Ramley, private.....	1	
2		Hudgins and Neal, privates.....		2
3		Elliott, private.....		1
		Total spies.....	2	7

GEO. H. GRIFFIN, *First Lieut. Sixth Infantry, Acting Assist. Adj. Gen'l.*
 Z. TAYLOR, *Commanding.*

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 790.

[2D SESSION.]

STATEMENT OF THE NUMBER OF TROOPS, INCLUDING INDIAN ALLIES, EMPLOYED IN THE WAR AGAINST THE SEMINOLE INDIANS IN FLORIDA, AND VARIOUS OTHER PARTICULARS CONNECTED WITH THAT WAR.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE FEBRUARY 21, 1838.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 20, 1838.*

SIR: By a resolution of the Senate of the 29th of December last, this department is required to state:

1. The number of troops, including allies, which have been employed in the war with the Seminole Indians, since its commencement to this time.
2. The number now in the service.
3. The authority under and by which allies have been employed, and the terms and conditions upon which they do or have served.
4. The amount of naval force which has been employed upon this service, and whether, and to what extent, it has been employed on land.
5. If steam vessels have been employed, how many, and for what kind of service.
6. The number of persons employed by the United States that have been killed, or have perished from wounds or other causes in the several campaigns.
7. The entire disbursement made by the United States to carry on this war up to this time.
8. The probable arrearages now due.
9. The whole number of Seminole population at the commencement of hostilities.
10. The number of warriors then.
11. The number of warriors killed, and the number taken prisoners by the troops of the United States.
12. The number that has come in and voluntarily surrendered.
13. The number of warriors who have emigrated.
14. The number still remaining.
15. The number of other classes who have emigrated.
16. The number still remaining.
17. The probable number of arms possessed by the Seminoles at the commencement of the war.
18. The sources from which they have obtained supplies of ammunition.

Of these points of inquiry, the 1st, 2d, 6th, 11th, and 12th are answered by the accompanying report of the adjutant general to the commanding general of the army, marked A, with as much accuracy as the information possessed by the department will allow.

The enclosed letter of the Secretary of the Navy, marked B, together with the report of the adjutant general, already mentioned, furnish the best information in the possession of the department on the subject embraced in the fourth inquiry.

The 5th inquiry is answered by the accompanying statement, marked C, prepared by the Third Auditor.

Such of the information specified in the 9th, 10th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th points, as could be gathered from all the sources accessible to the department, will be found in the report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, herewith transmitted, and marked D.

In answer to the 7th inquiry, I have the honor to state that the entire disbursement for the purpose therein specified, amounted, at the date of the resolution, to \$8,358,955 70, and at this time amounts to \$1,000,000 more.

In respect to the 8th inquiry, I remark that all the arrearages due at the date of the resolution have since been paid.

In reply to the 3d inquiry, I have the honor to state that no *allies* have been employed by the government during the hostilities with the Seminole Indians.

This department has no means of obtaining the information required by the 17th and 18th inquiries.

An answer to this resolution would have been given before this time, had the great press of business, and the requisite laborious examinations in the office of the Third Auditor, permitted that officer to complete at an earlier period the statement respecting the steamboats employed.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Hon. R. M. JOHNSON, *President of the Senate.*

A.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, January 27, 1838.*

SIR: In compliance with so much of the Senate's resolution of December 29, 1837, as calls for "the number of troops, including allies, which have been employed in the war with the Seminole Indians, from its commencement to this time," I have to state that the *regular* force assigned to that service, at first inconsiderable, has from time to time been increased to nearly 5,000, and now amounts to about 4,500 officers and men; but it should not be inferred that the efficient force of the regular army is represented by the last-mentioned number, as all the invalids, &c., are included.

The militia and volunteer force mustered into the service at various periods from the commencement of Indian hostilities in Florida is computed to be 15,290, including 900 Indian warriors.

"The number of troops now in service" may be computed as follows:

1. Regulars and marines, about.....	4,500
2. Militia and volunteers, about.....	2,855
3. Sailors, about.....	100
4. Indians, about.....	178
Total.....	<u>7,633</u>

The Georgia mounted volunteers, under General Nelson, supposed to be 1,200 strong, are not included in the foregoing statement, returns and muster-rolls of the same not having been received at this office; nor should this force, it is thought, be regarded as so much in addition to the above, (7,633,) for, taking into consideration the chances of discharges in other volunteer corps, and the casualties incident to the general service in Florida, yet unknown at the War Department, it is possible that the force, as represented by the returns now on file, may not be entirely correct.

In answer to so much of the same resolution as calls for "the number of persons employed by the United States that have been killed, or have perished from wounds or other causes in the several campaigns," I have to state, that according to the several reports received at the Adjutant General's office, it would appear that 18 officers and 157 men have been *killed* in action; of which number 14 commissioned officers and 139 non-commissioned officers and men were of the regular army, 3 officers and 12 men of the volunteers and militia, and one Indian officer and six warriors as "allies" in the service of the United States. The number reported to have "perished from wounds" is ten. The number that have perished from "other causes," (which may include the effects of the climate,) is about 14 commissioned officers of the regular army, and of the rank and file, it is presumed, a like proportion, which cannot at this time be accurately stated.

The information called for by the same resolution, at the tenth paragraph, expressed in the following language: "The number of warriors killed, and the number taken prisoners by the troops of the United States, the number that has come in and voluntarily surrendered," cannot be correctly furnished in such manner as will correspond with the precise and varied classification of subjects, concerning which particular information is required. The answer to this part of the resolution, therefore, can only be given in the language found in official communications, which do not, for the most part, separate and specify the several classes of Indians which have, from time to time, voluntarily surrendered, been taken prisoners, or otherwise fallen into our hands.

Thus, from the various statements and reports received at the Adjutant General's office, from the commencement of Indian hostilities in Florida, in December, 1835, inclusive of November, 1836, it is seen that the number of Indians reported to have been killed is 131; the number of Indians, women, children, and negroes, taken prisoners within the same period, 15. The number of warriors cannot be separated from the mass, and of course cannot, with any accuracy, be specified.

It may be proper to remark, there is reason to believe that the number of Indians reported to have been "killed," between the dates above specified, much exceeds the actual number, which, it is supposed, could not have amounted to more than 70 or 80.

In his letter of the 21st of October, 1837, Major General Jesup states that, "my prisoners, since I

commenced operations in December last, (1836,) amount to 500 black and red, and about 30 Indians and negroes have been killed, by which more than 200 rifles have been silenced."

By the reports received from the commanding general in Florida, subsequent to his communication of the 21st of October, above quoted, it appears that 127 Indians, negroes, women, and children, have been taken by the army, 58 voluntarily surrendered, and 14 warriors killed.

Respectfully submitted.

R. JONES, *Adjutant General of the Army.*

Major General A. MACOMB, *Commanding-in-chief.*

B.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *February 6, 1838.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th ultimo, and to state, in reply to it, that nearly all the naval force on the West India station has been occasionally employed in co-operation with the military forces in Florida since the commencement of hostilities with the Seminole Indians, cruising on the coasts of Florida and Cuba for the purposes of preventing supplies to the Indians and the removal of property captured by them, and of rendering such aid and succor to the inhabitants in that quarter as might be required. The steamers America, Izzard, and Major Dade, and the revenue cutters Dallas, Washington, Jefferson, and Dexter, were placed under the orders of the commander of the West India squadron, (the former being officered and manned from the vessels of the squadron,) and have been actively employed in co-operation with the army. These vessels have been, since the last summer, withdrawn from the service, the steamers being turned over to the War Department and the revenue cutters restored to the revenue service, at the instance of the heads of the Treasury and War Departments. Recently the cutters Jackson and Madison have been placed, by order of the President, temporarily under the control of the Secretary of the Navy, and have been ordered to Florida for the purpose of co-operating with the army under the direction of Commodore Dallas.

Several expeditions on *land*, composed of seamen and marines belonging to the squadron and commanded by officers of the navy, have been undertaken; and Lieutenant Powell, of the navy, with about one hundred seamen and ordinary seamen, is at this time, as you are aware, in command of a similar expedition, in co-operation with the army. The strength of that portion of the marine corps, under the command of Colonel Henderson, employed in Florida, it is presumed, will be shown by the returns on file in the War Department. The services rendered by it are too well known to you to require a statement of them from me.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. DICKERSON.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War.*

C.

A statement exhibiting the number of steam vessels employed in the service of the United States, in the war with the Seminole Indians, ascertained from accounts settled and rendered at the office of the Third Auditor; prepared in pursuance of the resolution of the Senate of the United States of December 29, 1837.

Steamboat Metamora, chartered June 7, 1836, at \$160 per day; employed in transporting troops and stores until August 9, 1836.

Steamboat Metamora, chartered in December, 1836, for the trip; employed in transporting troops and stores from Fort Mitchell, Alabama, to the Withlacoochee, for \$3,000.

Steamboat Reindeer, chartered June 10, 1836, at \$175 per day; employed in transportation until July 22, 1836.

Steamboat Reindeer, chartered September 14, 1836, at \$150 per day; employed as above until September 25, 1836.

Steamboat Forrester, chartered December 31, 1836, for a month, or longer period, at \$3,500 per month; employed in the service of the United States until July 30, 1837.

Steamboat Georgian, chartered June 17, 1836, at \$200 per day; employed in transporting troops and stores up and down the Chattahoochee river until July 18, 1836.

Steamboat Georgian, chartered October 8, 1836, at \$250 per day; employed in procuring wood for steamboats until October 15, 1836.

Steamboat Polander, chartered June 20, 1836, at \$150 per day; employed in transporting troops and stores up and down the Chattahoochee river until July 23, 1836.

Steamboat Charleston, chartered October 7, 1836, at \$3,750 per month; employed in transporting troops and stores until November 6, 1836.

Steamboat Charleston, chartered November 6, 1836, at \$4,400 per month; employed in transporting troops and stores until September 7, 1837.

Steamboat Mobile, chartered October 11, 1836, at \$450 per day; employed in transporting troops and stores until October 22, 1836.

Steamboat Mobile, chartered December 17, 1836, at \$465 per day; employed on a voyage from Mobile, Alabama, to places in Florida, in transporting troops and supplies until January 11, 1837.

Steamboat James Boatwright, chartered February 18, 1836, at \$300 for the trip; employed in transporting troops, &c., from St. Augustine, Florida, to Charleston, South Carolina.

Steamboat James Boatwright, chartered October 8, 1836, at \$1,500 for the trip; employed in transporting horses, mules, wagons, forage, &c., from Charleston, South Carolina, to Jacksonville and Garey's Ferry, Florida.

Steamboat Santee, chartered January 25, 1836, at \$100 per day; employed in transporting troops, &c., until February 3, 1836.

Steamboat Santee, chartered February 3, 1836, at \$2,200 per month; employed in transporting troops, &c., until August 3, 1836.

Steamboat Santee, chartered September 28, 1836, at \$1,000 for the trip; employed in transporting horses, forage, &c., from Charleston, South Carolina, to Garey's Ferry, Florida.

Steamboat Santee, chartered October 25, 1836, at \$1,500 for the trip; employed in transporting supplies from Savannah, Georgia, to Garey's Ferry, Florida.

Steamboat Santee, chartered November 7, 1836, at \$2,100 for the trip; employed in transporting horses, forage, &c., from Charleston, South Carolina, to Garey's Ferry, Florida.

Steamboat Santee, chartered November 13, 1836, at \$3,900 per month; employed in transporting troops and supplies, &c., until September 13, 1837.

Steamboat Henry Crowell, chartered October 18, 1836, at \$300 per day; employed in the Seminole campaign until February 28, 1837.

Steamboat Hyperion, chartered September 16, 1836, at \$300 per day; employed in transporting troops and supplies until October 18, 1836.

Steamboat Hyperion, chartered in May, 1837, at \$1,100 for the trip; employed in transporting troops from Apalachicola, Florida, to Columbus, Georgia.

Steamboat Hyperion, chartered July 8, 1837, at \$1,200 for the trip; employed in transporting public stores from St. Mark's to the depot on the Santa Fé river.

Steamboat Hyperion, chartered August 3, 1837, at \$200 per day; employed for similar services until August 23, 1837.

Steamboat Le Flore, chartered September 21, 1836, at \$200 per day; employed in the public service until December 26, 1836.

Steamboat Florida, chartered April 30, 1836, at \$1,200 for the trip; employed in transporting troops and supplies.

Steamboat Florida, chartered December 11, 1836, at \$100 per day; employed in transporting troops, &c., until December 14, 1836.

Steamboat Florida, chartered March 16, 1837, at \$3,000 per month; employed in transporting troops, &c., until August 21, 1837.

Steamboat Anna Calhoun, chartered September 13, 1836, at \$300 per day, and \$50 per day for her three barges; employed in the service of the United States until October 14, 1836.

Steamboat Anna Calhoun, chartered January 26, 1837, at \$400 per day; employed in transporting ordnance and ordnance stores until February 12, 1837.

Steamboat Richmond, chartered March 8, 1837, at \$2,400 for the trip; employed in transporting horses, &c., from Augusta, Georgia, to Garey's Ferry, Florida.

Steamboat Free Trade, chartered March 24, 1837, at \$2,300 for the trip; employed in transporting horses, &c., from Augusta, Georgia, to Garey's Ferry, Florida.

Steamboat Duncan McRae, chartered March 8, 1837, at \$2,500 for the trip; employed in transporting horses, &c., from Augusta, Georgia, to Garey's Ferry, Florida.

Steamboat Congaree, chartered January 21, 1837, at \$100 per day; employed in transporting troops, &c., from Post's Ferry to Charleston, South Carolina, until January 28, 1837.

Steamboat Congaree, chartered in February, 1837, at \$1,500 for the trip; employed in transporting troops to Garey's Ferry.

Steamboat Cincinnati, chartered January 9, 1837, at \$2,000 per month; employed in transporting troops, &c., from Charleston to Garey's Ferry, and thence to Volusia, until February 21, 1837.

Steamboat Cincinnati, chartered June 15, 1837, at \$4,000 per month; employed in transporting troops, &c., until August 15, 1837.

Steamboat John McLean, chartered August 1, 1837, at \$4,000 per month; employed in the service of the United States until September 1, 1837.

Steamboat Merchant, chartered February 2, 1836, at \$450 per day; employed in transporting troops, &c., from Port Pontchartrain to Fort Brooke, Florida, until February 21, 1836.

Steamboat Merchant, chartered March 1, 1836, at \$450 per day; employed in transporting troops from Mobile to Tampa Bay until March 17, 1836.

Steamboat Merchant, chartered April 27, 1836, at \$8,500 for the trip; employed in transporting troops, &c., from Fort Brooke to New Orleans.

Steamboat Merchant, chartered September 24, 1836, at \$450 per day; employed in transporting troops, &c., until December 11, 1836.

Steamboat Merchant, chartered March 24, 1837, at \$10,000 for the trip; employed in transporting Indians from Fort Brooke to New Orleans.

Steamboat Merchant, chartered May 21, 1837, at \$150 per day; employed in transporting troops, &c., from Fort Brooke to Tampa Bay until June 2, 1837.

Steamboat John D. Morgan, chartered January 25, 1837, at \$1,500 per month; employed in the service of the United States until March 3, 1837.

Steamboat Minerva, chartered May 11, 1836, at \$150 per day; employed in the service of the United States until May 31, 1836.

Steamboat Minerva, chartered September 16, 1836, at \$300 per day; employed in the service of the United States until November 29, 1836.

Steamboat Tomochicki, chartered April 18, 1837, at \$275 per day for the first "thirty" days, and \$225 per day for every day thereafter employed; employed in the service of the United States until August 31, 1837.

Steamboat Watchman, chartered February 3, 1836, at \$450 per day; employed in transporting troops, &c., from Port Pontchartrain to Fort Brooke until February 20, 1836.

Steamboat Watchman, chartered, together with one brig and four schooners, February 23, 1836, at \$22,000 for the trip; employed in transporting troops, &c., from Mobile to Tampa Bay.

Steamboat Watchman, chartered December 13, 1836, at \$450 per day; employed for the transportation of troops, &c.

Steamboat Bonnets O'Blue, chartered in November, 1836, at \$500 for the trip; employed in transporting stores from Mobile to Cedar creek, and back to Mobile.

Steamboat Comet, chartered in December, 1836, at \$300 for the trip; employed in transporting troops, &c., from Claiborne, and arms from Fort Stoddard.

Steamboat Commerce, chartered June 9, 1836, at \$400 per day for the first "twenty days," and \$350 for each day thereafter employed; used as a transport until July 6, 1836.

Steamboat Eclipse, chartered December 29, 1836, at \$1,400 for the "first month," and \$1,000 per month for each month thereafter; employed until February 28, 1837, to proceed against Seminole Indians.

Steamboat Etiwan, chartered January 27, 1836, at \$130 per day; employed in transporting troops from Savannah, Georgia, to St. Augustine, Florida, until February 3, 1836.

Steamboat Etiwan, chartered February 19, 1836, at \$1,500 for the trip; employed in transporting troops and supplies from Savannah, Georgia, to Picolata.

Steamboat Etiwan, chartered May 4, 1836, at \$1,200 for the trip; employed in transporting troops from St. Augustine, Florida, to Charleston, South Carolina.

Steamboat Etiwan, chartered in January, 1837, at \$100 per day; employed eight days in transporting troops from Post's Ferry to Charleston, South Carolina.

Steamboat Convoy, chartered September 20, 1836, at \$280 per day; employed in transporting troops from Apalachicola to Tampa Bay until September 30, 1836.

Steamboat Leon, chartered April 27, 1836, at \$6,000 for the trip; employed in transporting troops, &c., from Fort Brooke to Mobile.

Steamboat John Stoney, chartered January 11, 1836, at \$60 per day, finding fuel, &c.; employed until January 26, 1836.

Steamboat John Stoney, chartered January 28, 1836, at \$3,000 per trip; employed in transporting troops, &c., from Charleston, South Carolina, to St. Augustine, Florida.

Steamboat John Stoney, chartered February 11, 1836, at \$1,000 for the trip; employed in transporting troops, &c., from Charleston, South Carolina, to St. Augustine, Florida.

Steamboat John Stoney, chartered May 5, 1836, at \$1,400 for the trip; employed in transporting troops, &c., from Charleston, South Carolina, to St. Augustine, Florida.

Steamboat John Stoney, chartered August 8, 1836, at \$2,300 per month; employed one month for similar purposes.

Steamboat John Stoney, chartered September 8, 1836, at \$3,000 per month; employed for similar purposes until September 8, 1837.

Steamboat Cherokee, chartered March 18, 1836, at \$1,800 for the trip; employed in transporting supplies, &c., from Savannah, Georgia, to Picolata, Florida.

Steamboat Cherokee, chartered May 3, 1836, at \$192 per day; employed in transporting supplies, &c., from Savannah, Georgia, to Picolata, Florida, until May 18, 1836.

Steamboat Cherokee, chartered May 19, 1836, at \$1,000 for the trip; employed in transporting troops from Savannah to Augusta, Georgia.

Steamboat Cherokee, chartered August 22, 1837, at \$1,215 for the trip; employed in transporting troops, &c., from Jacksonville to Garey's Ferry, Florida.

Steamboat Tugalo, chartered February 12, 1836, at \$1,800 for the trip; employed in transporting supplies from Georgia to Jacksonville, Florida.

Steamboat David Brown, chartered February 3, 1836, at \$3,250 for the trip; employed in transporting troops and supplies from New Orleans to Tampa Bay.

Steamboat Irwinton, chartered May 4, 1836, at \$1,250 for the trip; employed in transporting troops, &c., from Apalachicola to Fort Mitchell.

Steamboat Dolphin, chartered January 25, 1836, at \$1,200 for the trip; employed in transporting troops, &c., from Charleston, South Carolina, to St. Augustine, Florida.

Steamboat Dolphin, chartered February 8, 1836, at \$2,750 per month; employed in the service of the United States until April 8, 1836.

Steamboat Dolphin, chartered April 8, 1836, at \$2,500 per month; employed in the service of the United States for one month.

Steamboat Dolphin, chartered May 12, 1836, at \$1,150 for the trip; employed in the service of the United States.

Steamboat Dolphin, chartered October 20, 1836, at \$100 per day; employed in the service of the United States until November 5, 1836.

Steamboat Dolphin, chartered November 6, 1836, at \$4,000 per month; employed in the service of the United States for one month.

Steamboat Dolphin, chartered December 6, 1836, at \$4,000 per month; employed in the service of the United States until December 17, 1836.

Steamboat George Washington, chartered February 15, 1836, at \$1,300 for the trip; employed in transporting stores from Savannah, Georgia, to Picolata, Florida.

Steamboat George Washington, chartered February 26, 1836, at \$1,500 for the trip; employed in the service of the United States.

Steamboat Meridian, chartered September 26, 1836, at \$450 per day; employed in transporting troops, &c., from New Orleans to the waters in Florida, and continued in the service of the United States one hundred and four days.

Steamboat American, purchased June 10, 1836, for \$13,000.

Steamboat Southron, afterwards called the Major Dade, purchased June 28, 1836, for \$13,500.

Steamboat Yallo Busha, afterwards called the Lieutenant Izard, purchased July 4, 1836, for \$11,000.

Steamboat General Marion, purchased November 1, 1836, for \$15,000.

Steamboat New Brighton, afterwards called the Poinsett, purchased in August, 1837, for \$27,000.

RECAPITULATION.

Forty steam vessels, as per list above, found to be "chartered" since the commencement of hostilities by the Seminole Indians, were generally employed in the transportation of troops, military stores, provisions, horses, mules, Indians, &c.

In addition to the services rendered by the foregoing steam vessels, employed under charter, the same and many other steam vessels were used and paid freight for purposes similar to the above.

PETER HAGNER, Auditor.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, *Third Auditor's Office, February 16, 1838.*

D.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Office of Indian Affairs*, January 6, 1838.

SIR: In obedience to your direction, I have the honor to submit a report on those parts of the resolution of the Senate of December 29, 1837, which have been referred to this office.

The whole number of the Seminole population was estimated, at the commencement of hostilities, at 3,000. No return of the number of warriors was made at that time, but assuming in this as in other cases every fifth one to be a warrior, it may be stated at 600. Of the 3,000, 407 have been removed: males of ten years and under twenty-five, 41; of twenty-five and under fifty, 71; over fifty, 19; of other classes, 276.

In a letter from Lieutenant Casey, dated October 16, 1837, the whole number of the population is represented to be 5,000; of the warriors, 1,485.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. A. HARRIS, *Commissioner*.

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War*.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 791.

[2D SESSION.]

APPLICATION OF MARYLAND FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL FOUNDRY AT HAVRE DE GRACE, IN THAT STATE; OF RICHARD B. ALEXANDER, OF ONE AT FOUR-MILE RUN, IN ALEXANDRIA COUNTY, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; OF MISSISSIPPI, FOR A MILITARY DEPOT AT COLUMBUS, IN THAT STATE; AND OF ARKANSAS, FOR AN ARSENAL AND SUNDRY FORTIFICATIONS IN THAT STATE.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE FEBRUARY 21, 1838.

A.

Resolutions of the general assembly of Maryland, in relation to the establishment of a national foundry at or near Havre de Grace, in said State.

BY THE SENATE.

FEBRUARY 8, 1838.

Whereas the President of the United States, in his late annual message, did recommend the establishment of a national foundry; and whereas it is important to the people of these United States, and of the State of Maryland in particular, that said foundry should be established in a central and convenient position; and whereas, in the opinion of this legislature, the town of Havre de Grace, in this State, possesses those advantages in an eminent degree, being situated at the head of the Chesapeake bay, and at the termination of the tide-water canal, now nearly completed, which, by its connexion with the great works of the State of Pennsylvania, unites the waters of said bay with the waters of the Mississippi river and its tributaries, passing through one of the richest mineral regions in these United States, thereby affording the best means for the transportation of the raw material from its deposit to a site at all times accessible by sea and by land, and which combines the additional advantage of being remarkable for health, and easy of defence against a foreign enemy in time of war: Therefore—

Be it resolved by the general assembly of Maryland, That our senators and representatives in Congress be, and they are hereby, requested to call the attention of their respective houses to this subject, and to use their best exertions to secure the erection of said foundry at or near Havre de Grace, in this State.

Resolved, That the governor be, and he is hereby, requested to forward a copy of the foregoing preamble and resolutions to our senators and representatives in Congress.

By order:

JOSEPH H. NICHOLSON, *Clerk*.

We certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the preamble and resolutions relative to the establishment of a national foundry, which were assented to by the general assembly of Maryland, at December session, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven.

Given under our hands, at the city of Annapolis, this 9th day of February, 1838.

JOSEPH H. NICHOLSON, *Clerk of the Senate of Maryland*.

GEORGE G. BREWER, *Clerk of the House of Delegates of Maryland*.

Resolutions of a number of citizens of Havre de Grace, in Maryland, in relation to the establishment of a national foundry at that place.

At a large and respectable meeting of the citizens of Havre de Grace, convened at William Smith's hotel, on Saturday, the 17th of February, 1838, to take into consideration the propriety of memorializing Congress on the subject of establishing a national foundry at or near this place, Howes Goldsborough, esq., was called to the chair, and W. L. Nichol and Robert Gale were appointed secretaries. The object of the meeting having been stated by the chairman, it was, on motion of Mr. George Wareham—

Resolved, That Washington Hall, esq., Doctors William Sappington, Hopkins, and Haughey, Captain William W. Virdin, and Messrs. James Sullivan and Robert M. Magraw, be appointed a committee to prepare a preamble and resolutions to be submitted to the meeting, who, after having retired for a short time, presented the following:

Whereas the attention of Congress has been directed, by a resolution of the legislature of the State of Maryland, (passed on the 8th instant,) to the town of Havre de Grace, as a site suitable for the establishment of the national foundry recommended by the President of the United States in his last annual message; and whereas we believe that this town possesses, in an eminent degree, the advantage of a central and convenient position, being situated at the termination of the Susquehannah canal, and thus connected with the internal improvements of the neighboring State of Pennsylvania, and with the western rivers, and the lakes, and at the head of Chesapeake bay, and on the great line of railroad connecting the northern and southern portions of the Union, affording the greatest facility for the transportation of metal and coal from the mineral region of Pennsylvania, and of the manufactured article, by sea and land, to all parts of the Union. This town possesses the additional advantages of being remarkably healthy, and easy of defence in time of war; abounding also with all the materials necessary for the erection of the works, and with the best moulding sand in the country; many of which facts will appear by a reference to a report of the survey of the harbor of Havre de Grace, made by G. W. Hughes, United States civil engineer, and presented to Congress at their last session: Therefore—

Resolved, That it is the opinion of this meeting that the selection of Havre de Grace as the site for said foundry will be alike advantageous to the government, and productive of the happiest effects on the growth and prosperity of the town.

Resolved, That we believe Havre de Grace is, in a great degree, entitled to the preference of the general government, having sustained a severe calamity during the late war with Great Britain, from which it has not recovered, many of its citizens having received no indemnification for the losses sustained by the destruction of their property.

Resolved, That the thanks of the citizens of this town be tendered to the honorable Senators Buchanan and Merrick for the decided stand which they have taken in favor of this location.

It was, on motion, further

Resolved, That Robert Gale and Robert M. Magraw be appointed a committee to convey to Washington city the proceedings of this meeting.

Resolved, That the proceedings of this meeting be signed by the officers, and published.

HOWES GOLDSBOROUGH, *Chairman*.

W. L. NICHOL, ROBERT GALE, *Secretaries*.

HAVRE DE GRACE.

The vast importance this town is destined soon to assume induced Congress to order a survey of its harbor with a view of removing a slight obstruction to its approach. The survey was made late last season, and a report made by G. W. Hughes, esq., United States civil engineer, but was not presented in time to secure the favorable action of Congress during its late short and hurried session. The estimate allows \$48,009, exclusive of a dredging machine, for deepening the bed to sixteen feet, which is considered sufficient for merchant vessels. Mr. Hughes says:

"The town of Havre de Grace is situated on the west side and at the mouth of the Susquehannah river. It is built on a beautiful and elevated plain, presenting a fine site for a city, which was at one time, indeed, seriously contemplated as the seat of the federal government.

"At this point it is understood the Susquehannah canal from Columbia will terminate." It is now under contract to within three miles of the place, and the residue is expected to be put under contract in a few weeks. The excavation is now in progress, and the whole work is expected to be finished in two years from its commencement in October last.

"When the canal is completed, the great bituminous and anthracite coal regions will send down their hundreds of thousands of tons annually. And this consideration alone, if there were none other, would be sufficient to justify, and even imperiously demand, this improvement. The annual consumption of coal in the Atlantic States is now one million of tons, and increases at the rate of two hundred thousand tons per annum, and in less than five years will probably exceed two million of tons per annum. This will give employment to hundreds of thousands of persons in different capacities, and will of itself build up a great commercial marine, from which the government may draw in times of emergency. These considerations are so evidently important, that a mere statement of them is demonstration.

"The position of Havre de Grace, at the head of Chesapeake bay, and the terminus of the vast chain of internal improvement, besides its great commercial advantages, invest it with some importance in a military point of view. It would form a convenient post for an arsenal of arms, provisions, and munitions of war, and could be effectually defended on the water side by a fort at the head of Spes-Utic island, six miles below the town, which would effectually command the channel. A light-house at the head of the island would be a great convenience to navigation, and will be necessary when the trade becomes very great."

The Susquehannah canal, like the Pennsylvania State canal, of which it is a continuation, will be a noble work. With a water surface of fifty feet, a depth of five feet, and double locks eighteen by one hundred feet, it will admit boats carrying more than one hundred tons of freight.

An enumeration of the ramifications of this vast chain of internal improvement, such as the world has never before seen, would exceed the limits of an advertisement. On the west it connects with the Ohio canal at two points, and consequently with Lake Erie at Cleveland, and also, by another canal, with the town of Erie, on the same lake. On the north it will intersect the Erie canal, and unite with Lake Ontario at Sodus bay, distant from Havre de Grace about two hundred and sixty miles.

"This canal seems destined to be the outlet or drain of the great west, embracing, in its wide-spread arms, vast, rich, and populous countries, whose wants will be supplied through the same channels in return for the valuable productions of their labor and capital."

This chain of intercommunication, thus briefly alluded to, constructed along the Susquehannah river and the regions west of it, comprises, with the exception of the Portage railway, an unbroken line of one

thousand two hundred and fifty miles of canals, made at a cost of about thirty-two millions of dollars. The Susquehanna canal, a short link of but forty-five miles, will unite this inland chain to the Chesapeake, and place Havre de Grace in a position for the enjoyment of its immense and valuable trade, which no other city can attain.

The tolls on the Pennsylvania canals the last year exceeded \$800,000, and are estimated for this year at \$1,300,000.

Even the trade of the river is important, notwithstanding the unfavorable and discouraging circumstances under which it is prosecuted. Last year, up to the 1st of November, there were run on the river to tide, 1,100 arks, and 1,400 rafts, valued at about \$4,000,000; and had the canal been open, the amount of descending produce would not, probably, have fallen short of \$20,000,000. These canals are open so much earlier in the spring, and continue open so much later in the fall, that the trade will naturally seek this route in preference to any other, and the map will clearly show that nature and art have inevitably destined Havre de Grace to become the great emporium of the vast regions connected with it.

The railroad from Philadelphia to Baltimore passes through Havre de Grace. The cars are now running daily from Wilmington to Baltimore. From Wilmington to Philadelphia the road will be finished this season.

It would, at the first view, seem singular that the advantages of this place should have been overlooked, or not justly appreciated by the public, who are usually clear-sighted in perceiving any new commercial advantages, or in improving those already known. But the surprise ceases when we consider the tenacity of opinion so frequently evinced in favor of our own residence, where we have invested our property and have the necessary facilities for business; there we are apt to flatter ourselves the business will come, although a more convenient mart should be opened for it.

That this is eminently the case in the present instance will be readily seen by those of clear discernment.

The citizens of New York have not had their attention directed that way, or if they have thought of the matter at all, have supposed the location too remote to have any influence on their prosperity; whereas it is intimately connected with it, either as a rival in the great trade of the interior, or as an auxiliary of the first importance.

The descending trade of the Susquehanna river and canals is now almost equal to the trade of all the New York canals, and will, in a short time, surpass them; even exclusive of coal, of which, probably, will come to Havre de Grace 1,000,000 of tons annually; giving employment to thousands of vessels in that branch of business alone, and the whole trade surpassing in magnitude that of any city in the Union, with the exception of New York and New Orleans. This great chain of canals will be the chosen avenue for the ascending trade, and goods will equally seek it, whether purchased at Havre de Grace, in this city, or elsewhere.

Philadelphia and Baltimore will be essentially affected by the opening of the canal to the tide, but the event seems to be erroneously viewed by both.

The former relies on retaining the trade by means of her railroad and the Union canal, as well as by a circuitous route through the Chesapeake and Delaware canal.

This latter route can, indeed, be performed at much less expense than either of the others, but yet at a cost quite equal to a voyage by sea, and nearly equal to the passage to New York by way of the Raritan canal.

Baltimore not only expects to retain the Susquehanna trade that she now has, and which is of vital importance to her, but she expects to draw to herself the greatest portion of that which Philadelphia now enjoys, and hopes greatly to increase.

Baltimore expects this; because *twelve hundred and fifty miles* of canals debouche into the Chesapeake at Havre de Grace.

But she seems to overlook that Havre de Grace is, by water, sixty miles north of her, with as good a port as her own, and quite as accessible at all seasons; that the transshipment of commodities from one port to the other will in almost any case be preposterous and in some cases impracticable, such, for instance, as coal and lumber, which, being articles of great bulk and comparatively small value, will not bear extra charges. These two great articles being fixed at Havre de Grace, it necessarily and incidentally follows that these will determine the location of the whole trade at that port.

Goods cannot be transhipped to Baltimore or elsewhere without expense; this will be equally felt on the return freight, and the time has come, and is likely to continue, when commerce will not incur unnecessarily heavy and ever-accruing expenses.

As certain an effect follows cause, so certain is it that Havre de Grace must become a city of the first commercial importance, and that, too, in an unprecedented short space of time. The circumstances under which it comes into being are without a parallel in the history of the world.

Memorial of a number of citizens of Maryland, praying the establishment of a national foundry at Havre de Grace, in said State.

To the honorable the Senate and House of Representatives in Congress assembled:

The undersigned citizens of the State of Maryland, or interested in property therein, beg leave to call the attention of Congress to the town of Havre de Grace, in the county of Harford, in said State, as a situation admirably calculated for the establishment of the foundry referred to by the President.

The harbor, bay, and Susquehanna river was recently surveyed by G. W. Hughes, esq., United States civil engineer, under the direction of the Secretary of War, and a copy of his report was communicated to the House of Representatives by the Secretary of War on the 2d of February, 1837, and we beg now to lay before you a printed extract of the same, (see page 998,) and from which it will be seen he refers to Havre de Grace as a situation "invested with some importance in a military point of view."

There is now in the course of construction a canal from Columbia, in Pennsylvania, to Havre de Grace, which will be completed, as is supposed, and ready for use by the 1st of April, 1839, and which opens a direct communication to the richest mineral section of the State of Pennsylvania, at all times insuring a plentiful supply of iron and coal at an expense for transportation much less than it could be furnished at any point of the Union, which is capable of being made, at a small outlay, accessible at all seasons of the year by ships or vessels of any burden.

By reference to a map of the United States and the statistics of public improvements, it will be seen that there are about *thirteen hundred miles* of canal and railroad already constructed, and in the course of construction, connected with Havre de Grace, which would afford to the government the means of transporting cannon and munitions of war, after manufactured, to various and remote parts of the Union with greater facility and less expense than from any other point at which a foundery could advantageously be established within the knowledge of the undersigned.

The canals and railroads referred to are the routes following :

	Miles.
The Susquehannah canal, from Havre de Grace to Columbia.....	40
Grand Pennsylvania canal, with thirty-seven miles of railroad, from Columbia to Pittsburg.....	313
Middle division Pennsylvania canal, from Juniatta river to the south boundary of New York....	204
From the southern boundary of New York, by the way of Chemung canal, Seneca lake, to Great Sodus bay, on Lake Ontario.....	61
From the Erie canal, where it connects with Chemung canal, gives an east and west distance of.	365
From Northumberland, along the west branch of the Susquehannah, to Bald Eagle creek.....	68
The cross cut canal from Pittsburg, to connect with the Ohio canal at Massillon, Ohio, say....	80
The branch of the last canal.....	40
The connexion of the last canal with the Ohio canal gives an east and west distance of the whole length of Ohio canal, say.....	306
A few miles of navigation on Lake Erie, from Cleveland, bring us to the Wabash and Erie canal, which traverses the State of Indiana for.....	300
Making	1, 777

In addition to the canal and railroads referred to, it is known to Congress that there will soon be a continuous line of railroad from New York to *Havre de Grace*, which affords a connexion for the officers of the government to visit the public works, if they should be established at *Havre de Grace*.

The favorable position of this place, in many other points of view, originally led to its examination and survey for the seat of the general government.

It seems, then, to the undersigned, that Congress will take into consideration the following properties in favor of erecting the public work in question at *Havre de Grace* :

1. Its proximity to the richest mineral regions of the United States.
2. The facility of transportation of all raw material necessary for manufacturing purposes.
3. A like facility for transporting to any part of the Union the manufactured articles wanted by the government.
4. Its accessibility by sea at all seasons of the year.
5. Climate, cheapness of living and of labor, is worthy of consideration, as is also the price of the land which the government would require for its use.

All which is respectfully submitted.

Stevenson Archer.	John Christie.	Washington Hall.
George W. Hall.	H. J. S. Archer.	John Mitchell.
Thomas Hopkins.	Amos Spencer.	Thomas Courtney.
George Moony.	William F. Evans.	D. M. Cooly.
Owen Gaffaney.	Daniel Chestney.	Thomas Courtney.
William P. Chew.	John M. Crew.	Hanson Courtney.
Parker Mitchell.	Jacob Hoke.	E. J. Hughes.
Bernard Mitchell.	William B. Paca.	Henry O'Neill.
James Murray.	John L. Griffith.	James Chesney.
W. A. Patterson.	Timothy Keen.	William Moore.
Benjamin B. Williams.	Aquila Keen.	Hollis Courtney.
W. W. Virdin.	Aquilla Baldwin.	Henry Baker.
John Stump.	James Stephenson.	George Ergood.
H. L. Gale.	Benjamin Vandiveer.	Thomas Kirby.
Joseph Smith.	J. C. Relish.	J. B. Stump.
Alex. Spareen.	William Sappington.	Allen Anderson.
George B. Chamberlain.	Gardner Furness.	Samuel B. Silver.
John Hopkins.	Harry D. Gough.	John Dougherty.
Aquila Bailey.	James Amoss.	James Stephenson, jr.
Owen Conner.	George R. Amoss.	Otho Scott.
Littleton Green.	James W. Williams.	Richard S. Gallior.
Robert McCullock.	J. Reardon.	Thomas J. Loplin.
Robert Calley.	Thomas Taylor.	T. D. Anderson.
Jacob Ergood.	J. D. Maulsby.	Edward Mitchell.
Jacob Wareham.	A. J. Thomas.	Thomas Sadler
John Myers.	George Wareham.	S. J. Ramsey.
Henry Myers.	George Bartol.	Matthew Howlett.
Thomas Kelley.	Howes Goldsborough.	Reuben Thompson.
B. O'Connor.	John Donahoe.	William C. Pennington.
Henry W. Williams.	John Wareham.	W. J. Benjamin.
James Gilispey.	William P. Smith.	Thomas Moffit.
J. A. Gover.	W. P. Brobson.	William McGarrey.
R. S. McKindless.	John K. Sappington.	A. Rhaads.
Harrison Courtney.	Henry Whittemore.	Jacob Tome.
Joshua Green.	Winston D. Smith.	James Maddox.
George W. Kirk.	Barney B. Bartol.	Samuel A. West.
Amos Singleton.	William Boyd.	John Coen.

John Brown.
James Brien.
Stephen Boyd.
William R. Brooke.
Thomas Boyd.
Septimus Norris.
John W. Stump.
Amos Gilbert.
Robert Stephenson.
R. H. Archer.
George Stephenson.
John Richey.
Joseph C. Parker.

William M. Jordon.
Henry P. Sutor.
John Roberts.
William Dinsmore.
Ezra Bailey.
George W. Barnes.
Mordecai Barnes.
George W. Brown.
Benjamin Mahan,
Jonathan McVey.
Thomas Sutor.
Henry Maul.
Wesley W. Levy.

Edward Ewing.
William O'Neill.
Ezra Reed.
R. M. Magraw.
Robert Gale.
Benjamin Silvery.
Alex. Myers.
James T. Sullivan.
George H. Dutton.
Henry Barnes.
W. L. Nicoll.
Joseph C. Carver.
William B. Paca.

Memorial of Richard B. Alexander to the honorable the members of the Senate of the United States in Congress assembled.

The memorial of the undersigned respectfully represents to your honorable body, that for a number of years the subject of a national foundry for cannon, to be located near the seat of the general government, has attracted public attention, and been made matter of discussion and inquiry—all who have turned their attention to it agreeing in the value and expediency of such an institution. In the last annual message of the President of the United States to Congress, he says: "The creation of a national foundry for cannon in the service of the army and navy of the United States has been heretofore recommended, and appears to be required, in order to place our ordnance on an equal footing with that of other countries, and to enable that branch of the service to control the prices of those articles and graduate the supplies to the wants of the government, as well as to regulate their quality and insure their uniformity. The same reasons induce me to recommend the erection of a manufactory for gunpowder, to be under the direction of the Ordnance office."

To this strong recommendation of both these important measures your memorialist respectfully begs leave now to direct your most serious consideration, whilst he lays before you some facts concerning the most suitable and eligible situation for the proposed foundry and manufactory. The site which is proposed for survey and examination is the Columbian Factory Mills, on Four-Mile creek, in the county of Alexandria, and District of Columbia. This location combines every advantage which can be required. It is in the District of Columbia, the territory exclusively under the control of Congress; it is but three and a half miles from Washington city, and within one mile of the Potomac river; transportation from it to the United States arsenal, the navy yard, or the channel of the river, is easy and convenient. The situation is healthy and retired. In short, it is believed that no place could be selected combining so many advantages. There are various large and commodious buildings already erected, which your memorialist has presented drawings of, together with a map of the adjacent country, to the Secretary of War, both of which he respectfully begs that you will examine. These will show that government, at comparatively small expense, can repair the buildings and turn them into such as will be suitable. They consist of—

1st. The factory, a large three-and-a-half-story brick building, the dimensions 54 feet by 37, the wall 20 inches thick, with a large water-wheel and other machinery, which could easily be made suitable for boring cannon.

2d. The mill, a large two-story building, the basement story of stone, the superstructure a frame building, measuring 53 feet by 34, and running two pairs of burrstones, which could, at little expense, be converted into a powder manufactory.

3d. A large two-story brick building, with four rooms on a floor.

4th. The old mill, a large two-story brick building, much out of repair.

5th. A large two-story frame building, 50 feet by 24, with four rooms on a floor.

6th. A commodious two-story brick dwelling.

It is presumed that these various buildings will be found to be so constructed and arranged as to answer most admirably for the purposes of a manufactory and foundry. These mills are situated, as before remarked, on Four-Mile creek, which is navigable for scows and longboats to within seventy or eighty yards of the buildings, and, by opening and cleaning out the old canal, they can load and unload at the mill, as they did a few years since. At high tides the water flows up to the mill. The distance to the Alexandria lateral canal is about half a mile, either by land or water, and about the same distance to the Alexandria and Washington turnpike. The stream is abundant and never failing, and sufficient to drive four or five pairs of burrstones. The height of the fall is forty feet, and length of the mill-race about half a mile; the water, it will be observed, being thus equal to all the wants of a cannon foundry and powder factory. There are several springs of very fine water adjacent to the mills, and the neighborhood is considered very healthy. Your memorialist further remarks that the fact of the contiguity of the mills to the Alexandria lateral canal, a branch of the Chesapeake and Ohio canal, will strike you as important, in view of the facility with which iron ore from the Alleghany region can thus be brought to the foundry. It is believed, also, that no site in the District or elsewhere could be selected as convenient and safe for the proposed powder factory as this. It is surrounded by hills, and there are several deep ravines, where magazines could be built without danger to the Columbian mills and neighboring houses from explosion. One of these ravines is situated on the line of the mill-race, where a powder factory might be erected, were it deemed expedient to place it at a distance from the Columbian mills. Indeed, the more the situation is examined, the more conveniences, advantages, and facilities for the proposed establishments it will be found to possess. It only requires the report of competent engineers to satisfy you of the facts here stated, and many more which might be mentioned; and your memorialist, therefore, respectfully asks that it may be surveyed by government engineers, to make a report to you. He also requests that this memorial may be referred to the Military Committee, the intelligent members of which might, from personal examination, (it being near and convenient,) satisfy themselves of the facts here set forth.

In addition to what has been already stated by your memorialist, he would respectfully beg leave further to remark to your honorable body that the site proposed by him for a national foundry for cannon and a national factory for gunpowder not only combines all the advantages required for such establishments, but it has the decided advantage of cheapness and economy over all other places in the District or elsewhere, resulting from the location of both establishments at the same place, and requiring the purchase of but one tract of land, with all the buildings necessary for both already erected, and, consequently, the saving of time, labor, and expense to the government would be very considerable, and that both establishments might be carried into operation without interfering with each other, and without the unavoidable delay that would necessarily be produced by the long and tedious process of building.

The lot on which the Columbian factory stands contains $37\frac{1}{2}$ acres, and the farm adjoining 260 acres, the whole or any part of which your memorialist offers to the government for either or both of the national purposes here mentioned at a fair and reasonable price.

RICHARD B. ALEXANDER.

FEBRUARY 12, 1838.

NOTE.—A drawing of the buildings and a map of the surrounding country is in the possession of the Secretary of War, to both of which you will please refer.

Resolution of the legislature of Mississippi, to obtain the establishment of a military depot at or near Columbus, on the Tombigbee river.

Resolved by the legislature of the State of Mississippi, That our senators in Congress be instructed, and our representatives requested, to desire the government of the United States to establish a military depot at or near Columbus, on the Tombigbee river, in this State.

Resolved, That his excellency Charles Lynch be requested to furnish our delegation in Congress with a copy of this resolution.

JOHN L. IRVIN, *Speaker of the House of Representatives.*
JOHN A. QUITMAN, *President of the Senate.*

Approved February 27, 1836.

CHARLES LYNCH.

I certify the foregoing to be a true copy of the original resolution, as is now on file in my office. In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, at the town of Jackson, the 2d February, 1836.
B. W. BENSON, *Secretary of State.*

IN SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, January 4, 1837.

The Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred the resolution of the legislature of the State of Mississippi, instructing the senators and requesting the representatives from that State to obtain from the general government the establishment of a military depot at or near Columbus, on the Tombigbee river, in said State, report:

That they have duly considered the subject of the said resolution, and are of opinion that there are strong and decisive reasons for granting the request as asked; but that a separate bill is not necessary, as the bill to establish arsenals in States where there are none yet established, includes the State of Mississippi, and proposes the establishment of an arsenal there.

Memorial of the legislature of Arkansas, asking an appropriation for a line of fortifications along the western boundary of that State, and the establishment of an arsenal.

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

The memorial of the general assembly of the State of Arkansas respectfully represents: That, owing to the great accession of Indians immediately bordering on the western boundary of our State, and to the fact that a foreign power adjoins our southern boundary, the State of Arkansas occupies a more exposed situation than any other State in the Union. But thinly inhabited, we live, as a frontier people, in a constant state of dread and alarm lest the war-whoop or battle-cry may be sounded through our land. Exposed as we are, in our present defenceless situation, if we were attacked either by the Mexicans or Indians, we would be entirely overrun before we could receive aid or succor from the adjoining States.

We have, therefore, felt it to be our duty to submit to the American Congress our views in relation to this important subject, and respectfully request for them a calm and deliberate consideration. We entirely approve of the establishment of a military road from St. Peter's to the Sabine, and the erection of strong works within a convenient distance of each other upon the road. We would recommend, however, that the works be so constructed as to afford a place of refuge for the inhabitants, as well as works of attack and defence. We would also recommend that the forts be made of durable materials, and built upon a large scale, as the time may come when those forts will have to be occupied by large bodies of troops, and be the points from which the most extensive military operations may be carried on. We would, therefore, respectfully ask that an appropriation of two hundred thousand dollars be made for the construction of the fortifications on the western frontier of Arkansas, as follows: *say erect a work at or near the northwest corner of this State, to cost from fifty to seventy-five thousand dollars; one at a suitable*

point intermediate between the northwest corner of the State and the Arkansas river, to cost from twenty-five to thirty thousand dollars; a work at some eligible point on Red river, to cost about fifty thousand dollars; a work at some suitable point on the Sulphur fork of Red river, to cost about twenty-five thousand dollars; and, also, a fort, to cost from fifty to seventy-five thousand dollars, at some eligible point on the Sabine. The erection of these forts would secure the protection of this State from Indian depredations, and be a shield against any foreign power that might wage war against the government from the south or west, and also enable the general government more effectually to carry into effect the several treaties with Indian tribes on our western frontier.

Your memorialist would also respectfully represent that they highly approve of the erection and establishment of a public arsenal at or near Little Rock. They would suggest, however, the propriety of this work being constructed upon the most extensive plan, and that it be built with a view at a future day of connecting with it the necessary works for the manufacture of arms. No section of the United States can afford more abundant means and facilities for such a work than the country contiguous to Little Rock. We therefore pray that such further appropriation may be made as the extent of the work, and the object in contemplation, may make necessary.

In considering the various means of protection which our situation calls upon us to provide, we have been led to believe that it would be in the power of Congress, by holding out sufficient inducements, so to increase the settlement upon our frontier as to obtain a dense population of brave defenders of our homes and firesides in all the counties of this State bordering upon the frontier. This may be done either by donations of land to the actual settlers, to be granted conditionally, the title not to be given to the occupant until after a residence of five or more years; or, if this cannot be done, then by a grant of pre-emption right to all settlers, with the privilege to hold possession of their lands, and not be required to make the entry for a limited term of years.

And, in conclusion, your memorialists would respectfully represent that the late arrivals of disaffected and hostile Indians, from the Seminole, Creek, and Cherokee nations, on our western frontier, there are strong reasons to apprehend that those Indians will unite with other nations, and commence hostilities on the western frontier of this State; and to be prepared to meet this emergency, your memorialists would urgently and respectfully recommend that an additional regiment of mounted dragoons be stationed on the western frontier of this State, until such fortifications for defence be erected as Congress may deem expedient.

JOHN WILSON, *Speaker of the House of Representatives.*
SAMUEL C. ROANE, *President of the Senate.*

Approved October 20, 1836.

J. S. CONWAY.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 792.

[2D SESSION.]

ON CLAIM OF A SERGEANT OF TENNESSEE VOLUNTEERS, WHO SERVED ONE MONTH AND TWENTY-THREE DAYS AND WAS DISCHARGED ON ACCOUNT OF SICKNESS, FOR ONE YEAR'S CLOTHING.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FEBRUARY 23, 1838.

Mr. McCLELLAND, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred the petition of William Bloomer, reported :

The Committee on Military Affairs have had under consideration the petition of William Bloomer, of Hawkins county, Tennessee, who volunteered in the company of Captain David S. Rogers, was mustered in service the 8th of July, 1836, and served as first sergeant one month and twenty three days, when he was discharged on account of sickness. It is represented, and appears, that the petitioner incurred the same expense as other soldiers in the company for clothing, who were allowed pay for one year's clothing. The committee recommend that the petitioner be allowed one-half the amount of his year's clothing, deducting the amount allowed and paid for one month and twenty-three days, while he was in service; and report a bill accordingly.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 793.

[2D SESSION.]

REPORT OF THE SURVEY, ESTIMATE, AND DRAWING OF A MILITARY ROAD FROM SAGINAW TO MACKINAC, MICHIGAN.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE FEBRUARY 26, 1838.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, *February 23, 1838.*

SIR: The copy of the report and map of the survey of the military road from Saginaw to Mackinac, called for by a resolution of the Senate of the 19th instant, are herewith respectfully transmitted.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

J. R. POINSETT.

Hon. R. M. JOHNSON, *President of the Senate.*

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, *Washington, February 23, 1838.*

SIR: In compliance with your order accompanying the resolution of the Senate of the 19th instant, I have the honor to furnish herewith a copy of the report of the survey made by Lieutenant Poole of a military road from Saginaw to Mackinac, together with the original map of the same, which cannot be conveniently copied for want of the adequate force in this office.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. CROSS, *Acting Quartermaster General.*

Hon. J. R. POINSETT, *Secretary of War, Washington.*

DETROIT, *September 30, 1835.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that the survey of the route from Saginaw to Mackinac is completed, and to submit herewith a map of the route selected, with an estimate of the cost of opening the road.

This route was to be traced through a trackless wilderness nearly two hundred miles in extent, about which nothing was known, but that it presented obstacles of an unusually formidable character. That portion of it which is between Saginaw and the river Au Sable was represented to be an uninterrupted succession of windfalls, thickets, and swamps. Such has been the impression of the serious nature of the obstructions to traversing this region that the Mackinac mail has, up to this time, been carried by the very tedious and circuitous route of the shores of Saginaw bay and Lake Huron, no person having been found sufficiently hardy and adventurous to attempt the passage of the interior.

In undertaking to trace the line of a road through such a country, a general reconnoissance being impracticable, for men could not carry a sufficient quantity of provisions to subsist them from one extremity to the other, the only course that could be pursued was to carry on at the same time the reconnoissance and survey, pushing the former as fast as possible in advance of the latter.

While all the information that could be obtained led to the belief that the road should follow the general course of the Titabawassee, it was desirable to cut off its large bends, and a route indicated by the Indians, leading directly to a point of the river called the Upper Fork, opposite the thirty-eighth mile stake of the line, was adopted in preference to following the river. It is thought, however, as stated in a former communication, that more favorable ground would be found by running, for the first twenty miles, a line nearer to the river than that reported.

From the Upper Fork the location was continued in the manner above stated as far as the river Au Sable. The arrangements made for supplying the party with provisions having failed to meet its wants, it became necessary to discontinue the survey at that point and penetrate a forced march to Mackinac. By examinations made during this journey, and subsequently, the general course of the remaining portion of the line was fixed, and a part of it was surveyed before the close of the last season. All the difficulties of the work having been overcome then, a few weeks of this summer past sufficed to complete it.

The accompanying map explains itself, and presents so full and minute a representation of the topographical features of the country through which the route is traced, that only a very general description of it is believed to be required in this report.

On leaving Saginaw, the line crosses a succession of low ridges of a rich soil and heavily timbered, separated by swales, which are overflowed in the wet season. The angles in the line were made in order to pass these swales at the narrowest places. This sort of land continues to the fourteenth mile, from whence, to the fortieth mile, the line follows the course of a series of low ridges, in many places but little more than wide enough for the road, and very much obstructed by windfalls and thickets, with tamarack and black ash swamps on each side. The soil on the ridges is invariably a light sand throughout the remainder of the route. The timber is chiefly pine and hemlock, with an occasional intermixture of nearly all the varieties of hard wood. A slight alteration has been made upon the thirty-fifth mile, which there was no opportunity of making upon the ground; instead of following the circuitous course run, a line is drawn directly from stake 157 to stake 162; the stakes being marked with their appropriate numbers, there will be no difficulty in making this correction.

From the fortieth to the fifty-first mile the line is traced upon a high ridge which forms the east bank of the Titabawassee, and separates it from extensive swamps which skirt the river at the distance of a few rods from it. This ridge is covered with windfalls and thickets of an almost impervious character. The ravines which are here crossed would require grading to render them passable for wagons; but no estimate having been required for this purpose, none is rendered for any part of the line. On the fiftieth mile a river thirty feet wide and three and a half deep is crossed.

From the fifty-first mile the line passes over a flat table land, elevated some sixty feet above the level of the river, with pine and hemlock ground, cedar thickets, and tamarack and alder swamps, nearly upon the same level. On the sixty-first mile it crosses one branch of the Titabawassee, which is here but one and a half rod wide and one and a half foot deep, and on the sixty-fifth mile it touches another branch of the same stream. From this point to Rifle river the ridges sustain the principal varieties of hard timber which indicate a strong soil. The seventy-first mile crosses a small stream which, the Indians say, is the head of the left branch of the Titabawassee. Upon the seventy-second and seventy-third miles the land is high and broken.

The country for, the first four miles north of Rifle river, is nearly all swamps; though, by following the ridges which intersperse the swamps, the line actually traverses but a comparatively small portion of wet ground; thence to the river Au Sable, a high, undulating district is passed, covered with groves of yellow and pitch pine, and dense thickets of pitch pine brushwood.

The Au Sable is a large and rapid stream, being, where the line crosses it, nearly thirteen rods wide and one and a half to three feet deep. Its width and rapid current render it impracticable to throw anything across it which would stand, and which could be accomplished within an expense deemed admissible; it is, therefore, left to be crossed by a ferry during the spring freshets, it being fordable at other seasons.

Between this river and the Skootawargumish the country is high, undulating, and barren, sustaining a light growth of yellow and pitch pine, interspersed with thickets of brushwood, with occasional belts of hard timber. On the sixty-eighth mile from Dousman's mill, the northern extremity of the line, Thunder

Bay river is crossed near its source, and on the sixty-fourth mile another stream, supposed to be Sandy river.

The Skootawargumish is a tributary of the Chiboigon, and empties into that stream about four miles from its mouth. Where the line crosses it it is four rods wide and three and a half feet deep, and has a rapid current. The space between this river and the strait of Mackinac is divided between large cedar swamps and undulating ridges, covered with a heavy growth of hard timber mixed with hemlock and cedar. On the thirty-third mile a river is crossed three rods wide and three feet deep, with a rapid current. On the seventeenth mile the line crosses the Chiboigon at the foot of Tche-Sauguigee or Long lake. This river is ten rods wide and twelve feet deep, and has a very strong current. The expense of bridging it being inadmissible, it is left to be crossed by a ferry.

An attempt was made to cut off the bend in the line near the mill, but it was found that a direct course for the first four miles would traverse an almost continuous swamp.

It is impossible to convey an adequate idea of the extent and severity of the labors attending the selection of the route upon which this line has been traced. The assistants were frequently employed for days, and even weeks, in creeping through thickets and windfalls, where walking was quite out of the question. The great expense of building causeways, compared with that of merely cutting the timber, rendered it necessary that no pains should be spared in seeking to avoid the wet and swampy grounds. An inspection of the map will show in what degree this object was accomplished.

So little is known of this region that there are no data upon which to found a comparison between the route adopted and any others. It can only be said that it is believed it follows as closely the direct course between the extreme points as the nature of the country admits.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. POOL, *Second Lieutenant 3d Artillery.*

Major HENRY WHITING, *Assistant Quartermaster United States Army.*

Estimate of the cost of opening a road, sixteen feet wide, upon the route surveyed from Saginaw to Mackinac; the timber to be cut even with the ground, except where causeway is to be laid, and there grubbed; the wet places to be causewayed with poles and earth and hewed logs, with hand-rails attached, to be thrown across the streams. The bottoms of the streams being generally hard, with the exception of narrow strips near their edges, the strips are to be covered with platforms of logs. The width allowed for the causeway is twelve feet; leaving two feet on each side for ditches. The corrections made upon the original line having, in some instances, caused the distances between the mile stakes to vary from exact miles, in such cases the actual distance is put down in a separate column. One dollar per diem is taken as the price of labor.

Number of mile.	Actual distance between the mile stakes.	Quantity of causeway required.	Cost of opening the road.	Remarks.	Number of mile.	Actual distance between the mile stakes.	Quantity of causeway required.	Cost of opening the road.	Remarks.
	Rods. Ft.	Rods.				Rods. Ft.	Rods.		
1	316 06	32	\$100		39	320 00	25	\$100	
2	316 06	33	113		40	320 00	8	63	
3	316 06	60½	162		41	320 00	4	54	
4	316 06	69½	181		42	320 00	10	67	
5	334 09	60½	164		43	320 00	1	48	
6	320 00	69½	181		44	320 00	1	48	
7	320 00	48½	136		45	320 00	33	115	
8	320 00	60½	162		46	320 00	6	58	
9	320 00	57½	156		47	320 00	2	50	
10	320 00	27	90		48	320 00	46	
11	320 00	54	148		49	320 00	46	
12	320 00	21	77		50	320 00	7	76	Including a log bridge over river.
13	320 00	49	139		51	320 00	2	50	
14	320 00	56	152		52	320 00	48	147	
15	320 00	44	130		53	320 00	44	138	
16	320 00	12	61		54	320 00	35	119	
17	320 00	21	70		55	320 00	10½	68	
18	320 00	33	106		56	320 00	13½	74	
19	320 00	45½	133		57	320 00	18	84	
20	320 00	53	150		58	320 00	36	122	
21	320 00	106	262		59	320 00	58	168	
22	320 00	2	40		60	320 00	49	149	
23	320 00	7	51		61	320 00	2	66	Including pathway over river.
24	320 00	8	53		62	320 00	76	206	
25	320 00	18	74		63	320 00	3	52	
26	320 00	24	87		64	320 00	4	54	
27	320 00	19½	77		65	320 00	50	
28	320 00	10	57		66	320 00	50	
29	320 00	4½	45		67	320 00	50	
30	320 00	17	113		68	320 00	18	81	
31	320 00	1	38		69	320 00	35	119	
32	320 00	15	68		70	320 00	22½	90	
33	320 00	9	79		71	320 00	5	60	
34	320 00	36		72	320 00	40	
35	224 00	115	274		73	320 00	7½	62	
36	320 00	10	67		74	320 00	15	77	
37	320 00	9	65		75	320 00	69	216	Including a log bridge over Rifle river.
38	320 00	13	73		76	320 00	125	314	

Estimate of the cost of opening a road, &c.—Continued.

Number of mile.	Actual distance between the mile stakes.	Quantity of causeway required.	Cost of opening the road.	Remarks.	Number of mile.	Actual distance between the mile stakes.	Quantity of causeway required.	Cost of opening the road.	Remarks.
	<i>Rods. Ft.</i>	<i>Rods.</i>				<i>Rods. Ft.</i>	<i>Rods.</i>		
77	320 00	68	\$189		32	320 00	2½	\$46	
78	320 00	23	73		33	320 00	34	127	Including pathway over river.
79	320 00	2	21		34	320 00	14	73	
80	320 00	16		35	320 00	8	53	
81	320 00	1		36	320 00	82	225	
82	320 00	28		37	320 00	1½	35	
83	320 00	30		38	320 00	36	
84	320 00	8		39	320 00	16	75	
85	320 00	12		40	320 00	15	71	
86	320 00	13		41	320 00	38	
87	320 00	13		42	320 00	10	58	
88	320 00	10		43	319 12	9	61	
89	320 00	18		44	320 00	18½	113	Including footpath over river.
90	320 00	12		45	25	
91	320 00	5		46	27	
92	320 00	6		47	6	31	
93	320 00	8		48	12	65	
94	320 00	13		49	20	
95	320 00	42		50	25	
96	320 00	50		51	21	
97	320 00	30		52	15	
98	320 00	15		53	36	
99	320 00	20		54	32	
100	320 00	8		55	292 00	21	80	
101	320 00	18		56	275 00	16	
88	170 13	16½	47	From Dousman's mill.	57	320 00	3½	30	
1	320 00	114	290	Beginning at Dousman's mill.	58	320 00	18	76	
2	320 00	18	92		59	320 00	61	162	
3	320 00	27		60	320 00	32	
4	320 00	13		61	320 00	25½	89	
5	320 00	36		62	320 00	23	
6	298 12	6	46		63	320 00	21½	83	
7	320 00	36		64	320 00	22	84	
8	320 00	3		65	320 00	9	40	
9	320 00	36		66	320 00	8½	41	
10	320 00	36		67	320 00	36	
11	320 00	36		68	334 00	33	
12	320 00	9		69	320 00	3	90	Includ'g pathway over Thunder Bay river.
13	320 00	15		70	320 00	32	
14	320 00	7½		71	320 00	25	
15	320 00	13		72	320 00	23	
16	320 00	36		73	325 10	28	
17	320 06	107½	271		74	320 00	49	195	
18	320 00	1½		75	320 00	36	
19	320 00	22½		76	320 00	29	
20	320 00	19½		77	320 00	27	
21	320 00	39		78	320 00	25	
22	320 00	8		79	320 00	21	
23	320 00	106		80	320 00	36	
24	320 00	36		81	320 00	40	
25	320 00	4½		82	320 00	36	
26	320 00	38		83	320 00	36	
27	320 00	36		84	306 04	10½	57	
28	320 00	36		85	320 00	3	39	
29	320 00	36		86	320 00	3	36	
30	320 00	43½		87	320 00	6	51	
31	320 00	24		88	320 00	10	58	

Whole distance : 188 miles, 307 rods, and 7½ feet.
Quantity of causeway required, 3,438 rods.

Cost of opening the road, according to the above estimates	\$14,125 00
To which add ten per cent. for contingencies	1,412 00
Total amount required	15,537 00

B. POOL, Second Lieutenant, Third Artillery.

25TH CONGRESS.]

No. 794.

[2D SESSION.]

APPLICATION OF LOUISIANA FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MILITARY FORCE NEAR
THE CADDO PURCHASE, ON THE SABINE RIVER, IN THAT STATE.

COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE MARCH 1, 1838.

RESOLUTION.

Be it resolved by the senate and house of representatives of the State of Louisiana in general assembly convened, That our senators in Congress be instructed, and our representatives requested, to make every effort near the general government to obtain the establishment of a military force, in addition to that already in the State of Louisiana, to be stationed upon the river Sabine, near the Caddo purchase, or in its vicinity.

Be it further resolved, &c., That the governor be requested to transmit copies of this resolution, as soon as possible, to our senators and representatives in Congress.

JOSEPH WALKER, *Speaker of the House of Representatives.*C. DERBIGNY, *President of the Senate.*

Approved January 12, 1838.

E. D. WHITE, *Governor of the State of Louisiana.*

